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FUAD A. JABBER

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PREFACE

International Documents on Palestine is an annual compilation of documents that attempts to offer a comprehensive picture of the different policies and attitudes adopted by countries throughout the world towards the Palestine Question, as expressed by their spokesmen and leading personalities both within and outside the United Nations.

The collection is divided into three sections: *International* (including Israel), *United Nations*, and *Arab World*. It thus replaces the series *Palestine Before the United Nations* published by the Institute, which covered the period 1947-66 in three volumes.

In the International and Arab World sections, the selection of documents has not been governed by any strict typological limitations, but rather by the desire to give a clear conception of the Middle East policy of each country, point out changes of policy, and register attitudes regarding specific developments. Thus, entries range from presidential speeches and parliamentary debates to interview statements and talks with diplomatic envoys. Items have, however, to a large extent been limited to pronouncements by responsible officials and policy-makers, except in the case of some Powers closely connected with the issue, where statements by leading groups and other representatives of considerable bodies of opinion have also been included.

Similarly, in the case of countries where press media are used to voice official policy—and here, the Soviet Union and People's China are prime examples—some editorial articles and commentaries have been included.

This being a selective collection, no full coverage of all relevant official statements has been attempted for any one country. This is particularly true in the case of Israel, where a very restricted selection has been included; while statements by cabinet members are predominant, some entries provide an illustration of forces at variance with cardinal points of Israeli policy towards the Arab countries.

The incidence of documents in the International section is naturally higher in the case of the Great Powers, who were more or less directly

involved in the events of June 1967, and of countries politically or geographically close to the Middle East. In this sense, representation in this collection is a rough index of the interest displayed by different areas of the world in the events of this region. Latin American countries, for example, limited their diplomatic activity and pronouncements on the May-June crisis in large measure to the United Nations forum, and are thus minimally represented in this section.

The documents are arranged in chronological sequence. The word 'excerpt/-s' has been used to indicate that only that part or parts of the text that refer to the Palestine issue in any of its aspects have been included. In the case of some Arab documents, however, material that, though dealing with Palestine, was repetitive or inconsequential, was left out. The spelling of names of persons and places was left unchanged in texts which appear in their original untranslated version. In documents translated from the Arabic the transliteration adopted was that which most accurately reflected the Arabic pronunciation.

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Documents in the International section were compiled by Fuad A. Jabber, in the U.N. section by George Dib, and in the Arab World section by George K. Nasrallah. Translations into English are by Meric Dobson and Muhammad J. Tutungi, while the index was prepared by Michael Frost.

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Preface	xi
List of Documents	xv
Documents:	
International	1
United Nations.....	211
Arab World	471
Index	737

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

INTERNATIONAL

Page

1. New Year Message from U.S. President Johnson to President Shazar of Israel, Washington, January 1, 1967	1
2. Interview Statement by Israeli Chief of Staff General Rabin on Reprisals Policy, Tel Aviv, January, 1967	1
3. Address by U.S. President Johnson to Congress on the State of the Union [Excerpt], Washington, January 10, 1967.....	1
4. Republican "State of the Union" Address by U.S. Senate Minority Leader Dirksen [Excerpt], Washington, January 19, 1967.....	1
5. Joint Communiqué on Moscow Talks Between the Syrian Ba'th Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 20-26 January [Excerpt], Moscow, February 11, 1967	2
6. Interview Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban [Excerpt], Jerusalem, February, 1967	2
7. Joint Communiqué on Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi's Visit to Pakistan, 27 February-3 March [Excerpt], Karachi, March 3, 1967.....	3
8. Joint Communiqué on Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi's Visit to India, 3-8 March [Excerpt], New Delhi, March 8, 1967	4
9. Joint Communiqué on Iraqi President Arif's State Visit to Iran, 14-19 March [Excerpt], Teheran, March 16, 1967.....	4
10. Joint Communiqué on Mauritanian President Ould-Daddah's Visit to Algeria, 23-27 March [Excerpt], Algiers, March 27, 1967.....	4
11. Joint Communiqué on Indian Foreign Minister Chagla's Visit to Kuwait, 16-17 April [Excerpt], Kuwait, April 17, 1967.....	4
12. Interview Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol, Jerusalem, April, 1967.....	4
13. Press Communiqué Issued by the West German Government on Talks Held with Arab League Secretary-General Hassunah [Excerpt], Bonn, April 22, 1967.....	5
14. Joint Communiqué on Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 17-22 April [Excerpt], Moscow, April 26, 1967.....	5
15. Interview Statements by the Head of the Middle East Division at the West German Foreign Ministry, Dr. W. Gehlhof, on West German-Arab League Talks [Excerpt], Bonn, April 27, 1967	5
16. Soviet Government Warning to Israel as Reported by "Pravda", Moscow, April 27, 1967.....	6
17. Joint Communiqué on Sudanese President Al-Azhari's Visit to India, 28 April-5 May [Excerpt], New Delhi, May 5, 1967.....	6
18. Joint Communiqué on the Visit of a U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Delegation to Lebanon, 4-12 May [Excerpt], Beirut, May 13, 1967.....	7
19. Address to the Nation by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol [Excerpt], Jerusalem, May 13, 1967	7

	<i>Page</i>
20. Message from U.S. President Johnson to U.A.R. President Nasir Asking for a Relaxation of Tension in the Area, Washington, May 23, 1967.....	7
21. Memorandum from the U.S. Government to the U.A.R. Government on the Middle East Crisis, Cairo, May 23, 1967.....	8
22. Speech of Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset on the Closure of the Tiran Straits, Jerusalem, May 23, 1967.....	9
23. Statement by U.S. President Johnson Calling for Restraint in the Middle East, Washington, May 23, 1967	10
24. Statement by the Soviet Government on the Middle East Situation, Moscow, May 23, 1967	11
25. Statement by Ninety-Six Members of the U.S. House of Representatives on the Middle East Crisis, Washington, May 23, 1967	12
26. Official French Cabinet Statement on the Middle East, Paris, May 24, 1967.	13
27. Speech of British Prime Minister Wilson at the Electrical Trades Union Conference [Excerpts], Margate, May 24, 1967.....	13
28. Statement by Canadian Prime Minister Pearson in Parliament on the Middle East, Ottawa, May 24, 1967.....	13
29. Statement to the Press by Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada, Rawalpindi, May 24, 1967	17
30. Statement by Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck, Canberra, May 25, 1967.	18
31. Statement by Indian Foreign Minister Chagla in Both Houses of Parliament on the Withdrawal of UNEF, New Delhi, May 25, 1967.....	18
32. Statement Issued by the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Prague, May 25, 1967	20
33. Message from U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin to the Israeli Government Appealing for a Relaxation of Tension in the Area, Moscow, May 26, 1967.....	21
34. Address by Guinean President Sekou Toure on the Fourth Anniversary of the Organisation of African Unity [Excerpt], Labe, May 26, 1967.....	21
35. Statement Issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China, Peking, May 27, 1967.....	22
36. Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol Broadcast to the Nation, Jerusalem, May 28, 1967.....	23
37. Statement Issued by the Turkish Cabinet, Ankara, May 28, 1967.....	24
38. Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset on the 'Aqaba Blockade [Excerpts], Jerusalem, May 29, 1967.....	24
39. Statement by Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada Before the National Assembly, Rawalpindi, May 29, 1967.....	25
40. Editorial by the Official Organ of the Chinese Communist Party "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), Peking, May 29, 1967.....	26
41. News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban [Excerpts], Jerusalem, May 30, 1967	28
42. Press Statement by a West German Government Spokesman [Excerpts], Bonn, May 30, 1967	30
43. Address by the Secretary General of the Rumanian Communist Party Ceau-sescu to the Armed Forces Aktiv [Excerpt], Bucharest, May 31, 1967.....	30

	<i>Page</i>
44. Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East, London, May 31, 1967.....	30
45. Statement by British Conservative Party Leader Heath in a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East, London, May 31, 1967.....	37
46. Statement by British Prime Minister Wilson Closing a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East, London, May 31, 1967.....	42
47. Statement in Parliament by Chile's Foreign Minister Valdes on the Middle East, Santiago, May 31, 1967.	48
48. Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin in Reply to the Soviet Note of May 26, 1967, Jerusalem, June 1, 1967.....	49
49. Official Cabinet Statement on France's Position Regarding the Situation in the Middle East, Paris, June 2, 1967.....	50
50. Statement by French Information Minister Gorse Outlining his Country's Position, Paris, June 2, 1967.....	51
51. News Conference Statements by British Prime Minister Wilson on the Crisis [Excerpts], Washington, June 2, 1967.....	51
52. Joint Communiqué on Soviet President Podgorny's Visit to Afghanistan, 31 May-3 June [Excerpt], Kabul, June 3, 1967.....	53
53. Message of Support from East German State Council Chairman Ulbricht to Syrian President Al-Atasi, Berlin, June 4, 1967.....	53
54. Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin Announcing the Outbreak of Hostilities, Jerusalem, June 5, 1967.....	54
55. Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament on the Situation in the Middle East [Excerpts], London, June 5, 1967.....	55
56. Statement Issued by the White House on the Outbreak of Hostilities, Washington, June 5, 1967.....	56
57. Statement Issued by the Soviet Government on the Outbreak of Hostilities, Moscow, June 5, 1967.....	56
58. Statement by Yugoslav President Tito on the Outbreak of Hostilities, Belgrade, June 5, 1967.....	57
59. News Briefing by Secretary of State Rusk on the United States Attitude Towards the Middle East Conflict, Washington, June 5, 1967.....	58
60. News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban [Excerpts], Tel Aviv, June 5, 1967.....	59
61. Statement in the Senate by South African Foreign Minister Muller on War in the Middle East, Pretoria, June 6, 1967.....	59
62. Statement by Australian Acting Prime Minister McEwen on the Outbreak of Hostilities, Canberra, June 6, 1967.....	61
63. Declaration Issued by the Bulgarian Government on War in the Middle East, Sofia, June 6, 1967.....	61
64. Statement Issued by the Government of People's China Supporting the Arab States, Peking, June 6, 1967.....	62
65. Speech of Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada Before the National Assembly [Excerpt], Rawalpindi, June 6, 1967.....	62

	<i>Page</i>
66. Statement Issued by the British Foreign Office Denying British Involvement in the Middle East Fighting, London, June 6, 1967.....	64
67. News Briefing by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk Denying American Involvement in the Middle East Fighting, Washington, June 6, 1967.....	64
68. Statement By British Prime Minister Wilson in Parliament on His Talks About the Middle East and Ensuing Debate, London, June 6, 1967.....	64
69. Speech of Guinean President Sekou Toure Expressing Support for the Arab States, Conakry, June 6, 1967.....	71
70. Message from Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China to U.A.R. President Nasir, Peking, June 6, 1967.....	71
71. Message from Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China to Syrian President Al-Atasi, Peking, June 6, 1967.....	72
72. Message from Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China to the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organization ash-Shuqayri, Peking, June 6, 1967.....	73
73. Message of Support from Pakistani President Ayub Khan to Heads of Arab States, Rawalpindi, June 6, 1967.....	73
74. Statement by U.S. President Johnson on the First Security Council Cease-Fire Resolution, Washington, June 6, 1967.....	74
75. Editorial by the Official Organ of the Chinese Communist Party "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily), Peking, June 6, 1967.....	74
76. Statement Issued by the Spanish Government Explaining Its Position on the Middle East Conflict, Madrid, June, 1967.....	75
77. Statement by U.S. President Johnson Announcing the Establishment of a Special Committee of the National Security Council, Washington, June 7, 1967.....	76
78. Statement from the Soviet Government to the Government of Israel Demanding a Cease-Fire, Moscow, June 7, 1967.....	76
79. Statement Issued by the Cuban Government on the Middle East War, Havana, June 7, 1967.....	77
80. Statement by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in Parliament, New Delhi, June 7, 1967.....	77
81. Speech of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Before the National Assembly, Paris, June 7, 1967.....	79
82. Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament and Ensuing Debate, London, June 7, 1967.....	84
83. Cable Message from Pope Paul VI to the Arab and Israeli Heads of State, Vatican City, June 8, 1967.....	90
84. Statement by Canadian Prime Minister Pearson in Parliament on Conditions for Peace in the Middle East [Excerpts], Ottawa, June 8, 1967.....	90
85. Statement by Canadian Foreign Secretary Martin on the Middle East Arms Race [Excerpts], Ottawa, June 8, 1967.....	92
86. Message of Solidarity from East German Foreign Minister Winzer to the Secretary of the Arab League Hassunah, Berlin, June 8, 1967.....	92
87. Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament and Ensuing Debate, London, June 8, 1967.....	92

	<i>Page</i>
88. Exchange of Letters Between U.S. Senator Mansfield and President Johnson on the Situation in the Middle East, Washington, June 8, 1967.....	97
89. Statement by the Communist Parties and Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the Middle East, Moscow, June 9, 1967.....	98
90. Interview Statement by Japanese Prime Minister Sato, Tokio, June 9, 1967	99
91. Speech of British Prime Minister Wilson at the Opening of a New Mill [Excerpts], Workington (Cumberland), June 9, 1967.....	99
92. Speech of Israeli Information Minister Galili on Israel's Post-War Position, Eilat, June 9, 1967.....	100
93. Note from the Soviet Government to the Israeli Government Announcing the Severance of Diplomatic Relations, Moscow, June 10, 1967.....	100
94. Press Statement by Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada, Rawalpindi, June 10, 1967	101
95. Statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, Ankara, June 10, 1967..	101
96. Note from the Yugoslav Government to the Israeli Government Threatening the Severance of Diplomatic Relations, Belgrade, June 11, 1967.....	101
97. Speech by Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson on "Metal Workers' Day" [Excerpt], Sandviken, June 11, 1967	101
98. Editorial by the Official Organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "Pravda" (Condensed), Moscow, June 11, 1967.....	102
99. Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset [Excerpt], Jerusalem, June 12, 1967.....	103
100. Statement by NATO Secretary-General Brosio on the Middle East on the Eve of a Ministerial Council Meeting, Luxemburg, June 12, 1967.....	104
101. Note from the Soviet Government to the Israeli Government on the Continuation of Hostilities Against Syria, Moscow, June 13, 1967.....	104
102. Note from the Yugoslav Government to the Israeli Government Announcing the Severance of Diplomatic Relations, Belgrade, June 13, 1967.....	105
103. News Conference Statements by U.S. President Johnson on the Middle East, Washington, June 13, 1967	105
104. Statement by British Foreign Minister Thomson in Parliament, London, June 13, 1967	107
105. Communiqué Published at the End of a NATO Ministerial Council Meeting [Excerpt], Luxemburg, June 14, 1967	109
106. Interview Statements by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Following a NATO Ministerial Council Meeting [Excerpt], Paris, June 14, 1967...	109
107. Speech of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Before the National Assembly [Excerpt], Paris, June 15, 1967.....	109
108. Reply of the Israeli Government to the Soviet Government Note of June 13, 1967, Jerusalem, June 16, 1967	112
109. Remarks by U.S. President Johnson at a Fundraising Dinner [Excerpt], Austin (Texas), June 16, 1967.....	113
110. Press Statement by Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck, Canberra, June 16, 1967.....	113

	<i>Page</i>
111. Statement by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in the National Assembly [Excerpts], Paris, June 16, 1967.....	114
112. Address by Zambian President Kaunda at a Dinner Given in His Honour by the Indian Government [Excerpt], New Delhi, June 17, 1967.....	115
113. Interview Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban [Excerpt], Jerusalem, June 17, 1967	115
114. Address by U.S. President Johnson on American Policy Towards the Middle East [Excerpt], Washington, June 19, 1967.....	116
115. Joint Communiqué on Iranian Shah Reza Pahlevi's Visit to Turkey, 16-21 June [Excerpt], Ankara, June 21, 1967.....	118
116. Statement by French President de Gaulle on the Middle East, Paris, June 21, 1967.....	118
117. Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on the Middle East, Moscow, June 21, 1967.....	119
118. Vatican's Note on Jerusalem Circulated at the United Nations by Its Permanent Observer Msgr. A. Giovanetti, New York, June 23, 1967.....	120
119. Report to the Nation by U.S. President Johnson on His Talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin at Glassboro [Excerpt], Washington, June 25, 1967.....	121
120. Statement by Soviet Premier Kosygin on His Talks with U.S. President Johnson at Glassboro [Excerpt], New York, June 25, 1967.....	122
121. News Conference Statements by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin at the United Nations on Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East [Excerpts], New York, June 25, 1967	122
122. Speech of Turkish President Sunay in the Course of a Visit to France [Excerpt], Paris, June 27, 1967	124
123. Statement Issued by the White House Reiterating the U.S. Position on the Status of Jerusalem, Washington, June 28, 1967.....	125
124. Statement Issued by the U.S. Department of State Denouncing Israel's Unilateral Actions Regarding the Status of Jerusalem, Washington, June 28, 1967.....	125
125. Joint Communiqué on Turkish President Sunay's Visit to France, 27-30 June [Excerpt], Paris, June 30, 1967	125
126. Broadcast to the Nation by Pakistani President Ayub Khan [Excerpt], Rawalpindi, July 1, 1967.....	126
127. Conclusions from the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the Middle East, Belgrade, July 7, 1967.....	126
128. Address by Soviet Premier Kosygin at a Dinner in Honor of French Premier Pompidou [Excerpt], Moscow, July 3, 1967.....	128
129. Foreign Policy Statement in Parliament by the Information and Tourism Minister of Tanzania [Excerpts], Dar es Salaam, July 3, 1967.....	128
130. Speech of Soviet Communist Party Secretary-General Brezhnev at the Graduation Ceremony of the Military Academy [Excerpts], Moscow, July 5, 1967.....	129
131. Statement by British Foreign Minister Thomson in the Course of a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East Crisis [Excerpt], London, July 6, 1967..	132

	<i>Page</i>
132. Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in the Course of a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East Crisis [Excerpt], London, July 6, 1967.....	135
133. Question and Answer in Parliament on British Position Regarding Nuclear Desalination in the Middle East, London, July 6, 1967.....	137
134. Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk Before the Golden Anniversary Convention of the Lions International [Excerpts], Chicago, July 7, 1967....	137
135. Interview Statement by French Prime Minister Pompidou During His Visit to the U.S.S.R., Moscow, July 8, 1967.....	138
136. Joint Communiqué on French Prime Minister Pompidou's Visit to the Soviet Union, 3-8 July [Excerpt], Moscow, July 8, 1967.....	138
137. Communiqué on the Conference of Communist Parties and Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the Middle East, Budapest, July 12, 1967.....	138
138. Statement by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow Before the House Committee on Agriculture [Excerpt], Washington, July 12, 1967	140
139. Statement by Dr. William Jacson, Leader of a French Parliamentary Delegation Visiting the U.A.R. [Excerpt], Cairo, July 13, 1967.....	141
140. Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk on the Status of Jerusalem, Washington, July 14, 1967	142
141. Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk to Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program [Excerpt], Washington, July 14, 1967.....	142
142. Soviet-Algerian-Iraqi Talks on the Middle East Crisis, 17-18 July, as Reported by "Pravda", Moscow, July 18, 1967.....	143
143. News Conference Statements by U.S. President Johnson on the Middle East, Washington, July 18, 1967.....	143
144. Speech of Indian Foreign Minister Chagla in the Course of a Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Policy [Excerpt], New Delhi, July 18, 1967.....	144
145. News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk [Excerpts], Washington, July 19, 1967.....	148
146. Authorised Statement Issued by the Soviet News Agency Tass, Moscow, July 20, 1967.....	150
147. Soviet Government Statement on the Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Moscow, July 23, 1967.....	151
148. Joint Communiqué on Japanese Foreign Minister Miki's Visit to Poland, 25-27 July [Excerpt], Warsaw, July 27, 1967.....	152
149. Joint Communiqué on Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 19-28 July [Excerpt], Moscow, July 28, 1967.....	152
150. Motion Adopted by the Israeli Knesset at the End of a Foreign Policy Debate [Excerpt], Jerusalem, August 1, 1967.....	153
151. Communiqué on a Meeting of Soviet and Israeli Communist Party Leaders as Reported by "Pravda", Moscow, August 1, 1967.....	153
152. Speech of Yugoslav President Tito at a Luncheon in Honour of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie [Excerpt], Brioni, August 6, 1967.....	154

	<i>Page</i>
153. Joint Communiqué on Bulgarian Vice-Premier Abramov's Visit to Iraq, 3-7 August [Excerpt], Baghdad, August 7, 1967.....	155
154. Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party as Reported by "Pravda", Moscow, August 8, 1967.....	155
155. Principles Guiding Israel's Policy in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War as Outlined by Prime Minister Eshkol [Excerpts], Jerusalem, August 9, 1967...	156
156. Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Syria, 13-14 August [Excerpt], Damascus, August 14, 1967.....	157
157. News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on Direct Negotiations with the Arabs [Excerpts], Jerusalem, August 14, 1967.....	157
158. U.S. Senate Resolution 155 Expressing the Sense of the Senate Concerning a Means Toward Achieving a Stable and Durable Peace in the Middle East, Washington, August 14, 1967.....	158
159. Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Iraq, 14-16 August [Excerpt], Baghdad, August 16, 1967.....	158
160. Joint Press Statement on Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to the U.A.R., 10-13 and 16-17 August [Excerpt], Cairo, August 17, 1967.....	158
161. Press Statement by Yugoslav President Tito at the End of His Visit to the U.A.R., Alexandria, August 17, 1967.....	159
162. Policy Statement by the U.S. Department of State on the Middle East, Washington, August 18, 1967.....	160
163. Joint Communiqué on Talks Between U.S. President Johnson and Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran, 22-23 August [Excerpt], Washington, August 23, 1967..	160
164. Press Release on the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden [Excerpts], Helsinki, August 23, 1967.....	160
165. Message from U.S.S.R. President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin to the Khartum Conference of Arab Heads of State, Moscow, August 29, 1967.....	161
166. Statement by French Information Minister Gorse on French-Yugoslav Contacts on the Middle East, Paris, August 30, 1967.....	161
167. Address by Canadian Foreign Secretary Martin on the Threat of the Arms Race [Excerpts], Bob-lo Island (Ontario), August 31, 1967.....	161
168. Speech of Turkish President Sunay at a Dinner in Honor of King Husayn of Jordan [Excerpts], Ankara, September 5, 1967.....	162
169. Interview Granted by West German Foreign Minister Brandt to the Beirut Daily "An-Nahar", Bonn, September 5, 1967.....	162
170. News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk [Excerpts], Washington, September 8, 1967.....	164
171. Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to Turkey, 5-11 September [Excerpt], Ankara, September 11, 1967.....	166
172. Joint Communiqué on French President de Gaulle's Visit to Poland, 6-12 September [Excerpt], Warsaw, September 12, 1967.....	166
173. Joint Communiqué on Talks Between U.S. President Johnson and Italian President Saragat, 18-19 September [Excerpt], Washington, September 19, 1967.....	166
174. Joint Communiqué on Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to Ceylon, 18-21 September [Excerpt], Colombo, September 21, 1967.....	167

	<i>Page</i>
175. Joint Communiqué on Saudi Arabian King Faysal's Visit to Somalia, 20-23 September [Excerpt], Mogadishu, September 23, 1967.....	167
176. Joint Communiqué on Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's Visit to the U.S.S.R. 19-29 September [Excerpt], Moscow, September 30, 1967.....	167
177. Joint Communiqué on Pakistani President Ayub Khan's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 25 September-4 October [Excerpt], Moscow, October 4, 1967	168
178. Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 2-5 October [Excerpts], Moscow, October 5, 1967.....	168
179. Rumania's Stand on the Middle East Crisis as Stated by A. Malnashan, Rumanian Ambassador at Belgrade, Belgrade, October 1967.....	169
180. Interview Statements by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the Middle East, New Delhi, October 1967.....	169
181. Reply of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Tito at a Dinner in Her Honour [Excerpt], Belgrade, October 11, 1967.....	170
182. News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk [Excerpt], Washington, October 12, 1967	170
183. Speech of French President de Gaulle at a Banquet in Honour of Pakistani President Ayub Khan [Excerpt], Paris, October 17, 1967.....	171
184. Reply of Pakistani President Ayub Khan to President de Gaulle at a Dinner in His Honour [Excerpt], Paris, October 17, 1967.....	171
185. Official Statement by the Israeli Cabinet on the Country's Position vis-à-vis the Arab States, Jerusalem, October 17, 1967.....	171
186. Letter from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Macomber to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nuclear Desalting Plants for the Middle East, Washington, October 18, 1967.....	171
187. Statement by U.S. Secretary of the Interior Udall Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Water Resources as a Key to Middle East Peace [Excerpts], Washington, October 19, 1967.....	173
188. Statement by the "Third Force" Movement in Israel on a Middle East Settlement, Tel Aviv, October 19, 1967.....	175
189. Joint Communiqué on Pakistani President Ayub Khan's Visit to France, 17-20 October [Excerpt], Paris, October 20, 1967.....	176
190. Speech of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai at a Banquet in Honor of Mauritanian President Ould-Daddah [Excerpt], Peking, October 20, 1967.....	176
191. Statement by Norwegian Prime Minister Borten on the Middle East, Oslo, October 1967.....	176
192. Speech of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel at a Banquet during His Visit to Iraq [Excerpt], Baghdad, October 20, 1967	177
193. Joint Communiqué on Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to the U.A.R., 19-21 October [Excerpt], Cairo, October 21, 1967.....	177
194. Address by Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson to a Special Congress of the Social Democrat Party [Excerpt], Stockholm, October 23, 1967.....	178
195. Joint Communiqué on Mauritanian President Ould-Daddah's Visit to People's China, 20-24 October [Excerpts], Peking, October 24, 1967.....	178

	<i>Page</i>
196. Joint Communiqué on Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's Visit to Iraq, 20-24 October [Excerpt], Baghdad, October 24, 1967.....	179
197. Address by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to the National Press Club [Excerpts], Washington, October 24, 1967.....	179
198. Statement by Candian Foreign Secretary Martin in Parliament, Ottawa, October 24, 1967	180
199. Statements by U.S. Department of State Spokesman McCloskey on Arms to the Near East, Washington, October 24, 1967.....	180
200. Statements by British Prime Minister Wilson in Parliament in Reply to Oral Questions on the Middle East [Excerpts], London, October 26, 1967.....	181
201. Joint Communiqué on Somali Prime Minister Egal's Visit to Kuwait, 20-24 October [Excerpt], Kuwait, October 27, 1967.....	183
202. Statement of Policy by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol Opening the Winter Session of the Knesset [Excerpts], Jerusalem, October 30, 1967.....	183
203. Joint Communiqué on King Mahendra of Nepal's Visit to the United States, 30 October-9 November [Excerpts], Washington, November 1, 1967.....	185
204. Speech of Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration [Excerpt], London, November 4, 1967.....	185
205. Speech of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Before the National Assembly [Excerpt], Paris, November 7, 1967.....	186
206. Joint Communiqué on Moscow Talks Between U.A.R. Vice-President Sabri and Soviet Communist Party Leader Brezhnev, 2-11 November [Excerpt], Moscow, November 12, 1967.....	188
207. Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset [Excerpt], Jerusalem, November 14, 1967.....	188
208. Address by U.S. Under Secretary of State Katzenbach on Arms for the Developing World [Excerpt], Stanford, November 17, 1967.....	189
209. Statements by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament in Reply to Oral Questions on the Middle East, London, November 20, 1967.....	189
210. Commentary by the Official Organ of the Chinese Communist Party "Ren-min Ribao" (People's Daily) on the November 22 Security Council Resolution, Peking, November 25, 1967.....	192
211. Joint Communiqué on West German Chancellor Kiesinger's Visit to Ceylon, 24-26 November [Excerpt], Colombo, November 26, 1967.....	194
212. News Conference Statements by French President de Gaulle [Excerpt], Paris, November 27, 1967.....	194
213. Speech of Albanian Ambassador to People's China Nathanaili at a National Day Reception [Excerpt], Peking, November 29, 1967.....	196
214. Joint Communiqué on Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabbah's Visit to Iran, 28 November-1 December [Excerpt], Teheran, December 1, 1967.....	196
215. Joint Communiqué on Syrian Premier Zu'ayyen's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 29 November-2 December [Excerpt], Moscow, December 2, 1967.....	196
216. Joint Communiqué on Talks Between a French Communist Party Delegation and the Syrian Ba'th Party, 27 November-4 December [Excerpt], Damascus, December 4, 1967.....	197

	<i>Page</i>
217. Joint Communiqué on East German State Council Chairman Ulbricht's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 11-12 December [Excerpt], Moscow, December 12, 1967.....	198
218. Speech of French President de Gaulle at a Banquet in Honour of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen [Excerpt], Paris, December 15, 1967.....	198
219. Joint Communiqué on Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen's Visit to France, 10-15 December [Excerpt], Paris, December 15, 1967.....	198
220. Joint Communiqué on Talks Between a Syrian Ba'th Party Delegation and the Italian Communist Party, 11-18 December [Excerpt], Rome, December 18, 1967.....	199
221. Statements by U.S. President Johnson on the Middle East in the Course of a Telecast Interview, Washington, December 19, 1967.....	199
222. Communiqué on the Warsaw Conference of Foreign Ministers of European Socialist Countries on the Middle East, Warsaw, December 27, 1967.....	199
223. Interview Granted by Israeli Ambassador to West Germany Ben Natan to the German Weekly "Der Spiegel", Bonn, December 1967.....	201
224. Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic's Visit to the U.A.R., 26-28 December, Cairo, December 28, 1967.....	206
225. Letter from French President de Gaulle to David Ben Gurion, Paris, December 30, 1967	207

UNITED NATIONS

PART I. The Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

226. Report of Secretary-General U Thant on the Withdrawal of UNEF, June 26, 1967.....	211
--	-----

PART II. The June War in the Security Council

A. Complaint of the United Arab Republic against Israel

227. Letter from the U.A.R. Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council, June 5, 1967.....	228
--	-----

B. Reports of Secretary-General U Thant on the Evolving Situation in the Middle East

228. Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 5, 1967, at 9:30 a.m. (and Supplemental Information).....	228
229. Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 7, 1967, at 1:00 p.m....	233
230. Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 7, 1967, at 2:20 p.m....	234
231. Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 8, 1967, at 2:50 p.m....	235
232. Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 9, 1967, at 0:30 p.m....	235
233. Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 9, 1967, at 7:15 p.m....	237

	<i>Page</i>
234. Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 10, 1967, at 4:30 a.m..	239
235. Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 10, 1967, at 8:10 a.m. (and Supplemental Information).....	241
236. Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 10, 1967, at 9:15 p.m. (and Supplemental Information)	242
237. Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 11, 1967, at 10:30 p.m..	247
 <i>C. Non-Adopted Draft Resolutions</i>	
238. Joint Draft Resolution Submitted by Canada and Denmark on May 24, 1967.	248
239. Draft Resolution Submitted by the United Arab Republic on May 24, 1967..	248
240. Draft Resolution First Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on June 8, 1967.....	249
241. Draft Resolution First Submitted by the United States of America on June 8, 1967.....	249
 <i>D. Adopted Resolutions</i>	
242. Resolution Calling for a Cease-Fire Adopted at the 1348th Meeting, June 6, 1967.....	250
243. Resolution Reiterating the Call for a Cease-Fire Adopted at the 1350th Meeting, June 7, 1967.....	250
244. Resolution Calling for a Cease-Fire on the Syrian-Israeli Front Adopted at the 1352nd Meeting, June 9, 1967.....	250
245. Resolution Regarding Forward Movements of Troops Subsequent to Accep- tance of the Cease-Fire, Adopted at the 1357th Meeting, June 12, 1967.....	251
246. "Humanitarian" Resolution Adopted at the 1361st Meeting, June 14, 1967..	251
 PART III. The June War in the General Assembly	
<i>A. U.S.S.R. Request for the Convening of an Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly</i>	
247. Letter from the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General U Thant, June 13, 1967.....	252
 <i>B. Non-Adopted Draft Resolutions Submitted to the Fifth Emergency Special Session...</i>	
248. Draft Resolution Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 19, 1967	252
249. Draft Resolution Submitted by the United States of America, June 20, 1967.	253
250. Draft Resolution Submitted by Albania, June 26, 1967.....	253
251. Draft Resolution Submitted by Non-Aligned Countries, July 3, 1967.....	254
252. Draft Resolution Submitted by Twenty Latin American Countries, July 4, 1967.....	255

	<i>Page</i>
<i>C. Resolutions Adopted by the Fifth Emergency Special Session</i>	
253. Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance Adopted at the 1548th Plenary Meeting, July 4, 1967	255
254. Resolution on Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of Jerusalem Adopted at the 1548th Plenary Meeting, July 4, 1967	256
255. Resolution on Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of Jerusalem Adopted at the 1554th Plenary Meeting, July 14, 1967	260

PART IV. Cease-Fire Violation Complaints

<i>A. Complaint Leading to the Stationing of U.N. Military Observers in the Suez Canal Area</i>	
256. U.A.R. Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, July 8, 1967	261
257. Israel Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, July 8, 1967	261
258. Statement by the Security Council President Presenting the Consensus Reached by the Council on the Stationing of U.N. Military Observers, July 9, 1967 [Excerpt]	262
<i>B. Complaint Leading to a Security Council Resolution on Cease-Fire Violations</i>	
259. U.A.R. Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, October 24, 1967	263
260. Israel Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, October 24, 1967	264
261. Security Council Resolution on Cease-Fire Violations Adopted on October 25, 1967	264
<i>C. Strengthening of UNMO</i>	
262. Statement by the Security Council President on the Need to Strengthen UNMO, December 8, 1967	265

PART V. A Peaceful Solution

263. U.A.R. Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, November 7, 1967	266
264. Joint Draft Resolution Submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria, November 7, 1967	266
265. Draft Resolution Submitted by the United States of America, November 7, 1967	266
266. Draft Resolution Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 10, 1967	267
267. Draft Resolution Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 20, 1967	268

	<i>Page</i>
268. United Kingdom-Sponsored Security Council Resolution for a Peaceful Solution of the Middle East Conflict, November 22, 1967.....	268
269. Verbatim Record of the 1382nd Meeting of the Security Council, November 22, 1967	269

PART VI. Reports of the Secretary-General

270. Report of Secretary-General U Thant on Ambassador Thalmann's Mission in Jerusalem, September 12, 1967.....	295
271. Report of Secretary-General U Thant on Mr. Gussing's Mission in the Occupied Territories, September 15, 1967.....	331
272. Report of Secretary-General U Thant on the Work of the Organization (16 June 1966-15 June 1967), September 15, 1967 [Excerpt].....	376

PART VII. The Palestine Refugees

273. Report of the U.N. Conciliation Commission on Repatriation or Compensation of Palestinian Refugees, September 30, 1967.....	380
274. Report of UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmore Covering the Period 1 July 1966-30 June 1967.....	381
275. Statement by UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmore in the Special Political Committee, December 11, 1967.....	460
276. Resolutions on Assistance to the Refugees Adopted by the General Assembly, December 19, 1967.....	466
277. Draft Resolution on Appointment of a U.N. Custodian Not Voted-Upon by the General Assembly, December 19, 1967.....	468

ARAB WORLD

278. Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at the Opening of the Third Conference of Labour Unions in Support of Aden and Occupied South Yemen [Excerpts], Damascus, January 15, 1967.....	471
279. Address by Syrian Ba'th Party Assistant Secretary-General Jadid During a Visit to the U.S.S.R. [Excerpts], Moscow, January 24, 1967	472
280. Speech by Jordanian King Husayn on Certain Arab Problems [Excerpts], Jerusalem, January 25, 1967.....	472
281. Statement by Syrian Information Minister Zu'bi on the Israel-Syrian Joint Armistice Commission [Excerpt], Damascus, January 26, 1967.....	479
282. Memorandum Submitted by Syria to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, Damascus, January 29, 1967.....	480
283. Letter from Jordanian King Husayn to Tunisian President Burghiba on the Joint Arab Defence Council [Excerpts], Amman, February 1, 1967.....	486

	<i>Page</i>
284. Interview Granted by Jordanian King Husayn to a Correspondent of the Kuwait Daily "Ar-Ra'yul-Aam", Kuwait, February 2, 1967.....	487
285. News Conference Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir and Iraqi President Arif [Excerpts], Cairo, February 4, 1967.....	489
286. Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to Kuwait, 1-4 February [Excerpt], Kuwait, February 4, 1967.....	492
287. Interview Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir to the British Weekly "Observer" [Excerpt], Cairo, February 5, 1967.....	492
288. Joint Communiqué on Iraqi President Arif's Visit to the U.A.R., 2-7 February [Excerpt], Cairo, February 7, 1967.....	493
289. Speech of Saudi King Faysal at a Dinner in Honour of Jordanian King Husayn [Excerpt], Riyadh, February 12, 1967.....	493
290. Speech of Syrian Defence Minister Major General Asad at an Army Camp [Excerpts], February 13, 1967.....	493
291. Joint Communiqué on Lebanese President Hilu's Visit to Kuwait, 11-14 February [Excerpt], Kuwait, February 14, 1967.....	494
292. Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to Saudi Arabia, 11-15 February [Excerpts], Riyadh, February 15, 1967.....	494
293. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir on the Ninth Anniversary of the Union Between Egypt and Syria [Excerpts], Cairo, February 22, 1967.....	495
294. Speech of Syrian Chief of State al-Atasi on the Fourth Anniversary of the 8 March Revolution [Excerpt], Damascus, March 7, 1967.....	501
295. Speech of Jordanian King Husayn on Martyr's Day [Excerpts], Jericho, March 12, 1967.....	502
296. Resolutions Adopted by the Joint Arab Defence Council at Its Tenth Meeting, Cairo, March 14, 1967.....	505
297. Statement by the Jordanian Chief Delegate to the Arab League Jum'ah Announcing Jordan's Withdrawal from the League Council Meetings, Cairo, March 14, 1967.....	505
298. Memorandum Submitted by Jordan to the Arab League on the Restoration of Its Diplomatic Relations with West Germany, Amman, March 18, 1967...	507
299. Resolutions Adopted by the Arab League Council at Its Forty-Seventh Ordinary Meeting [Excerpt], Cairo, March 18, 1967.....	511
300. Statement by a Syrian Military Spokesman on the Land and Air Clashes Between Syrian and Israeli Forces, Damascus, April 7, 1967.....	512
301. Speech of Syrian Chief of State al-Atasi on Evacuation Day [Excerpts], Hama, April 17, 1967.....	512
302. Statement by a Lebanese Foreign Ministry Spokesman in Connexion with Israeli Premier Eshkol's Statements on the Role of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, Beirut, April 17, 1967.....	516
303. Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at a Syrian Students Conference [Excerpts], Damascus, April 18, 1967.....	516
304. Joint Communiqué on U.A.R. Premier Sidqi Sulayman's Talks in Syria on the Joint Defence Agreement [Excerpts], Damascus, April 22, 1967.....	517

	<i>Page</i>
305. Interview Statements by the Syrian Chief of Staff Major General Suwaydani on the Military Situation, Damascus, April 1967.....	518
306. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir on Labour Day [Excerpts], Shubra al-Khaimah, May 2, 1967.....	521
307. Government Policy Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah [Excerpt], Amman, May 6, 1967.....	526
308. Memorandum of the Syrian Ba'th Party Foreign Relations Bureau on the Likelihood of Israeli Aggression [Excerpt], Damascus, May 11, 1967.....	526
309. Statement by an Official Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the "Repeated Threats by Israel," Damascus, May 13, 1967.....	529
310. Message from U.A.R. President Nasir to the Palestine Day Conference Held in London [Excerpts], Cairo, May 14, 1967.....	531
311. Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the Alerting of the Armed Forces, Amman, May 17, 1967.....	532
312. Statement by Saudi Crown Prince Emir Khalid Ibn Abd al-'Aziz on Israeli Threats Against Syria, Riyadh, May 18, 1967.....	533
313. Statement by U.A.R. Deputy Supreme Commander Marshal Amir on the Political and Military Situation, Cairo, May 18, 1967.....	533
314. Interview Statements by the Syrian Defence Minister General Asad, Damascus, May 19, 1967.....	534
315. Resolution Adopted by the Arab League Council on Aggression Against Arab Territories, Cairo, May 20, 1967.....	536
316. Speech of Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Premier Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir at the Opening of a New Factory Unit [Excerpt], Kuwait, May 20, 1967.....	536
317. Letter from the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri to U.A.R. President Nasir, Cairo, May 21, 1967.....	537
318. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir Announcing the Closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli Shipping, May 22, 1967.....	538
319. News Conference Statements by King Faysal of Saudi Arabia During His Visit to Britain, 8-29 May, London, May 23, 1967.....	541
320. Statement Issued by the National Command of the Syrian Ba'th Party on the "Battle of Destiny", Damascus, May 23, 1967.....	541
321. Statement by Lebanese Premier Karami Before the Chamber of Deputies [Excerpts], Beirut, May 23, 1967.....	543
322. Resolution Adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies Authorising the Government to Take All Necessary Military Measures, Beirut, May 23, 1967.	543
323. Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah in Support of the U.A.R., Amman, May 24, 1967.....	544
324. Statement by an Official Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Views Expressed to All Heads of Diplomatic Missions, Damascus, May 25, 1967...	544
325. Cable from Tunisian Foreign Secretary Burghiba Jr. to Arab League Secretary-General Hassunah, Tunis, May 25, 1967.....	547
326. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir to a Delegation of the Damascus Arab Workers Conference [Excerpt], Cairo, May 26, 1967.....	547

	<i>Page</i>
327. Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the American Attitude to the Crisis, Amman, May 27, 1967.....	549
328. New Conference Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir to the Arab and World Press on the Crisis, Cairo, May 28, 1967.....	549
329. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir to Members of the National Assembly [Excerpt], Cairo, May 29, 1967.....	564
330. Reply of Syrian Foreign Minister Makhus to a Verbal Message of the U.S. Ambassador in Damascus on the Crisis, Damascus, May 29, 1967.....	565
331. Statement by the General Director of the Israel Boycott Bureau of the Arab League Mahjub on Passage Through the Gulf of Aqaba, Damascus, May 29, 1967.....	568
332. Text of the Joint Defence Agreement Between the United Arab Republic and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, Cairo, May 30, 1967.....	568
333. Interview Granted by Saudi King Faysal to a Correspondent of American Television	570
334. News Conference Statements by the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri, Amman, June 1, 1967.....	570
335. Interview Granted by Syrian Foreign Minister Makhus to the French Daily "L'Humanite" During His Visit to France, 31 May-2 June, Paris, June 1, 1967.....	571
336. Letter from U.A.R. President Nasir to U.S. President Johnson, Cairo, June 2, 1967.....	573
337. Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan [Excerpts], Sidi Bil'abbas, June 3, 1967.....	575
338. Text of the Protocol on Iraq's Accession to the Joint Defence Agreement Between Jordan and the U.A.R., Cairo, June 4, 1967.....	577
339. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir After Iraq's Accession to the Joint Defence Agreement Between Jordan and the U.A.R., Cairo, June 4, 1967.....	577
340. Communiqués Issued by the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry Following the Initiation of Hostilities by Israel, Cairo, June 5, 1967.....	579
341. Statement by Sudanese President al-Azhari to the People [Excerpt], Khartum, June 5, 1967.....	579
342. Speech of Tunisian President Burghiba on the "Battle of Palestine" [Excerpt], Carthage, June 5, 1967.....	580
343. Communiqué Issued by Iraq Announcing Its Declaration of War on Israel, Baghdad, June 5, 1967	582
344. Statement by the Libyan Government Announcing a State of Defensive War Against Israel, Al-Bayda', June 5, 1967.....	582
345. Decree Issued by the Ruler of Kuwait Announcing a State of War Against Israel, Kuwait, June 5, 1967.....	583
346. Cable Message of Solidarity from Saudi King Faysal to U.A.R. President Nasir, Riyadh, June 6, 1967.....	583
347. Speech of Moroccan King Hasan II to the Army Contingent Headed for the Middle East [Excerpt], Rabat, June 5, 1967.....	583

	<i>Page</i>
348. Resolutions Adopted by the Conference of Arab Petroleum Ministers, Baghdad, June 5, 1967.....	584
349. Military Communiqués Issued by the U.A.R. on the Progress of Hostilities, Cairo, June 5, 1967.....	585
350. Cable from Joint Arab Command Chief of Staff General Riyadh to U.A.R. President Nasir, Amman, June 6, 1967.....	586
351. Communiqué by the High Command of the U.A.R. Armed Forces Announcing the Interruption of Navigation in the Suez Canal, Cairo, June 6, 1967....	586
352. Cable from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. President Nasir on the Military Situation in the West Bank, Amman, June 6, 1967.....	586
353. Cable from the Deputy Supreme Commander of U.A.R. Armed Forces Marshal Amir to Jordanian King Husayn, Cairo, June 6, 1967.....	587
354. Cable from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. Marshal Amir, Amman, June 6, 1967	587
355. Letter from U.A.R. President Nasir to the Arab Heads of State on the Need for a Unified Stand, Cairo, June 6, 1967.....	588
356. Statement by Sudanese President al-Azhari to the People, Khartum, June 6, 1967.....	589
357. Statement by Algerian Finance Minister Ahmad on the Enforcement of General Mobilisation [Excerpt], Algiers, June 6, 1967.....	589
358. Statement Issued by the Syrian Embassy in Algiers on the "Participation of the American and British Air Forces in the Battle", Algiers, June 6, 1967....	591
359. Military Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. on U.S. British Intervention, Cairo, June 6, 1967.....	591
360. Cable from U.A.R. President Nasir to Jordanian King Husayn, Cairo, June 6, 1967.....	591
361. Cable from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. President Nasir, Amman, June 7, 1967	592
362. Military Communiqués Issued by the U.A.R. on the Progress of Hostilities, Cairo, June 7, 1967.....	592
363. Cable from U.A.R. President Nasir to Jordanian King Husayn on the Progress of Hostilities, Cairo, June 7, 1967.....	592
364. Cable from U.A.R. President Nasir to Joint Arab Command Chief of Staff General Riyadh, Cairo, June 7, 1967.....	593
365. Cable from U.A.R. Deputy Commander in Chief Marshal Amir to General Riyadh on the Cease-Fire, Cairo, June 8, 1967.....	593
366. Cable Message from Jordanian King Husayn to the Arab Heads of State Calling for an Urgent Meeting, Amman, June 8, 1967.....	593
367. Cable Message from U.A.R. President Nasir Replying to Jordanian King Husayn's Call to a Summit Meeting, Cairo, June 8, 1967.....	594
368. Broadcast Message of Jordanian King Husayn to the People [Excerpt], Amman, June 8, 1967.....	594
369. Military Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. on the Progress of Hostilities, Cairo, June 8, 1967.....	596

	<i>Page</i>
370. Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. Armed Forces Supreme Command on the Withdrawal of Its Troops to the Western Bank of the Suez Canal, Cairo, June 9, 1967	596
371. Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. Armed Forces Supreme Command on the Cessation of All Hostilities, Cairo, June 9, 1967	596
372. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir Announcing His Resignation, Cairo, June 9, 1967	596
373. Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan to the People [Excerpt], Algiers, June 10, 1967	600
374. Communiqué Issued by Syrian Defence Minister General Asad on Syrian-Israeli Hostilities, Damascus, June 11, 1967	601
375. Letter from Moroccan King Hasan II to the Arab Heads of State and the Arab League on the Proposed Summit Conference, Rabat, June 13, 1967 . . .	601
376. Statement Issued by the Saudi Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources on the Resumption of Oil Exports, Riyadh, June 13, 1967	602
377. Statement by the National Command of the Syrian Ba'th Party on the War [Excerpt], Damascus, June 14, 1967	602
378. Appeal by the Leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri Calling on Palestinians To Remain in the West Bank	605
379. Message from Jordanian King Husayn to the Arab Heads of State Appealing for a Summit Conference, Amman, June 17, 1967	606
380. News Conference Statements by Jordanian King Husayn [Excerpts], Amman, June 19, 1967	606
381. Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan on the Anniversary of the "Rising of 19 June" [Excerpt], Algiers, June 19, 1967	608
382. Statement by Lebanese Premier Karami on the Occasion of the Prophet's Birthday [Excerpts], Beirut, June 20, 1967	610
383. Letter from U.A.R. President Nasir to Jordanian King Husayn on Unified Arab Action, Cairo, June 22, 1967	611
384. Letter of Reply from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. President Nasir, Amman, June 22, 1967	612
385. Interview Granted by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir to French Television [Excerpt], Kuwait, June 28, 1967	612
386. Interview Granted by Iraqi President Arif to a Correspondent of Agence France-Presse, Baghdad, June 29, 1967	613
387. Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on Israeli Measures to Annex the Arab Sector of Jerusalem, Amman, June 29, 1967	614
388. Statement of Policy by the New Libyan Cabinet of Mr. Abd al-Qadir al-Badri [Excerpt], Al-Baida', July 2, 1967	615
389. Address by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the War and the Arab Situation [Excerpts], Amman, July 5, 1967	616
390. Press Statement on the Cairo Meeting of Presidents Bumadyan, al-Atasi, Arif, al-Azhari and Nasir, Cairo, July 16, 1967	617

	<i>Page</i>
391. Statement by the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party on the Crisis [Excerpts], Damascus, July 1967	618
392. Letter from the Jerusalem Municipal Council to the Israeli Assistant Military Governor, Jerusalem, July 21, 1967.....	620
393. Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the 23 July Revolution [Excerpts], Cairo, July 23, 1967.....	620
394. Statement by Prime Minister Jum'ah Affirming that Jordan Will Take No Separate Action on the Palestine Problem [Excerpt], Amman, July 27, 1967.....	635
395. Statement of Policy by the New Iraqi Premier Yahya [Excerpts], Baghdad, July 28, 1967.....	635
396. Manifesto of the Arab Nationalist Movement on "The Struggle of Destiny Between the Arab Revolutionary Movement and Neo-Imperialism" [Excerpt], July 1967.....	636
397. Press Statement by the Arab Foreign Ministers Conference, Khartum, August 5, 1967	642
398. Interview Statements by Sudanese Prime Minister Mahjub [Excerpts]	642
399. Interview Statements by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Premier Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir on the Continued Stoppage of Oil Exports to Certain Countries, Kuwait, August 6, 1967.....	644
400. Press Statement on the Talks Held by Iraqi President Arif During His Visit to Syria, 10-12 August [Excerpt], Damascus, August 12, 1967.....	644
401. Statement by Prominent West Bank Personalities to Residents There Calling for National Unity.....	645
402. Joint Communiqué on the Talks Between Sudanese President al-Azhari and Jordanian King Husayn, 18-19 August [Excerpt], Khartum, August 19, 1967.....	646
403. Interview Granted by Libyan Prime Minister al-Badri to the Beirut Daily "Al-Hayat", Al-Baida', August 1967.....	646
404. Interview Granted by Jordanian King Husayn to the Paris Weekly "L'Express", Amman, August 1967.....	647
405. Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organisation Rejecting "Any Project Aimed at the Liquidation of the Palestine Question", Beirut, August 22, 1967.....	650
406. Telecast Interview Statements by Jordanian King Husayn [Excerpt]	650
407. Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the Israeli Attitude to the Return of Refugees from the West Bank, Amman, August 28, 1967.....	651
408. Statement by U.A.R. President Nasir Upon His Arrival in Khartum to Attend the Arab Summit Conference [Excerpt], Khartum, August 29, 1967.....	652
409. Message from King Hasan II of Morocco to the Arab Summit Conference, August 29, 1967	653
410. Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan at the End of a Student Military Training Course [Excerpt], Zeralda, August 30, 1967.....	654
411. Joint Communiqué Issued at the End of the Arab Summit Conference Held at Khartum, Khartum, September 1, 1967.....	655

	<i>Page</i>
412. Text of the Published Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Arab Summit Conference, Khartum, September 1, 1967.....	656
413. Interview Statement by Kuwaiti Minister of Guidance and Information Shaikh Jabir al-Ali on Kuwait's Attitude to the Palestine Question [Excerpt], Kuwait, September 3, 1967.....	657
414. Cable from Catholic Palestinian Refugees to Pope Paul VI.....	658
415. Interview Granted by King Husayn to the Jordanian News Agency [Excerpt], Amman, September 4, 1967	658
416. News Conference Held by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the Return of West Bank Refugees to Their Homes [Excerpts], Amman, September 10, 1967.....	659
417. Speech of the Chief U.A.R. Delegate to the African Summit Conference in Kinshasa Mr. Muhammad Fayiq [Excerpt], Kinshasa, September 12, 1967..	662
418. Resolutions Adopted by the Arab League Council at Its 48th Ordinary Session, 11-13 September [Excerpts], Cairo, September 13, 1967.....	664
419. Statement by an Official Jordanian Spokesman on the Israeli Decision To Permit the Return of Some Refugees, Amman, September 14, 1967.....	665
420. Statement of the National Command of the Syrian Ba'th Party on the Proceedings of the Ninth Extraordinary National Conference [Excerpts], Damascus, September 17, 1967	665
421. Statement by Greek Catholic Archbishop Assaf on Behalf of the Leaders of Christian Communities at the Islamic-Christian Conference [Excerpt], Amman, September 18, 1967.....	675
422. Reply of Saudi King Faysal to a Speech of Welcome by Somali President Shermarke [Excerpt], Mogadishu, September 21, 1967.....	676
423. Cable Message from the Islamic-Christian Conference to Some World Leaders, Amman, September 21, 1967.....	677
424. Views of the Lebanese Communists on "Ways and Means of Carrying On the Struggle Against the Israeli-Imperialist Conspiracy" [Excerpt].....	678
425. Resolutions Adopted at an Extraordinary Session of the Council of Arab Information Ministers, 27-30 September [Excerpts], Bizerte, September 30, 1967.....	679
426. Political Statement Issued by the Palestinian Liberation Movement "Fateh".	681
427. National Charter of the Arabs of the West Bank for the Current Phase, October 4, 1967.....	682
428. Statement by the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri on Solutions to the Palestine Problem, Beirut, October 13, 1967.....	686
429. Interview Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir to French Journalist d'Astier de la Vigerie [Excerpt], Cairo, October 21, 1967.....	687
430. Interview Granted by Iraqi Acting Foreign Minister Khayrallah to the Cairo Daily "Al-Jumhuriyah" [Excerpts], Beirut, October 27, 1967.....	688
431. Address by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Foreign Minister Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Opening a New Session of the National Assembly [Excerpt], Kuwait, October 28, 1967	689

	<i>Page</i>
432. Statement by the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri Addressed to the Jews of Israel [Excerpt], Beirut, October 30, 1967	690
433. Speech from the Throne Delivered on Behalf of Jordanian King Husayn by Crown Prince Hasan Opening a New Session of Parliament [Excerpt], Amman, November 1, 1967	691
434. Address by Jordanian King Husayn at Georgetown University During a Visit to the United States, 2-10 November [Excerpt], Washington, November 7, 1967	693
435. Statement by the Palestinian Liberation Movement "Fateh", November 8, 1967	694
436. Memorandum Addressed by the "Fateh" Movement to United Nations Secretary-General U Thant, November 8, 1967	695
437. Joint Communiqué on Lebanese President Hilu's Visit to Saudi Arabia, 12-16 November [Excerpt], Riyadh, November 16, 1967	695
438. Speech of Iraqi President Arif on the Fifth Anniversary of the 18 November Revolution [Excerpt], Baghdad, November 17, 1967	696
439. Statement of Policy by the New Jordanian Government of Mr. Bahjat at-Talhuni [Excerpts], Amman, November 18, 1967	696
440. Memorandum from the "Fateh" Movement to the International Red Cross Asking for Its Intervention, November 18, 1967	698
441. Speech from the Throne by Libyan Premier al-Bakkush at the Opening of a New Session of the General Assembly [Excerpts], Tripoli, November 20, 1967	698
442. Interview Granted by Saudi King Faysal to West German Television [Excerpts], Riyadh, November 21, 1967	699
443. Message of Lebanese President Hilu to the People on Independence Day [Excerpt], Beirut, November 21, 1967	700
444. Address by U.A.R. President Nasir at the Opening of a New Session of the National Assembly [Excerpts], Cairo, November 23, 1967	701
445. Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organisation Rejecting the British Solution Embodied in the U.N. 22 November Resolution, Cairo, November 23, 1967	715
446. Comment by an Official Syrian Government Spokesman on the 22 November Resolution of the U.N. Security Council, Damascus, November 23, 1967	716
447. Speech of Kuwaiti Ruler Shaikh Sabah as-Salim as-Sabah at the Opening of the Third Conference of Arab Labour Ministers [Excerpt], Kuwait, November 25, 1967	717
448. Interview Statements by U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyadh on the Current Situation [Excerpts], Cairo, November 28, 1967	717
449. Joint Communiqué on Talks Between U.A.R. President Nasir and Iraqi Premier Yahya [Excerpts], Cairo, December 4, 1967	720
450. Statement by the Heads of Christian Communities in Jordan on the Cancellation of Christmas Festivities and Visits to the Holy Places, Amman, December 6, 1967	720
451. Statement of Policy Issued by the "Fateh" Movement Declaring Its Rejection of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November, December 12, 1967	721

	<i>Page</i>
452. First Political Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	723
453. Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at a Dinner Offered by French President De Gaulle in His Honour [Excerpt], Paris, December 15, 1967....	726
454. Interview Statements by a Leader of the "Al Asifah" Organisation.....	727
455. Statement by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir on Ambassador Jarring's Mission [Excerpt], Kuwait, December 17, 1967...	730
456. Statement by the Assistant Secretary of the Jordanian Ministerial Commission for Relief, Information and Public Relations on the Number of Displaced Palestinians, Amman, December 21, 1967.....	730
457. Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Addressed to the Palestinian People, Cairo, December 25, 1967.....	730
458. Interview Granted by Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayeen to the French Daily "France-Soir", Paris, December 1967.....	731
459. Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at the Inauguration of an Electric Grid Project [Excerpt], Al-Qabun, December 28, 1967.....	732

International

New Year Message from U.S. President Johnson to President Shazar of Israel.¹

Washington, January 1, 1967

The memory of your brief summer visit to Washington heightens my pleasure in extending to you and the people of Israel my best personal wishes for a fruitful New Year. As your nation continues earnestly to strive with the complex problems of an age marked by rapid changes on all sides, I am confident that the remarkable and heartwarming record of Israel's progress since 1948 will serve as a continuing inspiration. I am gratified by this.

I am also convinced that increased peace and human understanding in the Near East will reward efforts that may be made in 1967 by you and other men of good will in Israel and neighboring countries to challenge with imagination the problems that remain to be solved. As you move forward you can count on the continued friendship of my country.

Interview Statement by Israeli Chief of Staff General Rabin on Reprisals Policy.²

Tel Aviv, January 1967

Today, as on 13 November, I would recommend to the Government reprisal action against the Jordanian village of Samu',³ if required by the situation.

Though Israel has been condemned by the Security Council, it is a fact that commando raids from Jordan have stopped. . . We shall use armor, and we shall use aircraft, if necessary, so as to put a stop to incursions into Israeli territory. At a given moment before Samu', the Arabs believed they could attack Israel and get away

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, Jerusalem, 6/1/1967.

² *Yedioth Aharonoth*, Tel Aviv, 3/1/1967.

³ On November 13, 1966, Israeli armed forces in brigade strength and supported by a squadron of Mirage aircraft crossed into Jordan and razed the village of Samu' in a 3-hour operation, leaving 4,000 people homeless.

with it. At the present time, they know they cannot do it with impunity, and it is this conviction more than anything else that will ensure quiet on our borders.

Address by U.S. President Johnson to Congress on the State of the Union.⁴ [Excerpt]

Washington, January 10, 1967

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In the Middle-East, the spirit of good will toward all unfortunately has not yet taken hold. An already tortured peace seems to be constantly threatened. We shall try to use our influence to increase the possibilities of improved relations among the nations of that region. We are working hard at that task.

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Republican "State of the Union" Address by U.S. Senate Minority Leader Dirksen.⁵ [Excerpt]

Washington, January 19, 1967

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As regards the Middle East, let me also add the proposal that the United States take the initiative in reconvening the Conference of the Tripartite Guarantee Powers, and that these Powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—use this new conference to reaffirm their "unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force" in the Arab-Israel area and revive their pledge to preserve the frontiers and armistice lines in the Middle East.

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⁴ *U.S. Congressional Record*, Vol. 113, Part I, pp. 38-39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1189.

5

Joint Communiqué on Moscow Talks Between the Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 20-26 January.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, February 11, 1967

Both Parties resolutely condemn the intrigues of imperialism and reaction in the Arab homeland, and all other subversive actions against the progressive Arab countries, as well as the aggressive policy of Zionism. Both Parties declare their full support for the struggle of the Palestine Arabs for their legitimate and inalienable rights.

6

Interview Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.² [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, February 1967

The Israel Government has stated that it would regard the entry of foreign troops into Jordan as a threat to Israel's security, and would reserve its freedom of action to safeguard her security in such an event. What would the Israel Government do if power in Jordan were seized by Ahmed Shukeiry or forces aligned with him—without foreign troops entering the country?

ABBA EBAN: Here is another "if." We recently reiterated our interest in the *status quo* and our freedom of action if the security balance were disturbed. There are good reasons for not going into specific undertakings beyond this general statement. I have reason to believe that our neighbours have read the signals. Indeed, the Israeli contingency is one of the elements which support the current stability.

My own feeling is that we should be less frequent in speculation about changes of regime in Jordan. The present regime has lasted for 15 years, during which Arab governments that have

predicted its downfall have themselves been overthrown more than once. There was too much talk about new situations in Jordan after the events of November 12-13th, 1966. I had the feeling then, which I expressed in Washington, that there was a great deal of over-reaction at the United Nations and in some capitals.

In the Middle East today we have the kind of stability which arises from a lack of alternative. There is a French saying: "*On ne détruit que ce qu'on remplace.*" It is easier to talk about overthrowing the Jordanian regime than to face the consequences of the vacuum.

The same is true of other international situations in the world: They have an unstable look, but they endure because the alternatives are less attractive than their continuation. At any rate, Israel is firm in support of the *status quo*. We would like the situation on the "West bank" to be stabilized and not disturbed.

Do you think that United States policy in the Middle East has led to a lessening of the tensions in the region? If not why not?

ABBA EBAN: There have been some interesting re-statements of United States policy in this area. In Israeli eyes, the central element of U.S. policy is its fidelity to the existing political and territorial structure of states. They are more frequent in asserting this principle than anyone else recently, and their commitment to it seems to me to have grown stronger during 1966.

That year began with my conversations in Washington, during which I became impressed by the conviction with which President Johnson, Secretary Rusk and Secretary MacNamara uphold the *status quo* and the arms balance in our region. The American component in Israel's defence equipment is becoming more central than before.

Thus, both in theory and in practice, the past year has been a year of progress in Israel-U.S. relations. We felt a measure of U.S. support in our complaint against Syria in October. On the other hand, we are still separated by different interpretations of the reprisal principle in self-defence. They reject this principle totally—at any rate in the Middle East. I cannot understand what self-defence means, within Article 51 of

¹ *Al-Ba'ath*, Damascus, 12/2/1967.

² *Jewish Observer & Middle East Review*, London, 17/2/1967.

the United Nations Charter, if an attacked party may never hit back.

What is being done to improve relations between Israel and the Soviet Union?

ABBA EBAN: Most of the things being done are being done on the Israel side. We abstain from involvement in the Cold War. We support the movement towards co-existence. We are unswerving in our support of existing territorial arrangements all over the world. We welcome the present tendency of Eastern and Western Europe to surmount the barriers that divided them during the Iron Curtain epoch.

I told Mr. Gromyko four months ago that there were many objective reasons for the Soviet Union and Israel to have a more fruitful dialogue than they have at the present time.

There is no secret—in my view—about the cause of the trouble: The Soviet Union still believes that the road to Arab hearts lies through alienation from Israel. This, of course, is a fallacy. In their thinking about the Middle East, other Powers have gone through this phase but have grown out of it by experience.

The truth is that in order to be a factor in the Arab world you have to be a factor in Israel. France understood this very early on, and is reaping the fruits of her understanding. The United States now grasps more fully than in the early fifties that U.S. power is something the Arab governments have to take into account irrespective of U.S. friendship for Israel.

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Brown have let it be known that the friendship between Britain and Israel is not a currency with which Egyptian friendship will be bought. Arab governments are now trying to return to Bonn. They left because Israel arrived. When they come back—Israel will still be there. This confirms my thesis that no Government suffers in its Arab relations through maintaining a constructive relationship with Israel.

I notice that the Turkish Foreign Minister, representing a country close to our region, found it necessary to say in his parliament that you cannot buy new friendships by sacrificing old ones.

So the question is when the Soviet Union

will acknowledge that a great power is fully capable of maintaining parallel relations with Israel and the Arab states, and gains nothing by involving itself one-sidedly in their controversies. There is a dialectical element in international relations. It is possible to reconcile contradictions.

Another approach that we are making to this problem is to develop our relations with other East European countries. Our diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with parts of Eastern Europe have been somewhat strengthened during the past year. I felt strongly when I was in Warsaw last summer that the East European states have authentic individuality and are not parts of a bloc. There is room for diversity in their relations with Israel.

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7

Joint Communiqué on Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi's Visit to Pakistan, 27 February-3 March.¹ [Excerpt]

Karachi, March 3, 1967

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The Foreign Ministers asserted their belief in the justice of the cause of the people of Palestine, and expressed their support for the struggle of this people to recover their established right to their homeland. The Iraqi Foreign Minister took this opportunity to repeat his expression of the profound appreciation and gratitude of the Iraqi people for the attitude Pakistan has adopted toward the Palestine Problem.

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¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 9/3/1967.

8

Joint Communiqué on Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi's Visit to India, 3-8 March.¹**[Excerpt]****New Delhi, March 8, 1967**

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The two Foreign Ministers affirmed their governments' full support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and for their struggle to achieve their aims, in accordance with the Statement of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

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9

Joint Communiqué on Iraqi President Arif's State Visit to Iran, 14-19 March.²**[Excerpt]****Teheran, March 19, 1967**

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The two leaders expressed their support for the struggle of peoples still suffering under the yoke of imperialism and stressed the need to eliminate colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. In particular, the two Heads of State reviewed the Palestine problem, not only as a problem of the Arab countries, but also as a problem of interest to all Islamic countries, a problem directly linked with the security and stability of the region.

The two sides expressed their support for the Palestine people's struggle and efforts being made to vindicate their legitimate rights and just demands in accordance with UN resolutions.

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10

Joint Communiqué on Mauritanian President Ould-Daddah's Visit to Algeria, 23-27 March.³ [Excerpt]**Algiers, March 27, 1967**

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After studying the Palestine Problem, the two Presidents denounced the imperialist activities of Zionism throughout the world, and affirmed their active solidarity with the people of Palestine in their legitimate struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

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11

Joint Communiqué on Indian Foreign Minister Chagla's Visit to Kuwait, 16-17 April.⁴**[Excerpt]****Kuwait, April 17, 1967**

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The two sides affirmed the support of their governments for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their struggle to realise their aspirations in accordance with the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in 1964.

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12

Interview Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol.⁵**Jerusalem, April, 1967**

If Israel were attacked in force by its neighbors, would you expect help from the United States and possibly Britain and France?

¹ *Ibid.*² *Ibid.*, 20/3/1967.³ *Al-Mujahid*, Algiers, 2/3/1967.⁴ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 19/4/1967.⁵ *U.S. News and World Report*, Washington, 17/4/1967.

MR. ESHKOL: Surely, we expect such help—but we would rely primarily on our Army... I wouldn't want American mothers crying about the blood of their sons being shed here. But I would surely expect such help, especially if I take into consideration all the solemn promises that have been made to Israel.

We get these promises when we ask the United States for arms and are told: "Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here."

My reply to this advice is that the Sixth Fleet might not be available fast enough for one reason or another, so Israel must be strong on its own. This is why we spend so much money on arms proportionately to our population.

13

Press Communiqué Issued by the West German Government on Talks Held with Arab League Secretary General Hassunah.¹
[Excerpt]

Bonn, April 22, 1967

The talks were devoted to a clarification of German-Arab relations and an explanation of German policy as regards the Middle East.

Both sides candidly stated their points of view and emphasized that German-Arab relations must be based on trust and mutual esteem.

The Foreign Ministry reaffirmed that Germany's policy in the Middle East follows the general principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries or internal conflicts.

In accordance with its general policy aimed at the preservation of peace, the Federal Government supports all efforts, especially those of the United Nations, which might contribute to a

peaceful and just solution of the problems in the Near-East.

14

Joint Communiqué on Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 17-22 April.² [Excerpt]

Moscow, April 26, 1967

Both sides denounce Israel's repeated acts of aggression against the Arab countries and express their support for the legitimate and unalienable rights of the Palestine Arabs.

15

Interview Statements by the Head of the Middle East Division at the West German Foreign Ministry, Dr. W. Gehlhof, on West-German-Arab League Talks.³ [Excerpt]

Bonn, April 27, 1967

The talks were restricted to the following two points: 1) West Germany's policy in the Middle East and her relations with the Arabs and Israel; 2) aid to the Palestinian people. It was clear that the Secretary General of the Arab League desires a guarantee that no arms will be sent to Israel, that financial and technical aid to her will be stopped, and that aid will be given to the Palestinian people in the same manner as it is now being given to Israel. The German attitude was clear: that West Germany has no oil or military interests, and no ambitions to impose her political influence on the Middle East area. This means that it is in her interests not to incur

¹ *Al-Hayat*, Beirut, 23/4/1967; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 22073. Mr. Hassunah visited Bonn on April 18-21 to explore the possibility of restoring diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Arab countries which had broken them in 1965, following the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel. [Ed.]

² *Al-Jumhuriyah*, 27/4/1967.

³ *Al-Hayat*, 30/4/1967.

the hostility of anyone and not to be cut off from anyone.

As regards arms, Germany had stopped supplying them before the Arabs severed relations, and has, during the past two years, received several offers from more than one quarter in the Middle East, which offers are kept in my office; on each of them is written in my own hand the word "refused." As regards aid to the Palestinian people, our policy is to provide such aid, and we are prepared to provide it on condition that it be within the framework of raising the standard of education and health. We shall therefore only provide aid if we conclude an agreement by which UNRWA agrees to supervise expenditure.

16

Soviet Government Warning to Israel as Reported by "Pravda".¹

Moscow, April 27, 1967

The other day the Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. was received in the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presented with a statement concerning Israel's unceasing aggressive actions against the neighboring Arab states.

The statement points out that the Soviet government has repeatedly called the attention of the Israeli government to the complications of the situation in the Near East that periodically arise as a result of the policy of outside imperialist forces, as well as that of Israel's extremist and militarist circles, directed against the sovereignty and independence of the neighboring Arab states. The situation in this region has been discussed by the U.N. Security Council more than once and continues to alarm the world public.

The Soviet government, the statement says, could not but direct its attention to the armed incident that occurred on April 7 between Israel and Syria, in which the Israeli side took

undisguised armed action against the Syrian Arab Republic, using aircraft, tanks and artillery. This dangerous playing with fire on Israel's part, in a region in immediate proximity to the frontiers of the Soviet Union, was accompanied by statements confirming Israel's desire to solve the Israeli-Arab contradictions from positions of strength, through armed force. Thus, the Israeli Chief of Staff declared that Israel's armed attack of April 7 would not be the last and that Israel itself would choose the forms, methods and times of new actions of this sort.

The statement of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs further emphasizes that the world thus is again confronted with an Israeli act of aggression demonstrating a propensity for political adventures dangerous to the cause of peace.

In connection with the April 7 armed attack on Syria, the statement says, the Soviet government feels compelled to warn the Israeli government again that the risky policy Israel has been pursuing over a number of years with respect to its neighbor is fraught with dangers, for which responsibility will fall entirely upon the Israeli government. The Soviet government expects the Israeli government to weigh the situation carefully and not to heed the circles that, displaying political myopia, are willing to make their country the plaything of hostile outside forces, thus jeopardizing the vital interests of the people and the fate of their country.

The Ambassador said that he would forward this statement to his government.

17

Joint Communiqué on Sudanese President Al-Azhari's Visit to India, 28 April-5 May.² **[Excerpt]**

New Delhi, May 5, 1967

Both parties reaffirmed their unreserved support for the legitimate rights of the Arab people in Palestine and its efforts to vindicate these

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, New York, 17/5/1967, pp. 24-25.

² *Sudan News*, Khartum, 5/5/1967. (Arabic edition.)

rights in accordance with the Resolutions of the Cairo Non-Alignment Conference of 1964.

18

Joint Communiqué on the Visit of a U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Delegation to Lebanon, 4-12 May.¹ [Excerpt]

Beirut, May 13, 1967

Both parties condemn Israel's repeated acts of aggression against the Arab countries and express their support for the Palestine Arabs.

19

Address to the Nation by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol.² [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, May 13, 1967

During the past year we have made great strides ahead for the strengthening and consolidation of the State of Israel. The firm and persistent stand we have taken on behalf of our rights has strengthened the awareness among our neighbours that they will not be able to prevail against us in open combat. They recoil today from any frontal clash with Israel, and they postpone the date of such a confrontation to the remote future. Among the Arab rulers and their saboteur-minions there are some who nowadays attempt to manifest their hostility to Israel in deeds, diligently in search of ways of attrition, subversion and aggression against human lives. We have furnished proof that we shall not permit our borders to be opened to attack. We have proved that to their attempts to pick easy and exposed targets, we were able to respond at a place, time and by a method of our own choosing.

Thus, the saboteurs and their employers found out that they would not accomplish their aims this way. We do not recognize the limitations they endeavour to impose upon our acts of response. The Arab States and the nations of the world ought to know that any border which is tranquil from their side will also be quiet from our side. If they try to sow unrest on our border—unrest will come to theirs.

20

Message from U.S. President Johnson to U.A.R. President Nasir Asking for a Relaxation of Tension in the Area.³

Washington, May 23, 1967

Dear President Nasir:

I have spent most of the past few days thinking about the Middle East, the problems you are facing and the problems we are facing in the region. A number of our mutual friends, including Ambassador Battle, have told me that you are disturbed because the United States has evinced an unfriendly attitude towards the U.A.R. I would like you to know in all honesty that this is far from our intention.

From a distance, I have followed your efforts to develop your country and grow with it. I believe I understand the dignity and aspirations of your people and their determination to enter the modern world and fully participate in it as soon as possible. I hope that we shall be able to find general as well as specific ways to work together more closely.

I also understand the political forces operating in your region. I understand the ambitions and causes of tension, the memories and the hopes.

Naturally it is your duty as well as mine not to look back but to save the Middle East—and all human society—from a war which I believe nobody wants. I do not know what steps the U.N.

¹ *An-Nahar*, Beirut, 13/5/1967.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 14/5/1967.

³ *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, 23/6/1967. Handed to U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad by U.S. Ambassador Richard Nolte on 23 May.

Secretary-General U Thant will propose to you, but I urge you to consider as your first duty towards your nation, your region, and the entire world community that sublime aim, which is the avoidance of fighting.

Major disputes in this era should not be settled by illegal movements of men and arms across borders neither in Asia nor in the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. That sort of activity has led to actual war in Asia and is threatening peace in other regions. I was hoping to ask Vice-President Hubert Humphrey to leave for the Middle East for talks with you, with other Arab leaders and with Israeli leaders. If these days pass without actual fighting I will continue to hope that the friend who enjoys my utmost confidence can make this visit.

Each of us who bears the responsibility of leadership in his nation faces a variety of problems created by history, geographic position and the deepest feelings of our peoples. Whatever the differences in the views and interests of our two countries, we both have a common interest in the independence and progress of the U.A.R. and peace in the Middle East.

I am sending you this message at this critical moment hoping that you will share this evaluation with me and will be able to act accordingly during the coming hours and days.

Sincerely yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson.

21

Memorandum from the U.S. Government to the U.A.R. Government on the Middle East Crisis.¹

Cairo, May 23, 1967

Secret

During the past few days, tension has once again risen along the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab States. We agree with the

U.N. Secretary-General's view that the situation in this area is of concern to the international community as a whole, and we sincerely desire to facilitate his efforts in his leading role to ease tension and to restore stability and confidence.

In the present situation we have no reason to believe that any of the parties to the armistice agreements between the Arab States and Israel has any intention of committing an aggression. In fact the danger—a very grave danger—lies in a misadventure or a miscalculation. Those in power in the area are likely to misunderstand or misinterpret the intentions and actions of others.

Three aspects of the situation cause us special concern.

(1) The continual terrorist acts carried out against Israel with Syria's agreement, some of which at least are carried out from Syrian territory. This directly contravenes the general armistice agreements which call on the signatory States to guarantee that no warlike action or aggression be committed from any of these States against the other or against the civilian population in territory controlled by the other side. We believe that the general armistice agreements still constitute the best basis for peaceful conditions along the borders. We hope that the U.A.R., and the other Governments, will join us in appealing to all the signatories of the armistice agreements to honour fully the provisions of these agreements.

(2) We are concerned lest the preservation of peace along the U.A.R.-Israel border become more difficult as a result of the immediate withdrawal of the UNEF. We believe that the presence of UNEF constitutes an important factor for the preservation of basic security along the border. The U.S. Government supports the U.N. Secretary-General U Thant's mission in Cairo. It is truly confident that the U.A.R. Government will discuss with him in a comprehensive way the possibilities for continuing the preservation of peace in some form along the U.A.R.-Israel border.

(3) The U.S. Government believes it is particularly necessary that the present trend towards mobilisation and concentration of forces on both sides be halted and reversed. We have taken into consideration U.A.R. and Israeli statements indicating that the movements of

¹ *Ibid.* According to "Al-Ahram," this written version of the memorandum was submitted on official paper of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo by Ambassador Richard Nolte on May 23, together with President Johnson's message to President Nasser (*ante*, doc. 20).

their armed forces are for defensive purposes. We hope, however, that the two sides and other States which have adopted military precautions will withdraw and return their forces to their bases. By doing so they would render an important service to the relaxation of the present state of tension.

We take this opportunity of reaffirming our continuous commitment to the freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba for all ships. The right of free and innocent passage in these waters is of vital interest to the international community. We believe that any interference with this international right could have serious international consequences.

In the present situation, the U.A.R. and other Arab Governments can be assured that the U.S. Government opposes any form of overt or covert aggression in the area, whether it is carried out by regular or irregular armed forces. This has been the policy of this Government under four Administrations and the record of our deeds during the past two decades within or outside the U.N. makes this point abundantly clear.

In conclusion, the U.S. Government expresses its sincere hope that the U.A.R. and many other States will join efforts within and outside the U.N. to bring about a relaxation of tension and to restore stability in the area.

U.S. Embassy, Cairo, 23rd May 1967.

22

Speech of Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset on the Closure of the Tiran Straits.¹

Jerusalem, May 23, 1967

I will make a short announcement dealing with a single subject. As you know, an announcement by the President of Egypt was published this morning on his intention to close the international waterway that passes through the Tiran Straits and links the Gulf of Eilat with the Red Sea to the passage of ships sailing under the Israeli flag and to ships sailing under other flags which carry

strategic cargoes. Honored Knesset members: any interference with freedom of shipping in the gulf and in the straits constitutes a flagrant violation of international freedom, a violation of the sovereign rights of other nations, and an act of aggression against Israel.

It is known to the Knesset that since 1957 several governments, including the principal maritime states, undertook and announced their intention to make use of their rights to free passage through the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Eilat. In recent days, the Government of Israel has maintained close contact with the governments which have given expression to and implemented the principle of freedom of passage in these waters from 1957 until today. In accordance with these exchanges of opinions, I am in a position to say that international support for these rights is serious and rather widespread.

This is indeed a test for a solemn and clear international commitment on whose implementation depends the existence of a regime of international security and law. This means that we are facing a crucial hour—crucial not only for Israel but for the entire world. In view of this situation, I again call on the great powers to act without delay to maintain the right of free shipping to our southern port—a right that is reserved to every state, without distinction.

The Government of Israel will carry out the policy which it announced in the U.N. General Assembly on 1 March 1957. Since Israel made this announcement, free passage through the straits and the gulf has become consolidated. In the course of 10 years it has become a rooted international reality that has found expression in hundreds of sailings of ships under dozens of flags and in the creation of a far-flung network of commerce and transport which is still developing.

The Egyptian President's illegal declaration is added to the violation of the law which Egypt has committed for many years by maintaining a blockade in the Suez Canal in contravention of its obligations to permit free passage through that canal to all ships of all nations of the world.

Honored Knesset members: in my speech yesterday I called on the nations of the region to show mutual respect for the territorial integrity, political sovereignty, and rights of every state in

¹ *Knesset Records*, No. 28, May 22-24, 1967, p. 2267.

the region. I also declared Israel's readiness to participate in an effort to reduce the tension and to consolidate peace in our region.

If a criminal attempt should be made to impose a blockade on the shipping of a U.N. member state, this would constitute a dangerous precedent and would have far-reaching consequences for international relations and freedom of shipping on the seas. The latest development clearly shows the dangerous implications of Egypt's course. I call on international organs to show effective responsibility for the preservation of peace.

Knesset members: I shall give further details of the situation to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. There, we shall also continue to discuss them.

The debate in the Knesset has shown that the nation is facing the future united.

We shall develop a spirit of confidence and preparedness to meet the coming days.

23

Statement by U.S. President Johnson Calling for Restraint in the Middle East.¹

Washington, May 23, 1967

In recent days tension has again risen along the armistice lines between Israel and the Arab states. The situation there is a matter of very grave concern to the whole international community. We earnestly support all efforts, in and outside the United Nations and through its appropriate organs, including the Secretary-General, to reduce tensions and to restore stability. The Secretary-General has gone to the Near East on his mission of peace with the hopes and prayers of men of good will everywhere.

The Near East links three continents. The birthplace of civilization and of three of the world's great religions, it is the home of some 60 million people and the crossroads between East and West.

The world community has a vital interest in peace and stability in the Near East, one that

has been expressed primarily through continuing United Nations action and assistance over the past 20 years.

The United States, as a member of the United Nations, and as a nation dedicated to a world order based on law and mutual respect, has actively supported efforts to maintain peace in the Near East.

The danger, and it is a very grave danger, lies in some miscalculation arising from a misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of others.

The Government of the United States is deeply concerned, in particular, with three potentially explosive aspects of the present confrontation.

First, we regret that the General Armistice Agreements have failed to prevent warlike acts from the territory of one against another government or against civilians or territory under control of another government.

Second, we are dismayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai after more than 10 years of steadfast and effective service in keeping the peace, without action by either the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations. We continue to regard the presence of the United Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental importance. We intend to support its continuance with all possible vigor.

Third, we deplore the recent buildup of military forces and believe it a matter of urgent importance to reduce troop concentrations. The status of sensitive areas, as the Secretary-General emphasized in his report to the Security Council, such as the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particularly important aspect of the situation.

In this connection I want to add that the purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping has brought a new and very grave dimension to the crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the entire international community.

The Government of the United States is seeking clarification on this point. We have already

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 12/6/1967, pp. 870-71.

urged Secretary-General Thant to recognize the sensitivity of the Aqaba question, and we have asked him to give it the highest priority in his discussions in Cairo.

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and myself—as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past 20 years, within and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear on this point.

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all the states of the Near East. Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

We have always opposed—and we oppose in other parts of the world at this very moment—the efforts of other nations to resolve their problems with their neighbors by the aggression route. We shall continue to do so. And tonight we appeal to all other peace-loving nations to do likewise.

I call upon all concerned to observe in a spirit of restraint their solemn responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations and the General Armistice Agreements. These provide an honorable means of preventing hostilities until, through the efforts of the international community, a peace with justice and honor can be achieved.

I have been in close and very frequent contact—and will be in the hours and days ahead—with our able Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, at the United Nations, where we are now pursuing the matter with great vigor, and we hope that the Security Council can and will act effectively.

24

Statement by the Soviet Government on the Middle East Situation.¹

Moscow, May 23, 1967

A situation giving rise to anxiety from the viewpoint of the interests of peace and international security has been taking shape in the Near East in recent weeks.

After the armed attack by Israeli forces on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic on April 7 of this year, Israel's ruling circles continued aggravating the atmosphere of military psychosis in this country.

Leading statesmen, including Foreign Minister Eban, openly called for large-scale Israeli "punitive" operations against Syria and the striking of "a decisive blow" upon her.

The defense and foreign policy committees of the Knesset (Parliament) on May 9 granted the Government powers for military operations against Syria. Israeli troops moved to the frontiers of Syria were alerted. Mobilization was proclaimed in the country.

It is quite clear that Israel could not act in this way if not for the direct and indirect encouragement it had for its position from certain imperialist circles which seek to bring back colonial oppression to Arab lands.

These circles regard Israel in the present conditions as the main force against Arab countries, which pursue an independent national policy and resist pressure from imperialism.

Israeli extremists apparently hoped to take Syria by surprise and deal a blow at it single-handed. But they miscalculated. Showing solidarity with the courageous struggle of the Syrian people who are upholding their independence and sovereign rights, the Arab states—the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Kuwait, Sudan and Jordan—declared their determination to help Syria in the event of an attack by Israel.

The United Arab Republic, honoring its allied commitments for joint defense with Syria, took steps to contain the aggression.

Considering that the presence of United

¹ Tass Agency release, 23/5/1967.

Nations troops in the Gaza area and the Sinai Peninsula would give Israel in this situation advantages for staging a military provocation against Arab countries, the U.A.R. Government asked the United Nations to pull out its troops from the area.

A number of Arab states voiced their readiness to place their armed forces at the disposal of the Joint Arab Command to repel Israeli aggression.

As is known, the Soviet Government warned the Government of Israel in connection with the April 7 armed provocation, that it will bear the responsibility for the consequences of its aggressive policy. It appears that a reasonable approach has not yet triumphed in Tel Aviv. As a result, Israel is again to blame for a dangerous aggravation of tension in the Near East.

The question arises: What interests does the State of Israel serve by pursuing such a policy? If they calculate in Tel Aviv that it will play the role of a colonial overseer of the imperialist powers over the peoples of the Arab East, there is no need to prove the groundlessness of such calculations in this age when the peoples of whole continents have shaken off the fetters of colonial oppression and are now building an independent life.

For decades the Soviet Union has been giving all-round assistance to the peoples of Arab countries in their just struggle for national liberation against colonialism and for the advancement of their economy.

But let no one have any doubts about the fact that should anyone try to unleash aggression in the Near East, he would be met not only with the united strength of Arab countries but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving states.

It is the firm belief of the Soviet Government that the peoples have no interest in kindling a military conflict in the Middle East. It is only a handful of colonial oil monopolies and their hangers-on who can be interested in such a conflict. It is only the forces of imperialism, with Israel following in the wake of their policy, that can be interested in it.

The Soviet Government keeps a close watch on the developments in the Near East. It proceeds from the fact that the maintenance of peace and

security in the area directly adjacent to the Soviet borders meets the vital interests of the Soviet peoples.

With due account taken of the situation, the Soviet Union is doing and will continue to do everything in its power to prevent a violation of peace and security in the Near East and safeguard the legitimate rights of the peoples.

25

Statement by Ninety-Six Members of the U.S. House of Representatives on the Middle East Crisis.¹

Washington, May 23, 1967

Egypt and Syria are now threatening Israel and we fear that war in the Near East is inevitable unless the United States acts firmly and vigorously to prevent it. President Nasser's speech to his troops in Sinai yesterday was, in effect, a declaration of war. We note with dismay that the Soviet Union is encouraging and arming Egypt and Syria in a bold move to win influence and power in the Middle East. Once again the Soviet Union appears to be testing American resolve to defend the peace.

The United States Government, speaking through Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, and through the Congress of the United States has repeatedly declared its determination to act against aggression in the Middle East. And we note with appreciation the declaration of a White House spokesman that—"this country is of course, committed to the principle of maintaining peace in the Middle East. This has been our position over the years. It is still our position."

Consistent with that declaration, we pledge the fullest support to measures which must be taken by the Administration to make our position unmistakably clear to those who are now bent on the destruction of Israel, that we are now prepared to take whatever action may be necessary to resist aggression against Israel and to preserve the peace.

We are confident that the people of the United States will support such a policy.

¹ U.S. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 113, Part 11, p. 14617.

26

Official French Cabinet Statement on the Middle East.¹**Paris, May 24, 1967**

Le Conseil des Ministres a été tenu informé de la crise qui se développe au Proche-Orient. Il en a relevé avec beaucoup de préoccupation l'évolution récente notamment pour ce qui concerne le problème de la navigation dans le golfe d'Aqaba.

Le gouvernement poursuivra ses efforts auprès des pays concernés pour les dissuader de toute action de nature à porter atteinte à la paix dans cette région.

Son action tend, d'autre part, à obtenir que se concertent les quatre grandes puissances qui portent une responsabilité particulière dans la sauvegarde de la paix.

27

Speech of British Prime Minister Wilson at the Electrical Trades Union Conference.² [Excerpts]**Margate, May 24, 1967**

...The declaration then made³ remains the view and the policy of Her Majesty's government, and we shall promote and support international action to uphold this right of free passage.

We shall continue to urge that everything possible is done by the United Nations. We greatly regretted the disappearance last week, indeed almost overnight, of the U.N. emergency force.

It is our hope that as a result of the efforts

of U Thant in Cairo and the work of the Security Council we shall see the re-establishment, if not of the U.N. emergency force itself, then of some other form of U.N. presence which will be able to discharge the role that for ten years was so successfully undertaken.

28

Statement by Canadian Prime Minister Pearson in Parliament on the Middle East.⁴**Ottawa, May 24, 1967**

As my right honourable friend said yesterday, and I am paraphrasing his words, it is hard to imagine getting closer to catastrophe than in the way we seem to have been drifting in the last day or two. I, as have other Members of the House, have had some connection with this situation for a good many years—in fact, since I first went down to the United Nations at the end of the war when the state of Palestine was established by United Nations action.

The basic issue in this situation, it seems to me, as has already been mentioned in this debate, is the recognition of Israel's right to live in peace and security. The rejection and repudiation of that basic right has been over the years and is now a source of our danger. It is not the immediate manifestation of that danger but it certainly is a source of it. So long as Israel's neighbours, or some of them, refuse to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a state, then we move from one crisis to another. We already have moved from one to another over the last 10 or 15 years. Israel, of course, also has the basic obligation, which I am sure she accepts, to live without provocation and threat to her neighbours and in accord with the United Nations decisions which gave her birth. This is the continuing issue.

There is, however, an immediate crisis arising fundamentally out of this issue which now threatens war. I am perhaps repeating the obvious, but the danger point, it seems to me, and perhaps the most dangerous point, is the situation in Sharm el Sheikh. The troops of the United Arab

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st Sem., 1967, p. 101.

² *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 25/5/1967.

³ On March 1, 1957, the British U.N. representative declared in the General Assembly that his government viewed the Straits of Tiran as an international waterway through which the ships of all nations had a right to pass, and that it would assert this right for British ships and join others to secure its general recognition. [Ed.]

⁴ *External Affairs*, Ottawa, 1967, pp. 252-58.

Republic now control this port in the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1957 we spent days and nights arguing about this particular aspect of the settlement which it was hoped would have been reached at least in accord with the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the ground they had conquered. They made it quite clear at that time that they visualized a package deal by which, in return for withdrawing from vital strategic points, and especially from Sharm el Sheikh, they would be protected against action from those areas, and particularly this point, which would prejudice and destroy their own national interest. They undoubtedly feel they have a commitment to that effect.

We need not go into the legal situation. Perhaps it should be sent to the International Court of Justice for judgment, but before the International Court of Justice could render a judgment many things would have to be done to avoid trouble, because the Gulf of Aqaba now is of vital importance to the existence of the State of Israel. From 90 to 92 per cent of its oil goes past the Strait of Tiran and into the gulf to the port of Elath. That certainly is one very dangerous point.

The second dangerous point is the Gaza Strip, which now has been taken over by what is called the Palestine Liberation Army, a part of the force of the United Arab Republic. This army is composed of men devoted—and fanatically and sincerely devoted—to what they believe to be the liberation of their homeland. They are there now in the Gaza strip with 300,000 Palestinian refugees. If there could be a more explosive situation than that, I do not what it could be.

The third point is the Syrian border, which has been the scene of terrorist incidents and activities in recent weeks and which perhaps has been the occasion for the development of the recent crisis, which can explode at any minute. The fourth danger point is the possibility of excessive reaction or retaliation by land, water or air against provocations or terrorist incidents.

The feeling of some of the people on the spot is: "Let's force this issue and have it over." That can be just as dangerous as the development of the other three points I have mentioned—the temptation, if you like, to a pre-emptive war. There is another danger, the danger of expanding this conflict if it takes place and if the United

Nations is not able to limit it as it was earlier. There is the danger of the United States lining up behind one party and the U.S.S.R. lining up behind the other party. I cannot imagine a more frightening danger than that because, without the United Nations intervention, that could turn what might be a local conflict into a global tragedy.

Behind all the dangers, we notice now, from press, radio and television reports, the danger of inflammatory statements and attitudes—the war of the air waves, the demonstrations, people marching down the street shouting "We want war." These are the poor deluded people who would be the first to suffer from war. A leader in that part of the world is reported as having said the day before yesterday: "They threaten us with war; our answer is, we welcome war."

All this adds up to a terrifying situation. So what do we do about it? We all have our responsibilities as members of the United Nations. We have decided, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned yesterday, that we shall try to discharge our responsibility by getting this matter before the Security Council of the United Nations as quickly as possible. Yesterday the members of the Council from Canada and Denmark asked for the convening of the Security Council. That meeting is taking place today.

Whenever this world gets into trouble, where does it go? It goes to the United Nations. The worse the trouble, the more important the United Nations becomes and, as soon as the trouble is settled or put aside for the time being by the United Nations, it is then forgotten and everybody falls back on their own nationalist pride, privileges, fears and hatreds. But at the moment we all say "Let the United Nations take over." I do not know of anything else which could do it better, unless we had a conference of the four great powers. If they could work together, that would be equally effective—and more effective if they worked through the Security Council in doing it.

Our Ambassador to the United Nations, in dealing with this matter this morning, had this to say:

In calling this Security Council meeting we are suggesting that Council should exercise its responsibilities under the Charter to deal with the kind of threatening situation which the Secretary-General has not only reported to the Security Council but has regarded as sufficiently

serious to assume the responsibility for undertaking a personal mission to the area.

The situation, as the Secretary-General rightly reported to the Council, has shown signs of "increasingly dangerous deterioration" for some time.

Tension also grew as a result of terroristic and sabotage activities on the borders of Israel and Syria and the Secretary-General reported that the functions and resources of UNTSO had not enabled that Organization to arrest these activities.

In recent days there have been statements by the President of the U.A.R. and the Prime Minister of Israel which face us with the danger of direct confrontation between the U.A.R. and Israel over the question of access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

In the face of this rising and dangerous state of tension, means of bringing influences of moderation to bear in areas through the U.N., far from having been increased, have been decreased at the very moment of crisis by withdrawal of UNEF.

The principal means to balance this deteriorating situation through the U.N. has been the mission of the Secretary-General himself.

I believe at this stage the most useful contribution which this Council can make to this grave situation is to reinforce the current efforts being made by the Secretary-General to preserve peace in the area. This is the purpose of what we are suggesting the Council should do. We should at the same time urge that no member state of the U.N. take any action which would either prejudice the success of the Secretary-General's mission or worsen the situation.

In the face of grave facts, in the face of the mounting threat and *fait accompli*, how can the international community discharge its collective duty unless the moral influence of the Security Council, which is charged under Article 24 of the Charter with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security precisely "to ensure prompt and effective action" (and I underline these words), is brought to bear upon the seriously deteriorating situation in the Middle East?

This, in sum, is the aim of our initiative. Canada is a friend of all the nations of the area and has always striven to help by whatever means we can to maintain peace and stability in the area, and to assist those in trouble and distress. What we now ask is that the Security Council, and in particular all of its permanent members, who bear special responsibility, add the weight of its influence collectively by asking that no member of the United Nations take any action which would worsen the situation and jeopardize the efforts of the Secretary-General to preserve the peace. This is what we ask the Security Council to do at this stage; we believe it can do no less.

I hope that in due course it will be able to do more. Certainly, at the present time, the important thing is to do nothing to exacerbate the situation, and that applies, as my right honourable friend suggests, to the Government of Israel, which should be very careful about unnecessarily running a so-called blockade if that would

provoke the kind of retaliation which might have overriding results.

At this point, the Prime Minister was asked the following question: "In view of the admonition uttered by the representative of Canada at the Security Council yesterday, is it a fact that the United States, through its Ambassador Designate, Richard Nolte, advised the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riad, that Egypt should be warned that the United States will use force if necessary to hold open the Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli shipping, or is that statement merely one of speculation?" Mr. Pearson replied:

I cannot confirm that, and so far as I am concerned it is speculation. At this time only the United States could confirm the authenticity or otherwise of that story. I know that individual governments feel that they have their own special responsibilities and commitments, but I should hope that all these will be made secondary to the greatest commitment of all today, their duty as members of the United Nations Security Council. This will, of course, require moderation, tolerance and patience on the part of everybody concerned.

To a second question, whether "in view of the fact that each of the five major powers has the power of veto," there had been "any indication that the U.S.S.R. is viewing this matter through the eyes of the Prime Minister in the way he has indicated in his statements today," Mr. Pearson replied:

I certainly hope that to be the case and that they will work with the other permanent members of the Security Council. As my right honourable friend knows, there has already been a proposal made that these powers meet as a committee, and it would be very helpful if that could be done. As soon as that meeting takes place, I hope it will be possible to bring other activities within the ambit of the United Nations Security Council.

The Prime Minister's speech then continued as follows:

Having regard to the situation that we face in the Security Council, our Ambassador and the Ambassador of Denmark have moved or are about to move in the Security Council in New York the following proposal: "That the Security Council, having been seized with the current

situation in the Middle East, express full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation and request all states to refrain from any step which might worsen the situation, and invite the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council upon his return so that the Security Council may continue its consideration of the matter." I hope a resolution of this kind will be accepted by the members of the Security Council and that it will at least hold the line for the time being. Nothing can be more important than that. There will have to be subsequent steps, but I often wonder why, as the result of these critical situations in respect of which we find ways and means of avoiding open conflict, we cannot go one step forward and find a continuing solution to those things which brought about the conflict in the first place. That is something for the future.

There are things which we can do in the United Nations in the immediate future. This has been a great blow in one sense to our peace-keeping ideas and hopes. However, peace-keeping itself becomes more important than ever in the light of what has happened in the last three or four days. If the United Nations Emergency Force had not been withdrawn, this situation might not have developed. The lesson to be learned from that is that when we send these United Nations peacekeeping forces into these difficult areas we must do our best to make sure they have the foundation on which to act and that their work cannot be sabotaged except on order from the United Nations agency which sent them there.

This did not happen in respect of this United Nations Emergency Force. I remember very well the background, and I am not being critical of the Secretary-General because I have no doubt that, on an examination of the documents, one would come to the conclusion that what he did was right in terms of the documentary evidence. There was a special arrangement made between Mr. Hammarskjold and President Nasser. I objected to that arrangement at the time because I thought it might cause a lot of trouble in the future.

At that time, we did not follow this preferable course because we had to get these people over there quickly in view of the fact the war was

going on, and if, by this kind of an agreement, very fuzzy in its language (Mr. Hammarskjold was a past master in this regard), the U.A.R. would accept this Force, we thought we had better not go into the legalistic details too closely but get our troops on the spot.

This force was there for over ten years under this arrangement. This situation does not apply to Cyprus, because we have a Security Council resolution as a basis for authority in that regard. What we have to do now is not weaken in our pursuit of peace-keeping under the United Nations but strengthen our activities to obtain better peacekeeping arrangements. I do not think there is any possibility of reviving this United Nations Emergency Force, which certainly served gallantly for ten and a half years and has earned the gratitude of all the nations of the world. All the Canadians in that force have earned our gratitude over the last ten and a half years.

There is United Nations machinery available, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said yesterday, including the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization and the four Mixed Armistice Commissions, three of which are operating on the borders of Jordan and Lebanon and in Cyprus. The fourth has not been operating in respect of the United Arab Republic partly because it was not needed so much there in that the UNEF was located there and partly because the Israeli Government did not recognize its activities.

We can use this machinery in the hope that we can get the United Nations presence back into that area. What we and all the peace-loving governments must do today is try to keep that blue flag flying between possible combatants. If we can do that we shall have accomplished a great deal, even though the force may not be armed with the heaviest and most modern weapons available. I am not sure this would preserve the peace in the present circumstances but I think it would help, and I hope the Security Council will be able to take this first step by passing this first resolution. We are not sure of that but we hope we shall be able to move further and at least consider this United Nations machinery, which will do this job in perhaps a different way, by patrolling the boundaries and keeping the combatants from fighting each other.

In the meantime, we are facing a dangerous and critical situation from hour to hour and we can only hope that no one in any country directly concerned, irrespective of the emotions of the moment or what might seem to be the possibility of emotion, will do anything or say anything which will start off what is bound to be a bloody war in that area and what might be a bloody war in a much greater area.

Asked at this point if he was "prepared to say something now about the plans for the withdrawal of our Canadian troops in the Gaza Strip," Mr. Pearson said:

I have discussed this matter with the Minister of National Defence, who yesterday mentioned two sets of plans. There is the United Nations plan, which is a very carefully prepared plan for the evacuation of all members of the United Nations force. So far as we know, the United Nations authorities think that plan will be adequate, provided of course that the roof does not fall in.

That is the trouble, but they are very much aware of it, and, as a matter of urgency, they are trying to bring their plans into line with that possibility. Meanwhile, as the Minister of National Defence has said, we have moved three ships in that direction and have worked out an emergency plan which we hope and believe will take care of our people. I hope that as soon as it is possible the Minister of National Defence will be able to give the House all the details in that regard.

The Prime Minister's statement concluded with the following answer to an inquiry as to whether "the position the Canadian representative on the Security Council will take is that all nations, including Israel, should have free access to the Gulf of Aqaba as an international water and that no nation, Egypt or any other, should have the right to blockade or block access to a free port":

We believe that, under international law, and especially since the convention was passed in the United Nations (in 1952, I think, or 1953), these are international waters and the ships of all nations have access to them and passage through them. There are a good many cases of international law dealing with this matter. This particular

United Nations treaty, however, has not been signed by the U.A.R. and the Government of the U.A.R. has not admitted the contention that they are international waters. But we certainly think so, as do most countries in the world.

29

Statement to the Press by Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada.¹

Rawalpindi, May 24, 1967

Pakistan's position on the current crisis in the Middle East was set out in the statement of the Government's spokesman issued three days ago. The people of Pakistan have always stood by their Arab brethren. I wish to reiterate that Pakistan in unison with the entire Muslim world will render every support to the Arab countries in their efforts to resist Israeli aggression.

Pakistan has always condemned the establishment of the State of Israel as a flagrant injustice. We have consistently supported the Palestinian Arabs in their just struggle for the restoration of their rights to their homeland.

In pursuance of this policy, we have, through our Permanent Representative in the United Nations, expressed support for the action taken by the U.N. Secretary-General in accepting the demand of the U.A.R. for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Gaza and Sinai strips.

The State of Israel was brought into being by force and has frequently resorted to use of force to justify her existence. She has violated United Nations Charter and resolutions of the Security Council on numerous occasions. Her claims and contentions are contrary to international law and without any justification. If peace is disturbed in the area, the responsibility would be of Israel and Israel alone.

Pakistan fully and wholeheartedly supports the stand taken by the Arab countries.

¹ Pakistani Embassy, Beirut.

30

Statement by Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck.¹**Canberra, May 25, 1967**

The Australian Government is most disturbed by the critical situation that has developed in the Middle East.

There has been a sudden rise in tension, a major military confrontation, the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, and the declaration by the Government of the United Arab Republic of a blockade of Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba. A conflagration extending even beyond the region could be threatening. Such a conflict could not possibly bring benefit to either the Arab States or to Israel.

Urgent efforts are called for to secure a period of forbearance in which diplomacy and existing international machinery might bring about a diminution of tension and contribute towards the permanent peaceful settlement for which the international community has so long been searching.

All parties to the present dispute are entitled to peaceful existence as independent states, members of the United Nations. Under the United Nations Charter and under international law generally they are entitled to protection from aggression and from warlike acts. The Australian Government deeply regrets that the constructive provisions made in 1957 to restore and maintain peace to the area have been so abruptly terminated with consequences immediately threatening the peace.

The present situation will be aggravated if the international community divides at this stage into partisan groups. I hope that all the Great Powers, whatever their differences on some aspects of the present situation, will nevertheless work together to prevent hostilities. Peace and the hope of further peace have been won in the last ten years by concentrating upon the applications of the principles of the United Nations Charter and by applying the machinery available under that Charter.

So far as the present critical question of the

blockade of Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba is concerned, the Australian Government believes that redress of grievances should be sought in the first instance by making full use of United Nations organs and machinery. On the substance of this question, Australia holds today, as it has always done and reaffirmed in 1957 and on other occasions, that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.

The Australian Government's views in these terms are being conveyed to the Government of Israel and of the U.A.R. and to other governments concerned. This expression, and similar expressions which I hope will be forthcoming from other governments, should help contribute to an international consensus of opinion, opening the way to the period of forbearance to which I have referred and which is now so desperately needed.

31

Statement by Indian Foreign Minister Chagla in Both Houses of Parliament on the Withdrawal of UNEF.²**New Delhi, May 25, 1967**

The creation of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the Arab countries. From time to time, the tension has erupted into incidents of varying degrees of seriousness. After the aggression on the U.A.R. in 1956, a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was set up to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. The UNEF had contingents supplied by Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Israel has all along refused to let the UNEF be stationed on or enter the Israeli side of the border. UNEF, therefore, operated only from the U.A.R. side with the consent of the U.A.R. Government.

In recent weeks serious tension has developed between Syria and Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Chief of Army Staff were quoted as saying that they would

¹ *Current Notes on International Affairs*, Canberra, 1967, p. 224.

² *Foreign Affairs Record*, New Delhi, May 1967, pp. 63-64.

teach Syria a severe lesson and even march up to Damascus. At the same time, there were reports of Israeli troop concentrations near the Syrian border. The Syrians, apprehending an imminent attack from Israel, held urgent consultations with the United Arab Republic under the U.A.R.-Syrian Mutual Defence Agreement signed in November, 1966.

On May 18, a letter was received by U Thant from the U.A.R. Foreign Minister asking for the removal of UNEF entirely from U.A.R. territory and the Gaza strip. After again having consultations with the U.N. Advisory Committee on UNEF, the Secretary-General decided to terminate UNEF's presence as requested by the U.A.R.

The Government of India have always supported the UNEF's activities and believe that its presence on the Israel—U.A.R. border has helped in maintaining peace in the area. We would, however, like to state clearly that we appreciate the reasons which have impelled the U.A.R. to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF. When the UNEF was stationed in the U.A.R., it was with the consent of the U.A.R. Government and the UNEF could not continue to remain in U.A.R. territory without that Government's continuing consent. India could not be a party to any procedure which would make UNEF into an occupation force; nor could the Government of India agree to UNEF's continued presence in U.A.R. in absence of latter's consent and in any case Indian troops could not remain part of UNEF without U.A.R.'s approval. This is also in keeping with customary international law, the U.N. General Assembly resolution on the subject and the understanding reached between the late Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, then U.N. Secretary-General, and the U.A.R. Government.

On the question of UNEF's removal, I would like to refer to the reasons given by U Thant, United Nations Secretary-General, in his report dated May 18, 1967, to the U.N. General Assembly. U Thant has said:—

“(a) The United Nations Emergency Force was introduced into the territory of the United Arab Republic on the basis of an agreement reached in Cairo between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of Egypt and it, therefore, has seemed fully clear to me that since United Arab Republic consent was with-

drawn, it was incumbent on the Secretary-General to give orders for the withdrawal of the force. The consent of the host country is a basic principle which has applied to all United Nations peace-keeping operations.

(b) In practical fact, UNEF cannot remain or function without the continuing consent and co-operation of the host country.

(c) I have also been influenced by my deep concern to avoid any action which would either compromise or endanger the contingents which make up the force. The United Nations Emergency Force is, after all, a peace-keeping and not an enforcement operation.

(d) In the face of the request for the withdrawal of the force, there seemed to me to be no alternative course of action which could be taken by the Secretary-General without putting in question the sovereign authority of the Government of the United Arab Republic within its own territory.”

The Government of India fully endorses the position taken by the U.N. Secretary-General.

I may here refer to the incident on May 18, 1967, regarding the plane carrying General Inderjit Rikhye, Commander of the UNEF. General Rikhye was flying inside the Gaza strip when two Israeli aircraft buzzed his plane, fired warning shots and tried to force the aircraft to enter Israeli territory over the Mediterranean. General Rikhye refused to be intimidated and proceeded to his destination. We consider this incident a highly provocative one. It is, however, understood that the Israeli authorities have conveyed their apologies in this connection to the U.N. authorities. The coolness and courage of this officer who belongs to our Armed Forces deserves commendation.

On May 18, 1967, the Prime Minister received a verbal message from President Nasser communicated through our Ambassador in Cairo. The message referred to the various statements recently made by the Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the Chief of Army Staff, indicating that preparations were being made for an attack on Syria. The message indicated that the Israeli intention was to change the Government in Syria through pressure and even by invasion. In the circumstances, the U. A. R.

wanted to declare openly that it would come to Syria's help if the latter was attacked by Israel. The U. A. R. had consequently taken necessary measures to deter the Israelis from any aggressive designs against Syria.

The message added that U.A.R. was not interested in increasing tensions in the area, but considering their past experience, especially during the Suez crisis, they felt it necessary to take precautions against any possible Israeli attack on an Arab country.

A reply was sent to President Nasser's message through our Ambassador in Cairo on May 19, 1967. The reply expressed the deep concern of the Government of India at the dangerous situation which had developed and our anxiety at the nature of statements recently made by the Israeli leaders. The reply added that we shared with the U.A.R. adherence to the principle that no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another country. We said that we fully appreciated the reasons why the U.A.R. has had to institute precautionary measures. We expressed the hope that peace would be maintained and we noted with gratification that it was not the intention of the U.A.R. to increase tension in the area but that the measures taken were in the interest of preparedness and precaution against a possible attack on an Arab country. This message reiterated the respect and regard which we have for President Nasser personally and for our friendship for the U.A.R.

On May 21, 1967, the U.N. Secretary-General flew to Cairo for discussions with the U.A.R. leaders.

News has been received of the U.A.R. decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to other shipping carrying strategic goods for Israel. So far as the Government of India are concerned, we have taken the position as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea and that the entry to the Gulf lies within the territorial waters of U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. We adhere to this view.

I would like to impress on the House the gravity of the hour and the need to be exceedingly cautious in expressing views in a fast developing situation. The interests of West Asian countries, the interests of India and the interests of the world as a whole make it imperative that there should be peace and stability in this entire area of West

Asia. U Thant is on a delicate mission. He has the fullest support of the Government of India in his efforts to maintain peace.

32

Statement Issued by the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs.¹

Prague, May 25, 1967

The Czechoslovak people and the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic view with increasing concern the aggravation of the situation in the Near and Middle East, provoked by Israeli military preparations and war threats against the Syrian Arab Republic, which have called for defense moves on the part of the Arab countries.

As several times in the past, when the Near and Middle East became the center of tension and a potential center of war, the current dangerous situation also is a consequence of plots inspired by imperialist circles, immediately linked with oil monopolies, for which power and exploitation interests are dearer than peace and the security of nations.

The provocation of the conflict between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries is directed against the progressive Arab states, which for a number of years have been resolute opponents of imperialism and colonialism and support the national liberation movements of previously oppressed nations and countries.

This is why the imperialist circles, together with Israel, are trying to halt the independent and progressive development in this region, by intensifying pressure on the progressive Arab governments and by instigating war psychosis in the Near and Middle East.

The solidarity attitude of the U.A.R. and other Arab countries, which fully support the Syrian Arab Republic, testifies to the resolute opposition of the Arab people against these efforts.

The Czechoslovak people are linked with the Arab people by profound friendship, which grows

¹ Prague CTK International Service in English, 2106 GMT, 25/5/1967.

stronger in the struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and reaction and permanently develops cooperation in the building of an independent economy and a happy life of the people of the Arab countries.

In connection with the present dangerous situation in the Near and Middle East, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been charged to state that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and its people—just as the peace-loving nations of the entire world—have an exceptional interest in the maintenance of peace and security in this region of the world.

It condemns, therefore, the imperialist intrigues and war threats directed against the Arab countries, and expresses its full solidarity and support for the Arab people.

33

Message from U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin to the Israeli Government Appealing for a Relaxation of Tension in the Area.¹

Moscow, May 26, 1967

Mr. Prime Minister,

According to the latest information reaching the Government of the U.S.S.R., the tension on the borders of Israel, the U.A.R. and Syria is mounting more and more, with the two sides increasing their forces and in Israel the situation sharpening as though there was no alternative to acts of war. It would be a tremendous error if circles eager for battle, unrestrained by serious political thought, had the upper hand in such a situation, and arms were to begin talking.

Guided by the interests of peace and the desire to prevent bloodshed, the Government of the U.S.S.R. decided to send you this note.

We would like to appeal to you to resort to all measures to prevent a military conflict, since such a conflict would have a major effect on the interests of international peace and security. We turn to you so that no new threat of war may be created in the world, which would bring to nations immeasurable suffering.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 4/6/1967.

We are convinced that however complicated the situation in the area of the borders of Israel, Syria and the U.A.R. may be, it is necessary to find means to resolve the conflicts by non-military means, as it is easy to ignite a fire but putting out its flames may not be nearly as simple as those pushing Israel to the brink of war imagine.

We hope that following a serious consideration of the evolving situation and of the responsibility lying on the shoulders of that side which will initiate the aggression, the Government of Israel will do everything in its power to prevent a military conflict in the Middle East.

Sincerely,
A. Kosygin,
Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R.

34

Address by Guinean President Sekou Toure on the Fourth Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity.² [Excerpt]

Labe, May 26, 1967

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You know that eleven years ago all the imperialist forces joined together to struggle against Egypt for the Suez canal, but that they were defeated by the U.A.R. military forces. Now the imperialists again want to provoke the Arab countries. The Gulf of Aqaba is now being presented as an international gulf. That is why all the Arab countries are now mobilizing their forces. This morning we sent a message to the Arab countries to inform them about the active solidarity of the Guinean people and the Guinean army. The Guinean Popular Army is at the disposal of the Arab countries in case of war.

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² Conakry Guinea Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, 26/5/1967.

35

Statement Issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China.¹**Peking, May 27, 1967**

U.S. imperialism is at present hatching a big plot of aggression against Syria, the U.A.R. and other Arab states by making use of Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister and his foreign minister have repeatedly clamored about opening hostilities with Syria and overthrowing the Syrian Government. Israel is amassing large forces on its borders with Syria and the U.A.R., ready for a large-scale military adventure at any time. The United States has sent its Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean to make a big show of force and carry out military threats. The independence and security of the Arab states are being seriously menaced. The facts have once again shown that U.S. imperialism is the archcriminal supporting Israeli aggression against the Arab states and is the most ferocious enemy of the Arab people.

Confronted with the aggression and the threat of war posed by U.S. imperialism and Israel, the people of the Arab states have risen in unity to wage a resolute struggle against their common enemy. Syria, the U.A.R., and other Arab states have declared a state of alert and are ready at all times to deal head-on blows at the aggressors. The U.A.R. has demanded withdrawal of the U.N. emergency force from the Gaza Strip and U.A.R. territory, announced the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, and forbidden the passage of Israeli ships. The council of the Arab League has passed a resolution declaring that an attack against any Arab territory will be regarded as an aggression against all the Arab states. Iraq, the Yemen, Algeria, and other Arab states have adopted emergency measures in support of the struggle of the people of Syria and the U.A.R. These moves of the Arab states are just actions of self-defense against aggression and oppression and fully conform to the interests of the Arab people.

The Arab people's struggle against U.S. imperialism and Zionism is an important component of the world-wide struggle against imperialism. It has dealt hard blows at imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism and

given strong support to the people of the world in their struggle against imperialism. The 700 million Chinese people armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought resolutely stand on the side of the Arab people and firmly support all their just struggles. The Chinese people will forever remain the staunch and reliable comrades in arms of the Arab people in the fight against imperialism.

Fully revealing its bestial features, U.S. imperialism is at presently openly threatening to use force to compel the U.A.R. to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba; at the same time, its chieftain, Lyndon Johnson, is conspiring with such a person like U.N. Secretary General U Thant in a vain attempt to strangle the anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab states by employing its handy tool, the United Nations. The intensified contacts between the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, including George Brown's visit to Moscow, are all designed to master the fate of the Arab people and force them to submit by taking advantage of the so-called "status of big powers."

But no tricks or threats whatsoever can cow or dupe the daily awakening Arab people. Such acts of U.S. imperialism in so baring its fangs and committing aggression and playing the despot everywhere are by no means an indication of its strength, but a manifestation of its desperation and inner weakness. Chairman Mao has long pointed out: "U.S. imperialism has overreached itself. Wherever it commits aggression, it puts a new noose around its neck. It is heavily besieged by the people of the whole world." U.S. imperialism has suffered an ignominious defeat in its aggression against Vietnam and it will certainly come to no better end in its aggression against the Arab states. The day is not far off when the people of the whole world will completely bury U.S. imperialism.

The Soviet revisionist leading clique is the number one accomplice of U.S. imperialism. Everywhere it renders service to the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war. Now, just when the Arab people's struggle against U.S. imperialist and Israeli aggression is mounting to a new high, the Soviet revisionist leading clique once again is colluding with U.S. and British imperialism, busily working to strike a political deal with them and actively peddling its sinister

¹ *Peking Review*, Peking, 2/6/1967, pp. 29-30.

ware of the "Tashkent spirit" in a vain attempt to sabotage the just cause of the Arab people against imperialism. It says not a single word about the most essential issue—U.S. imperialist aggression against the Arab states. Nor does it support the just actions of the U.A.R. in demanding the withdrawal of U.N. forces and in closing the Gulf of Aqaba. This is an out-and-out betrayal. We are convinced that through their own experience, the Arab people with a tradition of fighting against imperialism will surely recognize the Soviet revisionist leading clique in all its ugliness as a betrayer of the interests of the Arab people and will never be taken in by it.

The great leader of the Chinese people Chairman Mao has said: "People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties, and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed." The Arab nation is a great nation. The Arab people are a heroic people. So long as they unite as one and persevere in the struggle, the Arab people will definitely defeat U.S. imperialism and its running dog, Israel, and win victory in the struggle. The Arab people are bound to win! U.S. imperialism is bound to be defeated!

36

Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol Broadcast to the Nation.¹

Jerusalem, May 28, 1967

The Cabinet today held a meeting to discuss the situation. At the end of the deliberations, the following decisions were adopted:

(1) The danger which confronts Israel as a result of the concentration of the Egyptian Army in Sinai and as a result of the blockade of Israeli shipping in the Red Sea is in full force. In view of this danger and for so long as it exists the necessity remains to continue to maintain our military readiness. The Government received a report on the measures of readiness which were taken and it states that the Israel Defence Forces

are fully prepared to defend the security of Israel. The Government notes with satisfaction the firm spirit of the people and of the Israel Defence Forces which are an expression and a guarantee of the strength of the State.

(2) The Government of Israel expresses its view that the blockade of the Straits of Tiran against Israeli shipping is the equivalent to aggression against Israel. We shall oppose it at the proper time in accordance with the right to self-defence vested in every state.

(3) The Government heard from the Minister for Foreign Affairs a report on his talks with the President of France, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of the United States on contacts with other states including the Soviet Union and on the growing readiness in the international arena to bring about without delay the speedy removal of the blockade which Egypt has imposed on the Straits of Tiran. There is no doubt that the mobilization of the Israel Defence Forces and their readiness for any test constituted and continue to constitute a decisive factor in the stimulation of world political activity. The Government laid down directives for the continuation of political action in the world arena which are designed to stimulate international forces to take effective measures to ensure free international passage in the Straits of Tiran. Lines of action were also determined for the moving of military concentration from Israel's southern border and for action to protect our sovereign rights, the security of our borders and to prevent aggression so that we shall not have to take action for self-defence with our military forces. The Government states that the Israel Defence Forces are sufficiently strong to defeat any aggressor and to ensure the sovereign rights of Israel.

Tomorrow I shall have the opportunity to clarify the standpoint of the Government in my statement before the Knesset.

¹ *Davar*, Tel Aviv, 29/5/1967.

37

Statement Issued by the Turkish Cabinet.¹**Ankara, May 28, 1967**

Turkey, which attaches great importance to peace and security in the area, has extended many efforts to this end and is seriously concerned about the current situation, which threatens peace. Turkey believes all nations should avoid taking action which imperils efforts to end the crisis.

Turkey believes as always that in looking at the situation the essential basis should be the U.N. Charter and the principles of right and justice. The Turkish Government takes into account its close relations with Arab countries as part of its policy of enjoying good relations with all its neighbours.

38

Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset on the 'Aqaba Blockade.²
[Excerpts]**Jerusalem, May 29, 1967**

A week ago, the ruler of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, announced the closing of the Straits to Israeli shipping and ships carrying cargo to Israel. Since then, he has several times repeated this statement and his threats against anyone who should try to break this illegal blockade.

The Government of Israel has repeatedly stated its determination to exercise its freedom of passage in the straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Eilat, and defend it in case of need. This is a supreme national interest on which no concession is possible and no compromise is admissible. It is clear to us—and I feel that it is now clear to the nations of the world—that so long as the blockade exists, peace is in danger. It is this grave situation that, in our opinion, obligates us parti-

cularly to find out, first of all and with great urgency, whether those governments that have undertaken to support and implement freedom of passage are prepared to translate their undertakings into the language of action in accordance with international law, which the Egyptian ruler is so criminally violating.

The Foreign Minister's brief visits to Paris, London and Washington were designed to clarify this question. He explained to the Presidents of the United States and France and the British Prime Minister that it was a matter of vital national interest, which our country will unflinchingly protect. From the Foreign Minister's conversation we learned that all the Governments with which he came in contact desired that the *status quo* which has recently been violated should be respected. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Britain have made strong public statements on the subject.

There is special interest in the attitude of the United States for its Government was the first to convey undertakings to Israel in 1957, in diplomatic exchanges, letters from the President and the Secretary of State, and public statements in the U.N. and other places.

After hearing President Johnson's statement of May 23, and our Foreign Minister's report of his talks in Washington, the Government was deeply impressed by the unambiguous stand of the United States in favor of the safeguarding of passage in these international waters. A similar attitude is expressed by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, in his public statement and his talks with our Foreign Minister. Other maritime States have already informed us of their readiness to effectively support freedom of passage, and we have been told that practical consultations on the subject are already taking place. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to expect that the States which support the principle of free passage should carry out and coordinate effective action in order to ensure that the Straits and the Gulf shall be open to the passage of the ships of all nations without discrimination within a short time. This expectation, which is founded on authoritative and express statements, has had a strong influence on the attitude and decisions of the Israel Government at this stage. There is no doubt that the readiness to protect freedom of passage which has

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 29/5/1967.² *Knesset Records*, No. 29, May 29-31, 1967, pp. 2283-84.

been shown by great nations has been influenced both by their attitude in principle and by their knowledge that the State of Israel will protect its rights.

It was our duty first of all to put international undertakings to the test. In the near future it will transpire whether this prospect is being realized. Israel's attitude in regarding the blocking of the Straits as an act of aggression against her remains fully in force. The Israel Government's statement at the United Nations Assembly on 1 March 1957 still expresses our policy with complete accuracy.

We are now at the apex of intense political action for the purpose of re-establishing the freedom of navigation. This action would not have been possible, and its chances would have been weak had it not been for our own strength and the justice of our aims. Moreover, the mutual relations which we have set up with the peoples of the world have helped us, and will continue to help us in the future, to increase our strength and protect our rights.

The Egyptian ruler's statements about the closing of the Straits, about acts of violence, about his aggressive intentions and troop concentrations, have raised the tension in the area to a peak. Colonel Nasser has created a position in which there is a danger of war.

On several occasions, I have spoken to the Knesset and the people about the increased strength of the Israel Defence forces and its reinforcement. Today our army is at the zenith of strength in manpower, know-how, fighting spirit and military equipment.

We must devote our attention not only to ensuring the freedom of passage, but also to the danger of military aggression led by Egypt. No sensible person will find it difficult to understand that so long as there exists a massive concentration of the forces of Egypt and her allies in the neighbourhood of our borders, a conflagration could break out. The Israel Defense Forces will therefore remain mobilized, at arms, ready for any test, and if the necessity arises they have the strength to defeat the aggressors.

Soldiers of Israel: No one knows better than you to what extent our power has increased in

recent years. The superiority of your strength over that of our enemies is today, more than ever, the guarantee of our security. Thanks to the steadfastness of your strength, which will enable you to defeat your enemy under any conditions, the Government of Israel will be able to take with confidence and resolution the momentous decisions that lie ahead, and which are imposed by our supreme responsibility for the security and welfare of the State.

39

Statement by Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada Before the National Assembly.¹

Rawalpindi, May 29, 1967

The Government of Pakistan have been watching with deep concern the recent developments in the Middle East which are fraught with grave repercussions. The House must have read the statements issued by the Foreign Office on May 20 and by me on May 24.

This explosive situation is the outcome of the massing of Israeli forces on Syrian borders and of a long chain of aggressive acts on the part of Israel against the neighbouring Arab countries. Israel has shown scant regard for the principles of the United Nations charter and for the resolutions of the Security Council.

The establishment of the state of Israel was against all canons of justice and morality and resulted in the uprooting of a million Arabs from their ancestral homes.

Pakistan has given steadfast and unstinted support to the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle for the restoration of their homeland. We believe that the cause of our Arab brethren is just and that it must and will prevail.

We have, through our permanent representative in the United Nations, voiced our support for the action taken by the Secretary General of the United Nations in accepting the demand of the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai and Gaza. The continued

¹ Pakistani Embassy, Beirut.

presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on the territory of the United Arab Republic without her consent would have been incompatible with her sovereignty.

The Government of Pakistan consider that the responsibility for precipitating the present crisis in the Middle East rests on Israel and that her claims and contentions are contrary to international law and have no foundation in recognised principles of justice. Israel has no legal right of passage in or through the Gulf of Aqaba. The U.A.R. is within her sovereign rights in denying passage to Israeli shipping through the straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Pakistan reaffirms her full support to Arab countries in their efforts to defend themselves and to repel aggression.

40

Editorial by the Official Organ of the Chinese Communist Party "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily).¹

Peking, May 29, 1967

The aggressive schemes and war threats carried out by U.S. imperialism against the Arab countries by means of Israel are being bravely resisted by the Arab people. The Arab countries have taken resolute action in self-defence and to rebuff the aggressors. The entire Arab region is seething with a new angry tide against the U.S. imperialists. A stirring and excellent situation prevails in the region.

The struggle between U.S.-led imperialism and the Arab people is a battle between aggression and anti-aggression, oppression and anti-oppression. U.S. imperialism has long been unscrupulously pursuing a neocolonialist policy in the region, violating the independence and sovereignty of the Arab countries and plundering the Arab people and their natural resources. It has been the root cause of all the troubles in the Arab region.

By creating an Israel, U.S. imperialism has thrust a knife in the heart of the Arab region. The so-called "U.N. Emergency Force" U.S.

imperialism caused to be sent to Gaza is in fact a police force for suppressing the Arab national-liberation movement. The United States has carried out incessant armed intervention, subversion and sabotage against the Arab countries. Its Sixth Fleet arrogantly prowls the Mediterranean, posing the constant threat of war to the Arab countries. U.S. imperialism is therefore the mortal enemy of the 100 million Arab people.

The contradiction between the Arab people and U.S. imperialism is one between life and death; it is irreconcilable. The so-called "Tashkent spirit" is pure deceit. How can there be conciliation and peaceful coexistence between the aggressor and the victim, the oppressor and the oppressed? It is inevitable that the contradiction between the Arab people and U.S. imperialism should come to a head. The Arab people must and certainly can thoroughly defeat colonialism and neo-colonialism headed by the United States.

At present, U.S. imperialism and its accomplices and pawns have been thrown into confusion. They are doing their utmost to suppress the Arab people's just struggle against imperialism and stabilize the position of colonialism and neo-colonialism. But their performance doesn't amount to much. It is the same old trick the imperialists have always played: one is the gunboat policy of armed intimidation; the other is the policy of political pressure through deals between the "big powers."

In his statement of May 23, Lyndon Johnson openly called for the redispach of the "U.N. Emergency Force" to Gaza and attacked the United Arab Republic, stating that the U.A.R.'s action of self-defence in closing the Gulf of Aqaba was an "illegal" act. The U.S. Ambassador to the U.A.R. even flagrantly declared that the United States "will use force if necessary to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open." This is an undisguised threat of war. The Johnson government has brazenly put forward five unreasonable "demands" to the U.A.R., and a "diplomatic offensive" has been launched following numerous exchanges among the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant has travelled on errands everywhere with the aim of interfering in the Middle East situation. All this is the "power politics" of the imperialists,

¹ *Peking Review*, 2/6/1967, pp. 34-35.

the aim of which is to force the Arab countries into submission by bringing several "big powers" together into an alliance.

The Soviet revisionist ruling clique has once again played the role of chief accomplice in U.S. imperialism's activities to intimidate the Arab countries by force and exert political pressure on them. In a statement released on May 23 on the Middle East situation, the Soviet revisionist clique did not utter a single word about the U.S. imperialist aggression in the Arab region. On the other hand, for its own ulterior purposes, it raised a hue and cry about the "violation" of the peace and security of the region, the "concern" this has brought to people, and so on. This was followed by the sudden appearance in Moscow of British Foreign Secretary George Brown for talks with Kosygin and Gromyko. According to what Brown admitted in Moscow, they have discussed the question of "a continuing United Nations presence in the Middle East" and "freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba." Brown stated with glee that the main theme of their discussion was "how we can stop a conflagration blowing up." It is clear that the talks between Brown and the Soviet revisionist chieftains were carried on within the framework set by Johnson. The so-called U.S.-Soviet "united action" is designed to force the Arab people to surrender to U.S. imperialism and its lackey. This is another instance of the Soviet revisionist ruling clique's big betrayal and sell-out of the Arab people's cause of opposing imperialism.

British imperialism is working hand in glove with U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. Britain is engaged in both colonialist and neo-colonialist undertakings in the region. Clinging fast to the U.S. imperialists as a support and serving as their cat's-paw, the British imperialists are trying to preserve their colonialist interests with U.S. backing and clamouring with the United States for "using force" against the Arab countries. Obviously, British imperialism which is in its dotage has clean forgotten the lessons of Suez in 1956.

U.S. imperialism, British imperialism and Soviet revisionism—all seem big in appearance. Hands linked in opposition to the Arab people, they seem to be "awesome." But be they imperialists or revisionists, they are all decadent

forces with one foot in the grave; they are all paper tigers.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, teaches us: "Bigness is nothing to be afraid of. Is not U.S. imperialism very big? We gave it a rebuff and that was that. So there are some big things in the world that are really not to be feared."

Does U.S. imperialism want to use force? Then it's necessary to take up positions and prepare to meet it. Does U.S. imperialism want to exert pressure? Then it's necessary to resist it with resolution. Does U.S. imperialism want to peddle deception through Soviet revisionism and interfere through the U.N.? Then it's necessary to maintain a cool head, refuse to be taken in and to expose its schemes. So long as people dare to carry out and persist in a tit-for-tat struggle in this way, U.S. imperialism, British imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the U.S. imperialist tool, the United Nations, will be defeated, will become bankrupt and will collapse in face of the people's might.

In the world today, the East wind prevails over the West wind. The time is long past when imperialism could ride roughshod everywhere with its boats and guns. Long past too is the time when the principal figures of a few "big powers," sitting over cups of coffee, could impose on the oppressed nations the result of their deals. The situation throughout the world at present is very favourable for the Arab people. The 14 million south Vietnamese people have dealt stunning blows at U.S. imperialism. The great victories of the Vietnamese people's war to resist U.S. aggression and save their country serves as a powerful support for the Arab people's struggle against U.S. imperialism and, in its turn, the anti-U.S. imperialist struggle of the Arab people constitutes a powerful support for the revolutionary cause of the peoples of the world against imperialism. The farther U.S. imperialism stretches its tentacles, the more scattered will be its forces and the better placed will be the people of the world to rise in attack.

So long as the 100 million Arab people unite and persist in struggle, they will certainly win final victory in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its tool, Israel!

41

News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.¹ [Excerpts]**Jerusalem, May 30, 1967**

Less than two weeks ago a change took place in the security balance in this region. The two most spectacular signs of this change were the illegal attempts to blockade the international passageway at the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and the abnormal buildup of Egyptian troops on the Israeli frontier. The government and people of Israel intend to insure that these two changes are rescinded, and in the shortest possible time. The emphasis in the Prime Minister's statement yesterday on the time factor should seriously be taken into account. The changes produced two weeks ago were so drastic and far-reaching that some time is obviously necessary to bring about the modification. The course that we have adopted and that we are embarked on is one that in our judgement is most likely to bring about the annulment of these two developments which have brought the Middle East to its present tense situation and made this area a focus of universal anxiety.

Let us (word indistinct) both of these factors in the present tension. The problem of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran is both an Israeli and an international problem. For Israel this is a central and vital national interest that will under no circumstances whatever be surrendered or abandoned. It is the kind of national interest for which a nation stakes all that it has, all its interests, and for which it is ready to assume all responsibility and to undertake every sacrifice. Now, if our southern neighbor believes that all this—the result of 10 years of tension and effort—can be canceled in 10 minutes, then he is making a serious error. Let there be no mistake then about the crucial character of this issue or about the unlimited effort which the Israelis are prepared to invest in the restoration of the legal situation. I said, however, that it is not an Israeli issue alone. The doctrine of free passage has been proclaimed and has been practiced by the major maritime powers. There are others

whose interests are prejudiced, whose principles are violated, and whose trade is damaged by the illegal announcement of last week. Therefore, the most natural thing in the world for Israel to do is to take a little time to try to clarify whether the task of insuring the opening of this waterway for international shipping is one which it must confront alone or whether there were others who share this doctrine and principle and who would concert efforts to achieve the same result.

... It is clear from the communications and the statements that have been exchanged on this point that there are others in the world who are prepared to make common cause for the restoration of the legal situation in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. There is no doubt that the readiness shown by the big powers to protect the freedom of passage has been influenced by their attitude in principle and by their knowledge that the State of Israel will protect its rights. We will have no part of any suggestion or arrangement which implies that all other ships can go through, but not Israeli ships. Of course, in terms of legal sovereignty any nation that possesses military forces and military equipment can (words indistinct) in the absence of international agreement limiting their (?disposition). But here, as distinct from the first problems I mentioned, the issue is not one of law but one of policy and security interests.

The Israeli defense preparations are serious preparations, and if I were the president of Egypt—I agree it is a most unlikely possibility—I would look at them with respect. If I were he, I would look at them with respect, remembering what has happened in the past.

This Israeli buildup results from the abnormal Egyptian concentration in Sinai. It is ridiculous to say, as I have heard said, that the Israeli people cannot, if necessary, endure tension over a period of time. They can do so. It is a heavy burden of course. But to say, as I have seen in the press, that this weighs upon us so much that we cannot—even if necessary—endure it, is, I think, to underestimate the courage our people are capable of. They are capable of a quick courage that enables them to strike in time of need.

They are also capable of what is in a sense a higher courage, the courage required for a patient, tenacious effort, so long as the purpose is

¹ Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in English, 1100 GMT, 30/5/1967.

reasonable and there is a rational and specific end. Perhaps this (words indistinct) I cannot think of any time, not even including 1948. I do not know of any time in our nation's history when the flood of sympathy, solidarity, support, and hope for Israel's triumph and faith in its capacity to emerge from its ordeals have burned as brightly, strongly, and over so wide an area of the globe as today. This in itself is an asset of no mean (word indistinct), time, and weight if it becomes necessary for us to live through even more drastic days than today.

Announcer: The BBC television correspondent noted that Mr. Eban had spoken of the fact that Israel was prepared to wait a limited time for the reopening of the strait. Was there a deadline?

Answer: Well, if I say a limited period instead of days or weeks, it is really not because of a deficiency of vocabulary. It is because this lack of definition to some extent is inherent in our position. But I really mean a short time, as in my own (word indistinct) of my heart there are certain periods assessed in days. But whether I would say a few days or weeks... (sentence unfinished—ed.) At any rate you can eliminate from your vocabulary all other description of time—that is, years, and months.

Question: Have you given up hope of a diplomatic solution, particularly through the United Nations?

Answer: When you ask me if I have given up hope of a solution through the United Nations you imply that I might at some time have had hope of a solution through the United Nations. My own belief in the curative powers of the United Nations for severe international ailments is, I am sorry to say, very limited as a result of experience. Those who have swallowed the medicine as often as we have should be regarded as experts on its effects. The United Nations, I think, (words indistinct) of the century. The United Nations did not emerge from the events of the last few weeks with brilliance and credit. In fact, we find ourselves here with a situation which has in large measure arisen from errors of U.N. judgment. I again recall the two main symptoms are the buildup of forces in Sinai and the announcement of the intention to close the Strait of Tiran. The United Nations had specific responsibility for

each of those problems. In 1957 the object of the U.N. presence was to insure that there would be legality and nonbelligerency in the gulf and that there would be a less explosive situation regarding the balance of forces in Sinai.

Question: (words indistinct) contacts between the prime minister of the Soviet Union and Israel?

Answer: There have been communications between the prime minister of the Soviet Union and Israel. I presume the Soviet Premier is in touch with other governments of the area as well. The general trend of his letter to Mr. Eshkol is very strong and on the whole stresses an appeal for a peaceful solution. I see a certain anxiety in that letter about the results of conflicts and a tendency to influence Israel to exhaust all possibilities for peaceful solutions. It is not necessary for anyone to urge restraint on Israel. I very much hope that I will not receive any more letters from anyone urging us to restrain ourselves, which we are very capable of from our own experience and judgment. I think that point has been made enough, perhaps too much. Incidentally, we have also received other letters, although less official, urging somewhat less restraint. It is not a question of writing letters to Israel about restraint, however. I do not know of many countries that would have, even for such a short time as this, embarked on an exploration of the possibilities of achieving a solution through international pressure if one of their major harbors had been blocked by an act of (word indistinct) war. That is what I mean by saying that the events of the last two weeks make it a waste of paper and ink to tell us that there is sometimes virtue in a policy of waiting for some effective, nonmilitary action. Although there is, of course, some danger in action, there is also a danger in inaction. We are fully aware of each of these dangers. The Soviet influence should, in our view, be applied in Cairo and Damascus.

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42

Press Statement by a West German Government Spokesman.¹ [Excerpts]

Bonn, May 30, 1967

[The West German Government] hopes for a peaceful solution of the Middle Eastern crisis which guarantees free entry into the Gulf of Akaba for ships bound for the Israel port of Eilat. . .

German weapons deliveries to Israel were the result of massive Soviet arms deliveries to the Arabs. They were meant for self-defence. It is unjust to blame arms suppliers for the tensions of an area. If one accepted that philosophy, then one would have to apply the same rule to those who have supplied Egypt with arms.

43

Address by the Secretary General of the Rumanian Communist Party Ceausescu to the Armed Forces Aktiv.² [Excerpt]

Bucharest, May 31, 1967

An especially grave situation profoundly disquieting for all peoples has recently been created in the Middle East. The Rumanian people support the just struggle of the Arab peoples for the defense of their independence and their democratic and social conquests and for the implementation of their aspirations of national unity. We denounce all the plots of reaction and of the imperialist circles, headed by American imperialism, aimed at the countries of the Middle East.

In our opinion a war or an armed conflict between the Arab states and Israel would not serve the one or the other, but only reactionary circles and international imperialism. This is why our people express their hope that all will be done to avoid an armed conflict, that diver-

gencies will be solved by way of understanding between the sides, and that rational and fair agreements will be reached that will take into account the legitimate rights of the interested peoples.

The interests of the peoples of the Middle East and the general interests of peace require that there be relations of collaboration between the countries of that area, require the exclusion of interference by imperialist reaction in their internal affairs, and insuring economic, national, and social progress of those countries.

44

Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East.³

London, May 31, 1967

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): One of the newspapers opened its leader this morning with a remark that it would be a considerable—I think it said notable—amount of self-restraint if we left the word “Suez” out of our speeches. Without going quite so far as that, I wish to say to the House that the situation in the Middle East, while looking less tense than it looked at the weekend, is nevertheless still very highly charged. If, at the end of this debate, we have left the general temperature at least no higher than it is as we find it, I think that that will be a sufficient compensation for any dullness there is in our speeches during the day.

For most of what I have to say, and no doubt in the debate which will follow, we shall be discussing the situation between the Arab countries and Israel, but I want right at the start to remind the House that the political, economic and strategic interests of too many countries are involved in the Middle East for it to be other than extremely difficult for a war, once started in that area, to be confined to the countries immediately concerned. If we are to get the present Arab-Israel

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 31/5/1967.

² Bucharest Domestic Service in Rumanian, 1800 GMT, 31/5/1967.

³ *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, 31/5/1967, col. 100-14. (This source is hereafter cited as *Hansard's*.)

crisis in perspective, we must see it in a wider context.

It is indeed true that this greater risk of war which we face today stems not so much from any increased enmity between Israel and the Arab States—bad though that is—not so much from any failure of the United Nations in precipitously withdrawing the United Nations force, but from the fact that into this area over quite some time now there have been pouring vast quantities of guns, armour and aircraft, not for the purposes of the local conflicts within the area, but for purposes of changing the global balance of power.

That is why it must be the basis of what I have to say, that even though we are now talking mainly about the Arab-Israel dispute, and ways of preventing that flaring up, it would be a bold man who would say that just to settle today's immediate problems would remove the continuing risk of war in that area.

Having said that, and despite the startling suddenness with which the crisis blew up, behind it is the intractable and longstanding dispute between the Arab countries and the State of Israel.

It is 20 years since the United Nations first tried to tackle this problem. Despite many efforts it has not been possible to find a permanent settlement; but, even so, it is here that the United Nations has more than anywhere else in the world been able to play a vital and constructive rôle in keeping the fires damped.

From 1957 until a year or so ago, there had been no serious flare-ups. In the South, between Egypt and Israel, the United Nations Emergency Force provided a buffer between the two sides, so that there have been almost no incidents. It also kept a detachment at Sharm esh Sheikh on the tip of the Sinai peninsula.

It was on the basis of the understanding that the detachment would remain there, and on the basis of firm declarations that there would be free passage for ships into the Gulf of Aqaba, that the Israelis finally withdrew their forces from Sinai in early 1957.

On the armistice lines elsewhere, there were more incidents, but the United Nations Chief of Staff, with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation and its corps of observers, worked

hard and with considerable success to keep the temperature down.

Over the past year or so, however, a new and more dangerous pattern of incidents emerged: groups of terrorists, infiltrated into Israel, have placed explosives on roads, bridges, railway lines. The amount of damage and the loss of life have not been great, but they have caused the Israel Government, in their turn, to mount retaliatory action against the territory of neighbouring countries from which they have come.

We have always made clear our view that the Governments concerned have a duty to prevent the mounting of attacks from their territory against their neighbours; that it is inexcusable to disown responsibility for the attacks, and even more inexcusable to praise publicly their perpetrators, as the Syrians have done. But we have always made equally clear to Israel our view that retaliation was not the right answer and that it was dangerous because one could never know where it would end.

Unfortunately, in the Security Council, the highest organ of the United Nations charged with the maintenance of peace, there has been a frustrating situation. We and others have tried to avoid partisanship, to pass judgments of cases on their merits in the light of the evidence supplied by the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, and to get all parties to co-operate in preserving the peace. The Soviet attitude has, however, been different. Twenty years ago they supported the resolution in the General Assembly which led to the creation of Israel.

In 1955, however, they switched their policy—one can hardly avoid saying, cynically—and they have since then been wholly one-sided in their action and in their behaviour. When the Israel Government are at fault, they are rightly criticised in the Security Council, and a resolution embodying that criticism can be passed. When an Arab Government are at fault the Soviet veto is used against any resolution criticising that Government.

For example, last autumn, when the Israel Government took to the Security Council a complaint about a terrorist raid in the north of Israel, no action ensued. Soon after that the Israel Government mounted an attack on the Jordanian village of Samu and we strongly and publicly

criticised their action at the time as unjustified and inexpedient, and in this case the Security Council passed a condemnatory resolution. Clearly, there has been no equity in this situation, this double approach.

This pattern of incidents and retaliation has continued this year. The Secretary-General of the United Nations tried to calm the situation by using the machinery of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission which had until then been boycotted for many years by Israel. We supported him fully in this initiative. The Commission met on several occasions, but despite the efforts of the Commission terrorist attacks in Israel were renewed. After an incident in the demilitarised zone south of Lake Tiberias, in early April, Israel attacked Syrian defensive positions from the air. In purely military terms, this action appeared to be successful, but the danger of escalation in all this was clearly patent. Apart from the usual propaganda machine, it should be recognised that during this period the United Arab Republic, despite the fact that it came under attack from other Arab States, nevertheless acted with notable restraint. About the middle of May Israeli leaders spoke strongly of the latest incursions from Syria and warned that they could not continue to tolerate them.

Perhaps on account of these statements it became widely, but, according to our information, erroneously, believed that some large-scale attack on Syria was imminent. It was then, on 14th and 15th May, that the Government of the United Arab Republic started to take large and ostentatious military precautions. On 16th May they took the very grave step of demanding the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. I have already spoken of the rôle of this force and will refer to it again in a moment if I may. It was set up in 1956 to supervise the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. It had remained on the Sinai frontier ever since as a buffer between Israel and the United Arab Republic.

There will, no doubt, be endless legal argument about the juridical position of President Nasser's action, but, in my view, this is not the point. One can sympathise with the Secretary-General confronted with that demand, but it cannot be right that when a fire is known to be imminent the fire brigade should be ordered to

depart.

Not only that, but there are wider implications. Even if the U.N.E.F. has not been the sole reason for the relative quiet which has been maintained over the past 10 years, nevertheless it has obviously played a very large part in it, and has shown what can be done by the United Nations in peacekeeping. But to remove the force in this way was bound to cast doubt on the credibility of such efforts elsewhere, and, thereby, risk intensifying other problems and other tensions in other parts of the world.

Mr. John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell) rose—

Mr. Brown: May I go on a bit perhaps?

Nevertheless, the decision was taken, and the Secretary-General decided without consultation with the appropriate organs of the United Nations that he had to accept the withdrawal of the force. This action clearly altered the whole situation in a very important and material respect.

Having achieved this result, possibly with unexpected ease, President Nasser announced on 22nd May that, following the removal of the U.N.E.F. detachment from Sharm el Sheikh, his Government intended to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, and to the carriage of strategic goods to Israel.

There are two serious aspects to this. In the first place, the Israel Government declared as long ago as 1957 that they would regard interference with their shipping as an aggressive act entitling them to take measures of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. There was, therefore, grave risk of a military conflict arising out of this situation. But, secondly, there was a wider aspect. This is not a matter which concerns only Israel and the United Arab Republic. It is also a matter of direct concern to all maritime nations interested in the unfettered movement of peaceful shipping in all parts of the world.

Our delegate to the General Assembly in 1957 declared that

“the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway, through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.”

He went on:

“Her Majesty's Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping, and they are prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.”

Other delegates made similar, in some cases even

stronger, declarations. Incidentally, some of those declarations make very interesting reading now, and Members may care to look at them. They are contained in the official records of the United Nations General Assembly (XI Session Plenary Meetings 1956-57, Volume 2), which is available in the Library. As the House knows, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister reaffirmed the Government's position in similar terms on this subject last week.

This is not just an arguable legal matter. It carries great political and economic consequences. Its repercussions could affect the rights of navigation in many parts of the world, including, be it noted, some of the maritime exits from the Soviet Union.

It is worth noting just in passing that this decision was announced while the Secretary-General of the United Nations was actually on his way to Cairo to discuss with the United Arab Republic Government means of dealing with the grave situation which had arisen.

As the House knows, I went to Moscow at that very time, and during my talks with Russian leaders I was convinced that the Soviet Government, despite their public statements and their very one-sided approach, were, in fact, very concerned about the Middle East situation and very anxious to help to prevent it from getting out of hand.

I made clear to them the importance we attach to immediate steps to get restraint observed by those in the area and the need to use any time thus gained to find acceptable solutions to the problems created, especially that of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

I also took the opportunity when giving an open, public lecture in Moscow—one of the few opportunities yet granted to a representative of a Western Power—to make the same point in public. This is what I said:

"Your country is a very great power. This is a fact. It imposes on you great responsibilities. In particular, it imposes the responsibility of using that power to see that peace of the world is maintained. To discharge this requires both restraint and creative imagination. I ask you to approach the situation in the Middle East with this responsibility in mind."

As members of the United Nations, we, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, including, as I have said,

the Soviet Union, welcomed the admission of Israel. We must continue to try to find some way in which Israel can live without fear of her neighbours and her neighbours can live without fear of Israel. This is just as much a Russian responsibility as it is for any of the other countries of the world.

At the same time, the French Government proposed that there should be discussions between the United States, U.S.S.R., France and Britain to seek a solution to this problem. We for our part warmly welcomed this proposal and so informed the three other Governments. However, I regret to tell the House that the Soviet Government have declined to take part in such discussions.

In all this background there has been some discussion of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. I explained Her Majesty's Government's attitude to this Declaration in answer to a Parliamentary Question on 19th December last, and the position remains unchanged since then. The Declaration was a statement made by three Governments about their intentions with regard to the supply of arms to the area. It also declared their opposition to the use of force in the area and their intention to take such action as they thought fit if force were used or if there were a threat of force. At that time the three Governments concerned were virtually the only suppliers of arms to the area and Britain herself had forces in several countries in the area.

The situation has entirely changed since that date. We do not now claim to play any special rôle in the Arab/Israel dispute. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Her Majesty's Government have a duty to support efforts to keep the peace everywhere; we are deeply concerned with peace and stability in the Middle East, and we have, of course, important national interests there. But we regard the United Nations as primarily responsible for peacekeeping. I am in these words paraphrasing what was said by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, in 1963, and re-affirmed by my right hon. Friend the present Prime Minister.

These, then, are the recent events and some of the considerations against which we have had to decide the course of our own actions. But our actions have not only to match the events of this particular crisis as it develops. They have to fit

into the broader setting of our Middle East policy as a whole.

Our interests in the Middle East, notably those affecting our trade and our investment, as elsewhere, depend on the maintenance of conditions in which peaceful and orderly development in the area can proceed. There are some areas of the Middle East where we can contribute directly to the maintenance of these conditions. The Persian Gulf is a clear example where our contribution has been both crucial and successful.

South Arabia presents, on the other hand, a more complicated and difficult example, but there, too, we are still striving to find the basis for these conditions; and I do not despair of eventual success. But we shall be debating that subject separately on another occasion.

There are two persistent features of the Middle East situation which threaten this peaceful and orderly development. They are the bitter hostility of the Arabs towards Israel and the deep-seated division within the Arab world. As I said earlier, there is also the extent to which others from outside are intervening in the situation. We deplore these conflicts and have no wish to take sides in them. But since they dominate so much of the Middle East scene, as recent events have demonstrated, I should like to state clearly our attitude to each of them in turn.

I do not want to be drawn into the endless argument about the rights and wrongs of the termination of the Palestine mandate and the creation of the State of Israel. It was certainly not a happy experience for this country.

But all that was a long time ago. It is a matter of great regret that it has not been possible to heal the wounds from those days and to make a final peace settlement. We understand the feelings of the Arab peoples on this subject; and as a major contributor to U.N.R.W.A. we are acutely aware of the problem of the Palestinian refugees. We would like to see a fair and full settlement of that whole problem.

But, having said that, the State of Israel has now been a member of the United Nations for nearly 20 years, recognised by most Governments of the world, and the Soviet Union were among the very first to do so. Two and a half million people live in Israel. This fact cannot now be ignored and recognising this cannot reasonably

be attacked as "taking sides in an Arab/Israel dispute."

We trade with Israel, as we trade with her Arab neighbours. We have friendly relations with the Israel Government, as we have, or wish to have, friendly relations with all her Arab neighbours.

In the same way, we do not seek either to be involved in, or to encourage, the dispute which has been dividing the Arab countries into two hostile camps. In our relations with the Arab countries we desire to develop our connections and our relations with the Arab States, of whatever political complexion, to recall and continue our participation not only in their attainment of freedom, but also to further the achievements of constructive Arab nationalism.

I recognise in Arab nationalism one of the most significant forces for change in the Middle East today. I have striven, for instance, to make an ally of it in South Arabia, and, despite setbacks, I shall continue to strive for that.

But, equally, I recognise that no one party, no one country, and no one group of countries, has a monopoly of Arab nationalism. It is at least as strong a driving force in those who seek for peaceful change as in those who seek to pursue their aims by methods of violence.

We must not fall into the trap of regarding, or allowing others to regard, our Middle East policy as a struggle to the death between ourselves and President Nasser. I got to know President Nasser over a long period of years, and I have a high regard for him. At the same time, I am not blind to his errors. I believe that he has long been following a profoundly wrong course in South Arabia, and I believe that in the last two weeks he rashly adopted a policy in the Middle East which could endanger, not only himself and his country, but the peace of the whole world.

We are not setting out—to use the colloquialism—to "topple Nasser," as hon. Members opposite once foolishly attempted to do. But neither are we prepared to accept that he has the right to topple another Middle Eastern nation at the risk of plunging us all into war.

Against this background, our aim in this present crisis, it seems to me, must be to prevent the confrontation which now exists from bursting into a conflagration, and to seek with others a

negotiated settlement achieved by peaceful means. There are many possible solutions by which the Gulf of Aqaba might be kept open on terms which both Israel and Egypt could reasonably be asked to accept; and any solution must also satisfy our own interests and those of other maritime nations concerned with shipping in those seas.

I am under no illusions about the difficulties either of maintaining the peace or of achieving out of it such a just and equitable settlement. Neither must we, in my view, necessarily confine our efforts to achieving it to only one forum. We must pursue our objective by every diplomatic means available to us. Clearly, the most appropriate and, ultimately, were it available, the best way to work for this settlement would be within the machinery of the United Nations.

Despite all the setbacks which the United Nations has received, the Charter does set out the basic principles which should govern the policies and actions of nations. Moreover, the main purpose of the Charter is to guarantee the integrity of all members of the United Nations, both great and small, and, just at this moment, a small country, the State of Israel, is being threatened.

We are proud of being a founder member of the United Nations and of being one of the permanent members of the Security Council. We believe that the strength and development of this great organisation are essential to world peace. In the Middle East, the area which is now so disturbed, the men of the United Nations Emergency Force have made a real contribution to preserving peace for nearly a decade. I make no apology for returning to this, as I think that it is worth dwelling on it for a moment. Their sudden removal symbolises the crisis that has so suddenly broken upon us.

Here was a military force with men from Yugoslavia, India, Canada and the Scandinavian countries which had worked together as a team and was probably the best United Nations peace-keeping force that had ever existed. Its disappearance is, at once, a sharp blow to the United Nations and to international law and order.

I must emphasise again that the removal of the United Nations Emergency Force at a moment when it was most needed was one of the most serious aspects of this whole business. The United

Nations could play a tremendous rôle in peace-keeping. Until its members can agree among themselves as to how this is to be done—and here the Security Council has an absolutely vital part to play—the rule of law in the world will be gravely jeopardised.

We welcomed the initiative of U Thant in going to Cairo, and his report draws attention to all the dangers of the present situation, including the explosive position in the Gulf. It makes various proposals for remedies. What is most needed now is a breathing space to enable these proposals to be fully considered and to enable the United Nations to exercise its unique rôle as a conciliator.

In this moderating rôle it must urge conciliation on both sides, on the Egyptians and on the Israelis. It is in order to gain this breathing space that Lord Caradon and others are working so hard at the present time to get support for a resolution in the Security Council which urges restraint and conciliation.

The Secretary-General referred in his report to the need for all concerned to

“exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension.”

We would consider as acts of belligerence any unilateral act to close the Gulf of Aqaba or any acts of aggression committed by either side on the Israel-Arab border.

The main task of the United Nations is, in fact, to work hard to reduce tension on both sides and, if that is possible, to secure a reduction in the forces which have now gathered on all the frontiers.

Once this conciliation and thinning-out process gets under way, there will be an urgent need for some new form of United Nations presence which would help to keep the two sides apart, as U.N.E.F. did during the last 10 years.

Such a United Nations presence might take many forms. It could grow out of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, which played an important rôle on the Egyptian-Israeli frontier before it was succeeded by U.N.E.F. It might be some entirely new body. Whatever form emerges, I believe that the Secretary-General should in any case send his personal representative to the area to help with the task of conciliation. I hope that U Thant will be able to find somebody

of real political stature and experience to carry out this very difficult task.

I am sure that the responsibilities of any new United Nations body should extend to both sides of the frontier so as to be, to that extent, independent of any one of the countries concerned. The Israelis have, unwisely, in my view, rejected this in the past, and we have made our view inescapably clear to them in the last few days. These are the kinds of directions in which we think the United Nations must continue to work.

Our policy, as I have said, is to work in the United Nations and through the United Nations. But, at the end of the day, the United Nations is only the sum of its members, and there are clear limitations on it at this moment.

Speaking for ourselves, we could not be satisfied with a situation in which a numerical majority in New York are satisfied with an inequitable settlement which will merely ensure that an Arab-Israel war is inevitable sooner or later. Therefore, we have not confined our diplomatic activity to New York. We have also been in touch, both directly and through our Ambassadors, with other Governments in their own capitals.

Although we should not make the mistake of assuming that there are not other grave dangers which could spark off a war, nevertheless, as I have said, the centre of the present crisis seems pretty clearly to be the Gulf of Aqaba. The immediate crucial problem is freedom of navigation there. We are, therefore, in the closest touch with other maritime countries which share with us a vital interest in the freedom of the seas.

We have explained our own position to these other Governments. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said at Margate on 24th May, this is still as it was in 1957—that the Straits of Tiran must be regarded as an international waterway through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. As he also said:

“Her Majesty’s Government will assert this right on behalf of all British shipping and is prepared to join with others to secure a general recognition of this right.”

Our recent diplomatic exchanges have shown that many other countries, as in 1957, share our views on this right of free passage. We are now discussing with them what we and they can do together to assert this right and to secure its general recognition. My noble friend Lord

Caradon has already publicly stated our position in the Security Council of the United Nations. But we cannot be sure that the Security Council will be able to agree on a clear and unequivocal statement of the position as we and others see it.

We have, therefore, decided to consult other like-minded nations about the issuing of a clear declaration by the international maritime community that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway into which and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Such a declaration, whether in an outside or a United Nations forum—preferable as the latter would be—would, I believe, have a substantive part to play in maintaining and prolonging the restraint which at present enables peace to be held in the area.

By so doing, it would give us the extra time to try to find the longer-term solutions about the use of the Gulf—including possibly a special convention enshrining its status, as applies to some other international waterways. But we must, of course, face the fact that action in the United Nations, or declarations made by nations outside the United Nations, may not be enough to secure the right of innocent passage to which we and all maritime nations attach such importance.

It goes without saying that we certainly hope that they will. I trust that it also goes without saying that we shall use every diplomatic effort to see that they do. But we would be failing in our duty if we were not now consulting others concerned about the situation that would arise if these initiatives I have outlined were to fail.

During the last week, while the House was in Recess, the Middle East moved close to the brink of war. Only those of us who were involved deeply in the events of last weekend know how close we came to seeing acts of war from which the waves of destruction might have spread out to engulf us all. Through the efforts of several countries, including, I am proud to say, our own, this horror was averted.

But although none of the countries of the Middle East has yet stepped over the brink, the abyss remains. Time is desperately short. Unless the international community shoulders fully its responsibilities and asserts itself to secure quickly a just and equitable settlement, a crisis more grave and threatening will inevitably be upon us. To

avert this, I pledge the untiring diplomatic efforts of this country.

45

Statement by British Conservative Party Leader Heath in a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East.¹

London, May 31, 1967

Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley): The House greatly appreciates the fact that the Government have arranged this debate on the first day after the House has reassembled and, in particular, before the Prime Minister leaves for his discussions with the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. As the Foreign Secretary has said, we are debating a situation which has arisen in the Middle East during the Recess. This is not the debate on Aden, which is still to come—although it is to some extent impossible to separate entirely the situation in Aden from the remainder of the situation in the Middle East.

I am sure that the Foreign Secretary was quite right to emphasise in his speech the gravity of the present situation. I believe that what we are debating is without doubt potentially the most dangerous international situation since Cuba—much more dangerous than the Indo-Pakistan conflict, unpleasant though that was, because the interests of other Powers were not directly involved in that conflict.

In some ways, I think, this situation is more dangerous even than the war in Vietnam. This, in my view, is because, in South-East Asia, the forces of the Powers involved are, to a considerable extent, under control and every step, though involving risk, can be carefully weighed before it is taken. Indeed, this proved to be true of Cuba, where there was a direct confrontation between the two super Powers, but where there was always a means of communication between them.

The situation in the Middle East today is quite different. The forces involved are not under any direct control of the major Powers, who may

themselves become involved. This seems to me to be the root of the immense danger which exists at the moment. There are dangers that raids and counter-raids—for example, by the Palestine Liberation Army from the Gaza Strip—will, now that the United Nations Emergency Force has been removed, escalate into war. There is the danger of provocation leading to counteraction and then full-scale conflict. There is the danger that, in desperation at the ineffectiveness of international action in the face of an economic blockade, of Israel deciding to “go it alone.”

The Foreign Secretary has made a very important statement in his definition of belligerence and aggression, in which he said that any attempt to block the Straits could be a belligerent act. This, of course, is an immensely important statement in relation to any action which followed the unblocking of the Straits by Israel in the event of no international action having been taken.

Surely, one of the problems in the Middle East is always what is the definition of “aggression.” This has become one of the fundamental problems about the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration—although the right hon. Gentleman has made it clear that, as far as Britain is concerned, the Declaration is not in force.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned another point in connection with the definition on which I would like to press him further. Perhaps the Prime Minister can amplify. As I understood him, the Foreign Secretary said that the Government would not be able to accept a majority at New York in the United Nations which meant an inequitable settlement. It must be the judgment of the Government whether a settlement is inequitable, or whether a resolution is inequitable. Therefore, in certain circumstances, the Government would find themselves having to reject such a settlement, which would presumably mean the use of the veto or a decision not to carry out a resolution of the United Nations. This is a very important statement. It may well prove to be justified, but, if it is possible in the present situation, I would like the Prime Minister to amplify the statement.

Mr. G. Brown: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be replying later, but I would not want any misunderstanding to arise. The words I used were “We could not be satisfied with

¹ *Ibid.*, col. 115-26.

a situation in which a numerical majority are satisfied," etc., etc. That means that, if such a situation were to come about, we would have to find ways and means of trying to improve upon it. That is different from the words the right hon. Gentleman has used, which said that we could not accept, etc.

Mr. Heath: I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary. This is an important statement from which serious consequences could follow. When he says "etc. etc." he is presumably referring to an inequitable settlement and, therefore, if the judgment of the Government were that a settlement was not just, they would have to take further action to bring about a just settlement.

There is another danger which we cannot ignore in the present situation. It is that President Nasser and the Arab countries will come to believe that having got rid of the U.N. Emergency Force, completed their own build-up—now very substantial—secured Soviet support, in public at any rate, and with Great Britain apparently in the process of withdrawing from certain Middle East commitments and the United States preoccupied in South-East Asia, this is the moment when they should finally attempt to liquidate the State of Israel from the Middle East. I do not believe that this is a danger which in the present heady atmosphere can be entirely ignored. Therefore, these are the very real dangers of the present situation which the Foreign Secretary was absolutely right to emphasise throughout his speech.

There is one further all-important fact. In this explosive situation both the United States and the Soviet Union appear to have very firm commitments, the United States to the territorial integrity of the countries of the Middle East. As I understand the President's declaration, it is a singular form of the Tripartite Declaration. In addition, there is the United States commitment to freedom of access to the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet Union has commitments to Syria and the United Arab Republic. If I am incorrect in this, perhaps the Prime Minister will correct me when he winds up the debate, but perhaps otherwise he can confirm that these are the present commitments of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

These commitments lead to the most dan-

gerous situation of all. The two greatest Powers involved are not in direct confrontation, as at Cuba or over Berlin, but indirectly through forces over which their control is much more remote and much more limited. It is right, therefore—and I agree with the Foreign Secretary—that, first and foremost, every pressure must be brought to bear on the countries of the Middle East to exercise restraint. That has been done by the United States, by the Secretary-General, by Lord Caradon at the United Nations, and it may have been done by the Soviet Union itself.

If a conflict breaks out, not only is there the risk of the major Powers becoming involved, but there will also be grave damage to the Arab countries as well as to Israel. In particular—and this is a point which has been somewhat overlooked—Jordan, to which we no longer have any commitments, is now in the unhappy position of having both Iraqi and Saudi forces on her soil and with the new defence agreement King Hussein may very well find it much more difficult to hold back in any conflict which breaks out, with the consequent temptation, which we have always feared and which may prove almost irresistible, for the Israelis to move up to the bank of the Jordan. This is another very serious aspect of any conflict which may break out. There is the danger, of course, to the oil pipelines and the danger in some countries of nationalisation of the oil companies and the expropriation of their property, and for Britain there is the danger of the removal of a substantial quantity of sterling deposits.

This is surely a formidable catalogue of the risks which are confronting so many countries because of the situation in the Middle East. The question is: what has brought this crisis about? At the beginning of his speech, the Foreign Secretary said that it was a long build-up. The Syrians alleged that the Israelis were about to attack and that the Israeli forces were mustered. I know of no evidence for that and I was very glad to hear the Foreign Secretary's confirmation that there was no evidence. The Secretary-General stated that that was the view of the U.N.T.S.O. general and he set it out fairly in his report. Nor do I know of any evidence—and the Foreign Secretary gave none—that the Israelis threatened to eliminate Syria.

It is true, as the Foreign Secretary described, that in April there were incidents between more aggressive Syrians and retaliation from Israel, but there was no evidence produced of an impending conflict of heavy forces being mustered to make an attack. But the fact that President Nasser wanted to move his forces in Sinai up to the Israeli frontier in support of his ally Syria seems to have been the main justification for the request for the removal of the United Nations force.

The fact that the justification did not really exist is bound to make one ask what was the motivation for withdrawing that force. Whether President Nasser expected the withdrawal to take place, or whether he made the request as a bluff to show willing to his ally, expecting to be refused, we do not know; nor do we know what would have happened had he been refused. That we cannot know, because the United Nations force was at once withdrawn.

The House has already shown, in response to what the Foreign Secretary said, that it regards the withdrawal of the force as a most extraordinary incident. When I was at the Foreign Office, with my right hon. Friend, we supported the election of U Thant. I have always supported him personally both at the Foreign Office and since. I have great admiration for him and happy personal relations with him. But the United Nations force was set up by the Assembly in November, 1956. Although the location was negotiated by Mr. Hammarskjöld in 1957, the force was set up by the Assembly itself.

It was said that it was necessary to withdraw the force. Having studied the resolutions and the *aide memoire*, I am not entirely convinced that that was so. Even if it were necessary to withdraw it in the circumstances, how can it have been right to agree to accede to its withdrawal straightaway without taking the matter to the Security Council or to the Assembly, to alert them to the situation which would arise following the withdrawal of the force and to enable them to take action to deal with the situation while the withdrawal was taking place? To me, it is entirely incomprehensible. I believe that the force should never have been withdrawn without putting the matter to the Security Council or the Assembly. I fear that its withdrawal was a major error of judgment.

However, five things have flowed from it. First, it has exposed the Middle East to a much greater risk of conflict. Secondly, it has enabled the Gulf of Aqaba to be closed. Thirdly, it has undermined the confidence of Israel which, for 10 years, has been brought to believe that the United Nations was its main security. This was an invaluable asset to have gained after 1956 and that asset has now been lost. Fourthly, it has given President Nasser personally an immense increase in prestige because of the way in which the force was withdrawn.

The consequences can already be very clearly seen. The other Arab States have already had to make adjustments to their policy, whether they wished to do so or not. The King of Jordan, in what is really an attempt to save his throne, has had to make a defence treaty which will give the U.A.R. much greater influence in Jordan. Kuwait has had to send troops. These are the consequences of a rapid readjustment of policy. Let us assume that a conflict is avoided. Then, as a result of the withdrawal of the force, the influence of the U.A.R. will increase right along the Gulf and down to the tip of Southern Arabia. These are very grave consequences to follow from the removal of the force.

Fifthly, it has brought into question the position of United Nations forces elsewhere, as the Foreign Secretary has said, and perhaps I can be more specific where the Foreign Secretary has to be more guarded and mention Cyprus, in particular. In the terms of the resolution, the position of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is negotiated with the consent of Archbishop Makarios. If the same interpretation were to be put on an immediate request by Archbishop Makarios as was placed on this, without consultation with the Assembly or with the Security Council, on his own understanding the Secretary-General would withdraw that force. I should like the Government to make it plain that they will now state at the United Nations that there will be no change in the status of that force in Cyprus until the matter has been debated, if there should be a request, in the Security Council or in the Assembly.

Quite rightly, the Foreign Secretary asked himself what, in this situation, were British interests. I should like to confirm some of them

and perhaps add others. First, I believe that the British interest is to have good relations with both the Arab countries and Israel. We cannot accept that it must be a choice of one or the other. As a country, we can never accept that. As a nation, we have worked very closely with the Arabs. We have helped to create Arab States in the same way as we helped to create Israel. When I was at the Foreign Office I worked closely with Arab leaders as well as with Israeli leaders.

What is more, I have never believed that it is impossible to establish reasonable relations with President Nasser and the U.A.R. I know that the Foreign Secretary has set his heart on doing that, and I do not quarrel with him in that respect. But I believe that it can be done on only one basis, which is for Britain to make it clear what British interests are in the Middle East and the commitments which we accept, and that we shall adhere to them, and that we have the means to carry them out. If we do that, then I believe that President Nasser will respect it. If the position is made absolutely clear, I believe that is possible. I do not believe that British interests and genuine U.A.R. interests are incompatible. Indeed, I believe that the interests sometimes are the same.

Therefore, may I say, in passing, because I have no wish to be controversial, that I believe that the weakness of the present position in trying to establish relations of this kind is Aden, since it appears that a power vacuum has been created there, and, wherever there is a power vacuum in the Middle East, President Nasser has no alternative but to step in. I believe that Aden is now the weak link in the whole of the Government's policy in the Middle East and in trying to establish reasonable relations.

Secondly, Britain has a general interest in the peace of the area, not only because of the danger of being dragged in to a much wider conflict but because of our investments and commercial interests there. Oil is still important, though less important than it was; let us recognise that. But, with the exception of the Gulf States, we no longer have direct commitments in the Middle East.

The Foreign Secretary made a remark which I was very glad to hear. He said that we are able to carry out certain obligations in the Middle East. He defined the Gulf area as the place where we can do it. He said that we have had a crucial

and successful part to play in the Middle East. I agree with him entirely. I was very glad to hear him, as Foreign Secretary, say it. It is of interest to note that we were able to do it because of the agreement which we negotiated with Kuwait in June, 1961, which entirely respected the independence of Kuwait. Kuwait then became a member of the United Nations. We were once called upon to carry out our obligations, which we did successfully. When that was seen, the effort was never required again. I believe that the same thing could have been done in Aden. Therefore, we look to the United Nations to take action in cases of conflict other than those specific commitments which we have.

Thirdly, Britain, as a maritime Power, has an interest, together with other maritime Powers, in the freedom of navigation. The Foreign Secretary quoted the statement which we made as a Government in 1957. I am glad that it has been endorsed by the present Government. Freedom of access to the Gulf of Aqaba was maintained until a fortnight ago by the United Nations. Therefore, it must surely believe in freedom of access. It must be a fundamental belief of the United Nations.

We look to the United Nations, and we are entitled to do so, to reinstitute it. It is interesting to go back to Hammarskjöld's *aide memoire* to see that he said at the time that no question of belligerent rights should in future arise after the settlement of 1957. Surely the Government are entitled to say to the United Nations that they should still adhere to the recommendation of the then Secretary-General on which the general settlement was based.

But what happens if the United Nations fails to take action? The Foreign Secretary has clearly faced that question. He has said that he would attempt to get a clear declaration by the maritime Powers of the position. This is to be welcomed. He is in consultation with other maritime Powers now. What steps are to be taken by the maritime Powers in order, to use the phrase, "to exert their rights"? The Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister must realise that this is the key to the whole question. I do not press the right hon. Gentleman on it at this point. It would be wrong to press him in the debate. But he knows only too well that, first, there must be no delay and,

secondly, that the House looks to the Government to take the necessary action to ensure that this declaration is implemented if necessary.

I return to the very serious general situation. At the moment, the peace, if it can be described as such, is precarious and can be shortlived. It will last for only a limited time. Restraint will be exercised in the Middle East only for a limited time unless results which, in the Foreign Secretary's words, are equitable, can be produced. It is difficult to be optimistic about the outcome of the Security Council. There has been much criticism of the first meeting called by the Canadians and Danes. I believe that the first meeting was absolutely justified to alert the world to the situation which was arising. I wish that it had been called much earlier.

It would be best if U.N.E.F. could be reinstated—no doubt that is the Foreign Secretary's view—and extended to the other Arab-Israeli frontiers. I agree with him in urging the Israelis to accept part of it on their own side of the frontier, or, perhaps less good, to strengthen the Truce Supervisory Organisation and its subsidiaries and extend it to the Egyptian-Israeli border.

But we must face the fact that it is difficult to see President Nasser accepting U.N.E.F. again or accepting a force of that nature. The Truce Supervisory Organisation would not be dealing, nor would a force on the frontiers alone, with Sharm el Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran. Therefore, there must be a separate solution of that problem, which should, if possible, be negotiated. Even if the Powers make their declaration and implement it, it cannot be a long-term solution. There must be finally a negotiated answer to the problem of the Straits of Tiran and Sharm el Sheikh.

If the United Nations Security Council does not produce a solution, what then? I was glad that the Government accepted the proposal of a four-Power conference. I regret that the Soviet Union rejected it. But, although there cannot be a formal conference, there can be informal discussions between the four major Powers at the United Nations as a location in an attempt to get a settlement of the Middle East problems. It may well be that the French, who have succeeded in maintaining good relations

with both the Arabs and Israelis, have a particular part to play in this. But, certainly, Her Majesty's Government should be able to play their part in a four-Power conference in a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

It is possible—I got a glimmer of this from the Foreign Secretary's opening remarks—that the Soviet Union will see the danger of conflicts between forces outside their own control and, therefore, will want a negotiated settlement. Perhaps the right course is to try to lift the problem from the immediate though very important detailed questions of the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip to the higher level of the whole Middle Eastern problems between the Arab countries and Israel. It might be that in this way there would be a better chance of getting a negotiated solution to deal with the problems which concern Britain.

I would not think of putting forward details in a debate of this kind, because they can be worked out only after soundings at somewhere like New York, where there can be constant discussions between the Powers concerned. But it may be right to lead it to the higher level of world problems and not limit it to the Middle East. When the two super Powers are involved in problems across the world, it may be possible to settle more than one of them by taking them together.

At first sight, this may appear to be vastly ambitious. But, on the other hand, by raising the whole level of discussion it may prove easier between the two super Powers to get a general negotiated settlement. Only if the Soviet Union is involved is Soviet pressure likely to be brought to bear on the U.A.R. to reach a settlement which the Foreign Secretary will be able to accept as equitable. Only if the United States is involved will there be a balance in the negotiation which is likely to produce a settlement of any kind.

We have been discussing—these are my final words; I do not wish to be too long—the immediate questions of the freedom of navigation, the attempt to strangle a small country economically and the risk of conflict between Arab and Jew. There are, however, two much bigger questions which are fundamental and remain to be answered. The first is whether this will develop into the attempt to wipe out Israel once and for

all. Surely, the United Nations, which recognised Israel at once, and the Powers which helped to create Israel, cannot possibly allow a small independent country to be eliminated by those surrounding her.

There is, secondly, the question whether this is an attempt to extend Soviet influence throughout the Middle East and down to the tip of Southern Arabia. That was the fear which I felt in the opening sentences of the Foreign Secretary's speech today. He indicated that this was but the end or a stage in a very long build-up of arms, presumably by the Soviet Union to the Middle Eastern countries in order to establish her own influence.

If that is the real threat, again it is only the United States which has the paramount part to play in this situation. That we must recognise. I urge Her Majesty's Government to support the United States in seeking a negotiated settlement for a more permanent peace in the whole of the Middle East, as well as for maintaining the rights of the maritime Powers and the existence of small countries, whether Israel or Jordan, and to keep them, if they can, free from the Soviet influence and domination which, the Foreign Secretary has indicated today, we have every right to fear.

46

Statement by British Prime Minister Wilson Closing a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East.¹

London, May 31, 1967

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): The tone in which the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has spoken has been in harmony with the tone adopted right through the debate. The gravity with which the whole House has approached this debate has shown that it was right, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said, for the Government to propose that our pre-arranged Parliamentary programme should be altered so that the whole House could

express its concern about the situation which developed with such dramatic and startling speed during the Recess.

The debate has been inevitably serious and sombre, but it has been more than that: it has been constructive and it has been determined. I do not propose tonight to go over the ground which was so fully covered by my right hon. Friend this afternoon. His analysis and interpretation have been widely recognised by the House as fair and judicious, and there has been a general desire in the speeches which have followed to support him in keeping the international temperature down, so far as that is possible in this situation. So I shall not attempt to go over the same ground, whether the events of the past three or four weeks, or the wider historical setting in which my right hon. Friend placed this present confrontation.

I think that I am summing up the mood of the House today and the vast majority of speeches—although, as the right hon. Gentleman said, there have been two or three on both sides which have taken a line different from this—when I say that there is no attempt to take sides, either in terms of support, or in terms of condemnation. The whole House feels—and in this I take account of the very serious and constructive approach of so many who have spoken—that, as the right hon. Gentleman has just said, Britain has an important rôle to play in securing peace and in securing an honourable negotiated settlement. I think that it has been recognised throughout the debate that that rôle can best be fulfilled not on the basis of dramatic declarations but on patient diplomacy, seeking to influence others and, as occasion offers, to influence others to take initiatives which in other circumstances we might have felt it right to take ourselves.

For this reason, and again following my right hon. Friend, while there is a great deal which all of us on this Bench would like to say, as the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman very fairly recognised, there are things which are best not said if we want to get the result which we want.

What we have today is not conflict but confrontation, not a breach of the peace but a deep and dangerous threat to peace. This confrontation and the dangers which it presents

¹ *Ibid.*, col. 199-212.

are on two levels. As so many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen have said, including the Leader of the Opposition, there is first confrontation along hundreds of miles of land frontier between Israel and Arab countries. Aircraft and naval units are in a state of instant readiness. Indeed, one of the great dangers last weekend was the fears of one side of a pre-emptive strike by the other.

Nor is it solely Israel and Egypt, or Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. Arab States which have been deeply divided on ideological grounds and grounds of national interest one with another have suddenly made common cause, burying, for the moment at least, their differences in new-found unity directed against their old enemy, Israel. In some respect—and this adds to the dangers—this confrontation has all the dangers and characteristics of a holy war.

It is not only for that reason that this confrontation is so dangerous. In the past, wars have been threatened and wars have been fought between sovereign States who, recognising one another's existence and recognising one and another's right to exist, nevertheless had deep differences of national interest or imagined national interest, claims on territory, or claims of persecution of ethnic minorities, or whatever it might be, and those feelings have led to war. But the characteristic of this situation is the declared aim of one side not to win concessions from the other. Their demand is that Israel should cease to exist—indeed has never existed.

But there is a still deeper danger which every speaker in the debate has recognised. The Leader of the Opposition—I made the same point outside the House—felt that if we are to seek in any sense an historical analogy—there have been references to Munich, Suez and the rest—that analogy is to be found, not in the events of 1956 or anywhere in the history of the Middle East, but in the Cuba confrontation of 1962. I think that both of us are right in feeling that even that analogy is not complete. The Cuban situation was dramatically described at the time, rightly, as an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation of the two super Powers, with all the dangers that that confrontation presented of a thermo-nuclear holocaust.

As both the opening speakers and most of those who have followed have made clear today,

the statements, commitments and postures of powerful outside countries with a vital interest in the Middle East suggest that a local conflict, disastrous and brutal though that would be, might quickly escalate into a still more tragic war whose consequences could engulf the whole world. But there are, as I think we all recognise, important differences from the Cuba situation—differences on the favourable side. There is, I think, the clear desire and determination on all sides to urge restraint and to prevent the first fatal step from being taken by either side.

No one will doubt the sincerity with which the United States, we ourselves and France have urged the maximum restraint during this past week, whatever provocation might have been thought to exist. Equally, I fully accept—indeed my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was given evidence of this on his visit to Moscow last week—the sincerity of the Soviet Union in desiring and urging restraint at this critical time. Here at least we have common ground which, despite all disappointments—disappointments about the fate of the French President's proposal for four-Power talks—could provide a basis for co-operation and consultation between the four great Powers to help all concerned to work their way towards a negotiated and honourable settlement. We have urged—and I was glad that the Leader of the Opposition supported this today—that the United Nations presents, or might present, the right forum for quadripartite co-operation of this kind to begin. I am less sure that the right hon. Gentleman was right in suggesting that such co-operation might be more productive or perhaps easier to get off the ground if the aim of the four-Power talks at the United Nations were to be an attack on wider world problems, including, as I suspect he had in mind, dangers in the Far East as well as the Middle East. I should like to feel that this was so and was right.

We for our part have proved that we are as anxious to secure an end to the fighting in Vietnam and to get the parties there to the conference table as we are to prevent fighting in the Middle East and get the parties there to the conference table. We shall continue to pursue peace in Vietnam with all the energy and imagination of which we are capable. Nothing that has happened in the Middle East in the last two or three weeks has made that less urgent. But to widen the area of

peace-keeping, as I thought the right hon. Gentleman was perhaps suggesting, might lead to delay in dealing with the desperately critical and urgent situation in the Middle East. Indeed, it might even provide opportunities for delay for those who might welcome them.

While we must hope and feel that we now have a short breathing space—that view has been expressed on both sides today—and while every minute of that short breathing space must be used to work for peace—while that must be our hope—time is certainly not on the side of peace.

That brings us to the other difference from the Cuba situation. Cuba, dangerous though it was—the right hon. Gentleman made the same point this afternoon—was a situation uniquely within the control of the two nuclear protagonists. Either of them had it in its power to call a halt to the actions on the high seas which were bringing war nearer. One could have called the ships back and the other could have dropped the proposals for the quarantine. In the end, it was the supreme statesmanship of both sides, the give and take, which meant that action was taken on both sides and that the danger was averted.

In the Middle East crisis, however, the great Powers which are concerned, and, indeed, who are committed by their statements, are not in complete control of the situation because the action of countries on the spot, those to whom commitments have been made—on the Arab side, not necessarily one country—or a dangerous border incident coming from either side—either of these things could trigger off conflagration and involve the great Powers.

I want now to turn to what has been the central theme of the debate, as it is the central theme of the danger which we face, and that is the central theme of the search for peace. This is the threat to the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. I say “the threat to the right of innocent passage” because up to this moment the Straits remain open. Hon. Members who have talked of reopening the Straits rather than keeping them open, which, I think, is the right phrase, could perhaps tend to overstate the present position and thereby possibly make a solution just that bit more difficult.

Hon. Member after hon. Member from my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary onwards

has stressed that the ten years since the time when Mr. Hammarskjöld negotiated the settlement that led to the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the Sharm el Sheikh area and the debate which followed in the General Assembly in March, 1957, have been years of free movement through the Straits.

Again, and I know that the right hon. Gentleman will not object to my making the point, while that was, as he suggested, partly due to the stationing of the U.N.E.F. force in Sharm el Sheikh, that was not the only reason for continued freedom of passage because, quite apart from what happened to the battery there, as recent events have made plain, shipping could have been interfered with in other ways whoever held the battery, but it was not interfered with.

The position of Her Majesty's Government about the freedom of passage I made clear about a week ago in a speech in the country, and this was repeated by my right hon. Friend this afternoon. It repeated the statement that was made on behalf of Britain in the General Assembly debate ten years ago. It remains our position, and the Government today have been encouraged by the very wide support given to it by right hon. and hon. Members in all parts of the House.

It is through the United Nations that in the first instance we shall seek to secure acceptance of the principle that was laid down. It is through the United Nations that, in the first instance, we shall seek to get effective agreement on the part of all concerned to see that that principle continues to hold good and that the right of the international waterway is maintained.

Here again, I very much agreed with the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire when he expressed agreement with my right hon. Friend that this problem is best looked at, not as a special localised problem, but as part of a much wider internationally-agreed conception of the freedom of passage through international waterways.

Doubts have been thrown this evening on the question of whether there is a legal right of free passage. Those who have the duty of advising Her Majesty's Government in this matter are in no doubt whatever that this is an international waterway, and that the right of free passage for innocent vessels through that waterway does not

derive in any sense from the agreement registered by Mr. Hammarskjöld in 1957, or from anything that was said at the General Assembly in that year, that this right is a right inherent in the situation of the Straits as part of a much wider international agreement. My right hon. Friend made clear that, with the present deep division within the Security Council, there can be no guarantee that a satisfactory arrangement will be concluded and made effective.

Perhaps here I should reply to the point with which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition asked me to deal. He took up the words of my right hon. Friend today about what our attitude would be in the event of a failure to secure an equitable settlement. The words which my right hon. Friend used were these:

"We could not be satisfied with a situation in which a numerical majority are satisfied with an inequitable settlement which will merely ensure that an Arab-Israeli war is inevitable sooner or later."

The right hon. Gentleman asked whether, given such a situation, that implied an intention to use the veto or, if not, what other action might be appropriate.

This is not the right moment at which to anticipate what will happen, and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be unwise and perhaps unhelpful if I were now to try and forecast either the situation which might arise or what the appropriate action might be in any particular circumstances. We might be faced at the Security Council, for example, with a situation where the hopes of an equitable settlement were frustrated by a veto used against such a settlement. We might face a situation where there was a majority in favour but not an adequate majority in terms of the requirements of Security Council procedures. We might face a situation where there was no majority at all. Again, we might face a situation where there was general agreement on a Resolution, but on a Resolution which did not go far enough to secure the right objective, in which case we should have to try again. That is what my right hon. Friend had in mind.

At this stage, it is impossible also to forecast, whatever present disappointments there have been about the fate of the proposals of the President of France for four power talks, what

prospects there might be of discussion between the four great powers in this context, which has been proposed, which so far has fallen on stony ground, but which will be pressed with the very warmest support on Her Majesty's Government.

What my right hon. Friend was urging, with very strong support from all parts of the House, was that, as I have said, time not being on the side of peace, it is our duty to extend our diplomatic activity beyond what we are now trying to do in the Security Council; for example, as he said, by our contacts with other maritime countries which share with us a vital interest in the freedom of the seas.

While, so far as the Security Council is concerned, our position has been made clear in New York and while we shall continue to press it there, above all, I feel that our decision was right to consult with other like-minded nations—and here I am thinking of the maritime nations—about the issuing of a clear Declaration by the International Maritime Community that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and that the Straits of Tiran do provide an international waterway into which and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. For the same reason as my right hon. Friend said, if our other diplomatic efforts did not produce the desired results and such a Declaration of itself failed to secure the right of innocent passage to which we and other maritime nations attach such importance, we should be failing in our duty if we were not now consulting with those concerned about the situation which would then arise and what action would then be appropriate to ensure that the objective which we have in mind is fulfilled.

As to the attitude of the international maritime community to the problem of maintaining freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, we are, of course, in consultation with them. The right hon. Gentleman mentioned a number of those whom he and we might feel would be particularly concerned, but I would like to remind the House, as my right hon. Friend did this afternoon, of the very clear declarations made by practically the whole international maritime community when the matter was debated in the General Assembly on 1st March, 1957.

The statement of the representative of Her Majesty's then Government has been repeated a number of times today, and I shall not weary the House with it again. There was the statement of the United States Government, and indeed the public declaration of the then President of the United States, which was quoted in the General Assembly. There was the statement of the French Government, which I think puts this so clearly that it would be right to remind the House that it said:

"The French Government considers that the Gulf of Aqaba, by reason partly of its breadth and partly of the fact that its shores belong to four different States, constitutes international waters. Consequently it believes that, in conformity with international law, freedom of navigation should be ensured in the Gulf through the Straits which give access to it. In these circumstances no nation has the right to prevent the free and innocent passage of ships, whatever their nationality or type."

The representative of Italy said:

"As far, in particular, as free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran are concerned, I do not need to restate here that we consider that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and that no nation has a right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Straits giving access thereto."

The Netherlands Government said that they were

"in full agreement with the statements made by Israel, the United States, France and a number of other countries to the effect that passage through the Straits of Tiran should be free, open and unhindered for the ships of all nations."

The Australian representative said:

"Let me now turn to the issue of the Gulf of Aqaba. In this case we have a gulf of importance to the commerce and shipping of at least two States—Israel and Jordan—and bounded by the territories of four States, Israel, Jordan, South Arabia and Egypt. I think no one could fairly deny that the Gulf of Aqaba is part of the seas where the principle of the freedom of maritime communication applies—a principle"—

the Australian delegate went on to say

"which the International Court of Justice in its judgment of 9 April, 1949 on the Corfu Channel case characterised as one of 'certain general and well-recognised principles'."

I think that that is what the right hon. Gentleman had in mind a few moments ago.

The New Zealand Government, Norway, Denmark—I could go on, but I do not intend to weary the House because the whole world maritime community was saying these very things in 1957. I think it is therefore right, and it seems to enjoy the support of the House as a whole, that

we should be working with the rest of the world maritime community to secure a declaration of the kind to which my right hon. Friend referred this afternoon.

The House will not expect me to say more about what we will do, or what we feel it will be right to do, if, first, action through the Security Council proves ineffective, or the mere issuing of a declaration fails to maintain the freedom of passage through these Straits. All of us here recognise that time is not on our side and I think it is recognised that one of the significant facts which has so far prevented action of a kind which could have escalated in a way which we all know it could, indeed one of the significant facts which I believe last weekend prevented such action being taken, with all the dread consequences which would have followed, has been the assertion of the obvious concern of ourselves and other maritime nations about the continued right of free passage through this as through other international waterways, and I think it right to say to the House that if this concern had not been expressed as strongly as it has been, it is very doubtful whether there would have been sufficient confidence last weekend to have averted what might have become a general conflagration.

Because of that, and because of the concern which has been expressed so clearly, time is not on our side in working out the necessary arrangements. We may have a few weeks, as the right hon. Gentleman said, or even a month or two. None of us can be certain about that. Therefore I believe that we have a very strong sense of urgency, and I believe that the House appreciates that sense of urgency.

As my right hon. Friend made clear and as has been said by hon. Members on both sides of the House, we shall do everything in our power to secure the effective presence of an appropriate United Nations agency or agencies to help maintain the peace in the area. As we all recognise and have said, they did so successfully in the past. It would be wrong at this stage to speculate about the precise duties which will be assigned to such a United Nations presence, but certainly, as has again been said by hon. Members on both sides, we are right to press that Israel as well as the Arab countries must accept a United Nations presence on their soil.

When the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition made his comments on the precipitate decision to withdraw United Nations peacekeeping force and, indeed, when the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire said what he did in pretty strong terms about the precipitate withdrawal and the acceptance, without consultation, of that demand, I believe that what they said was absolutely right, and we fully support their account and their criticism of this decision.

The Leader of the Opposition asked what possible consequences or implications this might have for Cyprus. I will come to that in detail in a moment. I certainly agree with the implication contained in a number of speeches, including that of the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, that this decision could have very far-reaching consequences for the United Nations as a whole, in a wider sphere, if we are not able in a very short time to repair the damage that has been done—and damage has been done, and it was done very much against the very strong pressure and insistence of the British delegation there, which wanted to have full consultation in the way the right hon. Gentleman suggested.

This situation has no bearing on the circumstances in which the Cyprus peace-keeping operation was set up. That was set up not by the General Assembly but, as the right hon. Gentleman remembers very well, by a Security Council resolution which requires a confirming resolution every six months. We are the major contributors to that force, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, and even if no more were done on such an occasion than was done in the case of the Sinai force we should have the right of consultation there, because there were some informal consultations with the countries who had troops in Sinai.

But this is not the point here, because if the Government of Cyprus requested that the forces be withdrawn Britain could and should demand that the question be debated by the Security Council, because the Security Council set it up and also because such a withdrawal of that force would be rightly regarded—indeed, this has been underlined by the events of the last two or three weeks—as a major threat to peace. We could therefore ourselves request, and would request, a meeting of the Security Council. Therefore,

in terms of a parallel between the two cases, the unfortunate and regrettable decision in the case of Sinai has no governing influence on what would happen in the case of Cyprus.

The right hon. Gentleman criticised this withdrawal, but it was not only Britain; other countries were with us in pressing that there should be full consultation and a full generalised discussion by those whose authority it was and under whose authority the original force had been sent out. Here I think particularly of Canada, whose forces have co-operated in maintaining this lonely vigil for these many years.

To sum up, I feel that this debate has been undeniably useful, not only in stating the views of the great majority of hon. Members—and I believe that they are the views of the great majority of hon. Members—but also in helping to emphasise, from a vastly confused and tortured situation, those issues to which Her Majesty's Government and all others who are concerned in the search for peace should now give priority.

I emphasise again that we are not concerned in this debate or in the actions which follow—and I think the House is not concerned—with taking sides or apportioning blame. However visionary this may seem in such a dangerous situation, what we must seek to do is not only to avoid the dangers of a tragic war, which would be tragic enough in all conscience even if confined to those who now only glower at one another across Middle Eastern frontiers. Many of us here who have visited one or another of many Middle Eastern countries in recent years can imagine the tragedy of the destruction that would follow, not only in loss of life but of treasured possessions and buildings and historic treasures of the countries in question.

Even if so limited, it would be tragic enough, but, as we have all emphasised, it is the danger of a war more horrible because of the dangers of escalation. Visionary as I have called it and visionary though it may seem, what we must seek to do in this situation is not merely to avoid war but to create the conditions of peace. A number of hon. Members have made their contribution to what we call conditions for a lasting peace rather than concentrating on things which must be done urgently to stop war breaking out.

One condition of a lasting peace must be

the recognition that Israel has the right to live. As my hon. Friend reminded us, it has been for nearly twenty years a member country of the United Nations, entitled to the respect and protection of the United Nations. Whatever the bitterness that rules today, there are wise men in Israel and there are wise men in Arab countries, however difficult it may be for them to become articulate, who recognise not only the need for co-existence but also the immense opportunities for peaceful co-operation which exist once man-made barriers, based on primeval hostility, can be broken down.

There are some, we know, in Arab countries who argue that with all the poverty and hunger in the Middle East, poverty which is still, despite the new but inequitably shared riches which oil has brought, and which is still the lot of the great majority of people in the Middle East, the cutting off of an initially fertile area and its designation as a home for large numbers of refugees from vast areas of the world is a provocative act and one which inevitably condemns the rest of the area to continued poverty.

But this is entirely to misconceive the problem of poverty in the Middle East. Wise men, Arabs and Jews alike, conscious of what has been achieved in this small country, which is one of the classic prototypes of successful economic development, conscious of what has been done particularly in irrigation and the transformation of desert into fertile areas, these men know how much could be achieved in a total Middle Eastern war on poverty and hunger if political differences could be set aside.

Commonwealth and other countries in Africa and Asia have good reason to know what Israeli technical assistance means, based as it is not on the expertise of an established advanced industrial country, with all the irrelevances which are sometimes provided in the form of technical assistance from advanced countries, but on their own recent experience in developing a primitive and underdeveloped area. They have come through this way, and they have made mistakes. They know what mistakes to avoid. But they have also had tremendous successes.

The tragedy for the Middle East is not that the Israelis are occupying a small part of the vast cultivable area; it is that political hostilities on

both sides and, above all, perhaps the wasteful deployment on both sides on arms and military expenditure of a prodigious amount—a scale that cannot be afforded—of resources which should be devoted to economic developments, it is these things, the continuing bitter hostility and this wasteful use of resources on arms one against another which has stood in the way of the economic and social development of millions upon millions of people.

In putting on record my feeling about the constructive way in which the whole House has approached this debate, I feel that it is right to interpret this debate as a mandate to Her Majesty's Government by every means in our power to continue with all who are working with us in the search for peace, as we are working with them, but in a wider sense, to use this opportunity today, if opportunity be given, having peered into the abyss as we have, to turn the threat of military war into the reality of total war in the Middle East against man's most ancient enemies of poverty, hunger and disease.

47

Statement in Parliament by Chile's Foreign Minister Valdes on the Middle East.¹

Santiago, May 31, 1967

It is not really correct to say that Chile is neutral, because we cannot remain indifferent to the threat of war. Chile is, within its means, actively working for peace, and so that a solution to this very serious problem can be found as speedily as possible. To this end, we will decidedly support in the United Nations all efforts to achieve this goal.

¹ Santiago Radio Presidente Balmaceda Network in Spanish, 1100 GMT, 31/5/1967.

48

Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin in Reply to the Soviet Note of May 26, 1967.¹

Jerusalem, June 1, 1967

Mr. Prime Minister, I beg to acknowledge receipt of your Note of 26 May, 1967, delivered to me by the U.S.S.R. Ambassador in Israel.

We appreciate the desire of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to make known to us the Soviet evaluations concerning the present crisis in the region.

We are very glad that, as expected, the U.S.S.R. is desirous of peace. As is known, the present situation has developed since Syria began her overt hostile activities against Israel's territory and citizens. These activities have been denounced by the majority of members of the Security Council in the meetings it held last October and also in the Report submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Security Council on May 19, 1967.

A fortnight ago Egypt, which is associated with Syria in a mutual aid agreement, began concentrating its forces in the Sinai peninsula, near the Israeli border. At the same time Egypt removed the U.N. Emergency Force. The decisive point is not the removal of that force, but the Egyptian explanation accompanying it, namely that Egypt's intention was to go to war against Israel.

These aggressive steps reached their climax when a war-like blockade was imposed on the free passage through the Straits of Tiran. This of course is a classical war-like act, and there is no need to emphasize that it also is in absolute contradiction to the rules of international law and the rights of nations. This situation cannot be tolerated.

These activities on the part of Egypt forced the Government of Israel to take security measures, to mobilize its forces and to station them to protect the security of its frontiers. The Egyptian military preparations, accompanied by unrestrained incitement to war by all Egyptian and Syrian propaganda organs, is continuing. Large-scale

Egyptian armies, composed of infantry divisions and armoured divisions, are stationed along our frontiers. In a speech delivered on May 26 the President of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, declared:

"The blockade of Sharm e-Sheikh means our waging an all-out war against Israel. This is going to be a total war. Our fundamental aim is the annihilation of Israel."²

I beg you, Mr. Prime Minister, to express to the Governments of Egypt and the world the opinion of the U.S.S.R. Government regarding such declarations.

When Egypt declares that it is not prepared to co-exist with Israel, and that it intends to wage a war of annihilation against it, only a considered and objective approach can contribute to the interests of peace. We much regret that on various occasions, such as for instance the participation of the U.S.S.R. delegate in the discussion now going on in the Security Council and in publications in the Soviet press, the U.S.S.R. has adopted the false claims and accusations of Israel's enemies. When the organs of Arab propaganda raised the contention that Israel is concentrating forces in order to attack Syria, I invited your Ambassador in Israel to visit the frontier and to find out for himself that there was no truth in this allegation. To my regret, the Ambassador did not respond to our invitation. The Chief of Staff of the U.N.T.S.O. checked these claims and informed the Secretary-General of the U.N. and the capitals of the region that there were no Israeli concentrations on the Syrian border. The Secretary-General even included a statement to this effect in the Report he submitted on May 19 to the Security Council. Nevertheless, the representative and the press of the U.S.S.R. continued to make this false accusation current. They also voiced the claim that the leaders of Israel, in their speeches, threatened Syria. All those who peruse the declarations made by Israeli statesmen will see that they only constitute a reaction to the threats which the Arab states have poured upon us during the last 19 years, and that even in very grave situations our declarations have always included an appeal to peace and the expression of the hope that it will be established.

An objective approach cannot also be

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 4/6/1967.

² See Nasir's speech (*post*, doc. 327) for actual words. [Ed.]

reconciled with the accusations that Israel is acting on behalf of external forces. This accusation is utterly groundless and it constitutes a grave and unjustified injury to a country which in all its actions is solely guided by its own independent interests. Also groundless is the claim that Israel has striven, or is striving, to change the regime in Syria. Our sole interest is the cessation of hostile activities from that country. More than once have we emphasized these acts, in conversations with U.S.S.R. representatives and in statements sent to its Government.

Israel is a small country and its people is peace-loving. Only 25 years ago, a third of the Jewish people was cruelly annihilated by the murderous forces of the common Nazi enemy. Suffering and grief, death and struggle have been the joint lot of the Jewish people and of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Only the remainder of our people has found new life in its ancient homeland. Only 19 years have passed since these survivors won their independence and began reconstructing the ruins of their national existence. The people of Israel remembers the support of the U.S.S.R. to the resurrection of our State.

Now again the Jewish people in Israel is faced with a grave danger.

We appeal to you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the Government of the U.S.S.R. and to the great Soviet people to understand the grave situation in which we find ourselves.

Nothing is dearer to us than peace. Since seven neighbouring states went to war against us in 1948, when the U.S.S.R. stood by us and denounced this aggression, we have remained firm in our resolve to reach a final and permanent peace settlement, but our hand stretched out in peace has been rejected.

In order to put an end to the danger of war in our area, it is necessary that the U.S.S.R. join the other powers which are ready to bring all their influence to bear towards bringing about permanent peace in the Middle East.

We are ready to settle the present grave crisis too by peaceful means. The settlement of the conflict should be based on the principles accepted by all peace-loving peoples of the world, namely:

a. Territorial integrity and independence of all countries in the region; opposition to *revanchism*

and to attempts to change by force the territorial *status quo*;

b. Abstention from hostile acts, diverse activities from beyond the borders, and the imposition of a maritime blockade;

c. non-interference with the internal affairs of States.

These principle have been publicly adopted by the U.S.S.R., and such an arrangement based upon them would serve as a basis for lasting peace in our region. We hope that you, Mr. Prime Minister, and the Government of the U.S.S.R. will be ready to help by using your great political power to the full in order to achieve it.

Sincerely yours,

L. ESHKOL

Prime Minister of Israel

49

Official Cabinet Statement on France's Position Regarding the Situation in the Middle East.¹

Paris, June 2, 1967

La France n'est engagée à aucun titre ni sur aucun sujet avec aucun des Etats en cause. De son propre chef, elle considéré que chacun de ces états a le droit de vivre. Mais elle estime que le pire serait l'ouverture des hostilités. En conséquence l'Etat qui le premier et où que ce soit, emploierait les armes n'aurait ni son approbation ni, à plus forte raison, son appui.

Au cas où la situation actuelle d'expectative pourrait être maintenue et où une détente de fait se produirait en conséquence, les problèmes posés par la navigation dans le golfe d'Aqaba, la situation des réfugiés Palestiniens et les conditions de voisinage des Etats intéressés devraient être réglés au fond par décisions internationales, de telles décisions devant donner lieu au préalable à une entente des quatre grandes puissances qui sont membres permanents du conseil de sécurité. La France maintient la proposition qu'elle a faite à cet égard.

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st Sem., 1967, p. 108.

50

Statement by French Information Minister Gorse Outlining his Country's Position.¹

Paris, June 2, 1967

Nous pensons qu'il n'est de l'intérêt de personne de chercher des provocations. Nous souhaitons qu'une détente des esprits intervienne pour que le problème soit abordé au fond. Nous pouvons jouer un rôle utile pour tout le monde, car on aura besoin de converser. Le pire serait pour toutes les parties intéressées, y compris le reste du monde, l'ouverture des hostilités. C'est d'ailleurs ce qu'à dit le Général de Gaulle à tous ses interlocuteurs récents: l'Ambassadeur d'Israël, celui d'Egypte, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Syrie, le roi d'Arabie.

La France, au cas où la situation actuelle d'expectative ne serait pas maintenue, définirait alors son attitude à l'égard du pays attaqué. Mais pour le moment la priorité est à la recherche de la paix. Il est bon que quelqu'un puisse un jour jouer un rôle d'arbitre, d'intermédiaire, de concertation. De toute façon la question du Proche-Orient ne sera réglée que par un examen au fond de tous les problèmes qui se posent entre Israël et les pays Arabes. On doit bien reconnaître que la navigation dans le Golfe d'Aqaba pose un problème, que celui des réfugiés palestiniens n'a jamais été réglé et que celui du voisinage des Etats, s'il n'est pas réglementé, donnera toujours naissance à des incidents.

Comme toujours, les questions d'Orient ne peuvent être réglées que par une entente entre les Quatre Grandes puissances intéressées au premier chef, ainsi qu'avec la collaboration des pays concernés.

51

News Conference Statements by British Prime Minister Wilson on the Crisis.²

[Excerpts]

Washington, June 2, 1967

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you expect a common declaration of the United States, Great Britain and other powers to be published soon?

A. We are all of us pursuing our efforts through the Security Council, trying to get an honorable settlement to take the steam out of, and the danger out of, this situation. But concurrently, as my colleague the Foreign Secretary and I said in the House of Commons in London on Wednesday, we are pursuing, as others are, with the principal maritime powers, the possibility of a statement reasserting the right of freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Discussions on that are still proceeding. I wouldn't try to forecast at what point they will be complete or a statement issued.

Q. If in the final result the U.A.R. refuses to open Aqaba, will Great Britain in concert with other nations exert force to open up the straits?

A. That is a hypothetical situation that you are raising and I don't think it's necessarily wise to say too much about what happens in hypothetical situations.

Q. Could you tell me, Mr. Prime Minister, whether on the basis of your recent soundings diplomatically in Moscow you have the opinion that the Soviet Union is seeking to contain the crisis in the Middle East or to enflame it?

A. The Foreign Secretary was in fact in Moscow last week, had discussions with Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Kosygin and I fully accept what the Foreign Secretary was told—the sincerity of the Soviet Government in their desire to see restraint exercised in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, you were quoted in Ottawa as saying that it's going to be—that you only had one or two days left to solve the tense situation in

¹ *Le Monde*, Paris, 3/6/1967.

² *New York Times*, 3/6/1967. The news conference was held at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.

the Gulf of Aqaba. Can you tell us what you meant by that?

A. Well, I didn't say one or two days. I said we might have only one or two days, But as I've said, time is not on our side. Whether we have a week or more or only a day or two we've got to use every minute of that time to try and avoid the crisis which is in danger of resulting.

Q. Do you see any connection between Vietnam and the Middle East situation? Do you see Russia using the Middle East to make us slow down in Vietnam?

A. I am not sure it's very rewarding to speculate on motives of various countries in this connection. Insofar as we are concerned with Soviet motives, I would have thought it is more connected with the Soviet Government's view of her influence in the Middle East rather than with any tie-up between the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Q. Is it the British position that this declaration of the maritime nations should be specific on the point of the right of Israeli-flag ships to pass through the Strait of Tiran?

A. To answer that question would be, I think, to disclose the prospective wording of the declaration, which is a matter for discussion with the other maritime powers, but I think I can go as far as to say we are concerned with the assertion of the acceptance of the Strait of Tiran and indeed the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there's some concern that there might be a new Suez crisis if Egypt should refuse Western warships the right to pass through the canal. Can you tell us your feelings about free passage through the Suez Canal?

A. Well, the Suez Canal is of course an international waterway, an acknowledged international waterway governed not by a general convention as in the case of the Gulf of Aqaba but governed by its own specific convention to which all signatories are a party and obviously anyone who might think of unilaterally breaking that convention would be taking on themselves a very very serious responsibility indeed. But again I think that this statement, which was it not based on another newspaper report, not this time from London, again must be regarded as hypothetical.

Q. As now envisioned by the British Government, would such a declaration include a statement by the maritime powers that they are prepared to assert the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. I think to answer that would again be tending to outline to you the sort of draft that might emerge from the discussions.

Q. Could you say what in your view are the chances of restoring some of the United Nations presence on the borders between Israel and Egypt?

A. This is something that all of us attach very great importance to as part of a long-term solution or medium-term solution. We feel and have said quite clearly, as others have, that the decision to withdraw the U.N.E.F. was precipitous and regrettable and we would like to see some form of United Nations active presence restored there. But it is fair, I think, that in proposing this we should insist that they should be stationed on the Israeli as well as the Arab side of the frontiers in question.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in connection with this petition or declaration, are we submitting it to any of the Communist powers for their consideration in signing it?

A. We shall be very glad to have their adherence. This is, by the way, a declaration and not a petition. They'll have the chance of signing it if they feel able to associate themselves with it.

Q. Does the Prime Minister propose to visit the United Nations headquarters before returning to London?

A. Yes, I'm going to New York tomorrow morning from here and shall be lunching with the Secretary General.

Q. What is the main forum for these confrontations on the maritime declaration? Would it be in the U.N.?

A. The discussions are taking capital by capital.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, is it your feeling that once this declaration is issued by a group of maritime nations that it will be the prelude to some negotiations with President Nasser or is it just going to stand out here and in the air on its own?

A. Well, there must be negotiations and ahead of any possible declaration. That is the purpose of the discussions at the Security Council.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister if there must be negotiations, what value will this declaration of the maritime powers have anyhow?

A. Well of course the ideal thing would be that the negotiations in the Security Council will be fruitful, in which case the declaration will not be necessary. But we have to face the possibility that the immediately proposed negotiations in the Security Council are not fruitful. Under these circumstances it's very important that the maritime powers should declare their positions on the subject. We shall still need negotiations at the end of the day.

Q. Is the first order of British interest in the Middle East to keep the peace or to end the blockade imposed on the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. I think that question, which I agree is in question form, is a false antithesis. I believe that one of the factors which led in the end to a degree of restraint being shown last weekend that not everyone expected is—was the feeling, the confidence, that perhaps the threat to close the Gulf of Aqaba would not be pursued.

If therefore, that confidence is not justified and if there is a closure of the Gulf of Aqaba with the stranglehold this would involve for Israel, then I believe we're at a very, very dangerous state in which the possibility not only of a local conflict, brutal and horrible though that would be, but perhaps a much wider conflagration might be a matter only of hours.

Therefore, the question of the Gulf of Aqaba is directly related and is a necessary condition of securing a situation in which we can avoid war.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, how much time do you think we have to cool this thing down in the Mideast? Is it a matter of hours or days or weeks at this time?

A. It might be anyone of these three. It could be that there will be a week or two in which to create a situation in which restraint will be exercised by all concerned so that we can then proceed over a rather longer period to get perhaps a permanent settlement. But it might well be that we shan't have very long and that the matter might come to a head. As I say we have it seems a little time, a little breathing space, but time is emphatically not on our side, and that's why we need a sense of urgency at the Security Council and elsewhere.

52

Joint Communiqué on Soviet President Podgorny's Visit to Afghanistan, 31 May-3 June.¹ [Excerpt]

Kabul, June 3, 1967

The sides are worried over the situation in the Middle East, where there are attempts to suppress the national liberation movement, to infringe on the sovereignty and independence of the Arab states, to return colonialism to the land of the Arabs, which is a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter and the declaration on impermissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and protection of their independence and sovereignty.

The U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan expressed solidarity with the struggle by the Arab countries, which are upholding their independence and sovereignty, and sharply denounce the provocative actions which have led again to a dangerous aggravation of tension in the Middle East. Both sides expressed their sincere desire for the Near and Middle East to become a peace zone.

53

Message of Support from East German State Council Chairman Ulbricht to Syrian President Atassi.²

Berlin, June 4, 1967

Excellency, the G.D.R. State Council and people follow with great concern and profound indignation the hostile and aggressive actions of U.S. imperialism and Israel against the Syrian Arab Republic and the other Arab States.

It is evident that these dangerous provocations are part of the worldwide strategy of imperialism, and aim at liquidating the freedom

¹ Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1403 GMT, 3/6/1967.

² East Berlin ADN Domestic Service in German, 1945 GMT, 4/6/1967.

and national independence of the Arab peoples, at preventing social progress in the Arab world, at further plundering the oil resources in the interests of imperialist, expansionist power politics, and at withholding them from their rightful owners—the Arab peoples.

The Government of the West German Federal Republic has given comprehensive support to Israel for years. This includes direct cooperation in the military sphere. Leading politicians as well as newspapers, radio, and television, clearly side with Israel and malign the just cause of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic and of the other Arab peoples.

The G.D.R. has always resolutely opposed this anti-Arab attitude of the West German Federal Government and now, too, considers it its duty to unmask and fight this imperialist conspiracy against the Arab peoples.

The G.D.R. State Council and Government resolutely condemn the maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists, of Israel, and of the West German Government, in the certainty that they will fail in the face of the unity and cohesion of all anti-imperialist forces.

The G.D.R. supports with all its strength the measures taken by the Syrian Arab Republic, the U.A.R., and the other Arab states for the defense of their sovereignty, independence, and freedom. It sides firmly with the Syrian people in warding off all imperialist and neocolonialist provocations, in its efforts for preserving peace in the Near East.

I feel impelled to convey to you, Excellency, in this way the undivided fraternal feeling and solidarity of the State Council and the people of the G.D.R.

Be assured of my amicable affection.

Walter Ulbricht,
Chairman of the State Council
of the G.D.R.

Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol to U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin Announcing the Outbreak of Hostilities.¹

Jerusalem, June 5, 1967

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I turn to you urgently to bring to your attention today's grave developments. Since the early hours of the morning, fighting has broken out between Egyptian armoured and air forces which moved against Israel and Israel forces which went into action to contain them.

After weeks in which our peril has grown day by day, we are now engaged in repelling the wicked aggression which Nasser has been building up against us. I discussed this fully in my letter to you June 1.

Israel's existence and integrity have been endangered. The provocative troop concentrations in Sinai, now amounting to five infantry and two armoured divisions; the placing of more than 900 tanks against our southern frontier; the massing of 400 tanks opposite Eilat in an attempt to sunder the Southern Negev from Israel, the lawless blockade in the Straits of Tiran; the insolent defiance of the international community; the policy of strangling encirclement including the deployment of Egyptian and Iraqi troops and aircraft in Jordan; Nasser's announcement in his speeches of May 26 and June 4 of "total war against Israel" and of his "basic aim" to annihilate Israel; yesterday's Order of the Day by the Egyptian Commander, General Murtagi, calling on his troops in Sinai to wage a war of destruction against Israel; the acts of sabotage and terrorism from Syria and Gaza; this morning's engagements and the bombardment of the Israel villages of Kisufim, Nahal Oz and Ein Hashlosa in Israel territory—all of this amounts to an extraordinary catalogue of aggression that must be abhorred and condemned by opinion in all peace-loving countries.

This is a ruthless design to destroy the State of Israel which embodies the memories, sacrifices and hopes of an ancient people which in this generation lost six million of its people brutally murdered in a tragedy without parallel in history.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 7/6/1967.

Surely, Mr. Chairman, no one can deny this, when it is announced and confessed by President Nasser himself.

Throughout the weeks in which Egypt was preparing itself for aggression against Israel, we acted with supreme restraint, hoping that the war machine mounted by President Nasser would not be put into action. Our hopes proved to be in vain. We appeal to you again, Mr. Chairman, to understand the gravity of the situation created by Egypt's warfare against Israel's existence. We appeal to you in this hour, crucial for peace in the Middle East and the entire world, to join in an effort to secure peace based on the independence and territorial integrity of all nations.

We claim nothing except peaceful life in our territory, and the exercise of our international rights. Surrounded by enemy armies on all sides, we are now engaged in a mortal struggle to defend our existence and forestall Egypt's avowed intention to repeat against the Jewish people in Israel the inhuman crimes committed by Hitler. We cannot but be confident that the Soviet Union's role in history will be vindicated once more by an attitude of comprehension and brotherhood toward the Jewish people in its hour of trial.

55

Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament on the Situation in the Middle East.¹ [Excerpts]

London, June 5, 1967

With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the Middle East situation.

The House will have learned with deep concern that, early this morning, hostilities broke out in the Middle East. The situation is still unclear. There has been heavy ground fighting on the border of Israel and the United Arab Republic. There has been substantial air activity, including attacks on airfields in the United Arab Republic and elsewhere. There has also been air activity over Israel. There are reports of fighting

on other frontiers of Israel.

Our Consul-General in Jerusalem reported earlier this morning that the city was "engulfed in war." Although the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation arranged a cease-fire from 12 noon in Jerusalem, the latest information reaching me is that, after some initial success, sporadic firing has broken out again.

I cannot emphasise too strongly how much Her Majesty's Government regret this tragic development. It was precisely in an attempt to avert the risk of such a development that the Government took the step I put before the House on 31st May. As the House knows, we have repeatedly urged, by all means open to us, both Israel and the Arab States to exercise restraint and seek a solution to their problems through peaceful negotiations.

During this morning I have been in touch with the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Italy, and, of course, with our mission to the United Nations. This afternoon I shall be seeing representatives of the Arab States and we have also been in touch with the Embassy of Israel.

Our immediate aim must clearly be to bring about an early and general ceasefire. The Security Council has been convened and is about to begin its emergency meeting. I hope that it will proceed immediately to the adoption of a resolution calling for this cease-fire.

The Government's attitude—and the House will, I know, support me in saying this—is that the British concern is not to take sides, but to ensure a peaceful solution to the problems of the area. In this situation, our interest is the same as that of all those in the area as well as the rest of the world. The House will wish to know that instructions are being given to all our forces in the area to avoid any involvement in the conflict.

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As I have said, we are at the moment in consultation with the other members of the Security Council and with the other countries to whom I referred about this matter. I would have thought myself that the right thing to do now is to go as quickly as we can for a straightforward resolution of the Security Council, calling on both sides to observe immediately a cease-fire, and not

¹ *Hansard's*, 5/6/1967, col. 629-31.

to tangle it up with other questions. This is being discussed at the moment in New York and those are the instructions that I have given to my noble Friend, Lord Caradon.

The question of calling for reinstatement of the United Nations force is, I would have thought, much more a part of a long-term solution to the problems in the area. What we are faced with is not finding a long-term solution now, but with the short-term problem—the immediate problem—of getting the fighting stopped. It is surely better to go straight for that.

On the question of a four-Power conference, I have made it clear this morning to the representatives of the other members of the four Powers how strongly I think this situation calls for the convening of such a meeting—it could be at United Nations level in New York—and that we should get together. That message has been conveyed to my opposite numbers in their capitals.

56

Statement Issued by the White House on the Outbreak of Hostilities.¹

Washington, June 5, 1967

We are deeply distressed to learn that large-scale fighting has broken out in the Middle East, an eventuality we had sought to prevent.

Each side has accused the other of launching aggression. At this time the facts are not clear. But we do know that tragic consequences will flow from this needless and destructive struggle if the fighting does not cease immediately.

The United Nations Security Council has been called into urgent session.

In accordance with his policy instituted earlier to keep the Congress advised of developments in the Middle East crisis, the President has asked Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to brief the Senate and House leaders at 9:30 a.m. today. At 8:30 this morning the President will meet with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara,

Walt Rostow, and George Christian.

The United States will devote all its energies to bring about an end to the fighting and a new beginning of programs to assure the peace and development of the entire area. We call upon all parties to support the Security Council in bringing about an immediate cease-fire.

57

Statement Issued by the Soviet Government on the Outbreak of Hostilities.²

Moscow, June 5, 1967

Today, June 5, 1967, Israel commenced military operations against the United Arab Republic, thus committing aggression. The U.A.R. Armed forces are waging battles against Israel's troops, which have invaded the territory of the U.A.R.

On both sides units of tanks, artillery and aircraft are participating in the military operations.

The Syrian Arab Republic has come out on the side of the U.A.R. and is giving it armed assistance in repulsing the aggression. Jordan has declared itself in a state of war with Israel and has said it will give armed support to the United Arab Republic. Iraq, Algeria and the other Arab states have declared they are supporting the U.A.R. with their armed forces and resources.

Thus, because of the adventurism of the rulers of one country—Israel, which has been encouraged by the covert and overt actions of certain imperialist circles—a military conflict has flared up in the Near East.

The country was pushed into such dangerous actions by leaders who constantly claim they are waging a struggle for the existence of Israel as a state. But if anything can undermine most of all the foundations of the development and the very existence of the Israeli state, it is precisely the course of recklessness and adventurism in policy that Israel's ruling circles chose today.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/6/1967, p. 949.

² Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 28/6/1967, p. 3. From Pravda.

The government of Israel, by unleashing aggression against the neighboring Arab states, has trampled underfoot the Charter of the United Nations and elementary norms of international law.

The government of Israel cannot say it was unaware of where its actions were leading. It cannot say the position of the peace-loving states in the event it unleashed an aggressive war was unclear to it.

The government of Israel knew that war could be averted. This was precisely what the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states called upon Israel to do. But it chose the path of war. There is no doubt that the venture undertaken by Israel will turn first and foremost against Israel itself.

The Soviet Union, true to its policy of rendering assistance to peoples victimized by aggression and to states that have been liberated from the colonial yoke, declares its resolute support for the governments and peoples of the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Jordan and the other Arab states and expresses confidence in the success of their just struggle for their independence and sovereign rights.

In condemning Israel's aggression, the U.S.S.R. government demands, as the first, pressing step to halt the military conflict, that the Israeli government immediately and unconditionally cease hostilities against the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan and the other Arab countries and withdraw its troops beyond the armistice line.

The government of the U.S.S.R. expresses the hope that the governments of other states, including the great powers, will do, for their part, everything possible to extinguish the military conflagration in the Near East and restore peace.

The United Nations must discharge its direct duty—condemn Israel's actions and promptly take the measures necessary to restore peace in the Near East.

The Soviet government reserves the right to take all steps that may be necessitated by the situation.

58

Statement by Yugoslav President Tito on the Outbreak of Hostilities.¹

Belgrade, June 5, 1967

The government and the peoples of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia learned with greatest concern and indignation that an armed attack by Israel against the United Arab Republic has begun this morning. Just as ten years ago, Israel again acted as an aggressor and instrument of imperialist policy of might and pressure against sovereign countries. The government of Yugoslavia resolutely condemns Israel's aggression.

The Yugoslav government considers that the United Arab Republic, faced with a constant hostile attitude by Israel, and exposed to continuous pressures by imperialists, had undertaken justified measures to protect her sovereign rights, territorial integrity and security of her country. The U.A.R. government had at the same time on its part taken steps to avoid an armed conflict and to seek a peaceable solution, for which reason it approached the Security Council.

Whereas in various quarters, within and outside the United Nations, great efforts were made to ensure peace in this area, Israel has started military operations in order to impose her own will by the force of arms. Thus Israel assumes all responsibility for the breaking out of a war conflict and for all the far-reaching consequences resulting from it for the world peace.

The Israel aggression must be stopped.

It is the duty of the U.N. and of all the governments and peace-loving forces in the world. The United Nations Organisation, in accordance with its responsibilities for the preservation of peace, must immediately undertake measures to urgently stop aggression and secure peace in the Near East. We appeal to all governments to join their efforts without delay to this end.

The government and the peoples of Yugoslavia express their full support for the U.A.R. and the other Arab countries in their opposition to the aggression, and will do everything to help their just struggle.

¹ *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, 20/6/1967, p. 5.

59

News Briefing by Secretary of State Rusk on the United States Attitude Towards the Middle East Conflict.¹

Washington, June 5, 1967

Secretary Rusk: I understand there has been some discussion in the course of the day about the attitude of the United States in this situation in the Near East.

I would refer you to the very fundamental statement made by President Johnson on May 23d and to his reaffirmation of the policies enunciated by four Presidents: that the United States is committed to the support of the independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area of the Near East.

We are in a situation where several governments have declared war. We are not a belligerent. We do not have forces involved in this violence. Our citizens in the area are entitled to the treatment that is due to citizens of countries who are not belligerents. They are not enemy aliens, wherever they might be out there.

But this traditional word of international law, "neutrality," does not involve indifference. The President has been deeply concerned about this situation since it flared up about 2½ or 3 weeks ago and has worked incessantly to try to stabilize the peace out there.

We have an obligation under the United Nations Charter, and very especially as a permanent member of the Security Council, to carry our full share of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the present time we are making a maximum effort in the Security Council to bring about a cease-fire. In the course of the day, that has been caught up in some of the political discussions which have to do with the longer range issues.

We have felt that it is important to work with the Security Council to stop the fighting in order that peaceful processes can have a chance to operate on those other questions.

So there is the position at law that we are not a belligerent. There is the position of deep

concern, which we have as a nation and as a member of the United Nations, in peace in that area.

I would hope that this would clarify some of the discussion that I have heard in the course of the day. I can take just a question or two. I have to go to a meeting in a moment.

Q. Then, Mr. Secretary, what we are trying to get straightened out was Mr. McCloskey's [Robert J. McCloskey, the Department spokesman] statement that we were "neutral in thought, word, and deed." The tradition of neutrality, legally, in international law—would that foreclose any options that we would have in the future?

Secretary Rusk: I don't want to speculate about the future. What I am saying is that the President has stated in the most fundamental way our attitude on this in his statement of May 23d. You had his statement, of course, this morning, about our attitude toward this outbreak of violence.

I want to emphasize that any use of this word "neutral," which is a great concept of international law, is not an expression of indifference, and, indeed, indifference is not permitted to us because we have a very heavy obligation under the United Nations Charter, and especially as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, to do everything we can to maintain international peace and security.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government made any determination on the basis of the information it has as to who initiated the violence in this present outbreak?

Secretary Rusk: No. The President commented on that this morning in his statement. The facts are still very obscure. It may be some time before the facts can be clarified. It may take quite a long time. We have not tried to make a judgment on that, and we have no reason to think that the Security Council is trying to make a judgment on that at the moment. The key problem is to get the shooting stopped.

Q. Have we had any indication whether Russia will go along with the effort to get a cease-fire resolution through the Security Council?

Secretary Rusk: We hope that they will. There have been discussions with them in the course

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/6/1967, pp. 949-50.

of the day at the Security Council. They, of course, as a permanent member, have the same obligations that we have to play their role in maintaining international peace and security. But when I last heard from the situation up there, those talks had not come to a final conclusion in the Security Council.

Q. Mr. Rusk, under our concept of neutrality, would it be a violation for one of the countries involved to raise funds by financing or floating bonds in this country, in your judgment?

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to get into that. We are not in a situation that calls for judgment or decision on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are we neutral in thought, word, and deed?

Secretary Rusk: I have in a good many words told you what our attitude is. I don't, I think, need to get into particular phraseology that goes beyond what the President has said and what I have said. Thank you.

60

News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.¹ [Excerpts]

Tel Aviv, June 5, 1967

Q. With what nations does Israel consider itself at war?

Mr. Eban: Egypt is the country that has engaged in hostilities. It all started with the Egyptian attack; at the same time there has been participation in the fighting by Syria and Jordan. This development was a result of the so-called Egyptian-Jordanian defense agreement—which expressed itself in the opening of fire by Jordan without any provocations.

Q. Which precisely was the first move against you this morning?

Mr. Eban: The first move was the move-

ment of Egyptian aircraft; the second was the shelling of Israeli settlements near the Gaza strip; the third was the Israeli riposte to these moves; the fourth has manifested itself as an expansion of the conflict by increased acts of aggression in Jerusalem. This is an aggressive assault started by Egypt in every sense: in the wider historical sense as well as in the immediate one.

Q. Would you say that the Israel Defense Forces at this time will limit itself to the defensive role on all fronts, or if the opportunity arises move to the attack?

Mr. Eban: Once hostilities develop into full-scale operations, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between these two. Quoting our present Minister of Defense, I will say that the Israel Government policy includes no aims of conquest. Our only objective is to frustrate the attempts of the Arab armies to conquer our land, and to break this siege and ring around us.

61

Statement in the Senate by South African Foreign Minister Muller on War in the Middle East.²

Pretoria, June 6, 1967

Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss foreign affairs in the hon. Senate. I regret that this debate must take place under such tragic and alarming international circumstances. With great alarm and regret we have all heard that war has broken out in the Middle East—war with all the suffering and damage which accompany wars. I want to say immediately that everyone in South Africa, together with everyone in their right minds, hopes and trusts that hostilities will soon cease and that a satisfactory solution will be found. As is generally known, in this 20th century two attempts have been made on the international level to prevent war. The first was, of course, the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War—an attempt which failed in its aim. The second attempt was the establish-

² Republic of South Africa, the Senate, *Official Report* No. 14, third Sess., Second Senate. col. 3746-48.

¹ *Davar*, 6/6/1967.

ment of the U.N. in 1945, after the Second World War and, although the chief aim of the U.N. was to maintain peace, the majority of the member nations apparently forgot the original aims of that organization more and more. As you know, South Africa warned against this continuously, and we pointed out that the organization disregarded the real threats to peace, and that the organization was used to interfere in situations which did not endanger world peace. Instead of furthering peace, the U.N. sometimes did exactly the opposite, namely to create feelings of enmity and to increase international tension. It is ironical, Mr. President, that during the last six or seven weeks, when tension in the Middle East built up, the U.N. should have failed to notice and foresee that the worst could happen. I say it is ironical that the U.N. should then have been busy with a special session, where it struggled with the ghosts of its own imagination. I refer, of course, to the emergency session of the U.N. in connection with South West Africa. This happened in spite of the burning danger in the Middle East, and the question arises what contribution the U.N. made towards solving that problem. Its only contribution so far has been to remove the U.N. Task Force from the Middle East—that force which was put there to try to maintain peace. The result is that we have now apparently reached a stage where the U.N. is incapable of maintaining peace, with the result that the great powers will again have to step in to try to bring about peace, and they will have to try to prevent this war from reaching global dimensions, because I agree with what the hon. the Prime Minister said in this hon. Senate a few days ago, that this war in the Middle East can possibly lead to a world war. We earnestly hope that the attempts which are made will succeed, so that the loss of life, all the suffering and damage can end. Mr. President, it is natural that we should ask ourselves how all this is going to affect us and our country. As is generally known, it is a basic principle here in South Africa not to interfere in the affairs of others, not to interfere in the quarrels of others or to choose sides, but to resist all attempts by others to interfere in our affairs. In view of this, I believe that you will agree with me that South Africa is not concerned with this war in the Middle East, and that it is not for us to dictate to the parties concerned how to conduct their affairs nor how

they must solve those problems. Besides our point of view in principle, it would, in fact, serve no purpose if we were to interfere there. As a small power which strives for peace and which is against all aggression and, therefore, also opposed to the clash of arms in the Middle East and which regrets it, we pin our hopes on the fact that everything possible will be done to end this war in a satisfactory manner, and that it will not develop further. In the meantime, South Africa is again required, for the third time in a period of less than 30 years, to help solve traffic problems which have arisen because the Suez Canal is involved and, according to the latest reports, has been closed as a result of this war. It can, of course, bring about enormous additional responsibilities for our facilities, but we will do everything possible, as my colleague, the hon. Minister of Transport, has already said, to face the difficulties which may arise in this respect. This closing of the Suez Canal, of course, underlines once more the importance of the sea-route around the Cape. One hopes that the time will arrive when it will be fully realized how important it is that the sea-route around the Cape be kept open and protected. As you know, South Africa recently accepted greater responsibilities in connection with the protection and safeguarding of the sea-route around the Cape during discussions with the British about Simonstown. It is simply inconceivable to us that those who gain by our actions in this respect do not realize how necessary it is that we should be given assistance to fulfil this task of ours as well as possible, and that we should not be thwarted. Mr. President, the Government is watching the position in the Middle East very carefully. We will see to it that we are kept informed about the latest developments, and the Government will decide from time to time, according to circumstances, how to act in order to serve South Africa's interests in the best way.

62

Statement by Australian Acting Prime Minister McEwen on the Outbreak of Hostilities.¹

Canberra, June 6, 1967

The outbreak of fighting in the Middle East is a tragic development. All Australians are dismayed at the suffering and destruction that is being brought to the people of the countries which are now in conflict. In addition any large scale fighting in that region which upsets the precarious balance there holds dangers of involving outside powers and endangering peace elsewhere.

The failure of the Security Council to act before hostilities began is to be deplored. The Australian Government still hopes that the United Nations can discharge its responsibilities and take decisions for which the Australian and other governments can offer their full support. The Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations has been instructed to give all support to this end.

On 25 May, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Hasluck, said: "I hope that all the Great Powers, whatever their differences on some aspects of the present situation, will nevertheless work together to prevent hostilities." Now that hostilities have broken out, this appeal to the Great Powers is no less valid. In fact, the urgency is even greater.

Australian has a great concern that peace should be maintained in the Middle East. Where our own good offices can be of use, we are ready to be helpful. Australia looks to the Security Council to act to prevent a widening of hostilities and to bring about an end to the present fighting.

63

Declaration Issued by the Bulgarian Government on War in the Middle East.²

Sofia, June 6, 1967.

On 5 June 1967 armed forces of Israel attacked the U.A.R. and bombed military targets near Cairo and the Suez Canal, thus committing direct aggression against the U.A.R., aggression which continues against the U.A.R., as well as against Syria and Jordan. In fulfillment of their contractual obligations, Syria and Jordan declared that they find themselves in a state of war with Israel. And several Arab countries are also helping the U.A.R. The Israeli Government attempted to make the U.A.R. responsible for its unprovoked military adventure. All data, however, show very clearly that aggression has been carried out by Israel, thus flagrantly violating U.N. statutes and international law.

In starting a war in the Near East the Israeli Government creates a serious threat for broadening the conflict in this region and to world peace. Israel ignored all appeals to give up aggressive actions and to pursue paths for a peaceful solving of the crisis in the Near East. The Israeli Government preferred to pay heed to the advice of certain imperialist circles and the most extreme adventurous Israeli circles, and it chose a path which is dangerous for world peace and the Israeli people themselves. The adventurous and aggressive actions of Israel arouse disgust and anxiety among world public opinion.

The Bulgarian people and their government follow with anxiety the development of events in the Near East. They condemn Israeli aggression against the U.A.R. and all other Arab countries and voice their full solidarity with the Arab peoples, who are struggling to beat off aggression, and for defense of their freedom and independence, against the actions of imperialism and neocolonialism.

The government of Bulgarian People's Republic and the Bulgarian people join the appeal of the peace-loving forces for an immediate end to Israeli aggression and for withdrawal of Israeli troops beyond the armistice line. The Bulgarian

¹ *Current Notes on International Affairs*, 1967, p. 232.

² Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian, 1400 GMT, 6/6/1967.

Government thinks that the Security Council at the United Nations must take measures at once in order to condemn and stop the Israeli aggressive actions and to restore peace in the Near East.

64

Statement Issued by the Government of People's China Supporting the Arab States.¹

Peking, June 6, 1967

On June 5, 1967, instigated and supported by U.S. imperialism, Israel flagrantly launched massive armed aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab states. This is another towering crime against the Arab people committed by U.S. imperialism and its tool Israel as well as a grave provocation against the people of Asia, Africa and the rest of the world. The people of the Arab states, rising as one in their hatred against their common enemy, are dealing head-on blows at the aggressors. A storm of struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression is sweeping the whole Arab world.

Israel is a product of the U.S. and British imperialist policy of aggression. After World War II Israel could not have existed at all without U.S. imperialist fosterage, and it would never have dared to launch an attack against the Arab states without U.S. imperialist support. It is U.S. imperialism that has instigated Israel to attack Syria; it is U.S. imperialism that, in league with British imperialism, has threatened to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba by force of arms; it is again U.S. imperialism that has been supplying Israel with large quantities of arms in order to mount sudden attacks on the United Arab Republic and the other Arab countries. Facts have fully proved that U.S. imperialism is the back-stage manager of Zionism and the No. 1 enemy of the Arab people and the people of the world.

In this incident, the Soviet revisionist leading clique has connived at the aggression committed by Israel at the instigation and with the support of U.S. imperialism, thus once again revealing

its ugly features as a betrayer of the Arab people.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the greatest leader of the Chinese people, has pointed out that "The raging tide of the people of the world against the U.S. aggressors is irresistible. Their struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys will assuredly win still greater victories." The U.A.R., Syria and the other Arab states and the Arab people of Palestine are waging a just war against U.S.-Israeli aggression. A just war is invincible. The heroic Arab people with a glorious anti-imperialist tradition have raised aloft the just banner of war against aggression. We believe that with the sympathy and support of the people of the whole world, the Arab people will surely win final victory so long as they strengthen their unity, persevere in struggle, advance wave upon wave and surmount all difficulties.

The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares: Armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, the 700 million Chinese people who are victoriously carrying on the great proletarian cultural revolution absolutely will not allow the U.S. imperialists and their collaborators to ride roughshod and commit aggression everywhere. We firmly stand on the side of the Arab people and resolutely support them in their just war against U.S.-Israeli aggression.

Victory will surely belong to the heroic fighting Arab people!

65

Speech of Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada Before the National Assembly.²
[Excerpt]

Rawalpindi, June 6, 1967

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I share the sentiments and shock shown by the honourable members at the nefarious and naked aggression committed by Israel against the territorial integrity of the United Arab Republic and the adjoining Arab States. This has been rightly and unequivocally condemned by all.

Sir, perhaps with the exception of Kashmir,

¹ *Peking Review*, 9/6/1967, p. 8.

² Pakistani Embassy, Beirut.

no issue has so stirred the people of Pakistan as the crisis in the Middle East. Even before the establishment of Pakistan, the Muslims of the sub-continent were deeply disturbed about the developments in regard to the Holy Land.

In the historic Lucknow session of the Muslim League held in October, 1937, the Quaid-e-Azam assured the Arab brethren of the solid support of the Muslims of the sub-continent in their brave and just struggle.

In November, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution sowing the seeds of a separate Jewish State. The Quaid-e-Azam as the Head of the State denounced this resolution and expressed surprise and shock at the serious lack of judgement shown by the United Nations Organisation by their inherently unjust and outrageous decision in respect of Palestine.

Sir, you will recall that on 14th May, 1948, long before the date laid down by the General Assembly, Israel proclaimed its alleged independence and started military operations to take possession of the areas assigned by the General Assembly to the Jewish State and even the areas reserved for the Arab State.

Thus, Israel is an illegitimate child born of fraud and force. Pakistan has never recognized its existence.

Even after the signing of the armistice agreement with the Arab countries in 1949, she has been guilty of incursions against Arab territory for which she has been censured and condemned by the Security Council.

According to the U.N. partition plan, Israeli frontiers did not border on the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel owes her position at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba to usurpation.

Israel's record of aggression can hardly be surpassed. The most flagrant aggression was committed against the U.A.R. in 1956. In November, 1966, she chose the date of arrival of our President in Amman to carry out an armed raid against Jordan.

Sir, coming to the circumstances leading to the current crisis, it will be recalled that Israel again carried out an air attack against Syria in April, 1967. Last month she massed her troops on the Syrian border as a prelude to a large-scale attack on Syria. This led to certain preventive

measures by the United Arab Republic who are in a defensive alliance with Syria.

On 16th May, 1967, the United Arab Republic asked for the withdrawal of U.N. Emergency Forces which were stationed in Gaza and Sinai. The Secretary-General complied with this request and ordered the withdrawal of these forces.

Recently the United Arab Republic imposed a blockade to prevent Israeli shipping to pass through the straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. We have already made it clear that Israel has no right to passage in or through the Gulf of Aqaba.

In the meantime the Security Council was seized of the matter. Notwithstanding that, and in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations, in fact, in a dastardly manner the Israeli forces launched yesterday in the early hours of the morning a massive land and air attack on the United Arab Republic. The Arab countries have taken the necessary defensive measures to protect their independence and sovereignty which are fully compatible with recognised principles of justice and morality, and the Charter of the United Nations.

I pay tributes to our gallant Arab brothers who are defending themselves with tenacity. It is our sincere hope and firm conviction that the cause of the Arab brothers will triumph.

It is abundantly clear that the responsibility for plunging the Middle East into the present war rests on Israel and Israel alone.

Sir, Israel is not only a cancer but a cancer in the body politic of the Middle East. It has not responded to the corrective treatment. The only cure seems to be a swift surgery.

The House will agree that a lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be based on perpetuation of injustice. The wrongs done to the Palestinian Arabs must be righted. Israel must be made to vacate its aggression, past as well as present, and the sovereignty and independence of the Arab States must be respected. Only then, and then only conditions will be created for a just and durable peace in the region.

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66

Statement Issued by the British Foreign Office Denying British Involvement in the Middle East Fighting.¹**London, June 6, 1967**

Her Majesty's Government are shocked by reports emanating from the Middle East and carried by official news media that planes from a British aircraft carrier have been involved in the fighting. It is a malicious fabrication. There is not a grain of truth in it. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to avoid taking sides in this conflict and to do everything they can to bring about a cease-fire as soon as possible. As stated by the Foreign Secretary yesterday in the House, all British forces in the area have the strictest instructions not to become involved in any way.

Measures to interrupt the normal flow of oil supplies or to close the Suez canal to shipping are therefore totally unjustified.

Urgent steps are being taken in London and in the capitals of Arab states to correct these misrepresentations.

[At the 12.30 p.m. news conference a Foreign Office spokesman added:] Two British aircraft carriers are in the Mediterranean and the Red sea, near Aden. Throughout yesterday the "Victorious" was stationary in Malta and the "Hermes" was stationary in Aden. It would not therefore have been physically possible for there to have been any aircraft activity from these carriers.

67

News Briefing by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk Denying American Involvement in the Middle East Fighting.²**Washington, June 6, 1967**

Secretary Rusk: Early this morning I heard a charge made by Cairo that U.S. carrier-based planes had taken part in attacks on Egypt.

¹ London Press Service Release VS241/67.

² U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/6/1967, pp. 950-51.

These charges are utterly and wholly false. The truth of the matter could have been ascertained very quickly if the authorities in Cairo had picked up a telephone and asked our Ambassador about it, or if their Ambassador in Washington had asked the Department of State or the Department of Defense about it.

We know that they and some of their friends know where our carriers are. We can only conclude that this was a malicious charge, known to be false, and, therefore, obviously was invented for some purpose not fully disclosed.

I said yesterday that the United States is not a belligerent in this situation. Our forces are not participating in it. There is just no word of truth in the charge that U.S. aircraft have taken part in any of these present operations in the Near East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any idea why they might have made this charge?

Secretary Rusk: I think they are trying to create difficulties for Americans in the Near East. I suppose they are trying to make this a part of a propaganda campaign. But we don't like this kind of charge, and we would hope that they would make the minimum effort to deal with such matters in a truthful fashion.

68

Statement by British Prime Minister Wilson in Parliament on his Talks About the Middle East and Ensuing Debate.³**London, June 6, 1967**

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson) . . .

During my visit I was able to have very full discussions over a wide range of topics with the Prime Minister of Canada, the President of the United States of America, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the President of the Security Council. Much of the content of these discussions must, of necessity, remain confidential, but I can tell the House that the situation in the Middle East figured prominently in all of

³ Hansard's, 6/6/1967, col. 796-809.

them; and that, in addition, President Johnson and I discussed the situation in Vietnam in some depth.

My talks about the Middle East were aimed at securing conditions in which the countries concerned in the Middle East could be fairly asked to maintain continued restraint and not to resort to violent action. In particular, they related to the problem of the freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran.

As my right hon. Friend said yesterday, the events of yesterday morning have overtaken these discussions, but the House will recognise their direct relevance to any long-term settlement capable of securing and maintaining peace in the Middle East on a basis which could be regarded as honourable by all concerned in the area. It will be our objective in securing the cease-fire for which we are pressing to ensure that such a long-term settlement is achieved. The issues I was able to discuss in such depth last week will of course, be highly relevant.

I now turn to the current situation. Since my right hon. Friend spoke to the House yesterday, there has been a flood of news, a great deal of it conflicting, about the fighting in the Middle East, though a pattern seems to be emerging. The most serious operations on the ground seem to have been on the United Arab Republic/Israel border, but information about them is unclear and disputed. Yesterday's air action by the Israel Air Force against United Arab Republic airfields was extended to airfields in Jordan and Syria. There are also reports of advances by Israel forces into Jordanian territory and the capture of the towns of Jenin and Latrun. The local truce in Jerusalem which was arranged yesterday did not, unfortunately, hold, and fighting continued into the night.

I would like to add the voice of Her Majesty's Government to that of His Holiness the Pope and others who have appealed for a cessation of fighting in the Jerusalem area before terrible damage is done to places which are sacred for three of the great religions of the world.

A most serious development has been the deliberate spreading by the United Arab Republic Government of entirely false accusations that British and American air forces have taken part in the fighting on the side of Israel. It has been

reported that President Nasser has announced that he will, in retaliation, close the Suez Canal to navigation. President Aref of Iraq is also reported to have said that he has ordered a cessation of the pumping of oil to the Mediterranean for the same reason and there have also been reports that the Kuwait Government have forbidden oil exports to British and American destinations.

Her Majesty's Government have already categorically denied this monstrous story, and all our Ambassadors in the Arab countries have been instructed to make clear to the local governments that this is a malicious and mischievous invention. One story alleges that aircraft from British aircraft carriers have taken part in the fighting. During the past week the only British aircraft carriers in the area have been H.M.S. "Victorious," which has been at Malta, and H.M.S. "Hermes," which has been at Aden, each over 1,000 miles away. In view of these incontrovertible facts, we are calling upon the Arab Governments not to disrupt commercial arrangements which are as much in their interest as ours on the basis of such false statements.

In New York, the Security Council met promptly as foreshadowed, but then rose for private consultations, which continued for 14 hours. I can only tell the House of my regret that a resolution calling for a prompt and general ceasefire has not yet been passed. I think that it is vital that there should be no further delay.

As regards the shipment of arms, as my right hon. Friend informed the House yesterday we are consulting with other Governments who are suppliers for the area. The House will realise the desirability of ensuring, so far as we are able, that any embargo covers all arms supplies to the area, from whatever source. Pending the outcome of our consultations, we are suspending any further shipments to any of the countries involved.

Mr. Heath: The House was glad to hear the Prime Minister confirm that, in his discussions with President Johnson, he made clear that any measures to assert the rights of the maritime Powers in the Gulf of Aqaba are still relevant and they must take their part in any settlement for permanent peace. I believe this to be so. Second, we agree with the Prime Minister that it is absolutely right to use every means possible

to show to the Arab countries that British forces are taking no part in the conflict.

May I now put three questions, recognising that the situation is still very fluid. First, in the Prime Minister's discussions with President Johnson, what contingency plans were made to deal with the situation which may now have been brought about, with the Suez Canal closed and certain Arab countries denying oil to Britain and to the United States?

Second, is the right hon. Gentleman now having any discussions with European colleagues about what action can be taken to deal with this situation? Perhaps he could state the Government's view on whether President Nasser is entitled in these circumstances to close the Canal. It would appear that, even on his own position in 1957, he is not entitled to do that, and that it should be possible to get an interim order from the International Court making this clear.

Third, in his discussions with President Johnson, did the Prime Minister propose changes in his policy for British forces in the Far East and in Aden as a result of the present situation?

The Prime Minister: I need not comment on the right hon. Gentleman's opening remarks. We are in agreement there.

The principal contingency plans which we started to discuss were those which would have been required in a different state of affairs in relation to the Aqaba situation. But, of course, we arranged to keep in the closest touch, which we have done, on any change in developments if fighting were to break out. We had some discussions on oil, and those discussions will continue, although, as regards both the United States and the European countries which might be involved if this plan were proceeded with, the right forum would be the O.E.C.D., which has its own special arrangements for dealing with all matters, emergency or otherwise, in relation to oil.

As regards the Suez Canal, the news is very conflicting and confused on whether there is a temporary or more than temporary closure. There seems to be some confirmation from the area that the Canal is at this moment closed. We do not know how long it will last. As to legality and entitlement to close it, the right hon. Gentleman is right: closure to peaceful nations—and Britain

is in that position—whether for a reason of the kind which, I hope, I have satisfactorily dealt with this afternoon or for any other reason, is quite beyond the legal capacity of President Nasser.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Will the Prime Minister go a little further and say what understandings were reached in his discussions with President Johnson with regard to maintaining United Kingdom oil supplies from across the Atlantic?

The Prime Minister: There was no detailed discussion about that particular contingency, apart from the arrangement for urgent discussion if a situation like this were to arise. I am sure that, despite the feverish heat and passion in the Middle East at this time, the Middle Eastern countries concerned, and especially their Governments, will recognise that what they are talking of doing is not so much cutting off our oil but cutting off our markets from their oil, and that this might have very serious effects for their long-term sales position. This country would not be willing to be put twice in a decade in a position in which this kind of threat or blackmail could be held out. There might be a number of people in this country thinking in terms of long-term contracts with other oil supplying areas, which might have the most profound and devastating effects, which we should all regret, on the Middle East.

Mr. Marten: Did the Prime Minister discuss with President Johnson the question of forming a United Nations peace-keeping force? Does not he agree that, if there is to be a ceasefire, the first thing which the United Nations will probably want to do is to put in a substantial peace-keeping force as soon as possible to separate the contestants, and that it should get on with the formation of that force now?

The Prime Minister: In the discussions last week, it was widely agreed among those with whom I spoke—both the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States, and it was the basis of a lot of our discussions in the United Nations building—that as part of a long-term settlement we would need some kind of United Nations peace-keeping force restored to that area, but including the Israel side of the

borders as well as the Arab side of the borders.

Mr. Blaker: I understood the Prime Minister to say just now that closure of the Suez Canal to peaceful nations would be quite unjustified. I am sure that he would not wish to give a false impression. Perhaps he would care to clear the point up. Does not Article 1 of the Convention of 1888 lay down that the Canal will always be open, in peace or in war, to ships of all nations?

The Prime Minister: I was not attempting to give a legal construction of the whole Suez Canal Convention. What I was trying to make clear is that we are not at war with Egypt, as the tendentious propaganda suggests. We are in their context a completely peaceful nation, not taking sides at all in this dispute and fighting. Clearly, in these circumstances, the Egyptians have no right to close the Canal to us and to others because of trumped-up statements of the kind which have been made.

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Mr. Alfred Morris: In my right hon. Friend's discussions with the President of the United States, was consideration given to bilateral or multi-lateral action outside the United Nations if the United Nations finds it impossible to conciliate in the grievous conflict in the Middle East?

The Prime Minister: To a considerable extent, the context in which we were talking has been changed by the events of yesterday. We were concerned with what could be done to secure some understanding about freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran. In those circumstances, we decided to put full weight behind the Security Council and, at the same time, to try to secure a multilateral declaration of maritime Powers, and only if those efforts failed should we be prepared to consider other matters. In the event, while the Aqaba question which we discussed will be highly relevant to a peace settlement, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition agrees, it has been overtaken now by the actual outbreak of fighting.

Mr. Thorpe: I accept that the Government's first priority is to obtain a cease-fire through the United Nations, but does the Prime Minister recall that in 1950 the Labour Government made a

firm declaration, in company with the Americans and the French, that they would intervene to prevent the violation of armistice or frontier lines in the Middle East? On the assumption that Israel were threatened with being driven into the sea, are we to take it that the Government prefer to wash their hands of this obligation or do they believe that they have a continuing moral obligation for the future of this State?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman's question is extremely hypothetical. Statements about the tripartite declaration have been made by successive Governments; a statement was made by one of my predecessors and I myself have made a statement about it. The tripartite declaration was made principally in the context of arms supplies at a time when the signatories to it were the only arms suppliers to the Middle East. The situation has been very much changed since that time, Mr. Macmillan, in 1963, and my right hon. Friend and I since, have made clear that we do not think it relevant to the present situation. What is relevant is our obligation as members of the United Nations.

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Mr. Sandys: Can the Prime Minister give us some indication of the kind of action he has in mind to secure the re-opening of the Suez Canal?

The Prime Minister: I have made it clear that it is only in the past few hours that this report has come through. We have been checking on its accuracy, content and meaning. I think that the right hon. Gentleman would not wish us to jump to any conclusions about what our attitude should be. I am sure that he will be particularly concerned that we should not jump to wrong conclusions about how to set about it.

Mr. Hale: As a number of the combatant Arab nations are members of the sterling area, is not this war on their side being partly financed at the expense of the £? May not it be necessary, in view of the embargoes they announced today, for Her Majesty's Government reluctantly to consider a moratorium upon those States which have declared a trade war upon Britain?

The Prime Minister: I am not sure if the opening part of my hon. Friend's question meant

—I am sure that he did not mean this—that we were some way financing this war. We are not financing it in any way. It is true that a number of the countries on both sides hold balances in this country. This is a commercial matter, and I am quite sure that my hon. Friend's suggestion would not be appropriate in present circumstances. We have had no suggestion in any form of economic warfare against this country. I think that it would be quite wrong to consider that solution.

Mr. Tapsell: While we all recognise the importance of not allowing the conflict in the Middle East to drag the great Powers in to conflict with one another, will the Prime Minister recognise that many of the small Powers in the Middle East are deeply reluctant to have their affairs settled by the great Powers. Will he, therefore, direct his mind to calling a peace conference with one of the smaller neutralist Powers in the chair?

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): Which one?

The Prime Minister: That raises the question, "Which one?" I think that this matter should be left to the Security Council. The Security Council is properly representative of great Powers, small Powers, Middle East Powers and neutral Powers. I think that it is a matter for the Security Council. We have given every support to the proposal of the President of France for close four-Power co-operation under the aegis of the Security Council to that end. As the House will know, my right hon. Friend and I are in very close touch at this moment with the heads of Governments of the other three permanent members of the Security Council.

Mr. Burden: While the Prime Minister has given the complete lie to the malicious invention of Colonel Nasser regarding British air cover over Egypt yesterday, does he agree that while that invention might indicate the massive blows that were struck against him it also indicates a very dangerous situation in which, whenever such blows are struck, Colonel Nasser might well try to blame us so as to involve us with Russia?

However successful the Israelis may be, they can never conquer the Arab States, so will

the Prime Minister undertake to put into discussion immediately with the United Nations considerations to try to ensure the future of Israel when this war has ended?

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman was quite right to stress the dangers which, as he indicated, are only part of the dangers. I have made clear that when my right hon. Friend meets the Arab Ambassadors later today he will give them chapter and verse for our denial of the malicious statement that has been made. This is also being made clear in the capitals of the countries concerned.

The second point was on?

Mr. Burden: The limited success of the Israelis.

The Prime Minister: I do not think that there has been any suggestion of a war of conquest here. The Prime Minister of Israel has said that Israel seeks no territorial changes, but wants to be in a position to resist aggression. I think that we can help best in these circumstances by not entering into declarations on these questions. Our job is to help, with those on the Security Council, to get a peace which satisfies the honourable requirements of all parties in the area.

Mr. Winnick: While we want to get a cease-fire as quickly as possible, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend is aware that many people in Britain consider Israel now to be in the same position as we were in 1940, standing alone and fighting those who want to destroy her and put her people to death?

The Prime Minister: I think that historical parallels, particularly in the Middle East, can very often lead to the wrong conclusions and dangerous courses of action. We have stated our position; it was fully stated in the debate last week. The Israeli Government have made it clear that they are fighting in this conflict on their own and do not desire outside help. It would be very harmful for me to follow up the kind of question put by my hon. Friend.

Mr. Walters: What new steps does the Prime Minister propose to take to bring about a cease-fire irrespective of which way the war happens to be progressing?

The Prime Minister: This is being done through the Security Council, where my right hon. Friend is in hour by hour touch with Lord Caradon and giving him instructions as to the line he should take there. We are working for a cease-fire as quickly as possible so that we can then discuss the more long-term problems that need to be laid down if we are to have some kind of guarantee against this kind of tension and war arising again. In addition, as I have said, we are in very close touch with the other Governments principally concerned, not themselves being Governments involved in the fighting.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I understood that the Prime Minister, in talking about an embargo on arms, rightly said that this needed close consideration because it must cover all suppliers. I understood him to go on to say that this country was suspending the shipment of arms to any country in the area, or am I mistaken? He will be aware that the Soviet Union is doing nothing of the kind. How long will the shipments from this country be suspended if the Russians do not take the same action?

The Prime Minister: We are trying to find out the position with regard to the other countries. A statement has been made by France which we are trying to verify and get elaborated, and the position of the Soviet Union needs to be known more clearly than it is at the present time.

But I agree with what I think is the right hon. Gentleman's point of view, that whatever is done should not be on a basis which creates unfairness as between one side and another in the Middle East. We have, of course, arms deliveries on order not only to Israel, but to other areas of the Middle East. We are, therefore, temporarily making this administrative suspension of shipments while we explore the situation with other countries, and we shall review the matter again tomorrow. It is a 24-hour suspension in the first instance.

Mr. Mendelson: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that if it is found that the Soviet Government are continuing arms supplies to Egypt and to Syria, whose Governments have publicly pledged the destruction of Israel, our

country will not leave the people of Israel without the wherewithal to defend themselves.

Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are discussing a very grave issue.

The Prime Minister: I have said that we believe that the proper settlement of the arms question should be on a basis of fairness and balance between the two sides who are fighting. Certainly, if we were to find that arms were going from anywhere else to one side that would be a very important issue to be taken up in our reconsideration of the matter tomorrow. At the moment, we are by administrative action stopping shipments, whether to Israel or to Arab countries, until we have a clearer picture of the international arms supply to those areas.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: In view of the disappointing news which the Prime Minister has given of the state of affairs in the City of Jerusalem and the fact that serious damage there would be a world tragedy, will he consider taking an initiative with all the Powers concerned to have Jerusalem declared an open city, in the same way and for the same purposes as Rome was so declared in the latter stages of the last war?

The Prime Minister: I should like to make it clear that not only do we fully support the appeal made yesterday by His Holiness the Pope to that very end, but that we have gone further and made plain our willingness, in addition to what is happening in the Security Council, to assist in a local sense to do anything to bring about a cease-fire to protect Jerusalem, not only to stop the damage and carnage there, but to protect the Holy City itself. We have actually been at work in trying to arrange a local cease-fire in Jerusalem.

Mr. Heffer: Further to the point concerning arms sales, will my right hon. Friend say what discussions are now taking place with the Soviet Government to stop Soviet arms going to the Middle East?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend will know that we are in the closest touch with the Soviet Government. I have exchanged a number

of messages with Mr. Kosygin on the broader issue, my right hon. Friend is in close touch with the Ambassador—I saw the Ambassador myself this afternoon—and we are in close enough touch, I hope, to be able to establish the position on this question. When we have established it, we will consider in the light of that what our own attitude should be.

Rear-Admiral Morgan Giles: In view of all these threats to our interests and, indeed, to the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole, will the Prime Minister now make an unequivocal statement that Britain will maintain an effective presence east of Suez for the foreseeable future?

The Prime Minister: This raises a much wider question than the position in the Middle East, although it is, of course, a fair question, because it arose out of my talks with the President of the United States. We are considering that position. I can now take into account the views of the President. We shall be discussing the position with the Australian and New Zealand Governments during the next two or three weeks before an announcement can be made to the House.

Mr. Ginsburg: Notwithstanding what my right hon. Friend has said about arms supplies, would he be prepared to give the House an assurance that there will no be holding up over the next 24 hours of any request by the Israeli Government for essential medical supplies?

The Prime Minister: I will certainly consider the question of essential medical supplies. I agree that that might require other considerations. I was, of course, referring to arms for the actual fighting, and to arms for both sides.

Sir D. Renton: Further to the question by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the initiative which he has used and will use further should also relate to the Holy places at Bethlehem, Nazareth and Galilee?

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. I think that I am right in saying, however, that those places have not been in any danger as yet, whereas there has been heavy fighting in Jerusalem. Our

representatives in Jerusalem have shown great courage—they have been very much under fire themselves yesterday in a very dangerous situation—in what they have been doing to try to arrange a local accommodation in order to secure a cease-fire. If a cease-fire could be arranged, I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman about extending it to other areas which were involved in the bilateral discussions between Israel and Jordan.

Mr. Kelley: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that it might assist clarification of the situation if Her Majesty's Government stated their attitude to the decisions which were imposed on the Middle East as a result of the tripartite action in 1956 and whether they agree that that situation should persist or otherwise?

The Prime Minister: If my hon. Friend is referring to the settlement made by Mr. Hammarskjöld at the beginning of March, 1957, relating to the Gulf of Aqaba, the position of Her Majesty's Government and, I think, of the House as a whole, was made clear during the debate last week. As for other issues, we have now to try to get a settlement that will settle those issues, if we can, once and for all.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: Would not the Prime Minister agree that perhaps the most disturbing element in the whole situation is the total breakdown of the United Nations and the Security Council? In view of this, will he urgently call a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers, first, to see whether there cannot be an agreement about reinforcement of arms for the area and, secondly, if that should break down, to try to establish a *cordon sanitaire* to see that no arms come in?

The Prime Minister: No, I think that the right hon. Gentleman's approach is not the right one. I think that all of us feel, as was stated by right hon. Gentlemen opposite and by myself last week in the debate, that the United Nations has taken a serious blow by the decisions of three weeks ago. This was a point which I made strongly when I was in the United Nations building.

It must, however, be a matter for the Security Council now to secure a cease-fire. I believe that

it is right for the four Powers concerned, instead of calling a conference at some time in the future, now to work, as we are trying to work, within the Security Council to get that. If it cannot be done by quadripartite co-operation in the Security Council, it cannot be got by quadripartite co-operation outside the Security Council.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I need not assure the House that Mr. Speaker shares the awareness of every hon. Member of the House of the gravity of the issues which we are considering. We must, however, move on now to the next item of business.

69

Speech of Guinean President Sekou Toure Expressing Support for the Arab States.¹

Conakry, June 6, 1967

Your Excellency, dear brothers of the Arab community resident in Guinea, I want to say that the thanks you addressed to the Guinean people are not (?timely), for the simple reason that the struggle has just started and not yet ended. The cause being defended today by the Arab countries is inseparable from that which is being defended by the peoples of Guinea, Africa, and other continents. Our stand is based on three fundamental reasons which are historical, political, and human. Historically, Guinea cannot forget that during the last world war imperialism favored the installation of the future state of Israel in a Guinean province, namely, the Fouta Djallon highlands in central Guinea. This in fact meant that the Guinean people living in the Fouta Djallon region would have been expelled from their own land in the interest of Israel.

Behind Israel were the imperialist powers, who could impose the argument of force on the Guinean people. Had this plan been realized, Guinea's independence would have had no significance because our people would have freed themselves from French colonization only to be

subjected to that of Israel. Had this happened, the Guineans would today have the right to appeal for the solidarity of all people who love justice and freedom to support them in their liberation struggle against imperialism and Israel.

The second reason is political. Guinea has the best relations with all the Arab countries. Since its independence, our country's relations of cooperation with the Arab states have never ceased to develop. There is also the fact that we and the Arab states are engaged in the common struggle against imperialism. If all the independent African countries were free to express the thoughts of the African people, all the African governments would have condemned Israel and declared their support for the Arab people since yesterday.

There are also human factors, such as the presence in Guinea of a large community of men and women of Arab origin who are intimately associated in our country's political, economic, social and cultural struggle, and who have greatly contributed to the progress of the national independence movement in Guinea and to our country's economic and social development.

70

Message from Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China to U.A.R. President Nasir.²

Peking, June 6, 1967

On June 5, 1967, instigated and supported by U.S. imperialism, Israel launched cowardly sudden attacks on Cairo, capital of the U.A.R., the Suez Canal zone, the Gaza Strip and other places, thus precipitating a war of aggression against all the Arab states and people. Fearing no brute force and filled with hatred against their common enemy, the people of the U.A.R. and the entire Arab people who have an anti-imperialist tradition have greatly deflated the truculent arrogance of the aggressors and have won the sympathy and praise of all the anti-imperialist revolutionary people of Asia, Africa and the whole world.

¹ Conakry Guinea Domestic Service in French, 2000 GMT, 6/6/1967. Delivered to representatives of the Arab community in Guinea.

² *Peking Review*, 9/6/1967, pp. 8-9.

The current aggression by Israel has been long premeditated and was launched after Israel had been assured of political and military support from U.S. President Lyndon Johnson. Facts have once again demonstrated that U.S. imperialism is the arch criminal supporting Israel in its aggression against the Arab states and is the most ferocious enemy of the Arab people. The Chinese people and Government fully agree with the correct conclusion drawn by Your Excellency Mr. President on May 2 that U.S. imperialism is "the headquarters of the counter-revolution in the world."

At present, the situation of the struggle against imperialism in the world is excellent. U.S. imperialism is besieged ring upon ring by the people of the world. By their war adventures U.S. imperialism and its tool Israel can only arouse the Arab people to even more resolute resistance and hasten their own doom. Britain, France and Israel did not come to any good end in their aggression against Egypt in 1956, and today, in instigating and supporting Israel in its aggression against the Arab states, U.S. imperialism will definitely come to no good end either.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, has said, "The just struggles of the peoples of various countries in the world support each other." The Chinese Government and people have always highly appraised the Arab people's struggle against imperialism and regarded their struggle as our own struggle and their victories as our own victories. Now I wish to reiterate to Your Excellency that in the struggle to repel the aggression by U.S. imperialism and its tool Israel, the Chinese Government and people stand firmly by the U.A.R. people and the entire Arab people and will for ever remain the staunch and reliable comrades-in-arms of the Arab people.

Finally, allow me, on behalf of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Vice-Chairman Lin Piao as well as in my own name, to extend to Your Excellency our sincere regards and greetings.

Message from Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China to Syrian President Atassi.¹

Peking, June 6, 1967

On June 5, instigated and supported by U.S. imperialism, Israel brazenly launched military aggression against your country. This is a new and grave war provocation against the people of Syria as well as the entire Arab people.

In the face of imperialist aggression, the Government and people of the Syrian Arab Republic have waged a tit-for-tat struggle and are hitting back at the aggressors with resolute and powerful blows. Your just action has demonstrated the strong will of the Syrian people and the entire Arab people to oppose aggression by U.S. imperialism and Israel and has won the sympathy and praise of all the anti-imperialist revolutionary people of Asia, Africa and the rest of the world. The Chinese Government and the 700 million Chinese people will, as in the past, stand firmly by the people of Syria and the other Arab states and give full support to your just struggle against aggression.

Facts have proved once again that U. S. imperialism is the No. 1 enemy of the people of Syria and the other Arab states and is the source of all the sufferings of the Arab people. This war of aggression launched by U.S. imperialism and its tool Israel in no way indicates their strength; on the contrary, it shows that they are at the end of their tether and are putting up a last-ditch struggle. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, pointed long ago: "All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful." I am deeply convinced that with the sympathy and support of the people of the world, the heroic people of Syria and the other Arab states, who have a glorious anti-imperialist tradition, will certainly win final victory in their struggle against aggression, so long as they strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Finally, allow me, on behalf of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Vice-Chairman Lin Piao as well as in my own name, to extend to Your Excellency our sincere regards and greetings.

72

Message from Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China to the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organization A. Shuqairi.¹

Peking, June 6, 1967

Instigated and supported by the U.S. and British imperialists, Israel has brazenly launched a massive armed attack on the Arab states and peoples.

United as one, the Arab people are waging a just war against aggression. The Arab people of Palestine and the Palestine Liberation Army have taken up their fighting posts and, together with the entire Arab armed forces and people, they are giving play to the spirit of courage in battle and fearing no sacrifice and are dealing head-on blows at the aggressors.

Israel is a product of the U.S. and British imperialist policy of aggression. Nineteen years ago, Israel, supported by the U.S. and British imperialists, forcibly occupied the homeland of the Arab people of Palestine and compelled about a million Palestinians to become homeless refugees.

Today, the oppressed Arab people and the disaster-ridden Palestinians have stood up. Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance; wherever there is aggression, there is struggle against aggression. I believe that having taken up arms, the revolutionary Arab people of Palestine and the entire Arab people will not lay down their arms and, like the heroic Vietnamese people, will fight on unflinchingly, resolutely and stubbornly until final victory.

At present, the situation of the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle throughout the world is excellent. U.S. imperialism is heavily besieged by the Vietnamese people, the Arab people and the revolutionary people of the whole world.

Your Excellency has on many occasions stated that Palestine can be liberated only by armed struggle. I very much admire this clear-cut view held by Your Excellency. Today, the just war of the Arab states and peoples against aggression by U.S. imperialism, British imperialism and Israel is a fine beginning of the struggle to liberate Palestine.

The Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung has taught us: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution." The practice of revolutionary struggle of the Arab people of Palestine will again prove this indisputable truth.

The Chinese people will for ever remain comrades-in-arms of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples in the struggle against imperialism. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, stand on your side and resolutely support you in carrying through to the end the just struggle against U.S. imperialism, British imperialism and their running dog Israel.

Please accept my regards and greetings.

73

Message of Support from Pakistani President Ayub Khan to Heads of Arab States.²

Rawalpindi, June 6, 1967

Israel's aggression against your country has come to me, as to all Pakistanis, as a great shock. We are watching with admiration the valour of your armed forces in defending your country.

We have full confidence in your ability not only to repel the attack but carry the fight to the enemy's camp and deliver him crippling blows.

All Pakistanis feel as one with their brethren in this crisis and wish to extend to them all possible assistance.

Please feel free to call us for whatever material help you require and we shall do our utmost to render it within our capabilities. Our earnest prayers with you and your people for victory.

² Pakistan Embassy, Beirut. Sent to the Leaders of the U.A.R., Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

74

Statement by U.S. President Johnson on the First Security Council Cease-Fire Resolution.¹**Washington, June 6, 1967**

The cease-fire vote of the Security Council opens a very hopeful path away from danger in the Middle East. It reflects responsible concern for peace on the part of all who voted for it. The United States has warmly supported this resolution. We hope the parties directly concerned will promptly act upon it. We believe that a cease-fire is the necessary "first step," in the words of the resolution itself, a first step toward what we all must hope will be a new time of settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East.

It is toward this end that we shall now strive.

75

Editorial by the Official Organ of the Chinese Communist Party "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily).²**Peking, June 6, 1967**

On June 5, Israel, a running dog of U.S. imperialism, flagrantly launched a war of aggression against the Arab countries by mounting massive air and ground attacks on the U.A.R., Syria and other countries. Thus, the threat of war conducted by U.S. imperialism in the recent period against the Arab people through Israel has turned into acts of war and U.S. imperialism and its lackey have imposed war on the Arab people.

Now that U.S. imperialism and its lackey have unleashed a war of aggression, the Arab people will naturally rise resolutely to fight a war against aggression. Since the enemy has already crossed the frontier, it is a matter of course to hit back with resolve. At present, the armed forces and people of the U.A.R., Syria and other countries are already dealing head-on blows at

the invaders. United by a bitter hatred for their common enemy, the Arab countries have one after another announced their entry into a state of war with Israel. Troops of many Arab countries have moved into frontline positions for joint resistance against aggression. This is the most forceful and staunch answer of the 100 million Arab people to the aggressors.

The frantic aggression unleashed by Israel against the Arab countries has been stagemanaged single-handedly by U.S. imperialism. In the past few days, warships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet have sailed into the East Mediterranean to threaten the Arab countries. Lyndon Johnson issued three statements within one week clamouring that the United States would "fulfil" its "promise" to Israel. The U.S. Ambassador to the U.A.R. declared long ago that the United States "will use force" against the Arab countries. The war of aggression now started by Israel in the Middle East is in fact a war in which the United States supplies arms and ideas and Israel provides men to fight for the United States and massacre the Arab people. The aim of this war of aggression stagemanaged by U.S. imperialism is to try and put down the Arab people's anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle so as to facilitate its control over and enslavement of the Arab countries.

British imperialism is also an accomplice in this war of aggression. Of late, Britain has trailed behind the United States in making one threat of war after another against the Arab countries and at the same time has been steadily amassing military forces east of the Suez Canal. Harold Wilson has brazenly declared that if the Arab countries did not bow to Israel, this "could lead to a local war in the Middle East." British imperialism which suffered a dismal defeat in the Suez Canal war is dreaming of riding again on the backs of the Arab people through this new war of aggression.

In the criminal aggressive activities of the United States and its lackey, Israel, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique is playing again the shameful role of No. 1 accomplice. Recently, busy contacts and intensive activities have been carried on between Moscow, Washington and London. A large number of Soviet war vessels have steamed into the East Mediterranean, exchanging fraternal greetings with the warships

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/6/1967, p. 935.

² Peking Review, 9/6/1967, pp. 11 & 39.

of the U.S. Sixth Fleet on the high seas. Kosygin wrote a hypocritical letter to the Israeli Premier urging him to be "cautious." Even Israeli officials found the tone extraordinarily "moderate." The Soviet revisionist clique is bent on stamping out the flames of the Arab people's just struggle, in collusion with U.S. and British imperialism. Its act of betrayal has added greatly to the aggressive arrogance of Israel.

The war of aggression unleashed by the U.S. imperialist lackey Israel is in fact the continuation of the neo-colonialist policy of enslavement that U.S. imperialism has been pursuing towards the Arab countries. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union have now joined hands in a vain attempt to bring the Arab countries to submission by means of war. While provoking a war, they are getting the United Nations to "mediate" so as to enable the big powers to continue their intervention. This lays bare the United Nations as a tool of U.S. imperialism, a tool of colonialism, a tool of power politics of the big powers, and a tool of the big powers to cover up their war crimes and carry out political deception.

U.S. imperialism and its accomplices and lackeys are bullying the Arab people in such a way that it is absolutely not to be tolerated. The Arab people are a heroic people with a tradition of struggling against aggression. They will never bow to the imperialist gangsters. In 1956 and 1958, they firmly countered the U.S.-British imperialist aggression. They are more united and powerful today than ever before. They will surely mete out redoubled punishment to the aggressors and deal them reinforced blows!

Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said: "If they fight, we will wipe them out completely. This is the way things are: if they attack and we wipe them out, they will have that satisfaction; wipe out some, some satisfaction; wipe out more, more satisfaction; wipe out the whole lot, complete satisfaction." This is the way for the Arab people to deal with imperialism and its lackey.

The present situation in the world is very favourable to the Arab people's war against aggression. U.S. imperialism is already badly mauled by the Vietnamese people and is inextricably bogged down in the Vietnam battlefield. It is committing aggression all over the world and is badly trounced everywhere. It is in a

position of utter passivity and is beset with difficulties. It puts on a very fierce appearance before the Arab people, but in fact it is extremely weak. What U.S. imperialism and its tool Israel fear most is that the Arab people will persist in this war against aggression. So long as the people of the Arab countries see through the reactionary essence of U.S. imperialism and its cohorts, strengthen their unity and persist in struggle, and refuse to be intimidated or deceived, they will certainly achieve final victory in their just war of self-defence against aggression.

The 700 million Chinese people strongly condemn the criminal aggression committed by U.S. imperialism and its lackey. U.S. imperialism is the common mortal enemy of the Chinese and Arab peoples. The Chinese people firmly stand by the Arab people and resolutely support their war against aggression.

U.S. imperialism and its lackey will certainly be defeated! The Arab people are sure to win!

76

Statement Issued by the Spanish Government Explaining its Position on the Middle East Conflict.¹

Madrid, June, 1967

In view of the damage that war engenders, and the grave threat that it may develop into a world-wide conflagration—which would have tragic consequences for Mankind—, Spain is determined to contribute all its efforts to the achievement of a cease-fire as an immediate objective.

Once more it has been proved that the perpetuation of acts of injustice—like that which created the distressing situation of the Palestinian refugees—will often degenerate into violence. In the conviction that the worst solution for all would be the attempt to solve problems by war, Spain calls upon all nations to concentrate their efforts, as she is doing, toward obtaining a stop in the fighting and the achievement of an hon-

¹ *Crónica de un año de España*, 18/7/66-18/6/67, pp. 66-67.
Day of issuance of the statement is not specified.

orable and just solution. This call is particularly motivated by Spain's friendship with the Arab countries—which are bound to her by an old and fraternal historical connection—as well as by the natural interest that, due to her own geographic position, she has in all that affects the Mediterranean area.

Furthermore, Spain deeply regrets that war may have reached the Holy Land, which is so much venerated by many men in the world, and especially by all Christians. In this regard, our Government considers that the protection of the Holy Places and access to them should be the object of a permanent international guarantee.

77

**Statement by U.S. President Johnson
Announcing the Establishment of a Special
Committee of the National Security Council.¹**

Washington, June 7, 1967

The United Nations Security Council has called for a cease-fire in the Middle East. This first clear step toward lasting peace has the strongest support of our Government. We have worked as hard as we could to avoid hostilities and to end them. But the fighting came, and the road forward to real peace and progress will not be easy. Still, there is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first responsibility falls to the peoples and governments in the area, we must do our best to that end, both inside and outside the United Nations.

The continuing crisis and the effort to help build a new peace will require the most careful coordination of the work of our Government. To insure this coordination, I am today establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council. The Secretary of State will preside over this committee, and its members will be the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of

the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Walt Rostow. I shall meet with the committee from time to time as necessary and so will the Vice President and the Ambassador to the United Nations.

I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve as a Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the committee. Mr. Bundy has worked with us before, and he has been in informal consultation in the last year on a number of subjects. Mr. Bundy has now asked his board of trustees at the Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of absence, and he is already at work. I am asking all agencies of the Government to assist him with such staff support as he may request for the Special Committee. The committee will meet regularly at the White House.

78

**Statement from the Soviet Government to
the Government of Israel Demanding a
Cease-Fire.²**

Moscow, June 7, 1967

Reports are coming in from different sources that the resolution of the U.N. Security Council on an immediate cease-fire and discontinuance of all hostilities is not being carried out by the Israeli side. Israel is grossly and demonstratedly trampling this decision underfoot and is continuing the war against the Arab states. This stand of the Israeli government is extra proof of the aggressive essence of your policy, which disregards elementary norms of international relations and openly shows disrespect for the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter.

The Soviet government has clearly warned the government of Israel against the promotion of a policy of aggression and ventures. But the Israeli leaders did not heed the voice of reason. If the Israeli government now does not immediately fulfill the common demand of states for an immediate ending of fire, expressed in the Security Council's resolution, the Soviet Union will revise

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/6/1967, p. 951.

² Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1701 GMT, 7/6/1967.

its attitude with respect to Israel and adopt a decision concerning the further maintenance of diplomatic relations with Israel, which by its actions is opposing itself to all peace-loving states. It goes without saying that the Soviet government will consider and implement other necessary measures stemming from Israel's aggressive policy.

79

Statement Issued by the Cuban Government on the Middle East War.¹

Havana, June 7, 1967

An analysis of all the news, facts, and events relative to the beginning and subsequent progress of the dramatic happenings in the Middle East demonstrates in an incontrovertible manner that the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries have been the object of a surprise, stealthy aggression by the Israeli Armed Forces, which, instigated and supported by imperialism, have carried out this aggression which attacks the freedom and integrity of the Arab nations. The Arab countries are today one more victim of the overall strategy of the imperialist policy in the world. These events, which at these moments stir the indignant conscience of the people, are part of the endless series of aggressions by imperialism promoted in various parts of the world.

It is the same policy and the same overall strategy of piracy and crime that is being practiced on the people of Vietnam and Laos. It is the same hypocritical and criminal policy which yesterday led to military intervention in Santo Domingo and which carries out provocations against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It causes the Green Berets to participate with—and it supports militarily—the gorilla governments of America in trying to halt the advance of the liberation movement in our continent.

The Central Committee of our party in a statement on 18 May warned the world of the dangers which this imperialist policy meant for all countries: "No country can feel safe because

tomorrow Yankee imperialism may again unleash new aggressions in Korea, or in Cambodia, Syria, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, or Cuba, to cite just a few examples." Today in the Middle East that forecast in the statement of the party Central Committee has come true. That is why, in view of this new imperialist crime, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, faithful to the principles formulated in the aforementioned statement of the party Central Committee, reiterates its most absolute solidarity with the Arab countries which today face the imperialist aggression, and it condemns that aggression.

The Revolutionary Government of Cuba declares its support for the impugnation made by the diplomatic representative of the United Arab Republic in the United Nations of the Security Council agreement which limits itself to ordering a cease-fire without condemning the aggressor or demanding an accounting from imperialism which armed and instigated it. This is the equivalent, as was expressed by the aforementioned representative, of imposing a surrender to imperialist aggression.

The Government of Cuba will support the Government of the United Arab Republic in any position of resistance which it adopts against that shameful agreement of surrender of the U.N. Security Council. It is painful for peoples to see the Government of the United States show its joy at what it obviously considers a political, diplomatic, and military victory of imperialism.

Havana, 7 June 1967, the year of heroic Vietnam.

(signed) Revolutionary Government of Cuba.

80

Statement by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in Parliament.²

New Delhi, June 7, 1967

Nearly two weeks ago, my colleague, the Minister of External Affairs, made a statement in this House giving Government's assessment of the explosive situation in West Asia and expres-

¹ Havana Domestic Radio and Television Services in Spanish, 1723 GMT, 7/6/1967.

² *Foreign Affairs Record*, June 1967, pp. 82-83.

sing our deep concern at the developments that were taking place there.

Since then, our efforts in the Security Council as well as outside have been concentrated on counselling moderation and lessening of tension and preservation of peace in that area. Our Representative in the Security Council in consultation with the non-permanent members of the Council and others made earnest endeavours to formulate a resolution which might be acceptable to the Council. The resolution aimed at supporting the Secretary General's recommendations contained in his reports to the Council and earnestly appealing to all parties concerned to exercise restraint in order to avoid actions which might aggravate tension. Our Representative met with favourable response and it was hoped that in the next meeting of the Security Council, significant progress would be made in this regard.

While these efforts were still continuing, news came in the morning of June 5 of an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the U.A.R. and other Arab countries.

The Secretary General of the United Nations made a report to the Emergency Meeting of the Security Council on June 5, in which he gave an account of various reports by the UNEF Commander and the U.N. Observers on the U.N. Truce Supervision Organisation and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, of attacks by Israeli aircraft on U.A.R. and Syrian territory.

I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language. But on the basis of information available, there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict which has now acquired the proportions of a full-scale war.

The world today faces a disastrous war in West Asia. The armed forces of Israel and those of U.A.R. and other Arab countries are locked in combat, and the situation becomes graver by the hour. If not stopped, this war is likely to expand into a much wider one, drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war. World peace is in grave peril. Our own national interests are bound up with peace and stability in West Asia. I do not need to expand on this or to describe the horrors and consequences of such a war in West Asia. It is our solemn duty as a Government as also that of the Hon'ble

Members of Parliament to help in the restoration of peace in the present perilous situation. It is the bounden duty of all countries, large and small, to work towards this end.

In the Security Council we have been making earnest efforts for a ceasefire and withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they occupied on June 4. We have just now received the news that the Security Council has unanimously adopted a simple resolution calling for, as a first step a Cease-Fire. Evidently, in view of the gravity of the situation a consensus emerged in this Council in favour of bringing about immediate cease-fire leaving other steps to be taken up later. This is a hopeful development. However, the resolution does not mean that troops are not to withdraw to positions as on June 4. Our representative in the Council has stated our position and this matter of withdrawal will necessarily have to be taken up in the Council without delay.

Hon'ble Members have no doubt learnt with deep resentment of the wanton Israel artillery attack and subsequent strafings by Israel aircraft resulting in the death and injury of a number of personnel of the Indian UNEF contingent in Gaza. These attacks were deliberate and without provocation in spite of clear and unmistakable U.N. markings and identification of our contingent.

I have addressed a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations on this subject, expressing our grief and indignation at these incidents and I have asked for effective steps to be taken to ensure their safety and earlier evacuation from the area of hostilities.

We have now learnt from our representative that the U.N. have alerted most of the Shipping Companies round the world to provide a ship immediately to withdraw our contingent from the Gaza beach.

According to latest reports, in addition to the five killed and 10 injured earlier in two attacks as a result of further shelling that took place, 3 more were killed and 3 other injured making total loss of 8 killed and 13 known to be injured so far.

Government will naturally give adequate compensation to the families of eight soldiers who have lost their lives, and we shall make sure that the amount is not less than what they would

have received had these men lost their lives in active combat. Meanwhile, I am sending a sum of Rs. 40,000 i.e. Rs. 5,000 per family, by way of immediate assistance to the bereaved families from the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund.

There can be no justification for Israel armed forces to have attacked our forces, whose whereabouts, identification markings and intention to withdraw were clearly known to the Israeli authorities. The Secretary General in his message of condolence said that "it is a tragedy that these officers and men who came from India to serve the cause of peace in the Near East should through no fault of their own have lost their lives in a situation where they had no means of defending themselves and at a time when they were about to return to their home country." While conveying this message, the Secretary General has paid tribute to India's noble and generous contribution to peace keeping operations in West Asia and elsewhere.

81

Speech of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Before the National Assembly.¹

Paris, June 7, 1967

Devant la gravité des événements qui se déroulent au Moyen-Orient et qui ont pris lundi un tour dramatique, le gouvernement a estimé nécessaire d'exposer à l'Assemblée nationale, et au-delà d'elle à l'opinion publique tout entière, la situation telle qu'il la juge et de définir les positions qu'il a prises pour chercher à en prévenir, à en limiter ou à en régler les conséquences de toutes sortes.

Tel est l'objet de la déclaration que je vais avoir l'honneur de faire en son nom et qui vous permettra, je l'espère, d'être exactement renseignés. Aller au-delà dès maintenant, c'est-à-dire organiser un véritable débat, a paru prématuré, car dans les circonstances présentes c'est encore d'action qu'il s'agit d'abord et tous nos efforts doivent se concentrer sur l'essentiel, c'est-à-dire l'arrêt immédiat des combats, tel qu'il vient d'être

demandé à l'unanimité par le Conseil de sécurité. Je pense que sur cette priorité, il ne peut y avoir de contestation. Ensuite nous aurons, et le gouvernement souhaite que ce soit le plus tôt possible, à débattre.

Pour bien des motifs historiques et actuels la France se trouve liée aux problèmes du Moyen-Orient et s'y intéresse activement.

Israël, depuis sa création, entretient avec la France des liens de toutes natures fondés, pour ce qui nous concerne, sur les sentiments d'un pays qui n'a jamais connu le racisme, qui le connaît aujourd'hui moins que jamais, qui n'a pas oublié les incroyables épreuves d'il y a un quart de siècle et que toutes sortes d'affinités, à commencer par le goût de la liberté, rapprochent du peuple juif.

Dans les pays arabes d'autre part, et dont certains ont été par elle conduits à l'indépendance, elle possède des amitiés anciennes, des intérêts de tous ordres, des traditions culturelles et humaines, enfin un contact politique que, tout ensemble, elle entend préserver.

La France par ailleurs, membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité, est au nombre des puissances qui sont reconnues par l'Organisation des Nations unies comme étant principalement responsables du maintien de la paix dans le monde. Elle a, de ce fait, des obligations qu'elle est en devoir d'assumer et qui lui imposent, dans la définition de sa politique, des responsabilités particulières. Dans le cas du Moyen-Orient, celles-ci sont d'autant plus marquées qu'il s'agit d'une région où s'affrontent depuis toujours les puissances extérieures et, depuis quinze ans, d'abord les Etat-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Autrement dit la paix dans le Moyen-Orient est un facteur essentiel de la paix générale.

C'est dans cette double série de considérations que se trouvent les motifs de l'action menée par le gouvernement depuis le début de la crise. C'est toujours elle qui nous inspire aujourd'hui.

La chronique des rapports quotidiens sur la frontière entre Israël et les pays arabes ses voisins est manifestement à l'origine de la crise: infiltrations terroristes et sabotages d'un côté, réactions militaires plus ou moins violentes de l'autre. La dernière en date de ces réactions, le 7 avril dernier, avait été particulièrement vive et semble être à l'origine de la conviction qui s'est emparée des dirigeants syriens que l'armée israélienne devait

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st Sem., 1967, pp. 110-14.

les attaquer à une date qu'ils prétendaient connaître exactement et qui aurait été le 17 mai. Ils firent appel à l'aide de la République arabe unie, à laquelle les liait depuis novembre 1966 un pacte de défense, et celle-ci, soit qu'elle prît la menace au sérieux, soit qu'elle eut des préoccupations de prestige, décida de répondre à l'appel en envoyant d'importantes forces armées dans la presqu'île du Sinaï vers les frontières d'Israël.

C'est alors que se produisit une première péripétie. Depuis 1957, la frontière israélo-égyptienne et l'entrée du golfe d'Akaba étaient gardées, en territoire égyptien exclusivement, par des éléments militaires dépendant des Nations unies. Rencontrant ces forces au cours de leur avance, les Egyptiens en demandèrent le retrait immédiat. Formulée le 18 mai, la demande recevait aussitôt une réponse positive.

La décision du secrétaire général des Nations unies, prise dans de telles conditions, a suscité des controverses passionnées.

En droit, et formellement, elle était malaisément contestable, car les Casques bleus se trouvaient à Gaza et à Charm-el Cheikh en vertu d'un accord signé en 1957 par M. Hammarskjöld avec le gouvernement du Caire et leur maintien était subordonné à l'agrément de celui-ci, lequel se trouvait désormais retiré. Les forces des Nations unies étaient placées sous l'autorité du secrétaire général, aux côtés duquel avait été constitué un comité consultatif composé de représentants de pays européens, asiatiques et latino-américains, qui fut effectivement consulté et ne fit pas d'objections.

En fait et politiquement, compte tenu de l'importance capitale de la décision à prendre, le jugement peut être différent. A défaut de l'Assemblée générale ou du Conseil de sécurité, avis aurait pu au moins être pris des quatre membres permanents de ce Conseil, qui auraient ainsi eu une première occasion de discuter entre eux et avec M. Thant et peut-être de commencer à agir pour assumer un certain contrôle des événements.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la crise était, dès lors, lancée. Elle était au départ sérieuse. Elle ne devait cependant prendre un tour dramatique que lorsque, quelques jours plus tard, le 22 mai au soir, le président Nasser annonça que l'Egypte, réinstallée dans le détroit de Tiran, interdisait

le pavillon israélien dans le golfe d'Akaba. Dès le lendemain, le gouvernement égyptien déclarait qu'il ne pouvait non plus accepter le passage d'armes et de matériaux stratégiques même pour des navires non israéliens.

Il était fatal, dès le moment où il y avait crise, c'est-à-dire où le *statu quo* était mis en cause, que ressurgisse un conflit qui oppose depuis l'origine les Arabes et les Israéliens et qui, à ce jour, n'a pu être réglé que par des solutions de fait prises contre l'une ou l'autre des parties et, de ce fait, précaires.

Depuis 1957 la question avait été réglée dans des conditions que chacun maintenant connaît bien. Charm el-Cheikh était occupé par les Nations unies aux termes de l'accord O.N.U.-Egypte que j'ai mentionné tout à l'heure. De ce fait Le Caire ne pouvait plus apporter aucune entrave à la circulation des bateaux. Israël d'autre part avait solennellement proclamé l'importance qu'il attachait à la liberté de la navigation et déclaré que, si celle-ci était mise en cause, elle la tiendrait pour une agression et se réserverait d'agir en vertu du droit de légitime défense défini par l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations unies. Les Etats-Unis et la Grande Bretagne avec une certaine prudence, la France de manière beaucoup plus nette avaient alors appuyé cette position.

Devant la situation nouvelle, et combien menaçante, créée par la décision de la République arabe unie, quelle devait être la réaction des puissances, et d'abord de la France?

Il nous a été reproché par beaucoup de n'avoir pas, sur-le-champ, et aussi par la suite, fait une déclaration solennelle, se référant à celle de 1957, et affirmant notre attachement au principe de la liberté de navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba. Cela n'aurait en effet peut-être pas été difficile et nous aurait valu quelques compliments. Mais quelle en aurait été la portée? Ou bien il s'agissait d'une déclaration platonique et par conséquent sans lendemain. Cela, nous ne pouvions l'envisager. Ou bien nous voulions dire que le gouvernement d'Israël, fondé à s'appuyer sur l'article 51 de la Charte, l'était aussi à commencer sans délai le combat, et que par conséquent le gouvernement français s'engageait de son côté à le soutenir, c'est-à-dire à envisager une assistance militaire.

Cela ne nous a semblé être ni le compor-

tement à conseiller à Israël, ni celui que devait définir pour lui-même le gouvernement. Cela d'ailleurs n'a été le conseil donné à Israël par aucun autre gouvernement quel qu'il soit.

Je dirai tout à l'heure pourquoi nous ne pouvons penser qu'il soit possible de régler durablement par la force aucun des problèmes qui opposent Israël et les pays arabes, et pourquoi par conséquent tous nos efforts ont tendu à essayer d'empêcher que l'une ou l'autre partie en arrive à cette extrémité. Mais dès maintenant je veux marquer qu'il nous est apparu que le problème était assurément beaucoup plus vaste et même plus grave que celui du seul golfe d'Akaba et des seuls rapports entre l'Egypte et l'Etat juif. Dans le Moyen-Orient, c'est un fait que les éléments extérieurs jouent un rôle capital, et je veux dire par-là les grandes puissances qui ont des raisons d'y intervenir soit pour défendre leurs intérêts, soit parce qu'elles s'y affrontent à d'autres, là comme en d'autres points économiquement et stratégiquement sensibles.

Ce n'est assurément l'intérêt d'aucun des pays de cette région de devenir, dans le jeu des grandes puissances, des éléments dont celles-ci se servent pour des fins de leur politique. Mais je dirai plus. Ce n'est pas non plus l'intérêt des grandes puissances elles-mêmes, si, comme je le pense, elles désirent sincèrement la paix, d'entretenir les rivalités locales et même de se servir des oppositions existant entre les uns et les autres, quitte à laisser se perpétuer sans solution les problèmes au sujet desquels ils s'affrontent. En d'autres termes il s'agit, dans l'intérêt de tous, de chercher à réunir et non à diviser.

Telle est la position que, dès le 24 mai, le gouvernement a prise publiquement, proposant aux trois autres membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité intéressés au Moyen-Orient de se concerter avec lui pour chercher une issue pacifique à la crise qui se développait. Il ne s'agissait nullement d'organiser de prime abord une conférence spectaculaire, mais bien de discuter entre délégués qualifiés, par exemple nos représentants permanents au Conseil de sécurité, pour commencer à chercher dans un esprit positif, les moyens de réduire la tension, avec l'espoir de pouvoir ensuite entreprendre la discussion des problèmes de fond.

L'opinion publique un peu partout a, je le

crois, bien compris et bien accueilli pareille initiative. Pour des raisons qui, sans doute, ne sont pas toutes en rapport avec la situation à la quelle il fallait faire face, je veux dire tout simplement parce que d'autres facteurs pèsent sur les rapports entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique, cette dernière a pris, après quelques jours de réflexion, une attitude réservée, tout en marquant son désir de poursuivre avec la France des contacts bilatéraux.

Pendant ce temps, les événements se précipitaient.

De part et d'autre, la tension devenait plus forte et les passions, inévitablement, s'exaltaient.

Du côté des Arabes, comme il est toujours arrivé en pareilles circonstances, un grand mouvement populaire amenait tous les gouvernements, quelles que fussent leurs oppositions et même leur hostilité, à se rapprocher et à s'unir. Aucun de ces pays ne pouvait résister, comme en témoigne l'accord de défense vite conclu entre la Jordanie et la République arabe unie, puis les positions vite adoptées ailleurs de l'Arabie Saoudite à la Tunisie et au Maroc.

En Israël, de plus en plus fortement, la pression de l'opinion publique s'exerçait sur les autorités pour que soient entreprises les actions considérées comme nécessaires pour ne pas permettre que se perpétue le fait accompli. Le gouvernement cherchait activement au dehors de quels appuis il pouvait s'assurer pour chercher à atteindre l'objectif immédiat, c'est-à-dire le rétablissement de la liberté de navigation à travers le détroit de Tiran. C'est en particulier à cette fin que, dès le 25 mai, son ministre des Affaires étrangères se rendait à Washington en vue de s'y entretenir avec les dirigeants américains.

Il est juste de reconnaître que, tout au long de cette éprouvante période de tension, l'action des grandes puissances s'est exercée dans le sens de la modération. Toutes étaient bien conscientes du redoutable péril que l'ouverture des hostilités aurait fait courir non seulement aux pays directement concernés, mais aussi à la paix mondiale. Toute guerre qui commence, où que ce soit, et particulièrement dans une région aussi sensible, n'échappe pas au risque que l'on définit aujourd'hui par le terme d'escalade.

Ai-je besoin d'ajouter que telle était aussi, sinon davantage encore, la position de la France.

Son activité diplomatique, tous les jours et inlassablement, s'est exercée auprès de tous en ce sens. Mais nous savions bien que, même si, encore une fois, les autres partageaient notre sentiment profond, une pression véritablement efficace ne pouvait s'exercer sur les parties opposées que par une action concertée, non par des actions individuelles, peut-être de même inspiration, mais forcément divergentes par le fait même qu'elles ne résultaient pas d'une discussion et d'un accord. Quel spectacle pouvait mieux le démontrer que celui de l'impuissance manifestée tout au long de cette période par le Conseil de sécurité, dès lors que ses membres permanents ne pouvaient s'accorder sur des décisions préparées et acceptées par elles?

Devant les menaces qui, de ce fait, s'accumulaient et faisaient craindre le pire, le président de la République et le gouvernement ont pris position sans équivoque dans une déclaration publiée à l'issue du Conseil des ministres du 2 juin.

En substance ce text disait que la France, qui n'est liée vis-à-vis d'aucune des parties par des traités ou des engagements particuliers, considère de son propre chef que chaque Etat a le droit de vivre, qu'elle ne pourrait ni approuver, ni soutenir le pays qui déciderait d'engager des hostilités, que les grandes questions qui opposent Arabes et Israéliens, et d'abord la navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba, les réfugiés palestiniens, les conditions de voisinage entre Israël et les pays arabes contigus, devaient être réglées par des négociations internationales, ce qui supposait l'entente entre les quatre grands; enfin elle continuait à estimer nécessaire la concertation de ces quatre puissances.

Sur le droit à l'existence de chaque Etat, c'est-à-dire en particulier d'Israël, il n'est pas besoin d'insister. Sans doute cependant les choses qui vont sans dire vont-elles encore mieux en le disant. Ajouterai-je, dans le même esprit, que ce qui est dit de chaque Etat vaut à plus forte raison pour chaque peuple, pour chaque race.

Sur l'appel à la modération et la désapprobation de tous actes de guerre, je me suis déjà longuement expliqué. Notre position est bien entendu la position traditionnelle de la France, à savoir que le recours à la force n'est pas le moyen de régler les conflits, et ceci s'applique, je le souligne, à l'une comme à l'autre des parties en

présence. C'est là d'ailleurs un principe si généralement accepté que lorsqu'ont éclaté les combats, Israéliens et Egyptiens se sont refusés à en assumer la responsabilité et ont accusé leur adversaire d'avoir attaqué le premier, eux-mêmes se trouvant contraints de se défendre contre l'offensive dont ils étaient la victime. Voilà qui témoigne éloquentement du sens dans lequel va, comme nous-mêmes, l'opinion internationale.

Mais dans le cas particulier, il y a plus. Dans la région de l'Orient où ils se trouvent, Arabes et Israéliens, Juifs et Musulmans sont en quelque sorte voués à la cohabitation. Ils doivent vivre ensemble. Ils le font d'ailleurs, même si cela était jadis dans des conditions bien différentes, depuis des siècles et des siècles. C'est pourquoi il n'est pas possible d'imposer aux uns ou aux autres des solutions qui seraient décidées contre eux et qui de ce fait, seraient fatalement remises en cause à la première occasion favorable. En d'autres termes, il faut parvenir à, finalement, s'entendre.

On m'objectera sans doute que voilà un langage étrange après tout ce qui vient de se passer, et bien éloigné de la réalité politique et humaine. L'Assemblée me permettra de répondre que je n'ai pas la naïveté de penser que demain, ni même après-demain sans doute, un vrai dialogue puisse s'établir entre Arabes et Israéliens, alors que depuis vingt ans il n'a pu être engagé. Mais c'est là précisément où les pays du dehors, et d'abord ceux qui portent les responsabilités principales, peuvent et doivent jouer leur rôle, dès le moment où ils parviendraient à coopérer.

Je prends pour exemple la navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba. Il ne suffit pas, l'histoire récente le prouve, de créer une situation de fait en faveur de tel ou tel. D'autre part le droit maritime international est en pareille matière trop controversé pour ne pas prêter à des conflits incessants, ainsi que le montre l'histoire tourmentée des détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles. Comme dans ce dernier cas, il faut pour Akaba arriver à établir une convention internationale fixant les conditions et les garanties de la navigation, convention qui, signée par toutes les puissances intéressées, créerait un régime assuré de la durée.

C'est là un exemple particulièrement significatif, je crois, du programme d'ensemble que la France propose à la coopération internationale, s'exerçant par exemple dans le cadre des Nations

unies et, d'abord, entre les quatre, pour chercher à régler enfin les problèmes qui font que, depuis la création de l'Etat d'Israël, le Moyen-Orient n'a pas connu la paix véritable.

Encore une fois, voilà, va-t-on nous dire, un beau rêve: les événements qui ont suivi de près la déclaration du 2 juin vous ont, sans indulgence, rappelés à la dure réalité.

Il est vrai que, lorsque nous avons fait ce geste, nous avions peu d'illusions sur ce qui sans doute allait se passer. Le 5 juin, tout au début de la matinée, les hostilités s'engageaient entre l'Egypte et Israël, puis s'étendaient à tous les autres pays arabes, à commencer par la Syrie et la Jordanie.

Le processus fatal une fois déclenché, tout s'est déroulé comme on pouvait le prévoir: des actions aériennes partout pour assurer à l'aviation d'Israël la maîtrise complète du ciel, des combats violents dès le départ, une avance spectaculaire des forces israéliennes, non pas tant en territoire syrien ou jordanien que dans la péninsule du Sinaï en direction du canal de Suez et le long du golfe d'Akaba. Mais, aussi, comme on pouvait le craindre, les conséquences inévitables de toute guerre sur les populations et les régions habitées, et je pense d'abord, bien entendu, au sort de Jérusalem, la ville sainte de trois religions. Mais aussi la course à l'escalade, c'est-à-dire la recherche d'une extension du conflit, comme en témoignent les mesures prises ou annoncées du côté arabe, en ce qui concerne le pétrole, en ce qui concerne le canal de Suez, en ce qui concerne les rapports de ces pays avec les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne.

Cela aurait été grave, et même exceptionnellement grave, si les grandes puissances avaient suivi. Ici la sagesse s'est manifestée. Dès que la guerre a commencé, la réflexion unanime a été: maintenant il n'y a plus qu'une chose qui compte, c'est d'arrêter au plus tôt le conflit, autrement dit de parvenir au cessez-le-feu. Tout naturellement, la discussion s'est organisée au Conseil de sécurité et cette fois les grands ont discuté directement entre eux. Cela n'a pas été facile; il a fallu plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits. Mais enfin le 7 juin, dans la soirée, à New York, une résolution unanime a demandé aux belligérants, à titre de première mesure, d'arrêter sans délai les combats. L'accord finalement intervenu entre l'Union soviétique et

les Etats-Unis a, bien entendu, été décisif. Mais j'ai le devoir de dire que, pendant toutes ces discussions, le président de la République lui-même et le gouvernement ont suivi activement les discussions, gardant en particulier un contact permanent avec le gouvernement soviétique, cependant que, d'autre part, le représentant de la France, travaillant étroitement de concert avec ses collègues américains et russes, a apporté au résultat final une contribution dont, pour ma part, je crois qu'il est juste de lui témoigner notre gratitude.

Le cessez-le-feu doit maintenant être appliqué par tous, dans toute son étendue. Ce ne sera que le début d'une longue entreprise. Les séquelles de la guerre doivent ensuite être réglées, à commencer par le problème redoutable du retrait des troupes. Ensuite il faudra chercher à reconstruire.

Les données fondamentales n'ont en rien changé. Les mêmes problèmes sont devant nous, comme la nécessité de les régler, si nous voulons qu'un jour, enfin, Israël et ses voisins puissent trouver les moyens d'une coexistence et établir entre eux la paix véritable, qui leur échappe depuis toujours. J'ai suffisamment expliqué à l'Assemblée comment le gouvernement concevait les moyens et le programme d'une action internationale en ce sens pour qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire que j'y revienne maintenant.

Ce que je voudrais seulement ajouter—et ce sera ma conclusion—c'est qu'à notre sens, dans cette grande œuvre qu'il faut essayer de réaliser, notre pays peut et doit jouer un rôle conforme à ce qui est à la fois sa tradition dans l'Orient et sa mission dans le monde. Le gouvernement pense que, par les positions qu'il a prises, par l'action qu'il a menée, par les rapports qu'il entretient avec tous, dans un esprit de raison et d'objectivité, il a préparé pour l'avenir la tâche qui incombe à la France. Ce sera son honneur si, ce faisant, il peut contribuer dans quelque mesure à amener le Moyen-Orient vers cette paix sans laquelle il ne pourra jamais, qu'il s'agisse d'Israël ou des Etats arabes, se consacrer dans l'avenir à ce qui est sa véritable tâche, c'est-à-dire son propre développement.

82

Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament and Ensuing Debate.¹**London, June 7, 1967**

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the situation in the Middle East.

The House will have heard with satisfaction that the Security Council of the United Nations has now adopted unanimously a resolution calling for a cease-fire. In this, the House can rightly take pride in the outstanding contribution which has been made by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon in bringing this result about.

The Council's most urgent task will now be to get this resolution implemented. I was glad to see that the Israel Foreign Minister, in his speech to the Council yesterday evening, welcomed the appeal for the cease-fire, while pointing out that its implementation requires an absolute and sincere acceptance and co-operation of all other parties. It is now for those other parties to make equally clear their acceptance of the call for the cease-fire so that this can come into force without any delay.

I have seen reports that the United Arab Republic and Iraq have rejected the appeal. I hope that they will think better of this very quickly. It seems to be much in their own interest to do so.

Once the cease-fire has been implemented the Security Council will need to turn its most urgent attention to the further steps that are needed to secure a lasting peace in the area. It is too early to speculate in detail about the form that this might take, but I am convinced that there will have to be now a thorough re-examination of all aspects of the root causes of the conflict.

Prior to the implementation of the cease-fire, it is now very clear that the military struggle has been going in favour of Israel. It is evident that in the first 24 hours of the fighting the Israel Air Force established complete air superiority over the Air Force of the United Arab Republic and of its allies.

On the ground, Israel forces defeated United

Arab Republic forces in the Gaza strip, and are engaging Egyptian units deep in the Sinai Desert. There has been fierce fighting on the Israel/Jordan front and Israel forces captured a substantial area of Jordan territory on the west bank of the River Jordan.

I am sorry to report that fighting has been particularly bitter in Jerusalem and still continues there. I have no reports of any serious damage to the Holy Places.

The United Arab Republic, through Cairo Radio, has continued to broadcast the downright lie that British and American air forces have taken part in the fighting on the side of Israel. I repeat that this is a lie. It not only did not happen, but it could not have happened, as it well knows. In the light of the military situation which I have described the reason for this lie is quite clear. The United Arab Republic is trying to give itself an alibi for its own military failures and the extent to which its failures have let down its allies.

The Government have taken every step open to them to deny this action. We have made statements in this House and have issued statements to the Press. We have made both oral and written communications in Arab capitals and to Arab Heads of Mission in London. My right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon has spoken in the Security Council and has circulated a written denial to all members of the Council. The United States delegate to the United Nations yesterday offered facilities for United Nations observers to visit ships of the American Sixth Fleet to check the falsity of the story.

I am equally ready to make a similar offer for United Nations observers to visit any of our ships in the area, any of our Royal Air Force stations, including those at Cyprus and our installations at the airfields of Malta. We wish to nail this lie once and for all.

I am sorry to report that the broadcasting of this lie has misled certain Arab countries into taking a series of measures against Britain. My right hon. Friend informed the House of some of these yesterday. The list is now as follows. British embassies, consulates and British Council premises have been attacked and damaged in many Arab cities. The United Arab Republic Government have closed the Suez Canal to all traffic. The Governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria and

¹ *Hansard's*, 7/6/1967, col. 1065-79.

the Lebanon have taken steps to interfere with oil supplies, either to the United Kingdom and the United States of America only, or, in some cases, on a wider basis than that.

The Governments of Iraq, Syria and the Sudan have notified us that they are breaking off diplomatic relations: relations, of course, were already broken with the United Arab Republic and Algeria. It is my sincere hope these Governments will reverse their attitude now that it is clear not only that the allegation was a lie, but it is also clear what the motives of the Egyptians have been in propagating it.

Nevertheless, the Government are having to make suitable arrangements for the protection of British interests if the countries concerned persist in breaches of diplomatic relations. We are in touch with appropriate Governments to act as protecting Powers.

I think that to break off diplomatic relations with us, and for this reason, is the most foolish possible action that these Governments could take. This has been put to them as forcefully as possible. If they insist, they will, of course, have to face the consequences.

Arrangements are also going ahead to evacuate further numbers of British subjects from countries involved in the fighting and from countries which have broken off diplomatic relations. However, in some of these cases a breach of diplomatic relations will presumably not extend to commercial relations and I would expect that, where there is no immediate danger to life and property, many British subjects will still wish to remain.

Urgent steps are being taken to re-adjust the pattern of oil supplies to this country. While there may well be temporary inconveniences for us, there should be no insuperable problem. The action taken against us has come at a time of oil surplus in the world and the countries which have taken it may find that they have done their own economic interests much greater harm than they have done to ours.

On the question of arms shipments, we are continuing our efforts to achieve a suspension of the export of all arms supplies to this area, and the call for a cease-fire, in my view, reinforces the position we have taken up on this.

However, I am bound to warn the House that

the situation at the moment is that we have had no positive response from the Russians and we understand that the Americans are not placing an embargo. In this situation, it makes it very difficult for Britain to maintain the suspension of supplies which we have already unilaterally imposed.

In any long-term agreement which is negotiated, limitation and control over arms exports into this area will clearly be a very important factor.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The House will be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for keeping us informed each day and for the tone in which he has made his statement. We welcome the fact that the Security Council has achieved unanimity on a cease-fire—a very modest beginning, but, nevertheless, a beginning on which we can perhaps build.

Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether Jordan has accepted the cease-fire? There are rumours that she has. If so, it is a very welcome fact.

We shall give the right hon. Gentleman all the help we can to obtain a comprehensive settlement of all the problems in the Middle East. This seems to be the most important thing ahead of us.

The most serious part of the right hon. Gentleman's statement was that which dealt with the reaction of the Arab countries to this country. Is every device of broadcasting being used—particularly the B.B.C.'s Arabic Service, which has a very wide and effective coverage in that area?

We have noted what the right hon. Gentleman has said about an arms embargo. I will not press him further today. It would not be reasonable. He has to have conversations with the United States and the Soviet Union and may hope to get some arrangements. But does he realise the seriousness of the United Kingdom's withholding arms if everybody else is sending them?

Mr. Brown: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has said what he had to say. On the question of Jordan and the cease-fire, the situation is exceedingly confused as to what was originally the Jordanian response and what was the Israeli response to that. I would

rather not go into that at the moment, if the right hon. Gentleman would not mind.

I agree that we will have to have discussions and we are now giving careful thought to the kind of items that ought to figure in a comprehensive settlement. There will, no doubt, be an opportunity for the House to discuss this, but the immediate thing is to get the cease-fire in order to move from there to the discussions.

About the B.B.C. and all other forms of communication being used, I think that they are, although I have heard suggestions that the B.B.C. services were not being as fully used as perhaps they should have been. I do not know this at first hand, but I am having inquiries made to see whether we can improve what has been done.

On arms, I take complete note of what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I worded that passage in my speech very carefully.

Mr. Thorpe: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that the success of obtaining a cease fire will not only be welcome for its own sake, but will help to restore the authority of the United Nations?

May I ask him, first, whether he is satisfied that this can be transmitted to the combatants in the field, as opposed to those in control of the Governments? Secondly, is Colonel Nasser still in effective control of the Government of Egypt, and, thirdly, can he say a word about the sterling balances held in London by the Arab States—particularly Kuwait, who, it has been suggested, is trying to transfer them to Switzerland?

Mr. Brown: As far as the United Nations authority is concerned, I deplore the tendency to giggle when it is mentioned. When this Middle Eastern situation has become just one more event in history the creating and building of United Nations authority will still be an outstanding aim of any intelligent, rational Government anywhere in the world. I agree entirely with what the Leader of the Liberal Party has said. Getting the resolution passed is important for its own sake, but it is also important as being a step back from the miserable period—so far as the United Nations is concerned—which has marked the last few weeks.

The right hon. Gentleman asks whether it is being transmitted. Certainly, it is being transmit-

ted to all those in authority and who can make the decisions, and I have no reason to think that they do not know about it.

As to whether President Nasser is in command, all that I can say is that I have no evidence to the contrary. I have seen a statement by a journalist in a mid-day newspaper, but that journalist's past record of accuracy is not such as leads me to give it all that much credence.

On sterling balances, I have nothing to say.

Mr. Shinwell: Can the Government now depart, at least to some extent, from their attitude of neutrality by congratulating the State of Israel and the Israeli Forces—[An Hon. Member: "Really."] —on having successfully—

Mr. Faulds: Conducted a pre-emptive strike.

Mr. Shinwell:—on having successfully resisted the threat of annihilation? Can the Government not go that far?

If my right hon. Friend is relying on the United Nations in the future to ensure a satisfactory and permanent settlement, can we have an assurance that, so far as our own Government's representations are concerned, there will be guarantees to protect the economy of the State of Israel against economic boycott, and free passage through international waters, including the Suez Canal? Can we have assurances of that kind?

Will my right hon. Friend take it from me that the noises behind me have no effect on my mind whatever? I am not afraid of this crowd. I am not afraid of the Arabs and Nasserites. I am not afraid of anyone. I take sides, and I am on the side of the State of Israel—[*Interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Brown: Unlike me, my right hon. Friend does not carry responsibility and is in the happy position of being able to take sides. Were I to make any of the statements which he invites me to make, it is clear that I should make the situation worse in hampering the working out of a settlement and do the cause which he has at heart as much harm as I should do any other cause. Therefore, I do not answer my right hon. Friend on the merits, but that does not mean that I agree with him on the merits, either.

As to the aspects of a long-term settlement, all the points which he mentioned must be taken into account. However, there are other matters to be taken into account, as well. I repeat that this is not a situation in which one can say that all the rights and merits are on one side and in one people's hands only. Before we make partisan statements in this House on behalf of one side—in this case, Israel—let us recognise that the Arabs also have cases and issues to deploy which they are entitled to expect to be heard and treated with respect.

All of these will be taken into account, and that is why I said in my statement that, in the settlement, I believe that we must take a good look at the fundamental and root causes of the conflict. We have had this twice in a decade. I believe that it will be the business of those of us who carry responsibility and, I hope, those who support us, to try to work out this time a settlement which will ensure that we do not have it a third time.

Mr. Sandys: Will the Foreign Secretary begin now to initiate action to secure the setting up of some kind of international force which could police the cease-fire when it takes effect? Secondly, is he now in a position to tell us what is being done to secure the reopening of the Suez Canal?

Mr. Brown: The establishment of anything in the nature of a permanent U.N. force must be one of the aspects of a long-term settlement. However, I believe that getting a cease-fire is the important matter. I do not think that complicating that with arguments about a United Nations force and where it should go at this stage in the battle will help us very much. But it may well be that if we can assure the cease-fire the Secretary General, or a very prominent representative of his, might help the situation by proceeding immediately to the area to ensure that what is said to be going on is, in fact, going on. Thereafter, we can discuss what kind of continuing force there should be.

The right hon. Gentleman has a passionate desire about opening the Suez Canal. I am never very clear how he envisages doing it. I can only say that I envisage doing it by getting a cease-fire and proceeding to negotiate a settlement for the whole area.

Mr. Lawson: Will my right hon. Friend recognise that perhaps the worst thing which can happen to any people is the feeling of national humiliation? Will he be most generous and sympathetic in this case and do his utmost to show that we are genuinely neutral and wish to be friendly with the Arab people as well as others?

Mr. Shinwell rose—

Mr. Lawson: Will he also recognise that the Arab people have a genuine grievance against the Israeli nation—

Mr. Shinwell rose—

Mr. Lawson: —and, on the basis which all of us recognise, try his utmost to heal the sores in this part of the world?

Mr. Brown: This is exactly what I am afraid of. One over-stated, emotional, partisan statement invites the contrary—[*Interruption*].

Mr. Rankin: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask for your guidance? Are you aware that war has broken out in my immediate neighbourhood? I am not taking sides, either, but may I ask my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to tell us what he proposes to do to stop the war in this House before he goes on to deal with the Middle East?

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are discussing a very serious issue. There are widely differing points of view inside what is probably a fundamental unity. Noise and heat do not help the day at all.

Mr. Brown: I was about to say this when I was interrupted by that point of order. May I remind everyone in the House, if anyone needs reminding, that not only are there vast issues at stake, but that people's lives are at stake. If statements which may satisfy our emotions in the House tend to prolong the conflict outside, they are much to be deplored and denounced.

My hon. Friend the Member for Motherwell (Mr. Lawson) spoke of the feeling of national humiliation. I understand this very well. As a matter of fact, the sense of humiliation since 1956 no doubt has been a factor in what has now happened. I put it no higher than that. I have it very much in mind.

My hon. Friend asks the Government to be friendly to the Arab people and to Arab statesmen. On that, I have as good a record as anyone, and they will know it. I ask them to respond to it.

Mr. St. John Stevas: Will the Foreign Secretary assure the House that the Government will do nothing to deprive Israel of the legitimate fruits of her victory, and that much less will they do anything to prevent the fate overtaking President Nasser which seems likely to reach him in the near future?

Mr. Brown: I am sorry, but I shall not say anything of the kind, and I think that, on reflection, even the hon. Gentleman will think it would have been better if he had not said it.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: When my right hon. Friend looks at the root causes, as he calls them, will he look at the sale early last year of £107 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, and consider whether this was not a cause of the intensification of the arms race in the Middle East?

Secondly, will my right hon. Friend look at the whole matter not in the context of one side having a case against the other, but of the determination expressed by one country completely to annihilate the other?

Mr. Brown: My hon. Friend made the latter point the other day, and there is no more that I can say about it. It is my hon. Friend's point of view.

On the question of arms, as I said the other day, we have a better record than most in ensuring that by any supplies which we have sold we have kept the balance of power very much in mind. I think that the balance of power, and maybe this conflict, owes a good deal more to the lack of concern which some other nations have shown in their supplies to the area.

Mr. Dodds-Parker: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman how many ships are held up in transit through the Canal, and what practical steps are being taken by the U.A.R. authorities to stop other ships transiting?

Mr. Brown: I cannot say without notice. The last information I had this morning was that some ships were still held up, but I do not recall the

number, and that efforts were being made to try to ensure that they were allowed to proceed. As I told the House the other day, we have in the meantime advised our shipping to stay away from the entrances to the Canal.

Mr. Mayhew: Would my right hon. Friend agree that one result of the war may well be—

Mr. Shinwell: Go back to Nasser.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Mayhew: —to remove the political objections on both sides to a solution of the bitter problem of the Arab refugees? Is my right hon. Friend aware that this country has had a good record in this matter in the past, and will he now make a special study of this problem with a view to taking advantage of the new situation which could soon exist?

Mr. Brown: For a long time I have been concerned—before I ever came to office—with the position of the Palestine refugees. I have visited them many times, and I have often made proposals, both to Israeli, and Arab statesmen now in office, about the ways in which I thought this problem might either be completely dealt with, or certainly removed as a festering irritating sore. I agree with my hon. Friend that we have a good record about this, and that one of the root causes of the conflict which will have to be dealt with in a settlement must be the future of these wretched people.

Mr. Woodnutt: May I follow the point touched on by the Leader of the Liberal Party and raised by the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) yesterday? While agreeing with the Government's policy of restraint and not wishing to take sides, there is no doubt that hostile acts have been taken against this country in the stopping of the oil flow and the breaking off of diplomatic relations. As there is a risk of a run on sterling, will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that if this takes place he will have no hesitation in freezing the balances of these countries in this country because of the danger to sterling?

Mr. Brown: I am sure that that was well meant, but it could hardly be more damaging. May I make it plain that the £ today is running

very strongly indeed. There is, therefore, no need for anybody to get into that kind of panic situation or to make suggestions of that kind. We do not need that kind of support.

On the question of acts against us which are hostile, such as breaking off diplomatic relations, and suspending oil shipments, I take a very strong view of them, and I have explained this very strongly both personally and in writing to the Governments and their representatives. On the other hand, I ask the House to recognise that in a situation as deeply charged as this has been in the last week it is possible to understand the pressures on some of these countries, and that probably the less we attack in public the more likely we are very soon to rehabilitate the situation.

Mr. Francis Noel-Baker: While expressing warm support for my right hon. Friend's general approach, may I ask one specific and one more general question? Among the major root causes of the conflict in the Middle East are not the war in Vietnam and bad relations between the Soviet Union and the United States very important factors?

My specific question is this. Is it not unrealistic to expect the victorious Israeli forces to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines unless there are very substantial guarantees, and that there will have to be substantial frontier rectifications if the security of Israel and stability in the Middle East are to be preserved in the future in addition to firm treaties with Israel's Arab neighbours recognising her existence and guaranteeing her frontier?

Mr. Brown: On the first point, what my hon. Friend called the general one, as I said when I returned from Moscow I did not have the impression that any differences about Vietnam were being allowed to cloud the Russians' minds about the undesirability of having a conflagration in the Middle East in addition to one in South-East Asia. I see no reason to believe that Vietnam has had anything to do with this conflagration arising, though I am bound to say it may have had something to do with the passing of the cease-fire resolution in the United Nations.

On the point about Israel's forces and positions reached by Israel, I repeat that I take note of what my hon. Friend has said. All these things will have to be considered when it comes

to trying to work out an equitable and lasting settlement.

Sir J. Eden: Although the position is still somewhat uncertain, would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that a more lasting settlement in future is likely to be achieved only if there are direct negotiations between the principal combatants? Therefore, as soon as he thinks the time is ripe, will the right hon. Gentleman initiate four-Power proposals to try to bring this about?

Mr. Brown: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I think that we are running ahead of ourselves here. If the House would accept a piece of advice, I think that canvassing these ideas at this stage may well be counter-productive. I will take these things into account. I agree that the four Powers have a rôle to play, but whether we handle it that way, or whether we handle it at the United Nations, is a matter which we have to work out very carefully, and I would rather not be pressed on it.

Sir B. Janner: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the battle which is being fought is the battle of Israel, similar to the lone battle that was fought in the Battle of Britain? Is not my right hon. Friend aware that some assurance must be given, in whatever terms are arranged, that the diabolical kind of propaganda which went on before will not emanate against the little State of Israel?

Secondly, will my right hon. Friend look into the question of the facilities for broadcasting which we gave to the Arabs who were attacking us as well as Israel, and the very little help that was given to Israel in the form of broadcasting facilities?

Mr. Brown: I am sure that this country's capacity to help bring about a lasting and equitable settlement, and thereby help the cause which my hon. Friend has at heart, will not be enhanced by any statement by me at this moment which could suggest to the Arabs that I was endorsing claims made by those who speak for Israel.

Equally, may I remind my hon. Friend that one of the difficulties in this is that other people do not distinguish as easily as we do between Government statements and responsibility in this House, and statements made by others in this

House. We want to get at a settlement. We have to get at it if my hon. Friend's ambitions are to be satisfied. We have to get at it if our own interests are to be satisfied. We have to get at it if the Arabs are to be satisfied. I urge on the House that restraint in what we have to say at this moment may be of the utmost possible value.

Sir B. Janner: On a point of order. My right hon. Friend did not answer the second part of my question.

Mr. Speaker: Order. It is for the Minister to answer questions in the way he wishes to answer. The hon. Gentleman knows that.

Mr. G. Campbell: Would the right hon. Gentleman say through what agencies on the ground this cease-fire, when accepted, is to be supervised and policed? Is this not a task which U.N.T.S.O. could carry out?

Mr. Brown: As I said when I made my statement on Monday, that is obviously a possibility. U.N.T.S.O. still exists, although it had a fairly rough time in Jerusalem. That is obviously a possibility, but I suggest that we remember the phrase, "First catch your hare." The first thing is to get the ceasefire, and then decide how to supervise and enforce it.

Mr. Michael Foot: Will my right hon. Friend accept that, whatever may be the inevitable differences of opinion which are bound to arise on this subject, many of us believe that his single-minded aim is to stop the bloodshed and get an honourable and lasting settlement? Is he aware that we wish him the very best of success in this endeavour?

Mr. Brown: I thank my hon. Friend very much indeed.

Sir J. Langford-Holt: Will the right hon. Gentleman be assured that, while agreeing with his hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot), the whole House will, I think, agree with him when he said that we cannot accept a situation which returns to the conditions which gave birth to the struggle which is going on?

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Jay. Statement.

Cable Message from Pope Paul VI to the Arab and Israeli Heads of State.¹

Vatican City, June 8, 1967

Poussé par le devoir de notre ministère, animé par une sollicitude et un amour égaux pour tous les peuples, angoissé par la pensée des souffrances, des deuils et des ruines que la guerre apporte aux individus, aux familles et aux nations, nous nous adressons à vous, comme aux chefs des autres pays en conflit, et, au nom de Dieu, vous adjurons d'accueillir la requête des Nations Unies pour la cessation immédiate des combats pour que, à la violence des armes, puissent se substituer des négociations confiantes, raisonnables et honorables, et que la paix tant souhaitée puisse être rendue à ces régions. Nous vous assurons que nous invoquons du Tout-Puissant qu'il vous assiste dans les graves décisions que vous avez à prendre et qu'il vous fasse choisir les voies qui vous méritent la reconnaissance de tous ceux qui ont des sentiments d'humanité.

Statement by Canadian Prime Minister Pearson in Parliament on Conditions for Peace in the Middle East.² [Excerpts]

Ottawa, June 8, 1967

... It is perfectly clear from the experience of 20 years, since the State of Israel was founded, that only a fair and enduring peace (and it will not endure if it is not fair) and a political settlement can avoid another round in this dangerous game of brinkmanship on the edge of the abyss, indulged in not only by the states of that area but by the great powers as well. . .

What is the basis for such a political settlement and a more enduring peace than an armistice along with a state of war? We must not forget that, in the almost 20 years since 1948, there has been an armistice but there has also been a state of war. I can only outline what I think is a possible

¹ *Le Monde*, 9/6/1967.

² *External Affairs*, 1967, pp. 300-02.

basis, and there is nothing original in it.

There will have to be certain military withdrawals, after a cease-fire, by negotiation and agreement. If the military *status quo*, or something approaching it, is to be restored, there must be certain political guarantees which will produce stability. This will require understanding on both sides and some firm and agreed decisions by the United Nations Security Council to back them up. That cannot be done unless the four permanent members of the Security Council can get together. I leave Honourable Members to form their own opinions about the ease with which this can be accomplished, notwithstanding the encouraging sign the other night when at least they agreed on a cease-fire resolution. But to bring the Israeli forces back behind the borders of last week, without doing anything about the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba, would not provide for peace but merely a temporary absence of hostilities.

So I suggest, secondly, that, regardless of the legal controversy, which can be sent to the International Court for decision, there should be no exercise by those who claim the right of sovereignty, whether the claim is valid or not (and I am not attaching any judgment to that), to interfere with any innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to Elath, which should be recognized by all as an Israeli port.

The third point is that something should be done about the right of Israel ships, which right was exercised by all other ships until a day or so ago, to navigate the Suez Canal. There have been decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations affirming that right, but, in practice, the affirmation has not meant very much to Israel.

Back in March 1957 again, the Right Honourable Leader of the Opposition asked me whether I agreed with "the statement made yesterday" by Mr. Dulles that the denial to Israel of the right of freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal was an unlawful act on the part of Egypt. I said in answer to that question:

Mr. Speaker, in regard to the first question *the policy of this Government —

(and I am sure it is the policy of this Parliament)

— has already been stated, that in its view navigation of the Suez Canal should be free to the ships of all nations, and that would include Israel.

The fourth point is the establishment once again, in spite of our somewhat disillusioning experiences in the last few weeks, of a United Nations presence in force between the armies that have been fighting, and a presence which will operate on both sides of the border. There has been a great reluctance on the part of Israel to allow United Nations truce observation groups to operate on her territory. This is one respect in which I think she should change her policy and on which agreement should be reached. . .

The next point relates to what I have been saying about a United Nations presence. I should also hope that there could be a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border and that effective steps (I know they have been attempted, and the men of these observer groups have served with great courage and devotion) will be taken to prevent infiltration, terroristic acts and provocation on both sides. . .

The other element in the situation is refugees. When the fighting ended in 1948, there were about 750,000 Palestinian Arabs who left their homes. I will not go into the pressures which were on them to leave, but they left their homes and became refugees. There are one and a quarter million of them now, after nearly 20 years. They are maintained by the United Nations.

A real opportunity has never been given to these refugees to decide whether they could or would be willing to locate in other countries, and perhaps a sufficient effort has never been made to get at least some of them back to their homes in Israel. Of course, the two things would go together. They have been tragically used as pawns in the game of Middle East politics and, unless a much more effective effort is made to deal with this situation than has been possible in the past, it will not be too easy to be optimistic about the other elements of the settlement.

Those are the five or six elements of a political solution that I venture to put before the Committee. Whether they could be successfully worked out in a political settlement I do not know, because there is an issue which goes even deeper than any of the ones I have mentioned—the issue of deep fear and hostility on both sides, the Arab side and the Jewish side. Until that fear is removed somehow, I do not think there will be peace in that area. Yet, if it could be removed and at least

a mutual acceptance on both sides could be built up, there is no doubt in my mind that the Arab states would be among the first and most important beneficiaries of that change through the help and co-operation that they could get from Israel.

85

Statement by Canadian Foreign Secretary Martin on the Middle East Arms Race.¹
[Excerpts]

Ottawa, June 8, 1967

...In searching for ways and means of findings grounds for the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions, one should not overlook the desirability of preventing a continuation of the arms build-up among the states of the Middle East. I think it has been clearly demonstrated that the contest in arms acquisition in the Middle East which has gone on in past years has contributed largely to the regrettable development of present full-scale hostilities and, at the same time, has had a most debilitating effect on the relatively weak economies of the countries involved. Surely the large sums expended towards the establishments of war machines would have been better devoted to an improvement in living conditions of the people of the area...

On the question of arms build-up, I should earnestly hope that supplier countries, and especially the big powers, could arrive at an understanding which would prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate accidents which we have witnessed during the past few days. It is the firm intention of the Canadian Government to continue its policy and practice of not providing military supplies to the area. The general policy of governments that have practised this concept is not to supply arms in any theatre of conflict...

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

86

Message of Solidarity from East German Foreign Minister Winzer to the Secretary of the Arab League Hassunah.²

Berlin, June 8, 1967.

Your Excellency, the G.D.R. Government and people watch events in the Near and Middle East with great indignation and deep concern. Inspired and supported by the imperialist powers, notably the United States, Britain and the West German Federal Republic, Israel has resorted to overt aggression. Israel's military aggression against the Arab states is part and parcel of the so-called global strategy by means of which the imperialist powers seek to retain their positions and profits and to undermine Arab national independence.

It is with indignation that the G.D.R. Government and people condemn Israel's aggression and demand the immediate cessation of acts of aggression and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to their positions prior to the aggression. The G.D.R. Government and people assure the Arab states and people of their full solidarity and sincere friendship.

I ask you to inform Arab League member states of this message.

87

Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament and Ensuing Debate.³

London, June 8, 1967

Sir Alec Douglas-Home (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement about the situation in the Middle East.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Brown): I have endeavoured to keep the House very fully informed about developments in the Middle East, but there is, frankly, little I can add today. The situation is very fluid and it

² *Neues Deutschland* News Agency, East Berlin, 12/6/1967.

³ *Hansard's*, 8/6/1967, col. 1291-99.

is simply not possible at this moment to amplify the general picture I gave yesterday.

The immediate necessity is to obtain an effective cease-fire. The position on this is that the Israel Foreign Minister said in the Security Council yesterday that his Government were ready to accept the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire at 8 p.m. G.M.T. provided that the Arab Governments did the same.

So far, the Arab Governments have refused to do the same, with the exception of Jordan, who have announced their Government's acceptance. But I must tell the House frankly that there are very conflicting and disturbing stories about what is actually happening on the Israeli/Jordan front.

Even though the United Arab Republic Government have not yet accepted the cease-fire, the Israel Government have announced that they are halting the advance of their forces in the Sinai Desert short of the Suez Canal. But I also have reports of resumed fighting on this front.

We still have no positive response from the Soviet Government about arms supplies and it is clear that for the time being there is no immediate prospect of a general embargo. We are, therefore, reverting to our normal practice of scrutinising applications for arms in each particular case, and we are, naturally, doing so particularly carefully in the present situation.

The only material change in the oil situation since yesterday is that the Libyan Government have suspended all oil exports. It is not entirely clear whether this is a temporary suspension due to strikes by oil workers. And here let me say that I understand the pressures that are operating on these Governments in this highly charged atmosphere.

The Arab Foreign Ministers were due to meet today in Kuwait to discuss the implementation of the resolution on oil supplies recently passed at the Baghdad conference. But I have heard in the last hour that the meeting has been postponed. Now that it has become so patently clear to everybody that we were not involved in the conflict, I trust that these Governments will decide to withdraw the actions which they were misled into taking against us.

We have examined the dangers in each of the territories where the safety of British subjects

arises. We have made plans, some of which are already being operated, to ensure the safe evacuation of British subjects from these areas. In a situation where airfields have been closed and others have been damaged this is clearly not an easy operation, but it is proceeding.

My greatest concern is with the British subjects in Jordan. Evacuation by road would be too dangerous; and evacuation by air involves the danger I have first mentioned. However, by various means, these problems will be overcome.

I will, of course, continue to report developments to the House when anything of significance occurs. Meanwhile, we are in close contact with all the parties concerned.

Our immediate objective must be, of course, to make the cease-fire effective. The House should, I suggest, be under no illusions that this may still take some little time. But once this has been achieved we must move on to consider how a more permanent settlement in the Middle East, on an equitable basis, can be reached.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: We on this side fully share the Foreign Secretary's hopes that the Arab Governments, at their meeting, will lift the oil embargo in face of the very convincing evidence that neither the United States nor Britain intervened in any way. We would support, too, the right hon. Gentleman's decision on arms as long as the Russians do not co-operate. There are rumours that arms are going into Alexandria. The Government's decision is right.

Would the right hon. Gentleman say a word about the Suez Canal? By what resolution of the United Nations is this now governed, and is the United Nations taking notice of the situation?

Mr. Brown: It has taken notice of it. But for the moment there is not a lot that anybody can do until we get the cease-fire and can start discussing all the complementary things which will form part of the settlement. Clearly, this will be one of them. But the right hon. Gentleman may have it firmly in his mind that I am addressing myself, and ensuring that our friends address themselves, to this as much as to anything else.

Mr. Judd: Is my right hon. Friend aware

that in Israel, even during the most critical recent days of the brilliant campaign, there has been a marked degree of moderation on the part of the Israeli leaders about the objectives in the political reality of the situation and that this is in marked contrast to some unfortunately exaggerated statements elsewhere? Would he agree that our major efforts, and the efforts of all true friends of Israel at this juncture, must be to encourage her in the long-term future to reach meaningful political and economic relations with the area of which she is essentially a part?

Mr. Brown: I agree very much with the latter part of that question. Israel must live as a Middle Eastern Power in a Middle Eastern context, and the more she can be encouraged to think that way, the better it will be.

As to the first part of the question, I dislike, as I said yesterday, these partisan comparisons with what is supposed to be moderation on one side and exaggeration on the other side. I do not think that that kind of presentation does us any good at all.

Mr. Maudling: I do not think that there has been any information about the Trucial States, particularly the oil-producing areas like Abu Dhabi. Has the Foreign Secretary any information about developments in that area, either political or economic?

Mr. Brown: No, Sir. As I am informed, none of those States is at the moment joining in the boycott or is heavily involved. Qatar, I am told, has recently made a decision to stop supplies, but I am hoping, and obviously trying very hard, to get these things lifted fairly soon. I made the point in my original statement that I understand the pressures which are upon those Governments. We have political pressures on us in this House. It is much more easy to understand the pressures which are on Governments in those States.

Mr. Donnelly: In view of my right hon. Friend's rightly expressed desire to secure pacification in the area, what instructions have been given to the British delegation at the United Nations to facilitate the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Yemen and abiding by the rules of international law regarding poison gas?

Mr. Brown: I have been so busy with the

immediate problem that I do not think that I have given any instructions recently to my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon on that subject. Our position is, however, clear. The Egyptians ought not to be in the Yemen. Many problems would be easier of solution if they were not. No civilised Government could possibly support the use of poison gas in any conflict anywhere in the world.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The Foreign Secretary will be aware that only today a Bill has been published which enables Her Majesty's Government to relinquish their sovereignty in Aden. Would not the right hon. Gentleman accept that this is an extremely ill-timed Measure and that it might be wise to take back that Bill and think again?

Mr. Brown: Not for the first time, I totally disagree with the hon. Member. But there will be an occasion for us to debate the matter.

Mr. Paget: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it is not a question of persuading Israel to settle down as a Middle Eastern Power: it is a question of persuading the Arab nations to accept her as a Middle East Power? Is it not true that for 20 years Israel has wanted nothing but peace, and is she not now entitled to demand peace before she retires from the territory?

Mr. Brown: My hon. and learned Friend and I had this one out yesterday and we had it out on Monday. The position remains the same. I believe that both parties—all parties is a better way of saying it—have to accept the same thing. Israel and the Arabs have to accept that Israel exists and that Israel exists as a Middle Eastern Power.

Mr. Paget: Hear, hear.

Mr. Brown: So long as we say "both," we may help the situation. It is when we say only one of the two things that we do not help the situation very much. My hon. and learned Friend continues to start history from a point of his own choosing. This has been the mistake of many would-be historians over the years.

Mr. Heath: We recognise the preoccupations of the Foreign Secretary during the past few days but ought not the Government to take an initiative

in the Security Council to bring about the condemnation of the use of poison gas in the Yemen by the U.A.R.? Should not everything possible be done to prevent the extension of use of this foul weapon by a desperate Power in the present circumstances elsewhere?

Mr. Brown: It is a matter for consideration. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] Seriously, this is a matter for consideration. I did not take the view that in this situation it was for us to take the initiative on that. The Arab countries, on whose territory it has been used and who made a great show of coming to the support of Egypt in the last few days, might themselves have taken the initiative. I thought that it was better for us to concentrate on the main issue.

Mr. Heffer: As the Security Council has unanimously called upon both sides to stop fighting, but also in view of the fact that there appears to be a continuation of the sale of arms, I understand both from the Soviet Union and from the United States of America, could we not follow up this initiative in the Security Council with a call for the complete embargo on all arms to the Middle East, so that no side will think that it can continue the fighting because it has a supply of arms ready to hand?

Mr. Brown: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. As I said yesterday, I am absolutely certain that one of the elements in the solution must be a limitation and control of the supply of armaments to this area of the world. The competitive exercise that has been going on while we have been exercising a very great deal of restraint is of no use to anybody and must be put right in the solution.

Mr. Hastings: Can the Foreign Secretary tell us anything about the whereabouts or position at this moment of King Hussein of Jordan?

Mr. Brown: King Hussein is in Jordan. He held a Press conference this morning and made his own position clear. I am not asked to comment on that, but that is where he is. He is, clearly, still operating as the Head of State of Jordan.

Mr. W. Baxter: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the most disturbing part of his original statement this afternoon is that he has made it

abundantly clear that we will raise our arms embargo, which has been in operation for the last day or two? I think that most people of this country will be very disturbed about that. I would like my right hon. Friend to reconsider that aspect of his statement.

Mr. Brown: I have a very great deal of doubt about my hon. Friend's judgment about what most of the people will feel. My own guess is that most of the people of the country will feel that if others are putting in replacements it would be very difficult for us to defend a situation in which we were not ready to honour contracts already entered into.

May I make it absolutely plain, however, that every request for arms or ammunition, whatever it is, will be very carefully considered by us in relation to the situation. I would like to think that the same careful consideration will be given in Moscow and other capitals of the world.

Mr. Sandys: The right hon. Gentleman has very rightly stressed the importance of making the cease-fire effective when it takes place. Does he realise that the cease-fire will not last for very long unless it is very quickly policed by some kind of international force along the cease-fire line pending the conclusion of a settlement? Will the right hon. Gentleman begin to take steps now to bring about the creation of such a force, so that it could be ready to go in very quickly when the fighting ends?

Mr. Brown: One of the reasons why I did not volunteer a statement today was that I thought that we were almost certain to go back over the discussion yesterday and the day before and the day before that. I dealt with this matter yesterday. The position remains the same. Of course, I am taking every step open to me to ensure that arrangements are made for supervising the cease-fire and for considering what United Nations presence thereafter can be helpful in the situation. I cannot say any more about it. There is literally nothing more that I can tell the House than I told hon. Members yesterday. But, like the right hon. Gentleman, I know only too well that both these are critically important factors.

Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Would my right hon. Friend think it appropriate at this stage to express

a word of regret at the death of two officers of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, and think it true to say of these men that they gave their lives in the cause of peace?

Mr. Brown: Yes, Sir. I said this yesterday, and I feel it strongly. If I may go from there, those who have been striving in their United Nations capacity to hold this area are very deserving of a special word of sympathy from us in a situation where their own faith and belief must have been shattered by the events which have occurred.

While on this point, I might say that, to the best of my knowledge, no British citizens have been killed or severely wounded during the recent troubles.

Mr. Birch: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that, at the moment, the fewer comments made in this House on the situation the better?

Mr. Brown: I wholly agree with that, and did my best to avoid any being made today.

Mr. Thorpe: Since Jordan and Israel have now both accepted the call for a cease-fire, could the Foreign Secretary use his initiative to get U.N.T.S.O. working on this frontier, in view of the fact that its headquarters is in Jerusalem? Secondly, since the call for a cease-fire is the united voice of the Security Council, are those who refuse to accept it technically to be considered aggressors?

Mr. Brown: Those who refuse to accept it are in conflict with the other members of the United Nations, although whether it does us much good to draw attention to that I do not know. That is one of the reasons why I did not want to be drawn too far on these matters today, because I do not want things on the record today which will make it that much more difficult tomorrow or the day after to bring about what I want to do.

As for U.N.T.S.O. and the cease-fire, I said in my original statement—and I was not referring to the newspapers only, or particularly—that I was getting conflicting and disturbing reports about what is happening on the Jordanian and Israeli frontier. I chose my words carefully and in that statement I was not identifying one

country more than another.

The situation is confused. I am not sure what is happening. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, U.N.T.S.O. was removed by force from Jerusalem to Israel. At the moment, it is not really in a position to operate, although it exists. I still think that the best use of any initiatives of mine is to try to bring about a genuine cease-fire. Then we can discuss how the area can be policed and by whom.

Mr. Heath: Quite rightly, the Foreign Secretary has addressed himself to the immediate problems and particularly to the implementation of the cease-fire. He has also spoken of his desire not to have just another truce, but a permanent settlement. However, it is difficult to see how a permanent settlement can be brought about by a United Nations resolution and discussions behind the scenes. Obviously, it will require, I suggest, a major conference of the Powers involved, with the United Nations Secretariat present and such other assistance from other Powers as is required. Can he assure the House that urgent thought is being given to how it can be brought about at the earliest opportunity?

Mr. Brown: Very much thought is being given to that, and I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for raising the matter. As he knows, I feel that, in the end, it must be done formally, at any rate, within a United Nations context. A lot of thought is being given to how we can do it, whether we should start from there, whether we should start elsewhere, whether the four Powers would be the best way of starting, or whether we could do it by direct contact with the parties in the area. We are thinking very hard, and we rule out none of the possibilities. However, in the end, I am sure that any settlement ought to be enshrined in treaties which are registered and endorsed by the United Nations.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Mr. Heath. Business question.

Exchange of Letters Between U.S. Senator Mansfield and President Johnson on the Situation in the Middle East.¹

Washington, June 8, 1967

Senator Mansfield to the President

Dear Mr. President: As I said this morning, it would be a great help to me, and I think to the Senate as a whole if we could have your own current views on the situation in the Middle East. That situation has developed so rapidly in recent days, and the issues before us there are of such great importance, that the Senate would be grateful, I am sure, to have your own present assessment.

Sincerely,
Mike Mansfield

The President to Senator Mansfield

Dear Mike: I am delighted to respond to your note with a brief statement on the current situation as we see it. I entirely share your view that it is good for the President and the Senate to be in close touch on this matter.

Our most urgent present concern is to find a way to bring the fighting in the Middle East to an end. We are deeply concerned that there has not yet been an effective response to the two unanimous votes by which the U.N. Security Council has called for a cease-fire. While the representative of Israel agreed to comply if other parties also agreed only Jordan, among the Arab States, has agreed to the cease-fire.

Ambassador Goldberg, on my instructions, has requested the immediate convening of another Security Council session, to deal with the current situation, and we have presented a Resolution whose text I attach.²

The fighting has already brought the suffering and pain that comes with all such conflicts. These losses have included the lives of Americans engaged in the work of peaceful communication on the high seas. On this matter we have found it necessary to make a prompt and firm protest to

the Israel Government which, to its credit, had already acknowledged its responsibility and had apologized. This tragic episode will underline for all Americans the correctness of our own urgent concern that the fighting should stop at once.

So we continue to believe that a cease-fire is the urgent first step required to bring about peace in that troubled part of the world. At the same time we know, of course, that a cease-fire will be only a beginning and that many more fundamental questions must be tackled promptly if the area is to enjoy genuine stability. Our new Resolution begins to deal with some of these questions.

Let me emphasize that the U.S. continues to be guided by the same basic policies which have been followed by this Administration and three previous Administrations. These policies have always included a consistent effort on our part to maintain good relations with all the peoples in the area in spite of the difficulties caused by some of their leaders. This remains our policy despite the unhappy rupture of relations which has been declared by several Arab states.

We hope that the individual states in the Middle East will now find new ways to work out their differences with each other by the means of peace, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We look beyond the current conflict to a new era of greater stability which will permit all the peoples of the area to enjoy the fruits of lasting peace. Our full efforts will be directed to this end.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

P.S. While this letter was in the typewriter I learned of the announcement, by the President of the Security Council, that the United Arab Republic accepts the cease-fire resolutions subject only to acceptance by Israel. Thus we seem at the edge of progress in the directions this letter indicates. You can be sure that the Government will continue its work for peace, especially in the Security Council where Ambassador Goldberg has done such brilliant and productive work in the last days.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26/6/1967, pp. 951-52.

² See *post*, doc. 241.

89

Statement by the Communist Parties and Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the Middle East.¹

Moscow, June 9, 1967

On June 9, 1967, the leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties and governments of the socialist countries assembled in Moscow: for the People's Republic of Bulgaria—Comrade Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and Chairman of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers, and Comrade Zhivko Zhivkov, member of the Politburo of the B.C.P. Central Committee and First Vice-Chairman of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers; for the Hungarian People's Republic—Comrade Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee, and Comrade Jenoe Fock, member of the Politburo of the H.S.W.P. Central Committee and Chairman of the H.P.R. Council of Ministers; for the German Democratic Republic—Comrade Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the G.D.R. State Council, Comrade Willi Stoph, member of the Politburo of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee and Chairman of the G.D.R. Council of Ministers, and Comrade Hermann Axen, candidate member of the Politburo of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee and Secretary of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee; for the Polish People's Republic—Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, and Comrade Jozef Cyrankiewicz, member of the Politburo of the P.U.W.P. Central Committee and Chairman of the P.P.R. Council of Ministers; for the Soviet Union—Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Comrade A. N. Kosygin, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and Comrade N. V. Podgorny, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R.

Supreme Soviet; for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—Comrade Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, and Comrade Jozef Lenart, member of the Presidium of the C.C.P. Central Committee and Chairman of the C.S.R. Government; for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Comrade Iosip Broz Tito, Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and President of the S.F.R.Y. and Comrade Vladimir Popovic, member of the Presidium of the L.C.Y. Central Committee.

Those who had assembled examined the situation that has taken shape in the Near East as a consequence of Israel's aggression, which is the result of collusion among certain imperialist forces, first and foremost the U.S.A., against the Arab states. The participants in the meeting exchanged opinions on the measures necessary to curtail the aggression and avert its dangerous consequences for the cause of universal peace.

The participants in the meeting believe it is necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions from the fact that Israel has ceased hostilities against the Arab states. The occupation of the territory of Arab states by Israeli troops could be used to restore a foreign colonial regime.

On June 9 Israeli troops, despite the Syrian government's declaration of a cease-fire, engaged in a new assault on the Syrian border, barbarically bombing cities in Syria.

The peoples of the Arab countries, in fighting against imperialism for their freedom and independence, for the integrity of their territories and for the inalienable, sovereign right to determine independently all questions of their internal life and foreign policy, are defending a just cause. The peoples of the socialist countries are completely on their side.

In recent years the peoples of the U.A.R. and a number of other Arab countries have attained great, historic victories in the sphere of gains in national independence and freedom. Important social transformations have been effected in the interests of the working masses.

We express confidence that these gains will be preserved and progressive regimes consolidated, despite the difficulties the Arab peoples are encountering on the way.

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28/6/1967, pp. 3-4. From *Pravda*.

In a difficult hour for the states of the Arab East, the socialist countries declare that they are in complete and full solidarity with their just struggle and will render them assistance in repelling aggression and defending their national independence and territorial integrity.

The states participating in the meeting demand that Israel immediately cease hostilities against the neighboring Arab countries and withdraw all its troops from their territories beyond the armistice line.

It is the duty of the United Nations to condemn the aggressor. If the Security Council fails to take the proper measures, grave responsibility will rest with the states that fail to fulfill their duty as members of the Security Council.

Today, as never before, resolute joint actions are necessary by all peace-loving and progressive forces, by all who hold dear the freedom and independence of peoples.

If the government of Israel does not halt the aggression and withdraw its troops behind the armistice line, the socialist states that signed this statement will do everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab countries deal a resolute rebuff to the aggressor, protect their legal rights, extinguish the hotbed of war in the Near East and restore peace in this area.

The just struggle of the Arab peoples will triumph!

90

Interview Statement by Japanese Prime Minister Sato.¹

Tokio, June 9, 1967

I believe that Japan should maintain a position of absolute neutrality regarding the Middle East issue. At the same time, we are determined to search for a solution within the United Nations in order to secure peace.

91

Speech of British Prime Minister Wilson at the Opening of a New Mill.² [Excerpts]

Workington (Cumberland), June 9, 1967

From the present confusion and bitterness we must now all work to bring about a lasting and honourable settlement for the future [in the Middle East]. If any such settlement is to carry hope of acceptance, it must take account of the legitimate interests and aspirations of both sides in this conflict.

Whatever the controversies which surrounded the establishment of the State of Israel, any settlement must unequivocally now recognise Israel's sovereign existence, and this must be accepted by all her neighbours. Any settlement will also have to take account of the right of free and innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran for all ships of all nations.

Equally, however, any lasting settlement in the area must recognise the legitimate interests of the Arab States. They too, as the Foreign Secretary has pointed out with great clarity in the House of Commons, are entitled to sympathy and understanding for their point of view, not least at this difficult time for them. We recognise in particular their deep feelings about the problem of the Arab refugees who have been displaced from their homes in what is now the State of Israel. All of us know the difficulties of achieving any solution of this refugee problem. But some progress here is essential if the future peace of the area is to be secured for a generation to come. For, out of the tragedy and suffering of these past days, it is for the next generation that all of us must be legislating. This country, the British people, and the British Government are in no sense hostile to Arab nationalism or to perfectly legitimate Arab aspirations to a greater degree of unity. We deplore the current misunderstandings between us and the Arab States. But we hope and believe that the present phase of bitterness and misrepresentation will pass and that we shall gradually be able to rebuild our relations on a firmer basis.

² British Embassy release, Beirut; *New York Times*, 10/6/1967.

¹ *Le Monde*, 10/6/1967.

We are confronted today with a major challenge to constructive statesmanship. The four Powers, who are the effective members of the Security Council, now have an opportunity—and if we miss this opportunity we may face the gravest dangers—to work together for an honourable and constructive settlement in the Middle East. Indeed, without such four-power co-operation, there is little hope of such a settlement being achieved. One particular field in which this four-power co-operation is particularly necessary is the organization of some general understanding to control the level of armaments flowing into the area.

92

Speech of Israeli Information Minister Galili on Israel's Post-War Position.¹

Eilat, June 9, 1967.

Following the military struggle on the battlefields, a political struggle has now begun in the international sphere and in the U.N. lobbies... a struggle between Israel's friends and those who wish to harm it. During the past days the government and its ministerial committees have wrestled with difficult problems to insure what matters most: victory on the battlefield. So far no discussions have been held and no plans have been made concerning the future. Nevertheless, I think I can say a few simple and clear things about this matter.

It must be said, first of all, that Israel cannot agree to a return to the *status quo ante*... that is to say, the situation as it was before the fighting started. On no account can Israel agree to a return to armistice agreements, to the armistice regime, and to the armistice borders.

I think we may simply say that the Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi tanks and planes have completely erased the armistice agreements and that the armistice regime with its borders and rule is dead and can no longer exist in our

world. Israel cannot exist in a situation which in the beginning was intended to serve as a preliminary and a transition to peace but which has continued for 20 years as a state of war.

We shall not return to this transition stage in which we have spent 20 years of suffering, distress, and bloodshed. We can no longer content ourselves with partial solutions. We must present to our neighbors and to the world an emphatic demand for a peaceful solution.

93

Note from the Soviet Government to the Israeli Government Announcing the Severance of Diplomatic Relations.²

Moscow, June 10, 1967

The news has just reached here that Israeli troops, ignoring the Security Council's resolution on the termination of military operations, are proceeding with these operations, seizing Syrian territory, and are advancing in the direction of Damascus. The Soviet Government has warned the Government of Israel that it bears the full burden of responsibility for its perfidy and its glaring violation of the Security Council decisions.

Unless Israel immediately halts its military actions, the Soviet Union, jointly with other peace-loving States, will adopt sanctions against Israel, with all the consequences flowing therefrom.

The Soviet Government states that in view of the continued Israeli aggression against Arab States and its gross violation of the Security Council resolutions, the Soviet Government has decided to sever diplomatic relations with Israel.

¹ Jerusalem Israel Domestic Service in Hebrew, 1100 GMT, 10/6/1967.

² *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, p. 22105.

94

Press Statement by Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada.¹

Rawalpindi, June 10, 1967

We have been closely watching the developments in the Middle East; it is reprehensible that Israel should have launched an attack against the Arab countries at a time when the Security Council was engaged in seeking a peaceful solution of the crisis.

We urge all members of the Security Council and peace-loving nations to ensure that the cease-fire is strictly observed. Israel must vacate her aggression and should not be permitted to continue her illegal occupation of Arab territories and of the holy places.

It is our firm belief that there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East unless it is based on justice and on respect for the political independence and territorial independence and territorial integrity of the Arab countries.

95

Statement by Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil.²

Ankara, June 10, 1967

We express the wish that all parties to the fighting in the Middle East would without delay observe the requirements of the Security Council resolution for a cease-fire. I would like to state in this connection that... we are opposed to the acquisition of land or the consolidation of positions through the use of force.

¹ Pakistani Embassy, Beirut.

² Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 1700 GMT, 10/6/1967. The statement was made in answer to a question put by an Anatolia News Agency correspondent.

96

Note from the Yugoslav Government to the Israeli Government Threatening the Severance of Diplomatic Relations.³

Belgrade, June 11, 1967

The government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has established that, in the wake of the acts of aggression perpetrated by Israel against the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries as well as after Israel's calculated delay in complying with the U.N. Security Council's resolutions providing for a cease-fire, responsible Israeli statesmen made statements indicating Israel's intentions to annex parts of territories belonging to neighboring Arab states while units of the Israeli army set to expelling dozens of thousands of inhabitants out of the occupied territories of the Arab neighbor states.

In denouncing the aggression committed and all aggressive acts perpetrated by Israel, the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deems it necessary that the Israeli troops be urgently withdrawn from the occupied territories to the starting positions they held on the eve of attacks launched on neighboring Arab countries. If not, the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will be compelled to reexamine its relations with Israel. The whole burden of responsibility for the possible consequences will be borne solely by the Israeli Government.

97

Speech by Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson on "Metal Workers' Day".⁴ [Excerpt]

Sandviken, June 11, 1967

Events in the Middle East seem to have entered into a quieter period now that the majority of the parties involved have complied with the

³ Belgrade TANYUG International Service in English, 0909 GMT, 12/6/1967.

⁴ *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy*, Stockholm, 1967, pp. 30-31.

Security Council's appeal for a cease-fire. Once again the United Nations has shown its value as a forum for international consultation. It has been said that the U.N. have lost prestige during the crisis. The decision to withdraw the U.N. forces was regarded by many people as if the U.N. had closed its umbrella as soon as it began to rain. On closer reflection, however, it is clear that the U.N. in this crisis too has given proof of its value as an instrument for the re-instatement of peace. It was there that negotiations could take place. It was there that direct contacts between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. could be taken up. Had the U.N. not existed the situation would have been much more hazardous and there would have been a greater risk of the conflict spreading. Nor must we forget that ever since the decision was made to create the state of Israel, the U.N. has had an important part to play both for peace in the Far East, and for co-existence—full of tension though it may have been—between the Israelis and the Arabs. The U.N. arranged the truce in 1948 and since then has kept a truce supervision organization in Jerusalem. After the military actions against Egypt in the autumn of 1956 it was the U.N. that made a withdrawal of troops possible and that created a system whereby it supervised the frontier between Egypt and Israel, which has been one of the factors underlying relatively peaceful conditions for more than 10 years.

We now hope that it will be possible to find ways towards a peaceful solution of this extremely serious conflict. But we must remember that the U.N.'s ability to act is determined by, and dependent upon, its members' willingness and capacity to reach mutual understanding. The Great Powers, in particular, bear a heavy burden for the restoration and maintenance of peace. We can therefore view with satisfaction the fact that the cease-fire resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the last few days have been unanimous.

During a long series of years Sweden has made an active contribution to the maintenance of peace in that part of the world. We have, for instance, contributed men and material to the U.N. Forces and we still have observers on U.N. assignments in the Middle East. Had the decision on the UNEF's withdrawal not been made, Sweden would have been ready to continue its participation.

The situation, which is still obscure, is filled with both open and latent tension. Many interests are deeply and diametrically opposed and the real grounds for the conflict are profound. It is, consequently, not an easy task confronting us. We must, notwithstanding, try to look forward into the future and hope that the wave of human suffering now swelling over the Middle East can be stemmed and that permanent peace can be established in that harrowed part of the world. Israel and its Arab neighbours must ultimately find peaceful forms for their future co-existence.

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98

Editorial by the Official Organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "Pravda".¹
[Condensed]

Moscow, June 11, 1967

... The Israeli Armed Forces' treacherous attack on the Arab countries began, as is known, on June 5. An absolutely unjustified aggression of a predatory, marauding nature was perpetrated against the U.A.R., Syria and other Arab states. In the very first hours after Israel's attack it became obvious that affirmations of the Israeli actions' supposedly "defensive" purposes, as Israeli politicians and military men called them, were false. The world was once again convinced that Israel's leaders have assumed the role of mercenaries of neocolonialism.

As irrefutable facts attest, Israel had been preparing for an attack on the Arab countries for a long time. By inciting the invaders, imperialist circles hope to prepare the groundwork for an immediate restoration of the old colonial orders throughout the Near East.

The thrust of the aggressor, who is inspired by his imperialist protectors, is directed against the progressive regimes of the U.A.R. and other Arab countries. In recent years the peoples of these countries have achieved great, historic victories in the struggle for national independence and freedom. They have effected profound social

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28/6/1967, p. 9.

transformations conducive to overcoming the painful heritage of the colonialists' many years of domination and to building a new life.

No one can doubt that in the war imposed on the Arab peoples they are upholding their freedom and sovereignty, the territorial integrity of their countries and the inalienable right to decide independently all questions of their own domestic and foreign policies. They are defending their revolutionary gains. And the gentlemen imperialists and their apprentices—the Israeli invaders—shall not dictate and impose their will on the Arab peoples!

As for the Soviet Union, true to its peace-loving policy, it has repeatedly cautioned the government of Israel in no uncertain terms against carrying out a policy of aggression and adventures. But the Israeli leaders have failed to heed the voice of reason.

The Soviet Union has this time demonstrated once again that it remains true to its internationalist duty, its policy of rendering assistance to peoples victimized by aggression and to states that have been liberated from the colonial yoke. Resolutely declaring complete support of the governments and people of the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan, which have been subjected to aggression, the U.S.S.R. has expressed unshakable confidence in the success of their just struggle for their independence and sovereign rights...

As of now Israel has failed to heed the U.N. Security Council's insistent appeal to cease fire, despite the fact that the Arab countries have supported this appeal. The Israeli rulers have thereby shown that they are cynically flouting the United Nations Charter and refuse to take world public opinion into consideration. As a result of the unbridled actions of the Israeli military clique and the rulers in Tel Aviv, who have unfurled a chauvinist campaign of territorial claims, the situation in the Near East has become still more complex...

Yesterday the Soviet government stated that, in view of Israel's aggression against the Arab states and its gross violation of the Security Council's decisions, the Soviet government decided to sever diplomatic relations with Israel and warned it that unless it ceases military operations immediately, the Soviet Union, jointly with other peace-loving states, will impose sanctions against

Israel, with all the consequences arising therefrom.

The aggressor has been warned and must know that the socialist states will do everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab countries deal a resolute rebuff to the aggressor, protect their legal rights, extinguish the hotbed of war in the Near East and restore peace in this area.

It cannot be doubted that all the peoples to whom peace on earth is dear will support the Statement of the socialist countries and the actions of the Soviet state and through joint efforts will curb the aggressors and all warmongers. The just struggle of the Arab peoples will triumph!

99

Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset.¹ [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, June 12, 1967

To the nations of the world I want to say: be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago. The State of Israel arose and continued to exist as a matter of right, and this nation has been compelled to fight and fight again for that right. Alone we fought for existence and our security: we are entitled to determine what are the true and vital interests of our country, and how we shall secure its future. The position that existed up till now shall never again return. The land of Israel shall no longer be a no-man's land, wide open to acts of sabotage and murder.

We have already explained to the nations of the world that we look, not backward, but forward—particularly to peace. We shall faithfully observe the cease-fire, if it is observed by the other side.

Members of the Knesset: A new situation has been created, which can serve as a starting-point in direct negotiations for a peace settlement with the Arab countries. The historic contribution which the peoples of the world, headed by the great Powers, can make toward the establishment of peace in our area is clear and unmistakable.

¹ *Knesset Records*, No. 31, June 12, 1967, p. 2330.

They must address their demands, not to Israel, which has sought peace since she came into being, but to the Arab States, which have turned the Middle East into a focus of tension and a hotbed of ceaseless hatred during the past two decades.

Justice, logic and morality demand that after all those twenty years the Powers should have the courage to tell the Arab States that the U.N. Charter obligates them, just as it obligates every other member-State, to solve disputes by peaceful means.

Today our area is at the cross-roads. In one direction lie peace and true cooperation, resting upon the sincere desires of the people in the area and their true interests. In the other direction lies the danger of continued hostility and hatred because of the absence of stable peace.

The international community is faced not only with a moral test, but with a test of its political sagacity. The sooner the arms race in the area is ended... the sooner steps are taken to bring peace nearer in the Middle East, the greater, perhaps, will be the contribution to the relaxation of general international tension.

To the Arab peoples I want to say at this hour: We did not take up arms in any joyful spirit. We acted because we had no alternative if we wanted to defend our lives and our rights. Just as you have a right to your countries, so we have a right to ours. The roots of the Jewish people in this country go back to primeval days. Throughout the generations, Israel in dispersion maintained its spiritual and material links with this country; it was never severed from it even when it went into exile. Similarly, this land has kept faith with us; it did not sell itself to any stranger, but waited for the return of its people and the ingathering of the exiles. Today the entire world realizes that no force can uproot us from this land.

There is no parallel in the annals of the nations to this unique bond between our people and its land. Perhaps the fact that we have successfully survived the three wars that have been forced upon us will finally convince those who refused to recognize this fundamental truth that our ties with this land are deeper than the sea, because without it our people cannot live.

100

Statement by NATO Secretary General Brosio on the Middle East on the Eve of a Ministerial Council Meeting.¹

Luxemburg, June 12, 1967

Now that diplomacy has come again into its own in the Middle East, the road is clear for negotiations aimed at achieving a stable and equitable peace. Israel and the Arab countries should settle their mutual relations among themselves. The Big Powers at the United Nations should encourage such efforts. The Atlantic Alliance should give evidence of its continued interest in finding a solution to such vital issues as navigation in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, and commercial interchange, particularly in regards to petroleum. This however should not mean direct interference on the part of the Alliance. The Foreign Ministers will no doubt have preliminary discussions on this matter.

101

Note from the Soviet Government to the Israeli Government on the Continuation of Hostilities Against Syria.²

Moscow, June 13, 1967

According to information received, Israel continues the invasion of Syria. On the evening and night of June 11, Israel troops occupied the settlements of Rafik, Jawada and Dzhira-Istabel.

The Arab original population is being driven out of Gaza, Jerusalem and from other regions. For the regions taken by the Israel troops an occupation administration has been established. Military Government has been appointed for towns and districts.

All seems to indicate that the same practice has been adopted that the Hitlerite invaders followed in those regions which were the victims of aggression during the Second World War. The Israel Government must have no illusions: Israel will be made to bear full responsibility for

¹ *Le Monde*, 14/6/1967.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 18/6/1967.

the criminal acts which it commits.

By continually showing its contempt for the decisions of the U.N. Security Council regarding immediate termination of all war operations, the Government of Israel has apparently decided to test the patience of the peace-loving countries. By acting so it commits a fatal miscalculation.

Israel has taken upon herself the whole burden of the responsibility and punishment for its treason, for all the crimes it has committed against peace, and the interest of the peoples.

102

Note from the Yugoslav Government to the Israeli Government Announcing the Severance of Diplomatic Relations.¹

Belgrade, June 13, 1967

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia finds that the Government of Israel has not heeded the warning of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, expressed in its note to the Israeli legation in Belgrade of 11th June of this year,² and that it continued with activities which obviously show that the Government of Israel persists in its aggression against the Arab countries.

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has therefore decided to break off diplomatic relations between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Israel, emphasising again that the responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom devolves exclusively upon the Government of Israel.

103

News Conference Statements by U.S. President Johnson on the Middle East.³

Washington, June 13, 1967

Q. On May 23d you reaffirmed the policy of three Presidents before you, committing this country to the territorial and political integrity of every nation in the Middle East.

When Ambassador Goldberg explained the U.S. vote at the cease-fire, he stated the same to the world. May I ask how you are going to honor this commitment in view of the Israeli conquest of the Arab lands?

The President: That is our policy. It will continue to be our policy. How it will be effectuated will be determined by the events of the days ahead. It will depend a good deal upon the nations themselves, what they have to say and what their views are, what their proposals are after they have expressed them.

I cannot give you any rule of thumb or arbitrary formula at this meeting of what the developments in that distressed area will be, other than to say what our policy is.

In that statement, as well as my statement to Senator Mansfield, you will find that this Government, under many Presidents, has first in its mind—has had and does have now—peace in the area. How that will be involved with the other parts of the statement, as that was a vital part of it, will be determined by the events.

Q. Sir, could I follow up on that?

The President: Yes.

Q. Is it correct, then, to assume that if the parties in the dispute negotiate changes in the boundaries that obtained before the fighting, the policy of the United States would not then necessarily be in opposition to such negotiated changes?

The President: I will stay with the statement, if you can live with it until the nations can adjust themselves to their positions and give their stories. I think it would be better for our country and for them.

¹ *Review of International Affairs*, 20/6/1967.

² See *ante*, doc. 96.

³ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Washington, 1967, pp. 869-72.

I see no real reason for my going beyond the statement I made. I do not think it would serve your interest as an individual or the Government's interest, or the Nation's.

Q. Mr. President, would you favor the two sides sitting down together and negotiating?

The President: I wouldn't go into that now. I have nothing more to say than my statement.

Q. Mr. President, during the war the Russians worked more or less in tandem with us to bring about a cease-fire. Is there any indication now or is it your hope that they would work in tandem, the two super-powers, to bring about this peace?

The President: We would like all nations to do everything they can to promote an acceptable and honorable peace. We can only speak for ourselves. But it is our hope that we can avoid war and can achieve peace. That is going to require the best efforts of all of us.

Q. Mr. President, in the statement that was issued on Monday when the fighting started, there was a sentence about new programs of development for the entire area. Could you give us some of your thinking as to what new programs might be involved?

The President: No, I don't think I ought to go beyond the statement that I made on May 23d at this time.

Q. Mr. President, to return to the Middle East—for the near future, what plans, if any, do you have for the resumption of economic aid?

The President: We are reviewing the aid program throughout that area. The Congress is presently considering our program for next year. I would think that the events of the next few days and weeks will determine the extent, the desire, and the need more clearly.

This morning, I don't think I could say this is it because I might have a credibility problem, if I did that. I don't think that they are that far along. I don't think the needs, the problems we face, are going to be clear this morning.

Q. Mr. President, Walt Rostow said yesterday in a speech in Vermont that regional cooperation in the Middle East would appear to be a key solution to their

problems over there. Does that accurately reflect the administration's thinking of possibilities?

The President: We have felt, as you know, Bob, for some time that where we could—as in Latin America, Africa, or in Asia, in various areas of the world—that the regional approach was a very desirable approach to facing up to the problems, economic and otherwise.

Some areas are further along than others. In the last 2 years, we think we have made considerable progress along this line. We would hope that we could do better in the days ahead in all areas.

Q. Mr. President, there is a story in the Baltimore Sun today quoting the American Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo saying the administration was not as sensitive to the seriousness of the crisis before it erupted into war in the Middle East. Would you have any comment on that?

The President: No. I think you will find that there are pro-Egypt spokesmen, pro-Israel spokesmen, and individual opinions that will flow pretty freely these days.

I do not believe anyone very high in the administration would feel that way about it. The Middle East has occupied a good deal of our thoughts, our attention, and the time of some of the ablest leaders in our Government ever since I came into the executive branch in 1961. It still does.

I do not know the person to whom you refer. It sounds very much like a parochial view, or a local viewpoint.

Q. Mr. President, the Arabs, particularly the Egyptians, have made quite an emotional case against the United States, claiming that we backed the Israelis and that our Air Force helped them in the military action, itself. What is your reaction to this campaign?

The President: I think that the people of the world should know that uppermost in my mind, our Government's mind, our people's mind, is trying to contribute anything we can to helping people get along with their neighbors and with each other. I do not want to say anything that would contribute to inflaming the feeling that already exists.

I think that all of you—and most of the world—know that the charges about our active

participation with our carrier planes in the events was completely untrue. In due time—when that becomes evident to all the parties—the attitudes of a good many people will change and will improve.

Q. Mr. President, can you say what steps, if any, are being taken by the users of the Suez Canal to get the canal reopened?

The President: No, I can't.

Q. Mr. President, have you had an opportunity to look into the problem of the refugees and whether any emergency relief will be needed?

The President: Yes, that is a problem that is high on the agenda of the problems of that area. It will be one that all of the interested parties will no doubt address their attention to.

So far as our reaching an independent, unilateral decision, none has been reached—although we have considered various factors involved and have given a good deal of attention to it for some time.

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us how helpful a role the "hot line" played in Russian-American relations during this period?

The President: I think it is always helpful when you can convey your thought orally or in writing to a person whom you want to communicate with. We did that on occasions. I did not see, except for the time involved, a great deal of difference between this and the other communications that save time.

You send a message just like you send a cable. There is no voice involved. The "hot line" was something dramatic, I guess. We just write out our message, giving our views, and say, "Here is how we feel about it." They come back with the same message. You take it and read it as you would any other message.

Q. Was time-saving important in some of those messages, sir?

The President: I think it is always good to save any time you can. I don't know how important it might have been.

Q. Mr. President, was there any voice communi-

cation with Premier Kosygin during the period of the crisis?

The President: No.

Q. Mr. President, sir, do you see any steps the United States might take to encourage resumption of diplomatic relations with the Arab countries?

The President: We think that at this time the best thing for us to do is to let things clear up and let the people of the area and the world realize just what has happened. Then we will be exchanging viewpoints with all concerned.

No doubt Secretary Rusk will be talking to the NATO nations today and tomorrow, receiving their viewpoints and giving them ours. I do not expect any immediate decision in that field.

104

Statement by British Foreign Minister Thomson in Parliament.¹

London, June 13, 1967

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Thomson): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I wish to make a statement on the latest situation in the Middle East.

The main development in the Arab/Israel conflict since the Foreign Secretary's Statement in the House has been the achievement of a cease-fire on the Syrian front. The cease-fire is now being generally maintained. Today, we have heard that the Soviet Government intend to ask for the Middle East to be discussed at the Special Assembly of the United Nations.

It was to me encouraging that General Odd Bull, of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, played a key part in arranging the final and effective cease-fire and that the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation observers are now in position on both sides of the cease-fire line. This Government and indeed the House as a whole have expressed the view that, wherever there has been a United

¹ *Hansard's*, 13/6/1967, col. 316-19.

Nations presence on both sides of the borders, it has greatly helped in preventing conflict. I hope that this will become a key factor of all the border arrangements.

As an effective step towards making the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation as effective as possible during the present critical period, I hope that General Bull will be able to return to the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem.

I now turn to some specific points on which the House, I know, would like to have some information. The first is the question of British subjects in the area. As the Foreign Secretary told the House in an earlier statement, emergency evacuation arrangements have been put into operation wherever the situation on the ground warranted it. British subjects have been evacuated overland from Syria into Turkey and from Iraq into Iran.

Over 300 British subjects were evacuated in American aircraft on Sunday morning from Amman to Tehran, where they were picked up by British aircraft to complete their journey to this country. I would like to express our gratitude to the United States Government for their generous assistance in this operation. I am glad to report that, as far as we know, in all these cases the evacuation has been completed without any loss of life. Evacuation arrangements for British subjects in Egypt are in hand and over 300 left Alexandria this morning.

The Suez Canal remains closed to navigation. The Canal Authority has said that the canal is obstructed by small vessels sunk by Israeli action, but the Israeli authorities have denied taking any such action. The position seems to be in any case, that some vessels are sunk in the waterway.

Four British cargo ships are in the Great Bitter Lake in the canal, together with several ships of other nationalities. We are in close touch with the owners concerned and they, in turn, have had some limited radio contact with the ships themselves. Some food supplies are running short, but we understand that it is possible to obtain fresh supplies locally.

We have asked the Canadian Government who act for us in the absence of diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic, to inquire urgently of the U.A.R. authorities what

the prospects are for the early departure of the four ships and also to give the crews whatever help they can.

As regards oil, exports from Arab countries are still stopped or restricted. The readjustment of existing supplies and the high level of stocks in many importing countries including the United Kingdom, provided a breathing space during which it is hoped that the tensions which led to the supply interruptions will ease and more normal conditions will return.

It has been made clear to the Governments concerned that the allegations of British and American intervention, which were the immediate cause of the supply interruptions, are completely without foundations. In the meantime, the main importing countries and the other countries associated with them in the O.E.C.D. are at this moment consulting together on the supply question.

We are, naturally, very concerned about the human suffering emerging in the aftermath of the fighting. We are acutely disturbed about the danger of a new refugee problem being superimposed on the existing one. This is, in our view, a practical matter of human importance which concerns the whole international community, and to which the United Nations organisation should address itself urgently.

Meanwhile, we have information that large numbers of refugees have already crossed to the east bank of the River Jordan. It seems plain that a relief problem of major proportions is building up. The voluntary organisations in this country are considering what they can do. Her Majesty's Government have agreed to make financial provision for emergency relief in Jordan and we are urgently considering what we can provide from British Government stocks in Cyprus as a first step.

So much for the present. We must now look to the future. There will clearly be a long process of negotiations and bargaining ahead before the shape of a settlement emerges. It is our hope that the United Nations will be able to play a vigorous and realistic part in this process. Certainly, the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations will do its utmost to contribute to achieving that outcome.

105

**Communiqué Published at the End of a
NATO Ministerial Council Meeting.¹**
[Excerpt]

Luxemburg, June 14, 1967

The Spring Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council was held in Luxemburg on 13th and 14th June, 1967.

Reviewing the international situation in the light of recent developments, Ministers took note of the high degree of instability and uncertainty still existing in the world. The Council once again affirmed that the cohesion of its members remains essential for their own security and for the maintenance of peace.

In accordance with their practice of consulting together, Ministers held an exchange of views on the Middle East situation, following the hostilities which have once again occurred in this region. They noted with satisfaction that a cease-fire had now taken place and stressed the urgency of humanitarian efforts to alleviate the sufferings caused by the war. Member governments expressed their determination to support all efforts to establish a lasting peace in this area and resolve the outstanding problems in a spirit of equity and in accordance with the legitimate interests of all concerned.

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106

**Interview Statements by French Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville Following a
NATO Ministerial Council Meeting.²**
[Excerpt]

Paris, June 14, 1967

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La crise du Moyen-Orient n'est pas une question qui est de la compétence de l'Alliance

atlantique. Il n'est pas question par conséquent de définir une position de cette Alliance par rapport à cette crise. Cela a été dit par moi et par beaucoup de mes collègues et ne fait de doute pour personne.

Ceci étant précisé, il était normal cependant que les différents ministres parlent, expriment leurs préoccupations, leurs opinions, échangent des informations. Et c'est ce qui a été fait sur une très grande échelle. C'est ce qui a été fait en particulier par la délégation française qui a eu l'occasion, par ma bouche, d'expliquer quelle avait été tout au long de cette difficile affaire la position adoptée par la France, comment nous jugions la situation actuelle et, je dois dire aussi, les préoccupations qui résultent pour nous du fait que cette crise, du moins, c'est ce que nous pensons, est loin d'être réglée, qu'elle est profonde et grave et qu'elle va sans doute durer très longtemps encore.

Q. Monsieur le ministre, pensez-vous que l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies soit une tribune valable pour discuter de cette affaire?

R. Poser la question comme vous le faites, appelle une réponse affirmative puisque la France a, aujourd'hui même, indiqué qu'elle était d'accord sur le principe de la réunion de cette Assemblée générale. Je dis: poser la question comme vous le faites, c'est-à-dire que l'Assemblée générale est un forum approprié pour discuter de cette question. Arriver à des conclusions, prendre des décisions, engager une action, c'est naturellement une toute autre affaire mais ce n'est pas ce que normalement on attend de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies.

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107

**Speech of French Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville Before the National Assembly.³**
[Excerpt]

Paris, June 15, 1967

La déclaration que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire le 7 juin dernier devant l'Assemblée nationale

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 3/7/1967, p. 14.

² *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st Sem., 1967, pp. 118-19.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-23.

au nom du gouvernement a défini les vues et la position de la France au sujet de la crise du Moyen-Orient, qui était alors, du moins pour ce qui est des combats, à son point culminant. C'est à mettre à jour et à compléter cette déclaration, même si nous n'avons pas encore le recul qui serait nécessaire, que j'entends consacrer la première partie de mon exposé d'aujourd'hui. Je parlerai ensuite des autres questions principales qui intéressent notre politique extérieure, à commencer par les affaires européennes.

La guerre, hélas, ne s'est pas arrêtée sitôt l'appel unanime au cessez-le-feu lancé par le Conseil de sécurité. Les combats les plus durs, les plus sanglants aussi, ont même été livrés après, en territoire syrien et se sont prolongés jusqu'à dimanche au prix de lourdes pertes. Pendant cette période, de quelques jours seulement, mais où les heures étaient longues, les Nations unies ont été, disons le franchement, dans l'incapacité de jouer vraiment leur rôle, parce que, aussitôt après l'unanimité réalisée le 6 juin et que j'avais saluée l'autre jour en en marquant la portée, les oppositions se sont manifestées à nouveau et ont rendu toute véritable action pour le moment impossible. Déplorable situation, qui ne nous fait que regretter davantage que n'ait pas été entendue la suggestion faite le 25 mai par la France en vue d'une coopération des quatre puissances, laquelle peut-être en s'exerçant à temps aurait pu changer le cours des événements et orienter vers ce règlement négocié des problèmes de fond qui, de toute manière, reste indispensable, parce qu'il est la condition d'une paix véritable.

Mais rien ne sert d'épiloguer sur le passé. La situation est désormais radicalement transformée, et pour longtemps. C'est ce qu'il faut maintenant considérer, quant aux données immédiates et quant aux perspectives d'avenir.

Pendant les quelques jours de son attaque foudroyante, l'Etat d'Israël a remporté la victoire militaire, annihilant les forces armées adverses et occupant un territoire énorme, en proportion du moins du sien propre, péninsule du Sinaï de Gaza au canal de Suez et à Charm el-Cheikh, Cisjordanie ou Palestine arabe, y compris la vieille ville de Jérusalem, enfin confins occidentaux de la Syrie le long de sa propre frontière. Par là même, il a pris en charge une population musulmane, qu'il n'est pas possible de chiffrer

exactement pour le moment, mais qui est considérable par rapport à sa propre population et qui comprend notamment environ trois quarts de million de ces réfugiés de Palestine que les Nations unies entretiennent dans leurs trop célèbres camps depuis l'armistice de 1949.

L'on sait les conséquences que le gouvernement israélien tire d'une pareille carte de guerre. Elles ont été succinctement définies dans la déclaration faite le 12 juin devant son Parlement par le président du Conseil M. Eshkol.¹ Israël vainqueur entend régler directement les conditions de la paix avec chaque Etat arabe intéressé successivement. Il ne s'agit plus d'en revenir aux procédures des Nations unies qu'il estime avoir fait la preuve de leur inefficacité. Les conditions de la paix, cela semble d'ailleurs signifier beaucoup, beaucoup plus en tous cas que ce qui était dit auparavant, lorsqu'il s'agissait avant tout de la liberté de navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba.

Du côté des Arabes, la défaite des armes a tout bouleversé, jusqu'au fond des choses et jusqu'au fond des âmes. Je ne vise pas tant la situation politique et le régime de chacun, dont il ne m'appartient évidemment pas de parler à cette tribune, et dont je me bornerai à dire que la porte est ouverte à toutes les éventualités. Je pense au choc créé par les événements, au traumatisme qui frappe tous ces peuples, dont les effets n'apparaîtront qu'à la longue, qui sont difficiles à mesurer en durée et en profondeur.

Ce que l'on peut dire dès à présent, s'agissant des positions arabes vis-à-vis d'Israël, c'est que le dialogue est devenu encore plus difficile que par le passé. Il faudra tenir compte d'autre part des réactions passionnées qui ont conduit à la rupture complète des Arabes avec les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne, à l'arrêt du fonctionnement du canal de Suez, au boycott du pétrole. C'est un aspect de la situation dont les conséquences ne peuvent encore être évaluées.

A côté d'Israël, à côté des pays arabes, les grandes puissances elles-mêmes ne sont pas pour le moment en mesure de jouer le rôle qui est le leur de par les responsabilités générales qui leur incombent et que j'avais cherché, la semaine dernière, à esquisser devant l'Assemblée nationale. Bien au contraire, il résulte de leurs oppositions

¹ See *ante*, doc. 99.

un élément supplémentaire de division, sinon de conflit. Je viens de dire que les Etats-Unis se trouvaient, provisoirement peut-être, mais complètement, coupés du monde arabe. L'Union soviétique, de son côté, suivie par la plupart des pays de l'Europe orientale, a rompu de son propre chef ses relations diplomatiques avec Israël et nous serions les derniers à sous-estimer pour le présent, mais surtout pour la suite, les conséquences d'une telle décision. En d'autres termes la guerre froide, en admettant qu'elle en ait jamais été éliminée, risque de reprendre en force dans le Moyen-Orient.

Aussi, après la crise militaire violente, mais localisée, qui vient de prendre fin, tous les éléments d'une crise politique d'une exceptionnelle gravité sont-ils maintenant réunis.

C'est à la prévenir, parce qu'il n'était pas difficile d'en prévoir les conséquences, que tous les efforts de la France s'étaient employés au cours des dernières semaines. Maintenant qu'elle est devant nous, quelle peut être notre politique?

Il est clair tout d'abord que personne ne peut songer à prendre quelque initiative dans l'immédiat dans le sens d'une action d'ensemble.

Certes, il y aura des manifestations, parfois spectaculaires, sur la scène internationale. Telle sera la réunion qui se tiendra sans doute bientôt, de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies. Cela est normal et nous y avons donné notre accord. A défaut de pouvoir amorcer un règlement, il s'agit d'organiser un large débat, qui permettra d'enregistrer les remous créés par la guerre du Moyen-Orient au sein de la Communauté des Nations unies; le choc a été profondément ressenti et sera long à guérir. Dès qu'il y aura lieu cependant d'engager une action, donc de prendre des décisions, la parole reviendra au Conseil de sécurité. C'est la charte des Nations unies.

Le fait est, en attendant, que la poussière des combats n'est pas retombée et que les passions sont toujours à vif. Si nous voulons être utiles, attachons-nous, en premier lieu, à établir définitivement le cessez-le-feu qui, dans les circonstances où il est intervenu, demeure fragile. Une reprise des hostilités serait non seulement déplorable, mais vaine ou injustifiée suivant le cas. Des problèmes humains se posent très vite ensuite, non seulement parce qu'il y a 250.000 réfugiés dans la zone de Gaza et 500.000 dans la Palestine arabe

mais parce que l'exode semble recommencer si l'on en juge par les nouvelles qui parviennent de Jordanie et qui font état déjà d'une centaine de milliers de réfugiés. Dans ce domaine, et sans aucune arrière-pensée politique, la coopération internationale devra s'exercer. Nous ne sommes plus ici ni dans la passion, ni dans la politique. Il s'agit d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants vis-à-vis desquels, si Israël est maintenant le premier à en assumer, nous avons tous, directement ou indirectement, des devoirs. J'entends par-là bien entendu leur propre survie, non le règlement de leur sort final, qui reste le premier point du contentieux israélo-arabe.

Au-delà, et c'est l'essentiel, je le disais l'autre jour ici même, il faudra reconstruire. La France persiste à penser, même si cela est aujourd'hui et pour longtemps du seul domaine de la raison et du sentiment, qu'une solution réelle, je veux dire durable, ne peut être imposée par la force aux uns ni aux autres, mais qu'elle doit résulter de l'accord de toutes les parties. Un accord qui tienne compte sans doute des réalités de toutes sortes, mais qui soit consenti. C'est là, semble-t-il, le sentiment, non seulement du gouvernement, mais de l'opinion tout entière. Mais comment, raisonnablement, envisager une telle solution dans les conditions présentes et peut-on imaginer que ces conditions puissent changer?

Ce problème, c'est d'abord aux belligérants, ou anciens belligérants, qu'il est posé. Rien dans l'immédiat ne peut être raisonnablement espéré bien entendu. Tout au plus observera-t-on qu'il apparaîtra vite qu'une prolongation de la situation présente risque d'entraîner, au cours des mois et des années, une dégradation, un pourrissement, dont les conséquences seraient redoutables. On peut dire aussi qu'à défaut d'une reprise des violences, qui ne semble être, encore une fois, de l'intérêt de personne, pour ne pas parler de l'intérêt de la paix en général, il est difficile de concevoir que les parties puissent un jour se rapprocher de leur propre mouvement, autrement dit que quoi que ce soit puisse intervenir dans la direction lointaine sinon d'un règlement, du moins d'un début d'accommodement, qui ne soit facilité, sinon inspiré de l'extérieur, toutes précautions étant prises bien entendu, car il s'agit de pays indépendants et qui entendent le rester.

Aller plus loin aujourd'hui serait présomptueux. C'est assez cependant pour montrer une fois de plus les devoirs de ceux qui détiennent des responsabilités générales. Sans doute, les Nations unies, dont l'intervention, je l'ai dit, serait d'ailleurs récusée par l'une au moins des parties en présence, seraient-elles mal placées pour offrir leurs services. Mais on peut penser que les grandes puissances joueront plus tard leur rôle, et de toute manière nous savons bien que rien ne se fera durablement contre l'une d'entre elles. Ce sont donc ces puissances en définitive, qu'on le veuille ou non, qui orienteront l'avenir, même encore une fois s'il ne s'agit en aucune manière de régler comme elles l'entendent les problèmes des autres.

La France pour sa part, dans le concert qu'il s'agira de rétablir, sera toujours disponible pour travailler à l'entente et à la paix. Son attitude, qu'elle veut objective, quels que soient les sentiments, et sereine, quelles que soient les inquiétudes, peut lui permettre de jouer ce rôle. Nous n'avons pas d'autre ambition, et nous serons assez récompensés, si la crise qui menace de durer et de s'amplifier peut se dénouer sans que jamais la paix, au Moyen-Orient ou dans le monde, soit à nouveau mise en péril, et si un jour, lointain sans doute, mais un jour quand même, Juifs et Musulmans en Orient peuvent parvenir à n'être plus ennemis, si Israël peut acquérir ce sentiment de sécurité qui lui manque depuis les origines, et les Arabes regagner, dans leur dignité retrouvée, les moyens d'un indispensable développement.

108

Reply of the Israeli Government to the Soviet Government Note of June 13, 1967.¹

Jerusalem, June 16, 1967

The Government of Israel acknowledges receipt of the message from the Government of the U.S.S.R. of June 13, transmitted through the Ambassador of Finland.

The allegations contained in the message

are unfounded. They are based entirely on statements made by Arab sources for propaganda purposes, and it is regrettable that these false and tendentious statements should be given further currency by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

The Government of Israel expresses its profound revulsion at the accusations voiced by the Soviet Government, charging Israel with practices similar to those adopted by the Hitlerite invaders. The Hitlerite war was against the peoples of Europe, following the pact concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany in September, 1939, and led to the slaughter of six million Jews and millions of other people in Europe.

The U.S.S.R. having severed diplomatic relations with Israel, it is obviously difficult for Soviet representatives to verify at first hand the truth of these Arab-inspired allegations. In fact, the Israel Defence Forces have scrupulously observed the cease-fire on the Syrian front and on all other fronts. That this is so was confirmed again in the report presented by the U.N. Secretary-General at the session of the Security Council held on June 13.

The Arab population in all the areas under Israel control is resuming its normal life. All public services are operating already. A certain number of civilians and soldiers have discarded their arms and uniforms and have moved to the East Bank, returning to their families. Others have moved in the opposite direction and crossed into Israel-controlled territory. Israel authorities have not prevented this movement.

During the last 19 years the Government of Israel has held out its hand in friendship to the Arab countries and expressed its readiness to meet with them and to discuss peace at any place, at any time and without prior conditions.

This remains Israel's position and the Government of Israel greatly regrets that the Soviet Union, by identifying itself with the extreme and belligerent policy of the Arab states, is in fact actively encouraging the Arab countries to even further intransigence and is contributing to the creation of an atmosphere in which it is more difficult to arrive at a just peace.

¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 18/6/1967.

109

Remarks by U.S. President Johnson at a Fundraising Dinner.¹ [Excerpt]**Austin (Texas), June 16, 1967**

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In the Middle East, our commitment has been not of lives, but of intense political concern. The crisis became acute one month ago, with the dangerous and unjustified closing of the Gulf of Aqaba. During 3 weeks of tension, as for many years past, we pursued a policy based on our belief

- in the territorial integrity and political independence of *all* states in the area;
- in the avoidance of conflict;
- and in the right of innocent passage at sea.

Our efforts to help keep the peace were intense—but they did not succeed. Conflict came to the area, and danger to the world.

After 6 hazardous days a cease-fire was achieved. This is a first long step away from peril and we played a responsible part in its achievement.

The great need now is to turn away from 20 years of combat, temporary truce, and hatred toward the building of durable peace in the area. This is a challenge to those who live there first of all, but America will do her share. The first and greatest requirement is that each nation must accept the right of its neighbors to stable and secure existence. If they turn in this direction, these peoples can count upon the friendly help of the United States.

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110

Press Statement by Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck.²**Canberra, June 16, 1967**

The calling of the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which

will probably begin on 19 June, moves the discussion of Middle Eastern questions into a new forum. Australia will be represented at the meeting.

The primary responsibilities in this difficult matter fall on the countries of the region and on those in a position to bring their influence to bear on them. Although Australia is not directly involved as a party we will be glad to play our part in furthering constructive efforts for peace and will give careful attention to the views of all countries of the region.

The recent fighting was an episode in a long history of tension in the Middle East. The fighting did not settle any of the old problems but may have created some new ones. The underlying problems and the interest of other nations in peace and stability in the region are still there.

Our objective now that fighting has ceased is not only to ensure that hostilities do not start again but to seek the commencement of an effort to build a long-term peace. It is to be hoped that the General Assembly will keep this objective clearly in mind and not engage in recriminations or in diplomatic hostilities but seek to reach a greater sense of magnanimity and tolerance than has existed in the past. Argument about who is to blame will not carry us far.

Among the issues that can be clearly identified are recognition of Israel as having a national existence and status; respect and support for the territorial integrity and political independence of states, be they Arab or Israeli; an assurance of security by both Arab and Israeli states; the position of Palestinian Arab refugees; the right of transit of ships of all nations through the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba; the future status of Jerusalem; the possibility of limiting the supply of arms to various countries of the region; and cooperation over the use of Jordan waters. These are difficult and serious matters. They require new approaches and will not be made easier if the debates are used to inflame feelings and harden attitudes. Our efforts will be used wherever possible first to prevent a recurrence of fighting and second to bring a constructive approach to the discussion of the basic causes of the struggle.

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 1967, p. 893.

² *Current Notes on International Affairs*, 1967, p. 236.

111

Statement by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in the National Assembly.¹ [Excerpts]

Paris, June 16, 1967

J'ai été frappé de constater qu'à propos d'Israël, comme de la plupart des autres questions qui ont été évoquées, tous les orateurs sont, en définitive, d'accord sur la politique suivie par le gouvernement, et que ce qu'ils critiquent, c'est non pas notre politique, mais notre procédure ou nos méthodes. On approuve ce que nous disons, mais on nous reproche de chercher à la mettre en pratique. On nous donne raison de critiquer la politique de tel ou tel pays, mais on nous donne tort de le lui dire. On ajoute que, ce faisant, nous démontrons notre impuissance parce qu'il ne suffit pas de critiquer un pays pour l'obliger à changer sa politique. En d'autres termes, selon certains orateurs, nous arrivons à la fois à être isolés, parce que nous critiquons les autres et impuissants, parce que nous n'arrivons pas à modifier leur politique. C'est ce qui a été dit pour l'O.T.A.N.; c'est aussi ce qui a été dit pour le Vietnam.

J'en viens à la crise du Moyen-Orient. Je ne crois pas qu'un seul orateur ait désapprouvé l'objectif de notre politique qui est d'arriver à la paix par l'accord entre les parties intéressées. Mais on critique, de façon assez générale, ce que nous avons dit et fait. Je voudrais présenter une première remarque d'ordre terminologique. On a beaucoup parlé de la «neutralité» du gouvernement, de façon plus ou moins péjorative, en lui reprochant même d'aller jusqu'au «neutralisme». Le terme de neutralité s'applique à un cas déterminé: le cas de guerre; est neutre le pays qui ne participe pas à la guerre. Nous n'avons pas participé à la guerre—qui, ici ou ailleurs, était d'avis que nous y participions?—et d'autre part, nous n'avons pas pris parti dans la guerre, comme d'ailleurs la plupart des autres pays, notamment les grandes puissances. En agissant ainsi, nous avons adopté une position de sagesse: la dernière des folies aurait été de prendre le risque d'étendre

le conflit et de transformer une crise locale en crise mondiale.

Mais avant que les hostilités éclatent et après le cessez-le-feu, le mot «neutralité» n'est pas le terme adéquat pour définir notre attitude: c'est une politique d'impartialité que nous avons cherché à mener.

On nous reproche de ne pas avoir tenu nos engagements. Je m'en suis déjà expliqué ici le 7 juin et j'ai dit que la seule question de savoir si la crise ayant éclaté pour les raisons que l'on connaît et qui sont l'évacuation des Casques bleus et le blocus du golfe d'Akaba, il était ou non souhaitable que la guerre s'ensuivit entre Israël et les pays arabes.

Notre propos était de faire notre possible pour l'éviter. Aussi n'avons-nous pas cru nécessaire de rappeler que le gouvernement français de 1957 avait dit qu'Israël serait justifié à faire la guerre si la liberté de navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba était compromise. Nous avons toujours dit, aux uns comme aux autres, que tenter de résoudre le problème par la guerre serait folie. Toutes les grandes puissances ont d'ailleurs pris la même position, et ce, je crois, pour deux raisons évidentes: d'abord en raison du danger d'escalade, ensuite parce que la guerre ne règle rien.

Voilà l'essence de ce qu'a été la politique du gouvernement dans cette affaire. Cela explique, en particulier, notre déclaration du 2 juin, et notre décision de mettre l'embargo sur les livraisons d'armes aux belligérants. Même s'il en est résulté une certaine amertume chez les Israéliens, nous n'avons, en aucune façon, le sentiment d'avoir agi contre les intérêts de quiconque. Je crois que la voie que nous indiquions était pour tout le monde sinon la meilleure, du moins la moins mauvaise.

Naturellement pour beaucoup, peut-être pour le plus grand nombre, cette crise du Moyen-Orient éveille des sentiments, des souvenirs, des préoccupations de toutes sortes qui conduisent—ceci n'est une critique pour personne—à fonder son jugement sur des bases qui ne sont pas objectives. C'est tout à fait naturel. Mais, pour le gouvernement, c'est une autre affaire. Ayant la responsabilité de la politique du pays, il doit mesurer la portée de ses actes, et considérer d'abord l'intérêt national. L'intérêt national, en l'espèce, c'était d'une part nos rapports avec

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st Sem., 1967, pp. 128-30.

les pays en cause, d'autre part la paix. Nous avons d'ailleurs toujours considéré que nos rapports avec ces pays étaient inséparables de la cause de la paix et que tous ensemble, eux et nous, nous avions les mêmes intérêts à cet égard. C'est pourquoi nous avons pris, et nous gardons, une position d'impartialité.

Maintenant, la guerre ayant eu lieu, la question est de savoir comment, après un armistice forcément précaire, on pourra parvenir à la paix, à un règlement négocié. Ici, la position du gouvernement rejoint le sentiment qui est, je crois, celui de tous les Français. Nous disons, en effet, que tous les problèmes, celui de la situation d'Israël, de ses frontières, de ses relations avec les pays arabes, celui des réfugiés, celui des libertés de navigation devront, à la fin des fins, être réglés par des accords consentis par les deux parties. Tout le monde, je pense, est de cet avis. Mais je ne me hasarderai pas à préciser les conditions d'un tel accord. J'ai entendu un orateur exposer comment il concevait, en particulier, les arrangements territoriaux. Je ne l'en critique pas, mais je crois que c'est la dernière chose à faire. Définir les conditions de la paix, c'est l'affaire des parties. De l'extérieur, on peut seulement les y aider.

Dans tout cela, la France est disponible du fait, précisément, de la politique qu'elle a pratiquée. Elle est à la fois désireuse et peut-être à même de contribuer pour sa part, même si elle est modeste, à atteindre les objectifs que je me suis efforcé de définir.

112

Address by Zambian President Kaunda at a Dinner Given in his Honor by the Indian Government.¹ [Excerpt]

New Delhi, June 17, 1967

The discussions which we have had with the [Indian] Prime Minister have helped much to enlighten both of us on problems confronting our two countries in our effort to build a strong

foundation for peaceful progress within our own respective nations, while ensuring greater and more effective contribution to the peace and security of the world. . . In view of the convening of the emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is necessary for me to restate my Government's position clearly.

I believe that negotiations cannot be successful, that a permanent settlement is inconceivable unless all the parties to this conflict return to the positions they occupied before the outbreak of the unfortunate war. Furthermore, my Government remains convinced that unless the big powers take a positive stand on this matter and on peace in general, the atmosphere will remain tense, unstable and dangerous for humanity. It will not be the nationals of the big powers who will suffer the consequences of war, it will be the innocent people, the common man in the battle ground.

113

Interview Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban.² [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, June 17, 1967

Q. Mr. Eban, you said we will not waste the achievements of the military victory. Will we propose a positive plan for security and peace?

A. I think it is still too early to determine the course of our tactics [in the U.N. General Assembly], but I believe that the situation is not different in principle from the situation which existed at the Security Council. I do not think that a body of 127 states will be able to discuss the fate of various areas or detailed security arrangements.

We are convinced that there is only one useful way which would lead to an arrangement: negotiations between the sides concerned. Our timetable is as follows: 1) to strengthen the cease-fire and to prevent its infringement; 2) to prevent

¹ *Foreign Affairs Record*, 1967, p. 88.

² Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew, 0800 GMT, 17/6/1967.

a deterioration in world public opinion toward a request that we return to the former positions; and 3) negotiations between Israel and every Arab state concerned so that we can set up ties with every state, and ties of coexistence. To attain this aim it is desirable that outside elements intervene as little as possible in a matter which in the final analysis is decided by the states of the region themselves.

The U.S. stand is the result of various factors, including the consultation and close contacts we had with the United States during the last week in May. Had it not been for that effort, we might have faced today the same situation we experienced on 8 November 1956, when the U.S. President and the Soviet Premier jointly asked, or at least asked in an identical manner, the Israeli Premier for a pledge of withdrawal. They received the pledge on the same day. Throughout this crisis, before and after the fighting, this memory was before my eyes. My main aim was and still is to prevent the formation of a Soviet-American front at the expense of the vital interests of the state.

114

Address by U.S. President Johnson on American Policy towards the Middle East.¹ **[Excerpt]**

Washington, June 19, 1967

Now, finally, let me turn to the Middle East—and to the tumultuous events of the past months. Those events have proved the wisdom of five great principles of peace in the region.

The first and greatest principle is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live and to have this right respected by its neighbors.

For the people of the Middle East the path to hope does not lie in threats to end the life of

any nation. Such threats have become a burden to the peace, not only of that region but a burden to the peace of the entire world.

In the same way, no nation would be true to the United Nations Charter or to its own true interests if it should permit military success to blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights and its neighbors have interests of their own. Each nation, therefore, must accept the right of others to live.

This last month, I think, shows us another basic requirement for settlement. It is a human requirement: justice for the refugees.

A new conflict has brought new homelessness. The nations of the Middle East must at last address themselves to the plight of those who have been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides have resisted the best efforts of outside mediators to restore the victims of conflict to their homes or to find them other proper places to live and work. There will be no peace for any party in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

A third lesson from this last month is that maritime rights must be respected. Our nation has long been committed to free maritime passage through international waterways; and we, along with other nations, were taking the necessary steps to implement this principle when hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, I think it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.

Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area but upon the larger states outside the area. We believe that scarce resources could be used much better for technical and economic development. We have always opposed this arms race, and our own military shipments to the area have consequently been severely limited.

Now the waste and futility of the arms race must be apparent to all the peoples of the world. And now there is another moment of choice. The United States of America, for its part, will

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 10/7/1967, pp. 31-34. The address was delivered before a Department of State foreign policy conference for educators.

use every resource of diplomacy and every counsel of reason and prudence to try to find a better course.

As a beginning, I should like to propose that the United Nations immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of all military arms into this area and to keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe.

Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area. We reaffirmed that principle at the height of this crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of all. This principle can be effective in the Middle East only on the basis of peace between the parties. The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war. Further, there just must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.

These five principles are not new, but we do think they are fundamental. Taken together, they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace. We believe there must be progress toward all of them if there is to be progress toward any.

There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. As our distinguished and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has already said, this is not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities.

Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but there must also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political independence and territorial integrity.

But who will make this peace where all others have failed for 20 years or more?

Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together.

But we must still ask, Who can help them? Some say it should be the United Nations; some call for the use of other parties. We have been first in our support of effective peacekeeping in the United Nations, and we also recognize the great values to come from mediation.

We are ready this morning to see any method tried, and we believe that none should be excluded altogether. Perhaps all of them will be useful and all will be needed.

I issue an appeal to all to adopt no rigid view on these matters. I offer assurance to all that this Government of ours, the Government of the United States, will do its part for peace in every forum, at every level, at every hour.

Yet there is no escape from this fact: The main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region. What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East.

They can seek another arms race—if they have not profited from the experience of this one—if they want to. But they will seek it at a terrible cost to their own people—and to their very long neglected human needs. They can live on a diet of hate, though only at the cost of hatred in return. Or they can move toward peace with one another.

The world this morning is watching, watching for the peace of the world, because that is really what is at stake. It will look for patience and justice, it will look for humility and moral courage. It will look for signs of movement from prejudice and the emotional chaos of conflict to the gradual, slow shaping steps that lead to learning to live together and learning to help mold and shape peace in the area and in the world.

The Middle East is rich in history, rich in its people and in its resources. It has no need to live in permanent civil war. It has the power to build its own life as one of the prosperous regions of the world in which we live.

If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward the works of peace, they can count with confidence upon the friendship and the help of all the people of the United States of America.

In a climate of peace we here will do our full share to help with a solution for the refugees.

We here will do our full share in support of regional cooperation. We here will do our share—and do more—to see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is applied to the critical problem of desalting water and helping to make the deserts bloom.

Our country is committed—and we here reiterate that commitment today—to a peace that is based on five principles.

- first, the recognized right of national life;
- second, justice for the refugees;
- third, innocent maritime passage;
- fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

This is not a time for malice, but for magnanimity; not for propaganda, but for patience; not for vituperation, but for vision.

On the basis of peace we offer our help to the people of the Middle East. That land, known to every one of us since childhood as the birthplace of great religions and learning, can flourish once again in our time. We here in the United States shall do all in our power to help make make it so.

115

Joint Communiqué on Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi's Visit to Turkey, 16-21 June.¹
[Excerpt]

Ankara, June 21, 1967

In the atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship which prevailed during the talks, the two Heads of State concentrated their attention on the existing Middle East situation and [observed that] their views were identical.

The two Heads of State reiterated that in international relations they are opposed to the winning of territory and political advantage through the use of force. The two Heads of State reiterated their friendship for the Arabs and

emphasized the importance they attach to the protection of the Arabs' legitimate rights.

116

Statement by French President de Gaulle on the Middle East.²

Paris, June 21, 1967

L'esprit et le fait de la guerre s'étendent de nouveau sur le monde. Un conflit contribue à en susciter un autre.

La guerre déclenchée au Vietnam par l'intervention américaine, la destruction de vies et de biens qu'elle entraîne, la stérilité fondamentale qui en est la marque, si puissants que soient les moyens employés, et si terribles qu'en soient les effets, ne peuvent manquer de répandre le trouble, non seulement sur place, mais au loin.

De là, l'attitude de la Chine et la hâte de ses armements. De là, d'autre part, le processus psychologique et politique qui a abouti à la lutte au Moyen-Orient.

La France a pris position contre la guerre au Vietnam et contre l'intervention étrangère qui en est la cause. Elle soutient, depuis l'origine, que ce conflit ne pourrait cesser que par l'engagement que prendrait l'Amérique de retirer ses forces dans un délai déterminé.

La France a pris position contre la guerre en Orient. Certes, elle tient pour juste que chaque Etat en cause—notamment celui d'Israël—puisse vivre. Elle blâmait donc la menace de la détruire qu'avaient agitée ses voisins, et elle réservait sa position quant à l'hypothèque établie à l'encontre de cet Etat au sujet de la navigation dans le golfe d'Akaba. Mais elle condamne l'ouverture des hostilités par Israël.

Pour tenter d'éviter qu'on n'en vienne aux mains, le gouvernement français avait proposé que les quatre grandes puissances concertent leur commune opposition à l'emploi des armes. En même temps, il avait fait connaître à chacune

¹ Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 1100 GMT, 21/6/1967.

² *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st. Sem., 1967, pp. 130-31.

des deux parties qu'il donnerait tort à celle qui ouvrirait le feu la première. Aujourd'hui, elle ne tient pour acquis aucun des changements réalisés sur le terrain par l'action militaire. Mais, dès lors que la guerre s'est étendue au Moyen-Orient, la France considère qu'il n'y a aucune chance d'aboutir à un règlement pacifique dans l'actuelle situation mondiale, à moins que n'apparaisse un élément mondial nouveau. Cet élément pourrait et devrait être la fin de la guerre au Vietnam, par le terme qui serait mis à l'intervention étrangère.

Si l'occasion de rétablir la paix venait à s'offrir un jour, la France ne manquerait naturellement pas de la saisir pour ce qui la concerne. Pour qu'alors elle-même soit efficace, il est nécessaire qu'elle maintienne la position qu'elle a prise dans l'intérêt du monde tout entier.

117

Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on the Middle East.¹

Moscow, June 21, 1967

Having heard and discussed the report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, "On the Policy of the Soviet Union in Connection With the Aggression of Israel in the Near East," the plenary session of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee resolves:

to give full approval to the political policy and practical activity of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which are aimed at suppressing Israel's aggression, at supporting the U.A.R., Syria and the other Arab states that were attacked, and at averting consequences of the aggression dangerous to the cause of world peace.

Israel's aggression is the result of a plot by the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, first and foremost the U.S.A., directed against one of the detachments of the national-liberation movement, against the advanced Arab states which have embarked on the path of progressive social-economic transfor-

mations in the interests of the working people and which are pursuing an anti-imperialist policy.

In conditions when the U.S.A. is continuing its marauding war in Vietnam, Israel's aggression in the Near East represents still another link in the overall chain of policies of militant imperialist circles, which are attempting to halt the historic advance of the cause of national independence, democracy, peace and socialism.

The Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and all progressive anti-imperialist forces are on the side of the Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, for the inalienable right to decide all questions of their internal life and foreign policy themselves. The Central Committee plenary session, voicing the will of the Soviet Communists and of the entire Soviet people, resolutely condemns Israel's aggression and declares its solidarity with the peoples of the U.A.R., Syria, Algeria and the other Arab countries.

The plenary session notes that the swift, resolute and joint actions of the Soviet Union and other socialist states played an important role in the cessation of hostilities in the Near East. The position of our party and the Soviet government and their practical steps in connection with the events in the Near East received the full support of the entire Soviet people.

The Central Committee plenary session states with satisfaction that the fraternal socialist states that signed the Statement of June 9, 1967,² acted together, shoulder to shoulder, at a crucial moment in the development of international events. It was confirmed once again that the joint action of socialist countries is a potent factor in the struggle against the aggressive schemes of international imperialism.

The Central Committee plenary session gives full approval to the June 9 Statement of the Communist and Workers' Parties and Governments of the Socialist Countries and confirms that the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, will do everything necessary to help the peoples of the Arab countries deal a resolute rebuff to the aggressor, to protect their legitimate rights, to extinguish the hotbed of war in the Near East and to restore peace in this area.

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 12/7/1967, pp. 11 & 19. From *Pravda*.

² See *ante*, doc. 89.

At the present moment, when the forces of imperialism and neocolonialism, exploiting the situation in the Near East created by Israel's aggression, are violating the independence and territorial integrity of the Arab states, the most important task is to prevent the aggressor from capitalizing on the results of his treacherous acts and to achieve the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the interventionists' troops from the occupied territories to behind the armistice line and compensation for the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan.

In accordance with the basic goals of our party's policy, defined by the 23rd C.P.S.U. Congress and confirmed by the December, 1966, Central Committee plenary session, it is imperative to continue the struggle against the militant forces of imperialism and their policy of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and to continue the line of supporting the Arab states in their struggle for freedom, independence, territorial integrity and social progress.

It is also imperative in the future to strengthen the friendship and solidarity between the Soviet Union and the Arab states, to deal a resolute rebuff to the schemes of imperialism, to expose its true, antipopular nature and to wage a struggle against the slanderous campaign and splitting activities of Mao Tse-tung's group, which are aimed at dividing the anti-imperialist forces and undermining the trust between the peoples of the Arab states and the peoples of the socialist states.

The Central Committee plenary session holds that the events in the Near East emphasize with fresh force the necessity of united action by Communist and Worker's Parties, the International Worker's movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, by all peace loving and progressive forces, by everyone who holds dear the cause of freedom and independence of peoples and the cause of the struggle for world peace.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, implementing the decisions of the 23rd. Congress, will continue to wage a steadfast struggle against imperialism, to support the high vigilance of the Soviet people, to pursue consistently the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems and to perform its international duty, rendering all around assistance to

peoples fighting for their freedom and national independence, for social progress. The joint actions of the forces, democracy and socialism and of the national liberation movement are capable of curbing the aggressor and preventing a new world war.

The Plenary session of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee urges party organizations and all the working people of the Soviet Union to new labor efforts aimed at the construction of communism, at further strengthening the country's economic and defense might and to greet the glorious 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist revolution in a worthy manner.

118

Vatican's Note on Jerusalem Circulated at the United Nations by its Permanent Observer Msgr. A. Giovanetti.¹

New York, June 23, 1967

The hostilities in the Middle East have reopened a series of problems which will have to be faced in the immediate future and in which the Holy See is greatly interested, particularly the question of Jerusalem.

The resolution of 29 November 1947 adopted by the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine called inter alia for the creation of a "corpus separatum" comprising the city of Jerusalem and its immediate environs, which was to be placed under a special international regime.

The following year, the General Assembly resolution adopted on 11 December 1948 instructed the U.N. Conciliation Commission on Palestine "to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area."

Instead of a regime for an internationalized Jerusalem area, the draft "instrument" prepared by the commission provided for international supervision of and free access to the holy places.

The General Assembly, however, did not adopt this proposal. Instead in its resolution of

¹ *New York Times*, 24/6/1967.

9 December 1949 it affirmed that the fundamental principles of the 29 November 1947 resolution constituted "a just and equitable settlement" of the question.

It restated that the city of Jerusalem should be established as a "corpus separatum" under a special international regime and requested the Trusteeship Council—which was to administer the area for the U.N.—to "complete the preparation of the statute of Jerusalem."

The aforementioned resolutions were subsequently re-confirmed by a large majority of the members of the United Nations although their implementation was never achieved.

Jerusalem remained divided between Jordan and Israel along the armistice line drawn after the 1947-48 conflict. It should be noted that this was merely an armistice and not peace. The demarcation line was not a frontier but marked the point at which the belligerents stood when the cease-fire went into effect.

The Holy See never modified, much less retreated from, the stand it took when the discussions took place at the U.N. in the years 1947-49.

The Holy See remains therefore convinced that the only solution which offers a sufficient guarantee for the protection of Jerusalem and of its holy places is to place that city and its vicinity under an international regime. Only such a regime can properly safeguard the rights of the various religious faiths interested in the safety of and free access to the holy places.

It is appropriate here to specify that the term "internationalization" in its proper sense means a separate territory, a "corpus separatum" subject to an international regime.

The same term "internationalization" is sometimes used in a different sense, giving rise to ambiguity and misunderstanding.

Thus during the discussion in the United Nations in the years 1947-1950, all admitted the advisability of establishing some form of international control over the holy places, which are to be found in Palestine outside Jerusalem, in order to guarantee the conservation of the shrines, the normal performance of all the events which according to the "status quo" take place therein and finally to safeguard free access to them.

The international control would mean only a function of protection and of international supervision of the Holy places, not their "internationalization" in the proper sense. Such international protection and supervision is necessary and would be sufficient for the holy places outside of Jerusalem.

But the case of this city is different. In Jerusalem the holy places are so numerous throughout the city that it is not possible to separate the two questions, namely, that of Jerusalem and that of the holy places.

Only an international regime would have the authority and sufficient power to prevent incidents and above all to provide for the maintenance of and free access to holy places, which constitute a cultural and religious heritage of many faiths.

119

Report to the Nation by U.S. President Johnson on his Talks with Soviet Premier Kosygin at Glassboro.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, June 25, 1967

On my return tonight to the White House after 2 days of talks at Hollybush, I want to make this brief report to the American people.

We continued our discussions today in the same spirit in which we began them on Friday—a spirit of direct face-to-face exchanges between leaders with very heavy responsibilities.

We wanted to meet again because the issues before us are so large and so difficult that one meeting together was not nearly enough. The two meetings have been better than one, and at least we learned—I know I did—from each hour of our talks.

You will not be surprised to know that these two meetings have not solved all of our problems. On some, we have made progress—great progress in reducing misunderstanding, I think, and in reaffirming our common commitment to seek agreement.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 10/7/1967, p. 37.

I think we made that kind of progress, for example, on the question of arms limitation. We have agreed this afternoon that Secretary of State Rusk and Mr. Gromyko will pursue this subject further in New York in the days ahead.

I must report that no agreement is readily in sight on the Middle Eastern crisis and that our well-known differences over Viet-Nam continue. Yet even on these issues, I was very glad to hear the Chairman's views face to face and to have a chance to tell him directly and in detail just what our purposes and our policies are—and are not—in these particular areas.

The Chairman, I believe, made a similar effort with me.

When nations have deeply different positions, as we do on these issues, they do not come to agreement merely by improving their understanding of each other's views. But such improvement helps. Sometimes in such discussions you can find elements—beginnings—hopeful fractions—of common ground, even within a general disagreement.

It was so in the Middle East 2 weeks ago when we agreed on the need for a prompt ceasefire. And it is so today in respect to such simple propositions as that every state has a right to live, that there should be an end to the war in the Middle East, and that in the right circumstances there should be withdrawal of troops. This is a long way from agreement, but it is a long way also from total difference.

120

Statement by Soviet Premier Kosygin on his Talks with U.S. President Johnson at Glassboro.¹ [Excerpt]

New York, June 25, 1967

On June 25 a second meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kosygin, and President Johnson of the United States, was held in the town of

Glassboro, not far from New York. At the second meeting, as at the first, which took place on June 23, the exchange of views touched upon several international problems.

In connection with the situation in the Middle East, the two sides set forth their respective positions. It was stated on the Soviet side that the main thing now is to achieve the prompt withdrawal behind the armistice lines of the forces of Israel, which has committed aggression against the Arab states. This question is of signal importance for the restoration of peace in the Middle East, and it is in the center of the attention of the emergency special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and it must be positively resolved without delay.

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121

News Conference Statements by U.S.S.R. Premier Kosygin at the United Nations on Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East.² [Excerpts]

New York, June 25, 1967

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We came to New York to take part in the emergency special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was convened on the initiative of the Soviet Union. We called for this session in connection with the complicated situation in the Middle East. You all know that the Soviet Union took several steps to try and prevent aggression in the Middle East area. But these efforts on our part were not crowned with success and war did break out, a war caused by the aggression unleashed by Israel.

We believe that the United Nations, and indeed all the peoples and states of the world, should do all they can to prevent war from again breaking out in the Middle East and acquiring an even greater scope. You know that after the aggression was perpetrated, the Security Council took several measures to bring about an immediate

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

² Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1345 GMT, 26/6/1967.

cease-fire, and we for our part also tried to take steps to bring about a cease-fire between Israel and the Arab states.

Now the fighting has ended but the aggressor—Israel, has seized considerable portions of territory belonging to the U.A.R., to Syria, and to Jordan, and at present the troops of the opposing sides confront each other. Naturally, that gives rise to the possibility that the war could be resumed at any moment if the consequences of Israel's aggression are not liquidated. Therefore, as we see it, the prime objective and the most important aim are the condemnation of the aggressor and the bringing about of the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor's forces behind the armistice lines. Without the withdrawal of troops behind the armistice lines the world can never be sure that the war will not be resumed.

In the past several days here in New York we have been endeavoring to gain a clearer understanding of the views of the Arab states as to the way in which the solution of the problems of the Middle East could be approached. And the conversations and meetings which we have had here with the representatives of almost all the Arab nations attest to one thing: and that is that in order to begin the consideration of a possible peaceful solution of all the problems of the Middle East it is necessary as a first step to achieve the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines. All other solutions that are proposed by certain groups or certain countries aimed at considering the whole package of questions relating to the Middle East are unrealistic. They do not meet the task of preventing a resumption of hostilities in that area. I repeat that the withdrawal of forces is the only possible solution; it is now the main, central question.

Q. [representative of Press Trust of India] Mr. Chairman, you have had two long meetings with President Johnson. How do you assess the outcome of those talks in the context of war and peace in the Middle East and Vietnam?

A. In regard to the Middle East situation we did not reach agreement with President Johnson on the main question—the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops. The president believes that it is necessary to consider the entire complex of

questions relating to the situation in the Middle East and we believe that it is essential first and foremost to bring about an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces. That, we feel, is the prime objective today. As regards our further efforts and activities, we did agree that the foreign ministers of our two countries would remain in contact with each other during the work of the emergency session of the General Assembly for a further exchange of views on the question of the situation in the Middle East.

Q. [Pravda and Izvestiya correspondents] How do you evaluate the work of the U.N. General Assembly during its first week?

Q. [Reuters Correspondent] In the light of your meetings with Mr. Johnson, how do you envisage actions now by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council on the Middle East problem?

A. We feel that the results of this first week of the work of the assembly have been positive, and that this past week has shown that the majority of speakers have condemned the aggression of Israel and called for the withdrawal of troops behind the armistice line.

This confirms our view that the United Nations is duty bound to adopt decisions favoring the withdrawal of Israeli troops, because further procrastination in carrying out that step can only increase the risk of war breaking out again. We feel that all states which really want stable peace to be established in the Middle East should vote for the immediate withdrawal of forces. We believe that if the General Assembly decides in favor of the withdrawal of forces, every state, large or small, should comply with that decision.

Q. [Associated Press correspondent] Do you think it is possible and desirable to have international agreements among the major powers and other countries limiting arms shipments to the Middle East, guaranteeing the existence of all states of this area, and insuring freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal?

A. As regards the limitation of arms shipments to the Middle East countries, this question, as well as questions of guaranteeing the rights and freedom of shipping, cannot be solved before the

withdrawal of troops of the aggressor. It is first necessary to insure a withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice line and it will then be possible to consider those questions which demand their solution in the interests of strengthening peace in the Middle East.

Q. [Moscow Radio and Television correspondent]

What ways do you see at the present time to overcome the international tension which evidently becomes bigger at the present time as a result of actions of imperialist forces?

A. I think that one of such steps that would improve the international situation would be the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a decision on the condemnation of Israel's aggression against Arab countries, on the immediate withdrawal of Israel's troops behind the armistice line, and on Israel's punishment by making it pay compensation for the damage that it caused the Arab states as a result of war. Such a decision would considerably improve the situation and would be a serious warning to anyone else who might contemplate an aggression in the future. . .

Q. [Cairo newspaper al-Ahram correspondent]

what are the chances of implementing the principles outlined in your speech before the U.N. General Assembly in connection with Israel's aggression?

A. I believe that these principles, which I set forth in the General Assembly, are quite realistic, and if the General Assembly should adopt a decision along this line it would make a considerable contribution to the reestablishment of peace in the Middle East. Naturally, the Security Council would have to supervise its practical implementation. If that decision were not complied with by anyone, then the appropriate sanctions could be applied through the Security Council.

Q. [correspondent of the French newspaper *Le Monde* and the Israeli newspaper *Maariv*] *According to reports from various sources, large quantities of Soviet weapons, including planes and tanks, are now being sent by the Soviet Union to the U.A.R. and Syria to replace the arms lost in the recent fighting. Do you consider that this better facilitates the stabilization of the situation*

in the Middle East than the embargo on arms shipments to the area imposed, as stated by their governments, by France and Britain?

A. This is a question between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union. The main question should now be solved to restore peace in the Middle East—the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice line. This is the best means now to liquidate the aftermath of the aggression. It is impossible to consider any other question until this is done.

Q. [International Radio Service correspondent]

In the light of your direct talks with President Johnson, do you advocate similar direct contacts and talks between Israel and the neighboring Arab states?

A. This question concerns the Arab states and they will answer it.

Q. [Saut al-'Arab correspondent] *Will your meeting with President Johnson lead to any change in your relations with the Arab world?*

A. During our talks with President Johnson we did not discuss our relations with the Arab world at all. This is a concern of the Soviet Union and the Arab states. We have very good relations with the Arab world. The Soviet Union has the trust of the Arabs and Arab states, while Arab states have the trust of the Soviet peoples. We will consolidate this trust further.

122

Speech of Turkish President Sunay in the Course of a Visit to France.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, June 27, 1967

The armed conflict that recently shook the Middle East has shown once more how precarious are the bases on which peace rests and how easily we can find ourselves, all of a sudden, on the edge of the abyss of a fatal conflagration.

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st. Sem., 1967, p. 136.

All countries, whatever their power and responsibilities, have, in these circumstances, the imperative duty of contributing to the restoration of peace with justice, and creating the conditions that will facilitate the solution of the conflicts in such a manner as to safeguard the legitimate interests of those concerned. We know that this is the aim of France, and we are gratified. As for Turkey, its policy is inspired by similar considerations and preoccupations, inasmuch as the peace, security and welfare of the Middle East are of direct concern to it and it shares deep affinities with its neighbours in this area.

123

Statement Issued by the White House Reiterating the U.S. Position on the Status of Jerusalem.¹

Washington, June 28, 1967

The President said on June 19 that in our view "there...must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem." On this principle he assumes that before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned. Jerusalem is holy to Christians, to Jews, and to Moslems. It is one of the great continuing tragedies of history that a city which is so much the center of man's highest values has also been, over and over, a center of conflict. Repeatedly the passionate beliefs of one element have led to exclusion or unfairness for others. It has been so, unfortunately, in the last 20 years. Men of all religions will agree that we must now do better. The world must find an answer that is fair and recognized to be fair. That could not be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the President is confident that the wisdom and good judgment of those now in control of Jerusalem will prevent any such action.

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 17/7/1967, p. 60.

124

Statement Issued by the U.S. Department of State Denouncing Israel's Unilateral Actions Regarding the Status of Jerusalem.²

Washington, June 28, 1967

The hasty administrative action taken today³ cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.

The United States has never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem.

The policy of the United States will be governed by the President's statement of June 19 and the White House statement this morning.

The views of the United States have been made clear repeatedly to representatives of all governments concerned.

125

Joint Communiqué on Turkish President Sunay's Visit to France, 27-30 June.⁴

[Excerpt]

Paris, June 30, 1967

Les deux gouvernements ont des préoccupations analogues en ce qui concerne la situation dans le Moyen-Orient. Ils déplorent l'aggravation que la guerre a fait subir aux problèmes qui se posent entre Israël et les pays arabes.

Ils considèrent que les occupations de territoires qui résultent des opérations militaires ont créé une situation de fait qui ne peut être

² *Ibid.*

³ On June 27, the Israeli Parliament approved three bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdiction, and public administration over the Old City of Jerusalem and other territory of the former mandate of Palestine which has been under the control of Jordan since the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. On June 28, the Government of Israel took administrative action under the new legislation to extend its municipal services and controls over the entire city of Jerusalem. [Footnote in source text].

⁴ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 1st Sem., 1967, p. 137.

tenue pour acquise. Seul un règlement librement accepté pourrait un jour résoudre l'ensemble des problèmes qui se posent.

126

Broadcast to the Nation by Pakistani President Ayub Khan.¹ [Excerpt]

Rawalpindi, July 1, 1967

Last month, Israel attacked the Arab countries and a serious situation developed in the Middle East.

The tragic and heart-rending events that followed are too painful even to recall.

I am fully aware of your sentiments on this agonising episode. I assure you that at this critical time, your Government will fully co-operate with the Arabs and give them all support at every stage.

The activities of Israel have been a source of constant danger to peace. During the last two decades, it has committed aggression thrice and about 2.5 million Arabs of Palestine have so far been evicted from their ancestral homes. It continues in its illegal occupation of the Holy City of Jerusalem and is inflicting inhuman atrocities on its inhabitants.

When Israel committed aggression, I sent a message to all Heads of the Arab States expressing your sentiments. I assured them of the full political, moral and material support of Pakistan. After the ceasefire, I made an appeal to leaders of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and France to use their influence . . . in order to set right the situation in the Middle East so as to ensure that it does not deteriorate beyond repair.

It is the duty of all the Big Powers to compel Israel to vacate the occupied area immediately and withdraw to the old frontiers.

What has happened in the Middle East is for all of us a great tragedy. But such calamities

do afflict nations.

The noble-hearted people of Pakistan have been touched much by the sufferings of our Arab brethren. I made an appeal on behalf of the Government that the people should contribute, according to their means, towards funds being raised for help to the Arabs. It is very satisfying indeed that enough money and goods have already been collected and contacts are now being made with the Arab countries in order to despatch the relief goods.

127

Conclusions from the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the Middle East.²

Belgrade, July 7, 1967

1. The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia unanimously lends its support to the positions assumed and action undertaken by this country relative to the aggression against the United Arab Republic and other Arab states. At the same time, the Central Committee gives its full approval to the conclusions adopted and the activities pursued by the Presidency and Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on the occasion of the Near East crisis, the Declaration made by President Tito in connection with the aggression, the intensive activities undertaken by Yugoslavia in the international sphere, in collaboration with the U.A.R., India, Algeria and other non-aligned, socialist and other countries and in the United Nations; it also fully approves the measures and steps taken by the Federal Assembly, the Federal Executive Council

² *Review of International Affairs*, 5-20/7/1967, pp. 29-31.

Certain problems concerning the international situation were among the matters considered at the seventh session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. After a lengthy discussion, in which President Josip Broz Tito was the first to take the floor, the Central Committee adopted the above conclusions relevant to the Middle East.

¹ Pakistani Embassy, Beirut.

and all other organizations and institutions in Yugoslavia. The working people of this socialist community have offered united and determined support to these positions and steps, reflected among other things in the mass nation-wide demonstration of solidarity with the Arab nations and countries.

The talks held and conclusions reached by representatives of socialist countries and Communist parties in Moscow have had a positive influence on developments in the Near East. Determined support for the Arab countries, condemnation of Israel's aggression and demands for urgent and decisive help and support by the socialist countries and progressive forces in the world for the purpose of preventing further aggression and eliminating its consequences were attended by concrete efforts to implement comprehensive assistance.

President Tito's participation in the Moscow meeting reflects the principled positions of this country's foreign policy and its implementation in the present situation, as well as the need for cooperation among socialist, non-aligned and other peace-minded countries and all progressive and democratic forces in the world in resisting aggressive imperialist actions. Such broad-based cooperation is the most effective means of action against the policy of aggressive pressure and the use of force.

6. The aggression against the Arab countries has reaffirmed that the struggle for assertion of the policy of peaceful coexistence and non-alignment is not and cannot be a policy of reconciliation with imperialist violence but rather the chief and most successful form of action against imperialism and violence against nations, and for the independence and equality of nations large and small.

The significance and role of the policy of non-alignment and active peaceful coexistence have made the emerging countries and non-aligned states the chief target of attack by imperialist circles throughout the world, and particularly by U.S. imperialism.

A growing number of countries, movements and people in the world are grasping the fact that the policy of peaceful coexistence alone can surmount the state of affairs in which peace is

constantly hanging in the balance, and render possible the successful solution of outstanding international problems.

After strong pressure had been brought to bear on certain emerging countries, especially those which had won their independence only recently, some non-aligned states showed a tendency to stagnate in their activities along these lines. It has been demonstrated in this dangerous emergency, however, that the non-aligned countries in the United Nations are determinedly opposed to aggression and that they are pursuing with full responsibility the struggle against the policy of force. They have therefore reasserted themselves as a powerful political factor in the United Nations and in international relations generally.

This indicates that aggressive imperialist plans are running up against mounting pressure from all progressive peoples and forces in the world. This has been confirmed by the unity of the masses of the people in the Arab countries at a moment of serious crisis when they were faced with enemy military forces on their territory, and by the readiness of those people to defend their independence and the achievements of their progressive development.

In fighting imperialism and hegemony, and in struggling for independence and equality among nations, we must be aware of the growing expansion of the joint interests binding together the nations of the contemporary world. Activities directed toward rapprochement and democratic cooperation, and toward the joint solution of the problems besetting the present-day world are therefore a component part of the struggle against imperialism and all forms of violence against peoples.

Intensification of the tendency to consolidate independence and gradually transcend the bloc divisions in the world, attended by simultaneous expansion of international cooperation, is causing the maneuvering space of the most reactionary imperialist forces to dwindle.

The uncritical attitude toward Israeli aggression or the direct support extended to it by certain leaders and leading groups in socialist parties is increasingly being shown up as untenable in view of the fact that the aggressiveness and danger inherent in Israeli policy at present are becoming

clearer as time goes on. In the interests of peace and social progress, relations and cooperation with these forces must continue to be developed, all the more so as it is to be expected that further developments will lead to an evolution in their positions on the Near East crisis.

Possibilities, and awareness of the need, for taking joint action and activating to the maximum all forces in the world willing to strive for peace, security, independence of nations and social progress, have waxed rather than waned. Circumstances confirm the significance of action by progressive forces and socialist countries in a joint front with the non-aligned countries for the purpose of strengthening national independence and the equality of emerging countries, which also makes the greatest possible contribution to the further assertion of the most progressive strivings and aspirations of numerous countries and peoples throughout the world.

7. Socialist Yugoslavia, and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, consistent with their international policy, will exert the greatest possible efforts to make a full contribution in the new circumstances to increasing the possibilities for affirmation of the policy of non-alignment and active peaceful coexistence.

The Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia stresses the importance of taking all the indispensable measures to implement with consistency the positions adopted by the Central Committee, the decisions of government bodies and political organizations in the country relevant to support and assistance for the struggle of the Arab countries to preserve their independence and national integrity.

In this respect, the Central Committee attributes particular importance to the further development of all inter-state relations, and of the international relations of our community generally and to activities by socio-political organizations.

128

Address by Soviet Premier Kosygin at a Dinner in Honor of French Premier Pompidou.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, July 3, 1967

Two days ago we had an exchange of opinions with the president of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, in Paris, and we are deeply satisfied with this exchange. It showed that our positions are close to each other on the main thing: namely the need to restore conditions of peace in the Middle East, liquidate the consequences of Israel's attack on the Arab States, and exert every effort to liquidate hotbeds of aggression in other parts of the world. We hold that the Soviet Union and France have good possibilities for further cooperation in promoting a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

129

Foreign Policy Statement in Parliament by the Information and Tourism Minister of Tanzania.² [Excerpts]

Dar es Salaam, July 3, 1967

...Our position [on the Middle East] has been widely misunderstood. The United Republic of Tanzania recognizes the state of Israel and recognizes its right to exist as a sovereign entity. Nothing that has happened or that has been said in the past few weeks affects that position. Tanzania wishes to live in a state of friendship with Israel...

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 was an act of aggression against the Arab people. The only reason why the world community stilled its conscience and accepted that original

¹ Moscow TASS International Service in English, 1940 GMT, 3/7/1967.

² Dar es Salaam Tanzania Domestic Service in English, 1810 GMT, 3/7/1967.

act of aggression against the Arab people was the enormity and the inhumanity of Europe and Christianity toward the Jewish people. It was the long history of Jewish suffering and oppression up to the horrors of Hitler's gas chambers that left the world no choice but to accept the state of Israel against natural and understandable Arab protests. The world would never have accepted this dispossession of the Arabs if Arab land had been taken in order to settle Britons, Chinese, or Ibos.

I repeat, therefore, that because of that history of the Jews, Tanzania did recognize and does recognize the state of Israel. Because of that history, and only because of that history, we have already appealed to the Arab people to live in peace with their Jewish neighbors. Even now, we still make this appeal to the Arab people.

But we cannot proceed from this to excuse every act of aggression by Israel against the Arab states. We condemn the aggression of 1956 and we condemn the recent aggression. Jewish history unhappily ought to have made Israel a natural ally of all people who are struggling to free themselves from oppression, exploitation, and humiliation. Israel should never glory in the humiliation of the humiliated.

It is both understandable and highly desirable that the former prosecutors of the Jews should now cooperate with Israel in repairing the damage of anti-Semitism. But it is a terrible irony of history for Israel to cooperate with those persecutors in hoisting the crime onto the shoulders of Moslems and Arabs...

130

Speech of Soviet Communist Party Secretary General Brezhnev at the Graduation Ceremony of the Military Academy.¹

[Excerpts]

Moscow, July 5, 1967

Imperialism, however, has no desire to leave the historical scene voluntarily. It tries to strike blows at individual detachments of world socialism and the national-liberation struggle. This is shown, in particular, by the events in the Near East, where the Israeli rulers, in the service of the Western imperialists, and egged on by the latter, attacked one of the big detachments of the national-liberation movement—the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab countries.

The Near East is one of the major areas of the national-liberation movement. The leading Arab states—the U.A.R., Syria and Algeria—have chosen the noncapitalist path of development. Progressive Arab states pursue an anti-imperialist course in their foreign policy.

International imperialism, and American and British imperialism above all, does not want to reconcile itself to all this. For many decades the imperialists regarded this region as their domain, they were used to deciding in their own arbitrary way the destinies of the peoples living there.

The interests of the oil monopolies, which extract huge profits from the Near East and are the main suppliers of crude oil and fuel to the NATO countries, are also of considerable importance for the imperialist circles. The Near East holds 60% of the world's oil resources. The Arab countries account for some 50% of the world's oil trade. This region supplied almost 1,000,000 tons of oil a day to Western Europe. The earnings of American monopolies from Arab oil exceed \$ 1,200,000,000 a year, and those of the British monopolies \$ 600,000,000 a year. Capital investments of these monopolies here are repaid in approximately a year and a half, as compared with ten years in the United States itself.

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 26/7/1967, pp. 4-5. From Pravda.

As for the chief cause of Israel's anti-Arab aggression, this was the desire of the American and British imperialists to strike a blow at the national-liberation movement in the Near East, to halt at any cost the movement of peoples along the path of social progress, to restore to bondage countries that had won freedom and independence at so dear a price, and rob them of their wealth. Imperialist propaganda efforts to depict this aggression as supposedly the result only of Israeli-Arab national strife are aimed at concealing the true causes, at camouflaging the class meaning of the events. The essence of the Near East crisis lies in the conflict between the forces of imperialism and the forces of national independence, democracy and social progress.

The Soviet Union sees its task as one of frustrating imperialism's designs in the Near East and helping the Arab states to defend their freedom and independence. We have long-standing relations of sincere friendship and cooperation with many Arab countries—as with other countries that have thrown off the colonial yoke and are now developing along the path of progress.

In the very first days of the Israeli aggression, the Soviet Union, in close unity with other socialist states and in constant contact with the Arab countries, took energetic measures to stay the aggressor, protect the lawful interests of the Arab peoples, terminate the armed conflict and prevent it from increasing to proportions endangering all of mankind.

Looking back today, we can say confidently that our actions in the critical days of the Near East crisis were right.

Now that hostilities have ceased, it is first of all imperative that the aggressor withdraw his troops from all the territory he has seized. The aggressor must not be permitted to benefit by his perfidious attack, the aggression must not go unpunished.

The situation in the Near East continues tense, and everything must be done to prevent the embers of war from flaming up again. The Israeli government, relying on the support of its patrons, the U.S.A., Britain and West Germany, is presenting an insolent challenge to the peace-loving states. The acts of Israel's unbridled rulers on occupied territory of the Arab states deserve the most resolute censure.

The aggressors conduct themselves here as the most arrant brigands. In their atrocities upon the peaceful Arab population they apparently are trying to copy the crimes of the Hitlerite aggressors.

Now too, at the new political stage of the struggle against aggression, the struggle to eliminate its consequences, we are giving every support to the Arab peoples. As you know, at the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was called on the initiative of the Soviet Union, A. N. Kosygin, the head of the Soviet government, and the heads of government of several socialist countries present at the Assembly, as well as the representatives of many other states of the world, condemned Israeli aggression and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the aggressor's troops behind the truce line. The aggressive role played by Israel and those who stood behind her back was conclusively demonstrated and exposed at the session.

We want to emphasize once again that the aggressor must clear out of alien territory and compensate the peoples of the U.A.R., Jordan and Syria for the damage done them. Justice demands this. The Soviet people and honest men and women the world over demand this.

The Soviet Union is firmly and resolutely supporting the Arab states in their struggle for freedom and territorial integrity and giving them comprehensive assistance. Recently, as you know, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, made friendly state visits to Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad. We attach great importance to these visits and to the frank and friendly exchange of views with President Nasser, President Atassi and President Arif, as well as other leading figures of the Arab countries.

The exchange of opinions undoubtedly will promote the further strengthening of our relations and the coordination of joint actions in the political struggle for the defense of the rights and interests of the U.A.R., Syria and the other Arab countries.

In unleashing the conflict in the Near East, the imperialists aimed the main blow against the countries which have taken the noncapitalist path of development and strove first of all for overthrow of progressive regimes. However, they did not

achieve their goal.

From this platform we want to tell our Arab friends: Soviet people understand very well that you are now going through a difficult time. But in a struggle of liberation—the history of every people testifies to this—there are not only victories, but also temporary failures. These failures cannot break a nation which has firmly embarked on the road of freedom and independence, they merely strengthen its determination in the struggle.

The events in the Near East have shown once again how treacherous imperialism is and how important it is to defend well the gains achieved in the course of the national-liberation struggle. The cause of national and social liberation is a just cause, and for its sake it is necessary to strengthen in every way the newly free states, their defense capacity, their unity; it is necessary to be always ready to rebuff imperialism's aggressive intrigues.

We express the firm conviction that the just cause of the Arab peoples, who have risen to the struggle for national independence and social progress, will triumph. We are confident that the revolutionary forces of the Arab world will draw all the proper conclusions from the events that have taken place. In the struggle against aggression the Arab peoples are strengthening their unity.

The imperialists have now put their propaganda machine to work at full capacity; they are pouring forth streams of falsehood and calumny in the attempt to weaken and isolate the Arab countries, introduce dissent among them, and drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The imperialists want most of all to undermine the friendship of the Arab peoples with our Soviet country.

Our Arab friends well understand the meaning of this venomous propaganda. They realize that in the present situation it is particularly important to strengthen the united front between the Arab peoples and the peoples of the socialist countries.

In talks with Soviet representatives, Nasser, Atassi, Zuayyin, Boumedienne, Arif and other leaders of the friendly Arab countries have emphasized that the peoples of these countries see what kind of support the Soviet state has been and is giving them and that the Arabs will firmly safe-

guard the friendship with the Soviet Union from any kind of encroachments.

Friendship and alliance with the progressive forces of the national-liberation movement are the unshakable course of the Soviet foreign policy set long ago by V. I. Lenin. We shall continue to pursue this course consistently and firmly.

Comrades!

You know that at the period of the Near Eastern crisis, at its very peak, a conference of first secretaries of the Central Committees of the fraternal parties and of heads of government of the European socialist countries took place in Moscow. The fraternal countries, which signed a joint declaration on the events in the Near East, came forth in a united front and demonstrated their will and readiness to act together at a difficult moment, working shoulder to shoulder for our common goals, for our ideals.

The Moscow Declaration of the socialist countries played a big role in terminating the war in the Near East. This act gave tremendous moral and political support to our Arab friends and had a sobering effect on the aggressor and his backers.

The unity of the countries of socialism is, as life shows, a great force. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union will always fight tirelessly to strengthen this unity.

The June plenary session of the Party Central Committee, having discussed the latest events in the Near East, emphasized that it was necessary to continue waging a struggle against the aggressive forces of imperialism and their policy of interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

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West German militarism and revanchism, on which international imperialism places its main stake here, persistently oppose the guaranteeing of collective security in Europe. The aggressive essence of the policy of West Germany's ruling circles most clearly showed itself once again at the height of the Near Eastern crisis.

The F.R.G. made no small "contribution" to Israel's preparation for military ventures and, during the Near East conflict itself, the F.R.G.

took the side of the Israeli military indeed. Aggression in the Near East met with the full sympathy of the militarist ruling circles of West Germany, which have their eyes on foreign lands and to this day cannot bring themselves to part with the dream of swallowing the German working people's state, the German Democratic Republic.

131

Statement by British Foreign Minister Thomson in the Course of a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East Crisis.¹

[Excerpt]

London, July 6, 1967

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Thomson): The House has had many opportunities during the last few weeks to discuss both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the problem of South Arabia. The advantage of the debate which the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has just opened is that it enables us to discuss the problems of the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli conflict, South Arabia, and other aspects of the Middle East—as a whole. One of the useful features of this is that it enables us to remind ourselves that, while we may be preoccupied with the Arab-Israeli conflict, our main interests in the Middle East and our most direct responsibilities there lie elsewhere than at the northern end of the Red Sea.

The countries in the Middle Eastern area are on a good deal better terms with Her Majesty's Government than would sometimes appear from the recent weeks of crisis. A breach of relations with this country always makes the headlines, whereas a decision to continue relations with us seldom counts as news. I find in the Foreign Office, as in Fleet Street, where I used to work, that the sad fact of life is that vice is news, but virtue is not.

Although our efforts to avert the war before it broke out, and to contain and limit it after

it broke out, were misunderstood and misinterpreted in the Arab world, we have been able to maintain our links with the majority of Arab Governments, and our differences with certain other Arab Governments, who have not maintained relations with us, have not been of our own making. We would like to have good relations with these countries. We wish them and their people well. We can sympathise with and try to understand their aspirations and desires for a better social order within their own countries.

We are not opposed to Arab nationalism and in so far as we have clashed with it our quarrel has been only with certain manifestations of it which seem to us to have worked in a negative and destructive way. It is also worth recalling, with the opening of this general Middle Eastern debate, that the Middle East is more than the Arab world. Our relations with Iran remain close, and we shall continue to foster them.

The main development in the Arab/Israeli conflict since my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary last reported to the House has been—blessedly—that the battle of words that has been fought at the United Nations, rather than any serious breaches of the cease-fire. There has been some fighting in the east bank of the Suez Canal, but reports do not suggest that the clashes have been on a large scale. Whatever may have been the origin, we deplore these breaches of the cease-fire and we shall give full support to the United Nations' efforts to bring them to an end.

I want to give the House a report on the United Nations debate. As the House knows, after two weeks of discussion the General Assembly has failed to agree on any general political recommendation. It has now adjourned for a week. I hope that this breathing space may be used urgently to evolve some agreed and constructive expression of the Assembly's views. Any agreement will have to result in both balanced and realistic terms. This is surely the message of the deliberations of the last two weeks in New York.

The issue was focused in two resolutions. There was a draft resolution from a group of "non-aligned" delegations, with Arab and Communist support, which went through a considerable amount of change before it came to the vote. But in the end, despite a number of amendments, it remained the case that Israel was to

¹ *Hansard's*, 6/7/1967, col. 2010-16.

withdraw immediately, while the Security Council was merely to consider action on other points without any urgency.

In effect, therefore, the resolution of the non-aligned group remained a call for unconditional withdrawal. In addition, it made no mention of other practical problems, especially the end of belligerence. Even in its amended form the draft resolution was, therefore, fundamentally lacking in balance. In particular, it was unrealistic to expect that it would achieve an Israeli withdrawal. Her Majesty's Government had, therefore, to cast their vote against it. So did 45 other delegations, including members of almost every group in the General Assembly.

The British Government voted for the other resolution, sponsored by Latin American delegations. It was not a perfect resolution, in our view. For example, it did not propose the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General, as put forward by my right hon. Friend, but it would have provided for a withdrawal from occupied territory. It would have called for a guarantee for the freedom of innocent passage through international waters, and it stated other essential principles. We warmly welcomed the reference in it to the need for a full solution of the problem of the refugees. This resolution, sponsored by the Latin Americans, in our view offered a prospect of making progress towards withdrawal and a durable peace.

Our decision on these two resolutions was taken on grounds of effectiveness. Without withdrawal there is no prospect of progress towards stability in the Middle East. Without acceptance of the territorial integrity of States—which means the dropping of any claim to belligerence—there is little hope of withdrawal. We voted for the resolution which was balanced and against the resolution which, because of what it left out, would have put the chances of success in jeopardy.

What then, is the outcome of the General Assembly debate? In the first place, the General Assembly adopted with near unanimity two resolutions—one on refugees and the other on Jerusalem—both of which we supported. The resolution on Jerusalem was passed by 99 votes, with none against and 20 abstentions. It represented, in my view, a firm international consensus against Israel's taking any unilateral action which would

prejudice the status of that city in a final settlement. It was striking endorsement of what the Foreign Secretary said on this subject at the Assembly. His remarks then were misunderstood and misinterpreted in some quarters. But, not for the first time, when the dust has settled his judgment and his instinct have been confirmed.

In the second place, the Assembly—so it seemed to me—showed a growing sense of realism during the debate. It paid scant regard to the more extreme condemnatory resolutions tabled by the Soviet Union and Albania. Speaker after speaker emphasised, as my right hon. Friend had done on 21st June, the need for balance and a practical approach. There was widespread endorsement of the British suggestions for practical action. The House may recall the three particular points made by my right hon. Friend.

First, he said that we must deal at once with the question of refugees. I shall say something in more detail about that in a moment. Secondly, he said that the Secretary-General should nominate a representative of high standing to go at once to the area to explore with all the parties the possibilities of conciliation, and then report to the Secretary-General. Thirdly, he suggested that there should be an immediate strengthening of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation which, under General Bull, has done such fine work.

My right hon. Friend, in his speech at the General Assembly, urged that the Government of Israel might permit General Bull to reoccupy Government House in Jerusalem, the headquarters from which he had been excluded during the fighting there. I am glad to report to the House that the Israeli Government have now agreed to this.

The results of the debate represented a reverse for those who called the emergency special session with the plain purpose of making destructive propaganda rather than seeking to make a positive and constructive contribution to a peaceful settlement. I would not describe what has happened as a failure for the United Nations. Rather, out of the debate and the very frustrations of the voting has come a certain pattern which all parties to the Arab-Israel conflict would do well to ponder.

It is clear that a substantial body of world

opinion does not support the attempt to condemn Israel or the unconditional call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, but, on the other hand, virtually every member of the Assembly voted for one resolution or another which called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops as well as against any action to alter the status of Jerusalem. If both sides to the conflict will draw the lesson from this, the hopes for a practical solution will be greatly improved.

Equally, there was a wide range of agreement with my right hon. Friend's view that any arrangement for Israeli withdrawal must deal with other fundamental matters in which both parties to the conflict have a legitimate interest. I would mention two. First, as rightly mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman, is the need for action—for swift action, I hope, dramatic action to safeguard the interests and welfare of the refugees. This is an immediate humanitarian problem and one whose solution is basic to any general and enduring peace settlement to the conflict.

No settlement will be possible while the million Arab refugees continue to exist in the demoralising condition of receiving international charity and it is tragic that the recent war added a new dimension to this already intractable problem by the flight across the Jordan of about 150,000 refugees, mostly destitute Arabs. Although most were in refugee camps on the west bank before, they must now be found new accommodation.

Her Majesty's Government have made urgent representations to the Israeli Government on this problem. We stressed the need not only to refrain from driving the Arab refugees out of the occupied territories on the west bank but to encourage them to stay and to allow those who had left to return. We therefore welcome the news that the Israeli Government has invited those who have left since 7th June to come back to the west bank. Behind all this, there lies the question of confidence; if the Israelis can win confidence in their intentions, a further tragic displacement may be avoided.

I would here pay tribute to the work of U.N.R.W.A. over the years to educate and clothe and feed the refugees and generally care for them. No one who, like myself, has seen its work in the camps can doubt that, without its efforts, an

admittedly tragic situation would have been an absolute catastrophe. We have made an immediate additional contribution of a half a million dollars to U.N.R.W.A. and have also given £ 500,000 to the Jordanian Government for expenditure on rehabilitation and reconstruction.

I have heard criticisms that our emergency contribution in this respect has not been adequate, but I cannot accept that. We are already the second largest contributor after the United States and have been during the whole 17 years of this United Nations agency's life. This year, we shall reach the 100 million dollar mark in our contributions. I do not want to make invidious comparisons but, while the heaviest burden is carried by the United States, it is proper to put this in perspective and mention that, apart from the United States, all the other contributor nations put together have contributed less than three-quarters of Her Majesty's Government's contribution over the years under successive Governments. The Soviet Government, which are so generous with its arms to countries in the Middle East have contributed nothing at all.

I now turn to the question of freedom for all countries in the Middle East from the pressures which have driven them to waste their scarce resources on a wholly unproductive arms race. New countries are now becoming involved in the business of supplying arms to the Middle East. Fresh consignments of Soviet arms are already arriving in Egypt and other Arab countries to replace those destroyed in the war. I do not seek to argue that, at this stage, the Soviet Government is planning to rearm Arab countries to the point at which a further conflict would become inevitable.

I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the Soviet motive at this stage is much more likely to be diplomatic than military, but the dangers inherent in a new Middle East arms race are patent to all and this fresh flow of the munitions of war underlines the need for a fresh international agreement on arms limitation. We made one effort to start something on these lines and failed. We cannot act alone. The arms race is a symptom and the disease can be cured only by a peace settlement, but we shall continue trying to bring about international agreement for the limitation of arms flowing into the Middle East.

I have outlined the principles on which we believe that a constructive settlement must be based, but how is it to be achieved? The right hon. Gentleman dealt with this point. The Israel Government have, understandably, insisted on direct negotiations with individual Arab States. This, of course, would be desirable if it were likely to happen, but we cannot be optimistic that direct contacts between Israel and her Arab neighbours are likely in the immediate future, and must, therefore, apply our minds to what other means there are of promoting progress.

In this, of course, we come back to the United Nations. Whatever the shortcomings of the organisation—we do not seek to ignore them—we believe that it can provide a framework in which a settlement can be arranged. Despite the differences which manifested themselves at the Security Council during the earlier discussions, it is still our view that the Council can play a constructive part in the phase which lies ahead. Naturally, this pre-supposes a measure of agreement among permanent members of the Council which has often been lacking in the past, but, whatever the differences in approach now, we all have a common interest in avoiding a further round of Arab-Israel fighting.

If this were to happen, it might next time carry with it even more dangerous possibilities of direct confrontation between great Powers, with the possible use of nuclear weapons by the combatants themselves, making the outcome alarming for mankind as a whole. These are the kind of stakes involved in seeking a settlement of the conflict.

132

Statement by British Foreign Secretary Brown in the Course of a Parliamentary Debate on the Middle East Crisis.¹

[Excerpt]

London, July 6, 1967

I was asked about the state of the Suez Canal. The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire said that someone had told him that it was not blocked. I do not think that there is any doubt about our information being right. It is blocked partially or wholly between Port Said and Ismailia. It is also blocked to the South of Ismailia and it is also obstructed between the Great Bitter Lake and Suez.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned proceedings in the International Court with a view to getting the canal open. I do not think that that would help very much. There are a number of complex legal arguments and that way would probably not succeed. In any case, I think that the right answer is by way of political rather than legal action. We are keeping in touch with other Governments who are concerned with the waterway as an international waterway and we are doing our best to get it opened as soon as we can. Several hon. Members have mentioned our policy of the supply of arms to the Middle East. I agree with those who have said that it is important to avoid a new arms race. For this we need agreement among the countries which are supplying arms to the Middle East. As my right hon. Friend said, new supplies of Soviet arms are already arriving in Egypt and in other countries. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about them pouring in, but I would not use those words. We think that the motives of the Russians at this stage are more likely to be diplomatic than military and we do not, therefore, despair of eventually reaching agreement in this matter.

When the fighting started, we imposed a unilateral suspension of supply and we tried to get others to follow suit. But we were unsuccessful in achieving that and we did not think that we could maintain a unilateral ban indefinitely. I do not believe that in this matter we can act

¹ *Ibid.*, col. 2121-24.

alone, for reasons which the whole House will easily take on board. Our firm intention is to work for an international agreement in this respect, and that is what we are doing.

I now turn to what I believe to be the most constructive thing to have come out of the debate. The right hon. Member for Barnet spent a great deal of time on it, I am glad to say. This is a tragic aspect of the situation, an aspect on which it is surely possible to get something done, the aspect of the refugees in the area. Like the right hon. Gentleman and others, I visited the refugee camps before the recent outbreak, and saw the plight of the refugees. It is absolutely deplorable that, nearly 20 years after they originally left their homes, more than 1 million of these people are still living on international charity. I agree wholeheartedly with the right hon. Gentleman when he said that just doling out aid was no answer to this problem.

We have now added a new dimension to this with the flight across the Jordan of 150,000 west bank Arabs. I tried hard to persuade the Israeli Government to discourage the flow and to welcome these people back. I am very glad that this has been done, and I hope that it will lead to a substantial reduction in the numbers on the other side of the river.

I agree that we really must deal with this in a much bigger and much more imaginative way. We have given a lot of money and help through U.N.R.W.A. and other ways. What we really want here is an imaginative scheme for the relief of that area. We need roads, hospitals, schools, houses, and we need water so as to bring areas under cultivation. It is an absolute requirement that the international community should be engaging in a massive co-operative effort to develop the region. If we do that, then we really could solve this problem. If there were such an effort made, whether by the World Bank, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, or through some other agency, either existing or which we set up, then I believe that this is the time for it, and Her Majesty's Government would be willing to play their part in it and contribute towards it.

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire drew attention to the letter from Mr. de Rothschild about the need

for desalination plants so that we could provide the essential missing resources. This may well be the right solution. We would certainly encourage it very much, because this would get us over probably the most difficult hurdle. I join with those who have spoken before me in saying that this is no longer a question of money, of aid or charity. It must be a question of the resettlement of those people in real dignity, able to earn their living in that region, and the final removal of this particular problem.

I would like to say a word about New York and the United Nations. The resolutions, as the House will know, were not carried in the end, and the Assembly has now adjourned for a short period to see whether it is possible to reach a measure of agreement about the future.

A good deal of serious and constructive work has been done. I would like here to second what my right hon. Friend said at the beginning of the debate. There was a great change in the atmosphere at the beginning of the debate, compared with that at the end. As the right hon. Gentleman said, what Russia appeared to have set out to get, at the end of the day she simply had not got. The urgent matter now is that the Secretary-General should send his representative there, that we should see what kind of United Nations force we can get in the disputed area so that we can get, at any rate, a partial withdrawal and accompany this with the ending of belligerency, and thereby the acceptance of the existence of the various States.

In the case of Jerusalem, we have played a considerable part in avoiding actual formal annexation of the city. That was the right thing for us to do, and we must now work to see that this does not happen again, unless we take into account all the factors that make up for a final settlement.

There is no doubt that a final settlement must be found within United Nations framework. The withdrawal of Israeli forces will have to be part of this, but the ending of belligerency must also be part of it. The right of all States to exist must be a part of it, free and innocent passage through the waterways must be part of it, and the ending of the present arms race must also be included. This is the basis for the settlement for which we are looking, the basis of the settlement

which, I gather, at the end of the debate everyone would like.

133

Question and Answer in Parliament on British Position Regarding Nuclear Desalination in the Middle East.¹

London, July 6, 1967

Mr. Eldman asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, as a contribution to the settlement of the Middle-East situation, he will propose to the United Nations that a study be made of the use of nuclear power for desalination purposes, with a view to the establishment of an Israeli-Jordanian irrigation and development board, operating at a technical level.

Mr. Mulley: Her Majesty's Government would welcome a concerted effort by the international community to assist the further development of the Middle-East region. A prior condition for progress on the lines suggested would seem however to be some progress towards resolution of the political situation in the area.

134

Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk Before the Golden Anniversary Convention of the Lions International.² [Excerpts]

Chicago, July 7, 1967

A lasting peace cannot be achieved merely by wishing for it, or by talking about it, or by passing resolutions. It has to be organized and built, and there must be effective means of enforcing it.

What are the essential ingredients of lasting world peace? I know of no better answer than the United Nations Charter: particularly the

Preamble and Article One. Those paragraphs represented what the authors of the Charter believed to be the lessons of history—especially the lessons taught by the events which led to the Second World War. They were written while the fires of that most destructive of wars still raged, when men were thinking hard and prayerfully about the millions of dead and how “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...”

Regrettably, some disputes have remained unsettled. Recently one of these disputes once again flared into war. We can impose no blueprint for peace in the Middle East; the primary responsibility rests upon those who live there and upon their governments. But President Johnson has set forth the principles which we think any settlement must encompass:

First, recognition that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live. This means an end to belligerency and terrorism.

Second, justice for the Arab refugees.

Third, free navigation through international waterways.

Fourth, an end to the Middle East arms race. This requires the cooperation of larger states outside the area.

Fifth, respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area. This requires recognized boundaries and other arrangements to provide security against terrorist raids and war.

Further, as President Johnson has emphasized, we believe there should be adequate recognition that three great religions have a deep interest in the holy places of Jerusalem.

Some have urged an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. But that, as my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Goldberg, has said, is a prescription not for peace but for renewed hostilities. We believe that the goal must be a lasting settlement.

¹ *Ibid.*, col. 282-83.

² American Embassy Release, Beirut.

135

Interview Statement by French Prime Minister Pompidou During his Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹**Moscow, July 8, 1967**

Q. Quelles mesures peut-on prendre, à votre avis, pour régler la crise du Moyen-Orient et liquider les conséquences de l'aggression israélienne?

R. Nous estimons qu'il existe au Moyen-Orient depuis longtemps une situation difficile, et qu'il s'y pose un grand nombre de problèmes qui n'ont jamais reçu une solution satisfaisante et admise par tous. Le résultat, ce sont des crises, et nous venons d'en connaître une particulièrement grave. Il est évident que ces problèmes ne peuvent pas trouver de solution satisfaisante par la voie militaire. La France ne peut reconnaître le fait accompli de la conquête, par les armes. Son gouvernement a désapprouvé l'action militaire entreprise par Israël, et voté aux Nations unies pour la résolution des pays non engagés demandant le retrait des troupes.

Nous estimons aussi qu'il faut chercher des solutions durables et acceptées par tous les pays. Il s'agit de l'existence de ces Etats, de leur intégrité territoriale, des réfugiés ou de la navigation. Nous pensons que les grandes puissances peuvent, par leur accord, faciliter des solutions et, le cas échéant, les garantir. C'est pour nous la seule voie, mais malheureusement pour le moment elle ne paraît pas correspondre aux réalités.

136

Joint Communiqué on French Prime Minister Pompidou's Visit to the Soviet Union, 3-8 July.² [Excerpt]**Moscow, July 8, 1967**

The Soviet leaders and the French Prime Minister analyzed the situation in the Near East. They regret the fact that the U.N. General

Assembly, during the voting on July 4, 1967, was unable to make recommendations concerning the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the initial positions which they held prior to June 5, 1967, or concerning searches within the framework of the Security Council for a settlement of all the problems of this region, bearing in mind that territorial seizures resulting from military operations cannot be regarded as a *fait accompli*.

They agreed that their own efforts should be exerted in directions furthering the creation of conditions for the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the Near East and ensuring all the peoples of this region the right to an independent existence. Guided by these principles, the two governments agreed to maintain contacts and to consult with one another.

137

Communiqué on the Conference of Communist Parties and Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on the Middle East.³**Budapest, July 12, 1967**

A conference of leaders of Communist and Workers' Parties and heads of government of the socialist countries was held in Budapest July 11 and 12; taking part in the conference were Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; Zhivko Zhivkov, member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee; Jenoe Fock, member of the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Hungarian People's Republic Council of Ministers; Arpad Pullai, Secretary of the

¹ *Politique Etrangère de la France*, 2nd Sem., 1967, pp. 33-34.

² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 26/7/1967, p. 21. From *Pravda*.

³ *Ibid.*, 2/8/1967, p. 15.

Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee; Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the German Democratic Republic State Council; Willi Stoph, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the German Democratic Republic Council of Ministers; Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee; Jozef Cyrankiewicz, member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee and Chairman of the Polish People's Republic Council of Ministers; Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; Jozef Lenart, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Chairman of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; Josip Broz Tito, Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Vladimir Popovic, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and General Secretary of the President's Office of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and Kiro Gligorov, member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and Vice-Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The conference was held in conformity with the accord reached at the June 9, 1967, Moscow meeting of leaders of the Communist and Worker's Parties and heads of government of the above-mentioned countries¹ on maintaining regular contacts on questions of the situation

in the Near East which was created as a result of the aggression of Israel against the Arab countries.

The participants in the conference exchanged opinions on the most recent events in the Near East. They noted that Israel's continuing occupation of the territory it seized as the result of aggression constitutes a flouting of the basic principles of the U.N. Charter and of international law and an infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab states. By their policy of aggrandizement, the ruling circles of Israel, behind which stand the aggressive forces of imperialism, first of all of the U.S.A., are bidding defiance to the peace-loving forces throughout the world.

The participants in the conference confirmed anew that the fraternal parties and the socialist countries represented at the conference resolutely support and will continue to support the friendly Arab states in their just struggle for the liquidation of the consequences of Israel's aggression, first of all for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territory they have seized. They spoke out in favor of the still fuller utilization of appropriate means in the interests of the struggle against aggression and for the restoration of peace in the Near East.

The participants in the conference exchanged information on the political support being rendered by each of their countries to the friendly Arab states; on economic aid, including measures capable of promoting the development of industry and agriculture in the United Arab Republic and in the other Arab countries that have been subjected to imperialist aggression; on measures aimed at strengthening these countries' defensive capacities; and on measures of long-range economic cooperation with the Arab states. They unanimously expressed their firm intention to continue to exert concerted efforts for the implementation of these aims.

The conference proceeded in a comradely atmosphere and in a spirit of complete unity.

The participants in the conference agreed to continue to maintain regular contacts among one another on questions of the situation in the Near East.

¹ See *ante*, doc. 89.

138

Statement by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow Before the House Committee on Agriculture.¹
[Excerpt]

Washington, July 12, 1967

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before your committee on the foreign policy aspects of H.R. 10915. As you know, the Department of State has already submitted its comments on this proposed legislation which would close U.S. markets to extra long staple cotton exports of any country which has severed diplomatic relations with us. In my remarks this morning, I should like to enlarge upon the material contained in that letter.

H.R. 10915 raises two issues of foreign policy: First, is it a sound way to deal with our problems in the Middle East, where the Sudan and the United Arab Republic have chosen for the moment to break diplomatic relations with us? And secondly, is it consistent with our trade policy and our obligations to other countries in the field of international commerce?

H.R. 10915 is predicated on the assumption that the absence of diplomatic relations is alone sufficient justification for the severance of trade relations. But historically this has not been the case in the conduct of U.S. foreign trade policy. The United States traded with the Soviet Union long before diplomatic relations were established between the two Governments. In fact, whenever a government comes to power which we do not recognize immediately, there is a temporary lapse in diplomatic relations; but we normally continue trade as before.

At the present time, there are five countries with which the United States neither trades nor enjoys diplomatic relations. In each case there are important specific circumstances that do not apply, even remotely, to the U.A.R. or the Sudan.

These five are:

North Viet-Nam, which is conducting aggressive warfare against a friendly allied state and is engaging our armed forces in combat;

North Korea, which waged aggressive war-

fare against the U.N. and still faces U.N. forces, including American contingents, across a hostile frontier;

Communist China, condemned by the U.N. as an aggressor in 1951;

Albania, the European outpost of Mao's China; and

Castro's Cuba, against which the OAS [Organization of American States] has imposed a trade embargo except for items of mercy.

A break in diplomatic relations does not and should not lead automatically to disruption of commerce. Each case is different and should be examined on its own merits as a matter of policy.

This particular case—involving our imports of extra long staple cotton—raises important issues of policy concerning the future of our relations with all the states in the Middle East which have chosen to break diplomatic relations with us in the wake of the recent hostilities between Israel and its neighbors. Only the United Arab Republic and the Sudan export extra long staple cotton to the United States. But what we do in this instance will be closely watched by all the countries of the Middle East and North Africa as a signal of our policy. If we take economic reprisals against two of those countries with regard to one commodity, it will be assumed that we are embarking on a general policy of economic warfare against all of them.

Is it in the interest of the United States to start down this road?

I submit that such a course would be contrary to our interests.

The United Arab Republic and other nations of the Middle East and North Africa broke diplomatic relations with the United States on the basis of false charges that British and American planes participated in those hostilities and that we and the British had given Israel military assistance in other ways as well. These allegations have no foundation in fact. They are known to be false. It is significant in this connection that no country making these accusations against us has taken up our offer to examine the records and investigate the facts.

In the Middle Eastern crisis we have pursued an even-handed course in behalf of our own strong

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 21/7/1967, pp. 236-37.

national interest in peace and stability in the area. We have opposed acts of hostility and acts likely to lead to war—the infiltration of terrorists, the closing of the Strait of Tiran, the menace of mobilization, the massive supply of arms to certain countries. We did everything in our power to find a peaceful solution of the crisis before the fighting broke out. When the crisis exploded into battle, early in June, we bent every effort to obtain a cease-fire and then to move toward a more durable peace. That course is in the equal interest of Israel and of its neighbors. The survival in the Middle East of the claim that some countries are in a perpetual state of war with Israel and have rights of belligerency against Israel has become a burden to world peace. All our energies are devoted to finding the basis for a just and durable peace in the Middle East, a peace which rests on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all the states in the area, justice for the refugees, a status for Jerusalem which protects the deep religious interests of the whole world in that universal city, the assurance of maritime rights, and an end of the arms race.

As we move toward peace in the area, we hope that diplomatic relations will be restored with the countries which have broken their ties with us. We regret their decision. Diplomatic relations are needed particularly in times of strain, when the risk is great that misunderstanding can escalate into hostility. We have strong ties of friendship, interest, and respect with all the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa. We wish to do nothing at this stage which would make the restoration of normal relations more difficult when conditions evolve sufficiently to permit that step.

Taking the ramifications of such a step into account, we can see no useful purpose to be served by preventing the United Arab Republic and Sudan from keeping their historic share in our extra long staple cotton quota. Cutting one of the oldest commercial ties between Egypt and the United States would add an additional obstacle to the many which will have to be removed before normal relations can be restored between the United States and the Government of the United Arab Republic. We do not believe it is in the interest of the United States to make that high wall higher still.

The Governments of the United Arab Republic and of the Sudan face difficult decisions as they begin to face the realities of the situation. We believe they and all the other governments of the area should know that the door to friendly and peaceful relations with the United States is always open if they wish to take the indispensable steps toward peaceful cooperation.

The economic sanctions that have been applied by Arabs in terms of oil exports and by Egypt in the closing of the Suez Canal have had comparatively little effect on the United States. The burdens of these sanctions have fallen in major proportion on the Arabs themselves. With this fact becoming more apparent with each passing day, it is questionable whether the United States would gain by imposing a sanction against Egypt. Such a move on our part would seem to play into the hands of those who are seeking to widen the breach between the Middle Eastern countries and the United States, and indeed to take positions of control in the internal affairs of the United Arab Republic, Syria, and Algeria.

139

Statement by Dr. William Jacson, Leader of a French Parliamentary Delegation Visiting the U.A.R.¹ [Excerpt]

Cairo, July 13, 1967

Le Général de Gaulle, soucieux d'éviter la création d'un foyer de guerre au Moyen-Orient, qui risquerait de se transformer en conflagration internationale, est partisan de l'établissement d'un dialogue entre les pays Arabes et Israël, voire d'un *modus vivendi*, ou de tous autres moyens diplomatiques de nature à rétablir la paix.

¹ *Le Monde*, 14/7/1967.

Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk on the Status of Jerusalem.¹

Washington, July 14, 1967

The United States has abstained today on a General Assembly resolution concerning Jerusalem. As Ambassador Goldberg indicated in his statement earlier today, this abstention was necessary because in our view the resolution as presented did not fully reflect either the existing situation or the best means of dealing with it. But it would be wrong for any people or government to assume that this abstention indicates that the United States is indifferent to the future of Jerusalem.

The United States deeply regrets the administrative actions on Jerusalem which have been taken by the Government of Israel in recent weeks. As we said on June 28² these administrative decisions cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them. We have made this position clear to the Government of Israel both before and after these decisions were taken. We understand the deep emotional concerns which move the people and Government of Israel on this matter, but we are bound to point out the need for understanding of the equal concerns of others.

As we have observed before, Jerusalem is holy to Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and it is genuinely tragic that this city of the highest spiritual meaning has so often been a cause of conflict in the past. Surely the lesson from this experience is that we must all do better now.

The United States Government continues to hope that a generous and fair-sighted view will prevail among all concerned, and its own influence will be directed to that end. It is our belief that means of reason and of persuasion are most likely to be successful in this purpose.

Statement by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk to Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program.³ [Excerpt]

Washington, July 14, 1967

Several weeks ago, the President offered a constructive approach for moving toward a permanent settlement of the problems in the Middle East. His approach included five points:

- first, the recognized right of national life;
- second, justice for the refugees;
- third, innocent maritime passage;
- fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

We are hopeful that reason will prevail and that the countries in the Middle East, with help from economically advanced countries, will concentrate their energies on building a better life for their peoples.

In the meantime we have suspended planned assistance programs in the Middle East countries which have broken diplomatic relations with the United States, except for certain food programs for humanitarian purposes. AID and other economic assistance to Tunisia and Morocco and other economic aid to Israel and Lebanon is continuing. In Jordan, activities are being resumed as the situation permits, and more funds than originally proposed may be needed to help restore the economy and provide opportunities for refugees. In addition, \$5 million is being made available, in accordance with the President's recent announcement, to provide, through UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East], the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other agencies, for the immediate needs of the refugees.

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the developing world, there should be no higher priority than building economic and social strength. There is increasing evidence that most developing countries are accepting this challenge.

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 31/7/1967, p. 149.

² See *ante*, doc. 123.

³ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 14/8/1967, p. 210.

142

Soviet-Algerian-Iraqi Talks on the Middle East Crisis, 17-18 July, as Reported by "Pravda".¹

Moscow, July 18, 1967

Talks were held in the Kremlin on July 17 and 18 between the Soviet leaders and H. Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Algerian People's Republic, and A. Arif, President of the Republic of Iraq, both of whom had come to Moscow.

Participating in the talks on the Soviet side were L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee; A. N. Kosygin, member of the Politburo of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers; B. N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee; Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense; and V. V. Kuznetsov, U.S.S.R. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the course of the talks, which took place in a friendly and comradely atmosphere, H. Boumedienne and A. Arif spoke about the results of the conference among the leaders of the Arab states in Cairo, which ended on July 16.² Comrades L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin spoke about the conference among the leaders of the fraternal parties and governments of the socialist countries, held in Budapest on July 11 and 12.³

The leaders of Algeria and Iraq gave a high appraisal to the position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in connection with the current Near East crisis, which was unleashed by Israel and the forces of imperialism backing it. This support by the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries has played an important role in opposing the aggressive plans of Israel, which is being encouraged by imperialist circles.

An exchange of opinions took place on ways to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression and on the situation in the Near East as a whole. This exchange of opinions disclosed the parties'

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 9/8/1967, p. 11.

² See *post*, doc. 390.

³ See *ante*, doc. 137.

agreement that elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression is the most important condition for restoration of peace in the Near East.

The parties' desire to develop and strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries was once again confirmed.

143

News Conference Statements by U.S. President Johnson on the Middle East.⁴

Washington, July 18, 1967

Q. Mr. President, what is happening to our efforts to hold down arms shipments in the Middle East by us with the Russians?

President Johnson: We made a proposal that all of use file with the United Nations a statement as to the amount of shipments that have been made. We have not been able to get an agreement on that. We talked about it at Hollybush in Glassboro. It was hoped that other nations would do likewise. As of now, there has been no agreement.

Q. Mr. President, have we had any further response from the Israeli Government concerning our proposals for keeping the Old City of Jerusalem international in character so that all religions would have access to the shrines there?

President Johnson: I know of no decisions that have been made in that area.

⁴ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 1967, p. 1031.

144

Speech of Indian Foreign Minister Chagla in the Course of a Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Policy.¹ [Excerpt]**New Delhi, July 18, 1967**

The Hon. Member also said that India has failed to uphold peace. I shall again prove, through documentary evidence I have, the steps which India took from time to time and from stage to stage in this crisis which will satisfy the House, that all along we were trying to ask both the parties to exercise restraint—(*interruptions*).

Let us see what has been happening. Just before Mr. Kosygin came to New York, he went and saw President Nasser. The President of the U.S.S.R. was consulting President Nasser while the United Nations Assembly was sitting in New York. Important Russian officials and Ministers had been visiting President Nasser. President Nasser sent his Special Envoy to meet the Prime Minister; President Tito sent his Special Envoy to meet the Prime Minister. This is a return visit to the U.A.R. and to Belgrade. See the situation in which we find ourselves today. The United Nations is deadlocked; the Suez Canal is closed. No compromise seems to appear on the horizon. It is time for us to consult people who are vitally interested in these matters. When I was in New York, Mr. Eban came to see me, I saw him and I heard his point of view for one hour. I am accessible to everybody; I do not shut my ears to any side.

We have often been told: why don't we keep quiet; how does West Asia concern us; how does Vietnam concern us; how does this country or that country concern us? Let us not forget that India is a member of the Security Council. As a member of the Security Council, it has got to review and pass judgment on world events. Is it suggested that as a member of the Security Council it should take no notice of what is happening in different parts of the world? Injustice, aggression, breach of faith or confidence, tyranny, colonialism are all the concern of India and will always remain so. I think it is wrong for anybody to say that India should keep quiet when things are

happening which call for our judgment, our decision and our appraisal. I would, therefore, ask the House to judge the West Asian conflict in this context. May I preface this by saying that although we are non-aligned, although our West Asian policy was not dictated by any power—it was our own independent policy—we could not remain neutral. We had to pass judgment and it is for the House—after I have stated the facts—to judge whether our judgment was right or wrong.

Let us first come to the most important question on which the House has taken up such a strong attitude about Israeli aggression. Let us see what President de Gaulle says. On June 2, a statement was issued in the name of President de Gaulle after a French Cabinet meeting in which it was stated that the country which is the first to use arms, whichever that be, will neither have our approval, that is, the French Government's approval, nor French support.

In another statement issued on the 22nd June, after a French Cabinet meeting, President de Gaulle said:

"France condemns opening of hostilities by Israel."

That is President de Gaulle's view. That is not all.

Let us come to the paper which is very dear to the hearts of many, the American publication, the *Time*. It says:

"Israel scarcely bothers to deny any longer that it started shooting first. On the day before the guns opened up, the Israeli Cabinet met secretly to discuss whether to launch a preemptive attack before the gathering Arab armies struck. Mr. Abba Eban argued for further diplomatic efforts. Defence Minister Mr. Dayan insisted that the safety of the nation could not permit delay. Mr. Dayan carried the day. The attack was authorised by a vote of 16 to 2... the only nays being cast by the left-wing Socialists."

Here is the evidence of 2 completely detached objective witnesses, President de Gaulle and an American publication like the *Time*.

Then, Mr. Masani said, in the course of his interesting speech, that we are isolated. Mr. Nath Pai said that we have lost our influence and we are isolated. May I for the information of the House point out which countries, apart from the socialist bloc, apart from the Arab bloc, voted for the non-aligned nations' resolution? It is very revealing.

¹ *Foreign Affairs Record*, 1967, pp. 106-07.

The basis of the non-aligned nations resolution was the aggression committed by Israel and the resolution wanted Israel to vacate the aggression, to give up the fruits of aggression, and to go back to the line of the 4th June from where they started. It is worth seeing who voted with us. Were we alone in the camp? Were we isolated or was there a large volume of world public opinion on our side? Look at the countries who voted with us—Spain, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroons, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nigeria and Pakistan...

There are two significant and important facts about the Israeli aggression to which I wanted to draw the attention of the House. The House will remember that President Johnson told President Nasser that he wanted to send Vice-President Humphrey to confer with him and the reply that President Nasser gave was that he would not like to receive Vice-President Humphrey, but he would send his Vice-President, Mr. Mohiuddin, to meet President Johnson to discuss the ways and means of settling this problem. Vice-President Mohiuddin was to have left for the United States; on the 5th June and before he could leave, before he could confer with President Johnson, Israel struck the blow.

The second important fact to which I wanted to draw the attention of the House is that Mr. U Thant had gone to see President Nasser after the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and withdrawal of UNEF. They were discussing the ways and means of settling the Aqaba problem; they were discussing how the Gulf of Aqaba could be used, what would be the *modus operandi* within the sovereign framework of Egypt. While the discussions were going on, Israel struck the blow, which made any settlement impossible.

It has been said, and I think erroneously, that a pre-emptive strike, a preventive war, is permissible. I say that it is a complete violation of the Charter; it is not open to a country to indulge in a pre-emptive strike or a preventive war, and the most that the advocates of Israel say is that this was a preventive war in which Israel indulged.

I am surprised at some Hon. Members comparing the Indo-Pakistan conflict with the

Israel conflict. In saying this, does the House realise that we are accepting the Pakistani propaganda? What does Pakistan say? Pakistan says that we committed aggression... (*Interruptions*).

I am telling you what Pakistan says. Pakistan says that we committed aggression because we crossed the international line, taking the date of the conflict, as if it was the date, on which we crossed the international line, forgetting completely what happened before. The House knows full well what the facts are. The facts are that infiltrators were sent by Pakistanis to Kashmir. Then their Army marched towards Chhamb, they wanted to cut off our life-line to our armies in Ladakh. It was at that stage that we crossed the international line and our armies marched towards Lahore and Sialkot... How can you compare this with the Israel conflict? Did Egypt march her troops into Israel? Did she send infiltrators? (*Interruptions*).

I now turn to the pleasant subject introduced by Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha. I was surprised to hear from her that no aggression could be committed because Israel and Arab States were in a state of war. This is an astounding proposition to make that they were in a state of war. It means that the Armistice had not been followed by a peace treaty. According to Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha, it was open to Israel to attack the Arab countries and this attack would not constitute an aggression. It is absolutely opposed to every principle of international law and international relations. Two countries stop fighting; they may have an armistice; they may not have concluded peace treaty. It is not open, while the armistice is there and there is no conflict going on, for a country to attack another...

Mrs. Sinha pleads her case with very persuasive advocacy. But, if I may say so, there is one shortcoming. Once she has got hold of an idea, she fondles it, she plays with it, she nibbles at it, she does not let it go even after the idea has lost all its substance. One of the ideas she has caught hold of and which she has repeated on several occasions and at several places is that the whole trouble is due to the first sentence in my statement. Let me read out this classic sentence which, according to Mrs. Sinha, has created the trouble. I will read and explain it. This is the sentence:

"The creation of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the Arab countries."

It is a factual statement. Any one who knows the history of the Middle East knows the feelings of the Arabs aroused by the creation of Israel because they felt that the Palestinians were driven out and the Jews were put in the place of the home of Palestinians. As a matter of fact, tension was created. But does it mean what it has been suggested to mean that we have not recognised Israel or that we agree that there should be tension. We have recognised Israel... That is not the question. I am only saying this. What is wrong in this sentence? It is factually correct.

The other part to which Mrs. Sinha has referred is what I said in the statement about the Gulf of Aqaba. This also will answer the question about the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba being a *casus belli*.

We said only this:

"News has been received of the U.A.R. decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to other shipping carrying strategic goods for Israel. So far as the Government of India are concerned, we have taken the position as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea and that the entry to the Gulf lies within the territorial waters of the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. We adhere to this view."

Two views have been put forward. Is the Gulf of Aqaba within the territorial waters of the U.A.R.? Or is it an international waterway? (*Interruptions*).

Now, may I read out what Mr. Dulles had said about it in 1957, that is, about the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Dulles had said:

"I think that it is the fact that a certain amount of shipping is or shortly will be passing through the Straits of Tiran; although I also think that it is important to get a decision by the International Court of Justice as to what the legal rights of the parties are. It would be very helpful, I think, and it should be helpful also from the Egyptian standpoint to get a decision on that matter, and consideration is now being given to ways and means of seeking an advisory opinion on that matter from the International Court of Justice."

So, it is clear that on the 26th March, 1957, the Secretary of State of the United States had said that it was not a settled question, and he had wanted the opinion of the International Court of Justice.

This is what Mr. George Brown, British Foreign Secretary, says ten years later in the House of Commons:

"I am bound to say that there is a case which the Arabs can deploy; it is a case which has not only plausibility but

legality and force."

Now, in the face of this, how could it be said that when Egypt exercised her sovereign rights, which according to her are sovereign rights, in closing the Gulf of Aqaba which she said was within her territorial waters, it constituted a *casus belli* for Israel? How could it be said?...

Let me satisfy this House as to what steps we took in the Security Council in order to preserve peace. It was largely at our instance that U Thant went to see President Nassser to try and see if some settlement could be arrived at, and we wanted the Council to be adjourned till he came back with a report. We felt that to have the Security Council without the presence of the Secretary-General would be like enacting Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark.

Then, we wanted—and this is very important—a holding resolution to be passed asking parties to exercise restraint. We actually moved it; it was not carried, but we said, call upon both parties to exercise restraint, let there be quiet diplomacy, let there be a breathing spell. We were urging the Members all the time to accept a resolution of this character.

Then, on the 5th June, Israel started hostilities against the Arab countries, and on the same day, we proposed a resolution for cease-fire and withdrawal. On 5th June we did not know how the fortunes of war had gone. We did not know who was winning and who was losing. But on principle we said that if armed conflict broke out it was necessary for the parties immediately to have a cease-fire and to withdraw. This was the resolution we moved on the 5th June.

Ultimately as the House knows, on the 6th June, a simple cease-fire resolution was passed as a first step. Then came the emergency session. Why have we supported the non-aligned resolution on withdrawals? We supported it because our view is, and I want the House to endorse this because this is an important matter from the point of view of not only this conflict but of the future, that no aggressor should be permitted to retain the fruits of aggression, that no aggressor should be permitted to negotiate from strength derived as a result of military conquest. And we said that both in logic and in sequence of time, the second step was to be withdrawal. We did not say that the other matters should not be

discussed, such as the navigation of the Suez Canal, the navigation of Aqaba, the recognition of Israel, the question of refugees etc.; we said that all those should be discussed, but first things should come first, and the next step after cease-fire was the withdrawal of troops.

Now, may I read a passage from the statement I made in the General Assembly. And I would ask the House's endorsement of what I said there because, as I have said, it has important repercussions with regard to the future. This was what I said on the question of withdrawal:

"Mr. President, we are second to none in desiring a return to peace in the area but it must be a lasting one. It is important for us to remember, however, that an enduring peace can be established in West Asia and elsewhere only if in this world body, we can all act together to ensuring strict adherence to certain basic values and fundamental principles of international law, practice, morality and behaviour...

I will attempt to summarise some of these cardinal principles. First, it is not open to a country to start a war merely because it feels that a threat to its security exists. If it thinks that such a threat exists, the Charter prescribes various courses of action open to it through peaceful means, and of course, it can come to the Security Council. But it is in the spirit and letter of the Charter illegal to deal with a threat which one State thinks is being held out by a neighbouring State through recourse to arms.

Secondly, no aggressor should be permitted to retain the fruits of his aggression.

Thirdly, it is not permissible for a country to acquire territory of another State in order to be able to bargain from a position of strength.

And finally...

—and this is very important—

...rights cannot be established, territorial disputes cannot be settled, boundaries cannot be adjusted through armed conflict."

All that we say is that first you must go back. You cannot remain in some others' territory and try to settle your dispute through military force or military acquisition. Just see what would happen. All over the world, there are boundary disputes, in Africa, in Asia. Are you going to permit a country to march its troops into the territory of another country, sit tight on it and then say 'Now negotiate; till you negotiate, I will not withdraw.'

What is happening today in West Asia? The Israelis are there on the territories of the Arabs. If they remain there, they are in violation of the principles of the U.N. Charter. What we are trying to see is to prevent violation of the

principles of the Charter.

Another result of this, as you must have seen, is that Israel goes on consolidating her strength. She has annexed Jerusalem. Their Prime Minister said the other day that she wants to annex the Gaza Strip. I do not know where this matter will end.

Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that there should be withdrawal of the Israeli troops... I have been told that this policy is not in consonance with our national interests. Fortunately, the policy we have followed in West Asia is in consonance with both right and justice and also our national interests. May I point out what our national interests are? It is absolutely necessary in our national interest that we should have a friendly Middle East. It is a strategic part of the world. It is the cross-roads of the world, and strategically it is of the utmost importance for India to see that we have a friendly Middle East. We have trade of a hundred crore of rupees with the Middle East.

We have got 50,000 Indians residing there, engaged in gainful occupations and professions. It is essential from our point of view that the Suez Canal should be in friendly hands. It is essential from our strategic point of view that oil, which we import from the Middle East, should come from countries which are friendly to us; and it is also in our national interest that the Persian Gulf, because of strategic reasons, should be in friendly hands. Therefore, as I said, the justice of the Arab cause and our own national interest dictated the policy we pursued...

Some Hon. Members said that the friendship between Prime Minister Nehru and President Nasser was the basis of our friendship with Egypt. Foreign policies are not evolved out of personal friendships, and the reason why India stood by Nasser, and stands by Nasser, is because he represents in the Arab world certain forces which we must support. These are the forces of progress, of socialism, of non-alignment, of secularism... As I said, he represents the forces of progress. He was opposed to Muslim fanaticism; he was opposed to the Muslim brotherhood and, therefore, it was in the interest of India to support and strengthen the causes for which Nasser stood.

Now, one more thing about West Asia and I have finished with that. I am surprised that my

hon. friend, Shri Madhok, should not have said one word of condemnation of Israel about the 14 brave and gallant Indian soldiers in the UNEF who were killed...

Shri Madhok [an M.P.] suggested that we are guilty in not evacuating them by air, that we were carried away because of some considerations of economy (*Interruptions*). That is not so. I have got the document. The UNEF continued to remain as an organisation under the orders of UNO up to the 17th of June.

The U.N. had drawn up a programme of evacuation till 17 June of the various countries' contingents. Six countries were involved. With regard to Canada, because of some reason, President Nasser asked the Canadians immediately to get out, and they were evacuated by that country. In our case and in the case of the countries like Brazil, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, a time schedule was laid down. Till the evacuation was completed, our contingent was entirely under the orders of the UNO. Therefore, this is no excuse or explanation for the action of Israel.

145

News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, July 19, 1967

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you assess the state of U.S.-Soviet relations in the light of the Glassboro conference and Soviet arms shipments to the Arab states in the continuing Middle East crisis?

A. There's been no dramatic change in our relations with the Soviet Union in recent weeks. I think the Glassboro talks were highly useful. They were hard-working talks. The President and Chairman Kosygin had a chance, over a period of 9 or 10 hours, to go over the world situation in considerable detail.

On the Middle East, I think from what Mr.

Kosygin has said in the General Assembly and what we know of their general attitude in the case, there are certain points on which we and the Soviet Union are agreed, even though the states in the area may not agree. The Soviet Union, for example, accepts the existence of the State of Israel; and we would suppose that that carries with it certain consequences.

Now, certain of the Arab states have been unwilling thus far to take the step of accepting the State of Israel as an established fact in international relations, and that has complicated somewhat the attitude of the various parties in the present United Nations General Assembly.

But we're conscious of the fact that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are very important to the general structure of world peace, and we are prepared to sit down with them on whatever point we can find to move toward agreement rather than controversy and to find ways to reduce the impact of disagreements which we might have on important questions.

So this is a matter of continuing concern that will find us ready to move toward a stabilization of the world situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is continuing to ship arms into the Middle East and in view of the fact that the logic of American policy in this area has always been to maintain a relative equilibrium on arms, does this place a great pressure and burden on the United States to perhaps lift its arms embargo?

A. Well, in the first place, we very much regret this neighborhood arms race in the Middle East.

In 1962, when I appeared at the Geneva disarmament conference, I pressed the conference to give attention not just to the overriding arms race, say, between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also to give its attention to the lesser arms races in different parts of the world. Unfortunately, we encountered considerable indifference to these neighborhood arms races.

Now, the intrusion of major arms into the Middle East by the Soviet Union in such countries as Egypt and Syria and Algeria raised problems not only affecting the security of Israel

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 7/8/1967, pp. 159-65.

but also affecting the security of neighboring Arab countries.

We have ourselves tried not to become a principal supplier of arms in that region. But we are committed to the political independence and the territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East. And when imbalances of a major proportion occurred, we felt it was necessary for us to supply some limited military assistance to certain of the Arab countries and to Israel.

Now, the answer to this ought to be some understanding among the arms recipients and the arms suppliers to put some sort of ceiling on the arms race in the Middle East. Because whatever one thinks about it otherwise, these burgeoning military establishments do divert important resources and scarce resources away from the economic and social development of the countries of that area. President Johnson has emphasized this point among his five principles with respect to a permanent settlement in the Middle East. We would like very much to see some arrangement by which defense establishments in the Middle East are kept within reasonable bounds in order that there not be that diversion of resources and in order that arms themselves not be a major source of tension which could set off additional hostilities.

We will continue to work at this in the United Nations and in capitals. I would not be able to say today that I am encouraged about the prospects, because the resupply of certain of the countries by the Soviet Union has been going on apace, and this will raise security questions for not only Israel but also certain of the Arab countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you view the continuing Soviet arms shipments to the Arab countries at this time? Do you look at it as a decision to try and replace most of the Soviet arms that were lost or destroyed during the war? Or do you look on it as more or less a stopgap move by the Soviet Union?

A. Well, I can't really interpret what has happened thus far. There has been some significant resupply of arms to certain of the countries there following the recent hostilities.

What the long-range purpose of the Soviet Union would be in this matter, I am not in a position to say.

What we would like to see is some understanding, perhaps through the United Nations, about the supply of arms. We would be glad to make our own arms shipments to that area public—to register them in some suitable fashion if others would do the same. We, as a matter of fact, don't keep these things secret ourselves on a unilateral basis, so that these matters become known.

What we would like to have is some sort of understanding—whether in general or in detail (because details are difficult to work out)—that the arms-supplying nations will not themselves be responsible for a major renewal of an arms race in the Middle East. Because down that trail lies a possible catastrophe.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are your present intentions on providing either economic or military aid to King Hussein of Jordan?

A. Well, the question of aid is under review. I have no announcements to make on that subject. We have, as you know, over a good many years provided economic assistance to Jordan and some military assistance to Jordan, as well as to other states in that area. Those questions, of course, are a matter of great preoccupation at the present time. But from time to time announcements will be made on that subject. I have no generalization to make at the moment. It's a matter in which we are very much interested.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Israel maintains that the most effective, probably the only effective, way to settle its problems is through direct talks with the Arabs. I wonder how you feel about this contention and whether you think it is a realistic approach?

A. Well, there obviously are some problem about that. One can understand why Israel believes that the time has come to sit down and make final peace settlements with its neighbors.

Now, this is a matter of great political sensitivity among its immediate neighbors, and there is some question as to whether any of the governments in that area can, in fact, do that and survive. So that you have some problems.

I would suppose that the United Nations has

a very important role to play in beginning the process of working out a permanent peaceful settlement on a basis that would involve some reconciliation among all of the governments who are in that area.

I wouldn't want to be dogmatic about techniques at this point. There is still a lot of work to be done. The Security Council, when it first had the Middle East question in front of it, was able to bring about a cease-fire through a series of unanimous resolutions, but I would suppose that quiet, patient work, not only at the table but behind the scenes in the Security Council, might find an answer to this particular kind of question. But it's a complicated question. I don't see a quick and easy answer for it today.

146

Authorized Statement Issued by the Soviet News Agency Tass.¹

Moscow, July 20, 1967

In connection with Israel's provocative actions against the U.A.R., Jordan, Syria and other Arab states and the Israeli government's gross violations of a series of decisions by the Security Council and the emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly, Tass has been authorized to say the following.

Every day brings additional facts indicating that Israel has no intention of abandoning the path of the aggression it has unleashed against the neighboring Arab countries and peoples, is continuing to trample upon the elementary norms of international law and is defying the decisions of the United Nations and world public opinion.

Despite the Security Council's cease-fire decision, Israeli troops using aircraft, artillery and tanks have repeatedly precipitated major armed incidents in the Suez Canal area after these decisions were adopted. The latest military provocation of this sort was perpetrated on July

14 and 15, when the towns of El Qantara, Ferdan and Ismailia were shelled by artillery and mortar and Israeli aircraft attempted to bomb the city of Suez. The shelling and bombing inflicted casualties on the civilian population. Each such clash, provoked by the irresponsible and brazen actions of the Israeli military, entails the danger that the military conflict will be renewed on a large scale and is a threat to peace in the Near East and to international security.

It is becoming increasingly clear that Israel and its backers, the U.S.A. and several other imperialist powers, oppose the U.N. decision providing for immediate withdrawal of Israel troops to the positions they occupied before June 1967, precisely because they have not abandoned and refuse to abandon the imperialist and expansionist goals for whose sake they launched their attack upon the Arab countries.

All of Israel's actions on the seized Arab areas show that Tel Aviv is attempting to gather these areas into its own hands. An Israeli occupation administration has been created there that has established Draconic laws with respect to the indigenous Arab population. Through terror and intimidation, hundreds of thousands of Arabs are being driven from their native areas in the vicinity of Gaza, in the western sections of Jordan, in Jerusalem and other districts. The Israeli parliament's decision on de facto annexation of the Arab section of Jerusalem is a brazen act of contempt for international law. This seizure has already been condemned twice by the emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly. However, the government of Israel continues to ignore these U.N. decisions, which were adopted by the overwhelming majority of the states belonging to this international organization.

Eloquent evidence of the real intentions of the imperialists, for whom the State of Israel has become a tool, is the fact that preparations are under way to plunder the natural resources of the occupied Arab territories. The government of Israel and private Israeli companies closely associated with international monopolies have already declared their intention of starting to exploit the petroleum deposits in the Sinai Peninsula. As a result of Israel's aggression the Suez Canal has been put out of operation and is not

¹ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 9/8/1967, p. 11. From *Pravda*.

functioning.

Thus the government of a state that until recently was not reluctant to strike the pose of condemning Hitler's crimes has now shown the whole world that it has borrowed the inhuman practices the German fascist invaders resorted to on the territories of the countries that fell victim to aggression during the second world war.

By defying the will of the peoples and the interests of preserving peace, Israel's ruling circles and those abetting them in the U.S.A., Britain, the F.R.G. and certain other Western countries are playing with fire, making a serious mistake in their evaluation of the determination of the Arab states and their friends to defend the cause of peace in the Near East and incurring the full burden of responsibility and compensation for their continued policy of aggression and provocations against the Arab states and peoples.

147

Soviet Government Statement on the Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly.¹

Moscow, July 23, 1967

On June 21, 1967, the emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly, convoked to examine the question of eliminating the consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab states, suspended its work. On the Assembly's decision, all its materials are to be sent to the Security Council to enable the Council to examine the tense situation in the Near East as a question of exceptional importance. The president of the General Assembly has been instructed to reconvene it if and when necessary.

The emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly was an important phase in the peace-loving states' struggle for rapid elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. It focused the attention of world public opinion on this question. The session's entire work showed that a substantial majority of U.N.

member-states have displayed sincere interest in protecting the lawful rights and interests of the Arab peoples subjected to aggression, condemn the aggressor and support the demand that Israeli troops be withdrawn from the occupied Arab territories.

By having twice adopted, by a great majority of the votes, a resolution demanding that Israel renounce the measures it took for annexing the Arab section of the city of Jerusalem, the General Assembly clearly expressed its opposition to any recognition whatever of the results of the Israeli aggression. It has thereby confirmed the principle that the use of force is inadmissible in acquiring territory, one of the U.N. Charter's most important legal and political principles underlying peaceful relations among states.

The political intrigues of Israel and the states supporting it and their attempts to shed responsibility for aggression and even to obtain U.N. encouragement for keeping the occupied Arab territories have merely served to expose further their real expansionist intentions. No one at the General Assembly, with the exception of Israel and two or three of its chief protectors headed by the United States of America, dared to justify the aggressor. It is highly indicative that the U.S.A. was even compelled to withdraw from the General Assembly vote its draft resolution, which was aimed at justifying the aggressor and rewarding him for his attack upon the Arab countries.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the General Assembly was unable to adopt a decision on the main question—withdrawal of Israel's troops from the occupied Arab territories to the positions they had held when the aggression began. In the July 4 vote on the draft resolution of the nonaligned countries, which contained a clear-cut demand for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories, it received the votes of the socialist, Arab and many African and Asian states, as well as of certain Western European states that pursue independent foreign-policy courses in the international arena. The General Assembly gave substantial support to the Soviet draft resolution providing for condemnation of the aggressor, immediate withdrawal of his troops from the occupied territories and compensation by the aggressor for the losses he had inflicted on the Arab states. However, neither

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 12 & 20. From *Pravda*.

the nonaligned countries' draft nor the Soviet draft was adopted, since both received fewer votes than were needed for their approval.

Subsequent consultations, which continued up to the very moment when the session was suspended, failed to produce a draft resolution providing the type of solution to the question of Israeli troop withdrawal that could have won the support of the necessary majority of delegates. This is why the Assembly's work ended with the adoption of the merely procedural resolution on transferring the materials to the Security Council.

This raises the question of who prevented the General Assembly from doing its duty in accordance with the aims of the U.N. Charter, which strictly prohibits aggressive actions. There can be only one answer: the General Assembly could not adopt an effective decision on elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and withdrawal of Israeli troops from the seized territories because of the opposition of the United States of America, some of their allies, and states that yielded to U.S. pressure and blackmail, which were crudely and unceremoniously brought to bear at the decisive moment.

The Soviet government expresses the firm conviction that all peace-loving states must continue their efforts to compel the aggressor to withdraw his troops from the Arab territories he occupied. As long as the aggressor's troops are on Arab territory and as long as Israel continues, with irresponsible brazenness, to make territorial and other claims upon the neighboring Arab countries, there will be no peace in the Near East. The military provocations perpetrated by Israel in the Suez Canal area show that a renewal of the war can be expected any day.

An important and responsible task now devolves upon the Security Council, to which the General Assembly has given the materials from its emergency special session. In further examining the question of eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression, the Security Council must fully take into account the clearly expressed wish of the majority of states at the session to obtain a constructive resolution of this question and, first and foremost, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories they seized. The Soviet government for its part stands ready as before to cooperate with all peace-loving states

for the sake of this goal.

The Soviet government likewise asserts that the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist states, will continue to give the Arab states political support in their just struggle for their lawful rights and help them restore and develop their economies and strengthen their ability to defend themselves.

As for states that through their positions have hitherto obstructed resolving the question of eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression, they will have to assume strict responsibility to all peoples unless they reconsider their policy.

148

Joint Communiqué on Japanese Foreign Minister Miki's Visit to Poland, 25-27 July.¹ [Excerpt]

Warsaw, July 27, 1967

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Discussing the conflict in the Middle East, both ministers stated that it is important to create favourable conditions for insuring lasting peace in the region, and agreed that appropriate measures should be taken to achieve this end, it being essential that the Israeli troops be immediately withdrawn to positions held prior to 5 June 1967.

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149

Joint Communiqué on Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 19-28 July.² [Excerpt]

Moscow, July 28, 1967

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The heads of both governments discussed the Middle East situation with special attention and condemned the act of resorting to force in inter-

¹ Warsaw PAP International Service in English, 1829 GMT, 27/7/1967.

² Teheran Domestic Service in Persian, 0330 GMT, 29/7/1967.

national relations for territorial gains. Confirming the just rights of the Palestinian Arabs, they demanded the implementation of U.N. resolutions and expressed the belief that withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in the recent war is the most important step on the road to the restoration of peace and security in the area.

150

Motion Adopted by the Israeli Knesset at the End of a Foreign Policy Debate.¹

[Excerpt]

Jerusalem, August 1, 1967

3. The Knesset approves the stand of the Government in favour of steps leading to direct talks between Israel and the Arab countries on the signing of peace agreements, and reaffirms that so long as peace is not attained Israel will continue to maintain unaltered the situation created by the cease-fire arrangements following the Israel Defence Forces' successful repulsion of enemy aggression.

4. The Knesset expects at this historic hour the Jewish people throughout the world to fulfil their supreme national duty by immigrating to Israel.

151

Communiqué on a Meeting of Soviet and Israeli Communist Party Leaders as Reported by "Pravda".²

Moscow, August 1, 1967

On August 1 a meeting was held in the C.P.S.U. Central Committee between M. A. Suslov, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, and B. N.

Ponomarev, Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, on the one hand, and M. Vilner, Secretary of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel, and T. Tubi, Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party, on the other.

The representatives of the two parties exchanged opinions on questions of the situation in the Near East, on the international situation and a number of problems of the Communist movement; they stated that their views on the questions under discussion completely coincided.

The participants in the meeting condemned the aggression perpetrated by Israeli ruling circles with the support of the imperialist powers, chiefly the U.S.A., against the Arab states as a crime against the cause of peace, against the vital interests of the Arab peoples and the people of Israel.

M. Vilner and T. Tubi, the representatives of the Communist Party of Israel, expressed full support for the Leninist foreign policy and the consistent measures of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee and the Soviet government, which are aimed at strengthening peace and international security in the Near East and at defending the just cause of the Arab peoples in the face of aggression. The participants in the meeting regard the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the seized territories to the position they occupied before June 5, 1967, as the unconditional requirement for the settlement of the Near East conflict in the interests of all peoples in the area.

The representatives of the C.P.S.U. expressed full support for the internationalist policy of the Communist Party of Israel, which has been consistently opposing the aggressive policy of Israel's ruling circles, supported by U.S. imperialism, and expressing the genuine national interests of its country's people. They condemned the repressions directed by Israel's ruling circles against Communists who have come out against the aggression.

The representatives of both parties supported strengthening the fighting solidarity of all anti-imperialist forces against the aggressive schemes of imperialism, for the defense of the heroic people of Vietnam. They emphasized their invincible loyalty to the general line of the international Communist movement as formulated at the

¹ *Knesset Records*, No. 38, July 31-August 2, 1967, p. 2825.

² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 23/8/1967, pp. 12 & 29.

Moscow Conferences of 1957 and 1960, and supported the necessity of preparing and holding a new international conference.

The meeting proceeded in a warm and comradely atmosphere.

152

Speech of Yugoslav President Tito at a Luncheon in Honor of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.¹ [Excerpt]

Brioni, August 6, 1967

We are very pleased that we again have an opportunity for a direct and friendly exchange of views, particularly since many important events have occurred in the world since our last meeting. This demands that we study these events carefully and that, in the interests of peace and the independence of peoples, as well as in the interests of our own countries, we actively work to suppress the policy of force and aggression which so dangerously hangs over mankind.

What we have in mind particularly are the recent events in the Middle East. Yugoslavia, as you know, has resolutely taken the side of the Arab countries, since it was obvious to us from the very first hour who the real aggressor was and what his intentions were. This belief was later confirmed despite attempt to obscure and cover up the truth. On this occasion I should only like to point out that in taking sides we were guided not only by the friendship which links us with the Arab countries and peoples; we primarily wanted to denounce and foil the attempts to inflict a blow against the independent and progressive development of the Arab countries, and thus against the very policy of nonalignment, through the exploitation of the existing contradictions and unsolved problems in the Middle East.

It is therefore fully consistent with the spirit of our entire policy to resolutely denounce the

aggressor, to condemn solutions by force of arms, and to offer support and assistance to the victims of aggression. The unhampered spread of the policy of force and aggression directly threatens and endangers the freedom and independence of all peoples as well as world peace. It is only in this context that our steps and all our activities, from the beginning of the crisis to this day, can be understood.

What is particularly disturbing today is the fact that the consequences of this aggression have not yet been removed. This fact has created a constant danger for the renewal of armed conflicts and for new threats to peace in the Middle East and in the world.

It now becomes more and more obvious that lasting solutions cannot be reached by dictating from a position of strength, by humiliating the Arab nations, or by infringing upon their basic rights and vital interests. Equitable and constructive solutions can only be sought by taking into consideration the dignity, interests, and security of the people of this entire area.

In order to find just and constructive solutions in the Middle East, it is necessary, in our opinion, to remove the consequences of the aggression, which means that the Israeli Armed Forces should withdraw as soon as possible to the positions they occupied before the clash. I think that the attitudes of the Arab statesmen, despite the heavy sacrifices and injustice imposed on their countries, are displaying sufficient realism and good will in seeking a peaceful political solution. This, however, cannot be said for Israel, which has not been reasonable and which, by its deeds, more and more reveals the true nature of its policy of conquest.

¹ *Borba*, Belgrade, 6/8/1967.

153

Joint Communiqué on Bulgarian Vice-Premier Abramov's Visit to Iraq, 3-7 August.¹ [Excerpt]**Baghdad, August 7, 1967**

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The two sides condemned in the strongest terms the imperialist-Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, and asserted the necessity of eliminating the results of this aggression. They agreed that continued occupation by Israel of parts of the Arab homeland was a grave threat to international peace and security. The two parties expressed their regret at the failure of the United Nations and the Security Council to adopt a resolution condemning the Israeli aggression and requiring the aggressive Israeli forces to withdraw from Arab territories and compensate the Arabs for the losses they had incurred, which failure was the result of the attitude adopted by the imperialist countries and the countries that support them.

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154

Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party as Reported by "Pravda".²**Moscow, August 8, 1967**

The 16th plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel was held recently. Comrade Meir Vilner, Secretary of the Politburo, delivered a report entitled "The Political Situation and the Party's Tasks."

The Central Committee, the plenary session's decision on the struggle against aggression and for peace says, takes note of the fact that the war begun by the Eshkol-Dayan-Begin government on June 5, 1967, did very serious damage to the interests of the state of Israel and to its international status.

The war begun by the Eshkol-Dayan-Begin government was an aggressive war, planned in advance in conjunction with the governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain and with the support of the West German government. The war brought death, ruin and devastation. Our Communist Party, the decision says, shares the deep grief and suffering of the families who lost their loved ones.

The principal aims of the war were to overthrow the anti-imperialist governments of Egypt and Syria, to break the ties of the Arab countries with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and to defend the concessions of the foreign oil monopolies and the strategic bases of the Western colonial powers in our area.

For the sake of Israel's security, for the sake of the security and future of our sons and daughters, the decision emphasizes, we demand that Israel withdraw its troops beyond the armistice line. The withdrawal of troops from the occupied territory should be the first step necessary for the creation of a new atmosphere and for implementing peaceful initiatives capable of once and for all resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Palestine problem on the basis of the recognition of the national rights of the people of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs.

The Central Committee calls on all the class-conscious population of Israel to protest the cruel acts that are being carried out in the occupied territories, poisoning the souls of our young people and implanting racist germs in Israeli society.

The entire responsibility for the break in diplomatic relations between the socialist world and Israel, the decision goes on to say, falls on the Eshkol-Dayan-Begin government, which launched an aggressive war. The break in relations is aimed not against the state of Israel but against the policy of the Israeli government, which has sacrificed Israel's national interests to the interests of the Anglo-American oil companies in our area. The Soviet Union did everything it could to avert a war in the Middle East. Now the Soviet Union is exerting maximum efforts to liquidate the consequences of aggression and to ensure peace and security in this area.

For the sake of the future security of the state of Israel, the decision emphasizes, we shall

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, 8/8/1967.² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 30/8/1967, pp. 16-17.

unite all our forces in the struggle for the withdrawal of the Israeli armies beyond the armistice line, the cessation of aggression and the realization of peace.

In another decision, the Central Committee voices a most resolute protest in connection with the arrests of individuals opposing the war, in connection with the arrests of leaders and members of the Communist Party of Israel. The Central Committee, it says, notes with satisfaction the courage of the party's members, members of the young people's alliance and many sympathetic Jews and Arabs, which was demonstrated during the days of trial. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Israel demands the immediate release of all political prisoners, the cessation of acts of terrorism and provocations and the realization of the democratic freedoms and rights of citizens.

The Communist Party of Israel calls on the democratic, peace-loving public of the world to organize actions of solidarity for the release of political prisoners and to demand the cessation of police terror in Israel.

In a decision concerning the Sneh-Mikunis group, the Central Committee notes that this group supports the aggressive war and makes common cause with the position of the Eshkol-Dayan-Begin government. The leaders of the Sneh-Mikunis group have betrayed the basic principles of the workers' movement—peace, proletarian internationalism, genuine patriotism, the brotherhood of peoples and socialism.

The Central Committee has called upon the members of the Sneh-Mikunis group who are still faithful to the cause of national independence, democracy and socialism to support efforts aimed at uniting all forces in Israel in the struggle against military adventurism, for the withdrawal of the Israeli army beyond the armistice line, for preventing a military dictatorship, for conducting a new policy of peace and independence from imperialism, for a policy of democracy, the brotherhood of peoples, friendship with the Soviet Union and social progress.

Principles Guiding Israel's Policy in the Aftermath of the June 1967 War as Outlined by Prime Minister Eshkol.¹ [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, August 9, 1967

(a) The Government of Israel will endeavour to achieve peace with the neighbouring Arab countries. We shall never permit a return to a situation of constant threat to Israel's security, of blockade and of aggression.

(b) The Government of Israel is prepared for direct negotiations with all the Arab States together, or with any Arab State separately.

(c) The State of Israel strives for economic cooperation and regional planning with all States in the Middle East.

(d) Israel will cooperate fully in the solution of the refugees problem... within the framework of an international and regional plan.

(e) The Government endeavours to maintain fair and equitable relations with the population in the new areas, while maintaining order and security.

After our military victory, we confront a fateful dilemma; immigration or stagnation... By the end of the century, we must have five million Jews in Israel. We must work hard so that Israel may be able to maintain decent human, cultural, technical and economic standards. This is the test of Israel's existence as a Jewish State in the Middle East.

¹ *Israel Digest*, Jerusalem, 25/8/1967. Prime Minister Eshkol spoke at the opening session of the International Economic Advisory Conference, which was called by the Israel Government and was attended by some 60 Jewish industrialists and financiers from outside Israel.

156

Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Syria, 13-14 August.¹ [Excerpt]

Damascus, August 14, 1967

In the course of the talks, which took place in a friendly atmosphere, there was an exchange of views on the present crisis in the Near East, the world situation and the development of bilateral relations between the two countries.

In the view of the two parties, the talks constitute a new contribution to cooperation between the two friendly countries, which will lead to the strengthening of joint efforts to eliminate the effects of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, and support the freedom of peoples, and progress and peace throughout the world.

157

News Conference Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on Direct Negotiations with the Arabs.² [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, August 14, 1967

Israel's position has not changed in relation to that which was expressed at the General Assembly itself and the latest formulation is that which was reached by a vast majority in the Knesset³ following the report which I made to it two weeks ago, namely that there is a situation expressed in the cease-fire agreements. We shall respect those agreements, we shall maintain that situation. That situation can be changed by peace and only by peace.

This means we reject vague and ambiguous intermediate solutions which fall short of a radical peace settlement. We reject what is called armis-

tice, we reject all kinds of euphemisms designed to provide our neighbors with an escape route from the necessity of formal inter-state relations.

There is no substitute for a directly negotiated peace settlement... Declarations by third parties concerning their view of the juridical situation would not have any effect... We think the time has arrived for restricting the areas of choice, that if the neighboring governments are faced by two alternatives, to maintain the existing situation or to change it by peace, then the idea of negotiating peace might seriously enter their minds. This juridical principle is also the key to the territorial question. There are two possible maps.

There is the cease-fire map as it exists today or there is the new map of the Middle East which could be achieved only by peace settlements. What that map would look like would only emerge in the peace negotiations themselves and we have certain very clear ideas about what we think it will look like and what we should like it to look like...

The June 5th map has been destroyed irrevocably. There is now the cease-fire map or there are the frontiers which would be the chief item to be negotiated by Israel and her neighbors.

In such negotiations we would offer reasonable and practical proposals, and I believe that every Arab government which negotiated a peace settlement with us would benefit from that peace settlement just as Israel would benefit from it. I believe that the lesson of the last twenty years, the experience of recent international discussions, everything that is happening in the Middle East today—all confirm this central thesis that there is now an opportunity which must not be squandered to achieve a patchwork, fragile settlement, but a radical and stable structure of normal and peaceful relations.

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 15/8/1967.

² *Israel Digest*, 25/8/1967.

³ See *ante*, doc. 150.

158

U.S. Senate Resolution 155 Expressing the Sense of the Senate Concerning a Means Toward Achieving a Stable and Durable Peace in the Middle East.¹

Washington, August 14, 1967

Whereas the security and national interests of the United States require that there be a stable and durable peace in the Middle East; and

Whereas the greatest bar to a long-term settlement of the differences between the Arab and Israeli people is the chronic shortage of fresh water, useful work, and an adequate food supply; and

Whereas the United States now has available the technology and the resources to alleviate these shortages and to provide a base for peaceful cooperation between the countries involved: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that the prompt design, construction, and operation of nuclear desalting plants will provide large quantities of fresh water to both Arab and Israeli territories and, thereby, will result in—

- (1) new jobs for many refugees;
- (2) an enormous increase in the agricultural productivity of existing wastelands;
- (3) a broad base for cooperation between the Israeli and Arab Governments; and
- (4) a further demonstration of the United States efforts to find peaceful solutions to areas of conflict; and be it further

Resolved, that the President is requested to pursue these objectives, as reflecting the sense of the Senate, within and outside the United Nations and with all nations similarly minded, as being in the highest national interest of the United States.

¹ U.S. Senate, *Journal*, 1967, p. 569. S. Res. 155 was introduced on August 14, 1967, by Senator Howard H. Baker (Tennessee), and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where Hearings were held on October 19, 20, and November 17. Reported back without amendment on December 11, the Resolution was considered and agreed to by the Senate on December 12, 1967, by unanimous consent. [Ed.]

159

Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to Iraq, 14-16 August.² [Excerpt]

Baghdad, August 16, 1967

The two Presidents and their entourages exchanged views on the crisis in the Near East, the world situation, and increased bilateral relations and friendly cooperation between the two countries.

The two sides expressed especial interest in the efforts being made to eliminate the results of the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries and in the strengthening of their economy and defense. The two sides regarded the talks as a further contribution to the friendly cooperation and close friendship that link the two countries and the efforts these countries are making, in addition to those of the non-aligned and peace-loving countries, on behalf of the just cause of the Arabs and the cause of world progress and peace.

160

Joint Press Statement on Yugoslav President Tito's Visit to the U.A.R., 10-13 and 16-17 August.³ [Excerpt]

Cairo, August 17, 1967

The two Presidents exchanged views on the Middle East crisis and the international situation. The talks also covered matters concerning the continued development of relations and cooperation between the two countries in all fields.

In their discussions the two sides particularly stressed the efforts being made to liquidate the effects of the Israeli aggression against the Arab States. They emphasised that the situation resulting from the aggression must not continue, and that it constitutes a serious violation of the rights and legitimate interests of the Arab States

² *Al-Jumhuriyah*, 17/8/1967.

³ U.A.R. *Documentary Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 104.

and a direct threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world. They also stressed that a solution to this crisis can be found only by respecting the rights and legitimate interests of the Arab peoples.

The two sides particularly stressed that the interests of the freedom- and peace-loving peoples demand that they shall not allow a dangerous precedent to be set whereby an aggressor may reap the fruits of his aggression. Therefore, the two said, they believed the U.N. was called upon to face up to the great challenge, affecting in particular the future role of non-aligned and other peace-loving and progressive States, now confronted with a crucial test in this crisis.

The two sides also stressed the need to support the Arab States to enable them to make up for the losses caused by the war and to strengthen their economic and defence capabilities effectively to resist any aggression.

The two sides discussed the specific measures to be taken in this respect, both bilaterally and collectively.

The two sides regard these talks as a fresh contribution to the mutual understanding and firm friendship linking the two countries. The talks also provided positive support for the joint efforts which the two sides and other non-aligned and peace-loving States are making for the sake of the just Arab cause, the freedom and independence of peoples and the cause of progress and peace throughout the world.

161

Press Statement by Yugoslav President Tito at the End of his Visit to the U.A.R.¹

Alexandria, August 17, 1967

I wish first to express my thanks and gratitude to the press and information media which gave prominence to our meetings in the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq. I also wish to point out that, owing to the shortage of time, I am afraid there will

be no room for questions and answers. However, I have agreed with the President to make this statement to you. I shall speak about the purpose of my trip to certain friendly Arab States in the present situation.

You must have noted that since the beginning of the aggression Yugoslavia has made efforts to find a solution for this crisis. Yugoslavia sympathises with the Arab States and supports their rights and interests. This is obvious from the Yugoslav delegation's activities at the U.N. and the various contacts we have made. All this reflects the feelings of the Yugoslav people and Government towards the Arab peoples. It also reflects our feeling about the need to reach a solution for this crisis through peaceful means. Our people and many other freedom- and peace-loving peoples support the Arabs, particularly in this situation in which they face aggression.

The purpose of my visit to the Arab countries has been to acquaint myself with the various aspects and features of the situation so as to arrive at the correct method of removing the effects of the aggression and guaranteeing Arab interests.

As you already know, I began my visit with the U.A.R. We feel great friendship for the U.A.R. and its leader and we always consult one another on various matters.

We talked together about the measures which could be taken in the future. I also talked with the leaders of Syria and Iraq on the issue and its aspects. The intention was to become acquainted with the views of the friendly Arab States and to let them learn my view as well, particularly since the Yugoslav proposal submitted to the U.N. in the name of the non-aligned States failed to secure [the necessary] majority.

Other attempts were also made in this respect, but none of them made any progress. Thus, I decided to pay this visit to the Arab world to study all aspects of the situation before making a new move. During my visits I submitted the view of the non-aligned States and of other States which we have contacted and which have contacted us, including the big Powers.

I want to say now that after the talks we have had with the Arab countries and the friendly countries we are optimistic about the steps which will be taken in the future. Although I cannot speak in detail on these steps, I can say that there

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 18/8/1967.

is agreement between us on the measures to be taken to settle this crisis politically. Of course, you will learn more about this from the steps and measures that will be adopted in due course. Thank you.

162

Policy Statement by the U.S. Department of State on the Middle East.¹

Washington, August 18, 1967

[This policy statement was contained in a letter from Mr. William Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, to Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sent in reply to the following question:

Is the United States as a nation committed to supply military or economic resources to protect the territorial integrity of these (Middle Eastern) states?]

President Johnson and his three predecessors have stated the United States interest and concern in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the Near East.

This is a statement of policy and not a commitment to take particular action in particular circumstances. Unrest and conflict in the Middle East have been of serious concern to the United States for a long time.

The use of armed forces in the Near East can have especially serious consequences for international peace extending far beyond that area. We have bent our efforts to prevent a renewal of conflict there. Thus, we have stated our position in an effort to use our influence in the cause of peace.

163

Joint Communiqué on Talks Between U.S. President Johnson and Shah Reza Pahlevi of Iran, 22-23 August.² [Excerpt]

Washington, August 23, 1967

The Shahanshah and the President reviewed the world situation and particularly the situation in the Middle East, and they agreed that a solution to the current tensions in the area should be sought in strict compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The two leaders agreed to remain in close touch about the Middle East situation. The Shahanshah also reaffirmed Iran's determination to sustain adequate modern defense forces to ensure Iran's national security.

164

Press Release on the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.³ [Excerpts]

Helsinki, August 23, 1967

The Nordic Foreign Ministers held their regular autumn meeting in Helsinki on August 22nd and 23rd, 1967 in order to discuss, among other things, questions concerning the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York.

The Foreign Ministers first discussed the international situation...The prolonged war in Vietnam and the consequences of the crisis in the Middle East had created a situation in which ever increasing efforts were needed if international peace and security were to be ensured.

In discussing the situation in the Near East the Ministers agreed that efforts must be continued within the U.N. in order to reach a lasting solution which would lead to a withdrawal of Israel's

² U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 18/9/1967, p. 361.

³ Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1967, p. 75. Danish Premier Jens Otto Krag and Swedish Minister without Portfolio Mrs. Alva Myrdal also attended the meeting. [Ed.]

¹ Jerusalem Post, 20/8/1967.

forces from the areas they have occupied during the war in June and which would guarantee independence and peace for all states in the area. A decisive pre-requisite condition for peace and stability in the Middle East is that the still unsolved refugee problems in this area, which have been further aggravated by the war, should be solved.

The crisis in the Middle East has once more demonstrated the ability of the U.N. to serve as an instrument of peace and as a forum for international consultations. The ability of the U.N. to contribute effectively to securing a lasting peace in the Middle East should be further strengthened.

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165

Message from U.S.S.R. President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin to the Khartum Conference of Arab Heads of State.¹

Moscow, August 29, 1967

The common struggle of the Arab peoples against the criminal aggression of Israel and against the endeavours of imperialist circles to incite the aggressor to violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, rights and legitimate interests of the Arab countries, has the full understanding and complete support of our country and of the whole Soviet people.

As in the past, the Soviet Union remains the sincere friend of the Arab peoples.

The Arab countries enjoy the sympathy of all peace-loving peoples, inasmuch as the struggle against Israeli aggression which is taking place on Arab soil is a struggle against the whole aggressive policy of the imperialists, who are waging a war of brigandage in Vietnam, organising provocations against Cuba, sending sabotage groups of foreign mercenaries to the Congo (Kinshasa) and hatching conspiracies against other countries and peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 30/8/1967.

166

Statement by French Information Minister Gorse on French-Yugoslav Contacts on the Middle East.²

Paris, August 30, 1967

La visite que Mr. Popovitch, ancien vice-président de la République Yougoslave, a rendu ce matin au général de Gaulle pour lui remettre un message du Maréchal Tito, a été évoqué par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, au cours du conseil des ministres de cet après-midi.

Dans sa longue lettre, le chef de l'Etat Yougoslave fait part des impressions qu'il a retirées du voyage qu'il a effectué au Moyen-Orient et évoqué les possibilités qui peuvent se présenter en vue d'un futur règlement de la situation au Proche-Orient. Il a été procédé à un échange de vues, et sur un grand nombre de points les positions françaises et Yougoslaves sont apparues voisines et coïncidant.

Le Maréchal Tito s'est adressé aux Quatre Grands. C'est une voie à laquelle la France avait pensé avant les événements. Elle ne saurait donc être récusée par le gouvernement Français, et elle n'exclut pas d'ailleurs l'examen par les Nations unies.

167

Address by Canadian Foreign Secretary Martin on the Threat of the Arms Race.³

[Excerpts]

Bob-lo Island (Ontario), August 31, 1967

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There as a number of areas in which the threat is immediate... One is the ominous tide of increased conventional-arms acquisition by non-nuclear countries in the less-developed world. In some regions, the arms race is only an "arms walk"; in others it is a pell-mell scramble. In *all*, it is a severe drain on the economic and technical resources of the poor countries and contributes

² *Le Monde*, 1/9/1967.

³ *External Affairs*, 1967, p. 402.

to the increase of tension. In the Middle East, for example, the leap-frog acquisition of arms contributed to the recent conflict and could lead again to hostilities. We must find ways of putting an end to the renewal of this arms race. Although Canada recognizes the problems created by Soviet arms activities in the Middle East, and the reasons which have led Western countries to attempt to maintain a military balance in that part of the world, we regret the continued flow of arms into the area, and we support practical and equitable proposals for controlling all arms shipments. Thus Canada has expressed its support for the preliminary suggestion of President Johnson to institute a system of registering arms shipments to the Middle East. Our hope would be that registration would be followed by arrangements to limit the supply of arms. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has so far shown little interest in this exploratory proposal. But we must continue to search for ways to reduce the flow of lethal equipment to this and other areas of tension in the less-developed world.

168

Speech of Turkish President Sunay at a Dinner in Honor of King Husayn of Jordan.¹
[Excerpts]

Ankara, September 5, 1967

Our respective nations have lived together for centuries. This past which we share and our social and cultural ties constitute an unshakable foundation for friendship and brotherhood between our nations. Turkey is a peace-loving nation dedicated to the ideals of the United Nations, the concept of justice, human rights and freedom... We believe that no effort should be spared to secure peace and stability based on justice. We hold that attempts to create situations based on the use of force, duress, and by the creation of *faits accomplis* inevitably lead to

conflicts and clashes. History is full of innumerable instructive examples supporting this belief. This is why the Turkish nation and the government of the Turkish Republic have been deeply perturbed and have deplored the recent Middle East crisis and war as well as its results. Turkey will continue to sincerely support efforts to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East founded on fairness and justice. We have announced with unmistakeable clarity our view that in order to establish such a peace it is necessary for Arab territory occupied in the recent war to be evacuated.

169

Interview Granted by West German Foreign Minister Brandt to the Beirut Daily "An-Nahar".²

Bonn, September 5, 1967

Q. In a press statement issued in November 1966 you stated that, as Leader of the Social Democratic Party and Leader of the Opposition, you had called on former Chancellor Erhard's government to try, with the assistance of the Arab League, to restore diplomatic relations with all the Arab countries. As soon as the new German government was formed, in which you took over responsibility for Foreign Affairs, you started making new efforts to this end. What results have these efforts achieved so far?

A. When I made the statement you have referred to I was expressing the view of the Social Democrats, that the exchange of diplomatic representation with Israel should not be an obstacle to continued diplomatic relations with all the Arab countries.

The rupture of diplomatic relations was not made by Germany. But, in spite of this, I held the view that we should make efforts to facilitate the restoration of diplomatic relations, as it was possible that the leaders of the Arab countries had come to realize that they had been somewhat hasty in taking their decisions. I therefore called for direct contacts, not only with the Arab coun-

¹ Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish, 2045 GMT, 5/9/1967.

² *An-Nahar*, 6/9/1967.

tries individually, but also with the Arab League, for the decision to sever diplomatic relations had been taken within the framework of the League.

Some weeks after my statement, the Social Democratic Party joined the new government, whose statement of 13 December 1966 affirmed that the new German Chancellor regarded the restoration of normal and traditional relations with the whole Arab world as one of his government's first duties. And, on 15 December 1966, I, as Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor, assured Parliament that we were extremely eager to achieve this important aim, which had been mentioned in the government's statement, as soon as possible. I also said that the West German Government had no wish to intervene in the current dispute in the Middle East or in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, and that it was prepared to assist United Nations efforts to achieve a solution of Middle East problems.

That is why we are anxious to make this attitude of ours clear to the Arab authorities and to the Arab League. For this reason, also, we welcomed the visit of the Secretary of the Arab League to Bonn last April.

Q. Was Mr. Abdul Khalek Hassunah's visit helpful?

A. We found the Secretary General of the Arab League a man of great wisdom, experience, firmness and sincerity, which qualities ensured that the talks were not fruitless. The talks disclosed an identity, or at any rate a rapprochement, of views on the most important points, and this made them extremely useful.¹

After the discussions I sent Mr. Hassunah a letter containing a summary of all that we had discussed, from my own point of view. The points contained in this letter were to the effect that there was no reason for the Arabs to be anxious lest our attitude to Israel might, or was bound to, lead to the impairment of Arab-German relations. As a result of this, I believe that Mr. Hassunah was able to submit a good and full report of the matter to the Council of the Arab League. This "first stage" was interrupted as a result of recent events in the Middle East.

Q. Do you think that recent events in the Arab world have made the restoration of diplomatic relations more complicated? What I have in mind is the attitude of the German government to the Arab-Israeli dispute.

A. I do not regard the West German government's attitude to the Arab-Israeli struggle as an obstacle to the restoration of diplomatic relations. Our attitude derives from my statement to Parliament on 16 December 1966, to the effect that the West German government firmly adhered to the principle of a policy of non-intervention.

I am well aware that there are forces outside the Arab world that are still making every possible effort, in their false statements, to accuse us of alignment with a specific side in the Arab-Israeli struggle or of hostility to the Arab peoples. All these accusations are groundless, and their aim is not only to damage the interests of the German Federal Republic, but also to destroy Arab-German links. This, naturally, is not in the interest of the Arabs.

Q. In spite of all the German government's assurances of complete neutrality, the Arab side cannot see what will be the effects of the close cooperation between Germany and France. It was said during General de Gaulle's recent visit to Bonn that methods of reaching agreement on joint action had been discussed by the two sides, and that the agreement was about to be implemented. What are the facts?

A. In this connection I should like to say the following:

The German Federal Republic is not a great power, nor is it a member of the United Nations, not to mention the problem of partition which has befallen our nation and which has such distressing results in a variety of fields—all this we have to take into consideration. No one, therefore, can expect us to undertake the burden of a world role in our foreign policy, such as that envisaged by French policy. General de Gaulle's recent visit to Bonn disclosed that the French and German governments are agreed that contacts with the Middle East countries will, in the future, require more European cooperation. Agreement was also reached on the bases on which the European countries must work to help rebuild the countries that suffered losses during the recent war. In this connection I should like to say also that French diplomacy, which at present repre-

¹ See *ante*, docs. 13 and 15.

sents our interests in some Arab countries, has tried to make our attitude clear to the Arab governments. This fruitful German-French co-operation is calculated to improve German-Arab relations, a thing that we greatly appreciate.

Q. In the course of Mr. Hassunah's visit to Bonn it was proposed that West Germany should play a greater part in offering aid to the Palestine refugees. Today such aid is more necessary than it was three months ago. Does the German government envisage taking any steps in this direction?

A. The West German government looks upon the fate of the Palestinian refugees with special understanding, for we are well aware of refugee problems from our own bitter experience here in Germany. That is why, during the recent troubles, Germany lost no time in offering humanitarian aid, and is at present engaged in the study of plans designed to meet the new problems that have arisen as a result of the last war.

Q. Every time the question of German-Israeli relations is raised, Arab politicians express their grave concern at the fact that the German government reserves "special treatment" for Israel, the result of which special treatment in the past has been to supply Israel with arms and aid on an enormous scale. Is this Arab concern justified?

A. When discussing the subject of "Germany and Israel" we must not forget the grim legacy of the dictatorship that ruled Germany from 1933 to 1945. Israel talks to us in the name of the millions of Jewish victims, and this is a subject that no German government—with any concern for the welfare of the whole German people—can possibly afford to ignore. In our present attempts to restore diplomatic relations with all the Arab countries, we recall that it has been our view for some years now that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Tel Aviv should be the end of the special treatment of Israel.

As you know, for twelve years, and before Bonn sent an ambassador to Tel Aviv, Israel had an ambassador in West Germany acting as head of an Israeli mission—there were thus unilateral relations, a situation which differed from that of most other countries, which have diplomatic relations with the Arab States and Israel at the same time. Then, in 1965, normal relations were

established between West Germany and Israel, by the establishment of diplomatic relations; this is something final and permanent. As regards the Arabs' concern, it is absolutely without justification, for all we are doing is to fulfill our desire for a balanced policy. In this connection, too, I can assure you that since 1965 we have sent no arms to Israel. As for the economic matters we have agreed on with Israel, they will not be unconditional; they will be subject to the same conditions that are applied in the case of other countries.

Q. You mentioned what you called the "first stage," which has come to an end as a result of recent events. Do you mean by this that future efforts will be made with the Arab League or with each Arab country individually?

A. There have been contacts in the past, there are contacts at present, and they will continue in the future. I have clarified all points that indicate in which respects the Arab League may be instrumental in the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Arab world and West Germany to their former normal state.

The German government will not be influenced by untrue accusations that it is trying to play one Arab country off against another.

As in the case with Jordan, we shall welcome attempts on the part of any Arab country to re-establish diplomatic relations with us. I welcome any initiative on the part of the Arab countries and any Arab decision to this effect, which may have been delayed for a variety of reasons.

170

News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, September 8, 1967

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we could turn to the Middle East. For some time you have been saying that the question of arms shipments into the area was under continuing review. More recently, you said it was under intensive

¹ U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 25/9/1967, pp. 337-89.

review. I wonder if this seeming semantic escalation means you are preparing to resume arms shipments into the area?

A. No, I think it is not quite as dramatic as that. [Laughter.] It is under review. It is not only under review here in the executive branch; it is under review in the Congress. As you know, we have had some complications on such questions in the recent hearings and actions by the Senate and the House of Representatives, on our aid bill, and on the Ex-Im Bank legislation.

Now, this matter is still up for consideration in the Congress. There will be a conference meeting on the aid bill, for example, and military assistance. So we want to be sure that we know where we are and what our legislative capability is, and what is possible, before we try to decide what we should do under certain circumstances. We don't want to find ourselves in a position of trying to make some decisions that would be undercut by the refusal of Congress to give us the legislative authority to carry them out.

So this is still under review—continuing, intensive, interested—but it is still under review.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with the U.N. reconvening, would you give us your assessment of what you see as a prospect on the Middle East crisis?

A. Our own position remains that stated by President Johnson on June 19, and the five principles which we have announced.¹

We do believe that those who live in the area have the primary responsibility for finding answers to the question. We do not believe that a state of belligerency or a state of war is consistent with peace in the Near East. And we know that those who have to face the prospect of living there for generations to come certainly for the next decades have got to find some basis on which coexistence is tolerable, and that applies to both sides. We would hope that now that everybody has had a chance to catch his breath and to reflect upon the situation that the United Nations would be able—when the General Assembly convenes and the Security Council takes up this question again—that the voices of moderation would make it possible to stabilize a peace in an area

where peace has been long delayed and where it is desperately needed.

So we will be doing everything we can, both in the U.N. and in capitals and through private diplomacy, to find a basis for an enduring peace there. Our approach is that announced by President Johnson in his five principles on June 19.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the Middle East and the necessity of moderation. Did you detect a sense of moderation coming out of the Khartoum conference?

A. I think in general there were some signs of encouragement from the Khartoum conference, but we have to, I think, defer judgments until we get down to the hard business of organizing a peace in the Middle East. I think that some of the realities are becoming more apparent on both sides and that this will perhaps make some contribution toward the possibilities of peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, the United States has said several times it would like to see the return of all those Arab refugees from East Jordan to West Jordan who want to go back. The total has now been set at 20,000 by Israel. Is the United States satisfied or—

A. Well, we think that these ordinary people, displaced by war, ought to have a chance to return to their homes. We hope that these refugees who fled from the West Bank would have a chance to come back to their homes. The events which overwhelmed them were not really of their making. They had nothing much to do with the ordinary people on either side. And we think it would be a contribution toward a peaceful settlement if these people could return to their homes.

We have made our views known on this subject. It is for the future to decide, to determine how far we can get in this regard.

¹ See *ante*, doc. 114.

171

Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to Turkey, 5-11 September.¹
[Excerpt]

Ankara, September 11, 1967

The two Heads of State studied the present situation in the Middle East in all its aspects, and reviewed the development of relations between their two countries.

His Majesty King Husayn expressed the profound appreciation and gratitude of the Arab world, and of the government and people of Jordan, for the understanding and solid support offered by Turkey to the Arab cause during the recent crisis in the area, and for the aid she had given to the Jordanian refugees from the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, who had been the victims of that crisis.

The President of the Turkish Republic reaffirmed Turkey's friendship and sincere feelings towards the Arab world, praising in particular the courage and patriotism of the Jordanian people under the leadership of His Majesty King Husayn. The Turkish President also reaffirmed Turkey's opposition to the use of force as a means of achieving political and territorial gains, and her opposition to the exploitation of such gains for the imposition of unilateral solutions inconsistent with the legitimate rights of peoples and nations.

The two Heads of State also reaffirmed the necessity for Israeli forces to withdraw from all the areas they have occupied since 5 June and the strict and rapid implementation of the two United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem.

The two Heads of State also expressed their firm conviction that peace can only be achieved in the area through a just and honorable solution that will ensure and fully protect the legitimate rights of the Arabs.

172

Joint Communiqué on French President de Gaulle's Visit to Poland, 6-12 September.²
[Excerpt]

Warsaw, September 12, 1967

Les entretiens ont porté également sur la situation au Moyen-Orient. Les interlocuteurs ont échangé leurs vues sur ce problème et ont constaté que leurs conclusions sont dans l'ensemble voisines.

Les deux parties ont évoqué le rôle important que l'Organisation des Nations unies peut jouer pour le renforcement de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant entendu que ses activités doivent se tenir dans le strict respect des principes et des dispositions de la charte.

173

Joint Communiqué on Talks Between U.S. President Johnson and Italian President Saragat, 18-19 September.³ [Excerpt]

Washington, September 19, 1967

It was agreed that the two countries, deeply concerned by recent events in the Middle East, share a particular interest in the reestablishment of peace and stability in that area...

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, Amman, 12/9/1967.

² *Le Monde*, 14/9/1967.

³ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 16/10/1967, p. 503.

174

Joint Communiqué on Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to Ceylon, 18-21 September.¹ [Excerpt]**Colombo, September 21, 1967**

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The Prime Ministers discussed the grave situation in West Asia and recognised that peace in this region was vital not only for the peace of the world but also for the peace and economic well-being of the developing countries of Asia and Africa. They expressed the hope that a peaceful settlement of this problem would be found in the near future on a just and honourable basis. The discussions revealed an identity of views on the essentials of this problem and the approach to a solution. The Prime Ministers agreed that any solution of this problem must ensure the return to peaceful conditions and the withdrawal of forces to the June 4, 1967 positions. They emphasised that occupation of territory by means of military action must be vacated without conditions. They further agreed that a satisfactory solution should seek to deal with this problem on a long range basis, take into account the legitimate aspirations of the people and respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in this area.

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175

Joint Communiqué on Saudi Arabian King Faysal's Visit to Somalia, 20-23 September.² [Excerpt]**Mogadishu, September 23, 1967**

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The two Leaders also expressed their concern at the continued Israeli aggression with the support of the forces of world Zionism, and at Israel's achieving new gains every time she launches an aggression, ignoring the United

Nations and challenging the conscience of the world.

It is the opinion of the two Leaders that the Zionist plan of aggression is not directed only against the Arabs of Palestine..., but also against all that is most sacred to religion in this part of the world. The Aqsa Mosque, the first *qibla* and the third most important holy place of Islam, has been violated, which obliges Muslims in all parts of the world to unite in the most strenuous efforts to counter this evil plan, which is designed to violate all that is most holy. Muslim leaders, and the leaders of all people who believe in God, should meet as soon as possible to define their attitude to this aggression, with the object of liberating the Arab homeland and the holy places from the grip of treacherous Zionism.

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176

Joint Communiqué on Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 19-29 September.³ [Excerpt]**Moscow, September 30, 1967**

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The two sides exchanged opinions concerning the present situation in the Near East. They expressed their concern in connection with the exacerbation of existing problems in this region as a result of hostile operations and the seizure by Israel of territories of the Arab States. The heads of government declared that *faits accomplis* cannot be regarded as definitive and that the use of force cannot justify territorial seizures or provide political advantages. The heads of government spoke out in favor of the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories seized as a result of military operations. The governments of the Soviet Union and Turkey declared anew their interest in seeing the Near and Middle East become a zone of peace and security.

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¹ *Foreign Affairs Record*, 1967, pp. 129-30.² *Al-Bilad*, Jiddah, 24/9/1967.³ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 18/10/1967, p. 22. From *Pravda*.

177

Joint Communiqué on Pakistani President Ayub Khan's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 25 September-4 October.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, October 4, 1967

...The immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied during the military operations is essential for the normalization of the situation in the Middle East.

178

Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 2-5 October.² [Excerpts]

Moscow, October 5, 1967

During the discussions and talks, which proceeded in an atmosphere of candor and mutual understanding, questions relating to the further development of friendly Soviet-Jordanian relations were discussed, and there was also an exchange of opinions on basic international problems. In the first place, the parties paid special attention to the discussion of questions connected with Israel's aggression against the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab states and with ways for liquidating its consequences. They also discussed matters related to the development of the situation in the Near East.

The Jordanian side expressed profound gratitude to the people and government of the Soviet Union for the sincere and valuable support and assistance the U.S.S.R. has rendered and continues vigorously to render to the Arab states that were victims of aggression. It gave high praise to the efforts of the Soviet government, both in

the U.N. and outside its confines, toward the cessation of military operations in the Near East and in the struggle for the swiftest possible liquidation of the consequences of aggression, which jeopardize the cause of peace in this area and the world over.

Both parties unanimously believe that, as long as the armed forces of Israel are on Arab territory, the danger of a new military conflict in the Near East will not be eliminated. Therefore, Israel must without delay withdraw its troops from the Arab territories they have seized to behind the lines they occupied prior to June 5. It is necessary also that the Arab states subjected to attack be recompensed for the material damage caused by the Israeli aggression and the continuing occupation of parts of their territory, and that the resolutions on Jerusalem passed by the recent emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly be carried out without delay.

Both parties expressed satisfaction with the fact that the question of the liquidation of the consequences of Israel's aggression against the peoples of the Arab countries was placed first on the agenda of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The two sides agreed that the U.N. must not allow a dangerous precedent to be set, one that would afford the aggressor an opportunity to profit by the results of the aggression he has committed and would permit him to turn the captured Arab territories into an object of political bargaining.

Both parties believe that the unity and solidarity of all the Arab countries on an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist basis, which is the guarantee of their successful joint struggle for strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the states of the Arab East, assumes special importance in the light of the aggression in the Near East.

The Soviet side confirmed that the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist states, will continue to render to the Arab states the necessary support in their just struggle for their legitimate rights, in the restoration and development of their economies and in strengthening their defense capability.

The Soviet side regarded with understanding the efforts undertaken by the Arab states along the line of strengthening, expanding and coordi-

¹ *Tass News Bulletin*, 4/10/1967.

² *Ad-Dustur*, 6/10/1967.

nating actions for the purpose of eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression. It expressed support for the unanimously adopted decisions of the Khartum conference of Arab heads of state.

179

Rumania's Stand on the Middle East Crisis as Stated by A. Malnashan, Rumanian Ambassador at Belgrade.¹

Belgrade, October 1967

Yet another problem boding ill for world peace is the situation engendered by the armed conflict which recently erupted in the Middle East.

From the very beginning, this country has supported the settlement of controversies between the Middle East countries not by armed conflict, but by peaceful means, taking as a point of departure the realities arising from the development of the postwar world, the existence of independent Arab states and of the state of Israel.

In the present situation, the problem is to arrive at a settlement of controversial questions in the Middle East by negotiation, by respecting the interests and legitimate rights of all nations and states in the area.

If the problem is to be solved along these lines, it is most urgent and important for Israeli troops to withdraw from territory occupied during the June hostilities. This country opposes the measures towards annexation of Jerusalem taken by the Israeli authorities and any other pretensions to achieving benefits from military operations.

Rumania considers it necessary and useful for all peace-minded states to invest their efforts in making possible and accelerating a peaceful solution of the conflict in that area. Obviously, however, the chief responsibility for finding a solution to the Middle East problem rests with the governments and peoples living in that part

of the world; it is equally obvious that no firm and lasting solution can be implemented without the participation and agreement of the parties directly concerned—the countries in that zone.

180

Interview Statements by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the Middle East.²

New Delhi, October 1967

Q. The West Asian situation being the most prominent danger point, may I ask for your opinion on ways the solution of this crisis would be served best?

A. The West Asian situation continues to cause deep anxiety. Mere absence of war does not ensure peace in the area nor can peace be restored without earnest and realistic measures to secure the withdrawal of forces to positions obtaining on June 4 and settlement on fair and honourable terms of the human problem of the Palestine refugees. India has welcomed the initiative taken by President Tito. I hope to discuss the situation more fully with President Tito, President Nasser and other leaders during my forthcoming visit. Meanwhile the Foreign Ministers of Yugoslavia, United Arab Republic and the Indian Defence Minister will meet soon in New York to take stock of the situation and consider what further steps might be taken.

Q. What is the part the United Nations could play in serving the purpose of a just and lasting solution there?

A. The United Nations can play a positive role in ensuring peace and in promoting a just and lasting solution in West Asia. Constructive international opinion must recognise that the age is past when State boundaries can be altered by armed force. The United Nations should uphold this view.

¹ *Review of International Affairs*, 5/10/1967, p. 11. Excerpt of an article on the basic postulates and goals of Rumanian foreign policy.

² *India News*, ISI/224/1967.

181

Reply of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Tito at a Dinner in her Honor.¹
[Excerpt]

Belgrade, October 11, 1967

You have referred to the continuance of deep tension and unresolved crisis in West Asia. This continued stalemate is a threat to peace. Aggression must be vacated. Only on this basis can the problem of security of nations in this region begin to be tackled. Other problems, economic as well as human, can be considered separately. We have followed with keen interest the great efforts which you have made in personally visiting a number of Arab capitals and in sending special envoys to other capitals of Europe and Latin America. Our good wishes and hopes accompanied you on your journey. As a result of these sincere probings there emerged a series of constructive ideas which have provided a *modus vivendi* and which contain the basis for lasting settlement. We have welcomed and supported your initiative as also your ideas and shall continue to do so. Through this period it has been useful to have the closest contact with you and your representatives and to share information. Many difficulties are yet to be overcome but we can discern a wider recognition of the need for finding a political solution of the West Asia crisis. We must continue to pursue our efforts to make this possible.

We are glad that in this hour of great national crisis our friend and colleague President Nasser weathered the storm with great wisdom and courage. We send him our message of solidarity. I am firmly convinced that the great historical movement of the Arab people will go forward in strength and unity towards the achievement of its progressive aims. The tide of Arab nationalism cannot be reversed. Statesmanship consists in recognising the validity as well as vitality of this great movement of the Arab people towards national self-expression.

182

News Conference Statements by U.S. Secretary of State Rusk.² [Excerpt]

Washington, October 12, 1967

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the diplomatic front in the Middle East, there have been several U.S.-Soviet meetings on the subject lately. Does this diplomatic activity indicate that you're making any progress within the present framework on this subject? Can you report anything to us on that?

Mr. Rusk: Well, in our business we work at such questions very hard, on the basis that progress is possible and that a good result can be achieved. We have not yet reached that result. It is, therefore, a little hazardous to indicate whether we feel that real progress is being made.

What is happening is private consultation between the countries in the area, or with countries in the area and among certain of the countries outside the larger powers, to see if we could find a basis on which there can be a permanent peace in the area.

Now, this turns critically upon the attitude of the countries in the area. At the present time, I do not think that it turns upon major differences or conflicts among the great powers, but nevertheless it is not easy for the great powers to agree among themselves unless they know what the attitudes of the countries in the area will be.

Now, I think this process is likely to continue. I don't think that time is working now on the side of a peaceful settlement. I think it is important for some movement to get started and that the United Nations has both a responsibility and an opportunity here in this situation.

So these discussions go on. They go on in great detail, with many governments. And I would hope that before too long we could find a formula which would move this situation toward that permanent peace which we desperately hope for and which I think the ordinary peoples of the area would welcome if it could be obtained.

¹ *Ibid.*, ISI/225/1967.

² U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 30/10/1967, pp. 561-62.

183

Speech of French President de Gaulle at a Banquet in Honor of Pakistani President Ayub Khan.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, October 17, 1967

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Nous voyons votre pays pratiquer à l'extérieur une politique qui répond à ce qui est essentiel... C'est ainsi qu'en ce qui concerne le conflit du Moyen-Orient vous tenez, comme la France, pour condamnable le fait d'avoir engagé les combats, pour inacceptable l'acquisition de territoires étrangers occupés par la force des armes, pour nécessaire un règlement futur fondé sur la reconnaissance mutuelle de tous les Etats intéressés, la fin de toute belligérance et l'établissement de la libre navigation pour tous dans une région dont le sort politique, économique et religieux touche de si près le monde entier.

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184

Reply of Pakistani President Ayub Khan to President de Gaulle at a Dinner in his Honor.² [Excerpt]

Paris, October 17, 1967

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We support your view that a sense of justice and fair play should prevail in international relations. Nowhere was this more in evidence than in the unfortunate Middle East war when you condemned aggression. As you know, we have declared without any reservation that the aggressor cannot be allowed to get away with the fruits of its aggression and that the territory illegally annexed by Israel has to be restored to the Arabs. Unless this is done promptly and unconditionally there can be no peace in that region.

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Official Statement by the Israeli Cabinet on the Country's Position vis-à-vis the Arab States.³

Jerusalem, October 17, 1967

In the light of the 22nd Assembly's deliberations, the Government notes with regret the fact that the Arab states maintain their refusal to recognize Israel, enter into negotiations with her, or conclude a peace treaty with her.

The Government of Israel expresses its hope that the peoples and Governments of the world will not shut their eyes to this grave fact, which is contrary to international law and the principles of the U.N. Charter. In view of the position of the Arab states, Israel will continue to maintain and safeguard her position, taking into account the vital needs of the country's security and development.

The Government of Israel reiterates and stresses that a solution to the area's problems can only be arrived at through a durable peace and on the basis of direct Israel-Arab negotiations.

The Government has instructed the Israel delegation to the U.N. to act in accordance with the policy adopted by the Government and Knesset on August 1, 1967.⁴

186

Letter from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Macomber to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nuclear Desalting Plants for the Middle East.⁵

Washington, October 18, 1967

Hon. J. W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Secretary has

³ *Jerusalem Post*, 18/10/1967.

⁴ See *ante*, doc. 150.

⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Construction of Nuclear Desalting Plants in the Middle East, Hearings*, October 19-November 17, 1967.

¹ *Le Monde*, 19/10/1967.

² *Dawn*, Karachi, 18/10/1967.

asked me to reply to your letter of August 16, 1967, requesting comments on S. Res. 155,¹ which is intended to express the sense of the Senate in support of proposals for regional nuclear desalinization facilities in the Near East as a contribution to peace in the area.

As you know, the United States has consistently made clear to the nations of the area its willingness to participate in programs for applying the new technology of desalinization. In a speech on the Middle East crisis on June 19, President Johnson said:

"If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward the works of peace they can count with confidence upon the friendship and the help of all the people of the United States of America. . . We here will do our share and do more—to see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is applied to the critical problem of desalting water and helping to make the deserts bloom."

The United States has demonstrated its interest through direct involvement in plans proposed by several nations of the area. The United States and Israel have jointly financed a study of the feasibility of constructing a nuclear-fueled dual-purpose electric power and desalting plant in Israel. Completed in February 1966, the study concluded it was technically feasible to construct a plant which would produce 100 million gallons per day of desalted water and 200 megawatts of saleable electricity. Subsequently, the Israeli Government proposed a supplementary study to investigate the possibility of increasing the electric power production of the proposed plant to 300 megawatts. This study, also jointly financed, is underway. The economic feasibility of constructing such a plant in Israel is also being studied.

Through the Office of Saline Water in the Department of Interior, the United States has cooperated with the Government of Saudi Arabia on the design of a fossil-fueled dual-purpose desalting and power plant for Jidda. Equipment is now being ordered for this plant and work is proceeding on schedule.

On a recent visit to Kuwait, Secretary Udall offered the cooperation of the United States in a program of desalinization research and plant

operations training which the Kuwait Government plans to establish.

As you know, the United States has given assistance, for many years, to the Arab and Israeli peoples in successive efforts to relieve the shortage of water, to organize useful work and to produce and otherwise obtain adequate food supply. The AID programs in recent years in the Kingdom of Jordan are an example: a Natural Resources Authority has been established by that Government and AID has assisted that agency in its program to locate and map all sources of water, to provide adequate water to population centers and to enable planning of agricultural and industrial development. You will recall the efforts that have been made to assist the interested countries in determining the most practicable and economical use of the waters of the Jordan River basin.

We would welcome further opportunities in the area for cooperation in the installation of desalting plants and research leading to the improved efficiency and economy of this technology and, in the broader effort, to determine the most economic sources of fresh water and the best methods of utilizing known sources.

Consistent with the spirit of the resolution under consideration, we will continue to be alert to all possibilities within and outside the United Nations and with all nations similarly minded, to make progress toward these objectives. We have been studying ways in which the new technology might best be employed in the pursuit of regional stability. For the moment, bilateral programs of the kind described seem to hold out the most immediate chance for achieving these ends and furthering the economic development of the area. But I can assure you that we shall be ready with the most imaginative and effective proposals that the political environment of the Middle East will permit.

We share your view that regional economic cooperation can advance the cause of peace, but we believe that effective economic cooperation between Israel and the Arab states will have to be founded on political understanding. Antagonisms are so deep seated that we do not believe that hope of economic progress alone is enough to break the political deadlock. While we are doing our utmost to achieve political breakthrough at the United Nations, unfortunately, so far no

¹ See *ante*, doc. 158.

one has succeeded. In the absence of a political base, we believe it would be premature for the United States to press regional cooperation on Israel and the Arab States. However, we would be prepared to cooperate fully with the support of the Congress, in any regional program that appears to offer genuine prospects of such cooperation if the parties desire the assistance of the United States.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

William B. Macomber, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

187

Statement by U.S. Secretary of the Interior Udall Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Water Resources as a Key to Middle East Peace.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, October 19, 1967

Mr. Chairman :

I want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss some of the actions we can take leading to Middle East development and peaceful relations among the nations of the area. I shall touch only upon the highlights, but will submit additional details for your information.

My Department certainly welcomes the initiative expressed in Senate Resolution 155. It is a constructive approach to using water for solving critical international problems. Having personally visited the area earlier this year and having focused on the many problems presented, I am convinced that appropriate actions to provide water will raise the level of living and contribute to peace in that troubled area. I have also seen the great total resource potential that exists in the Middle East. The problem, then, is one of selecting and implementing the best approaches to these vast opportunities.

¹ *Ibid.* The statement appears as entered in the record.

First, let me say that the U.S. Government has cooperated closely with Middle Eastern states in applying developing technology to the area's water problems. On February 6, 1964, President Johnson noted that the United States "had begun discussions" with Israel on desalting. During Prime Minister Eshkol's visit to this country in June 1964, the two leaders reached agreement "to undertake joint studies on the problems of desalting." Subsequently a study of the feasibility of constructing a large-scale, nuclear-fueled, dual-purpose electric power and desalting plant in Israel was jointly financed by the United States and Israel. The study, completed in February 1966, concluded that it was technically feasible to construct a plant which would produce 100 million gallons a day of desalted water and 200 megawatts of saleable electricity. Further studies of the economic feasibility of constructing such a plant were carried out under the leadership of then Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker.

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The United States (Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior) has also cooperated with Saudi Arabia on the design of a fossil-fueled, dual-purpose desalting and power plant for Jidda. Equipment is now being ordered for a plant which will cost 18 million dollars and produce 5 million gallons per day of desalted water and 50 megawatts of electricity. Work is proceeding on schedule.

During my trip to the Near East last February, I expressed the interest of the United States in cooperating with Kuwait in a program of research in certain aspects of desalting and the training of operational employees envisioned by the Kuwait Government.

Just last summer we negotiated an understanding with the Kingdom of Iran to undertake joint studies of the water resources and requirements of Iran and to make recommendations for increasing water supply, through desalting techniques and other methods, to the end that the demand for agricultural, industrial, and domestic water uses can be met.

From my own experience in the area and my department's work there, I would like to discuss briefly with you the vast opportunities

for developing water and other natural resources of the Middle East. These opportunities point up resource development projects for (1) creating jobs for refugees, (2) increasing agricultural productivity, (3) improving Israeli-Arab relations, and (4) advancing the role of the United States as a peacemaker in the Middle East. These are the admirable goals of Senate Resolution 155 that can be attained through imaginative diplomacy.

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I can think of no other commodity that would do more to quench the fires of war and tension that exist in the Middle East than an abundant supply of fresh water. The technology to supply that water is within our grasp.

Since its inception, the entire thrust of the department's desalting program has been to develop lower and lower cost methods of producing fresh water from saline sources. While remarkable progress has been achieved, there are still some who contend that this water is still not cheap enough to use for irrigation. But the use of desalted water for irrigation in the Middle East cannot actually be compared to existing irrigation projects anywhere else in the world. We have reached a point in time when it has become necessary to consider the value of water rather than its cost or price, and the three terms are not synonymous. I have read that the cost of the recent 6-day war in the Middle East exceeded 2 billion dollars. If a few hundred million dollars investment in a desalting plant could in any way contribute to the prevention of a future conflict, it may indeed be the wisest investment of our time.

As President Johnson has said: "We are not using all the imagination and all the enterprise that our problem requires."

We do not advocate that a plant be built to raise agricultural products which are readily available in other areas; but provided with the life-giving water, I am convinced that the fertile lands of the Middle East could produce high-value cash crops to meet the rising demand for food and fiber throughout the world. With the construction of desalting plants in the Middle East, we will need to develop better water conservation practices, select productive crops, learn

new irrigation techniques, organize new and effective methods of water management, find better ways to fertilize the soil, and many other methods of extending the use of water to its full potential.

We must do all in our power to apply 20th century technology to projects for peace. Nothing I have suggested is beyond our technical capability; all that is needed is the willingness of nations to join hands to advance such mutual projects to their completion.

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So when should construction begin? Would it be wise to wait until all of this technology is in hand? Or should work begin now that the need is so clearly demonstrated?

Technology available today in desalting makes it possible to consider a wide variety of plant sizes and processes to meet the supplemental water requirements existing in the Middle East, including agricultural, municipal and industrial needs, desalting plants can be built in capacities to meet conceivable short-term and long-term water requirements of the populations providing for the needs of the thousands of refugees and displaced persons. Dependent upon the requirements, it is possible to build single-purpose water plants only or dual-purpose water and electric power plants utilizing fossil fuels as well as nuclear power. Immediate consideration can be given to the application of desalting plants up to 150 mgd capacity strategically located to meet urgent local requirements. In areas where abundant low-cost fossil fuel is available, desalting plants can be constructed within a period of less than two years at reasonable water costs dependent on cost of fuel, money and related factors.

It would be possible to consider combinations of plants of different size, using different fuels and processes, to produce power and water to meet specific local needs. Cost of water from large units is estimated to be from 22 to 35 cents for 1000 gallons, which can be afforded in the Middle East, considering the intensive agriculture there and the purity of desalted water.

Against this background, and assuming that the people of the area are, or will be, prepared to cooperate in the development of the water and other natural resources of the region, they have an

excellent opportunity to exploit these resources, apply recent technological advances, implement water development projects, train local personnel, obtain international financing, carry out technical assistance programs, and stimulate tourism to strengthen their economies; in so doing, they can fulfil the basic objective of a richer life contributing to peace among nations.

188

Statement by the "Third Force" Movement in Israel on a Middle East Settlement.¹

Tel Aviv, October 19, 1967

**FOR A JUST PEACE
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS**

At the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which dealt with the recent Israel-Arab war, the following texts of a resolution were submitted:

1. That Israel unconditionally withdraw from all territories occupied by her during the above war.

2. That Israel's withdrawal from the above territories be conditioned on the cessation of Arab belligerency against her.

The first of the above proposals is inadequate. It is intended to right a wrong, but ignores the probability of its recurrence.

The second proposal is harmful. It practically implies Arab acquiescence in the great wrong done by Israel to the Palestinian Arabs, and also to the entire Arab nation. This proposal not only fails to punish the aggressor. It rewards him for his aggression.

If the Israel-Arab conflict continues, a new Israel-Arab war will be unavoidable. Such a war may not only utterly ruin both warring parties. It may set ablaze all the Middle East and endanger world peace.

It is urgent that the Israel-Arab conflict be solved, and justly solved. Only a just peace between Israel and the Arabs will be stable and beneficial to all concerned.

In order that a just Israel-Arab peace be established, the following actions are necessary:

1. Israel should:

a. Without delay withdraw from all territories occupied by her during the June war, including East Jerusalem.

b. Repatriate the Arab refugees of 1948 and 1967, and pay adequate compensation to those of them who will refuse to return—in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 1948.

The plight of the Palestinian refugees, who have been wasting their lives for 19 years in refugee-camps in appalling misery, while Israel calls for immigration of millions of Jews from opulent countries, is a blot on the human conscience. It is the chief cause of the Israel-Arab conflict.

It is therefore of essential importance that the repatriation of the Arab refugees begin forthwith and be completed in the shortest time possible under the supervision of the United Nations Organization.

c. Return to the Arab Refugees and the Israeli Arabs their property which has been confiscated by the Israeli government, and pay adequate compensation for any of their property destroyed or used by the Israeli government or citizens.

d. Abolish all discrimination against Arabs in Israel.

2. *After Israel has complied with the above requirements*, the Arab states should recognize Israel and negotiate with her about a permanent peace. Any matter in these negotiations on which the parties have not come to an agreement should be referred to and decided by an arbitration committee composed of Israeli and Arab representatives in equal numbers, and headed by a chairman appointed by the Secretary General of the U.N.O.

3. With the withdrawal of Israel from the Old City of Jerusalem, the entire city, Old and New, and its surroundings, should be internationalized, in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 1947.

4. With Israel's evacuation of the territories occupied by her, as above, the inhabitants of these territories should decide, by means of a referendum carried out by the U.N.O., whether the above

¹ Mimeographed circular.

territories should form a sovereign Palestinian state, or be annexed to Jordan or to any other neighboring Arab state.

During the interregnum in the above territories, U.N.O. forces should supervise order there.

It is the duty of the U.N.O., which has created the state of Israel, and whose main mission is to promote and maintain peace between nations, to have the above requirements implemented. But if the General Assembly and the Security Council ignore this duty as they have ignored it for the last 19 years, then the states which are interested in a just solution of the Israel-Arab conflict, should act instead of the defaulting United Nations Organization.

"The Third Force" movement in Israel
Central Committee
5, Yavneh Str. Tel-Aviv

189

Joint Communiqué on Pakistani President Ayub Khan's Visit to France, 17-20 October.¹
[Excerpt]

Paris, October 20, 1967

As regards the Middle East, the two Heads of State expressed their concern over the danger involved for all in the prolongation of the present situation.

They expressed the hope that conditions permitting a durable solution would be obtained as soon as possible. Such a settlement required in particular an agreement among the great Powers.

¹ *Dawn*, 21/10/1967.

190

Speech of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai at a Banquet in Honor of Mauritanian President Ould-Daddah.² [Excerpt]

Peking, October 20, 1967

Working hand in glove with each other, U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism supported and abetted Israel in launching a sudden large-scale armed attack against the Arab countries, and as a result the latter suffered temporary military setbacks. But the war has awakened the people, and educated and tempered them. The Arab peoples will realize even more clearly from the practice of their struggle that U.S. imperialism is their most ferocious enemy, that modern revisionism is a false friend who sold out their interests at the crucial moment, and that the United Nations is nothing but an illicit stock exchange where a few big powers are playing power politics. The Arab peoples with a fighting tradition have not been cowed by the ferocity of the enemies, nor have they been misled by political tricks. The Palestinian people in the enemy-occupied areas are taking up arms and plunging themselves once again into battle. A single spark can start a prairie fire. A gigantic people's revolutionary tide against U.S. and British imperialism and their lackeys will certainly rise on the desecrated Arab land.

191

Statement by Norwegian Prime Minister Borten on the Middle East.³

Oslo, October 1967

This crisis in the Middle East and the war in Vietnam are matters of grave concern to all of us.

² *Hsinhua News Agency Bulletin*.

³ *Review of International Affairs*, 20/10/1967, p. 2. In the course of an interview granted to the Yugoslav publishing institution "Interpress" shortly before the Premier's visit to Belgrade.

The Norwegian Government believe that these difficult problems can only be solved through negotiations in a manner acceptable to all parties in these conflicts, and will support all efforts towards such negotiations. We furthermore believe that the United Nations Organization must be strengthened in order to enable the world organization to make a constructive contribution to the safeguarding of world peace.

192

Speech of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel at a Banquet During his Visit to Iraq.¹ [Excerpt]

Baghdad, October 20, 1967

The Turkish Government, as you know, in its capacity as a Middle East country having a vital interest in the preservation of peace and security in the area, has followed with anxiety and concern the Israeli-Arab clashes and the resulting situation. Although the fighting has stopped, we cannot view the future with confidence. In fact, our area needs stability and peace based on right and justice. We believe that to achieve this the sisterly Arab States' legitimate rights must be assured. Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey has reiterated its view that it does not approve of occupation and political gains by the use of force. It also does not consider the *fait accompli* as a starting point for solving conflicts. This is consistent with the fundamental principles of our foreign policy. We are determined to uphold these principles.

Turkey has called for the use of every method to secure a withdrawal from the occupied Arab territory. It has openly opposed the attempts to achieve a *fait accompli* in Jerusalem City.

193

Joint Communiqué on Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's Visit to the U.A.R., 19-21 October.² [Excerpt]

Cairo, October 21, 1967

The President and the Indian Prime Minister reviewed the international situation, particularly some of the major problems which threaten world peace and endanger the prospects of relaxation of international tensions.

They reaffirmed their conviction regarding the vital importance in relations between states of adhering to the basic principles of international behavior, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

They expressed their faith in the principles of non-alignment and the right of all sovereign nations to maintain and develop their political and economic independence, without outside pressure or intervention.

They emphasized their adherence to the principle that no advantage should be allowed to be derived through the use of force for the purpose of furthering territorial or political objectives.

The President and Indian Prime Minister expressed their particular concern at the serious situation still prevailing in the Middle East. They underlined the urgency of finding a just solution to the problem and especially concerning the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the territories occupied by them since June 5, 1967.

The Prime Minister of India reiterated the solidarity of the Government and people of India with the Arab peoples and their support for the just rights of the Palestine people.

¹ BBC, ME/2601/E2/2.

² U.A.R. Documentary Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 103-04.

194

Address by Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson to a Special Congress of the Social Democrat Party.¹ [Excerpt]**Stockholm, October 23, 1967**

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Great Power responsibility finds expression not only in their actions but also in their sins of omission. Such a sin, which must now be dearly atoned for, is that the Great Powers did not take a more active part in reducing tension in the Middle East. When in the autumn of 1947 the U.N. adopted the resolution which was the foundation on which the state of Israel was built, it would have been a reasonable course if the permanent members of the Security Council had also sought to create the conditions essential for peaceful co-existence between the new state and its neighbours. This was not the case. Instead of peace a fragile armistice was instituted. Incidents took place constantly. The Arab states saw before their eyes how a modern welfare state was built up in the centre of a poor and backward area. An irreconcilable atmosphere of revenge was stirred up. Hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees were condemned to a comfortless refugee existence while waiting to be able to return to their former home. Fundamentally it is a social problem that has to be solved. In spite of the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union stood sponsors at Israel's birth, they were quite unable to fit the new state into a context that could bear fruit. Arms shipments took the place of constructive solutions to the problem common to all in the Middle East, the food problem.

Israel's efforts to express in flesh and blood time-honoured democratic and socialist ideas has been admired for a long time by the Swedish labour movement. When for some days in June 1967 it looked as if the very existence of the young state was being threatened, many people spontaneously showed sympathy and fellow-feeling. Israel, however, emerged victorious out of that brief war. A victor must always be prepared for the way in which it uses its victory to be watched with attention. If the Israeli military experts consider that the frontiers now obtained give

¹ *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy*, 1967, pp. 59-61.

them strategic advantages, we must hope that those politically responsible do not blind themselves to the danger of settlements that may strengthen the Arab states' spirit of revenge. Once the immediate post-war bitterness has abated, we must hope that the necessity of living together and agreeing in the future will establish the conditions necessary for a broadly based settlement. It should be a natural course to work for solutions that satisfy the legitimate demands of all the parties concerned. This, too, has been the reason for Sweden's posture in the U.N. during the consideration of questions of dispute between Israel and the Arab states. In our view a just and permanent solution must be based on two principles, one that all states—Israel as well as its neighbours—should be entitled to an existence in peace and freedom and, two, that no right should be based on military conquest.

It will now be incumbent upon the Great Powers in the U.N., in contact with those involved in the fighting, to make serious efforts to ensure that the cease-fire matures into a real peace. The refugee question is a problem that it should be possible to tackle at once. Sweden contributed kr. 12 million for refugee assistance in this area immediately the hostilities ceased. This reflects the great sympathy we feel for this unfortunate group of people.

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195

Joint Communiqué on Mauritanian President Ould-Daddah's Visit to People's China, 20-24 October.² [Excerpts]**Peking, October 24, 1967**

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They unanimously expressed staunch support for the struggle of the people of the Arab states to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity against the aggression by U.S. and British imperialism and their tool Israel. They were

² *Peking Review*, 3/11/1967, pp. 8-9.

firmly convinced that the people of the Arab states would surely win final victory.

Premier Chou En-lai expressed support for the policy of non-alignment pursued by the Mauritanian Government and praised Mauritania's just stand in breaking off diplomatic relations first with Britain and then with the United States in order to support the peoples of Zimbabwe and the Arab states in their struggle against imperialism.

196

Joint Communiqué on Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's Visit to Iraq, 20-24 October.¹ [Excerpt]

Baghdad, October 24, 1967

The Premier of Iraq again explained his country's attitude towards Palestine and the Palestinian people's tribulation and expressed the Iraqi Government's and people's appreciation and gratitude for the valuable assistance which Turkey had given the Arab States during the Middle East Crisis and for the aid given to Arab victims of the armed conflict.

The Turkish Premier reiterated Turkey's firm and cordial feelings towards the Arab peoples and its support for their legitimate issues. He also reaffirmed his Government's grave concern, which was previously expressed at the U.N. General Assembly, over Israel's unilateral measures in Jerusalem, its actions in the occupied territory and its obstinacy on the refugee question. Mr. Suleyman Demirel affirmed Turkey's opposition to the use of force and military occupation as a means of obtaining political benefits and territorial gains in international relations. In this respect, the Turkish Premier called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 5th June 1967 and for the strict implementa-

tion of the U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem and the Arab refugees.

197

Address by Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to the National Press Club.² [Excerpts]

Washington, October 24, 1967

One thing is certain. We shall not return to the situation which prevailed on June 4. We shall never, never, go back either to the political and juridical anarchy or to the strategic and territorial vulnerability from which we have emerged.

We now insist on the agreed demarcation of the political and territorial boundaries, which we have never known. Until the new peace map is negotiated, the present cease-fire map will be fully maintained, for the June 4 map...is gone forever.

The cease-fire situation can only be changed by specific, public and contractual commitments signed by the parties face to face in conformity with established international traditions.

The old Middle Eastern structure which President Nasser decided to disrupt last May cannot be restored. It must be replaced by a stable and durable order defining the new political, juridical and territorial relations between Israel and her neighbours.

Direct negotiation is not just a matter of mere procedural form, it is a matter of political principle.

If any international agency or friendly government believes that it can bring the Arab governments and Israel into direct and unconditional contact, we shall support its efforts.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, 25/10/1967.

² *Jerusalem Post*, 25/10/1967.

But no peace has ever been made between those who refuse to set eyes on each other. We shall interpret a refusal to meet us as a refusal to make peace, and shall maintain the existing reality until all Middle Eastern states recognize the compulsions of a future to be shared in peace.

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198

Statement by Canadian Foreign Secretary Martin in Parliament.¹

Ottawa, October 24, 1967

The fighting in the Suez area has stopped as the result of a suggestion by the United Nations Truce and Supervisory Organization that there be a cease-fire. The Canadian position has been that a representative of the Secretary General should be appointed by the Security Council to act as a communications link between the parties. This is the minimum action that should be taken to meet the situation in the Middle East, and the Canadian Delegation is working toward this end.

It has been suggested that, before this appointment can be agreed to, there will have to be an agreement by Israel to withdraw its forces beyond the present areas of occupation. In response to this, and I think rightly, Israel takes the position that there should be a declaration that the other side will forego its state of belligerency. Until these two statements of principle are agreed to, I am afraid I cannot report that progress in these negotiations is taking place. However, we shall persist in the view that the least that should be done is that a representative of the Secretary-General be appointed in the absence of direct negotiations to try to bring the parties together.

¹ *External Affairs*, 1967, p. 491. This statement was made in reply to a question regarding consideration by the Security Council of the sinking of the Israeli destroyer "Eilat."

199

Statements by U.S. Department of State Spokesman McCloskey on Arms to the Near East.²

Washington, October 24, 1967

Mr. McCloskey: I have a statement on arms for the Near East.

First, let me recall that our policy with respect to the arms sales has always been one of maximum restraint. And that remains our policy today.

We have under continuing review the question of what actions we should take, consistent with that spirit of restraint, to support United States interests in the Near East. As part of this review process, we have now decided to release selected items of military materiel to Israel and certain Arab states.

I want to emphasize the word "selected," to make clear that this is not in any sense an open-ended decision nor an opening of the floodgates.

Virtually all of this materiel was ordered from military or commercial sources before the 6-day war in June and has been held up since that time.

Now, the decision here was taken a short time ago. And for the last week we have been engaged in consultation with appropriate Members and committees of the Congress.

So far as the materiel is concerned it includes repair parts, components, and related items without which repair facilities would shut down and equipment could not be maintained in Israel and certain Arab states, countries which traditionally have looked to the United States and other Western countries as suppliers of their armed forces.

We are also releasing a number of end items ordered and in some cases paid for before June 5.

The countries that we are discussing here are Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia.

Q. No Jordan?

A. No decision has been arrived at with

² U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 13/11/1967, p. 652.

respect to Jordan at the present time.

The materiel for Israel includes aircraft we promised earlier, as well as parts, repair equipment, and components for such things as, for example, radios, which are assembled in Israel and which are ordered on a continuing basis from commercial and military sources.

The materiel for the various Arab countries is largely communications equipment, trucks, repair parts, construction materials. A small number of aircraft, agreed to before the war, are included for Libya and Morocco.

Q. Can you give a rationale for this decision?

A. Well, I think it's pretty much implied in our—in the first statement I made—the need for, in many cases, these spare parts so that industry at the other end doesn't have to close down, that defense inventories can be maintained, and, clearly, the rationale that if these countries are unable to obtain these committed deliveries from the United States they turn to other sources of supply.

The Soviets, as I'm sure most of you in this room are aware, have maintained a substantial high level of delivery to other countries in the area, specifically the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq, and have made no secret of the fact that they are also prepared to provide arms to other countries which, at least until now, have not equipped their forces from Soviet sources.

200

Statements by British Prime Minister Wilson in Parliament in Reply to Oral Questions on the Middle East.¹ [Excerpts]

London, October 26, 1967

Q. Mr. Marten asked the Prime Minister what consultations he has had with leaders of other countries during the last three months about the Middle East situation.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): During the Recess my right hon. Friend and I

have been in almost continuous consultation with governments in all parts of the world about this problem. I will circulate a fuller description of these contacts in the Official Report.

Mr. Marten: I am very grateful for that informative reply, but could I ask the Prime Minister whether he can give an assurance that no British financial aid will be given to Egypt till such time that Egypt has opened the Southern end of the Canal and let out the ships which are kept there?

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend has already taken up with the Egyptian Foreign Secretary the need for urgent action to open up the southern end even in advance of what all of us want, the general opening up of the Canal to shipping of all nations. Certainly I will give consideration to what the hon. Member has said, but I have not seen any suggestion at all for financial aid to Egypt, and I think the other question is certainly more urgent than any question of financial aid.

Mr. E. Rowlands: Can my right hon. Friend say what representations the Government have made to the Egyptian authorities as a result of Egypt's sinking of the Israeli ship?²

The Prime Minister: The sinking of the ship and other actions which have taken place this week of course only exacerbate an extremely difficult situation. Things were difficult enough in relation to making a move forward in the Middle East and towards the opening of the Canal. These other actions can only make it more difficult. I do not think it helps for us to express opinions about the merits, the timing, or the location of the events which took place last week. Our concern is, with the United Nations, to get the Canal open and then to find the best way to some general Middle East settlement.

Following is the information:

During the period I have discussed the matter with a number of Commonwealth leaders who have visited London. I have also been in personal correspondence with the Yugoslav President who had taken certain initiatives to explore the possibilities of a settlement. My right hon. Friend the

² On October 21, the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" was sunk off the Sinai coast near Port Said by missile boats of the U.A.R. Navy. [Ed.]

¹ *Hansard's*, 26/10/1967, col. 1879-84.

Foreign Secretary has had personal consultations with President Johnson and with a large number of Foreign Ministers of Middle Eastern and other interested countries and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. There have also been almost continuous consultations through the diplomatic channel with a large number of Governments including the Governments concerned in the Middle East and other Governments closely interested in the achievement of a settlement in the area.

Q. Sir Knox Cunningham asked the Prime Minister what steps he has taken in consultation with the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth and the President of the United States of America to ensure the unmolested use of the Suez Canal by international shipping?

Q. Mr. Shinwell asked the Prime Minister if he will state what is the present position on the reopening of the Suez Canal accessible to the ships of all maritime countries.

The Prime Minister: The House will recognise the acute difficulties we are facing in our efforts to get the Suez Canal open. We are in close and direct touch with all the Governments concerned and are also playing a full part in the United Nations' consideration of this question. Certainly it is our view that any lasting settlement in the Middle East must provide for freedom of passage in international waterways for the ships of all nations.

Sir Knox Cunningham: Is it true that the South exit has become silted up and unusable, and as it has been some months now since the Canal has been closed, will it be a matter of years before anything is done?

The Prime Minister: No, but it is certainly a fact that the longer the Canal is not in use the more there will be problems of silting, not only in relation to the exit but also in relation to the actual Canal itself, and ships which could have passed through six months ago will not be able to pass through, even when the Canal is opened, till further action is taken. We are concerned with the urgency of getting the Canal opened, and then clearing up all the technical problems, the administrative problems and the physical problems which have arisen through silting of the Canal.

Mr. Shinwell: Is it not extraordinary that the United Arab Republic can defy the wishes of every maritime nation in the world and of the

United Nations? Will my right hon. Friend suggest to Lord Caradon, our representative there, that instead of indulging in pious platitudes he should adopt a more vigorous and less unprejudiced attitude?

The Prime Minister: My noble Friend is doing a tremendous job in the United Nations. With respect to my very dear and right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), his remark just now, I feel, was more in the nature of a pious platitude and less in the nature of something unprejudiced than what my noble Friend has been enunciating in New York. It is intolerable that any nation should keep the Suez Canal closed to international shipping. It is also intolerable that any nation on either side should not co-operate in agreeing conditions in which, with good will, this Canal could be opened. My right hon. Friend has put forward proposals under which there could be a withdrawal from the Canal shores, and an opening of the Canal, and under which we could move forward to settling some of the broader and more long-standing issues such as the right of all nations, including Israel, to use the Canal, and such as the settlement of the refugee question. But for people to insist on standing on their rights, getting everything they want and keeping the Canal closed is intolerable, from wherever it may come.

Mr. Heath: Can the Prime Minister say what is now the cost to the British balance of payments of the closure of the Canal and the Middle Eastern situation per month?

The Prime Minister: It is a serious cost, though I think that that cost will shortly be diminishing. I should answer the right hon. Gentleman frankly that during the period of closure so far—[*Interruption*!—no. I could follow abundant precedent in all Governments and say that it is not in the national interest. But it is a fair question, and it will get a fair answer. While the Canal has been closed in recent months, the cost to Britain has been something of the order of £20 million a month. That is the estimate which we have been able to make. That figure will fall even if the Canal remains closed. In the early months, we had to buy a lot of very expensive oil in non-Middle East areas. In addition, B.P., for example, was very much under-tankered and had to charter

large tankers at very expensive freight rates. Now, tanker rates are falling. This £20 million will fall, but it is still an intolerable cost for this country, just as it is for India and other countries who are suffering through the non-delivery of goods which they urgently need.

Mr. Lubbock: In view of the fact that it has now become cheaper to take oil in 200,000 ton tankers round the Cape than in very much smaller tankers through the Suez Canal, would it matter very much in the long term to our economic interests if the Canal remained closed permanently?

The Prime Minister: It is not in our interests or anyone else's—least of all is it in Egypt's interests, because she is paying a very heavy price for the maintenance of the closure of the Canal—to see the Canal closed. At the same time, those who think that anyone is in a position to be black-mailed by the continued closure of the Canal is wrong. The growth of big tankers is making the Suez Canal rather a pathetic irrelevance for oil tankers very soon. Certainly it is the intention of the Government, as I indicated some months ago, to see that we take all measures necessary to ensure that we get our requirements of oil to this country without being dependent on a canal which is subject to the political whims of people on both sides who can interfere with an international waterway.

Mr. Sheldon: Can my right hon. Friend say how much of that £20 million is represented by foreign exchange costs?

The Prime Minister: It is a cost on our balance of payments, and I gave a clear answer to the right hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath). Obviously, if we have to buy expensive oil in Venezuela and the United States, as we did for a short time, that increases our imports bill. Again, if we have to pay for foreign chartered tankers—some of them are British, of course—that adds to our foreign exchange costs. As I have said, the cost of the closure is sharply diminishing, but it is still intolerable, just as it is on India and all other countries who depend on the Canal.

201

Joint Communiqué on Somali Prime Minister Egal's Visit to Kuwait, 20-24 October.¹ [Excerpt]

Kuwait, October 27, 1967

The two sides devoted special attention to the Palestine question. They discussed the effects of the treacherous Israeli aggression against Arab territory. They affirmed the need for the unconditional withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from Arab territory and continuation of efforts to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Arab people in Palestine. The Kuwaiti side praised the honourable stand of the Somali Republic toward the treacherous Israeli aggression on the Arab nation.

202

Statement of Policy by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol Opening the Winter Session of the Knesset.² [Excerpts]

Jerusalem, October 30, 1967

...Further to the government statement of September 3 in this connection, it is my duty to state: the Arab States are maintaining their attitude—not to recognize the State of Israel, not to negotiate with her, not to conclude with her a treaty of peace. Israel expresses the hope that the peoples and governments of the world will not overlook this grave fact, which is utterly incompatible with international law and the principles of the U.N. Charter.

In view of this attitude on the part of the Arab countries, Israel will continue to maintain unchanged the situation created by the cease-fire arrangements, and will strengthen her position in keeping with the vital requirements of her security and development.

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, 27/10/1967.

² *Knesset Records*, No. 1, October 30-November 1, 1967, pp. 2-6.

Israel emphasizes once more that only permanent peace, on the basis of direct negotiations between herself and the Arab States, can bring a solution to problems of the area. Israel is willing and prepared to work for peace with the neighboring Arab countries. She will not acquiesce in boycott or blockade, siege and aggression of any kind. She is prepared to conduct direct negotiations with all the neighboring Arab countries, or with any one of them separately. We are prepared for economic co-operation and regional planning with all the countries of the area.

We shall cooperate in the solution of the refugee problem. This humanitarian problem can and should be solved in the framework of international or regional planning, as similar problems in other countries have been solved. The Government will take steps to maintain just and fair relations with the populations of the areas under our control, while maintaining order and security.

In spite of the fact that the Arab leaders' refusal to countenance peace, as expressed at the Khartum Conference and from the U.N. rostrum, is still in effect, there seems to be some confusion in the Arab world's attitude towards the State of Israel. Hopes for peace in the future rest on three main factors: the first is Israel's potential for deterrence and defense; the second is the non-interference of the Big Powers on the side of those who declare before the world and the United Nations that they are not ready to sit at the negotiating table for peace talks, and whose only desire is to annihilate a U.N. member-State; the third is that the Powers and the U.N. avoid obscure and meaningless formulas, like declarations of the cessation of belligerency without a real peace settlement. These empty declarations can only have the perilous result of strengthening those who are bent on war... I wish to warn all those who resort to obscure formulas that they are undertaking a grave responsibility for the deterioration of the position in the area. Concrete experience in the area indicates that efforts aimed at prescribing peace conditions through mediation are fruitless and groundless. The problems of the area can be solved only through direct negotiations. Only direct contacts are capable of opening the way to

mutual understanding between the parties.

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The unification of Jerusalem has been carried out without upheavals. Isolated attempts to undermine the unification and sow panic among the inhabitants have been shown to be exceptional, and the situation has rapidly returned to normal. The city was previously arbitrarily divided, which was a security danger and an economic absurdity. The rapidity with which we have succeeded in uniting the two parts of the city only shows how vital and natural the merger was.

It is our intention to continue to develop East Jerusalem, without, of course, being unfair to the other parts of the city. A special team is preparing a comprehensive master plan for the eastern city. I do not intend to go into details of this project except to mention that an area is set apart under it for the construction of a private housing scheme. This area, which lies in the north-eastern part of Jerusalem, will be planned and prepared for immediate development and... will include many hundreds of housing units. Technical teams have already started the execution of this project.

The Jewish Quarter in the Old City will be rehabilitated... A committee set up by the Ministry of Justice will examine the various claims that have been submitted in regard to ownership or prescriptive rights in the Jewish Quarter. Various Government and public institutions will be transferred from Tel Aviv to the east of the city, as well as Ministries in the west of the city which have not yet obtained suitable permanent accommodation...

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It was agreed between the parties in 1949 that the Armistice Lines were determined only by military considerations and do not have the character of frontiers. The Arab Governments have insisted on this principle throughout these years. For these reasons, there is ample justification, both from the legal point of view and from the political and security point of view, for Israel's attitude that the aim should now be to determine agreed and secure national boundaries within the framework of peace treaties.

As for the Golan Heights, we shall not permit the restoration of the situation prior to June 5, 1967, a situation that bore the seeds of havoc and destruction for our villages in the valley. Nor will the situation in Sinai, in the Gulf of Eilat and in the Suez Canal be restored to what it was.

We believe that there are positive internal forces here and in the area which are working towards peace in the Middle East. In this peace lies the starting point for a solution of the area's problems, including the problem of the Arab refugees.

Experience shows that the rehabilitation of refugees not only has not weakened the economies of the absorbing countries, but has ultimately strengthened them. Thus, for example, there is no doubt that there are areas in Syria, Iraq and other countries suitable for the absorption of Arab refugees, who could be an agricultural element—and perhaps not only an agricultural element—beneficial to those countries. Israel is prepared to assist in the solution of this problem, within the framework of a regional or international plan, if she were asked to.

203

Joint Communiqué on King Mahendra of Nepal's Visit to the United States, 30 October-9 November.¹ [Excerpts]

Washington, November 1, 1967

King Mahendra and President Johnson discussed the efforts which both the Governments have been making to ease world tensions. It was agreed that the strong support of both countries for the United Nations would not slacken. The King explained that the policy of peaceful coexistence and non-alignment had a continuing validity for Nepal...

¹ U.S. *Department of State Bulletin*, 27/11/1967, p. 709. The communiqué was issued upon conclusion of the talks between the two Heads of State.

...With respect to the Middle East, it was agreed that both Governments should continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to evolve a just and durable peace for the Middle East which would be acceptable to all the peoples affected by the recent hostilities there.

204

Speech of Israeli Foreign Minister Eban on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.² [Excerpt]

London, November 4, 1967

Israel's life was dominated not so much by military victory as by the memory of the peril and solitude which had preceded it, when she was encircled by 150,000 troops and 1,500 tanks and cut off by an illegal blockade from maritime contact with half the world and exposed to enemy airfields only a few minutes' flying time away.

From these experiences Israel took the firm resolve never again to allow herself to be put in a situation of danger and vulnerability. This determination shall prevail against every other consideration.

Israel's policy on peace in the Middle East has been constant. Our aim is a directly negotiated settlement culminating in peace treaties with each of our neighbours. In these treaties we shall seek to define the conditions of mutual co-existence and strive to achieve not only a formal peace but—beyond that—regional cooperation within a Middle Eastern community of sovereign States.

We shall respect and maintain the ceasefire situation until the negotiated peace is secured. On the territorial issue we are adhering to the normal judicial principles. Secure national boundaries must now be determined by negotiation and agreement. After 20 years of tension and ambiguity it is not good enough to live with 'demarcation lines,' specifically described in

² *Jewish Chronicle*, London, 10/11/1967.

1949 as resting on military conquest and as not having any political or territorial significance in relation to the final settlement. We need something better than agreement to mutual irredentism. Israel and the Arab States will benefit and world peace will be served by an agreed and unambiguous definition of the juridical, political, and territorial relations of the Middle Eastern States.

In simple and undiplomatic language it means: we stay where we are and hold what we have until there is peace.

205

Speech of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville Before the National Assembly.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, November 7, 1967

Je disais en commençant qu'il me revenait de développer plus longuement devant l'Assemblée nationale mes explications sur les problèmes qui se trouvent être encore, ou de nouveau au premier plan de l'actualité. Il s'agit évidemment, d'une part, de la crise du Moyen-Orient, d'autre part, des communautés européennes c'est-à-dire de la candidature de la Grande-Bretagne. Ce sont ces deux questions que je vais m'efforcer de traiter aussi complètement que possible.

Sur le conflit israélo-arabe, j'ai déjà eu l'occasion, les 7 et 15 juin dernier, de définir ici la position et la politique du Gouvernement. Cinq mois ce sont écoulés depuis. Rien de ce qui s'est passé au cours de cette longue période ne conduit hélas, à reviser notre jugement, ou à nourrir davantage d'optimisme quant aux perspectives d'une solution pacifique.

Sans compter les dangers que toute crise violente fait courir à la communauté internationale par le simple fait de ce que l'on appelle l'escalade, c'est-à-dire en l'espèce le risque d'affrontement des grandes puissances, la guerre par elle-même ne pouvait rien régler, même si elle assurait

sur le terrain un avantage à celle des parties qui bénéficiait d'une évidente supériorité militaire.

Cela, nous l'avons dit dès le début, dès avant même que commencent les opérations. Comme ailleurs, seule une solution politique est imaginable, j'entends une solution qui ne soit pas tout simplement imposée par la force. Il s'agit, en effet, de faire vivre les uns auprès des autres, et finalement de réconcilier, des populations que l'état de fait créé depuis vingt ans contraint maintenant à la tolérance et au bon voisinage.

Dès après la fin des hostilités, le Gouvernement avait défini sa pensée de la manière suivante: "Il va de soi qu'aucun fait accompli sur place en ce qui concerne les limites territoriales et la condition des citoyens des Etats intéressés ne saurait être tenu pour acquis. Seul un règlement librement négocié, accepté par toutes les parties en cause et consacré par la communauté internationale, pourrait un jour résoudre l'ensemble des problèmes posés."

Parlant ainsi, le Gouvernement n'exprimait-il pas le sentiment général dans ce pays, si l'on en juge par la déclaration qu'à la même époque, le 10 juin, un des chefs de l'opposition, M. Guy Mollet, publiait sur le même sujet: "Il est nécessaire que les Israéliens sachent surmonter leur victoire militaire. Il est légitime qu'ils obtiennent par la négociation la reconnaissance de leur droit à l'existence et à la paix et les moyens d'assurer la garantie définitive de ce droit. Au-delà de cet objectif, ce serait une faute de chercher dans la victoire l'occasion d'une expansion géographique quelconque. Il est nécessaire pour les peuples arabes de surmonter leur abatement..."

"Eux aussi, comme les Israéliens, autant que les Israéliens, ont droit à l'existence, à la paix, au développement et au bonheur. Il faut que les uns et les autres, Arabes et Israéliens, musulmans et juifs, se rendent compte que rien ne les oppose fondamentalement, qu'au contraire tout les rapproche et qu'ils doivent donc apprendre à vivre côte à côte pour, un jour prochain, coopérer."

Mesdames, messieurs, on ne pouvait mieux dire!

C'est bien sur ces bases que, dans les votes du 4 juillet à l'Assemblée générale extraordinaire des Nations Unies, la délégation française avait pris position en faveur du projet de résolution qui

¹ *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, 1967, pp. 4611-12.

faisait de l'évacuation des territoires conquis le préliminaire de toute action utile dans le sens d'un règlement pacifique et s'était dans le même esprit, associée aux deux résolutions qui, elles, ont été acceptées, l'une à l'unanimité, l'autre à la quasi-unanimité, concernant le sort des réfugiés, d'une part, Jérusalem, d'autre part.

Mais alors, comme, depuis, rien n'a pu être entrepris qui laisse même entrevoir la possibilité d'une évolution dans un sens positif, les vaines discussions qui se poursuivent dans le cadre du conseil de sécurité n'offrent, aujourd'hui encore, aucune perspective d'ouverture sur un commencement de consensus et les débats qui, du fait de cette carence, risquent de s'ouvrir à nouveau à l'assemblée générale ne pourront qu'exciter les passions et souligner les désaccords, pour ne pas dire les impossibilités.

Peut-on vraiment penser, comme semble le faire le gouvernement israélien, que la seule procédure convenable serait l'ouverture de négociations directes entre lui-même et les gouvernements arabes en cause pour définir les conditions de la paix?

Nous l'avons dit déjà bien souvent, et je l'ai dit moi-même à l'Assemblée nationale dès le 15 juin, ce serait supposer à l'avance le problème résolu. Certes, les pays arabes admettent aujourd'hui, depuis la conférence de Khartoum, la nécessité d'une solution politique et le problème de la reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël ne se heurte peut-être plus au même *non possumus* que jadis.

D'autre part, les problèmes de la navigation n'apparaissent pas insolubles—mais d'autres subsistent et d'abord celui des réfugiés—ou sont apparus, ne fût-ce que celui des frontières et celui, le plus redoutable de tous, du sort de Jérusalem.

Mais aussi, les passions demeurent si vives et, pourquoi ne pas le dire, les haines apparemment si inexpiables qu'une confrontation directe serait inimaginable.

Nous sommes alors, comme toujours, ramenés à la même conclusion: ne nous laissons pas de répéter que, dans le très long processus que l'on est bien obligé de prévoir, seule une action de l'extérieur, appuyée par l'opinion internationale, peut amorcer l'évolution indispensable et lui permettre ensuite de se développer favorablement.

C'est dans le cadre des Nations Unies qu'une

telle action doit être normalement entreprise. Elle nécessite à l'évidence l'accord des puissances principales; à défaut d'un tel accord, toute initiative ne peut qu'échouer sans appel, comme cela a été le cas jusqu'à maintenant et encore ces jours derniers—je le rappelais à l'instant.

Telle est en définitive la raison profonde de l'immobilisme dans lequel se traîne la crise du Moyen-Orient. Il faut que les Grands—et je veux dire tous les Grands—en prennent conscience et acceptent enfin d'assumer leurs responsabilités, même si certains ont, à ce jour, des préoccupations plus immédiates et même si la perpétuation de la guerre du Vietnam est en définitive peut-être l'obstacle principal à une véritable concertation.

Ce changement d'attitude est d'autant plus impératif que la prolongation du *statu quo* est, par elle-même, grosse de périls. L'occupation des territoires, avec les abus et les résistances qu'elle entraîne inévitablement, le face à face d'armées qui restent en état de guerre ne peuvent qu'entraîner des incidents et maintenir un sentiment général d'alarme et d'insécurité. Les graves événements de ces dernières semaines à Port-Saïd et à Suez ne font qu'en apporter une fois de plus la démonstration.

La France, quant à elle, agit et continuera à agir dans le sens d'un accord des Grands. Elle ne peut pas penser que ses appels ne finiront pas par être entendus, et peut-être alors sera-t-il possible sur place d'intervenir utilement. En attendant, c'est auprès des belligérants la réserve qui s'impose. Telle est bien la raison pour laquelle, même si deux autres puissances ont cru devoir accepter à cet égard, dès maintenant, des responsabilités, le Gouvernement a décidé de maintenir une attitude d'expectative concernant les livraisons d'armements dont le caractère offensif est particulièrement évident.

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206

Joint Communiqué on Moscow Talks Between U.A.R. Vice-President Sabri and Soviet Communist Party Leader Brezhnev, 2-11 November.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, November 12, 1967

Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, expressed his full support for the efforts being made by the leaders, government and people of the United Arab Republic to promote independent national development and to continue on the road to social development in the United Arab Republic.

The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet government and the entire Soviet people harbor feelings of profound sympathy for the gallant struggle of the Egyptian people against Israeli aggression.

The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet government and the entire Soviet people have also offered, and will continue to offer, all necessary assistance to support this struggle.

The Soviet Union believes that the restoration of peace and security in the Middle East cannot be guaranteed without the complete elimination of the results of the aggression, . . . the liberation of the territories occupied by the aggressor and the payment of compensation for the losses caused by the aggression. The Soviet Union stands firm against any attempt to impose any settlement of Middle East problems that is designed to reward the aggressor.

Both sides reaffirmed their unified stand regarding the situation in the Middle East and the settlement of the crisis in this area. They also held identical views on other problems which were discussed.

207

Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset.² [Excerpt]

Jerusalem, November 14, 1967

With the renewal of the Security Council's deliberations on the Middle East, various proposals and approaches have been put forward on steps to be taken to solve the Israel-Arab dispute. Some of them are entirely unacceptable because of their hostility to Israel. They are based on the distorted political morality of Egypt, which operates under the tutelage and with the support of the Soviet Union. The purpose of these proposals is to put back the clock, to perpetuate and intensify hostility. Other ideas are suggested by those who have not yet, for some reason, penetrated to the roots of the political complications in the area.

At this grave hour, I wish to emphasize once again, in the hearing of the whole world, and of the peace-loving nations, what Israel's policy is. Israel strives for a durable peace between herself and her neighbors. Only peace provides the solution for the crisis under which we have been laboring for the past twenty years.

True peace will be achieved only through direct negotiations, which will lead to the conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and the surrounding countries. These treaties can settle the problems at issue. Without direct negotiations, and in the absence of peace treaties, no way out of the crisis is visible.

Our belief in this point of view is not due to any obstinate adhesion to a specific diplomatic formula, rejecting any other. Our outlook, which is inspired by the U.N. Charter and rests on the foundations of international law and procedure, is the lesson of twenty years of bitter experience, trial and error.

¹ U.A.R. *Documentary Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 104-05.

² *Knesset Records*, No. 3, November 13-15, 1967, p. 121.

208

Address by U.S. Under Secretary of State Katzenbach on Arms for the Developing World.¹ [Excerpt]**Stanford, November 17, 1967**

At times, withholding arms serves neither the cause of peace nor of stability. This is demonstrated by the Middle East.

In this troubled area our historic purpose has also been to search for arms limitations. Our efforts to establish an international framework toward this end began in 1948, after the first Arab-Israeli war. In 1950 this effort bore fruit in a tripartite declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and a Near East Arms Coordinating Committee was established to monitor arms shipments. Western efforts were brought to a halt, however, when the Soviet Union began large-scale arms shipments to the area in 1955.

The Soviet Union has remained the single major factor in the Mideastern arms scene ever since. Our several efforts in recent years to revitalize the Coordinating Committee did not meet with success.

Over the past 12 years, the U.S.S.R. has provided well over 2 billion dollars' worth of military equipment to countries of the Mideast. It was first to introduce heavy tanks and bombers into the area.

The military imbalance threatened by these Soviet deliveries caused the other countries in the area to seek military aid in the West. Even so, most Western arms going to the Middle East, both to Israel and moderate Arab states, came from European nations, not the United States. Only in a few cases have we provided United States equipment—where it seemed essential to do so to help friendly governments provide for their own defense.

The Arab-Israeli war in June made matters worse. We immediately suspended shipments to both Israel and the Arab states, hoping that other countries would match our restraint. Once again our hopes were disappointed.

The Soviets not only replaced a major part of the arms lost by the Arab states; they also began offering arms to those Arab states with which we have had long and friendly ties. This development forced us to resume limited and selective arms deliveries to the area under agreements concluded prior to the hostilities.

Our future arms policy toward the Middle East will rest on two factors; the willingness of the Soviet Union and other countries to exercise restraint, and the principle of disclosure. On June 19, the President proposed that the United Nations ask its members to report all shipments of arms to the area. Unfortunately, this proposal has not yet been accepted. But it is essential that adequate information be available—both to countries within the area and to the major powers without—to preclude the risk of miscalculation that could add fuel to an arms race and lead to renewal of hostilities.

209

Statements by British Foreign Secretary Brown in Parliament in Reply to Oral Questions on the Middle East.²**London, November 20, 1967**

Mr. Biffen asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the likelihood of resumed diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic.

Mr. Marten asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

Mr. Stratton Mills asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the talks with President Nasser.

Mr. Colin Jackson asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on his plans for improving Anglo-United Arab Republic relations.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr.

¹ *State Department Bulletin*, 11/12/1967, pp. 796-97.

² *Hansard's*, 20/11/1967, col. 897-99 and 909-14.

George Brown): As announced yesterday, agreement has been reached to re-establish diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the United Arab Republic in the first half of December. To this end the two Governments have agreed to proceed very shortly to the exchange of Ambassadors.

Mr. Biffen: Since the national interests of both Britain and the United Arab Republic require normal political stability in the Middle East, will the right hon. Gentleman take this occasion to remind the United Arab Republic of the disruptive consequences of the propaganda broadcast by Radio Cairo?

Mr. Brown: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. I have also taken some trouble recently to have a look at what is being put out by Radio Cairo. I do not think it bears out what the hon. Member said about the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Mr. Marten: Did the Foreign Secretary discover during the negotiations anything about the extent to which the Russians are currently aiding the Egyptians?

Mr. Brown: I do not see that that is part of the same question. I think there is everything to be said for having direct diplomatic relations and the hon. Gentleman can be quite sure that I keep my eyes open as to what is going on in that area.

Mr. Stratton Mills: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the diplomatic talks included Aden and the South Arabian Federation and an assurance of speedy withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen?

Mr. Brown: I do not think that the latter part of that question is related to this question of the resumption of diplomatic questions, which is quite another matter.

Mr. Jackson: Can my right hon. Friend say whether the resumption of diplomatic relations means there will be a resumption of cultural contacts between the two countries?

Mr. Brown: I would hope it would mean the resumption of full contacts in every way, but the immediate thing, of course, is to get our Ambassadors in each capital, and then we can get closer together on a number of things.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: These Questions have raised a number of matters which we cannot

pursue now, although it would be profitable to do so. Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether we could have a debate on this area, including Aden and the resumption of diplomatic relations, and have it early in December perhaps?

Mr. Brown: We will certainly be at the disposal of the House. In the Middle East a number of things are going on, as well as in Aden, to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, and there are happenings in New York, including the resolutions there. I would certainly be ready to discuss with the Leader of the House whether we can manage a debate.

Mr. Henig: Could my right hon. Friend tell the House whether in a condition of acceding to the Egyptian Government's request for establishing diplomatic relations was that they made good any losses of British goods lost in June?

Mr. Brown: There was no question of acceding to their request, but on the subject of sequestered property and other national interests I can assure my hon. Friend that we have that very much in mind.

Mr. Shinwell: Can the Foreign Secretary say whether on the resumption of diplomatic relations any strings or conditions were attached—for example, about freedom of all maritime nations to have their ships pass through the Suez Canal, etcetera? Or are we to understand that we are simply resuming diplomatic relations? Because so far our policy in the Middle East has signally failed.

Mr. Brown: We are resuming diplomatic relations. I am happy to say that both the Government and the United Arab Republic believe it would be wiser for us to be in full diplomatic relations rather than not. On the other issue, my right hon. Friend knows as well as I do that discussions are going on in New York apart from the question of the resumption of bilateral relations.

Mr. Mayhew: Is my right hon. Friend aware that he is entitled to warm congratulations on the success of the negotiations? Is he aware that the blind prejudice and vendetta against the Arabs in some parts of the House is not widely shared?

Mr. Hamling asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what representations have

been made to his Department by pacifist and anti-war organisations concerning the continued supplies of war materials by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Egypt, and other Arab nations; and if he will raise the matter of these supplies at the United Nations as a threat to peace.

Mr. George Brown: None, Sir.

As for the second part of the Question, I would refer to my speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 21st June, expressing Her Majesty's Government's view that the Powers who supply arms to countries in the Middle East have a responsibility to reach an agreement on arms limitation as soon as possible.

Mr. Hamling: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that Soviet supplies to the Middle East have particularly intensified our economic difficulties in the last fortnight?

Mr. Brown: It is very undesirable that arms should go on being supplied to that or any other area in a totally unrestricted and uncontrolled way. On the other hand, any agreement needs to carry the acquiescence of those concerned. Her Majesty's Government will continue to do all they can to bring about such an agreement.

Mr. Dodds-Parker: Will the Secretary of State confirm that the greatest source of arms in the last ten years has been Czechoslovakia? In view of the wish of this country to improve relations with that country, will he make representations to that Government?

Mr. Brown: That seems to me to be a somewhat different question; but I am sure that what I said just now is true, namely, that all countries supplying arms in that area must come to some controlled and registered agreement which can be enforced, and it will be our aim to bring it about.

Mr. Judd asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he will make a statement on the current position in the Middle East, with particular reference to refugees.

Mr. George Brown: The refugee situation has not altered fundamentally since the reports of the Commissioner General for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the Secretary General's special representative, Mr. Gussing. These reports are in the Library of the House.

Mr. Judd: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that the predicament of Jordan, minus the prosperous west bank, trying to cope with 220,000 new refugees, 150,000 in overcrowded cities and 70,000 in camps able to look less than four miles across the Jordan to their old encampments will create tension there?

Mr. Brown: I sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman has to say, but in view of the position which the discussions have now reached in New York, I think probably the less I say about it in public the better.

Mr. Marten asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement on the British ships trapped in the Great Bitter Lakes.

Mr. George Brown: I have nothing to add to what I said in the Debate on the Address on 2nd November.

Mr. Marten: If an international force, including dredgers, were to attempt to clear this international waterway south of the Bitter Lakes to liberate these ships, does the right hon. Gentleman seriously think that either the Israelis or the Egyptians would attack it?

Mr. Brown: That is asking me to go into areas where I would prefer not to. We are doing what we can with the other nations who are concerned—we are by no means the only one—both to get the ships out of the Bitter Lakes, and to get the Canal opened. This is obviously a very urgent requirement for us. It is also an urgent requirement for other people. One of the reasons why we are giving so much attention to getting a Resolution from the Security Council on which progress to a solution of the whole problem can be made is our need to get the Canal opened.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I do not want to press the right hon. Gentleman too far, but can he say whether, in discussing the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt, he is pressing upon President Nasser very strongly indeed the feeling in this country that if our ships continue to be blockaded or marooned in Suez it will be difficult to commend to the British people the resumption of diplomatic relations?

Mr. Brown: I will not link them together like that, but the hon. Gentleman can be assured

that all the time I am pressing on the U.A.R. authorities, and those who can help, the need to get these ships out. I was very encouraged the other day to receive a letter from the skippers of four British ships there. It was written in very warm terms and showed their morale to be high. They said that they were forming an association in the Bitter Lakes, and they were inviting me to be the only non-time serving member of it.

Mr. Ogden: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there are many in this House who will expect the resumption of diplomatic relations between this country and Egypt to be followed by the speedy removal of the physical and political obstacles to the movement of these ships, one of which comes from Merseyside?

Mr. Brown: I suggest that we should not link these two objectives together.—[*Hon. Members:* “Why not?”]—Because the question of the canal is linked with a lot of other issues about which negotiations are now going on among a number of countries. I suggest to the House that we would be wise to keep it there.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Ought not this to be linked with the British ships in the Lake? Surely the right hon. Gentleman can at least confirm that Sir Harold Beeley has talked about this to the President of the U.A.R.? How long does the right hon. Gentleman think it will take to clear the Canal, part of which I understand is silted up? What is the right hon. Gentleman's information?

Mr. Brown: On the question of representations to the President of the U.A.R., the right hon. Gentleman knows that Sir Harold Beeley raised this matter. I have informed the House about this. Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman knows that at my insistence Sir Harold Beeley visited the ships, and that as a result I had the letter from the skippers about it. Of course we are making representations in Cairo. When we have resumed relations, and we have an Ambassador there, we will be better placed to make them than we have been up to now, but I repeat—and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman knows this—that this issue is in many ways connected with others which have to be solved elsewhere.

I have recently answered questions about the timetable for clearing the Canal. Estimates vary from weeks to a few months. It would depend,

of course, on the size of the force that one was able to assemble and who was allowed to have the authority for doing it. Weeks or a few months is the usual assessment, but the longer the Canal stays shut the greater will be the silting up, and therefore the smaller the ships that will be able to use it once it is opened. I keep drawing the attention of the U.A.R. to the fact that this is a matter for them to consider very much in their own interests.

210

Commentary by the Official Organ of the Chinese Communist Party “Renmin Ribao” (People's Daily) on the November 22 Security Council Resolution.¹

Peking, November 25, 1967

The United Nations Security Council on November 22 adopted what was purported to be a British resolution on the Middle East situation. Though labelled “made in Britain,” it was a joint product of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. It represents another big conspiracy on the part of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in colluding to use the United Nations to force the Arab countries to capitulate completely to the aggressor. It is the product of another big deal on the Middle East question between the United States and the Soviet Union following their Glassboro talks, and signifies another act of big betrayal by the Soviet revisionist leading clique against the Arab people.

Under U.S. and Soviet manipulation, the United Nations did not utter a single word of denunciation against the war of aggression launched by U.S. imperialism and its stooge, Israel, in the Middle East last June, still less did it take any measure to check the aggression. However, after Israel had occupied large tracts of Arab territory, the United Nations stepped forward to impose a “ceasefire” on the Arab countries. More than ever, the “British” resolution adopted by the Security Council this time is a continuation of this attitude of conniving at Israeli aggression.

¹ *Peking Review*, 1/12/1967, pp. 32-33.

On the one hand, it contains no call for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops. On the other hand, it demands that the Arab countries which are victims of aggression should "respect and acknowledge" the legal existence of Israel, a U.S. tool of aggression, allow it to occupy more Arab territory, guarantee "freedom of navigation" in the Suez Canal and through the Tiran Straits, and also agree to further U.N. intervention in Middle East affairs. This resolution is obviously meant to help the U.S.-Israeli aggressors realize what they failed to fully realize by means of war.

The adoption of this resolution by the Security Council is the result of betrayal by the Soviet revisionist leading clique. Ever since the opening of the current General Assembly session, this pack of renegades headed by Brezhnev and Kosygin have been stepping up their co-ordination with U.S. imperialism and simultaneously exerting sustained pressure on the Arab countries. While Gromyko was making frequent contacts with Rusk, Kosygin repeatedly exchanged messages with Johnson in a flurry of manoeuvres. What warrants particular attention is the fact that the Soviet revisionist clique had put forward a draft resolution on November 20 which, on the surface, seemed to demand the withdrawal of Israeli troops. But two days later, as soon as the U.S. delegate welcomed the "British" resolution as completely conforming to the U.S. position, the Soviet revisionists lost no time in withdrawing their own resolution and swung their support to the "British" resolution. This show, which the Soviet revisionist leading clique put on together with U.S. imperialism in the United Nations, has once again laid bare its cunning sham support and real betrayal.

Moreover, in co-ordination with its acts of betrayal in the United Nations, the Soviet revisionist leading clique carried an article in *Pravda* on the "Middle East crisis" three days before the Security Council approved the "British" resolution. This article blatantly attacked the Arab people for having taken an "irresponsible" attitude towards Israel, and, playing the part of a blackmailer, it tried to advise the "Arab statesmen" to "keep calm" and "apprehend the actual situation..." What was it driving at by such nonsense? It was nakedly trying to force the Arab

countries to capitulate and give up their struggle against the Israeli aggressors, abandon their independence, sacrifice their state sovereignty, surrender their national dignity and submit themselves to being carved up and ravaged by the U.S.-led old and new colonialists and their lackeys. Has not this remarkable piece of writing completely revealed the true features of the Soviet revisionist leading clique as a pack of renegades and accomplices?

Through this resolution passed by the Security Council, the Arab people can see more clearly than ever that U.S. imperialism is their most ferocious enemy, that the Soviet revisionist leading clique is the No. 1 henchman of U.S. imperialism and that the United Nations is a tool of U.S. imperialism and a stock exchange for the United States and the Soviet Union to make political deals.

Our great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The oppressed peoples and nations must not pin their hopes for liberation on the 'sensibleness' of imperialism and its lackeys. They will only triumph by strengthening their unity and persevering in their struggle. The Arab people have further grasped this great truth through their own experience in struggle.

The contradiction between the Arab people on the one hand and the colonialists and neo-colonialists, headed by the United States, and their lackeys on the other is irreconcilable and cannot be solved by the conclusion of a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union. The U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionist leading clique will never succeed in their attempt to bind the 100 million Arab people hand and foot with a United Nations resolution, put out the roaring flames of their anti-imperialist struggle and stabilize the positions of neo-colonialism. The new schemes of aggression of the U.S. imperialists and the latest treachery of the Soviet revisionist leading clique can only arouse stronger indignation and opposition among the Arab people.

Today, the national-liberation movement in the land of the Arabs is continuing to grow in depth and the Palestinian people are persevering in their heroic armed struggle and striking at the Israeli aggressors again and again for the liberation of their homeland. We are convinced that so

long as the 100 million Arab people are closely united and persevere in long-term struggle, they will certainly surmount all difficulties, defeat all their enemies and win final victory.

211

Joint Communiqué on West German Chancellor Kiesinger's Visit to Ceylon, 24-26 November.¹ [Excerpt]

Colombo, November 26, 1967

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The two Heads of Government discussed the grave situation in the Middle East, and stated the viewpoints of their respective Governments. They stated that peace in that part of the world is of vital importance for world stability and the economic welfare of developing countries, particularly in Asia, and agreed that a lasting and peaceful solution is imperative. They declared that the legitimate wishes of the population should be taken into account and the sovereignty of all states should be respected in any efforts to solve the problem, if the solution is to be fair and lasting.

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212

News Conference Statements by French President de Gaulle.² [Excerpt]

Paris, November 27, 1967

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Q. Mon général, la guerre a éclaté au Moyen-Orient, il y a six mois. Elle s'est aussitôt terminée comme on sait. Que pensez-vous de l'évolution de la situation dans ce secteur depuis le mois de juin dernier?

R. L'établissement entre les deux guerres

mondiales, car il faut remonter jusque-là, l'établissement d'un foyer sioniste en Palestine et puis, après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'établissement d'un Etat d'Israël, soulevait à l'époque un certain nombre d'appréhensions. On pouvait se demander, en effet, et on se demandait même chez beaucoup de Juifs, si l'implantation de cette communauté sur des terres qui avaient été acquises dans des conditions plus ou moins justifiables et au milieu des peuples arabes qui lui étaient foncièrement hostiles, n'allait pas entraîner d'incessants, d'interminables frictions et conflits. Certains même redoutaient que les Juifs, jusqu'alors dispersés, mais qui étaient restés ce qu'ils avaient été de tout temps, c'est-à-dire un peuple d'élite, sûr de lui-même et dominateur, n'en viennent, une fois rassemblés dans le site de leur ancienne grandeur, à changer en ambition ardente et conquérante les souhaits très émouvants qu'ils formaient depuis dix-neuf siècles.

Cependant, en dépit du flot tantôt montant, tantôt descendant, des malveillances qu'ils provoquaient, qu'ils suscitaient plus exactement, dans certains pays et à certaines époques, un capital considérable d'intérêt et même de sympathie s'était accumulé en leur faveur surtout, il faut bien le dire, dans la Chrétienté; un capital qui était issue de l'immense souvenir du Testament, nourri par toutes les sources d'une magnifique liturgie, entretenu par la commisération qu'inspirait leur antique malheur et que poétisait, chez nous, la légende du Juif errant, accru par les abominables persécutions qu'ils avaient subies pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et grossi, depuis qu'ils avaient retrouvé une patrie, par leurs travaux constructifs et le courage de leurs soldats.

C'est pourquoi, indépendamment des vastes concours en argent, en influence, en propagande, d'Amérique et d'Europe, beaucoup de pays, dont la France, voyaient avec satisfaction l'établissement de leur Etat sur le territoire que leur avaient reconnu les puissances, tout en désirant qu'il parvienne, en usant d'un peu de modestie, à trouver avec ses voisins un «modus vivendi» pacifique.

Il faut dire que ces données psychologiques avaient quelque peu changé depuis 1956; à la faveur de l'expédition franco-britannique de Suez, on avait vu apparaître en effet un Etat d'Israël guerrier et résolu à s'agrandir. Ensuite,

¹ *La Documentation Française: Articles et Documents*, Paris, 29/12/1967, p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, 8/12/1967, pp. 17-18.

l'action qu'il menait pour doubler sa population par l'immigration de nouveaux éléments, donnait à penser que le territoire qu'il avait acquis ne lui suffirait pas longtemps et qu'il serait porté, pour l'agrandir, à utiliser toute occasion qui se présenterait. C'est pourquoi, d'ailleurs, la Ve République s'était dégagée vis-à-vis d'Israël des liens spéciaux et très étroits que le régime précédent avait noués avec cet Etat et s'était appliquée, au contraire, à favoriser la détente dans le Moyen-Orient.

Bien sûr, nous conservions avec le gouvernement israélien des rapports cordiaux et même, nous lui fournissions pour sa défense éventuelle les armements qu'il demandait d'acheter, mais, en même temps, nous lui prodiguions des avis de modération, notamment à propos des litiges qui concernaient les eaux du Jourdain ou bien des escarmouches qui opposaient périodiquement les forces des deux camps. Enfin, nous nous refusions à donner officiellement notre aval à son installation dans un quartier de Jérusalem dont il s'était emparé, et nous maintenions notre ambassade à Tel-Aviv.

D'autre part, une fois mis un terme à l'affaire algérienne, nous avions repris avec les peuples arabes d'Orient la même politique d'amitié, de coopération, qui avait été pendant des siècles celle de la France dans cette partie du monde et dont la raison et le sentiment font qu'elle est aujourd'hui une des bases fondamentales de notre action extérieure.

Bien entendu, nous ne laissons pas ignorer aux Arabes que, pour nous, l'Etat d'Israël était un fait accompli et que nous n'admettrions pas qu'il fût détruit. De sorte que, on pouvait imaginer qu'un jour viendrait où notre pays pourrait aider directement à ce qu'une paix réelle fût conclue et garantie en Orient, pourvu qu'aucun drame nouveau ne vînt le déchirer.

Hélas! le drame est venu. Il avait été préparé par une tension très grande et constante qui résultait du sort scandaleux des réfugiés en Jordanie, et aussi d'une menace de destruction prodiguée contre Israël. Le 22 mai, l'affaire d'Akaba, fâcheusement créée par l'Egypte, allait offrir un prétexte à ceux qui rêvaient d'en découdre. Pour éviter les hostilités, la France avait, dès le 24 mai, proposé aux trois autres grandes puissances, d'interdire, conjointement

avec elles, à chacune des deux parties, d'entamer le combat.

Le 2 juin, le gouvernement français avait officiellement déclaré,¹ qu'éventuellement, il donnerait tort à quiconque entamerait le premier l'action des armes, et c'est ce que j'avais répété, en toute clarté, à tous les Etats en cause; c'est ce que j'avais moi-même, le 24 mai, déclaré à M. Eban, ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Israël, que je voyais à Paris.

"Si Israël est attaqué—lui dis-je, alors, en substance—nous ne le laisserons pas détruire, mais si vous attaquez, nous condamnerons votre initiative. Certes, malgré l'infériorité numérique de votre population, étant donné que vous êtes beaucoup mieux organisés, beaucoup plus rassemblés, beaucoup mieux armés que les Arabes, je ne doute pas que, le cas échéant, vous remporteriez des succès militaires, mais, ensuite, vous vous trouveriez engagés sur le terrain, et, au point de vue international, dans des difficultés grandissantes, d'autant plus que la guerre en Orient ne peut pas manquer d'augmenter dans le monde une tension déplorable et d'avoir des conséquences très malencontreuses pour beaucoup de pays, si bien que c'est à vous, devenus des conquérants, qu'on en imputerait peu à peu les inconvénients."

On sait que la voix de la France n'a pas été entendue. Israël, ayant attaqué, s'est emparé, en six jours de combat, des objectifs qu'il voulait atteindre. Maintenant, il organise, sur les territoires qu'il a pris, l'occupation qui ne peut aller sans oppression, répressions, expulsions, et il s'y manifeste contre lui une résistance, qu'à son tour, il qualifie de terrorisme. Il est vrai que les deux belligérants observent, pour le moment, d'une manière plus ou moins précaire et irrégulière, le cessez-le-feu prescrit par les Nations unies, mais il est bien évident que le conflit n'est que suspendu et qu'il ne peut pas avoir de solution, sauf par la voie internationale. Mais un règlement dans cette voie, à moins que les Nations unies ne déchirent elles-mêmes leur propre Charte, un règlement doit avoir pour base l'évacuation des territoires qui ont été pris par la force, la fin de toute belligérance et la reconnaissance réciproque de chacun des Etats en cause par tous les autres. Après quoi, par des décisions des Nations

¹ See *ante*, doc. 49.

unies, en présence et sous la garantie de leurs forces, il serait probablement possible d'arrêter le tracé précis des frontières, les conditions de la vie et de la sécurité des deux côtés, le sort des réfugiés et des minorités et les modalités de la libre navigation pour tous, notamment dans le golfe d'Akaba et dans le canal de Suez.

Suivant la France, dans cette hypothèse, Jérusalem devrait recevoir un statut international.

Pour qu'un règlement puisse être mis en œuvre, il faudrait qu'il y eût l'accord des grandes puissances qui entraînerait *ipso facto* celui des Nations unies, et si un tel accord voyait le jour, la France est d'avance disposée à prêter sur place son concours politique, économique et militaire, pour que cet accord soit effectivement appliqué. Mais on ne voit pas comment un accord quelconque pourrait naître, non point fictivement sur quelque formule creuse, mais effectivement pour une action commune tant que l'un des plus grands des Quatre ne se sera pas dégagé de la guerre odieuse qu'il mène ailleurs. Car tout se tient dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. Sans le drame du Vietnam, le conflit entre Israël et les Arabes ne serait pas devenu ce qu'il est et si, demain, l'Asie du Sud-Est voyait renaître la paix, le Moyen-Orient l'aurait bientôt recouvrée, à la faveur de la détente générale qui suivrait un pareil événement.

213

Speech of Albanian Ambassador to People's China Nathanaili at a National Day Reception.¹ [Excerpt]

Peking, November 29, 1967

Another new incident stemming from the imperialist policy of war is the sudden criminal aggression launched by imperialism and Israel against the Arab people. The incident of aggression in the Middle East has exposed the common

agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in jointly plotting against the Arab people's freedom and independence; it also shows to the whole world who are their true friends.

The Albanian people and Government resolutely condemn this act of aggression and will always support the fraternal Arab people in their cause of just struggle.

214

Joint Communiqué on Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabbah's Visit to Iran, 28 November-1 December.² [Excerpt]

Teheran, December 1, 1967

The two sides had official talks in a friendly atmosphere, in the course of which they reviewed the international situation, the situation in the Middle East and problems of concern to their two countries. Both sides demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the previous status of Jerusalem in accordance with the pertinent resolution of the U.N. General Assembly.

215

Joint Communiqué on Syrian Premier Zu'ayyen's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 29 November-2 December.³ [Excerpt]

Moscow, December 2, 1967

The two parties reviewed in detail the present situation in the Middle East and urgent tasks connected with the struggle to eliminate the effects of the aggression.

They reaffirmed the necessity of "Israeli"

¹ Hsinhua News Agency Bulletin.

² *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, 4/12/1967.

³ *Al-Ba'th*, 3/12/1967.

aggressive forces withdrawing without delay to the positions they occupied before 5 June 1967.

It is impossible that peace should be established in the area without the withdrawal of the "Israeli" forces from all occupied territories in the Arab countries.

The two sides condemned the policy of imperialism, its constant adventures and its employment of "Israel" as an instrument against the independence of the Arab countries and their legitimate rights, for the purpose of toppling the progressive regimes in the Arab world, so that it may once more become a sphere of imperialist influence.

The two parties expressed their conviction that the solution of problems connected with the present aggression should be based on full respect for the legitimate interests of the Arab countries and on world appreciation of the great contribution of the Arab people to international life, and on preventing the aggressor from achieving any gains as a result of the aggression.

The Syrian Arab side expressed its government's profound gratitude to the government and people of the U.S.S.R. for their support and the valuable aid they have supplied to the Arab people in Syria and the other Arab countries which were the victims of Israeli aggression.

The Syrian Arab side referred to the sympathy and solidarity felt by all peace-loving peoples in all parts of the world for the just struggle of the Arabs against the Israeli aggressors and their expansionist efforts.

The Syrian government is also extremely grateful for the aid the Arab people are receiving from the socialist countries.

The Syrian Arab delegation declared that the Syrian Arab Republic would continue to strengthen and expand friendly relations with all the socialist countries.

The delegation expressed special appreciation for the attitude of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Germany, which has always been on the side of the just cause of the Arab people, whereas the Federal German Republic has supported and assisted aggression.

The two parties expressed the belief that it was essential that the unity of the people of the Arab countries should be strengthened on the

basis of their common struggle against Israeli aggression and the forces of imperialism which stand behind Israel.

The Syrian Arab Republic regards the elimination of the effects of Israeli aggression as a problem affecting all Arabs, and will continue to work with the United Arab Republic and the progressive Arab countries for the unification of the Arab potential in the common struggle against imperialism.

The Soviet Government declared that the U.S.S.R., along with the socialist countries, will provide the necessary aid to the Arab countries in the future and will support them in their just struggle to eliminate the effects of Israeli aggression and to rebuild their economy and strengthen their defence capabilities.

216

Joint Communiqué on Talks Between a French Communist Party Delegation and the Syrian Ba'th Party, 27 November-4 December.¹ [Excerpt]

Damascus, December 4, 1967

The two delegations agreed that the popular liberation movement in the Middle East, as in all parts of the world, was meeting with ferocious opposition from imperialism, especially American imperialism, which is becoming increasingly aggressive within the framework of a comprehensive strategy.

It is the United States, in collaboration with Great Britain and West Germany, that bears the greatest share of responsibility for the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and the other Arab countries, with Israeli expansionism used as an instrument.

The French Communist Party expressed its full solidarity with the struggle of the Syrian Arab people, and all progressive Arab forces, to defend their independence and security against

¹ *Ibid.*, 6/12/1967.

the Israeli aggression of 5 June.

The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party delegation expressed its gratitude for the support of the French Communist Party during that acute international crisis.

The two parties condemned Zionism and the Israeli policy of annexation, which is supported by American imperialism. They believe that it is essential that the effects of the Israeli aggression be liquidated; this would include the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they occupied before 5 June, and the return of the Palestine refugees, with their national rights, to their homeland, if a just solution of the current problems of this part of the world is to be reached.

217

Joint Communiqué on East German State Council Chairman Ulbricht's Visit to the U.S.S.R., 11-12 December.¹ [Excerpt]

Moscow, December 12, 1967

Both sides emphatically condemn the Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab states and insist that the troops of the aggressor be withdrawn immediately from the Arab territories they now occupy to behind the line where they stood prior to June 5th 1967. The German Democratic Republic declares that she condemns the policy of the governing circles of the Federal Republic of Germany who actively assisted Israel in her preparations for and carrying out of the invasion of the Arab states. The G.D.R. was and remains a true friend of the independent Arab states and peoples, and will continue to support their just cause firmly in future. The U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. agreed to take measures conjointly to support the Arab states, the victims of the aggression.

¹ *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, East Berlin, 5/1/1968.

218

Speech of French President de Gaulle at a Banquet in Honor of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen.² [Excerpt]

Paris, December 15, 1967

Le second domaine où vous et nous pouvons et devons nous concerter pour agir, c'est le domaine de la paix. Avant tout, naturellement, au Moyen-Orient, où la guerre s'est déchaînée et se tient, à présent, suspendue. Là comme partout et comme toujours, la paix ne saurait valablement s'établir qu'en excluant toutes conquêtes acquises par la force des armes, en mettant fin à toute belligérance de principe ou de fait, en assurant un sort digne et humain aux réfugiés et aux minorités, en attribuant à chacun des Etats intéressés, par exemple pour la navigation, les mêmes droits qui sont reconnus aux autres.

C'est à quoi, nul ne l'ignore, la France est prête à contribuer activement dès que s'en présenterait l'occasion internationale.

219

Joint Communiqué on Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen's Visit to France, 10-15 December.³ [Excerpt]

Paris, December 15, 1967

The Syrian Premier expressed his appreciation of France's attitude on major world problems in general and problems of the Arab homeland in particular. The two sides studied the development of conditions in the Middle East and agreed that no permanent peace could be established there except on the basis of justice and right.

The Syrian Arab delegation expressed its gratitude for the hospitality shown to it by the French Government and people and for President

² *Le Monde*, 17-18/12/1967.

³ *Ath-Thawrah*, 16/12/1967.

de Gaulle's profound understanding of the Middle East crisis.

220

Joint Communiqué on Talks Between a Syrian Ba'th Party Delegation and the Italian Communist Party, 11-18 December.¹ [Excerpt]

Rome, December 18, 1967

The two delegations regard the Israeli aggression of 5 June as being part of an overall plan aimed at overthrowing the progressive Arab regimes, securing continued imperialist domination, and protecting the oil monopolies in the Arab countries. The two delegations condemn the aggression of 5 June and Israel's militarist and expansionist policy, and insist on the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israelis to the positions they occupied on 4 June, and on the return of the Palestinian Arabs to their homeland with full national rights.

221

Statements by U.S. President Johnson on the Middle East in the Course of a Telecast Interview.²

Washington, December 19, 1967

Q. Mr. President, that brings us back to Glassboro and your conversations this summer. How much of a factor in the restraint that we and the Russians seemed to show in the Middle East crisis was a product of the dialogue that you established with Mr. Kosygin at Glassboro?

The President. I think that the Glassboro conference was a very useful conference. I am

not sure that it really solved any of the problems of the Middle East. I think the situation in the Middle East is a very dangerous one.

I think we have made clear our viewpoint in my statement of June 19th, the five conditions that ought to enter into bringing about peace in the area.³ We stressed those to Mr. Kosygin at Glassboro. He understands them. He did not agree with them. But I think that the Soviet Union understands that we feel very strongly about this matter, that we do have definite views.

I think Ambassador Goldberg, at the United Nations, has made our position very clear. As a result of the action of the United Nations, in sending Ambassador Jarring there as a mediator, we are hopeful that the conditions I outlined on June 19th can be worked out and that a permanent solution can be found to that very difficult problem.

I would say it is one of our most dangerous situations, and one that is going to require the best tact, judgment, patience, and willingness on the part of all to find a solution.

Q. Mr. President, do you consider that this country has the same kind of unwavering commitment to defend Israel against invasion as we have in South Vietnam?

The President. We don't have a SEATO treaty, if that is what you are asking. We have made clear our very definite interest in Israel, and our desire to preserve peace in that area of the world by many means. But we do not have a mutual security treaty with them, as we do in Southeast Asia.

222

Communiqué on the Warsaw Conference of Foreign Ministers of European Socialist Countries on the Middle East.⁴

Warsaw, December 27, 1967

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of European socialist states took place in Warsaw from December 19th to 21st 1967. It was attended

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 22/12/1967

² *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 1967, p. 1743.

³ See *ante*, doc. 114.

⁴ *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, 15/1/1968, p. 13.

by: I. Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; J. Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic; O. Winzer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic; A. Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland; M. Mihai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Rumania; A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; J. Pudlak, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic; and M. Nikezic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The participants discussed the development of the situation in the Middle East in detail and exchanged the pertinent information that was available to their governments.

The fact was ascertained that the Middle East still stands under the sign of strongest tensions as a result of imperialist interference. Opposing the clearly expressed will of most of the countries of the world and the decisions of the United Nations Organization, Israel continues to occupy the conquered territories of a number of Arab states and tries to benefit politically and otherwise therefrom. The Suez Canal, which is of the greatest importance for international shipping and trade, became a front line and all traffic has been suspended. Countless privations and difficulties have been inflicted upon one-and-a-half million Arab refugees whose land and dwellings have been occupied. The situation in this region is hallmarked by the danger of a new explosion.

Far-reaching plans and intentions of certain imperialist circles, above all of the United States, are behind the tensions that are being maintained and fanned with premeditation in this region. These plans and intentions are aimed at restoring in the Arab East the neo-colonialist relations that are most profoundly inimical to the peoples of this area. Attempts are being made with this objective to turn the Mediterranean region into an area of aggressive policy.

On behalf of their countries the Foreign Ministers expressed solidarity with and support for the friendly Arab states that are fighting a just battle against imperialist and neo-colonialist intrigues, for their legitimate rights and interests,

for independence and state sovereignty, for national unity and for economic and social progress. The participants in the conference welcomed the constructive attitude toward resolving the Middle East problem adopted by the governments of the United Arab Republic and other Arab states advocating that a political settlement be brought about as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the Ministers welcomed the efforts of these governments to strengthen the unified action of the Arab states for the purpose of warding off the hostile policy of neo-colonialism and imperialist aggression in the Middle East, the policy of interference by imperialism in the internal affairs of the Arab states. In this connection, the Ministers voiced their positive attitude toward the planned conference of the Heads of the Arab states in Rabat.

The participants unanimously emphasized that the most important and irrevocable condition for restoring and consolidating peace in the Middle East is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories of Arab states to behind the lines of June 5th 1967. The Ministers pointed in this connection to the great importance inherent to the fulfilment of the resolution the U.N. Security Council adopted on November 22nd 1967 as well as to the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the occupied territories of Arab states, and underlined the impermissibility of acquiring territories by war. Every interpretation that is targeted at weakening this fundamental element of the Security Council's resolution contradicts both its letter and its spirit.

At the same time the Ministers stressed the necessity that all the U.N. member-states of this region recognize the right of every one of these states to exist as an independent national state and to live in peace and security. Israel's acts, which are aimed at retaining hold of parts of the occupied Arab territories, prevent other problems of this area from being solved on the foundation of the above-mentioned principles of non-interference in domestic affairs and territorial integrity. Such acts must be condemned.

The Ministers exchanged their opinions on possible steps whose objective is contributing toward the political solution of the problems of the Middle East in the spirit of the implementation of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution.

Conference decided to continue with necessary consultations on the Middle East situation between the states that took part in the conference.

Moreover, the participants expressed the socialist countries' solidarity with the just struggle of the Yemenite people for its independence and sovereignty and against the machinations of imperialist and reactionary forces which are aimed at maintaining neo-colonialist rule in the south of the Arab peninsula. The Ministers also welcomed the foundation of the People's Republic of South Yemen as a new Arab states.

The conference took place in a spirit of complete unanimity and close comradely cooperation.

223

Interview Granted by Israeli Ambassador to West Germany Ben Natan to the German Weekly "Der Spiegel".¹

Bonn, December, 1967

Der Spiegel: Mr. Ambassador, last summer the sympathy of the greater part of public opinion was obviously in favour of Israel; the impression prevailed that Israel was waging a just war. However, in autumn, there was a wave of criticism, for people were of the opinion that Israel is capable of winning a war but not of making peace.

Ben Natan: We are capable of making peace for peace is what we wholeheartedly desire; however, we did not want the six days' war of June and we did not start hostilities. I think your impression is somewhat biased. Whether there will be peace or not does not at all depend on us.

Der Spiegel: Does this mean that you believe that the realization of peace depends only upon the Arabs?

Ben Natan: That depends on those who have been demanding for twenty years that the State of Israel be destroyed. We remain realists after the end of the war just as we were prior to this war, and as realists we know that there is no going back to the pre-June situation.

Der Spiegel: Recently, some of the Arab leaders—for instance, King Husayn, after a meeting with President 'Abdun-Nasir—have repeatedly and publicly confirmed their respect for the existence of the State of Israel.

Ben Natan: Oh, no one has assured this, and I believe that this is just part of the so-called new moderate policy of the Arabs aiming at making a favourable impression on the Western world, though in reality it is but a ruse. Moreover, even if Husayn had meant what he said, then Nasser's speech of November 23 has disavowed him for there was no mention made in it of the recognition of Israel.

Der Spiegel: Naturally, declarations from the Arab side alone cannot solve the decades old conflict. But we are of the opinion that recent Israeli declarations tend to aggravate the conflict, like that for example, of Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Defence, concerning the occupied Arab territories. He said that the present map of Israel was a cause of satisfaction as were the present frontiers. This statement makes it clear to everyone, and not only to Arab ears, that Israel is bent on annexation.

Ben Natan: Dayan says this only with regard to Israel's security. As long as the Arabs are not ready to speak with us about peace, Israel cannot leave such favourable defence positions—and these were much more favourable in autumn than they were in summer.

Der Spiegel: Moshe Dayan—of whom similar remarks may be expected—was not the only responsible authority to make such statements. The Israeli Minister of Labour, Allon, said: "The eastern frontiers of Israel pass right through the middle of the Jordan and the Dead Sea." Even the moderate Prime Minister Eshkol declared recently before the Knesset: "Israel's safety frontier must be the Jordan; and the most natural frontier would be the Suez Canal."

Ben Natan: I want one thing to be perfectly clear, namely that there does not exist any resolution on the part of the Israeli Government as to the future frontiers of Israel. All statements of this nature are made with security in view.

Der Spiegel: Galili, your Minister of Information, stated that: "There will be no return of the Egyptian troops to their positions of aggression in the Sinai."

Ben Natan: Well, what do you think this

¹ *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, 25/12/1967. pp. 70-78.

means? It definitely does not mean that the frontiers of Israel lie at the Suez Canal and neither does it mean that we demand Sinai for Israel. It means that Sinai shall never again be a military ramp for an Egyptian aggression against Israel.

Der Spiegel: Does your Government perhaps plan a demilitarization of the Sinai, similar to the demilitarization of the Rhineland by the Western Powers after World War I?

Ben Natan: I don't know if the Rhineland could serve as a model. In any case, an arrangement has to be reached guaranteeing the security of Israel.

Der Spiegel: We are under the impression that many Jews in Israel want to keep as much as possible of the occupied territory, because they believe that they have a historical and religious claim to it.

Ben Natan: I would like to make it clear that had there been a way leading towards peace and security, the frontier problem would look different. But we also have a public which knows, since twenty years, that they are in a state of war; that since twenty years hardly a week passes without an incident; we have a public which wants to feel that its security is guaranteed. And to this public we must say something.

Der Spiegel: Does Israel intend to annex the old town of Jerusalem which is also sacred to the Moslem Arabs?

Ben Natan: We have made specific statements on this subject, for we are determined that Jerusalem should never again become a divided town with trenches and barbed wire. However, we guarantee free access to the Holy Sites, and the religious places are supposed to be administered autonomously by the respective religious groups.

Der Spiegel: Why isn't Israel ready to internationalize Jerusalem as had already been requested by the United Nations in 1947, especially as this step might also be acceptable to the Moslems? The annexation of the old city of Jerusalem arouses hostile feelings.

Ben Natan: The internationalization of Jerusalem does not represent a solution to the problem. There are examples in history which have not proved a success. Today, there are 200,000 Jews in Jerusalem and you cannot internationalize them.

Der Spiegel: What will become of the Egyptian

Gaza Strip? We believe that Israel intends—just as it is the case in the Sinai—to control in the long run this area in one form or another, and the same applies to the Syrian Golan Heights.

Ben Natan: Speaking of the Gaza Strip, which incidentally the Egyptians did not acquire legally but through military aggression, and which they administered as an occupying power, and of the Golan Heights from which the Syrians have fired again and again at Israeli villages, there prevail in Israel different opinions. However, all opinions are agreed that these areas will never again be bases for an aggression against Israel.

Der Spiegel: What will become of the western bank of Jordan?

Ben Natan: This still remains to be negotiated. We cannot say anything about it yet.

Der Spiegel: Immediately after the June war, 40% of the houses in Kalkilia on West Jordan territory were destroyed by Israeli military detachments. In Shuyukh, South of Jerusalem, nine houses were pulled down and in November last, numerous houses of about 20,000 Arab refugees of the last war were demolished by bulldozers near the Damia Bridge on West Jordan territory. Do plans for the annexation of at least parts of the West Jordan territory lie behind these acts, or are they also performed under the pretext of security? The Israeli General Narkiss said that the reason for the destructions near the Damia Bridge was the danger of epidemics and rats plague.

Ben Natan: In Kalkilia a great number of houses was so heavily damaged during the hostilities that they had to be pulled down. Meanwhile, new houses have been built. The demolition of some houses in other places was done exclusively for security reasons, and not for the purpose of annexation as some people maintain. No decision whatsoever has been taken in the Knesset or by the Israeli Government for the annexation of West Jordan.

Der Spiegel: Is not the security of Israel then really guaranteed only when it comes to terms with the Arabs?

Ben Natan: For years we have been trying to reach an agreement with the Arabs, and not only after the last war. The question, however, is on what basis would such an agreement be possible? The State of Israel exists and the Arabs have to live with this State.

Der Spiegel: In 1990 there will be about 200

million Arabs. Their economic, technical and of course military power will increase considerably. In 1990 there will, however, be at the most five million Israelis. Isn't that a dangerous perspective?

Ben Natan: Yes, but what does this mean? We have tried our best and we will continue to exert all possible efforts to bring about peace with the Arabs. But we cannot agree to measures which would mean suicide and no one should expect this from us.

Der Spiegel: Nobody is asking for this; but does Israel exploit all possibilities to take up discussions with the Arabs? Why, for example, does your Government insist on direct negotiations although it knows that the Arabs are adamant on this point? Why does Israel not agree to negotiations within the framework of the United Nations?

Ben Natan: The Arabs did not propose negotiations in the framework of the United Nations.

Der Spiegel: In any case the U.N. has proposed that Arabs and Israelis...

Ben Natan: Yes, and for this purpose a U.N. envoy has now been nominated...

Der Spiegel: Whom Israel has so far refused. Israel still goes on saying: "We negotiate only directly."

Ben Natan: We have now agreed to the appointment of a U.N. envoy, and the Swedish U.N. envoy Jarring has already been to Jerusalem. However, we are still of the opinion that direct negotiations with the Arabs would be the best way, and we have been saying this repeatedly for 20 years.

Der Spiegel: Although you know that the defeated Nasir will be assassinated on the next day, if he sits at a table with a victorious Israel.

Ben Natan: I wouldn't say that so categorically. Would I presume this so categorically, then I would probably come to very sad consequences. Apparently, you want to point to the alleged alternatives which you mentioned in the "Der Spiegel" article on Arabs and Israelis. You wrote that two possibilities exist for Israel.

— To renounce the annexation of Arab territory, and thus to bring to a possible end the twenty years old state of war.

— Or to enlarge Israel and maintain the state of war.

I find these alternatives different and believe that

— We should keep the present favourable positions as long as the Arabs are not prepared for direct peace negotiations;

— Or the peaceful coexistence of the Arab States with Israel within mutually recognized boundaries.

Der Spiegel: The fact is that there is now an Arab unified front which did not exist before the June war; cracks have been cemented. However, it is just the Jordanians, whose attitude towards Israel was the most moderate one, who suffer most from the consequences of the war. Without the western bank areas, Jordan cannot exist economically.

Ben Natan: This assertion is not proven; besides up to 1949 West Jordan was not part of Transjordan. It was annexed that year, and this action was sharply criticised by the Arab League. Had Husayn not made the offensive alliance with Nasir on May 30, 1967, and had he listened to the warning of Eshkol...

Der Spiegel:...then he would no longer be King of Jordan.

Ben Natan: Who can say? Anyway, Jordanians were not more moderate than the Egyptians when war started on June 5. It is sad, however, that once again it was the Palestinian Arabs who suffered most.

Der Spiegel: Did Israel's relations with the western world deteriorate as well, after the June war?

Ben Natan: This cannot be affirmed.

Der Spiegel: These days France's President de Gaulle has shot a thunderbolt by his branding of the Jews as "a domineering and militaristic people."¹

Ben Natan: De Gaulle's words have been much regretted in Israel. We take this for a misrepresentation of our history, and furthermore, we disagree with all those who, like de Gaulle, claim that in June we waged an offensive war.

Der Spiegel: For twenty years now, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs have been living in miserable conditions in camps in Egypt, Jordan and Syria; 300,000 of these refugees are living in the Gaza Strip, and tens of thousands in West Jordan, both of which areas are at present under Israeli administration. Will it now be easier to solve the refugees problem?

¹ See ante, doc. 212.

Ben Natan: We have always stated and we cannot repeat often enough; we are ready to participate in a solution of the refugees problem. We stated this in 1948 for the first time, and have repeated it since then twice every year.

Der Spiegel: But nothing has happened in twenty years. What are the reasons?

Ben Natan: In 1950, we declared that we were ready—within the framework of a peace agreement with the Arabs—to take back to Israel 100,000 refugees. Moreover, we repeatedly offered to pay indemnities, but this offer was not accepted by the Arabs.

Der Spiegel: Again the condition for paying these indemnities was "direct negotiations."

Ben Natan: There is nothing indecent or shameful about direct negotiations. But instead of negotiating or trying to integrate the Arab refugees...

Der Spiegel: Which would of course be very difficult for the underdeveloped Arab States...

Ben Natan: They are kept as a potential fifth column in camps and stirred up against Israel.

Der Spiegel: May we come back to those refugees who are living at present in camps situated in areas occupied by Israel? This partial problem should now be easier to solve.

Ben Natan: The partial problem cannot be separated from the whole problem. Future events will be determined by the future status of the Gaza Strip and the development of Israeli-Jordan relations. In true peace lies the complete solution to the refugees problem. Since 1948, the Arabs have been claiming that in that year the Arab refugees were expelled by Israel and "Der Spiegel" supports this claim.

Der Spiegel: We have supported no claim, and we did not say that all of the Arab refugees were expelled. However, we believe that Israeli threats were largely instrumental behind the Arabs leaving their land.

Ben Natan: Many Arabs ran away because they were frightened and were looking for safety. Others left because their leaders, the rich Arabs, fled, and the people followed them. Frequently, the Arabs were also encouraged by their leaders to leave Israel. However, they were not expelled, for expulsion means turning them out by force and violence at the point of a gun.

Der Spiegel: Here and there, however, pressure was exercised, at least indirect pressure. Thus, for example, after the incident of Deir Yassin in 1948, which led to the massacre of 250 Arabs by the Israelis, a neutral witness, namely, the American missionary Bertha Spafford Vester, reported that trucks fitted with loudspeakers drove through the Arab colonies and threatened repetition of the Deir Yassin action, and the officers were mostly of the opinion that the "cleanest solution" would be for the Arabs to leave.

Ben Natan: No regular Israeli troops were involved in the Deir Yassin incident, and it has been officially regretted. Moreover, in wartime, regrettable things are prone to happen. I want to point out one thing however; when the Arabs chose to stay, nothing happened to them, and they did not rate as second class citizens as you claim.

Der Spiegel: From 1948 to 1966, that is, until a year ago, most of the 230,000 Arabs living in Israel were controlled by a military régime. These Arabs needed special permits to leave their villages, to till their land outside the village, and it was not regular law courts which judged the Arabs, but officers who gave them their orders.

Ben Natan: According to law, Jews and Arabs were and are equal. Unfortunately, security measures became necessary which were, however, cancelled as soon as we believed that this was compatible with our security.

Der Spiegel: Even nowadays, Arabs in general cannot serve in the army, neither can they be appointed in posts which are according to Israeli definition connected with the security of the country. From the 12,000 students of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, only 240 are Arabs and Druses, and the Arab students are not permitted—as are their Jewish counterparts—to form organisations.

Ben Natan: Let us start with the military service. The Arabs of Israel have proven their loyalty towards the State; however, there are things such as military service which we cannot demand from them.

Der Spiegel: Why not?

Ben Natan: Because the possibility exists that one day a Moslem Arab might have to fight against his own family, and we cannot ask that from them. This question is finally a question of our relations with the Arab States. When we

shall have peace with the Arabs, the Arabs of Israel will enjoy full equality of rights. The same applies to posts which are important from the point of view of security, for even loyal citizens are not suitable for all posts.

Der Spiegel: An Arab cannot for example hold an important post in the Ministry of Agriculture. Does that involve security as well?

Ben Natan: Well, one thing depends upon another...

Der Spiegel: Does not the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel remind one somehow—especially from the emotional point of view—of the colour problem in America? According to law, coloured people enjoy the same rights as ordinary citizens. In real life, however, this is not the case.

Ben Natan: We desire the full integration of all citizens of the State of Israel, and we deeply regret that due to the strained relations between Israel and the Arab States, absolute equality of rights cannot be completely realized. However, even now the average standard of living of the Arabs in Israel is quite above the average in other Arab countries. The educational level is higher, health services are much better, and the income per capita of the population is far higher.

Der Spiegel: From the 120 deputies of the Knesset only seven are Arabs; this is hardly six percent, whereas the Arab population of Israel comes up to eleven percent.

Ben Natan: That there are only seven deputies lies with the Arabs themselves for many of them vote for Jewish politicians. There is another point mentioned in the leading article which I would like to discuss, namely, the Kafr Qassem incident of October 29, 1956, an incident which I would like to add is also greatly deplored by the Israelis. On that day, the Sinai war started and martial law was proclaimed in the frontier villages. The Arabs who came after the curfew into the village...

Der Spiegel: ...the curfew of which they probably knew nothing...

Ben Natan:...were not, as you reported, put in trucks and driven to the place of execution. The frontier guards fired upon them and killed a portion of them.

Der Spiegel: Fifty-one were killed and most of them were women and children.

Ben Natan: Those responsible were summoned before a court and received prison terms of up to 14 years.

Der Spiegel: The main defendant, Major Melinki, was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. However, he was amnestied to five years and then released after 3½ years. Today, he is employed in an Israeli Ministry. Another defendant, Lt. Dehan, was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment but he, too, was amnestied and released before fulfilling his prison term. Later on, he was appointed "Commissioner for Arab Affairs" in Ramleh.

Ben Natan: The families of the victims were indemnified by the Israeli Government, as far as this is possible at all.

Der Spiegel: The Arabs consider the Jewish immigrants intruders. They do not accept the historically and religiously founded claim of the Jews for a state in Palestine. Can you understand their point of view?

Ben Natan: Of course I understand it. I can try to put myself in the place of Palestinian Arabs who are kept prisoner by other Arabs in refugee camps and are instigated against Israel. However, it is difficult for me to understand the agitated Arab masses in other Arab countries.

Dr. Spiegel: Mr. Ambassador, the present Israeli-Arab conflict has historical and religious roots which are deeper than the roots of any other conflict. Certain declarations have been made by Israeli authorities which denote that what lies behind Israel's efforts to annex Arab land is not only military security, but the biblical promise of the "Greater Israel" (Eretz Israel). Thus, for instance, we have the declaration by Israel's eldest Rabbi Nissim, who after the June war, said: "The land of Israel is the heritage of each Jew, and no worldly or religious authority has the power to derogate this claim." There is also the recent foundation in Israel of the "Movement for the Unified Eretz Israel" which an Israeli journalist compared to the "Kuratorium Indivisible Germany."

Ben Natan: It is interesting that you are always quoting this type of declarations. There are other statements made to the contrary which you do not quote. Moreover, Rabbi Nissim speaks for himself alone, especially when it comes to political statements. I do not wish to commit myself to either of these declarations. However, I would like to make one point clear, namely, that Israel has never pursued an expansionist policy, and neither has it applied force for the

realisation of historical or religious ideas, and this is still true today.

Der Spiegel: What was it like in 1956?

Ben Natan: It was no different.

Der Spiegel: Would you say that Israel did not start an aggressive war in 1956?

Ben Natan: In 1956, Israel had a special aim in view, namely the suppression of Arab infiltration which came mostly from the Gaza Strip, and the destruction of the military potential which had been built up in Sinai. Primarily, of course, Israel wanted to open the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal to Israeli navigation.

Der Spiegel: Was the war you waged then perhaps a deterrent war?

Ben Natan: You can call our action in the Sinai campaign—for we will not call it the Sinai war—a pre-emptive strike caused by the armed provocation and the military threat which was concentrating on our frontiers. Matters looked grave due to the military pact concluded by Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Der Spiegel: Do you expect the Arabs to understand this?

Ben Natan: Examine facts squarely. For twenty years, the Arabs have been stating that they are in a state of war with us. For twenty years they have been trying to destroy Israel: in the economic field through the Arab boycott, in the political field through constant efforts to isolate Israel, and in the military field through the enlargement of their military forces, through infiltration and terror. This was the Arab policy which we had to respond to and these were our reasons, and everything which happened later was a consequence of all this. Moreover, in 1947 we accepted the United Nations resolution defining the frontiers of Israel.

Der Spiegel: With a heavy heart, as you have to admit.

Ben Natan: I admit we accepted the resolution with a heavy heart, but we accepted and that is the main thing. Had the Arabs as well accepted the U.N. definition of frontiers, then there would have been no war in 1948, and the frontiers set by the U.N. would still be valid today. There exists a reality which has been created by the events of the last twenty years; dreams

have no frontiers. However, today Israel is ready to negotiate about terrestrial frontiers.

Der Spiegel: Is there a danger of a new Israeli-Arab war?

Ben Natan: I hope not. However, anyone who listened to Nasir's speech of November 23rd has to expect it.

Der Spiegel: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for this interview.

224

Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic's Visit to the U.A.R., 26-28 December.¹

Cairo, December 28, 1967

In response to an invitation from Mr. Mahmud Riyad, Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Marko Nikezic, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, paid an official visit to Cairo from 26 to 28 December. In the course of this visit, President Jamal 'Abdun-Nasir received the Yugoslav Foreign Minister. The visit of Mr. Nikezic was made within the framework of the Egyptian-Yugoslav custom of exchanging points of view and mutual consultation. The two Ministers reviewed recent political developments connected with the situation that has arisen from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries.

The U.A.R. Foreign Minister informed the Yugoslav Foreign Minister of the efforts the U.A.R. is making within the framework of the United Nations Charter to secure the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, and to reach a peaceful solution, while the Yugoslav Foreign Minister informed the U.A.R. Foreign Minister of the efforts made by his country in support of the just and legitimate demands of the Arab countries.

In the course of their talks, the two Foreign Ministers also reviewed a number of other matters connected with international problems, and matters of common interest to their two countries.

The talks took place in an atmosphere of mutual friendship and understanding.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Cairo, 29/12/1967.

225

Letter from French President de Gaulle to David Ben Gurion.¹**Paris, December 30, 1967**

C'est avec grand intérêt que j'ai pris connaissance de votre lettre du 6 décembre. En effet le vaste sujet de la renaissance et du destin de l'Etat d'Israël ne peut manquer, vous le savez, de m'attirer et de m'émouvoir. D'autant plus que le conflit qui s'est de nouveau ouvert au Moyen-Orient entraîne d'importantes conséquences qui touchent de près la France pour toutes les raisons politiques, économiques, morales, religieuses et historiques que vous connaissez. Enfin, vous n'ignorez pas que je porte à vous-même une haute considération et que je garde un vivant souvenir de ce que furent, depuis dix ans, nos relations personnelles.

C'est pourquoi l'éloquence de votre argumentation ne m'a aucunement étonné. Je sais ce que la restauration d'Israël en Palestine, telle que vous la décrivez après y avoir éminemment participé, a comporté de foi, d'audace et de difficultés, et combien a été méritoire la mise en valeur de régions semidésertiques par le nouvel Etat grâce à l'afflux de tant de juifs venus de partout et à l'aide de tant de leurs communautés réparties à travers le monde. Vous rappelez, à juste titre, que mon pays et moi-même n'avons pas, depuis l'origine, ménagé notre sympathie à cette construction nationale et vous ne pouvez douter que, le cas échéant, nous nous serions opposés à ce qu'elle fût anéantie, comme le garantissaient nos entretiens officiels de naguère et le fait que j'y avais publiquement qualifié Israël d'*"Etat ami et allié"*.

Mais ce sont là, précisément, les raisons pour lesquelles j'ai toujours dit,—et d'abord à vous-même—que, pour justifier à mesure l'œuvre ainsi commencée et assurer son avenir, une stricte modération s'imposait à Israël dans ses rapports avec ses voisins et dans ses ambitions territoriales. Cela d'autant plus que les terres initialement reconnues à votre Etat par les puissances sont

considérées par les Arabes comme leur bien, que ceux-ci, au milieu desquels s'installait Israël, sont, de leur côté, fiers et respectables, que la France éprouve à leur égard une amitié ancienne et naturelle, et qu'ils méritent eux aussi de se développer en dépit de tous les obstacles que leur opposent la nature, les graves et humiliants retards qu'ils ont souvent subis depuis des siècles du fait de leurs occupants successifs, enfin leur propre dispersion.

Certes, je ne conteste aucunement que le fâcheux blocus du golfe d'Akaba était unilatéralement dommageable à votre pays et je ne méconnaissais pas que celui-ci eût lieu de se sentir menacé étant donnée la tension où était plongée la région palestinienne par suite des flots d'invectives prodiguées à l'encontre d'Israël en même temps que du sort lamentable des Arabes réfugiés en Jordanie ou relégués à Gaza. Mais je demeure convaincu que, en passant outre aux avertissements donnés en temps voulu à votre gouvernement par celui de la République française, en entamant les hostilités, en prenant par la force des armes possession de Jérusalem et de maints territoires jordaniens, égyptiens et syriens, en y pratiquant la répression et les expulsions qui sont inévitablement les conséquences d'une occupation dont tout indique qu'elle tend à l'annexion, en affirmant devant le monde que le règlement du conflit ne peut être réalisé que sur la base des conquêtes acquises et non pas à condition que celles-ci soient évacuées, Israël dépasse les bornes de la modération nécessaire.

Je le regrette d'autant plus que, moyennant le retrait de ses forces, il apparaît qu'une solution comportant la reconnaissance de votre Etat par ses voisins, des garanties de sécurité de part et d'autre des frontières, qui pourraient être précisées par arbitrage international, un sort digne et équitable assuré aux réfugiés et aux minorités, la libre navigation pour tous dans le golfe d'Akaba et le canal de Suez, serait aujourd'hui possible dans le cadre des Nations unies, solution à laquelle on sait que la France est éventuellement disposée à concourir, non seulement sur la plan politique mais encore sur le terrain.

Cette issue, qui ramènerait la paix au Moyen-Orient, faciliterait la concorde universelle et, suivant moi, servirait l'intérêt des peuples intéressés, y compris celui du vôtre, ne comblerait pas,

¹ *Le Monde*, 10/1/1969. Made in reply to a long letter by Mr. Ben Gurion dated December 6, 1967, in which the former Israeli Prime Minister protested against statements made by President de Gaulle during his press conference of November 27, 1967 (see *ante*, doc. 212).

je le sais, tous les désirs d'Israël. Si j'en avais douté, la lecture de votre lettre et ce que vous écrivez de ce que Chanaan, sur les deux rives du Jourdain, représente pour beaucoup de juifs de tous les temps et d'aujourd'hui m'en auraient apporté la preuve. Il en est de même de l'émotion apparemment soulevée chez tels ou tels d'entre eux par le fait que j'ai dit de leur peuple qu'il était "un peuple d'élite, sûr de lui-même et dominateur," jugement que certains affectent de tenir pour péjoratif, alors qu'il ne saurait y avoir rien de désobligeant à souligner le caractère grâce auquel ce peuple fort a pu survivre et rester lui-

même après dix-neuf siècles passés dans des conditions inouïes. Mais quoi? Voici qu'Israël au lieu de promener partout dans l'univers son exil mouvant et bimillénaire, est devenu, bel et bien, un Etat parmi les autres et dont, suivant la loi commune, la vie et la durée dépendent de sa politique. Or, celle-ci—combien de peuples l'ont, tout à tour, éprouvé!—ne vaut qu'à la condition d'être adaptée aux réalités.

Je vous demande d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, avec mes sincères souhaits de nouvelle année, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus distingués et de mon meilleur souvenir.

United Nations

PART I

The Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

226

Report of Secretary General U Thant on the Withdrawal of UNEF, June 26, 1967¹

INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) is submitted because, as indicated in my statement on 20 June 1967 to the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly (1527th plenary meeting), important questions have been raised concerning the actions taken on the withdrawal of UNEF. These questions merit careful consideration and comment. It is in the interest of the United Nations, I believe, that this report should be full and frank, in view of the questions involved and the numerous statements that have been made, both public and private, which continue to be very damaging to the United Nations and to its peace-keeping role in particular. Despite the explanations already given in the several reports on the subject which have been submitted to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, misunderstandings and what, I fear, are misrepresentations, persist, in official as well as unofficial circles, publicly and behind the scenes.

2. A report of this kind is not the place to try to explain why there has been so much and such persistent and grossly mistaken judgement about the withdrawal of UNEF. It suffices to say here that the shattering crisis in the Near East inevitably caused intense shock in many capitals and countries of the world, together with deep frustration over the inability to cope with it. It is, of course, not unusual in such situations to seek easy explanations and excuses. When, however, this tactic involves imputing responsibility for the unleashing of major hostilities, it is, and must be, a cause for sober concern. The objective of this report is to establish an authentic,

factual record of actions and their causes.

3. It follows, therefore, that the emphasis here, will be upon facts. The report is intended to be neither a polemic nor an apologia. Its sole purpose is to present a factually accurate picture of what happened and why. It will serve well the interests of the United Nations, as well as of historical integrity, if this presentation of facts can help to dissipate some of the distortions of the record which, in some places, apparently have emanated from panic, emotion and political bias.

CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT ACTIONS

4. Not only events but dates, and even the time of day, have an important bearing on this exposition. The significant events and actions and their dates and times are therefore set forth below.

16 May 1967

5. *2000 hours GMT (2200 hours Gaza local time)*. A message from General Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, was received by the Commander of UNEF, Major-General Rikhye, requesting withdrawal of "all UN troops which install OPS along our borders" (A/6730, para. 6, sub-para. 3 (a)). Brigadier Mokhtar, who handed General Fawzy's letter to the Commander of UNEF, told General Rikhye at the time that he must order the immediate withdrawal of United Nations troops from El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh on the night of 16 May since United Arab Republic armed forces must gain control of these two places that very night. The UNEF Commander correctly replied that he did not have authority to withdraw his troops from these positions on such an order and could do so only on instructions from the Secretary-General; therefore, he must continue with UNEF operations in Sinai as hitherto. Brigadier Mokhtar told the Commander of UNEF that this might lead to conflict on that night (16 May) between United Arab Republic and UNEF

¹ U.N. doc. A/6730/Add. 3, as published in the *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, July 1967, pp. 135-61.

troops, and insisted that the Commander issue orders to UNEF troops to remain confined to their camps at El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh. General Rikhye replied that he could not comply with this request. He did, of course, inform the contingent commanders concerned of these developments. He also informed United Nations Headquarters that he proposed to continue with UNEF activities as established until he received fresh instructions from the Secretary-General.

6. *2130 hours GMT (1730 hours New York time)*. The Secretary-General received at this time the UNEF Commander's cable informing him of the above-mentioned message from General Fawzy. The UNEF Commander was immediately instructed to await further instructions from the Secretary-General and, pending this later word from him, to "be firm in maintaining UNEF position while being as understanding and as diplomatic as possible in your relations with local UAR officials."

7. *2245 hours GMT (1845 hours New York time)*. The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic visited the Secretary-General at this time at the latter's urgent request. The Secretary-General requested the Permanent Representative to communicate with his Government with the utmost urgency and to transmit to it his views (A/6730, para. 6, sub-para. 3 (c)). In particular, the Secretary-General requested the Permanent Representative to obtain his Government's clarification of the situation, pointing out that any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must come directly to the Secretary-General from the Government of the United Arab Republic.

8. *2344 hours GMT*. The UNEF Commander further reported at this time that considerable military activity had been observed in the El Arish area since the afternoon of 16 May 1967.

17 May 1967

9. *0800 hours GMT (0400 hours New York time)*. The Commander of UNEF reported then that on the morning of 17 May, thirty soldiers of the Army of the United Arab Republic had occupied El Sabha in Sinai and that United Arab Republic troops were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the UNEF observation post there. Three armoured cars of the United

Arab Republic were located near the Yugoslav UNEF camp at El Sabha and detachments of fifteen soldiers each had taken up positions north and south of the Yugoslav contingent's camp at El Amr. All UNEF observation posts along the armistice demarcation line and the international frontier were manned as usual, but in some places United Arab Republic troops were also at the line.

10. *1030 hours GMT (0630 hours New York time)*. The Commander of UNEF reported then that troops of the United Arab Republic had occupied the UNEF observation post at El Sabha and that the Yugoslav UNEF camps at El Quseima and El Sabha were now behind the positions of the army of the United Arab Republic. The Commander of UNEF informed the Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff of these developments, expressing his serious concern at them. The Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff agreed to request the immediate evacuation of the observation post at El Sabha by United Arab Republic troops and shortly thereafter reported that orders to this effect had been given by the United Arab Republic military authorities. He requested, however, that to avoid any future misunderstandings, the Yugoslav observation post at El Sabha should be withdrawn immediately to El Quseima camp. The Commander replied that any such withdrawal would require the authorization of the Secretary-General.

11. *1200 hours GMT (0800 hours New York time)*. The Chief of the United Arab Republic Liaison Staff at this time conveyed to the Commander of UNEF a request from General Mohd Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic, for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav detachments of UNEF in the Sinai within twenty-four hours. He added that the UNEF Commander might take "forty-eight hours or so" to withdraw the UNEF detachment from Sharm el Sheikh. The Commander of UNEF replied that any such move required instructions from the Secretary-General.

12. *1330 hours GMT*. The Commander of UNEF then reported that a sizable detachment of troops of the United Arab Republic was moving into the UNEF area at El Kuntilla.

13. *2000 hours GMT (1600 hours New York time)*. The Secretary-General at this date held

an informal meeting in his office with the representatives of countries providing contingents to UNEF to inform them of the situation as then known. There was an exchange of views. The Secretary-General gave his opinion on how he should and how he intended to proceed, observing that if a formal request for the withdrawal of UNEF were to be made by the Government of the United Arab Republic, the Secretary-General, in his view, would have to comply with it, since the Force was on United Arab Republic territory only with the consent of the Government and could not remain there without it. Two representatives expressed serious doubts about the consequences of agreeing to a peremptory request for the withdrawal of UNEF and raised the questions of consideration of such a request by the General Assembly and an appeal to the United Arab Republic not to request the withdrawal of UNEF. Two other representatives stated the view that the United Arab Republic was entitled to request the removal of UNEF at any moment and that that request would have to be respected regardless of what the General Assembly might have to say in the matter, since the agreement for UNEF's presence had been concluded between the then Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt. A clarification of the situation from the United Arab Republic should therefore be awaited.

14. *2150 hours GMT (1750 hours New York time)*. The Secretary-General at this time saw the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic and handed to him an *aide-mémoire*, the text of which is contained in paragraph 6 of document A/6730. The Secretary-General also gave to the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic an *aide-mémoire* calling to the attention of his Government the "good faith" accord, the text of which is contained in paragraph 7 of document A/6730.

18 May 1967

15. *1321 hours GMT (0921 hours New York time)*. The Commander of UNEF reported at this time that his Liaison Officer in Cairo had been informed by an ambassador of one of the countries providing contingents to UNEF that the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic had summoned the representatives of nations with troops in UNEF to the Ministry for Foreign

Affairs and informed them that UNEF had terminated its tasks in the United Arab Republic and in the Gaza Strip and must depart from the above territory forthwith. This information was confirmed by representatives of some of these countries at the United Nations.

16. Early on 18 May the UNEF sentries proceeding to man the normal observation post at El Sabha in Sinai were prevented from entering the post and from remaining in the area by United Arab Republic soldiers. The sentries were then forced to withdraw. They did not resist by use of force since they had no mandate to do so.

17. *1100 hours GMT*. United Arab Republic soldiers at this time forced Yugoslav UNEF sentries out of their observation post on the international frontier in front of El Kuntilla Camp. One hour later, United Arab Republic officers arrived at the water point and asked UNEF soldiers to withdraw the guard.

18. *1220 hours GMT*. At this hour, United Arab Republic soldiers entered the UNEF observation post on the international frontier in front of El Amr Camp and forced the Yugoslav soldiers to withdraw. Later, two United Arab Republic officers visited El Amr Camp and asked the UNEF platoon to withdraw within fifteen minutes.

19. *1210 hours GMT*. United Arab Republic officers then visited the Yugoslav camp at Sharm el Sheikh and informed the Commanding Officer that they had come to take over the camp and the UNEF observation post at Ras Nasrani, demanding a reply within fifteen minutes. The contingent commander replied that he had no instructions to hand over the positions.

20. *1430 hours GMT*. The UNEF Yugoslav detachment at El Quseima camp reported that two artillery shells, apparently ranging rounds from the United Arab Republic artillery, had burst between the UNEF Yugoslav camps at El Quseima and El Sabha.

21. *1030 hours New York time*. The Secretary-General met at this time with the Permanent Representative of Israel who gave his Government's views on the situation, emphasizing that the UNEF withdrawal should not be achieved by a unilateral United Arab Republic request alone and asserting Israel's right to a voice in the matter. The question of stationing UNEF

on the Israel side of the line was raised by the Secretary-General and this was declared by the Permanent Representative of Israel to be entirely unacceptable to his Government.

22. *1600 hours GMT (12 noon New York time)*. At this hour the Secretary-General received through the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic the following message from Mr. Mahmoud Riad, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic:

The Government of the United Arab Republic has the honour to inform Your Excellency that it has decided to terminate the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force from the territory of the United Arab Republic and Gaza Strip.

Therefore, I request that the necessary steps be taken for the withdrawal of the Force as soon as possible.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my gratitude and warm regards.

At the same meeting the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General of the strong feeling of resentment in Cairo at what was there considered to be attempts to exert pressure and to make UNEF an "occupation force." The Secretary-General expressed deep misgivings about the likely disastrous consequences of the withdrawal of UNEF and indicated his intention to appeal urgently to President Nasser to reconsider the decision. Later in the day, the representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General that the Foreign Minister had asked the Permanent Representative by telephone from Cairo to convey to the Secretary-General his urgent advice that the Secretary-General should not make an appeal to President Nasser to reconsider the request for withdrawal of UNEF and that, if he did so, such a request would be sternly rebuffed. The Secretary-General raised the question of a possible visit by him to Cairo and was shortly thereafter informed that such a visit as soon as possible would be welcomed by the Government of the United Arab Republic.

23. *1700 hours New York time*. The Secretary-General met with the UNEF Advisory Committee, set up under the terms of paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, and the representatives of three countries not members of the Advisory Committee but providing contingents to UNEF, to inform them of developments and particularly the United

Arab Republic's request for UNEF's withdrawal, and to consult them for their views on the situation. At this meeting, one of the views expressed was that the United Arab Republic's demand for the immediate withdrawal of UNEF from United Arab Republic territory was not acceptable and that the ultimate responsibility for the decision to withdraw rested with the United Nations acting through the Security Council or the General Assembly. The holders of this view therefore urged further discussion with the Government of the United Arab Republic as well as with other Governments involved. Another position was that the Secretary-General had no choice but to comply with the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic, one representative stating that the moment the request for the withdrawal of UNEF was known his Government would comply with it and withdraw its contingent. A similar position had been taken in Cairo by another Government providing a contingent. No proposal was made that the Advisory Committee should exercise the right vested in it by General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) to request the convening of the General Assembly to take up the situation arising from the United Arab Republic communication. At the conclusion of the meeting, it was understood that the Secretary-General had no alternative other than to comply with the United Arab Republic's demand, although some representatives felt the Secretary-General should previously clarify with that Government the meaning in its request that withdrawal should take place "as soon as possible." The Secretary-General informed the Advisory Committee that he intended to reply promptly to the United Arab Republic, and to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on the action he had taken. It was for the Member States to decide whether the competent organs should or could take up the matter and to pursue it accordingly.

24. After the meeting of the Advisory Committee, at approximately 1900 hours New York time on 18 May, the Secretary-General replied to the message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic through that Government's Permanent Representative as follows:

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter to me

of 18 May conveying the message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic concerning the United Nations Emergency Force. Please be so kind as to transmit to the Foreign Minister the following message in reply:

'Dear Mr. Minister,

'Your message informing me that your Government no longer consents to the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on the territory of the United Arab Republic, that is to say in Sinai, and in the Gaza Strip, and requesting that the necessary steps be taken for its withdrawal as soon as possible, was delivered to me by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic at noon on 18 May.

'As I have indicated to your Permanent Representative on 16 May, the United Nations Emergency Force entered Egyptian territory with the consent of your Government and in fact can remain there only so long as that consent continues. In view of the message now received from you, therefore, your Government's request will be complied with and I am proceeding to issue instructions for the necessary arrangements to be put in train without delay for the orderly withdrawal of the Force, its vehicles and equipment and for the disposal of all properties pertaining to it. I am, of course, also bringing this development and my actions and intentions to the attention of the UNEF Advisory Committee and to all Governments providing contingents for the Force. A full report covering this development will be submitted promptly by me to the General Assembly, and I consider it necessary to report also to the Security Council about some aspects of the current situation in the area.

'Irrespective of the reasons for the action you have taken, in all frankness, may I advise you that I have serious misgivings about it for, as I have said each year in my annual reports to the General Assembly on UNEF, I believe that this Force has been an important factor in maintaining relative quiet in the area of its deployment during the past ten years and that its withdrawal may have grave implications for peace.

'With warm personal regards,

U Thant'

Please Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

It is to be noted that the decision notified to the Government of the United Arab Republic in this letter was in compliance with the request to withdraw the Force. It did not, however, signify the actual withdrawal of the Force which, in fact, was to remain in the area for several more weeks.

25. Formal instructions relating to the withdrawal of UNEF were sent to the UNEF Commander by the Secretary-General on the night of 18 May (see annex).

26. Also on the evening of 18 May the Secretary-General submitted his special report to the General Assembly (A/6730).

27. On 19 May the Secretary-General issued his report to the Security Council on recent developments in the Near East (S/7896).

19 May 1967

28. *1130 hours New York time.* The Secretary-General again received the Permanent Representative of Israel who gave him a statement from his Government concerning the withdrawal of UNEF, strongly urging the Secretary-General to avoid condoning any changes in the *status quo* pending the fullest and broadest international consultation.

29. On the afternoon of 22 May, the Secretary-General departed from New York, arriving in Cairo on the afternoon of 23 May. He left Cairo on the afternoon of 25 May, arriving back in New York on 26 May (see S/7906). While en route to Cairo during a stop in Paris, the Secretary-General learned that on this day President Nasser had announced his intention to reinstitute the blockade against Israel in the Strait of Tiran.

17 June 1967

30. The withdrawal of UNEF was completed. Details of the actual withdrawal and evacuation of UNEF are given in document A/6730/Add. 2.

MAIN POINTS AT ISSUE

31. Comment is called for on some of the main points at issue even prior to the consideration of the background and basis for the stationing of UNEF on United Arab Republic territory.

The Causes of the Present Crisis

32. It has been said rather often in one way or another that the withdrawal of UNEF is a primary cause of the present crisis in the Near East. This is, of course, a superficial and oversimplified approach. As the Secretary-General pointed out in his report of 26 May 1967 to the Security Council (S/7906), this view "ignores the fact that the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the Near East is the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which has been present all along and of which the crisis situation created by the unexpected withdrawal of UNEF is the latest expression." The Secretary-General's

report to the Security Council of 19 May 1967 (S/7896) described the various elements of the increasingly dangerous situation in the Near East prior to the decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to terminate its consent for the presence of UNEF on its territory.

33. The United Nations Emergency Force served for more than ten years as a highly valuable instrument in helping to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and the United Arab Republic. Its withdrawal revealed in all its depth and danger the undiminishing conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours. The withdrawal also made immediately acute the problem of access for Israel to the Gulf of Aqaba through the Strait of Tiran—a problem which had been dormant for over ten years only because of the presence of UNEF. But the presence of UNEF did not touch the basic problem of the Arab-Israel conflict—it merely isolated, immobilized and covered up certain aspects of that conflict. At any time in the last ten years either of the parties could have reactivated the conflict and if they had been determined to do so UNEF's effectiveness would automatically have disappeared. When, in the context of the whole relationship of Israel with her Arab neighbours, the direct confrontation between Israel and the United Arab Republic was revived after a decade by the decision of the United Arab Republic to move its forces up to the line, UNEF at once lost all usefulness. In fact, its effectiveness as a buffer and as a presence had already vanished, as can be seen from the chronology given above, even before the request for its withdrawal had been received by the Secretary-General from the Government of the United Arab Republic. In recognizing the extreme seriousness of the situation thus created, its true cause, the continuing Arab-Israel conflict, must also be recognized. It is entirely unrealistic to maintain that that conflict could have been solved, or its consequences prevented, if a greater effort had been made to maintain UNEF's presence in the area against the will of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

The Decision on UNEF's Withdrawal

34. The decision to withdraw UNEF has been frequently characterized in various quarters

as "hasty," "precipitous," and the like, even, indeed, to the extent of suggesting that it took President Nasser by surprise. The question of the withdrawal of UNEF is by no means a new one. In fact, it was the negotiations on this very question with the Government of Egypt which, after the establishment of UNEF by the General Assembly, delayed its arrival while it waited in a staging area at Capodichino airbase, Naples, Italy, for several days in November 1956. The Government of Egypt, understandably, did not wish to give permission for the arrival on its soil of an international force, unless it was assured that its sovereignty would be respected and a request for withdrawal of the Force would be honoured. Over the years, in discussions with representatives of the United Arab Republic, the subject of the continued presence of UNEF has occasionally come up, and it was invariably taken for granted by United Arab Republic representatives that if their Government officially requested the withdrawal of UNEF the request would be honoured by the Secretary-General. There is no record to indicate that this assumption was ever questioned. Thus, although the request for the withdrawal of UNEF came as a surprise, there was nothing new about the question of principle nor about the procedure to be followed by the Secretary-General. It follows that the decision taken by him on 18 May 1967 to comply with the request for the withdrawal of the Force was seen by him as the only reasonable and sound action that could be taken. The actual withdrawal itself, it should be recalled, was to be carried out in an orderly, dignified, deliberate and not precipitate manner over a period of several weeks. The first troops in fact left the area only on 29 May.

The Possibility of Delay

35. Opinions have also been frequently expressed that the decision to withdraw UNEF should have been delayed pending consultations of various kinds, or that efforts should have been made to resist the United Arab Republic's request for UNEF's withdrawal, or to bring pressure to bear on the Government of the United Arab Republic to reconsider its decision in this matter. In fact, as the chronology given above makes clear, the effectiveness of UNEF, in the light of the movement of United Arab Republic troops

up to the line and into Sharm el Sheikh, had already vanished before the request for withdrawal was received. Furthermore, the Government of the United Arab Republic had made it entirely clear to the Secretary-General that an appeal for reconsideration of the withdrawal decision would encounter a firm rebuff and would be considered as an attempt to impose UNEF as an "army of occupation." Such a reaction, combined with the fact that UNEF positions on the line had already been effectively taken over by United Arab Republic troops in pursuit of their full right to move up to the line in their own territory, and a deep anxiety for the security of UNEF personnel should an effort be made to keep UNEF in position after its withdrawal had been requested, were powerful arguments in favour of complying with the United Arab Republic request, even supposing there had not been other overriding reasons for accepting it.

36. It has been said that the decision to withdraw UNEF precipitated other consequences such as the reinstitution of the blockade against Israel in the Strait of Tiran. As can be seen from the chronology, the UNEF positions at Sharm el Sheikh on the Strait of Tiran (manned by thirty-two men in all) were in fact rendered ineffective by United Arab Republic troops before the request for withdrawal was received. It is also pertinent to note that in response to a query from the Secretary-General as to why the United Arab Republic had announced its reinstitution of the blockade in the Strait of Tiran while the Secretary-General was actually en route to Cairo on 22 May, President Nasser explained that his Government's decision to resume the blockade had been taken some time before U Thant's departure and it was considered preferable to make the announcement before rather than after the Secretary-General's visit to Cairo.

The Question of Consultations

37. It has been said also that there was not adequate consultation with the organs of the United Nations concerned or with the Members before the decision was taken to withdraw the Force. The Secretary-General was, and is, firmly of the opinion that the decision for withdrawal of the Force, on the request of the host Government, rested with the Secretary-General after

consultation with the Advisory Committee on UNEF, which is the organ established by the General Assembly for consultation regarding such matters. This was made clear by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, who took the following position on 26 February 1957 in reply to a question about the withdrawal of the Force from Sharm el Sheikh:

An indicated procedure would be for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly.*

The Secretary-General consulted the Advisory Committee before replying to the letter of 18 May 1967 from the United Arab Republic requesting withdrawal. This consultation took place within a few hours after receipt of the United Arab Republic request, and the Advisory Committee was thus quickly informed of the decision which the Secretary-General had in mind to convey in his reply to the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic. As indicated in the report to the Security Council of 26 May 1967:

The Committee did not move, as it was its right to do under the terms of paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) to request the convening of the General Assembly on the situation which had arisen. (S/7906, para. 4)

38. Before consulting the Advisory Committee on UNEF, the Secretary-General had also consulted the Permanent Representatives of the seven countries providing the contingents of UNEF and informed them of his intentions. This, in fact, was more than was formally required of the Secretary-General in the way of consultation.

39. Obviously, many Governments were concerned about the presence and functioning of UNEF and about the general situation in the area, but it would have been physically impossible to consult all of the interested representatives within any reasonable time. This was an emergency situation requiring urgent action. Moreover, it was perfectly clear that such consultations

* *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/3563, annex, I, B, 2.* [Footnotes designated with asterisks and other reference marks belong to the source text.]

were sure to produce sharply divided counsel, even if they were limited to the permanent members of the Security Council. Such sharply divided advice would have complicated and exacerbated the situation, and, far from relieving the Secretary-General of the responsibility for the decision to be taken, would have made the decision much more difficult to take.

40. It has been said that the final decision on the withdrawal of UNEF should have been taken only after consideration by the General Assembly. This position is not only incorrect but also unrealistic. In resolution 1000 (ES-I) the General Assembly established a United Nations command for an emergency international force. On the basis of that resolution the Force was quickly recruited and its forward elements flown to the staging area at Naples. Thus, though established, it had to await the permission of the Government of Egypt to enter Egyptian territory. That permission was subsequently given by the Government of Egypt as a result of direct discussions between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser of Egypt. There is no official United Nations document on the basis of which any case could be made that there was any limitation on the authority of the Government of Egypt to rescind that consent at its pleasure, or which would indicate that the United Arab Republic had in any way surrendered its right to ask for and obtain at any time the removal of UNEF from its territory. This point is elaborated later in this report (see paras. 71-80 below).

41. As a practical matter, there would be little point in any case in taking such an issue to the General Assembly unless there would be reasonable certainty that that body could be expected expeditiously to reach a substantive decision. In the prevailing circumstances, the question could have been validly raised as to what decision other than the withdrawal of UNEF could have been reached by the Assembly once United Arab Republic consent for the continued presence of UNEF was withdrawn.

42. As regards the practical possibility of the Assembly considering the request for UNEF's withdrawal, it is relevant to observe that the next regular session of the General Assembly was some four months off at the time the withdrawal request was made. The special session

of the General Assembly which was meeting at the time could have considered the question, according to rule 19 of the Assembly's rules of procedure, only if two thirds of eighty-two members voted for the inclusion of the item in the agenda. It is questionable, to say the least, whether the necessary support could have been mustered for such a controversial item. There could have been no emergency special session since the issue was not then before the Security Council, and therefore the condition of lack of unanimity did not exist.

43. As far as consultation with or action by the Security Council was concerned, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the situation leading up to and created by the withdrawal of UNEF on 19 May 1967 (S/7896). In that report he characterized the situation in the Near East as "extremely menacing." The Council met for the first time after this report on 24 May 1967, but took no action.

44. As has already been stated, the Advisory Committee did not make any move to bring the matter before the General Assembly, and no representative of any Member Government requested a meeting of either the Security Council or the General Assembly immediately following the Secretary-General's reports (A/6730 and S/7896). In this situation, the Secretary-General himself did not believe that any useful purpose would be served by his seeking a meeting of either organ, nor did he consider that there was basis for him to do so at that time. Furthermore, the information available to the Secretary-General did not lead him to believe that either the General Assembly or the Security Council would have decided that UNEF should remain on United Arab Republic territory, by force if necessary, despite the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic that it should leave.

Practical Factors Influencing the Decision

45. Since it is still contended in some quarters that the UNEF operation should somehow have continued after the consent of the Government of the United Arab Republic to its presence was withdrawn, it is necessary to consider the factors, quite apart from constitutional and legal considerations, which would have made such a course of action entirely im-

practicable.

46. The consent and active co-operation of the host country is essential to the effective operation and, indeed, to the very existence, of any United Nations peace-keeping operation of the nature of UNEF. The fact is that UNEF had been deployed on Egyptian and Egyptian-controlled territory for over ten and a half years with the consent and co-operation of the Government of the United Arab Republic. Although it was envisaged in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 that the Force would be stationed on both sides of the line, Israel exercised its sovereign right to refuse the stationing of UNEF on its side, and the Force throughout its existence was stationed on the United Arab Republic side of the line only.

47. In these circumstances, the true basis for UNEF's effectiveness as a buffer and deterrent to infiltration was, throughout its existence, a voluntary undertaking by local United Arab Republic authorities with UNEF, that United Arab Republic troops would respect a defined buffer zone along the entire length of the line in which only UNEF would operate and from which United Arab Republic troops would be excluded. This undertaking was honoured for more than a decade, and this Egyptian co-operation extended also to Sharm el Sheikh, Ras Nasrani and the Strait of Tiran. This undertaking was honoured although UNEF had no authority to challenge the right of United Arab Republic troops to be present anywhere on their own territory.

48. It may be pointed out in passing that over the years UNEF dealt with numerous infiltrators coming from the Israel as well as from the United Arab Republic side of the line. It would hardly be logical to take the position that because UNEF has successfully maintained quiet along the line for more than ten years, owing in large measure to the co-operation of the United Arab Republic authorities, that Government should then be told that it could not unilaterally seek the removal of the Force and thus in effect be penalized for the long co-operation with the international community it had extended in the interest of peace.

49. There are other practical factors relating

to the above-mentioned arrangement which are highly relevant to the withdrawal of UNEF. First, once the United Arab Republic troops moved up to the line to place themselves in direct confrontation with the military forces of Israel, UNEF had, in fact, no further useful functions. Secondly, if the Force was no longer welcome, it could not as a practical matter remain in the United Arab Republic, since the friction which would almost inevitably have arisen with that Government, its armed forces and with the local population would have made the situation of the Force both humiliating and untenable. It would even have been impossible to supply it. UNEF clearly had no mandate to try to stop United Arab Republic troops from moving freely about on their own territory. This was a peace-keeping force, not an enforcement action. Its effectiveness was based entirely on voluntary co-operation.

50. Quite apart from its position in the United Arab Republic, the request of that Government for UNEF's withdrawal automatically set off a disintegration of the Force, since two of the Governments providing contingents quickly let the Secretary-General know that their contingents would be withdrawn, and there can be little doubt that other such notifications would not have been slow in coming if friction had been generated through an unwillingness to comply with the request for withdrawal.

51. For all the foregoing reasons, the operation, and even the continued existence of UNEF on United Arab Republic territory, after the withdrawal of United Arab Republic consent, would have been impossible, and any attempt to maintain the Force there would without question have had disastrous consequences.

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF CONSENT FOR THE STATIONING OF UNEF ON UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TERRITORY

52. Legal and constitutional considerations were, of course, of great importance in determining the Secretary-General's actions in relation to the request of the Government of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of UNEF. Here again, a chronology of the relevant actions in 1956 and 1957 may be helpful.

53. 4 November 1956. The General Assembly at its first emergency special session in resolution 998 (ES-I), requested "the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. . . ."

54. 5 November 1966. The General Assembly in its resolution 1000 (ES-I), established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force, and, *inter alia*, invited the Secretary-General "to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution."

55. 7 November 1956. The General Assembly, by its resolution 1001 (ES-I), *inter alia*, approved the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force and authorized the Secretary-General "to take all other necessary administrative and executive action."

56. 10 November 1956. Arrival of advance elements of UNEF at staging area in Naples.

57. 8-12 November 1956. Negotiations between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the Government of Egypt on entry of UNEF into Egypt.

58. 12 November 1956. Agreement on UNEF entry into Egypt announced and then postponed, pending clarification, until 14 November.

59. 15 November 1956. Arrival of advance elements of UNEF in Abu Suweir, Egypt.

60. 16 November to 18 November 1956. Negotiations between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and President Nasser in Cairo on the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt and co-operation with Egyptian authorities, and conclusion of an "aide-mémoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt" (the so-called "good faith accord").*

61. 24 January 1957. The Secretary-General in a report to the General Assembly† suggested that the Force should have units stationed on both sides of the armistice demarcation line and that certain measures should be taken in relation to

Sharm el Sheikh. On 2 February 1957, the General Assembly, by its resolution 1125 (XI), noted with appreciation the Secretary-General's report and considered that "after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement required the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area."

62. 7 March 1957. Arrival of UNEF in Gaza.

63. 8 March 1957. Arrival of UNEF elements at Sharm el Sheikh.

64. In general terms the consent of the host country to the presence and operation of the United Nations peace-keeping machinery is a basic prerequisite of all United Nations peace-keeping operations. The question has been raised whether the United Arab Republic had the right to request unilaterally the withdrawal "as soon as possible" of UNEF from its territory or whether there were limitations on its rights in this respect. An examination of the records of the first emergency special session and the eleventh session of the General Assembly is relevant to this question.

65. It is clear that the General Assembly and the Secretary-General from the very beginning recognized, and in fact emphasized, the need for Egyptian consent in order that UNEF be stationed or operate on Egyptian territory. Thus, the initial resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 requested the Secretary-General to submit a plan for the setting up of an emergency force, "with the consent of the nations concerned." The "nations concerned" obviously included Egypt (now the United Arab Republic), the three countries (France, Israel and the United Kingdom) whose armies were on Egyptian soil and the States contributing contingents to the Force.

66. The Secretary-General, in his report to the General Assembly of 6 November 1956, stated, *inter alia*:

* *Ibid.*, document A/3375, annex.

† *Ibid.*, document A/3512.

(9) Functioning, as it would, on the basis of a decision reached under the terms of the resolution 337 (V) 'Uniting for peace', the Force, if established, would be limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the parties concerned is required under generally recognized international law. While the General Assembly is enabled to *establish* the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be *stationed or operate* on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of that country.*

67. He noted that the foregoing did not exclude the possibility that the Security Council could use such a Force within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. He pointed out, however, that it would not be necessary to elaborate this point further, since no use of the Force under Chapter VII, with the rights in relation to Member States that this would entail, had been envisaged.

68. The General Assembly in its resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 expressed its approval of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report. This included the principle of consent embodied in paragraph 9.

69. The need for Egypt's consent was also stated as a condition or "understanding" by some of the States offering to contribute contingents to the Force.

70. It was thus a basic legal principle arising from the nature of the Force, and clearly understood by all concerned, that the consent of Egypt was a prerequisite to the stationing of UNEF on Egyptian territory, and it was a practical necessity as well in acquiring contingents for the Force.

The "Good Faith" Aide-mémoire of 20 November 1956

71. There remains to be examined whether any commitments were made by Egypt which would limit its pre-existing right to withdraw its consent at any time that it chose to do so. The only basis for asserting such limitation could be the so-called "good faith" *aide-mémoire* which was set out as an annex to a report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly

on 20 November 1956.

72. The Secretary-General himself did not offer any interpretation of the "good faith" *aide-mémoire* to the General Assembly or make any statement questioning the remarks made by the Foreign Minister of Egypt in the General Assembly the following week (*see paragraph 74 below*). It would appear, however, that in an exchange of cables he had sought to obtain the express acknowledgement from Egypt that its consent to the presence of the Force would not be withdrawn before the Force had completed its task. Egypt did not accept this interpretation but held to the view that if its consent was no longer maintained the Force should be withdrawn. Subsequent discussions between Mr. Hammarskjöld and President Nasser resulted in the "good faith" *aide-mémoire*.

73. An interpretative account of these negotiations made by Mr. Hammarskjöld in a personal and private paper entitled "*aide-mémoire*," dated 5 August 1957, some eight and a half months after the discussions, has recently been made public by a private person who has a copy. It is understood that Mr. Hammarskjöld often prepared private notes concerning significant events under the heading "*aide-mémoire*." This memorandum is not in any official record of the United Nations nor is it in any of the official files. The General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on UNEF and the Government of Egypt were not informed of its contents or existence. It is not an official paper and has no standing beyond being a purely private memorandum of unknown purpose or value, in which Secretary-General Hammarskjöld seems to record his own impressions and interpretations of his discussions with President Nasser. This paper, therefore, cannot affect in any way the basis for the presence of UNEF on the soil of the United Arab Republic as set out in the official documents, much less supersede those documents.

Position of Egypt

74. It seems clear that Egypt did not understand the "good faith" *aide-mémoire* to involve any limitation on its rights to withdraw its consent to the continued stationing and operation of UNEF on its territory. The Foreign Minister of Egypt, speaking in the General Assembly on

* *Ibid.*, First Emergency Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 5, document A/3302, para. 9.

27 November 1956, one week after the publication of the "good faith" *aide-mémoire* and three days following its approval by the General Assembly, said:

We still believe that the General Assembly resolution of 7 November 1956 still stands, together with its endorsement of the principle that the General Assembly could not request the United Nations Emergency Force to be stationed or to operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of the country. This is the proper basis on which we believe together with the overwhelming majority of this Assembly, that the United Nations Emergency Force could be stationed or could operate in Egypt. It is the only basis on which Egypt has given its consent in this respect.*

He then added:

...as must be abundantly clear, this Force has gone to Egypt to help Egypt with Egypt's consent; and no one here or elsewhere can reasonably or fairly say that a fire brigade, after putting out a fire, would be entitled or expected to claim the right of deciding not to leave the house.†

Analysis of the "Task" of the Force

75. In the "good faith" *aide-mémoire* the Government of Egypt declared that, "when exercising its sovereign rights on any matters concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956."

76. The United Nations in turn declared "that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned resolutions [1000 (ES-I) and 997 (ES-I)]; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed."

77. It must be noted that, while Egypt undertook to be guided in *good faith* by its acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I), the United Nations also undertook to be guided in *good faith* by the task established for the Force in resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 997 (ES-I). Resolution 1000 (ES-I), to which the declaration of Egypt referred, established a United Nations Command for the Force "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with

all the terms" of resolution 997 (ES-I). It must be recalled that at this time Israel forces had penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory and that forces of France and the United Kingdom were conducting military operations on Egyptian territory. Resolution 997 (ES-I) urged as a matter of priority that all parties agree to an immediate cease-fire, and halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area. It also urged the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements. It further urged that, upon the ceasefire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation.

78. While the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I) cover a considerable area, the emphasis in resolution 1000 (ES-I) is on *securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities*. Moreover, on 6 November 1956 the Secretary-General, in his second and final report on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, noted that "the Assembly intends that the Force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict."* Noting further the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I) he added that "the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of 2 November 1956" (997 (ES-I)).†

79. In a cable delivered to Foreign Minister Fawzi on 9 or 10 November 1956, in reply to a request for clarification as to how long it was contemplated that the Force should stay in the demarcation line area, the Secretary-General stated: "A definite reply is at present impossible but the emergency character of the Force links it to the immediate crises envisaged in resolution 2 November [997 (ES-I)] and its liquidation." This point was confirmed in a further exchange

* *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 597th meeting, para. 48.

† *Ibid.*, para. 50.

* *Ibid.*, *First Emergency Special Session, Annexes*, agenda item 5, document A/3302, para. 8.

† *Ibid.*, para. 12.

of cables between the Secretary-General and Dr. Fawzi on 14 November 1956.

80. The Foreign Minister of Egypt (Dr. Fawzi) gave his understanding of the task of the Force in a statement to the General Assembly on 27 November 1956:

Our clear understanding—and I am sure it is the clear understanding of the Assembly—is that this Force is in Egypt only in relation to the present attack against Egypt by the United Kingdom, France and Israel, and for the purposes directly connected with the incursion of the invading forces into Egyptian territory. The United Nations Emergency Force is in Egypt, not as an occupation force, not as a replacement for the invaders, not to clear the Canal of obstructions, not to resolve any question or settle any problem, be it in relation to the Suez Canal, to Palestine or to any other matter; it is not there to infringe upon Egyptian sovereignty in any fashion or to any extent, but, on the contrary, to give expression to the determination of the United Nations to put an end to the aggression committed against Egypt and to the presence of the invading forces in Egyptian territory.*

81. In letters dated 3 November 1956 addressed to the Secretary-General, the representatives of both France and the United Kingdom had proposed very broad functions for UNEF, stating on behalf of their Governments that military action could be stopped if the following conditions were met:

(a) Both the Egyptian and Israel Governments agree to accept a United Nations Force to keep the peace.

(b) The United Nations decides to constitute and maintain such a Force until an Arab-Israeli peace settlement is reached and until satisfactory arrangements have been agreed in regard to the Suez Canal, both arrangements to be guaranteed by the United Nations.

(c) In the meantime, until the United Nations Force is constituted, both combatants agree to accept forthwith limited detachments of Anglo-French troops to be stationed between the combatants.†

These broad functions for the Force were not acceptable to the General Assembly, however, as was pointed out in telegrams dated 4 November 1956 from Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.‡

82. Finally, it is obvious that the task

* *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 597th meeting, para. 49.

† *Ibid.*, First Emergency Special Session, Annexes, documents A/3268 and A/3269.

‡ *Ibid.*, document A/3284, annexes 2 and 4.

referred to in the “good faith” *aide-mémoire* could only be the task of the Force as it had been defined in November 1956 when the understanding was concluded. The “good faith” undertaking by the United Nations would preclude it from claiming that the Egyptian agreement was relevant or applicable to functions which the Force was given at a much later date. The stationing of the Force on the armistice demarcation line and at Sharm el Sheikh was only determined in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957. The Secretary-General, in his reports relating to this decision, made it clear that the further consent of Egypt was essential with respect to these new functions.* Consequently, the understanding recorded in the “good faith” *aide-mémoire* of 20 November 1956 could not have been, itself, a commitment with respect to functions only determined in February and March 1957. It is only these later tasks that the Force had been performing during the last ten years—tasks of serving as a buffer and deterring infiltrators which went considerably beyond those of securing and supervising the cessation of hostilities provided in the General Assembly resolutions and referred to in the “good faith” *aide-mémoire*.

The Stationing of UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line and at Sharm el Sheikh

83. There remains to examine whether Egypt made further commitments with respect to the stationing of the Force on the armistice demarcation line and at Sharm el Sheikh. Israel, of course, sought to obtain such commitments, particularly with respect to the area around Sharm el Sheikh.

84. For example, in an *aide-mémoire* of 4 February 1957,† the Government of Israel sought clarification as to whether units of the United Nations Emergency Force would be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba in order to act as a restraint against hostile acts, and would remain so deployed until another effective means was agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts

* *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, documents A/3512, para. 20, and A/3527, para. 5.

† *Ibid.*, document A/3527, annex I.

in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary-General pointed out that such "clarification" would require "Egyptian consent." He stated:

The second of the points in the Israel *aide-mémoire* requests a 'clarification' which, in view of the position of the General Assembly, could go beyond what was stated in the last report only after negotiation with Egypt. This follows from the statements in the debate in the General Assembly, and the report on which it was based, which make it clear that the stationing of the Force at Sharm el Sheikh, under such terms as those mentioned in the question posed by Israel, would require Egyptian consent.*

85. It is clear from the record that Egypt did not give its consent to Israel's proposition. The Secretary-General's report of 8 March 1957† recorded "arrangements for the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israel in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly." There is no agreement on the part of Egypt to forgo its rights with respect to the granting or withdrawing of its consent to the continued stationing of the Force on its territory. On the contrary, at the 667th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 4 March 1957, the Foreign Minister of Egypt stated:

At our previous meeting I stated that the Assembly was unanimous in expecting full and honest implementation of its resolutions calling for immediate and unconditional withdrawal by Israel. I continue to submit to the Assembly that this position—which is the only position the Assembly can possibly take—remains intact and entire. Nothing said by anyone here or elsewhere could shake this fact or detract from its reality and its validity, nor could it affect the fullness and the lawfulness of Egypt's rights and those of the Arab people of the Gaza Strip.‡

86. The Foreign Minister of Israel, in her statement at the 666th meeting of the General Assembly, on 1 March 1957, asserted that an assurance had been given that any proposal for the withdrawal of UNEF from the Gulf of Aqaba area would come first to the Advisory Committee on UNEF (see paragraphs 95-98 below).

Question of the Stationing of UNEF on Both Sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line

87. Another point having significance with respect to the undertakings of Egypt is the question

* *Ibid.*, document A/3527, para. 5.

† *Ibid.*, document A/3568.

‡ *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 667th meeting, para. 240.

of the stationing of UNEF on both sides of the armistice demarcation line. The Secretary-General, in his report of 24 January 1957 to the General Assembly,* suggested that the Force should have units stationed also on the Israel side of the armistice demarcation line. In particular, he suggested that units of the Force should at least be stationed in the El Auja demilitarized zone† which had been occupied by the armed forces of Israel. He indicated that if El Auja were demilitarized in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and units of UNEF were stationed there, a condition of reciprocity would be the Egyptian assurance that Egyptian forces would not take up positions in the area in contravention of the Armistice Agreement.‡ However, Israel forces were never withdrawn from El Auja and UNEF was not accepted at any point on the Israel side of the line.

88. Following the Secretary-General's report, the General Assembly on 2 February 1957 adopted resolution 1125 (XI), in which it noted the report with appreciation and considered:

... that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area; .

89. On 11 February 1957, the Secretary-General stated in a report to the General Assembly that, in the light of the implication of Israel's question concerning the stationing of UNEF at Sharm el Sheikh (see paragraph 84 above), he "considered it important ... to learn whether

* *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 66, document A/3512.

† Article VIII of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement provides, inter alia, that an area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity, as defined in the article, shall be demilitarized and that both Egyptian and Israel armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom. The article further provides that on the Egyptian side of the frontier, facing the El Auja area, no Egyptian defensive positions shall be closer to El Auja than El Quseima and Abou Aoueigila.

‡ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes*, agenda item 66, document A/3512, paras. 15-22.

Israel itself, in principle, consents to a stationing of UNEF units on its territory in implementation of the functions established for the Force in the basic decisions and noted in resolution 1125 (XI) where it was indicated that the Force should be placed 'on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line'".* No affirmative response was ever received from Israel. In fact, already on 7 November 1956 the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Ben-Gurion, in a speech to the Knesset, stated, *inter alia*, "On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in her territory or in any of the territories occupied by her." In a note to correspondents of 12 April 1957 a "United Nations spokesman" stated:

Final arrangements for the UNEF will have to wait for the response of the Government of Israel to the request by the General Assembly that the Force be deployed also on the Israeli side of the Armistice Demarcation Line.

90. In a report dated 9 October 1957 to the twelfth session of the General-Assembly,† the Secretary-General stated:

Resolution 1125 (XI) calls for placing the Force 'on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line', but no stationing of UNEF on the Israel side has occurred to date through lack of consent by Israel.

91. In the light of Israel's persistent refusal to consent to the stationing and operation of UNEF on its side of the line in spite of General Assembly resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 and the efforts of the Secretary-General, it is even less possible to consider that Egypt's "good faith" declaration made in November 1956 could constitute a limitation of its rights with respect to the continued stationing and operation of UNEF on Egyptian territory in accordance with the resolution of 2 February 1957.

92. The representative of Israel stated at the 592nd meeting of the General Assembly, on 23 November 1956:

If we were to accept one of the proposals made here—namely, that the force should separate Egyptian and Israel troops for as long as Egypt thought it convenient and should then be withdrawn on Egypt's unilateral request—we would reach a reduction to absurdity. Egypt would then

be in a position to build up, behind the screen of this Force, its full military preparations and, when it felt that those military preparations had reached their desired climax, to dismiss the United Nations Emergency Force and to stand again in close contact and proximity with the territory of Israel. This reduction to absurdity proves how impossible it is to accept in any matter affecting the composition or the functions of the Force the policies of the Egyptian Government as the sole or even the decisive criterion.*

93. The answer to this problem which is to be found in resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February 1957 is not in the form of a binding commitment by Egypt which the record shows was never given, but in the proposal that the Force should be stationed on both sides of the line. Israel in the exercise of its sovereign right did not give its consent to the stationing of UNEF on its territory and Egypt did not forgo its sovereign right to withdraw its consent at any time.

Role of the UNEF Advisory Committee

94. General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, by which the Assembly approved the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of UNEF, established an Advisory Committee on UNEF under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. The Assembly decided that the Advisory Committee, in performance of its duties, should be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arose which, in its opinion, were of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself.

95. The memorandum of important points in the discussion between the representative of Israel and the Secretary-General on 25 February 1957 recorded the following question raised by the representative of Israel:

In connexion with the duration of UNEF's deployment in the Sharm el Sheikh area, would the Secretary-General give notice to the General Assembly of the United Nations before UNEF would be withdrawn from the area, with or without Egyptian insistence, or before the Secretary-General would agree to its withdrawal?†

96. The response of the Secretary-General

* *Ibid.*, document A/3527, para. 5.

† *Ibid.*, Twelfth Session, Annexes, agenda item 65, document A/3694, para. 15.

* *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 592nd meeting, para. 131.

† *Ibid.*, Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 66, document A/3563, annex I, A, 2.

was recorded as follows:

On the question of notification to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General wanted to state his view at a later meeting. An indicated procedure would be for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly.*

97. On 1 March 1957 the Foreign Minister of Israel stated at the 666th plenary meeting of the General Assembly:

My Government has noted the assurance embodied in the Secretary-General's note of 26 February 1957 [A/3363, annex] that any proposal for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gulf of Aqaba area would first come to the Advisory Committee on the United Nations Emergency Force, which represents the General Assembly in the implementation of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956. This procedure will give the General Assembly an opportunity to ensure that no precipitate changes are made which would have the effect of increasing the possibility of belligerent acts.†

98. In fact, the 25 February 1957 memorandum does not go as far as the interpretation given by the Foreign Minister of Israel. In any event, however, it gives no indication of any commitment by Egypt, and so far as the Secretary-General is concerned it only indicates that a procedure would be for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the General Assembly. This was also the procedure provided in General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I). It was, furthermore, the procedure followed by the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of UNEF.

OBSERVATIONS

99. A partial explanation of the misunderstanding about the withdrawal of UNEF is an evident failure to appreciate the essentially fragile nature of the basis for UNEF's operation throughout its existence. UNEF in functioning depended completely on the voluntary co-operation of the host Government. Its basis of existence was the willingness of Governments to provide contingents to serve under an international command and at a minimum of cost to the United

Nations. It was a symbolic force, small in size, with only 3,400 men, of whom 1,800 were available to police a line of 295 miles at the time of its withdrawal. It was equipped with light weapons only. It had no mandate of any kind to open fire except in the last resort in self-defence. It had no formal mandate to exercise any authority in the area in which it was stationed. In recent years it experienced an increasingly uncertain basis of financial support, which in turn gave rise to strong annual pressures for reduction in its strength. Its remarkable success for more than a decade, despite these practical weaknesses, may have led to wrong conclusions about its nature, but it has also pointed the way to a unique means of contributing significantly to international peace-keeping.

ANNEX

Cable Containing Instructions for the Withdrawal of UNEF Sent by the Secretary-General to the Commander of UNEF on 18 May 1967, at 2230 Hours New York Time

The following instructions are to be put in effect by you as of date and time of their receipt and shall remain operative until and unless new instructions are sent by me.

1. UNEF is being withdrawn because the consent of the Government of the United Arab Republic for its continued deployment on United Arab Republic territory and United Arab Republic-controlled territory has been rescinded.

2. Date of the commencement of the withdrawal of UNEF will be 19 May when the Secretary-General's response to the request for withdrawal will be received in Cairo by the Government of the United Arab Republic, when also the General Assembly will be informed of the action taken and the action will become public knowledge.

3. The withdrawal of UNEF is to be orderly and must be carried out with dignity befitting a Force which has contributed greatly to the maintenance of quiet and peace in the area of its deployment and has earned widespread admiration.

* *Ibid.*, annex I, B, 2.

† *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 666th meeting, para. 8.

4. The Force does not cease to exist or to lose its status or any of its entitlements, privileges and immunities until all of its elements have departed from the area of its operation.

5. It will be a practical fact that must be reckoned with by the Commander that as of the date of the announcement of its withdrawal the Force will no longer be able to carry out its established functions as a buffer and as a deterrent to infiltration. Its duties, therefore, after 19 May and until all elements have been withdrawn, will be entirely nominal and concerned primarily with devising arrangements and implementation of arrangements for withdrawal and the morale of the personnel.

6. The Force, of course, will remain under the exclusive command of its United Nations Commander and is to take no orders from any other source, whether United Arab Republic or national.

7. The Commander, his headquarters staff and the contingent commanders shall take every reasonable precaution to ensure the continuance of good relations with the local authorities and the local population.

8. In this regard, it should be made entirely clear by the Commander to the officers and other ranks in the Force that there is no discredit of the Force in this withdrawal and no humiliation involved for the reason that the Force has operated very successfully and with, on the whole, co-operation from the Government on the territory of an independent sovereign State for over ten years, which is a very long time; and, moreover, the reasons for the termination of the operation are of an overriding political nature, having no relation whatsoever to the performance of the Force in the discharge of its duties.

9. The Commander and subordinate officers must do their utmost to avoid any resort to the use of arms and any clash with the forces of the United Arab Republic or with the local civilian population.

10. A small working team will be sent from Headquarters by the Secretary-General to assist in the arrangements for, and effectuation of, the withdrawal.

11. The Commander shall take all necessary steps to protect United Nations installations,

properties and stores during the period of withdrawal.

12. If necessary, a small detail of personnel of the Force or preferably of United Nations security officers will be maintained as long as necessary for the protection of United Nations properties pending their ultimate disposition.

13. UNEF aircraft will continue flights as necessary in connexion with the withdrawal arrangements but observation flights will be discontinued immediately.

14. Elements of the Force now deployed along the line will be first removed from the line, the IF and ADL, including Sharm el Sheikh to their camps and progressively to central staging.

15. The pace of the withdrawal will of course depend upon the availability of transport by air, sea and ground to Port Said. The priority in withdrawal should of course be personnel and their personal arms and equipment first, followed by contingent stores and equipment.

16. We must proceed on the assumption that UNEF will have full co-operation of United Arab Republic authorities on all aspects of evacuation, and to this end a request will be made by me to the United Arab Republic Government through their Mission here.

17. As early as possible the Commander of UNEF should prepare and transmit to the Secretary-General a plan and schedule for the evacuation of troops and their equipment.

18. Preparation of the draft of the sections of the annual report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly should be undertaken and, to the extent possible, completed during the period of the withdrawal.

19. In the interests of the Force itself and the United Nations, every possible measure should be taken to ensure against public comments or comments likely to become public on the withdrawal, the reasons for it and reactions to it.

PART II

The June War in the Security Council

A. Complaint of the United Arab Republic against Israel

227

Letter from the U.A.R. Permanent Representative to the President of the Security Council, June 5, 1967.¹

I have the honour to inform you that Israel committed a treacherous premeditated aggression against my country. This morning the Israelis launched attacks against the Gaza strip, airports in Cairo, in the Suez Canal area and several other airports within the United Arab Republic. Preliminary reports indicate that twenty-three Israeli aeroplanes have been shot down and that several Israeli pilots have been captured.

In repelling this aggression I wish to inform you, upon instructions from my Government, that it has decided to defend itself by all means in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, etc.

Mohamed Awad El-Kony
Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

B. Reports of Secretary General U Thant on the Evolving Situation in the Middle East

228

Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 5, 1967, at 9:30 a.m.² [and Supplemental Information].

The Secretary-General: Mr. President, in response to your invitation I present to the Council all information that I have received from United Nations sources in the Near East on the outbreak of hostilities. Of course, the United Nations sources have no means of ascertaining how the hostilities were initiated. As usual, reports coming from the parties are conflicting, but all agree that serious military action on land and in the air is taking place at a number of points and is spreading.

I have instructed both the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force to keep reporting urgently all information available to them and I shall keep members of the Council informed as new information comes in. This information is unavoidably fragmentary.

As far as information from UNEF is concerned, it must be remembered that UNEF is no longer on the Line, but is concentrated in its camps and is in the process of withdrawal. The information given by the Commander of UNEF is therefore, of necessity, somewhat general, and much of it has been given to the Commander by the United Arab Republic liaison service in Gaza.

General Rikhye, Commander of UNEF, reported that at 0800 hours local time today two Israel aircraft violated United Arab Republic airspace over Gaza town. One of these aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and fell into the sea. The pilot bailed out and was picked up

¹ U.N. doc. S/7926.

² U.N. doc. S/PV. 1347.

by a motor-launch. Also at 0800 hours local time two Israel aircraft violated United Arab Republic airspace over El Arish and were fired on by anti-aircraft guns. The United Arab Republic claims one Israel aircraft was shot down. UNEF personnel in Rafah Camp reported heavy firing between United Arab Republic and Israel forces across the International Frontier south of Rafah, starting at 0800 hours local time. United Arab Republic authorities in Gaza informed General Rikhye of a large-scale Israel air raid throughout the United Arab Republic including a raid on Cairo. I am informed that Israel has denied the report of the raid on Cairo. The United Arab Republic authorities also informed General Rikhye that at 0800 hours local time Israel forces had attacked El Quseima in Sinai. At 0915 hours local time, United Arab Republic artillery in Gaza started firing towards Israel-controlled territory. Firing stopped at 0930 hours local time, but resumed again at 1000 hours local time. The Commander of UNEF is taking all possible steps to ensure the security of UNEF personnel still in the area.

General Bull, Chief of Staff UNTSO, has informed me that firing in Jerusalem commenced at 1125 hours local time and was continuing. General Bull requested an immediate cease-fire at the highest local levels. The Senior Jordanian Delegate to the Mixed Armistice Commission accepted a cease-fire for 1200 hours local time. In a meeting between General Bull and the Israel authorities on the morning of 5 June, General Bull was informed that United Arab Republic planes had crossed the border and that Israel aircraft had been sent to meet them.

At 1145 hours local time Israel informed General Bull of its acceptance of his request for a cease-fire at 1200 hours local time. Most firing had ceased by 1210 hours local time, although a few mortar rounds continued to be fired from Jordan and near Mount Scopus. One mortar round landed in the Government House compound, which is the headquarters of UNTSO. No casualties are reported.

Since sporadic mortar firing from Jordan continued after the cease-fire, a second cease-fire was proposed for 1230 hours local time and accepted by both sides.

On the Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation

Line, United Nations Military Observers reported overflights by Syrian jet fighters between 1155 hours and 1206 hours local time on 5 June and reported air battles, anti-aircraft fire and explosions from aircraft bombing. The Senior Israel Delegate to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission informed the UNTSO officer in charge at Tiberias at 1218 hours local time that Israel considered itself in a state of war with Syria. The Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission reported that Damascus airport was being attacked by Israel aircraft at 1110 hours local time.

The Commander of UNEF reported that at 1245 hours local time Israel artillery opened fire on two camps of the Indian Contingent of UNEF which were in process of being abandoned, and soon thereafter United Arab Republic tanks surrounded one of the camps which still contains one reduced Indian company. Orders have been given for the Indian personnel in both camps to be withdrawn immediately.

General Rikhye also reported that a UNEF convoy immediately south of Khan Yunis on the road between Gaza and Rafah was strafed by an Israel aircraft on the morning of 5 June, although the vehicles, like all UNEF vehicles, are painted white. First reports indicate that three Indian soldiers were killed and an unknown number wounded in this attack. The Commander of UNEF has sent an urgent message through the Chief of Staff UNTSO to the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Force urging him again to give orders to Israel Armed Forces to refrain from firing on UNEF camps, buildings and vehicles.

After hostilities began on the morning of 5 June, the Chief of Staff UNTSO drew the attention of Israel and Jordan to the inviolability of the Government House area and asked them to ensure that this inviolability was fully respected. Both sides gave him the required assurance. However, at 1330 hours local time today approximately one company of Jordanian soldiers occupied the garden of the Government House. General Bull in person protested to the Commander and asked him to withdraw his troops. He also protested in the strongest terms to the Senior Jordan Delegate, to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission against the violation of United Nations premises by Jordanian soldiers,

whose withdrawal within half an hour he demanded. He also informed the Israel authorities of these developments and requested them to ensure that Israel soldiers would not enter the Government House area. By then an exchange of fire had already begun between the Jordanian soldiers in the Government House garden and Israel soldiers near-by. General Bull later informed me by an emergency message that Jordanian troops had not withdrawn and were demanding to enter Government House itself and had demanded that no telephone calls be made from the Government House. Firing was continuing and mortar shells were now landing within the Government House compound. United Nations Headquarters lost radio contact with UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem at 0852 hours New York time, at which time Jordan troops occupied Government House. This also means that United Nations Headquarters has lost direct contact with headquarters UNEF, whose messages are routed through UNTSO.

In view of these developments I have addressed the following urgent appeal to the King of Jordan:

His Majesty
King Hussein
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Amman, Jordan
Your Majesty,

I have just been advised at 0900 hours local time that all communications with Government House have ended because of its occupation by Jordanian troops. This is a breach of extreme seriousness. I appeal to Your Majesty with utmost urgency to order the immediate removal of Jordanian troops from the grounds and buildings of the Government House compound in Jerusalem. As Your Majesty knows, this compound has been respected by both parties to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission as the Headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and therefore under the exclusive United Nations occupation and control.

U Thant
Secretary-General
of the United Nations

**Supplemental Information Received by
the Secretary General¹**

1. In view of the apparent uncertainty about the time when the Council meeting which

adjourned on the morning of 5 June will reconvene, I have decided to circulate to the Members the information I have received since I gave my oral statement to the Council this morning. This written statement is supplemental therefore to this morning's oral statement.

2. Direct communication with General Bull continues to be suspended for the reasons which I mentioned in my previous statement. We understand, however, that heavy firing is taking place in and around the Government House compound in Jerusalem. A cease-fire in the area was called for at 1500 hours LT but was not respected, although both delegates to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission agreed to the arrangement.

3. The Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission has reported from Damascus that Damascus airport has been intermittently under air attack since 1110 hours GMT and that other locations in Syria have also been under air attack. The Mixed Armistice Commission has also received complaints from Israel that Megiddio, Ailabum and a locality south of Akko have been attacked from the air.

4. Contact has been re-established with the Commander of UNEF who reports artillery firing at 1430 hours LT on the Indian Battalion main camp, with whom communications have now broken down. Snipers' fire is reported at the same time from Rafah Camp. At 1520 hours LT, artillery firing was reported near Swedish Battalion main camp and at the same time artillery and mortar fire were reported near Rafah Camp. In Rafah Camp one Brazilian soldier and two local civilians are reported lightly wounded.

5. A later report from the Commander of UNEF states that during the artillery firing on the Indian main camp referred to above, one Indian officer and one soldier were killed and one officer and nine soldiers wounded.

6. The Commander of the Force has pointed out that a contributing factor to the casualties suffered from artillery fire was the proximity of UAR military positions to the camps concerned.

7. The Commander of UNEF reports that only sporadic firing has been heard since 1600 hours LT, but that at 1630 hours LT two Israel aircraft attacked the Wadi Gaza bridge and are reported to have destroyed it. This is

¹ U.N. doc. S/7930.

the bridge on the main road south from Gaza.

8. At 1748 LT the United Nations radio station in Amman, Jordan, reported that it was under air attack.

9. In my statement to the Security Council this morning I read out to the Council an urgent appeal which I had sent to His Majesty the King of Jordan relating to the occupation by Jordanian troops of the Headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Government House, Jerusalem. I now wish to read to the Council the text of a message which I have addressed to the Government of Israel through the Permanent Representative of Israel concerning the incident which I mentioned in my statement this morning in which a strafing attack by Israel aircraft led to the deaths of three Indian soldiers of UNEF, and the later casualties caused by Israel artillery fire on UNEF camps.

10. I regard both of these incidents as being in their different ways so serious that I have taken the unusual step of informing the Council of these two messages before the confirmed receipt of the messages themselves by those to whom they are addressed.

11. The message to Israel is as follows:

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to tragic incidents involving personnel of the Indian Contingent of UNEF which occurred during 5 June.

In a strafing attack by Israel aircraft on a UNEF convoy immediately south of Khan Yunis on the road between Gaza and Rafah three Indian soldiers were killed and an unknown number were wounded. All vehicles in the convoy were painted white, as are all UNEF vehicles. Prior to this incident the Commander of UNEF, as a result of Israel artillery fire on two camps occupied by the Indian Contingent of UNEF, had, through the Chief of Staff UNTSO, requested the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces to give instructions that a strict cease-fire would be observed in the vicinity of UNEF installations and camps. This appeal was acceded to and General Rikhye was notified that instructions had been given to the Israel forces to observe strictly the cease-fire in the vicinity of all UNEF installations and camps. After the incident, the Commander of UNEF again urged the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces to order Israel forces and especially Israel aircraft to take special care to avoid firing on UNEF personnel and installations.

At 1230 hours GMT on 5 June, the main camp of the UNEF Indian Battalion came under Israel artillery fire which killed one officer and one soldier and wounded one officer and nine soldiers.

The Secretary-General requests the Permanent Representative of Israel to convey to the Government of Israel his strong protest against the above-mentioned acts by the Israel Armed Forces, which have led to tragic and unnecessary loss of life among UNEF personnel, and to request them to take urgent measures to ensure that there is no recurrence of such incidents.

5 June 1967

12. A later report received through a non-United Nations channel, sent by the Chief of Staff UNTSO indicates that heavy firing broke out in the Government House area in Jerusalem at about 1130 hours GMT on 5 June and all communications were cut shortly thereafter. Jordanian soldiers in the compound were attacked and later driven out by Israel troops. The Israel troops then forced their way into Government House at about 1230 hours GMT. When the firing subsided temporarily at about 1400 hours GMT, the Chief of Staff UNTSO and his staff were ordered out of the Government House by the Israel troops and escorted into Israel. Government House itself was heavily damaged but there were no casualties among UNTSO personnel. General Bull reported that firing was still going on in Jerusalem at 1410 hours GMT. The Chairman of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission and his staff are continuing to function, and General Bull is attempting to establish a temporary Headquarters.

13. In view of these developments, I have sent the following cable to the Prime Minister of Israel:

His Excellency
Mr. Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister of Israel
Jerusalem (Israel)

I understand that Israel forces have now displaced the forces of Jordan in the Government House Compound in Jerusalem. Whatever the circumstances leading to the Israel occupation of Government House and its grounds, its continued occupation by Israel troops is a most serious breach of the undertaking to respect its inviolability.

I therefore request the Government of Israel to restore the grounds and buildings of the Government House Compound urgently to exclusive United Nations control. When this has been done I propose to seek a formal undertaking from both sides to respect UNTSO's occupation of Government House in the future.

U Thant
Secretary-General

14. The Commander of UNEF has reported that two Israel tanks entered the barbed wire around Rafah camp at about 1500 hours GMT and that fire from these tanks had caused a number of casualties among the local staff of the Rafah camp. It has been the scene throughout the day of sporadic exchanges of mortar and artillery fire. In view of the continued danger to UNEF personnel, the Commander of UNEF has decided to move units in exposed places to bivouac areas on the beach as soon as it is possible to do so.

15. I received word late this afternoon from the Chief of Staff UNTSO, again by a non-United Nations channel, that heavy firing was continuing in and around the city of Jerusalem with consequent great risk of damage to the holy places. I strongly support the idea that has been advanced that Jerusalem should be declared an open city in order to protect for all mankind its irreplaceable historical religious places which are of inestimable spiritual significance.

**Further Supplemental Information Received
by the Secretary General¹**

1. In view of the apparent uncertainty about the time when the Security Council will convene I am circulating to the Members information which I have received since the issuance of document S/7930 in order not to delay the availability of this information to the Members.

2. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on the evening of 5 June as follows:

3. The situation in Tiberias and Damascus was reported quiet. The situation in Beirut was reported as quiet. The Chairman of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had been informed by the Israel delegate that Jordan was shelling Tel Aviv and Lydda and by the Jordanian delegate that Israel was shelling Jenin. He was further informed by the Israel delegate that Israel would bomb Ramallah and Amman if Jordan did not stop shelling Tel Aviv and Lydda. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission approached both sides in an effort to stop Jordanian shelling and the threatened retaliation by Israel. In Jerusalem heavy machine-gun and mortar fire

was continuing in the general area of Mount Scopus.

4. Firing in Jerusalem continued throughout the night of 5/6 June and on 6 June heavy mortar and machine-gun firing continued in and north of the Mandelbaum Square area. At about dawn Israel forces appeared to be making a ground attack to link up with Mount Scopus, employing close air support. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission is still in his headquarters but has lost contact with the delegates of both parties.

5. The UNTSO Tiberias control centre reported that heavy firing broke out at 0355 hours GMT on 6 June along almost the entire length of the Israel/Syria Armistice Demarcation Line. Artillery, tanks, aircraft and napalm were employed. The UNTSO Tiberias control centre reported that at 0528 hours GMT Syrian armed forces had launched an infantry attack from Tel Azaziat towards Shear. At 0552 hours the Senior Israel Delegate informed the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission that Syrian forces had launched an armour and infantry attack towards Tel El Qadi. A cease-fire had been proposed by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for 0600 hours GMT but the fighting continued. At 0943 hours GMT the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission reported that he was still in contact with both the Syrian and Israel delegations and that the bulk of his OP's continued to be manned. Two proposed cease-fires since the fighting broke out along the Israel/Syria Armistice Demarcation Line had been unsuccessful and in his opinion a local cease-fire was not feasible in the present circumstances.

6. Israel newscasts reported that Latrun and Jenin in Jordan had been occupied by the Israel forces.

7. In Gaza the Commander of UNEF had attempted by messages to the military authorities of both the United Arab Republic and Israel to secure a general cease-fire by both sides around camps and other concentrations of UNEF troops. The communications of HQ UNEF had been made extremely difficult by Israel artillery fire in and around the area of UNEF headquarters and UNEF radio antennae and telephone wires were cut. The contingents of UNEF had been

¹ U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 1, 6/6/1967.

caught during the day of 5 June in various exchanges of fire between the two sides as reported by me on 5 June. All efforts are being made to concentrate UNEF personnel in safe areas and to arrange for their evacuation. A Swedish ship is arriving in Gaza during the day of 6 June to evacuate the Swedish contingent, the Norwegian Hospital and various non-essential personnel. Other possibilities for evacuation are being urgently examined both at Headquarters and in the area. The Force Commander reported that urgent consideration was being given to bringing the Indian Battalion to Tre Kroner Camp in Gaza on foot on 6 June.

8. UNEF headquarters came under direct Israel artillery fire during the night of 5/6 June. Efforts were made by the Commander to contact the Israel authorities with a view to stopping this fire. However, after two and a half hours of intensive shelling, which caused heavy damage to the headquarters buildings and damaged nearly half of its vehicles, the Commander of UNEF was forced to abandon his headquarters when a direct hit completely knocked out his radio communications. During this artillery fire three Indian soldiers were killed and three Indian soldiers wounded. I am protesting to the Israeli Government the shelling of UNEF headquarters and the tragic loss of life caused by it.

9. The Commander of UNEF re-established his headquarters in the Kroner Camp near the beach in Gaza and re-established communications. At 1040 hours GMT he reported heavy small arms firing in the town of Gaza. He also reported that the Indian contingent was surrounded at Deir el Ballah at 0700 hours GMT by Israel troops who had left them alone and proceeded towards the town of Deir el Ballah where fighting continued. Rafah Camp has also been by-passed by Israel forces and is quiet. The Yugoslav contingent at El Arish reported continued exchanges of fire between the two sides. The Swedish contingent in the Tre Kroner Camp near Gaza beach are reported all safe and it is intended to evacuate them by ship from Gaza today, 6 June.

10. At 1235 hours GMT the Commander of UNEF reported that an Israel tank unit had entered Gaza town at 1100 hours GMT and at 1115 hours GMT had by-passed the United Nations Tre Kroner Camp and had proceeded

north along the beach road. Firing in Gaza died down from about 1145 hours GMT. At 1200 hours GMT the Yugoslav contingent in El Arish reported all quiet.

11. In closing I must express to members of the Council, and particularly to the representative of India, my deep regret at the heavy casualties which the Indian contingent have suffered through no fault of their own and in a situation where they had no means of defending themselves. I ask the Permanent Representative to express to the Government of India and to the families concerned my deep condolences and sympathy.

229

Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 7, 1967, at 1:00 p.m.¹

The Secretary-General: I received this morning the following cable from the Foreign Minister of Jordan:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your cable informing me of the Security Council resolution calling upon the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures of an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area. This cable is to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has taken note of the Security Council resolution and has authorized me to convey its acceptance of the said cease-fire resolution. I would add that I was in telephonic contact with Dr. Farra, our permanent delegate, when the Security Council voted the cease-fire resolution unanimously. Consequently, immediate orders were issued to our armed forces to observe the cease-fire resolution except in self-defence.

Highest considerations, Ahmed Toukan, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The cable is dated 7 June 1967. I have informed the Government of Israel of its contents through the Permanent Mission of Israel by telephone.

The Chief of Staff of UNTSO reports that on the morning of 7 June the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Headquarters was occupied by Israel forces. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO lodged a strong protest with the Israel authorities, insisting that the Mixed Armistice Commission

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1349.

Headquarters should be evacuated at the earliest possible moment by Israel troops.

I regret to inform the Council of the death of an UNTSO Observer, Commandant Wickham of the Irish Army, who was killed on 7 June on the road between Kuneitra and Damascus. I wish to express my sympathy and condolences to the Government of Ireland and the family of Commandant Wickham.

I have instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to do whatever he can to continue with his functions and to make his good offices available to the parties whenever there is an opportunity to do so.

The Commander of UNEF reports that he is continuing his efforts to ensure the security of the remaining contingents of UNEF pending their evacuation. He reports that none of the units are at present in danger. Urgent efforts continue to find methods for their evacuation.

I also regret to have to report to the Council that the death of one Brazilian soldier of UNEF in Rafah Camp on 5 June is now officially confirmed. The Commander of UNEF has also informed me that, according to the latest information, the casualties suffered by the Indian contingent are nine killed, twenty wounded and twelve missing. I have expressed to the Governments of India and Brazil my deep sorrow at these casualties.

In view of the occupation of the Headquarters of both UNTSO in Jerusalem and UNEF in Gaza by Israel troops, I have formally approached the Government of Israel to ask for their assurances that the records and documents of both of these Headquarters, which are of both practical importance and irreplaceable historic value, will be preserved and protected, undisturbed and undamaged, until UNTSO and UNEF personnel return to their respective Headquarters.

I have no further detailed information about the fighting, which I understand to be continuing at numerous points.

230

Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 7, 1967, at 2:20 p.m.¹

The Secretary-General: During the recess of the Security Council meeting this afternoon, I received the following report from General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

1. Situation report at 10 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time. Report on situation in Jerusalem City area during the night 6/7 June.

A. Israel forces continued bombardment of Mount Scopus and reducing Jordan strongpoints.

B. Augusta Victoria Hospital burnt out.

C. Citadel on west side walled city also received heavy weapon attack during the morning of 7 June.

D. Sporadic fire mostly mortar and machine gun has continued in the city.

E. Crest of Mount Scopus occupied by Israel tanks in clear view of the city with clear fields of fire into the walled city.

F. Government House area allegedly received heavy mortar bombardment reportedly causing Israel casualties.

G. Mandelbaum Gate area placed under Jordan mortar fire for a short period in mid-morning.

H. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Chairman reports all quiet in the area at present.

I. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel Mixed Armistice Commission house has been occupied by Israel forces. Senior Israel delegate has advised the Chairman that if he and UNTSO personnel at the Mixed Armistice Commission house wish to leave he will assist and accept full responsibility for the building and property. I -- that is, General Odd Bull -- have advised the Chairman to remain there for the present.

J. Situation in the city at 10.45 very quiet. I am watching the developments.

2. Observers from Jenin and Latrun Observation Posts have returned under UNTSO control under Israel forces escort. Observers at Tulkarm safe. Arrangements to recover under discussion. Observers at Hebron are safe. I have radio contact with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Israel Mixed Armistice Commission.

3. At approximately 10.30 hours Greenwich Mean Time heavy Israel mortar bombardment placed on target area in the vicinity of Bethlehem.

4. Cease-fire not effective.

That is the end of the cable.

I have just received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Israel. The

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1350.

text is as follows:

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the copy of your telegram of last night addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem.

In this connexion, I wish to draw your attention to the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 1348th meeting of the Security Council on 6 June 1967, immediately following the adoption of the resolution, as follows:

'Let me then say here that Israel welcomes the appeal for the cease-fire as formulated in this resolution. But I must point out that the implementation depends on the absolute and sincere acceptance and co-operation of the other parties, which, in our view, are responsible for the present situation. And in conveying this resolution to my colleagues, I must at this moment point out that these other Governments have not used the opportunity yet to clarify their intentions.'

I have the honour to request you to bring this letter to the immediate attention of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Gideon Rafael
Permanent Representative

231

Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 8, 1967, at 2:50 p.m.¹

The Secretary-General: I received this morning the following message from the Foreign Minister of Kuwait:

Gratefully received your cable concerning resolutions of Security Council for cease-fire. I am sorry to inform you that Government of Kuwait will not observe nor adhere to these resolutions which do not condemn Israeli aggressors. The resolutions also ignored the just rights of the Palestinians in their homeland. With highest considerations.

I have received the following information from General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff, UNTSO:

On the morning of 8 June, General Bull received a message from the Foreign Minister of Jordan to the effect that, despite the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council, Israel troops were bombing Mafraq and that Israel forces were also concentrating on the west side of the River Jordan south of Damiah bridge and some troops had crossed to the eastern bank. General Bull

communicated this information to the Israel Foreign Ministry and was informed that Iraq troops and aircraft were in the Mafraq area. I may mention, in this regard, that the resolutions of the Security Council were transmitted to the Government of Iraq in addition to the Governments which I had informed previously, but no response has been received.

United Nations Military Observers in Tiberias reported on the morning of 8 June that very heavy continuous air and ground fire was taking place in the general area of the Israel-Syria central demilitarized zone.

The Commander of UNEF is continuing to concentrate UNEF troops prior to evacuation by ship off the beaches. One ship is already in the Gaza area awaiting clearance and two other ships are on their way to the area and are expected to arrive within forty-eight hours. It is hoped to resume the evacuation of UNEF within forty-eight hours.

* * *

The Secretary-General: I have just received the following communication from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations. It is dated 8 June 1967.

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to inform you, upon instructions of my Government, that it has decided to accept the cease-fire call, as it has been prescribed by the resolutions of the Council on the 6 and 7 June 1967, on the condition that the other party ceases fire.

"Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mohamed Awad El Kony
Permanent Representative of the United Arab
Republic to the United Nations.

232

Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 9, 1967, at 0:30 p.m.²

The Secretary-General: At thirty-six minutes past midnight New York time today, I received the message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic which has just been

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1351.

² U.N. doc. S/PV. 1352.

read by you, Mr. President.

The Permanent Representative of Israel was informed of this message by telephone at five minutes past one o'clock this morning, New York time. The President of the Security Council was similarly informed, and the message was immediately relayed to the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, with instructions to inform the Israel authorities in Jerusalem.

At 7.14 a.m., New York time today, I was advised by the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission that he had received the following message from Syria:

In spite of our observance of the cease-fire which was communicated to you at 4 a.m. this morning we are now being subjected to an Israel attack on the whole length of the Armistice Demarcation Line and against our towns and villages which began this morning, and continues at this moment. Different arms are being employed, aircraft, tanks, artillery and infantry. We hold the Security Council and the international conscience responsible for this criminal aggression. We demand immediately the convocation of the Security Council, the immediate cessation of the aggression and the punishment of the aggressors. Please circulate this document to the members of the Security Council. Ibrahim Makhos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic.

At 0900 hours GMT—that is, 5 a.m. New York time—the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, received a message from the Israel authorities strongly advising against the intention of the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to man observation posts on the Syrian side of the line as this would be a severe risk to the safety of the Military Observers, since there was severe shelling and shooting in the area.

General Bull was unable to contact the UNTSO Tiberias Control Centre and then contacted the Israel authorities, recalling to them that both sides had accepted a cease-fire and expressing his deep concern about the new developments.

At 7.45 a.m. New York time, I received reports from General Bull based on reports from the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission of artillery shelling and air bombing in the Central Demilitarized Zone at between 0745 and 0755 hours GMT. Further bombardment and aerial activity were reported by the Tiberias Control Centre half an hour later. The Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission requested Headquarters UNTSO to contact Israel authorities.

General Bull also reported at this time that he had been informed by the Israel authorities that there was heavy shelling going on in the north near Syria, including the town of Safat, and that in the early hours of the morning some sixteen villages and towns had come under heavy artillery fire.

At 8:21 a.m. New York time, I received through commercial channels the following message, similar to that transmitted by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic:

In spite of our acceptance of the two appeals in the resolutions of the Security Council for a cease-fire, which was communicated in our telegram of this morning and broadcast over Radio Damascus at the same time, Israel continues its aerial aggression over Syrian territory combined with a general attack by the Israel army and tanks. We have managed to stay calm so far. We ask immediate measures to prevent the war from breaking out afresh. Highest consideration. Ibrahim Makhos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic.

At 0930 hours New York time today, I received a message from the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission stating that the first confirmed bombing by Israel aircraft north and east of Lake Tiberias was at 0746 hours GMT on 9 June. The message went on to say that "bombing, napalming and strafing have been continuous up to 1218 hours GMT. The bombing of the village of Sqoufiye now in progress. Heavy explosions also heard north of Lake Tiberias."

At 10.32 a.m. New York time today, I received the following message through the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission in Damascus from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic:

Israeli attack still going on inside our territory. All enemy air and ground arms assaulting our country. Israel lying. Did not for a moment respect Security Council resolutions. We request immediate convening of Security Council and prompt compulsion for Israel to stop aggression immediately. Highest considerations. Dr. Ibrahim Makhos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic.

At 12.13 p.m. today—just about half an hour ago—I received the following report from General Bull:

Following messages received from Chairman Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. Time of despatch is indicated before text of each message:

A. 1246Z. 'We confirm bombing in vicinity Damascus. Senior Syrian Delegate has requested that Chief of Staff send a message to U Thant concerning current development.'

B. 1248Z. 'Unobserved explosions and heavy artillery fire continues far north from Tiberias. Tiberias Control Centre confirms Israeli jet aircraft in the area. Senior Syrian Delegate alleged 200 Israeli aircraft in the area. Considerable movement of troops and targets engaged as far east as Kuneitra.'

C. 1401Z. 'Damascus having an air raid.'

* * *

The Secretary-General: The cables to the two Governments of Israel and Syria, conveying the Security Council resolution of today, were despatched immediately after the adoption of that resolution. Ambassador Daoudy of Syria informed me orally at 2.15 p.m. today that he had just spoken to Damascus and relayed the latest Security Council resolution. According to Ambassador Daoudy, Syria accepts the terms of the resolution and is ready to stop immediately military operations on Syrian territory.

Just a few moments ago, I received this communication in writing from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic:

Excellency,

Concerning the information which I transmitted to your office at 2.15 p.m. this afternoon, I have the honour to inform you on instructions from my Government, after a telephone conversation with my Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim Makhos, that he has instructed me to convey to you officially the acceptance of the Syrian Government to Security Council resolution S/7960.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

George J. Tomeh, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Mr. President, I have just been informed that the response of Israel was that given by the Permanent Representative of Israel in his statement to the Council a moment ago.

* * *

The Secretary-General: Mr. President, I have just received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations. The text of the communication reads as follows:

Excellency,

I have the honour to confirm what I said in the Security Council on 9 June, that I have been instructed by telephone to announce that Israel accepts the cease-fire resolution adopted by the Security Council today, provided that Syria accepts it and will implement the cease-fire.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Gideon Rafael, Permanent Representative of Israel.
9 June 1967. 1505 hours.

233

Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 9, 1967, at 7:15 p.m.¹

The Secretary-General: Mr. President, immediately after the adjournment of the Security Council meeting this afternoon, I sent cable communications to the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Syria. The text of the cable is as follows:

Your Excellency,

The Security Council decided at 1625 hours to ask me to seek immediate confirmation that orders have been issued for the cessation of hostilities and that fighting has actually stopped. Since I am required to report back to the Security Council on these points within two hours I shall be grateful for your immediate reply.

Highest consideration,
U Thant

At 5.30 p.m. today I received a telephone message from Ambassador Daoudy of the Syrian Arab Republic. This oral message was later confirmed by a written communication from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. The text of the communication reads as follows:

Excellency:

With reference to the message which you have addressed to the Foreign Ministry of Syria, I have the honour to confirm the telephone conversation which Ambassador Daoudy had with you at 5.30 p.m. today.

(1) Israeli forces are still firing at the civilian population in Baniyas, which is located inside Syrian territory near the northern sector of the Armistice Line.

(2) The Israeli aircraft are still flying in the Syrian skies.

(3) Israeli helicopters are dropping paratroopers behind the Syrian lines in order to carry out sabotage activities.

(4) A huge number of tanks and armoured cars are

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1353.

taking positions inside Syrian territory for further offensive.

I wish to confirm that orders have been given to the Syrian Armed Forces to stop military operations forthwith in accordance with Security Council resolution S/7960 of 9 June 1967.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

George J. Tomeh
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

At 6.5 p.m. today, I received a personal oral message from the Permanent Representative of Israel, Ambassador Rafael. The message was as follows:

I am instructed by my Government to confirm that the Government of Israel has accepted the cease-fire resolution adopted by the Security Council today. Orders for the cessation of hostilities have been issued to the armed forces. I wish to assure the Secretary-General that on our part all fighting has stopped except for measures of self-defence where we are still being attacked.

At 6.50 p.m. today, I received the following second written communication from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic. The text of the communication reads as follows:

Excellency:

Further to my letter No. S/41 of today, I wish to draw to your attention that at 6.15 p.m. local New York time, I received a telephone call from Damascus informing me that:

(1) Israeli Air Force has bombarded the villages of Al-Yaquteh and Al-Ouyun near the town of Fiq inside Syrian territory.

(2) At the moment of the telephone conversation with Damascus, namely, at 6.15 p.m. New York time, Israeli military aircraft were still overflying Syrian territory.

(3) Israeli tanks and armoured cars are still being massed inside Syrian territory for further attack.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

George J. Tomeh
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

At 7.5 p.m. today, I received a cabled message from the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, through United Nations channels. This cable was dispatched from Damascus at 10.23 Greenwich Mean Time today. The message reads as follows:

Syria already complied with Security Council demand for immediate cease-fire but Israelis are at this moment attacking the villages of El-Yoqousa and EL-AAyoun from the air.

Ibrahim Makhous, Minister Foreign Affairs,
Syrian Arab Republic

Mr. President, that is the end of my report.

* * *

The Secretary-General: Mr. President, with reference to the request of the representative of the Soviet Union,¹ I have the following observations to make.

First of all, as I indicated earlier in my short intervention, I received a report from General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, that he had lost contact with his Observers in several areas because of the unsettled conditions there.

Secondly, in order to facilitate the collection of information, the essential condition is that the parties concerned must give all possible co-operation to the Observers. So far, to my knowledge, the necessary co-operation has not been forthcoming. Therefore, I would request the parties primarily concerned to render all possible co-operation and assistance to the United Nations Observers in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Thirdly, I should like to report to the Council that since General Odd Bull and his staff have had to leave Government House, they have no wireless communication facilities for the purpose of contacting the Observers. They have had to use mostly commercial services, commercial communications, which of course are very defective for the purpose of prompt reporting. Therefore, I should like to take this opportunity of appealing to the Government of Israel, through its representative, to restore the use of the Government House to General Old Bull so that he will be in a position to reach the Observers promptly for the purpose of reporting officially to me in order that I may be in a position to report accurately to the members of the Council.

Fourthly, one very essential element for the performance of their functions by the Observers is to get freedom of movement. I think this is a must if the Security Council is to expect prompt and effective and accurate reporting from the United Nations Observers on the spot. Therefore, I should also like to take this opportunity of requesting the parties primarily concerned to

¹ The Soviet representative had requested the Secretary General to take effective measures to utilize the U.N. machinery in the area of fighting and to report the forthcoming information to the Council without delay.

render all possible assistance to the United Nations Observers to achieve complete freedom of movement for them.

If those conditions are obtained, I am sure we will get the required information as soon as possible. But I do not think it is practical to expect an accurate report in the course of thirty minutes; that is physically impossible. I have no idea how long it will take. But if those conditions are met, I am sure the reporting will be prompt. I can assure the members of the Council that as soon as I receive the necessary report which is relevant to the matter under discussion, I shall see to it that the Council members get that report as promptly as possible.

234

Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 10, 1967, at 4:30 a.m.¹

The Secretary-General: Immediately after the adjournment of the Security Council at 10.30 o'clock last night, urgent instructions were sent to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO in Jerusalem and to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in Damascus. I informed them of the discussions in the Security Council, and of the undertakings given by both parties to extend co-operation, and expressed the hope that enough co-operation would be quickly extended to them so that United Nations Military Observers might check on the actual situation in Syria as regards the observance of the cease-fire. I requested them to advise me as speedily as possible on both the co-operation extended to them and the information obtained. I also specifically referred to the statement of the Syrian Permanent Representative concerning the attack on Massadeh and asked them in particular to check this situation to the best of their ability.

At 11.33 p.m., New York time, last night, I received from the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission the following report:

Senior Syrian delegate states that there is large-scale fighting in the northern area near Banias. The Israelis

are attacking with tanks and infantry supported with artillery.

At 12.02, New York time, this morning, I received a further message from the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission:

Following message received from Senior Syrian delegate at 0254 hours GMT: 'Israel has launched large-scale attacks along the northern front vicinity of Banias and Moussadiye. Massive air attacks are underway from north to south and to include Kuneitra. Request UN Observers reoccupy Kuneitra and to carry out observation of Israeli aggression in other areas. (signed) Ibrahim Makhous, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syrian Arab Republic.'

At 0224 this morning, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General Bull, communicated to me reports received from the Tiberias control centre indicating that hostilities were continuing along the northern part of the Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line and to the east.

Between 0110 hours GMT and 0125 hours GMT, numerous heavy explosions were heard north of Lake Tiberias.

At 0145 hours GMT, parachute flares were seen north of Tiberias over Jordan, and between 0147 hours GMT and 0155 hours GMT, continuous heavy explosions were heard north of Tiberias.

At 0230 hours GMT continuing and intense artillery fire was heard north east of Tiberias over Jordan valley.

At 0250 hours GMT, three or four big explosions were seen very far away in the direction of Kuneitra.

At 0320 hours GMT, three big explosions were seen in the direction of Kuneitra and continuing sound of artillery.

At 0400 hours GMT, 0425 hours GMT and 0450 hours GMT, heavy explosions believed to be air bombing heard in northeasterly direction. Aircraft heard passing overhead, usually in pairs.

At 0245 hours New York time, I addressed a message to the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, in Jerusalem and to the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission in Damascus in relation to the above-quoted message from the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic and requested that military observers should promptly visit the areas mentioned by him to determine the facts concerning the alleged and serious violation of the cease-fire and to report

to New York Headquarters as speedily as possible. I am awaiting their reply.

I also informed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that an emergency meeting of the Security Council had been called for 0430 hours on 10 June at the request of the Syrian representative because of reports from Syrian authorities of massive Israel attacks by land air in the Banias/Kuneitra area. Instructions were given to General Bull to continue to send most urgently any information as it became available.

Just a few minutes ago, at 4.04 a.m., I received a cable from General Bull which reads as follows:

Further to the situation reports originating from the Tiberias control centre, the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission reports that senior Syrian delegate alleged at 0616 GMT that Israel forces have launched two strong attacks on Kuneitra, first at Massadeh and second at Quassett, 12 and 7 kilometres respectively from Kuneitra. Again, at 0630 GMT, senior Syrian delegate alleged that Israel aggression continues and that Kuneitra, which is 50 kilometres from Damascus, had fallen to Israel forces. Request your immediate intervention to halt these violations of the cease-fire agreement.

That is the information which was conveyed to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission by the senior Syrian delegate this morning.

I have just been informed that General Odd Bull in Jerusalem had a discussion by Telex with Mr. Ralph Bunche, in which General Bull gave the following latest information. The time of the Telex is 0735 GMT.

An air attack took place on the Damascus airport area. Only half an hour ago, Sasson assured me that IDF is not in Kuneitra and not on the road to Damascus. He requested that United Nations military observers be sent to Kuneitra to observe cease-fire. I immediately sent a message to the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to send United Nations military observers to Kuneitra or to vantage points in order to check and report on compliance with the cease-fire resolution.

Another report has been received from Tiberias. Air attacks continuing on valley and Lake Tiberias shore.

* * *

The Secretary-General: In response to the request of the representative of the Soviet Union, I shall read out that portion of my report. In the course of the Telex conversation between General Odd Bull and Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche

at the time of my earlier report, we received this information: Report from the Chairman of Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. 10 June. Dispatch at 0735 hours GMT: "An air attack took place on the Damascus airport area."

I have just received a further report on the same subject from General Bull. It reads:

Most immediate from Bull. Report received from Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. Damascus at 0923 hours GMT. Air attack on Damascus going on.

* * *

The Secretary-General: Just before the short adjournment of the meeting, in a talk by Telex this morning, General Bull reported that on the morning of 10 June he had met with Mr. Sasson of the Israel Foreign Office. Mr. Sasson assured General Bull that UNTSO observers should be sent to Kuneitra to [sic] and that Israel liaison officers would be provided for them. Mr. Sasson suggested that United Nations observers should visit settlements on the front lines with Syria in connexion with the observance of the Security Council cease-fire. Mr. Sasson asked that United Nations observers should be sent to Kuneitra to confirm that Israel's forces were not in Kuneitra and were not advancing on Damascus. General Bull undertook to make every possible effort to observe the cease-fire both in the border settlements in the Kuneitra area and elsewhere.

A few moments later, General Bull transmitted another message to me. The text reads as follows:

Following message received from Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, Damascus:

"The situation report at 9.01 GMT 10 June. All observers and staff being called into Mixed Armistice Commission House area. This on the advice of the Syrian delegate who says he cannot accept responsibility for United Nations military observers and staff outside the Mixed Armistice Commission House area."

I do not know yet the exact implications of this message as far as the freedom of movement and effectiveness of the observers of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission is concerned.

I have just now received a few additional reports. One cable is from General Bull; the time of despatch was 1009 GMT and the text reads as follows:

Message from Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission received via Tiberias control centre at 0944 GMT. Air-raid seems to be over but alert still going on.

The last cable report from General Bull was despatched from Jerusalem at 10.10 a.m. GMT. The text reads as follows:

The present situation is very confused. This is my assessment in the light of available information:

1. UNTSO observers have reported that bombing and hostilities continue along the eastern ridges of Lake Tiberias shores in Syria, as well as on the eastern bank of Jordan River, north of Lake Tiberias, and that Damascus has been bombed by Israel air force.

2. There is a strong indication that Kuneitra has been taken by Israel troops but it is impossible for UNTSO to confirm.

3. Our observers in Damascus have been confined in Mixed Armistice Commission House at the request of the Syrian authorities for reasons of safety.

4. Our observers in Tiberias cannot function effectively because they have no freedom of movement.

5. No reply received regarding return of UNTSO Government House.

235

Reports to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 10, 1967, at 8:10 a.m.¹ [and Supplemental Information].

The Secretary-General: Mr. President, in response to your request for confirmation of information previously transmitted by him, the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission has sent the following message to me. It was received during the recess of the Security Council. I quote:

Confirming attack at 0735 Greenwich Mean Time in area—repeat, area—of Damascus airport. A second air attack south of Damascus at 0855 Greenwich Mean Time. And a further attack at 0919 Greenwich Mean Time north of Damascus. All strikes appeared to be outside the city of Damascus and based on UNTSO observation.

* * *

The Secretary-General: I have just received two short reports from General Old Bull. The

first report was despatched from Jerusalem at 1145 hours. The report reads as follows:

1. At 1115 GMT Colonel Gat of Israel called Chief of Staff to request that he go to Tel Aviv soonest to meet General Dayan, Israel Defence Minister. Gat said Israel is ready to make proper arrangements for cease-fire and wishes Chief of Staff to obtain time for cease-fire from Syrians. Israel also wished Chief of Staff to inform Secretary-General that he is in contact with Israel authorities to arrange cease-fire and he is going to see General Dayan as as soon possible.

2. Meeting arranged between Chief of Staff and Dayan for 1215 GMT Tel Aviv. Chief of Staff left Jerusalem for meeting at 1115 GMT.

3. Trust that this move will not delay implementation of cease-fire.

That is the end of the first report. The second report from General Bull despatched from Jerusalem at 1157 GMT. It reads as follows:

At 1130 GMT Sasson — from the Israel Foreign Office — called. Said he had heard Security Council reports on radio in which information concerning presence of Israel aircraft over Syria was presented. He said Israel aircraft taking protective measures over Syria were over border area repeat border area.

That is the end of the second report.

* * *

The Secretary-General: I have just received the following message from General Bull, Chief of Staff, UNTSO, dispatched at 1412 GMT from Jerusalem:

The following message has been sent by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission:

1. Most urgently advise Syrian authorities that Israel is prepared to co-operate on a cease-fire together with no further movement of troops provided Syria accepts same, provided further that United Nations Military Observers shall be deployed on each side of lines at same time that cease-fire fixed. Request urgently Syrian advise regarding acceptance this cease-fire arrangement.

2. UNTSO Chief of Staff proposed cease-fire to be effective 1630 hours (GMT) today 10 June. Speed is essential.

3. Chairman prepared to re-establish control center Kuneitra as soon as possible and further be prepared to post United Nations Military Observers together with Syrian Liaison officers at observation sites to be selected on the spot. Syrian Liaison officers to be provided with own communications. Advise estimate time required for movement and positioning United Nations Military Observers.

4. Officer-in-Charge Tiberias be prepared make similar paragraph 3 deployment of United Nations Military

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1355.

Observers on Israel side with Israel Defence Forces Liaison officers.

**Supplemental Information Received by
the Secretary General¹**

The following from General Bull was received at United Nations Headquarters in the early afternoon of 10 June:

1. Afternoon 10 June I proposed to both parties following practical arrangements to make implementation of cease-fire demand effective:

a. cessation of all firing and troop movement at 1630Z 10 June;

b. Chairman ISMAC to re-establish control centre Kuncitra by 1715Z 10 June. Observers will be positioned on Syrian side with representatives of local command morning 11 June;

c. Officer-in-Charge, Tiberias control centre getting in touch with SID Tiberias in order to prepare positioning of observers on Israel side in liaison with representatives of local command morning 11 June.

2. Both sides have now notified acceptance of proposed arrangements.

3. I shall advise both parties that cease-fire should be complete and absolute.

236

**Reports to the Security Council Meeting
Held on June 10, 1967, at 9:15 p.m.² [and
Supplemental Information].**

The Secretary-General: As members will recall, at the end of this morning's meeting I had informed them of the proposal for a cease-fire arrangement which was being presented to both sides by the Chief of Staff, General Odd Bull. Shortly after the meeting adjourned, word was received from General Bull that he had been notified by both sides of their acceptance of his cease-fire arrangement which was to go into effect at 1630 hours GMT. That message was circulated to the Security Council as document S/7930/Add.2.

Since the time fixed for the cease-fire I have received very little information and therefore I can give the Council only a limited report.

I must say frankly that I prefer not to make fragmentary reports because they can often be misleading, but in view of the fact that the Council is requiring information from me while its meetings are under way, and since the Observers themselves, because of war conditions and restrictions on their movements and communications, are unable to observe and report as they normally do, I have no choice but to give you the information as I get it, which is in the form of "flash" reports from the field. Before the Council had adjourned this morning, I sent to the Chief of Staff, General Odd Bull, a request for information on the following five questions:

1. Has aerial activity stopped, does it continue and if so where?

2. Does artillery shelling continue and if so where and by whom?

3. Is there a continuation of shelling of Israel villages and if so where or has it ceased?

4. To what extent have the troops of Israel penetrated into Syria and where do they remain?

5. How close to Damascus did Israel troops approach?

Late this afternoon I received the following response from General Bull on those questions:

Confirmed reports sparse since no United Nations observation in area of hostilities. Following as full and accurate as possible:

1. Tiberias reports from 1400 GMT to 1700 GMT of continuous helicopter flights to and from Israel/Syria, probably resupply and casualty evacuation. Helicopters carrying navigation as lights faded. At 1647 GMT Damascus reported air bombing by two Delta-winged aircraft in area seven to ten kilometres in southerly direction from Damascus. Commenced 1639 GMT. Aircraft not identified due to distance but seen by United Nations Military Observer at Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission Headquarters. Confirm definitely bombing, although strike could not be seen due to intervening buildings.

In this connexion I would point out that this was seventeen minutes after the cease-fire arrangement was to go into effect, which was, as I had reported earlier, 1630 GMT.

2. At 1752 GMT three United Nations Military Observers in Tiberias area reported four artillery guns firing from position north of Operation Post Delta. Target area not seen but flashes observed. Indicate firing from east to west (Syria to Israel). At 1805 GMT artillery fire continues from positions one to one and a half kilometres north of Operation Post Delta.

3. No reports from Tiberias, which has no obser-

¹ U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 2.

U.N. doc. S/PV. 1356.

vation over area of Israel settlements excepting Syrian Demilitarized Zone, but artillery fire reported in paragraph 2 indicates Syrian fire towards Israel from Syrian position location Hill 62.

4. Both Israel and Syrian authorities confirm occupation of Kuneitra by Israel forces. Israel claims prior to cease-fire.

5. No report of Israel troops closer to Damascus than Kuneitra—approximately 68 kilometres by road south-west from Damascus.

I also received the following message from the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission:

Following message received from Senior Syrian Delegate on 10 June at 1953 GMT: 'Israel paratroops dropped at Tsil (approximately 30 kilometres east of Lake Tiberias) and at Rafid (approximately 20 kilometres south-south-east of Kuneitra) from helicopters.'

I have subsequently asked the Chief of Staff to send to me with greatest urgency all information available to him on the reported bombing of Damascus or its vicinity and on any other breaches of the cease-fire arrangement. I have asked him to give me all possible information on the general situation with regard to the observance of the cease-fire arrangement and on the steps being taken to achieve full observance of the cease-fire. I have also asked him to indicate what steps have been taken to deploy Observers on both sides of the Line, including Kuneitra, as envisaged in the cease-fire arrangement.

The latest report I have received from General Bull, which came in not long ago, is as follows:

Reference Secretary-General's statement to the Security Council on morning of 10 June, following situation regarding implementation of cease-fire.

1. I proposed a cease-fire together with no further movement of troops to be effective at 1630 GMT 10 June. This proposal was accepted by both parties.

2. I instructed the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission to re-establish Kuneitra Control Centre in the afternoon of 10 June and informed Israel authorities accordingly. Chairman despatched an advance group of Observers accompanied by three Syrian liaison officers towards Kuneitra for this purpose, but when they arrived at Sasa (approximately forty kilometres from Kuneitra) it was learned that the latter town had been invested by Israel forces. It was thus impossible to achieve this first stage of deployment of [United Nations] Observers as planned.

3. It was planned to position first group of Observers immediately after cease-fire became effective and as soon as possible on both sides in the battle area. Due to the

changing situation this could not be done prior to darkness on 10 June.

4. It is our intention as soon as possible commencing morning 11 June to arrange for the deployment of Observers from both sides in an orderly fashion into the battle area. Until Observers can be deployed UNTSO is without definite knowledge regarding the troops on the ground and has no ability to observe any developments. Isolated pockets of resistance are likely to exist within which troops may not be under the control or even in communication with their national authorities. Under such conditions UNTSO is in no position to provide definite information or useful observation on the cease-fire situation.

5. The difficulties are heightened by the fact that armed forces of one party are deep in the territory of the other.

* * *

The Secretary-General: I have just received the following cable from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel:

His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, United Nations Headquarters, New York.

Referring to your cable I wish to inform you that orders were issued in accordance with the cease-fire arrangement reached with the assistance of your representative, General Odd Bull, with effect from yesterday evening at 1830 local time. The cease-fire went effectively into force at the appointed hour and has continued without interruption. The Israel forces are adhering scrupulously and maintaining fully the cease-fire arrangement.

Highest consideration.

Abba Eban
Minister for Foreign Affairs

* * *

The Secretary-General: In reply to the questions posed by the representative of France, I have the following observations.

With respect to his first question, relating to paragraph 1 of page 2 of my report to the Security Council, we have no further information from General Bull regarding the recurrence of bombing, as I have stated in my report.

The second question related to paragraph 2 of the same page, concerning firing from east to west, that is, firing from Syria to Israel. We have no further information from General Bull indicating that the firing was repeated or that there was a recurrence of firing.

With respect to the third question relating to paragraph 4 of the same page, all we know

concerning the occupation of Kuneitra by Israel forces is contained in my report, namely that Israel claims that its forces occupied Kuneitra prior to the cease-fire. There was no other version from the other side.

I have to report to the Council also that there is no further report of any other air incident over Syria, or for that matter over Israel.

In continuation of my answer regarding paragraph 4 on page 2, I have to report that the United Nations Military Observers were not in Kuneitra when that town fell to the Israelis, so we have no means, at least for the moment, of checking whether Kuneitra fell to the Israelis prior to the cease-fire or after the cease-fire. The United Nations Military Observers are not in a position to report on this point, at least for the moment.

Regarding the question posed by the representative of France on the matter of incursions into Syria, we have no definite information from either the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, or the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. But according to general information that we have, based on the previous report, the incursion in some places is about twelve miles deep inside Syria.

Regarding the last question, pertaining to the sufficiency, or otherwise, of the staff of General Odd Bull, I will transmit this question immediately to General Bull. But as I indicated in my report yesterday, the efficiency and the promptness in reporting of the United Nations Military Observers in the area depend primarily on freedom of movement; and of course the security factor is also a very important consideration.

Concerning the possibility of redeployment of other members of the United Nations Military group from other areas, I shall also immediately ask General Bull about his observations. For the moment, however, my feeling is that freedom of movement and the security factor are more important for his purpose of carrying out his present responsibilities than is the enlargement of the force. Then too, I wish to report to the Council that General Odd Bull has not so far asked for additional staff.

The Secretary-General: I have just received two reports from General Odd Bull. The first report was dispatched at 0305 GMT from Jerusalem, and was referred to in my report, in paragraph 1 of page 2. It reads as follows:

(a) Details of bombing incident which has been reported earlier, as provided by Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, are as follows: 'Two aircraft identified as delta-wing too high to observe marking. Bombs were definitely dropped. Heavy anti-aircraft put up as result. Impact south of Damascus estimated 7-10 kilometres. Estimated 10-15 heavy explosions heard. No smoke or dust observed due to intervening buildings. Absolutely not sonic boom. These aircraft observed by experienced air force United Nations Military Observers and were assessed as bombers and not photo-reconnaissance aircraft, due to flight angle of sun. Senior Syrian delegate reported that there were six aircraft in group although only two were observed by United Nations Military Observers.'

(b) No Arab breaches of cease-fire.

(c) Mr. Sasson—of the Israeli Foreign Office—categorically and repeatedly denied bombing by Israel aircraft. He stated that such allegation should not be permitted to distort picture of calm prevailing after cease-fire time.

(d) Steps taken to achieve observance of cease-fire on either side have been reported. Additional information is as follows: (a) United Nations Military Observers from Damascus deployed and remained overnight at Sasa where teams of two will deploy at first light on 11 June toward Kuneitra. Simultaneously, team from Tiberias will deploy eastward to Kuneitra which is invested by Israel forces—that is, occupied by Israel forces—and re-establish Kuneitra control centre.

That is the end of the first report.

The second report from General Bull was dispatched at 04.47 GMT and reads as follows:

1. Message reporting details of observed cease-fire breaches, deployment United Nations Military Observer team from Tiberias to Kuneitra has been delayed pending the decision of Israel Minister of Defence regarding this movement. Decision expected approximately 0800 GMT, 11 June.

2. United Nations Military Observers team which remained overnight at Sasa moved toward Kuneitra at daylight and at 0330 GMT reported to Damascus to have passed village of Fania. No further information available.

That is the end of the second report.

**Supplemental Information Received by
the Secretary General.¹**

1. The information here presented covers the period since my last oral report to the Security Council near the close of its meeting early in the morning of 11 June.

2. The cease-fire arrangement as proposed and negotiated by the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, and accepted by the parties and which went into effect at 1630 hours GMT on 10 June is being observed and no serious breaches had been reported in that period up to 1500 hour EDT on 11 June. I have sent to General Bull the following message of appreciation:

I convey to you my great appreciation of the initiative and skill you have demonstrated in your cease-fire arrangement in implementation of the Security Council's demand for a cease-fire between Israel and Syria. It is rare, indeed, that a cease-fire can be self-executing. You have provided the intermediary, co-ordination and observance which were essential to bring the cease-fire into reality. U Thant

3. As envisaged in General Bull's cease-fire arrangement, United Nations Military Observers on the morning of 11 June were deployed. General Bull reports:

Following sitreps [Situation Reports] refer deployment of United Nations teams in Israel-Syria FDLS [Forward Defended Localities]. Damascus based teams located Sasa overnight deployed at first light. Tiberias teams were delayed due to lack of agreement with Israel on proposal to re-establish Kuneitra Control Centre.

At 0330Z UN-75 to Damascus reported location as having reached Fania.

At 0435Z TCC [Tiberias Control Centre] team UN-183 departed Tiberias for Banat Yaqub-Kuneitra.

At 0500Z team UN-75 reported location at approx. MR 227-292 and proceeding SW.

Team UN-94 reported location at approx. MR 274-288 and proceeding SW on main road to Kuneitra. So far no breach of the cease-fire. FDLS not yet located.

At 0510Z UN-94 met Israel patrol on main Kuneitra road at road junction approx. 1 km east of Kuneitra. UN-94 now returning to main road junction and will follow the road west through Ahmediye until further contact is made. UN-75 is just west of Buqaata MR 223-290 having proceeded from the east Kuneitra checkpoint, north to Joubbata el-Khachab then west to present location.

At 0520Z, second team, call sign UN-56 departed TCC.

At 0542Z, three additional teams, call signs 77, 142 and 203 left Damascus for general area between northern MR 279-238.

Following further sitreps on deployment of United Nations teams in Israel-Syria FDLS:

Sitrepat 0730Z: UN-75 in contact with IDF [Israel Defence Forces] at Buqaata (approx. MR 2231-2896).

Sitrepat 0802Z: UN-56 and UN-157 are proceeding with Lt. Col. Spann (senior Israel representative) to a more eastern location. New position to be reported on arrival.

Sitrepat 0815Z: UN-183 who is at KCC (Kuneitra Control Centre) received the following signed certificate from Lt. Col. Spann (SIR) [Senior Israel Representative]: 'To whom it may concern: two United Nations Observers were authorized by HQ IDF to remain in the United Nations building Kuneitra. Please do not disturb them in their work.' This certificate is in both English and Hebrew and both certificates signed by Lt. Col. Spann (SIR).

Following sitreps refer deployment of United Nations teams in Israel-Syrian FDLS. Sitrepat 110915Z: At 0852Z one short burst of lmg [Light machine-gun] or smg [Sub-machine-gun] or single rifle heard from SE of Kuneitra.

At 0858Z several bursts of smg or lmg heard from same direction. Estimated distance between 500 to 700 metres.

At 0902Z two explosions heard in same direction.

At 0902Z one single shot heard in SE direction in outskirts of Kuneitra.

Sitreps on deployment of nine United Nations teams in Israel-Syrian FDLS: Sitrepat 1031Z: Location of UNMO [United Nations Military Observer] teams (2 UNMOs each).

UN-75 north of Kuneitra near Buqaata.

UN-56 and UN-94 (two different teams) proceeding towards rv at Kuneitra by-pass.

UN-34 and UN-20 (two different teams are both standing by at east Kuneitra check point.

UN-203 and UN-142 and UN-77 (three different teams) at OP [Observation Post] Echo check point.

UN-183 is at KCC.

Following information just received from Tiberias:

Kuneitra control centre back on the air at 0752Z. All wireless equipment in good condition and operative. Kuneitra control centre in contact with both Tiberias and Damascus.

4. On the morning of 11 June I also received from General Bull the following messages:

I will see Mr. Sasson at 1130Z 11 June to discuss the following:

a. Israel authorities slowness in allowing deployment of UNMO teams from Tiberias. Israel authorities have not provided an adequate number of LOs [Liaison Officers] to properly cover cease-fire line.

b. Complete freedom of movement for these teams has not been granted by Israel authorities.

c. The taking of a Syrian Liaison Officer prisoner who was with one of the UNMO teams from Damascus.

Incident was reported by Tiberias control centre as follows:

¹ U.N. doc. S/7930/Add. 3.

'At 1005Z 11 June UNMO-203 one of the teams deployed from Damascus is at OP Echo checkpoint which is now an Israeli position. The Israelis have taken the UNMO's Syrian Liaison Officer prisoner.'

I saw Sasson 11 June and discussed following matters:

1. Sasson agreed with me that everything should be done to expedite the deployment of UNMOs. To that effect I requested that IDF make available seven more Liaison Officers immediately so that we could have nine UNMO teams on Israel side. He agreed to this suggestion subject to concurrence by Dayan.

2. Regarding freedom of movement of UNMO teams he agreed that such movement should be granted in IDF battle areas on the understanding that movement should be co-ordinated with local unit commanders in view of military necessities.

3. In order to ensure greater co-ordination between United Nations and Israel authorities Sasson informed that Col. Gath had been designated as the officer responsible for liaison with United Nations in Tiberias for implementation of Secco [Security Council] cease-fire demand.

4. I also raised the question of the capture of Syrian Liaison Officer reported in my E/51. I urged in strongest terms the release of the Syrian Officer, pointing out that he was travelling with UNMOs at my request for the implementation of Secco resolution. Sasson stated that he was a prisoner of war and that he had to refer the matter to his government. He also stated that atmosphere was extremely tense at present and while he would work for release of officer he thought we should give him some time for his endeavour. I told him I had to report to the Secretary-General and again urged him to do everything possible to ensure the release of the Syrian Officer.

5. In ensuing discussions Sasson raised the possibility of action by me in bringing about exchange of war prisoners. I told him that this would be very good idea and I believe it is possible for me to use my good offices for exchanges of prisoners as it was done for instance by UNMOGIP [United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan] and UNIPOM [United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission] during the 1965 crisis in India/Pakistan.

6. Quite apart from the humanitarian considerations I believe that it would help ease tension if UNTSO could help about exchanges of prisoners between Israel and Syria. Would appreciate your advice.

7. I again raised the question of the return of UNTSO HQs to Government House. Sasson stated that the matter was before his government and until it had taken a decision on it there was nothing he could do or say. He stated that his government had before it, not only my letter of 9 June but also the Secretary-General's and the President of the Security Council's appeals and was giving them due attention.

Our efforts regarding return of UNTSO to Government House have so far met with obvious lack of co-operation on part of Israel government. Pending decision of Israel government on principle of return I requested Pragai to arrange for a visit by me to recover some urgently needed social effects. I even wrote a letter to General Rabin

whom I know well to seek his assistance in this connexion. Five days have passed since I made my first request. Pragai still tells me that it is not possible to arrange requested visit. I want to bring this to your attention in order to show you the difficulties we are faced with here.

The following reply has been sent to the foregoing messages from General Bull:

1. Fully support idea of your good offices being made available in arranging exchange of prisoners.

2. Your stand in demanding release of captured Syrian Liaison Officer is absolutely right and we support it.

3. Stand firm on your demand for prompt return your Government House Headquarters. We consider continuing delay in facilitating this to be unjustified, unco-operative and unfriendly to the U.N.

4. Full information on developments sent in this and earlier cables on 11 June is greatly appreciated this end.

Despite the strong appeals that have been made on the matter of the return of UNTSO to its Government House Headquarters, UNTSO continues to be greatly handicapped through its lack of facilities, and particularly its communications set-up and its deprivation of access to its records. This is a great handicap to me also since there is no longer any channel for confidential communication between United Nations Headquarters and the Chief of Staff. There is now an effective cease-fire between Israel and Jordan, there has not been any fighting in the Government House area for days and, indeed, no reason at all is now given for the refusal to permit the Chief of Staff and his colleagues to return to Government House. I regard this as a highly serious matter.

5. In the course of the Security Council's meeting early in the morning of 11 June, I informed the Chief of Staff of the clarification and elaborations sought by the Permanent Representative of France with regard to some of the information which had been transmitted by the Chief of Staff. Later that morning, I received the following cabled reply from General Bull:

Answers to French Representative's questions are as follows:

1. We have no reports of further aerial attacks in Syria since the reported attack on Damascus at 1639Z (and not 1647Z) 10 June.

2. Kuneitra control centre re-established 0752Z 11 June.

3. We have enough UNMOS available for task in Israel-Syrian sector. If necessary, we can shift more UNMOs from less critical areas.

4. Only way of ascertaining time at which Israel troops entered Kuneitra 10 June would be to question Sasson. I questioned Sasson on subject evening 10 June and he replied it was before time fixed for cease-fire, but did not give me further details, I shall question him again soonest.

6. In mid-afternoon on 11 June information was received from the Syrian Mission to the United Nations alleging a violation by Israel forces of the cease-fire. This information was immediately communicated to the Chief of Staff, Jerusalem, and the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, Damascus, by the following cabled message:

At 1525 hours New York Time Representative of Syria informed me of urgent message from his government as follows:

'At 1800 hours local time a column of Israeli tanks and supporting elements including airplanes and helicopters moved out of Rafid eastward and southward in the direction of Nawa and other localities where no fighting had heretofore taken place. It was added that in view of the cease-fire commitment Syrian forces were faced with a dilemma. It was also asserted that when UNMOB tried to reach the localities mentioned they were prevented from doing so by Israeli armed forces. Please advise urgently.'

The Syrian Mission stated that a letter giving this information would follow. At the time the telephone call came, no report concerning the action alleged had been received from General Bull or the Chairman of ISMAC.

7. With regard to the captured Syrian Liaison Officers the following two messages were received from General Bull in the afternoon of 11 June:

1. I saw Sasson again afternoon 11 June at his request.

2. Before meeting took place we received a message from Tiberias control centre to the effect that 'Damascus confirms that all Syrian Liaison Officers were captured at Rafid.' We immediately sent a cable to Chairman ISMAC requesting clarification regarding exact number of Syrian Liaison Officers captured and all relevant details.

3. During meeting Sasson informed me that Israel authorities had acceded to my request for seven more Liaison Officers and assured me that UNMO teams would have full freedom of movement. He also stated that as a gesture towards me personally and in order to show spirit of co-operation for implementation of Secco resolution Israel government had decided to release the Syrian Liaison Officer taken morning 11 June.

4. I expressed appreciation for what he had done regarding the release of Syrian Liaison Officer. However, I informed him that situation had changed as since morning meeting we received reports that more Syrian Liaison Officers had been taken, although details were still lacking after

discussion on this matter it was agreed that as soon as I received further details from Damascus, I should contact him again so that he could arrange for the release of these Liaison Officers as well as discuss with me ways and means to remedy this situation.

5. I believe that I must wait for clarification before raising this matter again but it is my firm intention to take a firm stand with Israel authorities on this vital question for implementation of Secco resolution.

1. Following repeated requests to Israel authorities. Sasson reported at 1845Z that six Syrian Liaison Officers had been returned to Syria.

2. I am checking with Chairman whether this represents the total of Syrian LOs taken from UNMO's jeeps today.

237

Report to the Security Council Meeting Held on June 11, 1967, at 10:30 p.m.¹

The Secretary-General: I have received three messages from General Bull this evening which are not to be found in the Supplemental Information paper which is before the Council and which you have just mentioned, Mr. President, namely document S/7930/Add. 3. All three of them relate to the question of the Israel tank column moving out of Rafid. I had sent to General Bull and to the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission at Damascus three cables seeking urgent information on this matter.

The three messages from General Bull are as follows. The first message received from General Bull, at 1906 hours New York time today, reads:

We are waiting for a report from Damascus and will inform you immediately upon receipt.

The second message, received from General Bull at 2032 hours New York time today, reads:

Hereby report just received from Damascus:

1. Approximately 0950 hours GMT today, 11 June, United Nations Military Observer teams UN 203, UN 150, UN 77, UN 147, UN 85 and UN 142 were proceeding from Sheikh Meskine—the maps have been distributed to the members of the Council, and the name of this village is given on the map—and Naqoua towards Rafid—those names are also given on the map—with a view to establishing mobile observation

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1357.

posts in the Kuneitra area. At Rafid the road was blocked by the Israel Defence Force. The United Nations Military Observers of all these teams reported that the Israel forces included numerous tanks.

2. At 1539 hours GMT UNMO teams 203 and 150 reported that they could observe two or three tanks in front of Joukada village.

This village is also shown on the map, where it is spelled "Joukhadar"; it is in a south westerly direction from Rafid. The message continues:

They also reported that on a ridge in front of this village a column of tanks was heading in an easterly direction and afterwards turning in a southerly direction.

The third message received from General Bull, at 2036 hours New York time, is as follows:

By telephone on 11 June 2330 hours GMT Mr. Sasson—of the Israel Foreign Office—informed me that he had received a message from New York containing a complaint of Syrian sources concerning troops movements around Rafid. This allegation he said had been checked with all forces and with the front commander. The front was quiet. He said that there was no advance anywhere on the front. This allegation was completely baseless.

I have no other information on this matter at this time, but it should be kept in mind that the United Nations Observers were not in that area on 10 June, and could not proceed there until the morning of 11 June. Their report, therefore, is unavoidably limited to their observation on 11 June—that is, today.

The key-point in connexion with the observance of the cease-fire is the question of whether the Israel troops were in Rafid and environs before 1930 hours GMT on 10 June, or whether they had advanced to that sector after the time fixed for the cease-fire to go into effect.

That is the end of my report.

C. Non-Adopted Draft Resolutions

238

Joint Draft Resolution Submitted by Canada and Denmark on May 24, 1967.¹

The Security Council,

Having been seized of the current situation in the Middle East,

1. *Expresses* full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation;
2. *Requests* all Member States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation, and
3. *Invites* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council upon his return to enable the Council to continue its consideration of the matter.

239

Draft Resolution Submitted by the United Arab Republic on May 24, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Article 24 (1) of the Charter,

Conscious of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East resulting from the inability of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to function in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and in conformity with the obligations of the parties of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement,

Noting with grave concern that in accordance with the various reports of the Secretary-General and, in particular, his latest report (document

¹ U.N. doc. S/7905. On May 18, Secretary-General U Thant agreed to withdraw UNEF upon the U.A.R.'s request, and on May 23 arrived in Cairo. During his absence, the Security Council met on May 24 at the request of Canada and Denmark to consider the situation in the Middle East. No action was taken on the above joint draft resolution submitted at the start of the Council meeting.

² U.N. doc. S/7919. No action was taken by the Council on this draft resolution.

S/7906) the aforementioned United Nations machinery became particularly inoperative due to the attitude of Israel authorities regarding the General Armistice Agreement,

Considering that the unilateral denunciation by Israel of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement cannot be accepted or tolerated by the Security Council, and does not absolve Israel of its obligations and responsibilities under that Agreement,

Fully convinced that such unilateral denunciation by Israel and its flagrant violation of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, threatening international peace and security in the area,

1. *Decides* that the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is still valid and reiterates that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative;

2. *Calls upon* the Israel Government to respect and abide by its obligations and responsibilities as stipulated in the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and to act accordingly;

3. *Instructs* the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to proceed promptly and reinstitute within two weeks the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in El-Auja from where it discharged its duties prior to the Israel unilateral action forcing its expulsion from that zone;

4. *Decides* to bolster additional measures necessary for the full implementation of this resolution in case of the non-compliance by the Israel Government with the terms of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to contact the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement for the immediate implementation of this decision and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days for its approval with regard to additional measures;

6. *Decides* to reconvene to discuss the report of the Secretary-General immediately upon its submission.

240

Draft Resolution First Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on June 8, 1967.¹

The Security Council,

Noting that Israel, in defiance of the Security Council's resolutions on the cessation of military activities and a cease-fire (S/RES/233 of 6 June 1967, S/RES/234 of 7 June 1967 and S/RES/235 of 9 June 1967), has seized additional territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria,

Noting that although military activities have now ceased, Israel is still occupying the territory of those countries, thus failing to halt its aggression and defying the United Nations and all peace-loving States,

Considering unacceptable and unlawful Israel's territorial claims on Arab States,

1. *Vigorously condemns* Israel's aggressive activities and continued occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, regarding this as an act of aggression and the grossest violation of the United Nations Charter and generally recognized principles of international law;

2. *Demands* that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements.

241

Draft Resolution First Submitted by the United States of America on June 8, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236, and the understanding formulated by the President of the Council at its 1353rd meeting,

Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic have accepted and implemented the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

¹ U.N. doc. S/7951/Rev. 2, June 13, 1967.

² U.N. doc. S/7952/Rev. 3, June 14, 1967.

and that military operations and any forward military movements have been discontinued,

Desirous of taking steps toward the achievement of a stable peace in the Near East,

1. *Insists* on the continued scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on compliance with the cease-fire;

3. *Calls for* discussions promptly among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3.

D. Adopted Resolutions

242

Resolution Calling for a Cease-Fire Adopted at the 1348th Meeting, June 6, 1967.¹

The Security Council,

Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,

Having heard the statements made in the Council,

Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

1. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate ceasefire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/233 (1967).

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

243

Resolution Reiterating the Call for a Cease-Fire Adopted at the 1350th Meeting, June 7, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East [resolution 233 (1967)], military activities in the area are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

1. *Demands* that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

244

Resolution Calling for a Cease-Fire on the Syrian-Israeli Front Adopted at the 1352nd Meeting, June 9, 1967.³

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),

Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

² U.N. doc. S/RES/234 (1967).

³ U.N. doc. S/RES/235 (1967).

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

2. *Demands* that hostilities should cease forthwith;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now.

245

Resolution Regarding Forward Movements of Troops Subsequent to Acceptance of the Cease-Fire, Adopted at the 1357th Meeting, June 12, 1967.¹

The Security Council,

Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary General on the situation between Israel and Syria, made at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and the supplemental information supplied in documents S/7930 and Add. 1-3,

1. *Condemns* any and all violations of the cease-fire;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible;

3. *Affirms* that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;

4. *Calls for* the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 GMT on 10 June 1967;

5. *Calls for* full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/236 (1967).

246

"Humanitarian" Resolution Adopted at the 1361st Meeting, June 14, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of the war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings,

Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,

Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949³ should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

2. *Recommends* to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;⁴

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/237 (1967).

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 972. [Footnote in source text.]

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950). Nos. 970-973. [Footnote in source text.]

PART III

The June War in the General Assembly

A. U.S.S.R. Request for the Convening of an Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly

247

Letter from the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General U Thant, June 13, 1967.¹

His Excellency U Thant,
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Despite the Security Council's decisions concerning the cessation of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States, Israel is continuing its piratical aggression. In flagrant defiance of the Security Council demands for a cease-fire adopted on 6, 7 and 9 June, Israel has seized further territories belonging to the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria.

The Soviet Government considers it essential that the United Nations General Assembly, in accordance with Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, should consider the situation which has arisen and should adopt a decision designed to bring about the liquidation of the consequences of aggression and the immediate withdrawal of Israel forces behind the armistice lines.

The Soviet Government calls for the immediate convening of an emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly for these purposes. The Soviet Government proposes that an emergency special session should be convened within twenty-four hours.

The Soviet Government requests you to take whatever steps are necessary for the convening of such a session and to notify it as promptly as possible of the exact date of opening of the General Assembly's session. The Soviet Government would inform you that it will send a delegation including leading statesmen of the Soviet

Union to the General Assembly.

Kindly regard this letter as an explanatory memorandum within the meaning of rule 20 of the rules of procedure and circulate it without delay as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly.

A. Gromyko
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R.

B. Non-Adopted Draft Resolutions Submitted to the Fifth Emergency Special Session

248

Draft Resolution Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 19, 1967.²

The General Assembly,

Noting that Israel, in gross violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted principles of international law, has committed a premeditated and previously prepared aggression against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, and has occupied parts of their territory and inflicted great material damage upon them,

Noting that, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967) and 235 (1967) of 6, 7 and 9 June 1967 on the immediate cessation of all hostilities and a cease-fire, Israel continued to conduct offensive military operations against the above-mentioned States and seized additional territory,

¹ U.N. doc. A/6717.

² U.N. doc. A/L.519. This draft resolution was put to the vote, in parts, by roll-call. As no part was adopted, the Assembly decided that the draft resolution as a whole would not be put to the vote. See pages 257-59 for the results of the roll-call vote.

Noting further that, although military activities have now ceased, Israel continues its occupation of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, thus failing to halt its aggression and defying the United Nations and all peace-loving States,

Regarding as unacceptable and unlawful Israel's territorial claims on the Arab States, which prevent the restoration of peace in the area,

1. *Vigorously condemns* Israel's aggressive activities and the continuing occupation by Israel of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, which constitutes an act of recognized aggression;

2. *Demands* that Israel should immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from the territory of those States to positions behind the armistice demarcation lines, as stipulated in the general armistice agreements, and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the armistice agreements;

3. *Demands also* that Israel should make good in full and within the shortest possible period of time all the damage inflicted by its aggression on the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan and on their nationals, and should return to them all seized property and other material assets;

4. *Appeals* to the Security Council to take for its part immediate effective measures in order to eliminate all consequences of the aggression committed by Israel.

249

Draft Resolution Submitted by the United States of America, June 20, 1967.¹

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the achievement of a cease-fire in the Middle East, as called for by the Security Council in its resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967), 235 (1967) and 236 (1967) of 6, 7, 9, and 12 June 1967,

Having regard to the purpose of the United

Nations to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations,

1. *Endorses* the cease-fire achieved pursuant to the resolutions of the Security Council and calls for its scrupulous respect by the parties concerned;

2. *Decides* that its objective must be a stable and durable peace in the Middle East;

3. *Considers* that this objective should be achieved through negotiated arrangements with appropriate third-party assistance based on:

(a) Mutual recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the area, encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrangements, including disengagement and withdrawal of forces, that will give them security against terror, destruction and war;

(b) Freedom of innocent maritime passage;

(c) A just and equitable solution of the refugee problem;

(d) Registration and limitation of arms shipments into the area;

(e) Recognition of the right of all sovereign nations to exist in peace and security;

4. *Requests* the Security Council to keep the situation under careful review.

250

Draft Resolution Submitted by Albania, June 26, 1967.²

The General Assembly,

Considering that Israel, at the instigation and with the aid and the direct participation of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, has committed armed aggression, premeditated and prepared far in advance, against the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan,

Noting that Israel, pursuant to its unlawful and absurd territorial claims, and in accordance with its expansionist designs at the expense of the

¹ U.N. doc. A/L. 520. This draft resolution was not put to the vote.

² U.N. doc. A/L. 521. By a roll-call vote, this draft resolution was rejected by 71 votes to 22, with 27 abstentions. See pages 257-59 for the complete record.

Arab countries, persists in maintaining its occupation of a part of the territories of the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan which it invaded by force of arms,

Pointing out that the aggression against the Arab States constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of the fundamental principles of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security,

Noting that, during a single decade, Israel has twice committed armed aggression against the Arab countries and that it has become a drill-ground of United States imperialism in the region of the Near and Middle East and a dangerous instrument of incessant imperialist plots against the freedom, independence and national sovereignty of the Arab peoples,

Bearing in mind the lawful rights of the United Arab Republic over the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran,

1. *Resolutely condemns* the Government of Israel for its armed aggression against the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan and for its continued aggression through the maintenance of its occupation of a part of the territories of those countries;

2. *Firmly condemns* the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for their incitement, aid and direct participation in this aggression and because they continue to support the aggression and the annexationist claims of Israel;

3. *Insistently demands* the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied territories of the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan;

4. *Declares* the Government of Israel responsible for all the consequences of the aggression and demands of it complete and immediate reparation for all damage caused by its aggression to the United Arab Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan and the return of all property which has been plundered;

5. *Confirms* that it rests with the Government of the United Arab Republic, and with it alone, to decide whether or not it can permit the passage of vessels of the Israel aggressors through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran.

Draft Resolution Submitted by Non-Aligned Countries, July 3, 1967.¹

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the grave situation in the Middle East,

Noting that the armed forces of Israel occupy areas including territories belonging to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic,

1. *Calls upon* Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with the present resolution and to secure, with the assistance of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization established by the Security Council, strict observance by all parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries;

3. *Requests further* the Secretary-General to designate a personal representative who will assist him in securing compliance with the present resolution and be in contact with the parties concerned;

4. *Calls upon* all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report urgently to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on compliance with the terms of the present resolution;

6. *Requests* that the Security Council consider all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful ways and means for the solution of all problems—legal, political and humanitarian—through appropriate channels, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those contained in Articles 2 and 33.

¹ U.N. doc. A/L. 522/Rev. 3. Submitted by Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia, this draft resolution obtained 53 votes to 46, with 20 abstentions, on a roll-call vote; it was not adopted having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority. See pages 257-59 for the complete record.

Draft Resolution Submitted by Twenty Latin American Countries, July 4, 1967.¹

The General Assembly,

Considering that all Member States have an inescapable obligation to preserve peace and, consequently, to avoid the use of force in the international sphere,

Considering further that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and accepted by the State of Israel and the States of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic is a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, a step which must be reinforced by other measures to be adopted by the Organization and complied with by the parties,

1. *Urgently requests:*

(a) Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict;

(b) The parties in conflict to end the state of belligerency, to endeavour to establish conditions of coexistence based on good neighbourliness and to have recourse in all cases to the procedures for peaceful settlement indicated in the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that no stable international order can be based on the threat or use of force, and declares that the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means should not be recognized;

3. *Requests* the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations to:

(a) Carry out the provisions of operative paragraph 1 (a) above;

(b) Guarantee freedom of transit on the international waterways in the region;

(c) Achieve an appropriate and full solution of the problem of the refugees and guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

4. *Reaffirms*, as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international régime for the city of Jerusalem, to be considered by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

C. Resolutions Adopted by the Fifth Emergency Special Session

Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance Adopted at the 1548th Plenary Meeting, July 4, 1967.²

The General Assembly,

Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Welcomes with great satisfaction* Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby the Council:

(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings;

(b) Considered that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war;

(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949³ should be

¹ U.N. doc. A/L.523/Rev. 1. Submitted by Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, this draft resolution obtained 57 votes to 43, with 20 abstentions; it was not adopted having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority. See pages 257-59 for the complete record.

² U.N. doc. A/RES/2252 (ES-V). Submitted by Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey and Yugoslavia, this resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 116 to none with 2 abstentions. See pages 257-59 for the complete record.

³ United Nations. *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 972. [Footnote in source text.]

complied with by the parties involved in the conflict;

(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

(e) Recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;¹

(f) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council;

2. *Notes with gratitude and satisfaction* and endorses the appeal made by the President of the General Assembly on 26 June 1967;²

3. *Notes with gratification* the work undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians;

4. *Notes further with gratification* the assistance which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing to women and children in the area;

5. *Commends* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue the activities of the Agency in the present situation with respect to all persons coming within his mandate;

6. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities;

7. *Welcomes* the close co-operation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the other

organizations concerned for the purpose of coordinating assistance;

8. *Calls upon* all the Member States concerned to facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance is being rendered;

9. *Appeals* to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals, to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as well as to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report urgently to the General Assembly on the needs arising under paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

11. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

254

Resolution on Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of Jerusalem Adopted at the 1548th Plenary Meeting, July 4, 1967.³

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

1. *Considers* that these measures are invalid;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.

¹ *Ibid.*, Nos. 970-973. [Footnote in source text.]

² A/PV. 1536, pp. 13-17. [Footnote in source text.]

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V). Submitted by Guinea, Iran, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, and Turkey this resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 99 to none with 20 abstentions. See pages 257-59 for the complete record.

**RECORD OF ROLL-CALL VOTES IN FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY — JULY 4, 1967¹**

SYMBOLS: Y - yes; N - no; A - abstention; * - absent

Country	Non-Aligned	Preamble	Soviet Union Draft				Albanian	Latin-	Humanitarian	Jerusalem	
	Draft		Operative	Paragraphs:	1	2	3	4	Draft	American	Assistance
Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y
Albania	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	Y	N	*	Y
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Argentina	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Australia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Austria	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Belgium	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Bolivia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Botswana	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Brazil	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Burma	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	N	Y	Y
Byelorussian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Cambodia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
Cameroon	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Canada	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Central African Republic	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	A
Ceylon	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
Chad	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y
Chile	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
China	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	Y	Y
Colombia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Congo (Brazzaville)	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	Y	*	*	*	*	*	*	N	Y	Y	A
Costa Rica	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y
Cyprus	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	N	N	Y	Y
Czechoslovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Dahomey	A	N	N	*	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Denmark	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Dominican Republic	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Ecuador	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia	A	*	*	*	*	*	*	N	Y	Y	Y
Finland	A	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
France	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
Gabon	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A
Gambia	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Ghana	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y

¹ U.N. Monthly Chronicle, July 1967, pp. 78-79.

Country	Non-Aligned	Soviet Union Draft					Albanian	Latin-	Humanitarian	Jerusalem
	Draft	Preamble	Operative	Paragraphs:				American	Assistance	Draft
			1	2	3	4		Draft	Draft	
Philippines	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Portugal	A	N	N	A	A	N	N	A	Y	A
Romania	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
Rwanda	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	Y	A
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	*	Y
Senegal	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y
South Africa	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Y	A
Spain	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Sweden	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	A	Y	Y
Syria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	A	Y
Thailand	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	Y	Y	Y
Togo	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Trinidad and Tobago	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y
Turkey	Y	A	A	A	A	A	N	A	Y	Y
Uganda	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	N	N	Y	Y
Ukrainian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
USSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
United Arab Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
United Kingdom	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
United Republic of Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y
United States	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Upper Volta	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	A
Venezuela	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	N	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	N	Y	Y

255

Resolution on Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of Jerusalem Adopted at the 1554th Plenary Meeting, July 14, 1967.¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2254 (ES-V). The Fifth Emergency Special Session, which had adjourned on July 5, met again on July 12 to consider the Secretary-General's report on Jerusalem. This resolution was adopted by 99 votes in favor, none against, with 18 abstentions. Israel did not participate in the vote.

Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-General,

Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V),

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);

2. *Reiterates* its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

PART IV

Cease-Fire Violation Complaints

A. Complaint Leading to the Stationing of U.N. Military Observers in the Suez Canal Area

256

U.A.R. Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, July 8, 1967.¹

I have the honour to inform you that Israel, in line with its established aggressive policy, has today as in the past violated the cease-fire order when at 10.15 this morning its armed forces launched an attack against the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic stationed South of Port Fouad on the Eastern Bank of the Suez Canal heavily shelling by artillery Port Fouad. Not satisfied with this flagrant violation of the cease-fire and in pursuance of its consistent policy of aggression, Israel has furthermore carried aerial raids against the United Arab Republic control stations in El Tina, Ras El Esh and El Kap in the Suez Canal area which were destroyed as a result of this unprovoked attack. Simultaneously, the Israeli Air Force indiscriminately bombarded the Eastern Bank, the heavily populated areas in Port Said on Kantara and Ras El Esh, causing several human casualties and property damage.

This latest violation by Israel of the cease-fire is but one of a premeditated series of violations carried out persistently since the Security Council adopted its resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 on the cease-fire.

These grave violations prove beyond any doubt and conclusively that Israel is still pursuing its original aggressive plans and unless the Security Council takes the necessary measures to force Israel to comply with the decisions of the Council, we will be faced with a situation where the prestige of the Security Council and of the

United Nations as a whole will be jeopardized. Consequently, the Council should, in our opinion, be able to discharge its responsibilities as stipulated in the Charter to maintain peace and order.

The Security Council is duty bound to call upon Israel to promptly and fully comply with the decisions of the Council and refrain from all military operations.

Moreover, the Council should be in a position to check any Israeli schemes for expansion and further aggression.

The Security Council could not but act urgently, to avoid any further deterioration of a situation which is already pregnant with all elements endangering not only the peace and security in the Middle East but also international peace and security in the whole world.

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that an emergency session of the Security Council be convened as soon as possible.

Please accept, etc.

Mohamed Awad El Kony
Permanent Representative of the United
Arab Republic to the United Nations

257

Israel Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, July 8, 1967.²

I have the honour to bring to your attention a further very serious breach of the cease-fire committed by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic on 8 July 1967.

At approximately 0925 hours local time this morning, fire was opened by United Arab Republic

¹ U.N. doc. S/8043.

² U.N. doc. S/8044.

lic forces on Israeli troops stationed in the area of Ras el'Ish, some fifteen kilometres south of Port Said. In addition to artillery shelling, other direct trajectory weapons, mainly recoilless-guns, were used from gun emplacements in the area of Port Said and Port Fuad. Fire was returned. The exchange of fire continued until 1130 hours. Israel casualties at this stage included two killed and thirteen wounded.

At 1130 hours the United Arab Republic Forces directed fire on Israeli troops at Kantara, and thus extended the area of the incident.

Following that, a United Arab Republic armoured column moved from Port Said in a southerly direction on the west bank of the Suez Canal, and opened fire on Israeli troops on the east bank of the Canal, mainly mortar fire. As a result more heavy casualties were caused to the Israeli troops, bringing the total to two killed and twenty wounded.

In order to repel these continuing attacks and to protect the safety of the Israeli troops, a limited number of Israeli planes took action against the Egyptian gun positions which included naval guns outside Port Said from which fire had been directed against the Israeli troops.

Egyptian fire continued intermittently especially in the area of Ras el 'Ish until 1500 hours. At 1540 Egyptian fire was resumed at Ras el 'Ish and at 1545 at Kantara.

Both Ras el 'Ish and the Kantara areas have been the scenes of earlier breaches of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic when Egyptian forces attacked Israeli troops. On 1 July 1967 I reported a serious breach of the cease-fire which occurred on that date when Egyptian forces opened mortar fire on Israeli troops in the vicinity of Ras el 'Ish (S/8026). Similar incidents occurred on 2 July at both Kantara and Ras el 'Ish and on 3 July north of Kantara.

Despite these continuing grave breaches, it remains the policy of the Government of Israel to do everything in its power to maintain the cease-fire scrupulously, on condition of reciprocity, and it reaffirms its undertaking to abide by its acceptance of the cease-fire of the Security Council.

These aggressive actions and the manner in which they are presented in public Egyptian

statements prove that it remains the policy of the Government of the United Arab Republic to maintain a continued state of belligerence against Israel.

In the light of this situation, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Israel complaint of serious violations by the United Arab Republic of the cease-fire.

Please accept, etc.

Gideon Rafael
Permanent Representative

258

**Statement by the Security Council President
Presenting the Consensus Reached by the
Council on the Stationing of U.N. Military
Observers, July 9, 1967.¹ [Excerpt]**

Recalling Security Council resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236, and emphasizing the need for all parties to observe scrupulously the provisions of these resolutions, having heard the statements made by the Secretary-General and the suggestions he has addressed to the parties concerned, I believe that I am reflecting the view of the Council that the Secretary-General should proceed, as he has suggested in his statements before the Council on 8 and 9 July 1967, to request the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General Odd Bull, to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

I believe that the statement which I have just read represents the consensus of the views of the Council members.

Since I hear no objection, I declare the consensus accepted by the Council.

¹ U.N. doc. S/PV. 1366, p. 71.

B. Complaint Leading to a Security Council Resolution on Cease-Fire Violations

259

U.A.R. Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, October 24, 1967.¹

I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to inform that in a new and premeditated flagrant aggression the Israeli forces at 12.30 GMT, started concentrated shelling of the city of Suez area. This new serious and grave violation of the cease-fire order was unprovoked by the United Arab Republic forces which did not take any action on its part which might have led to this new wanton aggression.

It should be apparent by now to the world and to the Security Council that as a result of the magnitude of the military operation which took place immediately after the Israeli Cabinet held its extraordinary meeting, that the latest aggression of Israel could not be considered by any yardstick as an isolated incident, but rather a most serious violation of Israel's obligations toward the Security Council. It further indicates beyond any doubt that continuous Israeli actions are symbolic of Israeli aggressive policies which were condemned on previous occasions by the Security Council.

The significance of these grave incidents lies in the targets which Israeli forces have chosen in the operation which took place today, and in particular, in the continuous shelling by the Israeli artillery of the city of Suez which resulted in extensive human losses and severe damage to the city and its inhabited areas which were almost demolished. Moreover, the Israelis systematically and continuously shelled industrial installations and consequently, the petroleum refineries in Suez, the Nasr plants for fertilizers, installations in the Suez harbour, and several other industrial complexes were completely or severely damaged. The extent of the damage cannot be estimated for the time being, but it will be reported promptly to the Security Council upon completion of the necessary investigations.

It should be clear by now that this pre-planned aggression from the Israeli Government and forces was ordered upon a decision from the Israeli Government, and its full implementation was carried out in spite of the request of the United Nations Observers to the Israeli forces to cease their shelling of the city of Suez. The request of the Observers was ignored by the Israeli forces and the over-all plan which was approved by the Israeli Government was fully implemented.

In view of these facts, the Israeli Government is fully responsible for this serious aggression which is in fact, far beyond a mere violation of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. The extensive operations which took place could not be considered under any circumstances less than full military operations which are, according to the Charter and international law, an act of war against a Member State of the United Nations, the United Arab Republic.

The Israeli Government cannot justify its planned aggression as a retaliatory measure against the United Arab Republic as a result of the sinking of the destroyer Elath in the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic. There cannot be any relationship whatsoever between the two incidents because the military operations carried out by the Israeli authorities were conducted systematically against the civilian and industrial installations and not against military targets, which in itself indicates that there could not be any link between the engagement in our territorial waters a few days ago and the latest Israeli military operations.

I am sure that all the facts which prove the Israeli guilt and responsibility would be substantiated by the report of General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, which proves beyond any doubt that on various occasions while the Egyptian authorities accepted the request of the United Nations Observers to abide by a cease-fire proposal by them, the Israeli authorities either categorically refused or resorted to delaying tactics and thus not responding to the request of the United Nations Observers, except after their pre-planned aggression was implemented.

For the above reasons, Mr. President, I request the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation resulting from the Israeli acts of aggression, with

¹ U.N. doc. S/8207.

a view of taking prompt action against Israel in accordance with the relevant articles of the United Nations Charter.

Accept, etc.

Mohamed Awad El Kony
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic to the
United Nations

260

Israel Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, October 24, 1967.¹

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to the attention of the Security Council a new act of aggression perpetrated by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic today.

On 24 October at approximately 1430 hours, United Arab Republic forces opened fire from the west bank of the Suez Canal on Israeli forces on the east bank north of Port Taufik. Fire was returned.

The United Nations observers were informed of the Egyptian opening of fire.

The United Arab Republic forces used mortars and artillery deployed in the built-up area of the city of Port Ibrahim and the city of Suez in shelling the Israeli forces. Fire was returned by artillery and Egyptian gun emplacements were hit. Due to the fact that Egyptian artillery was located in the vicinity of civilian installations, some oil refineries are believed to have been hit.

A proposal by the United Nations observers for a cease-fire to take effect at 1730 hours was agreed to by both parties, and at 1730 the area became quiet.

One Israeli soldier was slightly wounded.

This warlike act by the United Arab Republic armed forces, is the latest in the series of constant violations by the United Arab Republic of its obligations contracted by accepting the cease-fire resolutions. I have drawn attention to

these violations in my letters of 8 September (S/8145), 26 September (S/8169), 29 September (S/8173) and 10 October (S/8188). These culminated in the outrageous and menacing violation of the international law of the sea, by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer *Eilat*, as described in my letters of 21 October (S/8203) and of 22 October (S/8204).

I have the honour to request that the Security Council be urgently convened in order to deal with the open aggression and the violations of the cease-fire resolutions by the United Arab Republic.

Please accept, etc.

(Signed) Shabtai Rosenne
for Gideon Rafael

Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

261

Security Council Resolution on Cease-Fire Violations Adopted on October 25, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Gravely concerned over recent military activities in the Middle East carried out in spite of the Security Council resolutions ordering a cease fire,

Having heard and considered the statements made by the parties concerned,

Taking into consideration the information on the said activities provided by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add. 43, Add. 44, Add. 45, Add. 46, Add. 47, Add. 48 and Add. 49,

1. *Condemns* the violations of the cease-fire;
2. *Regrets* the casualties and loss of property resulting from the violations;
3. *Reaffirms* the necessity of the strict observance of the cease-fire resolutions;
4. *Demands* of the Member States concerned to cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area, and to co-operate fully and promptly with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

¹ U.N. doc. S/8208.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/240 (1967).

C. Strengthening of UNMO

262

Statement by the Security Council President on the Need to Strengthen UNMO, December 8, 1967.¹

The following statement is circulated in connexion with the report by the Secretary-General on the observation of the cease-fire in

¹ U.N. doc. S/8289.

the Suez Canal sector (S/8053/Add. 3). After consultations I have had with the representatives, I understand there is no objection to my transmittal of this statement as reflecting the view of the members of the Council:

As regards document S/8053/Add. 3, brought to the attention of the Security Council, the members, recalling the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting on 9 July 1967, recognize the necessity of the enlargement by the Secretary-General of the number of observers in the Suez Canal Zone and the provision of additional technical material and means of transportation.

PART V

A Peaceful Solution

263

U.A.R. Letter to the Security Council President Requesting an Urgent Meeting of the Council, November 7, 1967.¹

I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to request the convening of the Security Council in an urgent session to consider the dangerous situation prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it occupied as a result of the Israel aggression committed on 5 June 1967 against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria.

Mohamed Awad El Kony
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

264

Joint Draft Resolution Submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria, November 7, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Recalling its resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 on the outbreak of fighting which called for, as a first step, an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V),

Emphasizing the urgency of reducing tensions, restoring peace and bringing about normalcy in the area,

1. *Affirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be achieved within the

¹ U.N. doc. S/8226.

² U.N. doc. S/8227. The sponsors did not press for a vote on this draft resolution.

framework of the Charter of the United Nations and more particularly of the following principles:

(i) Occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and consequently Israel's armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict;

(ii) Likewise, every State has the right to live in peace and complete security free from threats or acts of war and consequently all States in the area should terminate the state or claim of belligerency and settle their international disputes by peaceful means;

(iii) Likewise, every State of the area has the right to be secure within its borders and it is obligatory on all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one another;

2. *Affirms further:*

(i) There should be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees;

(ii) There should be guarantee of freedom of navigation in accordance with international law through international waterways in the area;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to dispatch a special representative to the area who would contact the States concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution and to submit a report to the Council within thirty days.

265

Draft Resolution Submitted by the United States of America, November 7, 1967.³

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

³ U.N. doc. S/8229. The United States did not press for a vote on this draft resolution.

Recalling its resolution 233 (1967) on the outbreak of fighting which called, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V),

Emphasizing the urgency of reducing tensions and bringing about a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of the above Charter principles requires the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories, termination of claims or states of belligerence, and mutual recognition and respect for the right of every State in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and recognized boundaries and freedom from the threat or use of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity:

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

(d) For achieving a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned with a view to assisting them in the working out of solutions in accordance with the purpose of this resolution and in creating a just and lasting peace in the area;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

266

Draft Resolution Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 10, 1967.¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967, 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967 and 240 (1967) of 25 October 1967,

Recalling further the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting on 9 July 1967 concerning the sending of observers to the Suez Canal sector,

Noting the Secretary-General's statement at the 1371st meeting of the Security Council on 25 October 1967 and the Secretary-General's reports S/8053 of 11 July 1967, S/8053/Add.1 of 10 August 1967 and S/8053/Add.3 of 31 October 1967 concerning the stationing of United Nations observers in the Suez Canal sector, the desirability of sending additional United Nations observers to the area and the provision to them of technical facilities and means of transport with a view to the more effective implementation of the Council's decision concerning a cease-fire and the cessation of all military activities,

Noting further the Secretary-General's report S/8182 of 4 October 1967 on the financial implications in regard to the stationing of additional observers in the Suez Canal sector,

Taking cognizance of the above-mentioned reports by the Secretary-General,

Authorizes the Secretary-General to increase the number of observers in the Suez Canal sector to ninety and to take the measures proposed in his report to the Security Council (S/8053/Add.3) concerning the provision of additional technical facilities and means of transport for the United Nations observer group.

¹ U.N. doc. S/8236. The Soviet Union did not press for a vote on this draft resolution.

267

Draft Resolution Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, November 20, 1967.¹

The Security Council,

Expressing concern at the lack of progress towards a political settlement in the Middle East and at the increased tension in the area,

Noting that there have even been violations of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in its resolutions 233 of 6 June, 234 of 7 June, 235 of 9 June and 236 of 12 June 1967, a cease-fire which was regarded as a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the area and which was to have been strengthened by other appropriate measures,

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2253 (ES-V), 2254 (ES-V) and 2256 (ES-V),

Emphasizing the urgent necessity of restoring peace and establishing normal conditions in the Middle East,

1. *Declares* that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Urges* that the following steps should be taken:

(a) The parties to the conflict should immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before 5 June 1967 in accordance with the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war is inadmissible;

(b) All States Members of the United Nations in the area should immediately recognize that each of them has the right to exist as an independent national State and to live in peace and security, and should renounce all claims and desist from all acts inconsistent with the foregoing;

3. *Deems it necessary* in this connexion to continue its consideration of the situation in the Middle East, collaborating directly with the parties concerned and making use of the presence of the United Nations, with a view to achieving an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem on the basis of the following principles:

(a) The use or threat of force in relations between States is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Every State must respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all other States in the area;

(c) There must be a just settlement of the question of the Palestine refugees;

(d) Innocent passage through international waterways in the area in accordance with international agreements;

4. *Considers* that, in harmony with the steps to be taken along the lines indicated above, all States in the area should put an end to the state of belligerency, take measures to limit the useless and destructive arms race, and discharge the obligations assumed by them under the Charter of the United Nations and international agreements.

268

United Kingdom-Sponsored Security Council Resolution for a Peaceful Solution of the Middle East Conflict, November 22, 1967.²

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

¹ U.N. doc. S/8253. The Soviet Union did not press for a vote on this draft resolution.

² U.N. doc. S/RES/242 (1967). The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/8247) was adopted unanimously.

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

269

Verbatim Record of the 1382nd Meeting of the Security Council, November 22, 1967.*

Adoption of the agenda.

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226).

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): In accordance with decisions taken by the Council at its 1373rd meeting on 9 November and at its 1375th meeting on 13 November, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel, Jordan and Syria to take places at the Council table to participate without vote in the discussion of this item.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Eban, representative of Israel, Mr. El-Rifa'i, representative of Jordan, and Mr. Tomeh, representative of Syria, took places at the Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The Council will now resume consideration of the item before it. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Syria.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): During the 1377th meeting of the Security Council, held on 15 November, my delegation stated in the clearest terms the stand of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the Israeli war of aggression against the Arab States and the conquest of Arab territories, which resulted in what is referred to now, ominously, by Mr. Eshkol as "Greater Israel."

Today the Council is considering draft

* U.N. doc. S/PV. 1382. The wording of the Security Council Resolution 242 sponsored by the United Kingdom has been the subject of different and conflicting interpretations which were stated by the Council members and the parties directly concerned in the course of the 1382nd meeting at which Resolution 242 was adopted.

resolution S/8247, submitted on 16 November by the representative of the United Kingdom. As this session of the Security Council constitutes but another phase in the tragic history of Palestine—tragic only because of the unbridled ambitions of Israel, world Zionism, their allies, and the conspiracy of silence and callousness that up till now have surrounded Arab rights—my delegation feels it its duty to state once more, and in the clearest terms, the stand of the Syrian Arab Republic vis-à-vis the United Kingdom draft resolution.

That this session may prove to be crucial and a turning point has been expressed by many representatives in the Council, which has had the "Palestine Question" on its agenda for the last twenty years; whether it may be so depends basically on the safeguarding of Arab rights, so far ignored and disregarded.

In every great historical cause there comes a moment—the moment of truth—when the whole past converges on the present and the future. In such rare and unique moments one is motivated only by concern for the truth.

But as one looks around this Council table, when the future of a whole area and the destiny of a whole people are being decided, one is struck by an anomalous fact, namely, that the party directly concerned, the Arab people of Palestine, who should themselves be the first speakers to be heard, since they have never ceded their inalienable rights to anybody nor forfeited them, are totally absent from the picture. No reference is made to them in the draft resolution, except, belatedly, in sub-paragraph (b) of operative paragraph 2, as constituting the refugee problem. Yes, this is the Arab people of Palestine, the uprooted, dispossessed people in exile, crying for justice for over twenty years now, without so far finding justice in the councils of the world.

The Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, indeed, all the international documents pertaining to the unhappy history of Palestine, were not meant in any way to deprive peoples of their inalienable rights to self-determination in their own lands and their right to their homeland in which they had lived for over two thousand years; what it contains of pertinence here is enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter, to which no reference whatsoever is made in the

United Kingdom draft resolution.

In our last statement, on 15 November, we outlined what we believe should be the basic guide lines for the solution of the present crisis. We stated then that:

one of the cornerstones of the Charter is the non-recognition of the fruits of aggression; . . . that any solution of the present crisis which does not recognize that principle is a negation of the Charter itself; . . . that the new international order envisaged in the Charter . . . involved the renunciation for ever of the use of force for aggressive purposes . . . and non-recognition of any right based on conquest. (1377th meeting, p. 6)

In fact, and once more, the very first Article of the Charter is a confirmation of these principles.

It goes without saying that the withdrawal of the Israeli aggressive forces from occupied territories is at this stage the central point of the problem and should be the focus of the attention and efforts of the international community. The advocates of this draft resolution must know this axiomatic fact very well. That is why the question is a prerequisite for efficiently tackling the United Kingdom draft resolution.

While there is a mention of the withdrawal of Israeli forces, this reference is almost nullified by the absence of any time limit or any *modus operandi* for ensuring this withdrawal. No clearer proof could be given to illustrate the ambiguity of this withdrawal than its description by Israeli-Zionist sources. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's *Daily News Bulletin* of 20 November describes it in these words:

Israelis are known to have indicated unofficially that Israel 'could live' with the British formula. The draft does not spell out Israel's withdrawal as to timing, nor does it say that the withdrawal is to be to the pre-June 5 armistice lines . . .

Moreover, this mention of withdrawal is made subject to a score of concessions to be imposed on the Arab countries, thus coupling it with conditions amounting to the liquidation of the whole Palestine Question, a question which is basically and primarily the product of colonialism in the area. All of this is done purposely with a view to ignoring the will and rights of the Palestine Arab people. Even in the very mandate entrusted to the special representative-to-be, the call for withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces is not provided for. He is merely asked to:

...proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution. (S/8247, p. 2)

Twenty years of experience in the United Nations of trying to resolve the conflict between the Arab States and Israel arising out of the Palestine Question, involving scores of resolutions emphasizing the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, have been completely disregarded by the Israeli authorities. Suffice it to mention that, at the first session held after the expulsion of the majority of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine from their homeland, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the slain Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte; recognizing the right of the refugees to return to their homes, the Assembly directed, in resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, that they be permitted to do so "at the earliest practicable date" if they so chose, and that compensation be paid for "loss or damage to their property." The recognition of the right of the refugees to repatriation to their usurped homeland in accordance with their free choice has been recalled by the General Assembly at every regular session it has held since 1948—eighteen in all—but what has happened to those rights, affirmed regularly every year since 1948? Why have they been glossed over in the present draft? Why is no reference whatsoever made to those resolutions, as if they did not exist at all? It is in the light of this experience and of Israeli disregard of those resolutions that we consider the present United Kingdom draft resolution.

A mere review of the events which took place after the Israeli aggression of 5 June would show the rightness of our position *vis-à-vis* the grave situation obtaining in the Middle East and the reasons which compel my delegation not to accept the present draft resolution submitted in order to deal with it. In fact, Israel conducted its occupation, its invasion of Arab territories, while the Council was in session. In the case of Syria, the invasion of our territories started after we had accepted the cease-fire. There could be no better illustration to demonstrate how Israel was acting in fulfilment of a preconceived programme of aggression and expansion. The momentum of premeditation was so strong that the fact that the Security Council was just at that time

considering the very problems involved did not deflect it from its course. Everybody remembers what happened in the Council during those dramatic and catastrophic days. My delegation referred more than once to the use of delaying tactics in order to allow a new Israeli *fait accompli* to materialize, more especially in the territory of Syria.

The draft resolution under consideration fails to take account of all these factors, contents itself with a mere vague call on Israel to withdraw and is completely silent on the systematic violation of the cease-fire resolutions and the rejection by Israel of the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the status of Jerusalem and the return of the new refugees since 5 June. It is inconceivable to Syria that this draft resolution be accepted because it ignores the roots of the problem, the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the Palestine question and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and goes further than that; it crowns all those failures by offering to the aggressors solid recognition of the illegitimate truths of their wanton aggression when it speaks of "secure and recognized boundaries."

While the Arabs are being asked to surrender, the Israelis, who ought to withdraw their forces, on the contrary are consolidating more and more their grip on the occupied territories. If any confirmation is needed, a despatch from Tel Aviv gives loud testimony as to the scorn with which Israel is treating the Security Council and the international community. For, as the Security Council has been deliberating and is deliberating, the Israelis are building new colonies in the occupied Syrian territory, as indeed they have been doing in all other occupied territories. The following despatch in *Le Monde* of 12/13 November is entitled "The Israelis establish a new paramilitary kibbutz on occupied Syrian territory", and it states:

(spoken in French)

Tel Aviv, 11 November (A.F.D.)—A kibbutz of the paramilitary type has been created in Kuneitra on the Syrian heights occupied by Israeli forces.

The members of the Kibbutz, which is established at the gateway of the old garrison town, plan to build a tourist hotel. In the meantime, they have rounded up the animals abandoned by the Syrian farmers who fled during the Israeli-Arab conflict.

The provisional headquarters of the new kibbutz has been established at Golan, near Kuneitra, and it was visited on Friday by Mr. Igal Alon, the Minister of Labour.

On Tuesday the President of the State of Israel, Mr. Zolman Shazar, accompanied by Generals Moshe Dayan and Itshac Rabin, visited for the first time the heights above the Lake of Tiberius. On that occasion he confirmed—I repeat that—“he confirmed the intention attributed to the Israeli Government not to restore those strategic heights to Syria...”

And today, this very day, as the Council contemplates the liquidation of the Israeli aggression in the area, new proofs are given which indicate Israel's own interpretation of withdrawal. I will quote part of the article appearing in today's *New York Times* under the heading “Israelis, living in tents, work on new fishing kibbutz in Sinai.” The very title of the item of news is indicative. It begins “NAHAL YAM, United Arab Republic”—so already a colony with a Hebrew name has been established on the land of a sovereign State which is a Member of the United Nations. It states:

NAHAL YAM, United Arab Republic, Nov. 19—The westernmost settlement in the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula lies beside a salt-water lagoon on the Mediterranean coast, less than 50 miles from the Suez Canal.

It is a para-military fishing kibbutz, or communal settlement, established by the Nahal, a branch of the Israeli Army that combines fighting and farming. Its members are boys and girls in their late teens who volunteer for the often dangerous job of settling Israel's border areas...

Nahal Yam, as the new settlement is called, is the most remote of the four Israeli settlements that have put down roots in the occupied territories since the June war. The others are scattered through the Syrian heights and the west bank of the Jordan River. More than anything else, their presence has given rise to skepticism about Israel's intention of giving back the land she occupied during the war.

At the moment, Nahal Yam (Nahal is an acronym for ‘fighting pioneers’; Yam means ‘sea’ in Hebrew) consists of a number of large army tents pitched next to two single-story brick buildings. A clump of eucalyptus trees provides a meager patch of shade, but otherwise the scene is strictly sand. (p. 26)

Are not the latest Israeli attacks on the Jordanian refugee camp of Karameh, the massacre of children and women and the murder of policemen the actual translation into deeds of the deceiving and clamorous calls for peace with which the Israeli Foreign Minister is inundating the Council?

Has the history of the tragic past twenty years been anything other than Israeli verbal

utterances of peace accompanied immediately by killings and massacres on the spot?

Yet when we compare those criminal acts of genocide with Nazi practices the representatives of Israel protest with indignation. What, in their opinion, is the fit description of Deir Yasseen, Kibbyeh, Kilkiliyeh, Es-Samu—for which Israel was condemned by this very Council only last year and in this month of November—and, recently, the burning of Suez and its installations and the murder of innocent Jordanians? We wonder how these acts differ from those of the Nazis. We wonder. Of course, the only difference historically is that the Nazis have received punishment for their crimes, but the new Nazis, created to play the role of the henchmen of the colonialists, pouring the fire and napalm supplied to them by their masters on to the heads of the rising Arabs, anxious for dignity and justice—these new Nazis continue to carry out their crimes with impunity.

The conscience of the Arab people cannot be expected to acquiesce in this persecution, nor should the United Nations continue to evade its responsibility for putting an end to this outlawry.

Special attention should be paid to what is referred to as “a state of belligerency,” especially in the light of what I have just stated. Who, in fact, is the actual belligerent? For twenty years acts of aggression have been committed by Israel against the Arab countries, resulting time and again in untold suffering and destruction and more claims on the part of Israel. Those acts always constituted infringements of the sovereign rights of the Arab States, annexing more lands and territories and displacing and dispossessing hundreds of thousands of Arabs. All that is done while Israeli representatives are preaching law while practising lawlessness.

If there is a doubt about who is the actual belligerent, the records of the Security Council and the General Assembly condemning Israel for aggression should dispel it. The last of those was on Es-Samu' last November, and I shall read operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 228 (1966):

1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel on 13 November 1966;

2. Censures Israel for this large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan;

3. Emphasizes to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts;

There are no human beings who would, individually or collectively, on a rational basis resort to war for the sake of war. Peace is a goal which everyone desires and longs for, but measures of self-defence are perfectly legitimate and recognized by the Charter, and there is no measure whatsoever that we have taken which does not fall into the category of self-defence.

If the United Kingdom draft resolution is adopted by the Security Council, despite its deficiencies and shortcomings, it is to be feared that another unjust and tragic chapter in the history of the Arab world will be begun, because more gains will be secured for Israel, to the detriment of Arab rights. That is the more so since up to the present time hardly any nation in the world has been subjected to irrational hatred and defamation as have the Arabs at the hands of world Zionism, and indeed imperialism.

Our non-acceptance of the draft resolution should be construed, therefore, as placing things in their real, true and legal context. Regrettably, in a world where values are reversed, where wreaths of glory are offered to the victor of aggression, a restoring of values to a juster perspective becomes a moral imperative.

In taking that attitude we most sincerely believe that we owe it not only to the Arab people of Palestine, not only to the Arab nation as a whole, not only in the interests of a just and everlasting peace but also, and primarily, to the Charter, to this high Council and to this Organization, on which the hopes of small nations are pinned. Consequently it is our duty towards the principles and purposes of this Organization to stress the fact that peace and security, while being the cherished goal of every society, would only mean new oppression if they were to be emptied of their basic tenet, which is justice. History has taught us all that the seeds of past wars were sown in every unjust peace imposed by force. A lasting peace cannot be imposed by force. One does not open the way for it by

seizing another's property and demanding certain concessions before that property is given back to its legal, lawful owner.

Should the principle of putting on an equal footing the aggressor and the victim of aggression be approved, thus offering rewards to the aggressor, no safeguard would remain in the world to prevent one Power from overwhelming another and extracting concessions therefrom.

Mr. Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia): In my statement before the Council on 9 November 1967 I had occasion to give a clear indication of my Government's attitude and preference with regard to the draft proposals presented then for our consideration. My delegation felt then, and feels now, that our paramount objective at this stage should be to expedite Council accord on a United Nations representative in the Middle East, so that such a representative could establish contact with the parties concerned and prepare the ground for the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the difficult problems involved.

We have now reached the end of the road in our ceaseless search for an agreed formulation and it becomes our inescapable duty to decide on some set of guidelines which will best serve as the basis for the mission that we intend to entrust to a United Nations special representative.

In that first step which we want to take in the direction of establishing permanent peace in the Middle East, time is a factor of decisive importance, and I earnestly hope that we shall not fail to reach a final decision at our meeting today. The recent and repeated firing incidents across the truce demarcation lines are obvious reminders of the danger inherent in the present situation and emphasize the compelling need to decide on the first step that we need to take on the road which will lead from a state of fragile truce to one of permanent peace.

Since I last spoke on the subject a number of new proposals have been put forward for our consideration. Having studied those proposals very carefully, as we always do, we have found it necessary to reassess our attitude and to indicate the line that we intend to follow in taking a final position on the proposals now before the Council.

As I have already indicated on a number of occasions in the past, my delegation's attitude and its final position on any proposal will depend upon three considerations, each of which is in our view of the utmost importance.

First, no proposal can be worthy of our consideration, let alone of our support—nor indeed is any proposal likely to produce lasting results—unless it is based on the Charter of the United Nations and its relevant principles.

Secondly, no resolution can have a chance of successful implementation unless it is balanced in its affirmation of principles as well as in its clear recognition of the complicated problems involved.

Thirdly, the set of guidelines within which the special representative will have to operate will have to be such as on the one hand not to depart from the basic principles of the Charter while, on the other hand, to allow reasonable room and discretion in the representative's delicate task of contacts and preparations and in his search for a negotiated settlement.

The preceding are the three tests of balance and equity that we have always intended to apply to any resolution before we would commend it for adoption by the Council.

With regard to the principles that need to be affirmed, we deem it most essential that due emphasis be put on the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and hence on the imperative requirement that all Israeli armed forces be withdrawn from the territories occupied as a result of military conflict, and likewise on the need to ensure conditions of permanent peace in which all States in the area can live in security free from threats or acts of force. It follows from this that we seek the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and consider that there should be mutual respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area.

Moreover, in our consideration of the deep-rooted problems that have afflicted the nations in that vital region, the problem of the refugees comes uppermost in our mind. We believe that so long as the refugee problem remains unresolved, it is bound to continue to poison relations of the States in the area. It is therefore the duty of the international community to insist that justice be

done with respect to the refugees and that a final and constructive solution be promoted in order to resolve this grave and painful problem.

There is likewise the problem of freedom of navigation which has in the past been the cause of so much controversy and conflict. It is, we believe, in the interest, as much of the Middle Eastern States themselves, as it is of the international community at large that freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area be guaranteed for all nations.

These, in short, are some of the vital elements that we have always wished to see included in a resolution of the Security Council at this stage, and if we have shown preference for any proposal in the past, it is only because we have found these elements in them and have been guided by the belief that they were fair, balanced, and reasonable in their presentation.

It is again with the same fair and open attitude of mind that we have studied the draft proposals that have been submitted since we last spoke in the Council. I do not, of course, intend to make any detailed comments on the proposals at this stage. I can only repeat that in the light of the statement that I had just made, our final position on any proposals will depend on whether or not they go a reasonable way to meet our test of balance and equity and on the extent to which they accommodate the basic elements that we consider to be essential for any Security Council decision at this crucial stage.

I need hardly remind the Council that the appointment of a special representative is only the beginning, albeit a good and necessary beginning, in what is likely to be a long and difficult process of building permanent peace in an area which has for so long lived under the dark cloud of mutual animosity and in a state of constant hostility and belligerence.

The United Nations has indeed a challenging opportunity to help usher in a new era of Middle Eastern relations based on mutual respect of rights and on constructive co-operation. But this can only happen if all concerned are willing and prepared to co-operate with the United Nations to bring this about.

United Nations presence in the area can only be helpful if it can enjoy full co-operation and support of all members of this Council and of the

permanent members in particular. The permanent members of this Council need to put all their power and influence behind the United Nations effort if our Organization is to succeed in creating an atmosphere conducive to the establishment and the maintenance of a just and durable peace.

Much will obviously depend on the co-operation of the major Powers and equally on understanding between them. My delegation was particularly encouraged in this connexion by the spirit of co-operation expressed in the statement made before the Council by the distinguished Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in the course of our meeting of Monday, 20 November. I recall with equal satisfaction the similar assurances of co-operation expressed at earlier stages of our deliberations by the representative of the United States, our colleague, Ambassador Goldberg. This, I submit, is a most welcome element in the common search for a negotiated settlement and one that can greatly facilitate the urgent task of bringing peace and calm to this war-tormented region.

Finally, everything will depend on the co-operation and support of the parties directly concerned, and I wish to seize this opportunity of addressing a humble but sincere appeal to them to co-operate with and to assist the special representative in his difficult mission of conciliation and peace.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the hope that we shall decide today on the first and meaningful step in our common endeavour and that we shall take this first step not divided but united for peace.

Mr. PARTHASARATHI (India): Many of us around this table have tried very hard and sincerely to find a balanced approach to the solution of the West Asia crisis. The draft resolution (S/8247) introduced by the United Kingdom is one example of the sincere efforts which have been made since the outbreak of the conflict in June 1967. Another such effort is a draft resolution (S/8253) introduced by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

At the 1373rd meeting of the Security Council on 9 November 1967, my delegation, while introducing the three-Power draft resolution (S/8227), had explained our basic approach to the

course of actions the Security Council should take to break the impasse in the West Asia crisis. I shall not repeat all that I said then, but I should like to emphasize a few points. In working out the three-Power draft resolution my delegation proceeded from certain fundamental considerations. First, any resolution to be adopted by the Security Council should be fair and balanced and should ensure mutuality of rights and obligations. Secondly, it should spell out in clear and unambiguous language the principles and guidelines within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations in order to achieve a just and lasting peace. Thirdly, disputes should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter.

Members of the Council will recall that during the fifth emergency special session an overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, whether they voted for the Latin American or the non-aligned and Afro-Asian draft resolutions, had reaffirmed the principle of non-acquisition of territory by military conquest and had supported the call for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to the positions they held prior to the outbreak of the recent conflict on 5 June 1967. On this point there was universal agreement among the membership of the United Nations. Similarly, there was considerable agreement on the principle that every State has the right to live in peace and complete security free from threats or acts of war and consequently all States in the area should terminate the state or claim of belligerency and settle their international disputes by peaceful means. This was considered essential so that withdrawal does not lead to the emergence of the unfortunate situation of part war and part peace which existed in the area prior to the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June 1967.

I should like to remind the members of the Council that the three-Power draft resolution (S/8227) provides for the right of all States in the area "to live in peace and complete security free from threats or acts of war." While the first principle of our draft requires the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories, the second requires the termination of belligerency by all States in the area. The equality of obligation of all States is thus maintained in

a fair and balanced manner and takes account of the views of the great majority of the Members of the United Nations as well as of the views of the parties concerned. The third principle of our draft affirms the right of every State of the area to be secure within its borders and also stresses the obligation of "all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one another." Taken together, these three principles of withdrawal, security and non-belligerency and the right of every State to be secure within its borders, form the core of our approach to the problem and correspond to the second point of our basic approach; namely, that the Council should spell out in clear and unambiguous language the principles within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations to bring about a just and lasting peace in the area.

These three principles of our draft provide an over-all context within which the long-standing problem of Palestine refugees and that of freedom of navigation in international waterways can be solved. As I had occasion to state at the 1375th meeting of the Council on 13 November, the purpose of our draft resolution is to initiate the process of peaceful settlement of the West Asian crisis. Our draft resolution provides for the adoption of all peaceful means under Article 33 of the Charter to settle the dispute and gives the choice to the parties to seek solutions by any means of their own choice under that Article. We do not ask the Council to suggest or recommend any of these methods. It is left to the parties concerned to choose any of the methods of peaceful settlement.

The principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force is absolutely fundamental to our approach and we cannot accept or acquiesce in any decision that leaves out territories occupied by military conquest from the provision of withdrawal. This is the central issue in any approach to the solution of the West Asian crisis. Once we are agreed on this principle, then the process of bringing a just and lasting peace to the area becomes an integral whole in which all principles that I have enumerated above acquire equal importance and priority. For this reason, the three-Power draft resolution gives equal validity to the principles of withdrawal,

non-belligerency and secure borders. It also ensures a balanced and fair approach by calling for equal obligations from all the parties concerned.

I have listened with great care and attention to the statements made in this Council by Lord Caradon, the representative of the United Kingdom. Before commenting on the United Kingdom draft resolution (S/8247), I should like to quote from two statements of policy delivered in the General Assembly by Mr. George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary. This has already been done by Lord Caradon at our last meeting, but it will bear repetition. During the emergency special session, Mr. Brown said the following at the 1529th plenary meeting of the Assembly on 21 June 1967:

The attitude of the British Government is clear. We want the area to be at peace. We recognize that peace demands the greatest measure of justice in its political arrangements. And on this foundation the progress of its peoples, especially of those whose need is greatest, must be based. (*A/PV. 1529. p. 11*)

Mr. Brown added:

I should like, if I may, to set out certain principles which I believe should guide us in striving collectively for a lasting settlement.

Clearly, such principles must derive from the United Nations Charter. Article 2 of the Charter provides that: 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. . . .'. (*Ibid.*)

Mr. Brown went on to say:

Here the words 'territorial integrity' have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this; and I can state our position very clearly. In my view, it follows from the words in the Charter that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement. (*Ibid.*)

On 26 September 1967, at the 1567th meeting of the Assembly, Mr. Brown had this to say:

I should like to repeat what I said when I was here before: Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a State should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbours must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace. (*A/PV. 1567, p. 47*)

My delegation has studied the United Kingdom draft resolution in the light of these two policy

statements of the British Foreign Secretary. It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories—I repeat, all the territories—occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June 1967.

In other words, the draft commits the Council to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the whole of Sinai, Gaza, the old City of Jerusalem, Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River and the Syrian territory. This being so, Israel cannot use the words “secure and recognized boundaries” in sub-paragraph (ii) of operative paragraph 1 of United Kingdom draft resolution to retain any territory occupied in the recent conflict. Of course, mutual territorial adjustments are not ruled out, as indeed they are not in the three-Power draft resolution co-sponsored by India. This is our clear understanding of the United Kingdom draft resolution. Our vote on the draft will be determined accordingly.

In view of the position stated above, in which the delegations of Mali, Nigeria and India, the three co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document S/8227 concur, I have been authorized to state that we will not press our draft to a vote at this stage.

Lord CARADON (United Kingdom): As sponsor of the draft resolution in the name of the United Kingdom, I wish to speak very briefly before the vote to which we now are about to proceed. I shall do so in sincere respect for the part played by every member of the Council and with the utmost care not to raise any new dispute or to embark on any new controversy. On the contrary, we are all, I am sure, determined to conclude agreement.

We must now all strain every effort for harmony and unity, and it is in that spirit that I warmly welcome the decision which has just been communicated to us by the representative of India, speaking on behalf of his delegation and the other co-sponsors of the draft resolution which they have submitted to us. It is a decision certainly of the utmost importance. It marks a turning-point; I feel that it opens the way to agreement and to action.

Throughout this debate I have tried to put

forward five propositions, and it might be well if, immediately before the vote, I repeat them very briefly. As to the policy of my own Government, we stand by our votes and we stand by our declarations. We have throughout made our national position and our national policy quite plain.

Secondly, the draft resolution which we have prepared is not a British text. It is the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and with all members of this Council. As I have respectfully said, every member of this Council has made a contribution in the search for common ground on which we can go forward.

Thirdly, I would say that the draft resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the draft resolution, the whole draft resolution and nothing but the draft resolution.

Fourthly, I would say that every delegation has a right, of course, and a duty to state its own views. As I said on Monday:

Every delegation is entitled, indeed is expected, to state the separate and distinct policy of the Government it represents. (*1381st meeting, pages 23-25*)

But the draft resolution does not belong to one side or the other or to any one delegation; it belongs to us all. I am sure that it will be recognized by us all that it is only the resolution that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear. All of us, no doubt, have our own views and interpretations and understandings. I explained my own when I spoke on Monday last. On these matters each delegation rightly speaks only for itself.

I trust that now we can all go forward to approve the draft resolution. By so doing, we can put the maximum weight of this Council behind a new and determined effort to bring, at long last, peace and justice to all the peoples concerned.

Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): The United States is prepared to grant priority to the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom, and will vote for it. If the United Kingdom draft resolution is adopted, as we hope and

trust, we shall not press our draft resolution to the vote.

As Lord Caradon pointed out both on Monday and today, various members of the Council have views of their own for supporting the United Kingdom text. The voting of course takes place not on the individual or discrete views and policies of various members but on the draft resolution. We will vote for that draft resolution. We do so in the context of, and because we believe it to be consistent with, United States policy as expressed by President Johnson on 19 June and as subsequently reaffirmed in statements made by me to the Security Council, including those made recently. Accordingly, I give our consent to priority for the British text.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I have no further speakers on my list. With the consent of the Council I shall now put to the vote the draft resolutions before the Council. The order in which those documents were submitted is as follows:

(1) The draft resolution submitted by India, Mali and Nigeria (S/8227);

(2) The draft resolution submitted by the United States of America (S/8229);

(3) The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (S/8236);

(4) The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/8247);

(5) The draft resolution submitted by the USSR (S/8253).

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document S/8227 and the sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document S/8229 have stated that at this time they will not press their respective draft resolutions to the vote.

I also understand that the representative of the Soviet Union will not insist that his draft resolution, contained in document S/8236, be put to the vote at this time.

If there are no objections or comments from members of the Security Council, I shall therefore put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom contained in document S/8247.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cana-

da, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom in document S/8247 has been adopted unanimously.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to state that at the present stage of our consideration of the situation in the Middle East it will not insist on a vote on the draft resolution of the Soviet Union submitted in document S/8253.

Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria): When on 9 November last I spoke in support of the three-Power draft resolution contained in document S/8227, I said the following:

May I appeal to my colleagues around this table, as well as to the general public—and especially to members of the Press, who project our proceedings to them—to deal fairly with the draft that we have presented. (*1973rd meeting, pages 87-90*)

Since that time a lot of statements have been made both by the parties to the dispute before us and by members of this Council. Those statements disclosed what we knew beforehand: that our draft did not satisfy everybody. But unfortunately, some of those statements seemed to suggest that the people to whom I addressed my appeal of 9 November had not taken that appeal too seriously. A number of unkind things were said about the draft resolution that we put forward that I think were unfortunate. In that draft resolution we had, as faithfully as possible, followed the Latin American draft resolution that had been put before the emergency special session of the General Assembly. A number of representatives here have done what we also have done: they have paid a great tribute to the Latin Americans for their wisdom and their balanced position in regard to this matter. It was therefore very curious to those of us who had done the Latin Americans the compliment of following their draft that some of those who joined us in paying that compliment for the balanced nature of that draft nevertheless said unkind things about our own.

I refer to this phenomenon because I do wish once more to appeal to my colleagues by pointing out that in this forum, the greatest of the United Nations, it would help our work very greatly if we refrained, all of us, from unnecessary misunderstandings caused by apparent misinterpretation. The truth of the matter, of course, is that our draft was as balanced as the Latin American original draft was. What was deficient in it for the purpose of the consensus here was the fact that the parties to the dispute were not agreed upon accepting that draft to the extent, at least, of being ready to co-operate with the special representative to be appointed under the terms of our draft. This we ourselves had recognized. My colleagues will recall that at the conclusion of my statement on 9 November I did say that if there should emerge from our proceedings a different formulation to which the parties to the dispute were prepared to lend their support by co-operating with the special representative to be appointed under that formulation, nothing would more delight the co-authors of our draft resolution.

Thanks principally to the labours of Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom, we now have adopted such a resolution. We all know how hard Lord Caradon laboured for this compromise draft. He worked like a Trojan. His performance and the results of that performance demonstrate what, given the right instructions from his Government, an able, experienced and fair-minded person like Lord Caradon can achieve in the councils of the United Nations. The Nigerian delegation heartily extends to him and to his country a well-deserved tribute for this contribution to our proceedings.

Two months ago, at the opening of this session of the United Nations General Assembly, one of the most experienced correspondents at the United Nations accosted me and asked me whether I thought, in the state of the world, the United Nations could reach a decision on the Middle East situation in the course of this session. I replied, in American parlance, "I sure do." He said, "You seem to me to be an optimist." I replied, "Yes, I am; not only am I an optimist, I am an incurable optimist." He said, "Are you sure that your optimism will not prove to be unfounded?" I replied, "I prefer to be an optimist

proved by events to have been wrong than to be a pessimist proved by events to have been correct." Being an optimist and holding strongly to the conviction that anything can happen, I work very hard to see that what I believe in does happen and, with the co-operation of colleagues, sometimes what seemed to have been impossible at the start does get achieved in the end, as has been the case on this occasion.

But the resolution that we have just adopted is, of course, only the beginning, although a promising beginning, to our labours. The immediate duty of the Council is for all of us to avoid, in the course of our present interventions and outside at the conclusion of this meeting, any action or statement calculated to weaken the effect of what we have just accomplished.

Lord Caradon said a moment ago that it was for each of us to hold his own opinion about the effects of this or that clause of the resolution that we have adopted. I could not agree more.

We, for our part, feel that the resolution that we have adopted does provide for what we believe are the essential factors to the peaceful and just settlement of the Middle East situation. One of those factors, as we have reiterated more than once, is the recognition of the inadmissibility of territorial aggrandizement by military conquest and, as a consequence, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories that they occupied in the recent conflict. But one of the essential factors also is that this withdrawal should take place in a context in which all the countries in the area, including Israel and all the Arab States, can feel and enjoy a sense of security. We therefore subscribe very heartily to what Lord Caradon said when he stated that the resolution must be taken as a whole.

We have supported this resolution because, taken as a whole, we think it can promote peace in that disturbed area known as the Middle East. And yet, as we all know, if we succeed in our objectives, that success will not be due simply to the fact that we have adopted a resolution today and have adopted it unanimously. That success will turn very largely on what follows upon this achievement.

It is the duty of all of us, as one or two of my colleagues have already indicated, to follow up our action of today by consistently courageous

action in the future. None of us must encourage any of the parties of this controversy to cheat under this resolution. We must encourage them to help us open a new page in the Middle East. I think the parties—all of them—are now in a mood to respond favourably to that encouragement. And in this connexion, I should like to pay a tribute to the representatives of the parties for the relative restraint with which they have expressed themselves before this Council, because, let us face it, we are dealing with a very difficult and delicate situation. But may I appeal to the parties that, after this performance of today, they should follow up the restraint they have shown here with even more restraint if they intervene in these proceedings and when they arrive home in their respective capitals. We all know that there are a good number of people in those capitals who may not quite approve what we have done today. Therefore, a lot of courage will be required on the part of the leadership to explain that we have done what we have done not because it represents exactly the point of view of this or that country, but because we think that we have achieved a compromise solution which could help them to settle their differences, a settlement which, we all know, will require a real change of heart on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East.

Another factor that is going to contribute to the success of this scheme that we have built up in the resolution is, of course, the personality, competence, ability and experience of the person who is going to be chosen by the Secretary-General to be the Special Representative charged with this mission. We are very glad that fortunately we have a Secretary-General to whom it is not necessary to give advice in this connexion. We know how carefully he goes about complying with the resolutions that we adopt. All we can say is that we wish him luck, we wish him success in choosing the right man. And to whomever may be chosen for this task, we also wish to say that we wish him luck and success. He will require all the luck in the world to be able to succeed.

But the Nigerian delegation feels that if the parties are prepared to live with the scheme we have here built up, if they are prepared to co-operate with the Special Representative and if this Council is prepared to follow his action with as much support as he needs from time to time,

we shall be able to achieve the success that we hope for from our performance of today.

What is our objective in the Middle East? It is not the achievement of anything that Nigeria, India, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom or any other Member State wishes for. Our objective is the well-being of all the peoples of the Middle East. We hope that what we have done today will contribute to that. We hope that it will help to begin to create in the Middle East a region free from insecurity, free from fear and free from hatred, a Middle East where stable peace and tranquillity will begin to reign.

Mr. EBAN (Israel): I regret that this meeting should have begun with the statement that we heard from the representative of Syria. On his interpretation of the resolution I have nothing to say, but on his comments on my country's policy I must say a few words.

The Syrian utterance speaks for itself; it was a hymn of hate and aggression trumpeted by the Government which, more than any other, was responsible for disrupting the tranquillity of the Middle East in 1966 and 1967. The Syrian representative has repeated the revolting attempt to hang the odious Nazi label on the only people that sustained the full brunt and fury of Nazism without interruption or compromise for all the twelve Nazi years. What a sorry spectacle it is to see a tribunal of peace thus transformed into an arena of hate.

The policy of the Israeli Government and nation remains as it was when I formulated it in the Security Council on 13 and 16 November, namely that we shall respect and fully maintain the situation embodied in the cease-fire agreements until it is succeeded by peace treaties between Israel and the Arab States ending the state of war, establishing agreed, recognized and secure territorial boundaries, guaranteeing free navigation for all shipping, including that of Israel, in all the waterways leading to and from the Red Sea, committing all signatories to the permanent and mutual recognition and respect of the sovereignty, security and national identity of all Middle Eastern States, and ensuring a stable and mutually guaranteed security. Such a peace settlement, directly negotiated and contractually confirmed, would create conditions

in which refugee problems could be justly and effectively solved through international and regional co-operation.

Those are our aims and positions. They emerge from five months of international discussion unchanged, unprejudiced and intact. It is now understood as axiomatic that movement from the cease-fire lines can be envisaged only in the framework of a lasting peace establishing recognized and secure boundaries.

The time has come to adapt the Middle Eastern situation to the general principles and concepts which regulate the international order. Let us be done, after nineteen years, with truces, armistices and "demarcation lines based on military considerations" which leave territorial problems unsolved. The relations between States in the Middle East for nineteen years have been fragile, anomalous, indeterminate and unresolved. The hour is ripe for building a stable and durable edifice within which the peoples of the east Mediterranean can pursue their separate national vocations and their common regional destiny.

The tensions and rancours of the past cannot be ended overnight, but if the relations of States in the Middle East are contained in a permanent and contractually binding framework the patient task of reconciliation can go forward.

The Security Council, like the General Assembly, has consistently refused to endorse proposals which would have sought a return to the ambiguity, vulnerability and insecurity in which we have lived for nineteen years. It has now adopted a resolution of which the central and primary affirmation is the need for "the establishment of a just and lasting peace" based on secure and recognized boundaries. There is a clear understanding that it is only within the establishment of permanent peace with secure and recognized boundaries that other principles can be given effect. As my delegation and others have stated, the establishment for the first time of agreed and secure boundaries as part of a peace settlement is the only key which can unlock the present situation and set on foot a momentum of constructive and peaceful progress. As the representative of the United Kingdom indicated in his address on 16 November, the action to be taken must be within the framework of a permanent peace and of secure and recognized bound-

daries. It has been pointed out in the Security Council, and it is stated in the 1949 agreements, that the armistice demarcation lines have never been regarded as boundaries so that, as the representative of the United States has said, the boundaries between Israel and her neighbours:

...must be mutually worked out and recognized by the parties themselves as part of the peace-making process. (*1377th meeting, p. 38-40*)

We continue to believe that the States of the region, in direct negotiation with each other, have the sovereign responsibility for shaping their common future. It is the duty of international agencies at the behest of the parties to act in the measure that agreement can be promoted and a mutually accepted settlement can be advanced. We do not believe that Member States have the right to refuse direct negotiation with those to whom they address their claims. It is only when they come together that the Arab States and Israel will reveal the full potentialities of a peaceful settlement.

There were proposals, including those submitted by three Powers and then by the Soviet Union, which failed to win the necessary support because they rested in our view on the wrong premise that a solution could be formed on the basis of a return to the situation of 4 June. We hold that that premise has no logical or moral international basis. Similarly, the failure to understand that Israel's action last June was a response to aggression has prevented certain Governments from keeping pace with the development of international thinking. Israel notes, however, that recent Soviet statements and drafts reflect an understanding that the establishment of peace requires, amongst other things, an explicit respect of Israel's national identity and international rights.

I also note that the Soviet text, like that of the United States, included a reference to the need for curbing the destructive and wasteful arms race. I hope that the absence of this provision in the text on which the Council has voted does not mean that that objective will be lost from sight.

The termination of this debate takes us into a new phase, of which the centre lies not here in New York, but in the Middle East. What will henceforward be decisive is not the particular

words of an enabling resolution, but the spirit and attitude and policies of the Middle Eastern States. One of the points most strongly emphasized around this table and in all the exchanges which I and my associates have been privileged to have with representatives of Member States is that the only peace that can be established in the Middle East is one that the Governments of the Middle East build together. Peace can grow by agreement. It cannot be imposed. Our Governments in the area must look more and more towards each other. For it is only from each other that they can obtain the satisfaction of their most vital need—the need of peace.

I reiterate that in negotiations with our neighbours we shall present a concrete vision of peace. Before saying what that vision is, I should like to make one comment on the course of this debate with special reference to the remarks of the Indian representative. The establishment of a peace settlement, including secure and recognized boundaries, is quite different from what he had been proposing, namely, withdrawal, without final peace, to demarcation lines. The representative of India has now sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. For us, the resolution says what it says. It does not say that which it has specifically and consciously avoided saying.

Thus, if the representative of India is in any predicament, he should not escape it by reading into a text adjectives and place-names which do not occur in the text. He must know that the crucial specifications to which he referred were discussed at length in consultations and deliberately and not accidentally excluded in order to be non-prejudicial to the negotiating position of all parties. The important words in most languages are short words, and every word, long or short, which is not in the text, is not there because it was deliberately concluded that it should not be there.

I have said that we would, in peace negotiations, present a vision and a programme of peace. I draw attention to the ideas which I proposed on 3 October to the General Assembly under the heading of an "Agenda for Peace." In direct negotiation, we would seek the discussion of juridical problems, including the establishment of peace treaties instead of cease-fire or armistice

lines; security and territorial problems, including the establishment of permanent and agreed frontiers of peace and security; population problems, involving regional effort and international co-operation to resolve the problems of displaced populations created by wars and perpetuated by belligerency; economic questions, including the replacement of blockades and boycotts by intense economic co-operation; communications problems, including the opening of the Middle East to a free and normal flow of commerce; cultural and scientific problems, involving an attempt to substitute the best traditions of Arab-Jewish co-operation for the recent tensions and disputes, thus ending the epoch of alienation and hostility.

These are the horizons to which we shall address ourselves. For all the States and peoples of the Middle East, they hold the promise of a new and better age.

Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): The United States is gratified that the United Kingdom draft resolution has received the unanimous support of the Council. As I made clear in my brief intervention before the vote, we have voted for the resolution because we found it entirely consistent with the policy of the United States Government on the Middle East, the five principles enunciated by President Johnson in his statement of 19 June, and my several statements in the Council since then.

My delegation has worked unceasingly since last May for the constructive result we have reached today, but I should like to acknowledge that, whatever the differences of view, all other members of the Council, many other Members of the United Nations, you Mr. President, and your predecessor, Ambassador Tsuruoka, the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly have also contributed their unstinting efforts towards bringing about today's result. We cannot and should not ignore the contributions made under very difficult and trying circumstances by certain of the key parties immediately concerned. We owe particular gratitude, I am sure, to the United Kingdom delegation and its head, my esteemed friend Lord Caradon, and to the Latin American group as a whole and their representatives on this Council, Ambassador Ruda of Argentina and Ambassador de Carvalho Silos of Brazil.

We trust and we believe that this Council has the right to expect that the parties concerned, without prejudice to their respective positions, will receive the United Nations Special Representative and co-operate with him in the peace-making process which this resolution sets in motion. Success will depend, in the final analysis, upon the spirit in which the parties receive him and work with him to find solutions that will permit the Middle East to benefit from a permanent state of peace, security, justice and tranquillity.

For this reason, we strongly urge all parties not only to participate in the peace-making process, but to do so with the maximum spirit of accommodation, of respect for each other's vital interests and legitimate grievances and of mutual accommodation and magnanimity.

Were it not for the fact that the United Kingdom resolution was so delicately balanced, and our realization that the offering of any amendments from any source could have upset that balance and jeopardized the chance of successful action by the Council, my delegation would have offered an amendment so that the Council could have endorsed the need to achieve a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the Middle East. This was one of President Johnson's five points. We have taken particular note of and have been encouraged by the fact that a provision to this effect was included in the draft resolution placed before the Security Council by the Soviet Union, as it was in our draft resolution. However, we do not conceive that the mandate of the Special Representative to be designated by the Secretary-General excludes his exploring this important and urgent requirement of peace, as he establishes and maintains contacts with the States concerned.

His mandate encompasses the search for a just and lasting peace and in pursuing that search he should be encouraged by the fact that two great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have indicated their willingness to have the problem of a limitation on the arms race discussed and explored.

As for my own Government, we have stated before and I renew that statement now that the United States will use every recourse of diplomacy, including co-operating with the Special Representative, to find a course which will put an

end to the waste and futility of the arms race in the Middle East. A beginning, but only a beginning, could be made if the United Nations, as we have proposed, would call upon all its Members to report all shipments of all military arms into the area and keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe.

The Special Representative will need all the help and support he can get both from the parties and from the international community. I have already given my Government's pledge on this score and I wish to reiterate it today—a pledge to this Council and to the parties concerned that the diplomatic and political influence of the United States Government will be exerted in support of the efforts of the United Nations Special Representative to achieve a fair, equitable and dignified settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquillity. Similar pledges from other members of the Council and the United Nations membership, particularly those with great diplomatic and political influence, would be invaluable because they would not only lend weight to the efforts of the Special Representative but would help to reassure all the peoples of the Middle East that they are not alone as they turn their attention to the search for the foundations of a just and durable peace.

In creating the framework of peace in the Middle East, the Security Council took the first step last June by helping to bring about a cease-fire. It is vitally important that the cease-fire be maintained. Violations by any party cannot and must not be condoned. Today we have taken a second step—the appointment of a special representative to go to the area in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. For those who sometimes wonder about the value and effectiveness of the United Nations, perhaps by those two steps we have provided an answer to their worries and concerns. All who have contributed to those two steps can draw satisfaction from the fact that they have been taken. But we know realistically from the nature of this complex problem that those two steps are very far from the goal we have set, a just and durable peace, and we must recognize that although we have begun we shall not achieve that goal easily or without many difficulties. We must persevere with patience and fortitude,

just as we have been persevering since last May, in the search for peace.

I would conclude by quoting a portion of President Johnson's speech of 19 June, for it is an accurate description of the mood of the world community as we wish God speed to the Special Representative:

The world...will look for patience and justice. It will look for humility and moral courage. It will look for signs of movement from prejudice and the emotional chaos of conflict to the gradual slow shaping steps that lead to learning to live together and learning to help mould and shape peace in the area and in the world.

Mr. BERARD (France) (interpretation from French): For six months, in all their statements in the Council and the General Assembly, the representatives of France have stressed the need and expressed the ardent hope that in this troubled region of the Middle East Arabs and Israelis, Muslims and Jews, should be able to coexist in peace, tolerance and mutual respect.

They have also indicated that, in the present circumstances, for a settlement to be possible, in order to overcome the difficulties whose importance we do not underestimate, it seems indispensable that a relaxation of tension, a certain collaboration, be established among the great Powers to assist the parties in arriving at a solution, and that the framework of the United Nations and in particular that of the Council seem the most propitious. Indeed, it is here that we can lay down the principles which must be the basis of any peaceful settlement, define the problems that exist and encourage the evolution necessary for the achievement of a just and durable settlement of the crisis.

Those were the preoccupations of my delegation when considering the various draft resolutions submitted to us. We felt that in order to be really useful those drafts should leave no room for any ambiguity and that the Special Representative who would be nominated by the Secretary-General must be given very precise principles on which to act. I will not disguise the fact that the so-called three-Power draft as a draft based on the idea of the Latin American text submitted to the General Assembly in July would have had significant advantages in our view. However, it appeared that the desired agreement could not be achieved on the basis of those texts, whatever their merits.

Furthermore, we recognize the consistent and worthy efforts made by the United Kingdom delegation to draw up a text which would be rejected by no one, and we wish to pay tribute to that delegation.

We are fully aware of the fact that inevitably such a text could not fully satisfy either side. Therefore no one will be surprised if I say that we would have preferred that text to be more explicit on certain points, including the mandate of the Special Representative. We must admit, however, that as regards the point which the French delegation has always stated to be essential—that is, the question of the withdrawal of the forces of occupation—the resolution which has been adopted, if we refer to the French text, which is identical with the English text, leaves no room for any ambiguity since it speaks of withdrawal “*des territoires occupés*,” thus giving a precise interpretation to the expression “territories occupied.” Therefore we heard with satisfaction the representative of the United Kingdom stress the link which exists between that paragraph of the resolution and the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force and quote the words spoken by his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the General Assembly last September. We recall that in the same statement Mr. George Brown, expressing a concern that was shared by his French colleague, also said:

I believe that Jerusalem too requires a special mention here. The British position was made quite clear when, with the vast majority of the Members of this Assembly, we voted this summer for the resolutions calling on Israel to do nothing to prejudice the status of Jerusalem. (*A/PV. 1567, p. 48*)

We are also happy to note that the resolution has stressed the second principle, namely the termination of all belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within its own boundaries. We take note of the fact that the text stresses the need to achieve a just settlement of the refugee problem, for that is a problem to which, as we have said, the operations of war have given a new and tragic dimension. It also asks for freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area to be guaranteed.

Since the United Kingdom draft allowed us

to take a positive decision, and since we found in it the general principles necessary for a solution to the problem, my delegation voted in favour of it. The vote on the United Kingdom draft resolution is certainly nothing more than a point of departure, for long and arduous efforts will still be required to implement the principles contained in it and to arrive at a solution. We trust that the spirit of conciliation and understanding of which the great Powers, including my own country, have given an example today will in the months to come help to promote the settlement which has been so long desired.

Mr. KUZNETZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Security Council has just adopted a decision on the question of the situation in the Near East. The Soviet Government would have preferred to see the Council adopt the Soviet draft resolution, which is the one most in conformity with the need to eliminate the consequences of Israel's aggression and to establish a lasting peace in the Near East. However, we voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom, and we interpret that draft resolution in the same way as the representative of India, whose views we fully share.

In the resolution adopted by the Security Council, "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" is presented as the first necessary principle for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East. That provision which we have adopted we interpret as follows.

It is a matter of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all—we stress that—all territories of the Arab States conquered by them as a result of attacks against those States on 5 June 1967. That is confirmed by the fact that in the preamble to the United Kingdom text we find emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. Consequently the provision contained in the same draft concerning the right of all the States of the Near East to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries cannot serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israeli forces on any part of the Arab territories conquered by them as a result of war.

From statements made by representatives in the Security Council today, and from the nume-

rous statements made at previous meetings, it has been quite clear that that is the main content of the resolution and that is the way in which it is interpreted by all members of the Security Council. The same understanding was expressed in the emergency special session of the General Assembly, in resolutions which were put to the vote despite the fact that they were not supported by the overwhelming majority of States. In the resolutions presented by the countries of Latin America and by the non-aligned countries the provision concerning the withdrawal of troops was expressed in such a clear-cut manner that no possible misinterpretation could be accepted.

In that connexion I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the statement just made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel. His statement concerning the resolution just adopted by the Council cannot but put the Council on its guard. One cannot conclude from that statement that Israel is prepared to find the speediest possible solution to the problem of the Near East in conformity with the resolution just adopted. If such is the position of Israel, when a representative is sent to the area one may expect that he will have many obstacles to overcome before the resolution adopted by the Council is carried out.

The main thing now is the immediate implementation of the decision taken by the Security Council and, first of all, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all territories occupied by them as a result of aggression. We consider that, given the co-operation of all States, of all members of the Security Council, that can be carried out in the shortest period of time, in the interest of peace in the Near East and in the interests of all States in that part of the world.

Mr. de CARVALHO SILOS (Brazil): Since the very beginning of the recent conflict in the Middle East the main concern of the Brazilian Government has been to contribute to supporting, either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, a formula which while having the viability of implementation could also embody the set of principles that have already guided my country's policy in relation to the situation in that area. The members of the Security Council are, of course, aware that we have taken an active part in all the discussions conducted either in

public or in private since this matter first came under the consideration of this Council. The non-permanent members spared no efforts to arrive at a consensus or at a resolution acceptable to all of them which could be presented on their behalf to this Council.

Unfortunately, we did not succeed in drawing up a text that could secure the undivided support of all those who participated in our discussions. But we reached unanimous agreement on three essential points that I should like, with the Council's permission, to re-state: first, the resolution of the Security Council should fall within the scope of Chapter VI of the Charter; second, a special representative of the Secretary-General should be promptly dispatched to the area; third, a set of principles should guide the action of the special representative. The first two points did not raise serious difficulties, but on the third complete agreement failed to materialize.

It is our hope that the principles included as guidelines offered to the special representative, even if they do not give full satisfaction to any of the different currents of opinion, may well become the common denominator acceptable to all.

The main immediate purpose of the action of this Council is to secure the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General with a view to paving the way for achieving a peaceful solution in the area.

I should like to restate, on behalf of my delegation, the general principle that no stable international order can be based on the threat or use of force, and that the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means should not be recognized. The validity of this rule cannot be contested and is not being challenged by anyone around this table. Its acceptance does not imply that borderlines cannot be rectified as a result of an agreement freely concluded among the interested States. We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure permanent boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighbouring States; on a full and just settlement of the refugee problem; and on the guarantee of free transit for Israeli ships through both the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Bearing these facts in mind, and after ex-

tensive consultations with the parties concerned, my delegation came to the conclusion that its support of the United Kingdom draft resolution (S/8247) would represent a positive contribution to a peaceful solution of the Middle East crisis. This text does not give full satisfaction to my delegation. But, on the one hand, the United Kingdom draft includes a set of principles that reflect most of those suggested by my Government and embodied in the Latin American proposal submitted to the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly. My Government, of course, remains faithful to those principles. On the other hand, the implementation of the resolution presented by the United Kingdom seems to be viable.

On behalf of my delegation I should like to thank the representatives of France, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States for their words here today and last Monday on the role played by the Latin American countries since the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly. My Government has acted inspired only by the desire to see peace, stability and economic progress re-established in the area and by its commitments and duties as a member of this Council.

Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I shall be very brief in explaining the position of the Canadian delegation on the draft resolution which has just been adopted unanimously.

The Canadian approach towards all proposals has been determined by the extent to which any particular proposal could have the effect of getting under way those diplomatic processes which we believe would lead to a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Middle East.

It is with this consideration in mind that Canada willingly supported the United Kingdom draft resolution which is now the resolution of the whole Council. We think that this resolution, which is clear and speaks for itself, has the best prospects of opening the way to the result which I believe we all desire, namely, a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The resolution just adopted does, in our view, meet the essential positions of both sides, taking into account the various ideas which emerged from consultations among non-permanent

members and among permanent members of the Council, as well as with the States in the area. The resolution represents a fair, balanced and non-prejudicial basis for the dispatch to the Middle East of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Furthermore, the unanimous adoption of the resolution is in itself a positive contribution which should provide the best framework for the successful launching of the task of the Special Representative.

This is the main step now being taken by the Security Council, namely, to put the presence of a representative of the Secretary-General into the area to help bring about negotiations and peaceful conditions. As for the mandate of the Special Representative, it entails, in the words of the criterion which I set out when I spoke in the Council on 9 November, "an equitable balance of obligations" on both sides (1373rd meeting, p. 139-140). It is most important that the Council has finally acted to have a Special Representative appointed and that his influence should be brought to bear as soon as possible in the area in the interests of establishing a just and lasting peace. We hope very much that the Special Representative will have the necessary co-operation of all the States directly concerned in the area.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): The resolution that has just been adopted by the Security Council has proved to be, at the present moment, the only possible compromise which does not jeopardize the interests of the victims of the aggression and which might open the way to a political settlement of the Middle East crisis, provided, of course, that it is strictly and judiciously applied.

This compromise resulting from lengthy and often difficult and painful consultations, represents the only positive alternative that the United Nations has been able to present in the face of the ever-growing tension in that region which constitutes a real danger to peace and security. We would have liked the Security Council to take much more energetic and effective measures. Several proposals have been made to that effect, including the condemnation of the aggression and the aggressor, a great many of which are included in the various draft resolutions submitted to the Security Council. They could not be adopted because of the conditions which exist in the

Security Council, because of the violent opposition of certain countries which would not feel comfortable if the Council embarked on a practice of condemning aggression and the aggressor.

However, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that any attempt, any effort directed at a peaceful settlement of the crisis in conformity with the principles of the Charter, must be supported.

An end must be put to the existing explosive situation which inflicts upon the Arab population of the occupied territories intolerable sufferings and also threatens world peace. The resolution that we have just adopted, generally speaking, gives an adequate reply to the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops; it stresses, first of all, "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This obviously is a basic principle of international law today which flows from the inadmissibility of aggression itself and the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity and the political independence of States.

Confirming the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Zhivkov, told the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly the following:

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, just as the other socialist and peace-loving countries, does not recognize the forcible seizure of Arab territories by Israel. (*A/PV. 1528, p. 14-15*)

We note with satisfaction that in the resolution we have adopted the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, proclaimed in the preamble as a general principle, is confirmed in operative paragraph 1 of the resolution in an extremely clear and explicit fashion, where the resolution calls for the "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." Therefore, this is a very clear-cut provision that spells out the need for Israel to withdraw from all territories occupied since 4 June of this year. That is a concrete application of the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war stressed in the preamble.

In this same light is placed also the question of the recognition "of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every

State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.”

It is precisely peace and the security of all States that requires above all the prohibition of any acquisition of territory by one State from another through resort to war. The provision concerning the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the occupied territories is an extremely important condition in order to ensure that the other principles contained in operative paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (ii), and in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution will be put into force as well.

The resolution of the Security Council also adequately defines the terms of reference of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. He is to establish contacts with the States concerned in order to assist efforts to achieve modalities to ensure the implementation of the provisions and principles of this resolution and, in one word, to participate actively in the negotiations and contribute to the solution of the problem.

It is indispensable now that this resolution be scrupulously respected and applied in good faith by all the parties concerned, as well as by all other nations. It must be put into force forthwith without any endeavours to evade its provisions. The vote today is but the first step, which doubtless will be followed by others on the part of the United Nations and its Members to ensure peace in the Middle East, which is imperative for the peace of the world.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I now call on the representative of the United Arab Republic.

Mr. Mahmoud RIAD (United Arab Republic): On 7 November, the United Arab Republic requested the Security Council to meet in urgent session to resume its consideration of the grave situation in the Middle East. This situation resulted from Israel's war of aggression on 5 June and its subsequent occupation of Arab territories in Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, as well as territories under United Arab Republic administration.

The Council responded to the request of the United Arab Republic and convened on 9 November, at which time I stated the position of my Government. I emphasized that it was the

duty of the Security Council to apply the Charter of this Organization and thus eliminate the consequences of the present aggression, by forcing Israel to withdraw from all the territories it occupied after 4 June.

On 16 November, I again addressed the Council and I reaffirmed that the United Arab Republic would never accept aggression, and that the Security Council should not be allowed to compromise on a question of such primary importance to the Charter and to international peace and security.

Today, I wish to affirm once again our position that the first step towards peace lies in the full withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all territories they have occupied as a result of their aggression on 5 June. The efforts on behalf of peace which would then follow would of necessity be within the framework of this Organization and its Charter. The provisions of our Charter prohibit aggression and require all States to assume in good faith their obligations arising from the Charter as well as from international agreements and other sources of international law.

The inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, recognized and continually reaffirmed by the United Nations, belong in the highest and most essential category of the norms and rules of our present international order. These rights should under no circumstances be allowed to fall by the wayside. Historically, legally, constitutionally and morally, this Organization is inescapably committed to the rights of the people of Palestine.

In conclusion, the United Arab Republic will be guided by these considerations in its continuous search for a peaceful and just solution of the present crisis in the Middle East.

Mr. EL-RIFA'I (Jordan): Now that the Security Council has concluded its present discussions, I feel duty bound to make the following remarks.

My Government has been following with special interest and appreciation the efforts of the members of the Council to arrive at a positive result. We, for our part, share with the members the genuine desire to establish conditions in our area conducive to peace, based on justice and on the fulfilment of the legitimate rights of our

people. Indeed this has always been and continues to be our aim.

In the present crisis the basic issue which has to be remedied as an essential step toward peace is the immediate and complete withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all territories they occupied in the recent conflict. The resolutions which were adopted both by the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the statements made on the question, have stressed this basic requirement. Whether those resolutions pertain to the cease-fire, to the return and safety of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories, to the invalid Israeli measures taken in Jerusalem or to the problem in its entirety, they all emphasize the fundamental principle that military aggression and occupation should neither pay nor stay. The discussions and prevailing opinion in this Council and in the General Assembly have made it clear that the United Nations does not accept in full or in part the illegal Israeli occupation or any measures taken by Israel from the position gained by this occupation or as a result of it. That would be contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to the rules of international law, to the spirit and letter of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and indeed to peace itself.

On these premises the position of my Government is based.

Mr. RUDA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): From the very outbreak of the crisis in the Middle East my delegation endeavoured constantly to lay the groundwork for a solution to the conflict in such a way as to permit us to overcome this acute moment of indecision and enter a new stage that would permit us to make positive achievements.

We have striven tirelessly to devise formulas that would establish an adequate system of a balance of interests and a balance of concessions. We have always believed that the road to final peace must be embarked upon by adopting calm and effective decisions that would include the mutual concessions which are normal in this type of conflict. Basically this means the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories on the one hand and the cessation of the state of belligerency on the other.

For those reasons we felt from the outset that

a simple withdrawal would not help peace and that that measure had to be accompanied by others so that, free of all coercion, the parties might seek voluntary agreement to any commitments to be signed in the future.

Those ideas were the essence of the position adopted by my country and the other countries of Latin America in the General Assembly when we submitted document AL. 523/Rev. 1.

We were extremely happy to note today, when the Security Council reached its moment of truth, how our ideas were adopted and how they have served as a basis for the resolutions that were submitted to the Council. Our satisfaction was even greater when we heard through different channels that one of those draft resolutions, that submitted by the United Kingdom in document S/8247, if it did not have the acquiescence of all parties, did at least carry the promise of co-operation with the special representative who was to be sent to the Middle East by the Secretary-General. This means that to a large extent there is general agreement with the terms of his mandate.

My delegation has always been ready to submit another draft resolution to this Council that would be in strict conformity with the main lines of the Latin American draft resolution. But it was not submitted because we wished in no way to hamper or diminish the good results we hoped that the United Kingdom draft resolution would bring, once we knew of it and once we were informed and convinced of the fact that the co-operation of the parties could be counted upon. If that were not the case, my delegation would not have hesitated to submit its own draft resolution which incorporated the principles and the purposes originally submitted by the Latin American delegations to the General Assembly, taking into account only two later aspects, namely, to adapt it to the new body that was to consider it, namely, the Security Council, and that it be fitted within the framework of Chapter VI of the Charter. Because the document was generally acceptable and because, generally speaking also, it is based on the ideas we advocated in July, we voted in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution. However, we cannot pass over in silence the fact that we would have preferred some drafting improvements. Thus, for example, it might have been preferable if the preamble had

widened the commitments of the Member States to act not only in conformity with Article 2 of the Charter but also with the Charter as a whole and particularly Articles 1 and 33 of that document.

With regard to the formula of withdrawal which in Spanish reads:

Retiro de todas las fuerzas armadas israelíes de territorios que ocuparon durante el reciente conflicto,

we do not believe it entirely reflects a well-defined thought and thus, even though my delegation voted in favour of paragraph 1 (i), we believe a more clear text would have been preferable, and I would refer you to the text that the Latin American delegations submitted to the General Assembly which read:

Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict. (*S/8235*)

We trust that obedience to the formula defined will achieve the ends that are being sought. It cannot be otherwise since my delegation has always contended that no international order, as the representative of Brazil pointed out, can be based on threats or the use of force. Territorial arrangements cannot be endorsed or countenanced unless they are achieved by peaceful means. The acquisition or occupation of territories obtained by force of arms cannot be accepted.

The second point I wish to refer to is that of the "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries." We interpret this expression really to mean the right to live secure within recognized boundaries. There are many parts of the world where frontiers are not secure—if we attach to this concept a geo-strategic meaning which goes beyond its simple legal connotations—and yet despite that, States still have the right to live in peace within those frontiers.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. George Brown, defined the concept in a very felicitous phrase in the statement he made recently in the General Assembly, as follows: "But equally, Israel's neighbours must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers." (*A/PV. 1567, p. 47*)

In view of all I have just mentioned, my country, for the purpose of bringing about an

agreement that might spell effective results within a reasonable period of time, decided to support the draft resolution.

We wish the greatest success to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and trust that all parties will give him their full and unreserved co-operation.

In concluding our explanation of the favourable vote we cast for this document, I should like to express in this Council our thanks to all delegations for the efforts they have made, particularly those delegations known as the group of six, composed of Brazil, India, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia and my own country, with whom we carried on for so long a time such arduous and difficult consultations. I also wish to express our gratitude to the delegation of the United Kingdom, whose spirit of co-operation, gentlemanliness and great talent have enabled us to achieve such important results that we trust will really lay the groundwork for peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. This has also made it possible for the Security Council to meet the challenge with which it was faced and once again to show that it is an effective instrument in the difficult task of preserving peace.

Before concluding, I wish, in the name of my delegation and my Government, to express our thanks to the delegations of the United Kingdom, Nigeria, the United States and France for the kind words they spoke regarding our work and that of the other Latin American countries in the negotiations that have taken place during all these long months. In them we were guided only by the desire to serve the cause of peace and justice.

Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan): The Japanese delegation was very glad to vote in favour of the United Kingdom draft resolution in document *S/8247*. The adoption of that resolution by the Council is a very substantial contribution towards the goal of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. My delegation is immensely pleased by this accomplishment and expresses a debt of gratitude to our friend and colleague Lord Caradon and to the United Kingdom delegation for the initiative that has led to this fortunate result.

As I said in the Council on 9 November, my delegation very much hoped that intensive consultations would lead to a compromise and

a consensus that the members of the Council could support. We are delighted that our hope has been realized. We are particularly pleased that this resolution has been adopted unanimously. I should like to express our respect and our warm thanks to all who have contributed so much to the result we have now achieved.

(spoke in French)

To you particularly, Mr. President, I should like, in the name of my delegation, to pay tribute for the wisdom with which you have guided our work, extremely delicate and difficult as was the task, to a successful conclusion.

(continued in English)

Peace, of course, cannot be built in a day. But the resolution we have now adopted states in clear and simple terms the principles and objectives upon which peace in the Middle East must be based. We emphasize "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security." We affirm that

the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East... should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

We are very hopeful that the mandate given to the Special Representative who is to be designated by the Secretary-General will enable him "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution."

We all know that the mission assigned to the Special Representative is not going to be an easy one. A very heavy responsibility will rest upon him. At the same time, I would strongly emphasize that the success of his mission demands the utmost of support by the Council and, indeed, the full and effective co-operation of all Members of the United Nations. Above all, the co-operation of the parties concerned is essential.

On behalf of the Japanese delegation, I

should like to offer to the Special Representative, in advance, our very best wishes and to pledge to him our whole-hearted co-operation.

I do not wish to conclude my statement on a note that may seem to be too visionary; but my delegation can foresee the time—and we ardently hope that it will soon arrive—when the dissensions, the belligerency and the war that have so grievously torn asunder the countries of the Middle East for so long a time will give way to an era of peace, an era when those countries will find it possible to co-operate harmoniously for the benefit of the peace and security, the prosperity and the welfare of all the peoples of the area.

Mr. BORCH (Denmark): In explaining the vote cast by my delegation on the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom, I can refer to my statement in the meeting of the Security Council on 9 November in which I presented the substance of the policy pursued by my Government in the crisis in the Middle East. But let me, for the sake of clarity, once again underline the importance that we have always attached to the desirability of having a resolution that should be so carefully balanced that the parties to the conflict would be able to feel that they at least could live with it and could reasonably be expected to co-operate under its terms. We voted in favour of the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom because that text, as it was voted upon and as it stands, meets with our point of view as to procedure and is compatible with our position as to substance.

The adoption today of the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom is indeed a most auspicious development. As Lord Caradon stated the other day, the text is based upon a number of ideas and views that were brought up during the long and arduous consultations among members of the Security Council during the last month. It is a compromise in the best sense of the word. It does take into account all the essential interests of the parties involved. In the words of my Canadian colleague, which I fully endorse, this resolution represents a fair, balanced and non-prejudicial basis for the dispatch to the Middle East of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

The Government of Denmark would strongly urge all the parties involved to extend their full

co-operation and goodwill to the Special Representative in the exercise of his most difficult and equally important task and in the realization of the high principles embodied in the Council's resolution of today.

Lord Caradon has on various occasions been generous in his appraisal of the contribution made by other members of the Council. As a newcomer to this table I cannot conclude these brief remarks without giving expression to my admiration and respect for his essential contribution at the right time to the successful and constructive result of the deliberations.

Mr. LIU (China): During the past weeks, indeed months, members of the Council, particularly the elected members, have been busily engaged in consultations in search of the principles and procedures by which a just and enduring peace could be established in the Middle East. Those consultations have been useful in providing the common ground as a basis for the resolution which has just been adopted. We owe these members of the Council a debt of gratitude for their untiring and persistent efforts in this difficult task.

We realize that the issues in the Middle East are extremely complex and deep-rooted and that they cannot be resolved overnight by a single resolution of the Security Council. We are encouraged, however, by the fact that the parties involved, while they have certain reservations in regard to the resolution, have shown a willingness to co-operate with the Council in its efforts to bring about the necessary conditions for peace in the Middle East.

My delegation is particularly gratified that the Council, thanks to the timely intervention of the representative of the United Kingdom, has arrived at a formulation which commanded unanimous support. Surely issues involving war or peace are too serious to be viewed simply as a voting contest in this Council. On a question as vital and difficult as the present one, anything short of unanimity would not carry the kind of weight needed for effective implementation.

The Special Representative to be appointed by the Secretary-General can now press forward in his important assignment backed by the full weight of this Council and with the support of responsible opinion throughout the world.

It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the parties concerned will not allow the intensity of their feelings to impair the prospects for constructive steps on the long and tortuous road to peace in the Middle East.

Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I should like merely to observe that in explanation of vote various members of the Council, as is their right, have expressed views of their own for supporting the United Kingdom draft resolution. I should like to repeat what I said earlier. The voting, of course, has taken place not on the individual views and policies of various members, but on the draft resolution. I, and I assume other members of the Council, voted for the draft resolution and not for each and every speech that has been made. Of course, I hastily add that I have voted for my own speech, and I assume others have done likewise with respect to their speeches.

The PRESIDENT (Mr. Kanté, Mali) (interpretation from French): I shall now speak in the name of the delegation of Mali.

May I first tell the representative of Japan how grateful I am for the kind words that he addressed to me a few minutes ago. Through me, those kind words and expressions of gratitude must be construed as being addressed to you all, members of the Council, with whom your humble servant, the President of the Council for the month of November, must share the credit for the result which the Council has achieved today. On your behalf, then, I should like to thank the representative of Japan once again.

In the name of the delegation of the Republic of Mali, I should like to say that the adoption by the Security Council of the draft resolution contained in document S/8247 should in no way be construed as signifying that my country abandons the fundamental principles which throughout the centuries have guided men who love peace and justice and which have been the aspiration of mankind throughout its long history, principles which are enshrined in the noble ideals of the Charter of the United Nations.

Therefore, my delegation would like to state that its vote today is in conformity with the extremely clear and unequivocal interpretation of the provisions of the United Kingdom draft

resolution given by the representative of India, that is: first, that the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from all territories occupied since 5 June cannot be attached to any condition whatever; secondly, that the just solution of the problem of the refugees lies in its view in the effective implementation of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and by the Security Council with a view to restoring the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine.

We have never ceased to underline here and in all circumstances that it was the perpetuation of a flagrant injustice committed against that people which was the root cause of the crisis which has been tearing the Middle East apart for twenty years.

In the opinion of my delegation, the solution of this problem must above all be based on the necessity to recognize the natural right of every people to a homeland, and a decent life within the great human family.

Motivated by the same desire for justice, my delegation wishes to stress further the specific obligations which flow from the adoption of this resolution for the parties in relation to respect for the Charter, that is, the renunciation of belligerence, a renunciation which must ensure for every country in the area the right to live in peace and in security, free from any threats or acts of war, with respect for their national sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity.

As far as the guarantee of navigation on the international waterways of the area is concerned, that guarantee must be recognized by all States, in conformity with the international agreements and conventions in force.

The delegation of Mali wishes to state that in no case will its country accept before history and mankind any part of responsibility for the retention of gains resulting from the violation of the territory of States, because that violation constitutes a grave infringement of the Charter and its consequences for the international community are grievous.

Indeed, if we do give our vote its full meaning in conformity with the duty which requires each of us scrupulously to watch over respect for the Charter by all nations, great and small, we shall surely contribute to the establishment of a new order where might alone will be right. Without

doubt, such a development would compromise the laudable efforts undertaken by the international community to put a brake on the armaments race. Such an event would in itself constitute a temptation for the countries of the Third World to increase their military potential to the detriment of their economic and social development programmes. Their peoples would thus become ever poorer. We cannot agree that the role of our Organization should be limited henceforth to underlining and sanctioning accomplished facts. History teaches us that the most powerful State today can be the most humble tomorrow, because that is the way of the world. The danger which threatens us concerns therefore all the States Members of the United Nations, whatever their power and whatever their technological prowess.

For all those reasons my delegation, in voting for draft resolution S/8247 on the Middle East submitted by the United Kingdom, wished to record its unshakable adherence to the principles of the Charter.

Therefore my country continues to believe more than ever that the withdrawal of forces from territories occupied by military conquest is a preliminary condition to any solution of any armed crisis. It is a deeply-held conviction on our part. Mali is a country of peace and it is for peace, that is to say, peace together with justice and equity. We fervently wish for peace, this time true peace, in the Middle East.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): The test of the success or failure of any major resolution can be measured only by its results. The future will prove whether or not the resolution adopted today will secure the cause of peace in the Middle East.

I have listened very carefully to Mr. Eban's statement and his interpretation of the resolution, but not equally so to the acrimonious part about Syria, which is to be expected. His interpretation of the withdrawal only confirms, but in a very round about way, the full intent of Israel to consolidate its gains as a result of its aggression, which was amply explained in my statement to the Council. Again, the words spoken are denied by the intent expressed and the deed achieved. I should have liked Mr. Eban to have denied some of the facts and occurrences which I brought out in my statement. However, it is to be noted that

the following sentence occurred in Mr. Eban's statement: "Peace... cannot be imposed" (*supra* p. 282). I should like to quote what I said in my statement about peace, which was the following:

A lasting peace cannot be imposed by force. One does not open the way for it by seizing another's property and demanding certain concessions before that property is given back to its legal, lawful owner. (*Supra*, p. 273)

Mr. Eban went on to attribute aggressive acts and intentions to Syria. I need not go into the details of what happened on 7 April 1967, which we put before the Council when an attack was perpetrated against Syria, and which included seven sorties by the Israeli air force, with a battle ensuing that took place over Damascus, the capital of Syria.

Finally and briefly I should like to comment on the description given by Mr. Eban of my statement as a "hymn of hate" (*supra*, p. 280). That is really an amazing interpretation because, reduced to its basic principles, my statement invokes two of the Ten Commandments: "Thou shalt not kill"; and "Thou shalt not covet" other people's property. That two of the Ten Commandments should be interpreted as a "hymn of hate" is really beyond my understanding, but the twisting of words and meanings can result in anything. We condemn killing and the stealing of other people's property most strongly and most vehemently, whether it has been committed by Nazi Germany against the

innocent Jews, the French, the Danes or the people of any other country which it occupied, just as we condemn it most strongly and vehemently when it is committed by the Israelis against the Arabs—by Dayan and Begin and justified by Mr. Eban.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The next speaker is the representative of Israel, on whom I now call.

Mr. EBAN (Israel): I do not propose to maintain the discussion with the representative of Syria, except to say that if he is interested in the document of Hebrew literature to which he referred I recommend that he should not stop short with two commandments but should also study the statement "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," because the quotations which he put in my mouth were not there.

I intervene for another purpose, which is to say that I am communicating to my Government for its consideration nothing except the original English text of the draft resolution as presented by the original sponsor on 16 November. Having studied that text, document S/8247, my Government will determine its attitude to the Security Council's resolution in the light of its own policy, which is as I have stated it.

The meeting rose at 7 p.m.

PART VI

Reports of the Secretary-General

270

Report of Secretary General U Thant on Ambassador Thalmann's Mission in Jerusalem, September 12, 1967.¹

INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 2254 (ES-V) adopted on 14 July 1967 relating to Jerusalem, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the resolution. In a note dated 14 August 1967, which was circulated to the Security Council (S/8121 and Corr. 1) and to the General Assembly (A/6785 and Corr. 1), the Secretary-General announced that he had appointed Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland as his Personal Representative in Jerusalem for the purpose of obtaining information on the situation as a basis for his report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

2. The terms of reference for the mission which was entrusted to Ambassador Thalmann were laid down in the Secretary-General's letter of 12 August 1967, as follows:

I am glad to know that you are willing to undertake, and that your Government is prepared to make you available for, the special *ad hoc* assignment as my Personal Representative in Jerusalem for the purpose of obtaining information in order to facilitate my report to the Security Council and the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in paragraph 3 of its resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 'requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution'... That part of my report relating to the implementation of the resolution will consist of the written reply to my note about the resolution dated 15 July 1967... which the Government of Israel has promised to address to me. Your concern, therefore, will be exclusively with the gathering of information 'on the situation' in Jerusalem which I may, in turn, use in my report to the Council and the General Assembly.

I would wish you to gather as much information as you reasonably can within a period of two weeks on the situation in Jerusalem, by which is meant specifically condi-

tions relating to the assumption of control by Israel authorities over the entire city of Jerusalem. Thus, a major part of your attention would be directed to the situation in the Old City of Jerusalem, with specific reference to the status and treatment of Arab residents and their property and the situation of all of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

Your function, thus, is to obtain information only and involves no responsibility on your part for any negotiations or for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution.

At my request, the Government of Israel has given assurance that it will co-operate with your mission and will give you all necessary facilities and information.

3. Ambassador Thalmann's mission constitutes the sole independent source of information of the Secretary-General for the report on the situation in Jerusalem requested of him by the General Assembly and, therefore, part one of this report is based upon the information gathered by Ambassador Thalmann during his visit to Jerusalem.

4. Part two of the report, dealing with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), is based on the information supplied by the Government of Israel.

PART ONE. THE SITUATION IN JERUSALEM

I. MISSION OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

A. Delimitation of the inquiry

5. In accordance with the terms of reference, the Personal Representative restricted his inquiry to Jerusalem. For the purposes of the investigations, Jerusalem was understood to include both those parts of the city which were under Jordanian control before June 1967 and those under Israel control. It was also understood to include the former no man's land and the rural areas which Israel has included in the municipality of Jerusalem. For exclusively practical reasons, particularly brevity, and with no other connotations, the expressions "East Jerusalem" and "West Jerusalem" are used to designate the

¹ U.N. doc. A/6793.

parts formerly under Jordanian and Israel control, respectively.

6. It would no doubt have been desirable to set current conditions in Jerusalem against their historical background. This was not possible, however, in the short time available.

7. During the Personal Representative's visit to Jerusalem, Arab personalities handed him a number of memoranda, petitions and statements, some of which went beyond the purely factual conditions and consequently beyond his terms of reference. It is nevertheless considered appropriate to reproduce some of these documents as annexes because, taken as a whole, they reflect an attitude which forms a part of the facts that are the subject of the investigations (see annex I).

8. The Israel authorities supplied a substantial amount of documentation, which could not be fully evaluated in this report. Some documents, which are helpful for an understanding of the factual conditions, are also annexed to the report (see annex II).

9. It should be noted that conditions in Jerusalem are in a state of rapid flux. Certain of the observations in this report may therefore have been partially overtaken by events.

B. Conditions under which the mission was carried out

10. The Personal Representative arrived at Tel Aviv on 21 August 1967 and proceeded the same day to Jerusalem. He was able to carry out his investigations in an orderly atmosphere and the Israel authorities offered him various material facilities such as transportation and technical arrangements.

11. The Personal Representative was free to move about and to meet the various personalities whom he wished to see and to talk with them privately when he desired to do so. He met a great number of Israel officials, Arab personalities and representatives of the various religious communities. The most important names are contained in the lists in annex III.

12. Ambassador Thalmann left Jerusalem on 3 September and arrived in New York on the evening of 4 September.

II. GEOGRAPHY AND EXTERNAL ASPECT OF THE CITY

A. Geography

13. As a result of the assumption of control by the Israel authorities over East Jerusalem, the municipal area of West Jerusalem was expanded by over 60 square kilometres to a total exceeding 100 square kilometres. A map prepared at the Personal Representative's request by the Israel municipal authorities and annexed to this report¹ shows the claimed boundaries of the extended municipality and other lines relevant to an understanding of the present situation.

B. Population

14. Since the occupation, a census was carried out in East Jerusalem by the Israel authorities. This shows that the approximate population of the area is 70,000, of whom 28,000 (or 40 per cent) reside in the Old City and 42,000 (or 60 per cent) outside the walls.

15. The distribution of population according to religious denomination is as follows:

Muslims	81.0 per cent
Catholics	8.1 per cent
Orthodox	6.5 per cent
Armenians	2.4 per cent
Others	2.1 per cent

16. The population of West Jerusalem is approximately 200,000 practically all of whom are Jews.

17. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, about 7,000 refugees left the Jerusalem area. So far only a few persons have returned.

18. According to the figures of the Jordanian Census of 1 and 3 July of this year, 7,791 persons (including 1,201 householders) left the Jerusalem area. Arab sources consider that these figures are too low and that they represent only about 70 per cent of the real total of the refugees.

C. External aspect of Jerusalem

19. During his visit, the Personal Representative was struck by the great activity in the streets of the city.

¹ Not printed here.

20. The uniforms were few and the weapons fewer. The military policemen went about their duties in a matter-of-fact way. They appeared to be mostly concerned with directing the traffic, which was quite heavy. The picture of the crowd in the Old City was dominated by the tourists. Arabs and Jews were mingling. To the destruction of the war new destruction had been added. Bulldozers had cleared the walls which separated the firing lines, as well as many houses in the area of the former no man's land. Also in the walled city one could see the debris of levelled houses.

21. There was direct access to the Old City through many newly made roads and through the reopened gates. Outside the walled city the scars of battle were more noticeable. Also a number of shops were closed. Most of the hotels had reopened. Before dawn and during the day the muezzin could be heard as well as the church bells.

III. STRUCTURE OF THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

A. Situation in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem before June 1967

22. Every citizen who had reached the age of eighteen and who paid municipal taxes of at least one Jordanian dinar a year was eligible to vote in the municipal elections.

23. Twelve representatives were elected to the Municipal Council on a non-party basis. Candidates had to be Jordanian citizens over the age of twenty-five, literate and have committed no crime. The Government, through the Minister of the Interior, appointed the Mayor from among the twelve Council members. The Council chose the Assistant Mayor from among its members by a simple majority vote; the Assistant Mayor deputized for the Mayor in his absence. The Council appointed from among its members the members of auxiliary committees, which were usually headed by the Mayor. The Council served as an advisory body to the Mayor and usually convened once a week, though a meeting could be called at the request of two-thirds of its members.

24. Elections for Mayor and Council members were held every four years. The Mayor

received his salary from the Municipal Council. Members received no remuneration.

25. The current term of office was to have ended on 31 August 1967.

B. Situation since June 1967

26. The Israel authorities stated that they had offered the members of the Municipal Council of the Old City the opportunity to apply for new positions in the framework of the Israel administration, which they refused to do. Several members had left Jerusalem; at present there were only eight in the city.

27. The Municipal Council of the Old City had been superseded by the Municipal Council of West Jerusalem, which is composed of twenty-one members, all Israelis, who were elected on 2 November 1965.

C. The administration of the municipality

28. The Israel authorities further stated that the municipality of West Jerusalem began operations in East Jerusalem the day after the fighting ceased. In the beginning it acted as the agent of the Military Government, but from 29 June municipal processes started to function according to Israel law.

29. The Arab personnel of the Old City was absorbed in the equivalent departments in the Israel municipality, so that at present, for example, all the engineers and staff of the municipality of East Jerusalem were employed in the City Engineer's Department, the Water Supply Department, etc.

30. Practically all municipal employees included in a list comprising some 370 names provided by the Assistant Mayor of East Jerusalem, immediately after the take-over by the Israel authorities, were now employed by the municipality.

31. The question of the pension rights of pensioners in East Jerusalem had not been fully settled. In the meantime the pensioners had received an *ex gratia* payment on account of the pension for the month of June, pending a decision on the matter.

32. The Israel Authorities stated that they were not interfering with the functioning of the

Muslim *Waqf* which is responsible for all resources designated for the upkeep of religious and welfare institutions. Moreover it had offered to assist the *Waqf* authorities to exercise direct control over the property. In addition, immediately after the hostilities, it had granted the *Waqf* a loan of 25,000 Israel pounds.

IV. MEASURES TAKEN BY THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO INTEGRATE THE PARTS OF THE CITY WHICH WERE NOT UNDER ISRAEL CONTROL BEFORE JUNE 1967

A. Preliminary remarks

33. In the numerous conversations which the Personal Representative had with Israel leaders, including the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it was made clear beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step to place under its sovereignty those parts of the city which were not controlled by Israel before June 1967. The statutory bases for this had already been created, and the administrative authorities had started to apply Israel laws and regulations in those parts of the city. However, for practical reasons—for example, because the texts of the laws had not been translated into Arabic—but also with the intention that the Arab population should become familiar with the new situation step by step, not all Israel laws and regulations were as yet being enforced; nevertheless, it was the declared objective of the Israel Government to equalize the legal and administrative status of the residents of those parts of the city which were not previously controlled by Israel with that of the Israel citizens as soon as possible.

34. The Personal Representative was repeatedly assured by the Israel side that every attention was being paid to the well-being of the Arab population and that the Arab residents would have the opportunity to bring their standard of living up to the level prevailing in Israel.

35. The Israel authorities stated unequivocally that the process of integration was irreversible and not negotiable.

36. Some information concerning the manner in which Israel is proceeding at the governmental and municipal level is given in two statements, which are to be found in annex II.

37. It is considered appropriate to discuss below in greater detail the measures taken by Israel in the various fields, placing particular stress on those questions which are especially vital to the life of the population. It is in the nature of the following account that the information is drawn for the most part from Israel sources.

B. Israel legislation affecting East Jerusalem

38. The Personal Representative was supplied by the Israel authorities with the text of certain laws and orders which had been adopted with a view to including Old Jerusalem and certain surrounding areas previously under the control of Jordan within the State of Israel.

39. Under the Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law of 27 June 1967, it was provided that the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State should apply in any area of the State of Israel designated by the Government by order. Under this provision the Government issued an order dated 28 June 1967 which declared that a territory defined in an annex was an area in which the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel were in force. The area described in detail in the annex included the Old City, Sur Baher, Sheich Jarakh, the Kalandia airport, Mount Scopus and vicinity and Sha'afat.

40. Similarly under the Municipal Corporations Ordinance (Amendment No. 7) of 27 June 1967, the Minister of Interior was empowered at his discretion to enlarge, by proclamation, the area of a particular municipal corporation by the inclusion of an area designated under the Law and Administration Ordinance as just amended. By an order dated the following day, the Minister declared that the boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipal Corporation would be extended by the inclusion of the area described in the previous paragraph.

41. It was explained that the Jerusalem Municipality had refrained from enforcing the municipal by-laws to the eastern sector immediately after reunification because they had not as yet been translated into Arabic.

42. When the by-laws became available in Arabic the Municipality began to enforce

sanitation and public health laws and the ordinance forbidding peddlars to operate without a licence. In order to enforce the by-laws throughout the larger area, thirty-five new inspectors had been hired.

43. The policy of the Municipality was to introduce the by-laws in stages, out of consideration of the need to familiarize the population with them in a gradual manner.

C. Physical measures and civilian services

44. The opening of means of access to the Old City and the destruction of barriers started almost immediately after the end of hostilities. By the end of August all former access roads had been reopened.

45. Alongside this activity went on the destruction of former Jordanian military positions and the removal of mines, principally in the old no-man's land, in the Jerusalem area.

46. The Israel authorities stated that buildings in a slum area outside the Temple Wall had been destroyed; the inhabitants had been provided with alternative housing. Fifty to seventy families, however, had been put in houses left by refugees who had since returned, so they had to find their own accommodation; they were being given key money and their rent would be subsidized for two years through the city welfare agency. Loans for seven years would also be made to fifty-five families in the Old City whose houses had been damaged by shelling, so that they might repair them before the winter. Dilapidated and dangerous houses along the Old City walls had been demolished (these houses had mainly been in no-man's land) and it was planned to build a park round the walls. The land was mostly church property and compensation would be paid. Houses in no-man's land, where there were many mines, had been demined and demolished; they had been uninhabited since 1948. These houses were in a dangerous condition and there was a risk of squatters with the existing housing shortage. It had not been possible to do anything about them before, as they were in no-man's land.

47. The Israel authorities further stated that there were no plans for the construction of buildings in East Jerusalem. There was a ban on

all buildings within the Old City walls, except for the reconstruction of several streets in the Jewish Quarter. These would be kept in the same style as before as far as their exteriors were concerned, but would be modernized inside.

Water

48. According to the Israel authorities, the water supply network of East Jerusalem was connected with the Western system one day after the end of hostilities.

49. In the past, East Jerusalem had received its water from sources at Ein Fara, Ein Pohar and Wadi Kelt, which together were capable of supplying 3,000 cubic metres a day, or fifty litres per inhabitant. Because of the water shortage it was necessary to supply water only intermittently. The city was divided into three areas, each of which received water twice a week.

50. During the war, several pumping stations and waterpipes were damaged. The damage was repaired and the water supply resumed. After it became apparent that the water supply was insufficient, three connexions were made with the system in West Jerusalem. During the first weeks the demand doubled, and the need was three times what it had been before the war (9,000 cubic metres a day); two thirds of this amount came from West and one-third from East Jerusalem.

51. It was explained by the Israel authorities that the cost of water in East Jerusalem had been more than twice as high as that in West Jerusalem. With the merger of the systems, the cost was lowered to that prevailing in the west, which would lead to an annual deficit of half a million Israel pounds in the budget of the Water Department (which must cover all expenses through fees). An equalization fund had been established.

Sanitation

52. The Israel authorities stated that the Sanitation Department had begun its work immediately after the war. During the first period it was mainly concerned with removing the rubble accumulated during the fighting. Once this was completed, it concentrated its efforts on the improvement of services, which included the acquisition of sweeping machines, machines to

collect garbage, 5,000 garbage cans to be distributed to houses and 150 large garbage receptacles, at a total cost of more than one million Israel pounds.

53. While checking waste-water, thirty malaria sources were found. They were now being eliminated. Efforts were also made to stop the use of unpurified sewage water for irrigation.

54. Veterinary control had been increased and, within this context, renovation had begun at the municipal *abattoir*, which had been partially destroyed during the hostilities.

55. The entire Sanitation Department had been transferred to the Old City Municipal Building.

Roads, parks and public property

56. According to the Israel authorities, the City Engineering Department had begun work on the beautification of public parks, and the improvement of roads and lighting. The budget for East Jerusalem allots approximately four million Israel pounds for the execution of various works.

Welfare

(57) The Personal Representative was informed that on 7 August 1967 a Welfare Bureau was opened to the public in East Jerusalem. At present the Bureau was primarily occupied with the distribution of aid to past recipient families, and with the investigation of the new cases applying for assistance by means of interviews in the office, home visits by social workers and contact with friends and local leaders who knew of their situations.

58. A programme has been prepared to distribute 3,337 food packages contributed by UNICEF to needy cases in East Jerusalem.

59. UNRWA has an important Field Office and a Ration Distribution Centre in Jerusalem and it takes care of the refugee camp in Kalendia.

60. The Catholic organizations in East Jerusalem are supporting up to 2,000 families a month, at a cost of \$3.00 per person on average.

D. Budgetary figures for East Jerusalem

61. According to Israel authorities the municipal budget for East Jerusalem for the period from July 1967 to April 1968 amounts to approximately 8 million Israel pounds for regular and non-recurrent expenditures and to an additional 8 million pounds for development schemes.

62. The break-down of the budget is as follows:

	<i>In Israel pounds</i>
General administration	310,000
Sanitation	1,609,000
Financial administration	395,000
Fire-fighting.....	263,000
Construction plans	440,000
Property maintenance	1,416,000
Tourism and economic activity..	200,000
Municipal Central	418,000
Education	1,258,000
Youth and sport activities	100,000
Cultural activities.....	100,000
Public health services	188,000
Public welfare	10,000
Water	1,731,675
	<u>8,498,675</u>

63. The breakdown of the development budget is as follows:

	<i>In Israel pounds</i>
Equipment for sanitation services	1,000,000
Public property	4,000,000
Improvement of school buildings .	400,000
Water installations and supply ...	2,500,000
	<u>7,900,000</u>

E. Economic measures

General situation

64. The Israeli authorities provided the Personal Representative with a substantial amount of information on the present economic situation in East Jerusalem both in the form of an oral briefing by a high official of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of written material. In general, while admitting the existence of serious economic problems of adjustment, they maintained that in many respects the economy of the area was in a prosperous state

due to the constant flow of Israel shoppers and sightseers and that the adverse effects of the cessation of tourism should not be unduly protracted.

65. The Personal Representative was told that many of the economic problems were the result not of the reunification of the City but of the dislocation caused by the war, which had been fought within the boundaries of Jerusalem. There was the physical damage to buildings, equipment and, particularly, vehicles, as well as the fact that goods had been taken over by the Israel army for its own use. An instruction had been issued that all private property should be returned immediately, but it was sometimes difficult to locate it. Absentee property was handled by the Custodian of Absentee Property.

66. It was explained that previously Amman, not Jerusalem, had been the economic and financial centre of Jordan. East Jerusalem had had no industry except for tourism and its related small industries; there were in all about 200 small workshops. On the other hand, there were over 1,500 shops and a variety of service establishments.

67. It was reported that from the time that access from Israel to East Jerusalem had become free, the shopkeepers there had been unusually active, selling at the rate of 2 million Israel pounds a day in the first month and at a steady rate of 1 million Israel pounds a day at present. As a result, stocks had run down quickly in many instances and were being replenished in part from Israel sources and in part from supplies in the west bank and in unoccupied Jordan. Service establishments were reported to have greatly increased their activities. The workshops, after an initial period of dislocation, were said to have all reverted to routine and normality and to be going through a process of adjustment to new marketing conditions.

68. In general, the Israel authorities stated that unification had meant that the "underdeveloped" economy of the eastern sector had come into contact with the more developed economy of the western sector. That had caused an economic shock, but would not necessarily be detrimental to the population, which could enjoy a higher standard of living.

69. The Personal Representative was in-

formed that everything was being done not to cut East Jerusalem off from its source of supply on the west bank, in particular in respect of fruit and vegetables and other agricultural supplies. It was true that certain measures had been taken to avoid the overflow of agricultural produce so as not to affect the price and markets for frozen vegetables in Israel; some produce, however, had gone from Jerusalem to other markets in Israel.

70. It was stressed that agricultural produce from the west bank was untaxed on entry into the city. Customs check-points had been set up near Sha'afat and Bethlehem and other imports were in law subject to Israel customs duty; in practice, however, no customs duty was being collected on any product.

71. Under a customs order published on 28 June, wholesalers were liable to pay on goods previously imported the difference between the duties already paid to Jordan and the higher Israel tariff. Stocks had been inventoried, but the Customs Department had not yet sent out any debit notices, which would in any case only be served on wholesalers with stocks of a value exceeding 1,000 dollars.

72. On the other hand, the Israel system of excise duties was being applied not only to East Jerusalem but throughout the Israel-controlled areas and was being collected at the factory. Duties were accordingly payable on tobacco, alcoholic beverages, spirits, petrol and cement.

73. As a result of these measures, retailers had raised the prices of products in stock. The question of the increased cost of living was being studied by a committee; figures had been asked from the Bureau of Statistics. All salaried officials—municipal employees, etc.—had had their salaries increased, though they were not yet receiving the Israel scale, which would bring them a fivefold increase in the higher grades, a twenty-fourfold increase in the lower.

74. It was stated that citizens of East Jerusalem would be required to pay income tax in accordance with the legislation of Israel as from 28 June 1967. From the end of August, deductions for tax payment would be made from the salaries of public servants, whether of the Government or of the municipality.

75. It was explained that the system of

municipal taxation in Israel differed in many respects from what was in force in East Jerusalem. It would seem that in general the municipal taxes in West Jerusalem are more varied, and levied at a higher rate where comparable, than those in East Jerusalem, though water charges were less than half. On the other hand, it was maintained that the services previously supplied by the municipality of East Jerusalem could not bear comparison, in scope and efficiency, with the standard attained by local government in Israel.

76. It was stated that no municipal taxes had been paid in East Jerusalem since the unification, except for *abattoir* fees and market dues, which continued to be collected at the previous rates.

77. Finally, the information provided by the Israel authorities showed that motor vehicle licences in Israel were higher than those previously imposed by Jordan.

78. It was explained that serious obstacles to economic recovery had been caused by monetary problems. The eight banks previously operating on the west bank of the Jordan, with nine branches in East Jerusalem, had had their headquarters and kept their reserves in Amman. The cash actually held by the banks was only enough to cover 6 per cent of the public's deposits, and it had, therefore, been impossible to open them. In East Jerusalem, those deposits amounted to 5.7 million dinars, which meant that the bank closure immobilized more than half of the monetary assets in the hands of the public. The closure also prevented businessmen from getting the credit which they needed for the resumption of their affairs. The economic integration of East and West Jerusalem had been accompanied by a rise of prices in East Jerusalem which had brought about at the outset a further diminution of the real value of the liquid assets of the inhabitants.

79. On the other hand, the contraction of liquidating had been offset to a certain extent by such factors as the fact that borrowers did not at any rate for the time being have to repay bank loans, amounting to 3.9 million dinars and that purchases in East Jerusalem by Israelis had added considerably to its liquid assets.

80. It was stated that before long five Israel

banks had opened branches in East Jerusalem and were granting loans to firms so that they could refloat their activities. Moreover, Israel was involved in negotiations, through the International Monetary Fund, to have Jordan transfer the assets of the closed banks back to them and was working to facilitate their reopening.

81. Arrangements had been made for the citizens of East Jerusalem to convert their holdings of Jordanian currency. They were reported to have so far exchanged 400,000 dinars into Israel pounds; that represented from 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the cash in their hands.

82. It was stated that, on the special question of the rate of exchange of the dinar, the criterion in fixing the rate had been the value of the currency on the free Swiss market (7.50 Israel pounds to the dinar). So as to avoid curtailing purchasing power, Israel had subsequently decided to raise the rate of exchange of the dinar.¹ As far as possible that would be done retroactively. Those who had exchanged more than 100 dinars—of which a record would be available in the bank—would receive a refund. For smaller amounts, of which no record existed, the differences would be placed at the disposal of the community for social purposes.

Information supplied by the Israel Chamber of Commerce

83. At a meeting which was arranged by the President of the Israel Chamber of Commerce and which included several Arab personalities, it was stated that individual Arab businessmen from East Jerusalem were being given all possible assistance by the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and other West Jerusalem businessmen to enable them to obtain agencies and distribution rights of Israel industries and so aid them to obtain raw materials for their industries; some of these materials were already on their way to the Jordan port of Aqaba and some still in European or overseas ports, awaiting consignees' instructions. The Chamber of Commerce helped them to obtain Israel import licences, allocations of foreign exchange to pay for their imports, and in matters of procedure.

¹ The current rate is 8.40 Israel pounds to the dinar.
[Footnote in source text.]

84. The President of the Israel Chamber further stated that the Arab Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem, had been contacted in order to assist Arab businessmen in their adjustment to the new conditions, and in the re-establishment of normal business life in Jerusalem. The Committee of the Arab Chamber of Commerce had expressed its gratitude and indicated its willingness to co-operate.

Tourism

85. As regards the hotel industry, the Personal Representative was informed by the Israel Ministry of Tourism that all except four of the thirty-four hotels (with 3,726 beds) recommended for tourists in East Jerusalem had reopened. (The corresponding figures in West Jerusalem were twenty-three hotels with 2,244 beds.) The question of ownership had not been fully established but the hotels were being run by substantially the same personnel. As a result of rising costs, room rates had been raised an average of 14 per cent, which still was lower than rates in West Jerusalem.

86. Of the fifty-five tourist agencies in East Jerusalem, forty-seven had already applied for temporary licences and thirty-eight had already received them. Similarly, fifty-nine out of the 192 guides operating in East Jerusalem had already applied for temporary licences.

87. While there had been an influx of Israel visitors, the ordinary tourist trade, which had come to a standstill, was only just beginning again. From an analysis of tourism before the hostilities it was maintained that any possible loss from tourists in transit to other Arab countries was likely to be balanced by the opening up of East Jerusalem to Jewish tourists to Israel, as well as local tourists from Israel.

Transportation

88. The Personal Representative was informed that there were 300 taxis in the Old City for a population of 70,000 compared with 150 in West Jerusalem for a population of 200,000. Those taxis were mainly operated on long journeys to Beirut, Amman and Petra, from which they were now cut off. The Israel authorities planned to license about forty to fifty general taxis and

had offered others the status of tourist taxis (the drivers could not pick up ordinary cab fares, but could act as guides to tourists), but that had been refused. Consequently, the problem had not yet been solved.

89. There were still unsolved problems with bus companies, of which there were some thirty in the Old City, each one owning one to six buses. It appears that the Israel authorities had difficulties coming to terms with those companies and had allowed the Egged Bus Company from West Jerusalem to operate in the Old City. Matters had been further complicated when the East Jerusalem bus companies had gone on strike.

Integration of East Jerusalem workers into the activities of the Histadrut (Israel Federation of Labour)

90. A branch of the Histadrut has been opened in East Jerusalem. A certain number of Arab workers have already registered, and the Israel authorities expect that the number will increase substantially as more and more East Jerusalem employers approach the Histadrut to safeguard the rights of their workers.

91. The number of Arab workers is estimated at between 12,000 and 14,000.

92. The Personal Representative was told that the policy will be to pay Arabs employed in Israel enterprises salaries equal to those received by their Israel counterparts. As regards Arab enterprises, salaries would be calculated according to the economic solvency of the enterprise. Salaries would be raised gradually so as not to disrupt the Arab economy and to allow it to adjust to the conditions prevailing in Israel.

93. At present over 2,000 workers from East Jerusalem (including some 400 employees of the Municipality) are employed in the Jewish sector of the economy. They are employed in various branches, including construction, industry, hotels and other services.

94. The Personal Representative was informed that the Histadrut plans to establish various welfare and health institutions in East Jerusalem including a loan fund, a community centre for girls and women offering vocational training, a branch of "Working Youth" (a youth movement), and a branch of the "Rapoel" (sports club).

95. In the economic sphere, the Histadrut planned to initiate several enterprises in East Jerusalem which would provide employment for the local workers. The establishment of printing plants and a daily newspaper was under consideration.

96. A special authority for East Jerusalem would be established, whose task would be to initiate new enterprises and strengthen existing ones.

F. Measures concerning the judiciary

97. The High Rabbinical Court (the highest Jewish authority in religious matters) has been moved to East Jerusalem. A municipal court, presided over by an Israel municipal magistrate, deals with infringement of by-laws. It was stated that so far no Arabs had been charged before this court.

98. The Israel authorities stated that with the application of Israel law to East Jerusalem, the appointment of a *Kadi* (judge in the religious court) would be governed by the procedure provided in the relevant Israel law. However, the Government of Israel has decided to allow the situation prevailing before 5 June 1967 to continue. Muslim courts were functioning and handing down judgements in the same manner as in the past.

G. Educational situation

99. The Israel Authorities stated that at the end of the 1966/1967 school year there had been twenty-eight public educational institutions in East Jerusalem with 12,500 pupils, and twenty-four private institutions with 8,000 pupils. The structure of education had been very different from that in Israel.

100. It was intended to introduce as soon as possible in East Jerusalem all the educational laws and regulations applicable in Israel to Arab children, using the curriculum and textbooks already available for that purpose. While Arabic would be maintained as the basic language of instruction, Hebrew would be introduced gradually as a subject in grades 4 to 12.

101. Kindergartens, which had not previously existed, would be gradually introduced. Grade 9, which in Israel was part of the secondary

school system, in which tuition was charged, would continue for 1967/68 in East Jerusalem to be part of the tuition-free intermediate schools. All the other pupils in grades 10 to 12 would be incorporated in the Graded Tuition System. In that system, the contribution of parents to tuition varied from nil to 1,000 Israel pounds and was determined by their economic status. Since most Arab families had large numbers of children most of them would not have to pay tuition; the Government and the municipality would cover their children's tuition.

102. The Israel authorities further reported that the Jerusalem Municipality was rapidly restoring all damaged school buildings. All previously employed teachers had been invited to continue their work for the next academic year, which was expected to open on time in the second half of September.

103. From information available to the Personal Representative from other sources, it seemed doubtful whether the teachers would be prepared to co-operate with the Israel authorities in reopening the schools. Reports subsequent to the Personal Representative's departure tend to confirm this.

104. It was further stated that private schools would be subject to a "pedagogic control" only.

H. Press

105. It was stated that the two Arab newspapers which were published before June 1967 in East Jerusalem had disappeared.

V. THE SITUATION IN JERUSALEM AS DESCRIBED BY ARABS

A. Preliminary remarks

106. It should be noted, first of all, that there is a certain disproportion between the volume of the information which the Personal Representative received from the Israel side and that of the information from Arab sources. This was due partly to the fact that his investigations were carried out in an area under the control of the Israel Government, but partly also to the fact that his Arab interlocutors, in contrast to the Israelis, were not involved in an action, but

simply expressed their reactions. In addition, the Arabs in Jerusalem—again in contrast to the Israelis—at present lack any extensive administrative machinery.

107. Israel Government representatives stated that the Arab personalities whom the Personal Representative met at his own desire were, with few exceptions, members of the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Mr. Ahmad Shukairy, and that they did not truly represent the Arab population. Naturally, it is impossible to delve into that argument. The Personal Representative noted that the memoranda, statements, resolutions, and other communications handed to him by the Arabs also bore the signatures of a wide range of Arab personalities, including many officials of the previous Jordanian administration and recognized religious leaders.

108. The Personal Representative also remarked that he had met not only Arab personalities who are opposed to the Israel Government but also some who were co-operating with the Israel authorities.

B. Arab information on population figures

109. According to Arab sources, the population of Old Jerusalem prior to 5 June 1967 was about 75,000. If the population of the immediately surrounding areas (Sha'fat, Beit Ranima, Ram, Kalendia and Tours) was included, the figure was about 130,000. Of this hereditary population, many had fled to Jordan as a result of the hostilities, while others were working abroad (in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Qatar, Bahrein, Abu Dhabi, etc.). These temporary emigrants alone were said to number about 60,000.

C. Arab complaints

110. The Arab personalities whom the Personal Representative met put forward both orally and in the written communications a number of detailed complaints against the Israel authorities (see annex I). The most important of these are summarized below. A description is also given of certain steps taken by Arab notables to establish an organization representative of Arab interests.

Desecration of Muslim Holy Places and other acts

111. Most of the Arabs interviewed by the Personal Representative stated that the Muslim population was shocked by Israel acts which violated the sanctity of the Muslim shrines. It was regarded as a particular provocation that the Chief Rabbi of the Israel Army, with others of his faith, conducted prayers in the area of the Haram Al-Sharif. (The Israel Government has in the meantime put a stop to the offering of further prayers by members of the Jewish faith in the area of the Holy Mosque.)

112. Statements by Israel official representatives and Jewish personalities concerning Jewish claims and plans in the Temple area had had an alarming effect.

113. The dynamiting and bulldozing of 135 houses in the Maghrabi Quarter (in front of the Wailing Wall) had also aroused strong feelings. This action involved the expulsion of 650 poor and pious Muslims from their homes in the immediate vicinity of the Mosque of Omar and the Aksa Mosque. The houses, which also included two small mosques, belonged partly to the *Waqf* and partly to Arab individuals.

114. It was charged that the Israel authorities had taken over the so-called Jewish Quarter and evicted 3,000 residents at short notice.

115. It was also pointed out that the Israel authorities had chosen a government school for girls near the Aksa Mosque as the seat of the High Rabbinical Court, without consulting the *Waqf*.

116. It was repeatedly emphasized that further encroachments by the Israel authorities would lead to serious unrest among the Muslim population and might have grave consequences.

Application of Israel laws

117. The Personal Representative was told that the Israel authorities claimed jurisdiction over the Muslim religious courts and control over the sermons preached from the Aksa Mosque, and that that was rejected as contrary to the precepts of Koranic Law and of Muslim theology.

118. It was also stated that the application of Israel civil law was unacceptable to the Arabs, not only because the laws of Israel would supersede

the existing Jordanian laws, but because they were alien to Koranic Laws.

119. Judges and attorneys had therefore refused to co-operate with the Israel judicature.

Arab municipal authorities

120. The dissolution of the elected Municipal Council of East Jerusalem and the taking over of its buildings, furnishings and archives by the Municipal Council of West Jerusalem was described by Arabs as a violation of international law.

121. In a letter of 24 July 1967, the Israel Military Governor for the West Bank was informed that the twenty-four signatories of the letter had "constituted themselves as the Muslim body in charge of Muslim affairs on the West Bank, including Jerusalem."

122. This "Higher Muslim Council," as it is also called, on the same date designated four Arab personalities to carry out the responsibilities of public administration, with express instructions to exercise their jurisdiction on the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in accordance with the applicable Jordanian law.

123. In communications (of which the Personal Representative received copies) to the President of the Council, the representatives of the following organizations expressed their support for the "Higher Muslim Court":

The Women's Organizations and Institutions on the West Bank

The Union of Doctors

The Union of Dentists

The Union of Pharmacists

The Union of Lawyers

The Union of Engineers

The Union of the Officials and Labourers of the Electricity Board in Jerusalem

The Union of Scaffolding Workers in Jerusalem

The Labourers in Printing Houses

The Workers in the Jerusalem Municipality Councils

The Workers in Exchange Offices

The Union of Workers in Hotels and Cafés

The Union of Workers and Chauffeurs

The Union of Bakers

The Union of Builders

The Union of Tourist Guides

The Union of Tailors

The Union of Shoemakers

124. The Personal Representative was also given a copy of an appeal on the subject by Arab Women on the West Bank.

125. The decisions taken by the "Higher Muslim Council," which has not been recognized by the Israel authorities, are made known to the Arab population through Amman Radio.

Economic situation

126. The Personal Representative was told that the measures already introduced or announced by Israel with respect to taxes, customs duties, licences, absentee properties, and other economic matters, were considered oppressive by the Arab population and that there was a growing feeling of economic strangulation. Even if the present dislocations in economic life should cease in due course, the Arabs feared that they would be permanently at a disadvantage in comparison with the Israelis, who were at a more advanced stage of economic development.

127. On the other hand, the Personal Representative had an opportunity to speak to a few Arab businessmen who considered it to their advantage to co-operate with the Israelis and had already entered into business relations with them. They stated that they were satisfied with the accommodating spirit shown by the Israelis.

Situation in the cultural and educational field

128. Where the schools were concerned, the Personal Representative found a pronounced aversion to the efforts of the Israel authorities to apply their own educational system to Arab schools. He was told that the teachers would refuse to resume their duties under the given conditions. It remains to be seen, in mid-September or late September, when the Arab schools are scheduled to reopen, to what extent the parents will likewise refuse to send their children to school.

129. From the cultural standpoint, the fear was expressed that the Arab way of life, Arab traditions and the Arabic language would

suffer permanent damage under the influence of the Israel majority. It was also pointed out in this connexion that from the standpoint of customs and origin the Israel community formed a heterogeneous society which might have an adverse effect on strict Arab morals.

D. General objections

130. The following observations relate in part to considerations of international law, and thus go beyond a presentation of facts. At the same time, however, they reflect an attitude and a state of mind which are vital to the evaluation of the factual conditions.

131. The Personal Representative was told that the Arabs recognized a military occupation régime as such and were ready to co-operate with such a régime in dealing with current questions of administration and public welfare. However, they were opposed to civil incorporation into the Israel State system. They regarded that as a violation of the acknowledged rule of international law which prohibited an occupying Power from changing the legal and administrative structure in the occupied territory and at the same time demanded respect for private property and personal rights and freedoms.

132. It was repeatedly emphasized that the population of East Jerusalem was given no opportunity to state for itself whether it was willing to live in the Israel State community. It was claimed that the right of self-determination, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, had therefore been violated.

133. In conclusion, it was pointed out that the Arab population placed its trust in the United Nations and relied on the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

VI. THE ATTITUDE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

134. All representatives of the various religious communities whom the Personal Representative met agreed that the Holy Places needed special protection and that their believers should have free access to those places. They felt that the prime prerequisite for this was peace and stable

political conditions. Their objective was to be able to perform their spiritual duties in peace without constantly having to fear that international conflicts or State interference could jeopardize their traditional tasks.

135. One detected among the religious dignitaries a feeling of relief that a cease-fire was in effect and that material damage to the Holy Places was relatively minor. It was acknowledged by all, with thankfulness, that the combatant parties obviously had it in mind to spare the Holy Places as much as possible. On the other hand, one detected concern for the future. Would the situation remain as it was, or were further convulsions to be expected? What would be the consequences if the Holy Places were under the sovereignty of a State which identified itself with one religion and which had never concealed the fact that, where Jerusalem was concerned, its political objectives coincided with the religious objectives?

136. One eminent member of the Christian faith expressed this concern as follows: Jerusalem must retain its universal religious character. The well-established rights of the three major religions must be protected *in toto*. History had shown that whenever a religion tried to assert its hegemony in the politico-religious field serious and sometimes bloody conflicts ensued.

137. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, reassuring statements were already being made by the Israel side in this connexion.

138. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, meeting on 7 June with the spiritual leaders of all communities, declared:

Since our forces have been in control in the entire city and surroundings, quiet has been restored. You may rest assured that no harm of any kind will be allowed to befall the religious Holy Places. I have asked the Minister of Religious Affairs to contact the religious leaders in the Old City in order to ensure orderly contact between them and our forces and enable them to pursue their religious activities unhindered. At my request the Minister of Religious Affairs has issued the following instructions:

(a) The arrangements at the Western Wall shall be determined by the Chief Rabbis of Israel.

(b) The arrangements in places sacred to the Moslems shall be determined by a Council of Moslem religious dignitaries.

(c) The arrangements in places sacred to the Christians shall be determined by a Council of Christian religious dignitaries.

139. Meeting with them again on 27 June, the Prime Minister declared:

It is my pleasure to inform you that the Holy Places in Jerusalem are now open to all who wish to worship at them—members of all faiths, without discrimination. The Government of Israel has made it a cardinal principle of its policy to preserve the Holy Places, to ensure their religious and universal character, and to guarantee free access. Through regular consultation with you, Heads of the communities, and with those designated by you, at the appropriate levels, for this purpose, we will continue to maintain this policy and to see that it is most faithfully carried out. In these consultations, I hope that you will feel free to put forward your proposals, since the aims I have mentioned are, I am certain, aims that we share in common. Every such proposal will be given full and sympathetic consideration. It is our intention to entrust the internal administration and arrangements of the Holy Places to the religious leaders of the communities to which they respectively belong: the task of carrying out all necessary procedures is in the hands of the Minister of Religious Affairs.

140. The same day, the Knesset passed the "Protection of Holy Places Law" 5727-1967, as follows:

PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES

1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.

2. Whoever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years.

3. This law shall add to and not derogate from any other law.

4. The Minister of Religious Affairs is charged with the implementation of this law and he may after consultation with or upon the proposal of representatives of the religions concerned and with the consent of the Minister of Justice make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation.

5. This law shall come into force on the date of its adoption by the Knesset.

141. These statements and statutory measures were very favourably received. Various religious representatives in fact told the Personal Representative spontaneously that so far the Israel authorities had conformed to the principles which had been laid down and that there was therefore no ground for complaints. They hoped that whatever difficulties still existed or were feared—mostly of a practical and physical nature—would be resolved in a spirit of co-operation.

142. Although the attitude of represen-

tatives of other Christian denominations was, rather, one of "wait and see," they also described the present situation as satisfactory.

143. Apart from the Muslims, whose position was discussed earlier in connexion with the attitude of the Arabs generally, it was essentially only the Catholic Church which adopted a systematically divergent attitude. As is well known, the Holy See remains convinced that the only solution which offers a sufficient guarantee for the protection of Jerusalem and of its Holy Places is to place that city and its vicinity under an international régime in the form of a *corpus separatum*.

144. The Vatican has had talks with the Israel authorities on this and other questions, and the talks are reported to be continuing.

145. Various religious representatives expressed the hope that their links with the outside world, including the Arab countries, would remain open. These links are of particular importance to the religious communities as they relate to contacts with the corresponding religious centres abroad, the influx of pilgrims and the exchange and replacement of clergy, monks, nuns, and so forth.

146. The Personal Representative was assured by the Israel side that a liberal practice would be pursued in this respect. It was stated that, so far as entry from Arab countries was concerned, it was for those countries to issue the relevant permits.

147. Other religious leaders displayed some concern that their privileges, including exemption from taxes, should be respected. These privileges are of particular importance to those religious communities whose income is derived entirely or partially from landed property, houses and shops.

148. With respect to religious schools, which now come under the "pedagogic supervision" of the Israel Ministry of Education, the feeling generally expressed was that no undue interference with the form of education was to be expected. Schools which have students from Arab countries feared that they might no longer be able to attend.

149. Lastly, mention should be made of a special case which was submitted to the Personal Representative by the representative of the Syrian

Catholic Church. Since 1948, the church and vicariate of the Syrian Catholic parish had been in no man's land and had remained intact throughout. It was stated that on 30 June and 2 July the buildings had been completely destroyed by the Israelis, without the parish's having been informed. The Vicar General of the Syrian Catholic Patriarchate had lodged a protest concerning this with the Military Governor of Jerusalem and claimed compensation. It was stated, however, that his demands had not yet produced any result.

150. The continuing interdenominational disputes with respect to the possession and custody of the Holy Places were mentioned by the religious representatives on a number of occasions, but the Personal Representative did not believe that they should be dealt with in his report.

VII. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REMARKS

151. In conclusion, I would like to express my warm appreciation to Ambassador Thalmann for having gathered this very useful and important information on the situation in Jerusalem, in the brief space of time available to him. The information thus gathered has formed the sole basis for part one of this report.

152. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to the Government of Switzerland for having so readily responded to my request to make Ambassador Thalmann available for this specific *ad hoc* assignment, thus facilitating my report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

PART TWO. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2254 (ES-V)

153. On 15 July 1967, following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V), the Secretary-General addressed the following letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel:

Sir,

At its 1554th plenary meeting, on 14 July 1967, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2254 (ES-V), a copy of which is attached.

In operative paragraph 3 of that resolution the Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and the implementation of the resolution.

I should be grateful if you would kindly bring the above-mentioned resolution to the attention of your Government as a matter of urgency.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

U Thant

154. Subsequent to the despatch of the above letter, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Israel that the part of his report relating to the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly would necessarily consist of the response to be received from the Government of Israel. The Permanent Representative of Israel assured the Secretary-General that a reply from his Government on the question of implementation of the resolution would be forthcoming in time for the Secretary-General to include it in his report.

155. On 11 September 1967, the Secretary-General received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the following reply to his letter of 15 July:

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

After the adjournment of the emergency special session of the General Assembly on 21 July, the Government of Israel was consulted by you on the appointment of a personal representative entrusted with the mission of obtaining information for your report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Ambassador Thalmann visited Jerusalem from 21 August to 3 September. The Government of Israel extended to him all the assistance necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities. He had detailed conversations with the Prime Minister and me, and with heads of the religious communities represented in Jerusalem. He also met leading personalities of all communities and heard the frank expression of their views.

A salient fact of Jerusalem's life today is the intrinsic necessity of ensuring equal rights and opportunities to all the city's residents by extending to them the same public services and facilities. No international or other interest would be served by the institution of divisions and barriers which would only sharpen tension and generate discrimination. This does not foreclose the final settlement of certain important aspects of the Jerusalem situation which lie at the origin of the international interest in the city. I refer to the need to secure appropriate expression of the special interest of the three great religions in Jerusalem. It is our urgent desire to promote this objective in co-operation with the universal interests concerned. I am confident that in an atmosphere of international tranquillity substantial progress could be made towards this aim, which has hitherto had no concrete fulfilment.

We are now concentrating on this task. It is our policy to ensure that the Moslem, as well as the Christian and Jewish Holy Places, should be scrupulously respected and

reversed, and placed under the responsibility of a recognized Moslem authority.

I should like to assure you that the report based on the information obtained by your Personal Representative will receive our close study and on its publication I shall make a further clarification of our policies.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Abba Eban
Minister for Foreign Affairs

ANNEX I

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY ARAB PERSONALITIES

A. Letter from Sheikh Abd al-Hamid al-Sayeh and thirteen other personalities received by the Personal Representative on 26 August 1967

Sir,

On the occasion of your arrival in Jerusalem in the capacity of a personal representative for Mr. U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to investigate and inform yourself on the steps the Israeli authorities have taken to implement the two resolutions adopted on the 4th and 17th of June 1967, in the course of the Emergency Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, calling upon the Israeli authorities to rescind the measures it took to merge and annex Arab Jerusalem, we, the undersigned, both Muslims and Christians, have the honour to direct your attention to the following:

1. The Israeli authorities so far have not taken the slightest steps to indicate that they intend to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning Jerusalem. On the contrary, they have positively announced that they will not implement the aforesaid resolutions, and have taken more measures to demonstrate clearly their determination to annex Arab Jerusalem, revealing, in their actions, a complete disregard for the resolutions of the United Nations and the wishes of the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem and their rights to self-determination.

2. In support of the above statement, the following measures, though not comprehensive, may nevertheless demonstrate the trend of their policy:

(1) The occupying power dissolved the duly elected Arab Municipality Council in Jerusalem and dismissed the Mayor and other officials.

(2) It placed Arab Jerusalem under the administration of the Municipality Council of Israeli Jerusalem which, in turn, confiscated the movable and immovable property of the Arab Council.

(3) It subjected Arab Jerusalem to Israeli laws and regulations, and thus abrogated all the Jordanian laws previously applied in the City.

(4) It imposed upon the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem the heavier taxes and municipal rates applicable in Israel, thus causing undue hardship and additional heavy financial burdens.

(5) It constructed physical barriers between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank, and restricted passage between the two sectors to special permits to be issued by the authorities.

(6) It dissolved the Jordanian civil administration in the City, and dismissed most of its officials.

(7) It dissolved the Jordanian Courts of Justice in Jerusalem, and subjected the City and its inhabitants to the province and jurisdiction of the Israeli Courts.

(8) It replaced the Jordanian currency by Israeli currency as the only legal tender in the City, and compelled the inhabitants to change their currency into Israeli tender at rates which were far lower than the official rates and rates prevalent in world markets, thus causing many of the Arab inhabitants to suffer substantial losses.

(9) It subjected the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem to heavier rates of income taxation, and thus burdened them to further material losses to those already sustained in consequence of the war and the occupation.

(10) It erected customs barriers around Arab Jerusalem and imposed and collected excise duties on all the goods imported from the West Bank, while allowing free entry of Israeli imports.

(11) It imposed customs and duties based on Israeli laws on Arab Jerusalem, and collected such duties even on the goods already in stock which were imported before 5.6.67 and already paid for under Jordanian laws.

(12) It refused to recognize Jordanian license permits for vehicles and other trades or

professions, thus compelling people to obtain Israeli permits under threat of punishment, and further exerted great economic pressure, especially on travel offices and their agents.

(13) It integrated the government schools in Arab Jerusalem into the Israeli Municipality Council's educational system, and replaced the Jordanian curriculum by an Israeli one, and further closed the office of the Director of Education in Arab Jerusalem.

(14) It neglected the usage of the Arabic language in most of its measures and dealings, although it is the language of the inhabitants.

(15) It placed the property of Arab absentee landlords under custodianship, as a preliminary step to confiscating it, as previously done with Arab property in Israel.

(16) It attempted to place the religious courts and Muslim *Waqf* (property) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Religious Affairs in Israel, and apply the laws relating to personal status in Israel to Muslims.

(17) It interfered with the personal freedom of citizens in that it exiled and committed to prison a number of Arab citizens who have expressed their views relating to the unacceptability to the Arabs of the annexation of Jerusalem.

Furthermore, the Israeli authorities have taken many arbitrary and provocative measures of which the following list, though not comprehensive, may give an idea:

(1) The razing to the ground of the entire Maghrabi Quarter in the Old City comprising 153 houses and involving 650 persons, who were unable even to retrieve furniture because they were not given sufficient warning, and the destruction of two small mosques in that quarter.

(2) The expulsion and rendering homeless of the 3,000 inhabitants of Sharif Quarter, on the pretext that Jews had lived in the Quarter in the past, although most of the houses in the area had been inhabited by Arabs throughout and owned by Muslim *Waqf*.

(3) The destruction of many Arab houses and properties outside the walls of the Old City.

(4) The occupying Israeli authority has also applied strong economic pressure against the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem, with a view to reducing their resistance and forcing them to leave.

(5) It confiscated a large number of private and public cars, pullman buses, and occupied a number of hotels.

(6) It introduced Israeli bus companies into Arab territory to compete with or replace Arab companies.

(7) It did not respect the sanctity of Muslim and Christian religious shrines, and thus forced the custodian of the holy places to close some of the churches. Moreover, the Chief Rabbi of the Israeli Army, Brigadier Goren, conducted a prayer together with some followers in the Haram Al-Sharif (Holy Mosque), thus blatantly offending the Muslims' susceptibilities and infringing upon their established rights, while the Minister for Religion in Israel announced that the Muslim Mosque is Jewish property, and that sooner or later they will rebuild their temple there. Finally, the Ministry for Religion announced its intention of expanding the Wailing Wall again thus destroying some of the Muslim buildings surrounding it, and constructing a synagogue there, in contravention of the *status quo*, and in outright violation of the rights of Muslims and Muslim *Waqf*.

It is quite clear that all these measures contradict basic principles of international law and international conventions governing the state of war and the treatment of civilians in occupied territories, which preclude the annexation by the occupying power of any territory or its division into administrative units to serve political purposes as long as the state of war still stands, and moreover do not give the occupying power the right to change or modify existing laws and administrations in occupied territories. On the contrary, international law and conventions call upon the occupying power to apply existing laws and administrative structures, and to protect private property, religious beliefs, and personal liberties, and to refrain from imposing new taxes and fees on the inhabitants under occupation.

The Israeli authorities, instead, have replaced the structure of Jordanian Arab administration in the city by a direct Israel administration in all aspects, and caused an exorbitant rise in the standard [cost] of living creating difficulties for Arab inhabitants.

Although some of these measures were taken before the two resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations in its emergency session,

the majority were taken after the resolutions. Thus, the Israeli authorities did not only mean to challenge the United Nations and the Muslim and Christian world, but also to violate the rights of the Arab inhabitants of the city, particularly their right to self-determination, contravening in this the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the principles of justice and equity.

Naturally, the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem will not accept this situation or recognize its status, and strongly protest against the annexation of their city by Israel.

In the light of this, we pray that Your Excellency will take the earliest convenient opportunity to meet with the undersigned and others in Arab circles in the city to discover their views regarding the annexation of their city, and we, in turn, are perfectly willing to forward any information or other details that you may wish to obtain.

Please accept our deepest regards.

Signed:

1. Sheikh Abdal-Hamid al-Sayeh, Chief of the Moslem Supreme Court and Kadi-al-Kudah (Chief Justice)

2. Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem

3. Bishop Nagib Aub'em, Arab Anglican Bishop in Jordan

4. Sheikh Sa'd al-Dein al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem

5. Anton Atallah, Senator and ex-Foreign Minister for Jordan

6. Muhamed Is'ak Darwish, Member of the Higher Arab Committee

7. Yusef Khouri, for the Union of Engineers

8. Anwar Nusseibeh, ex-Jordanian Ambassador in London, Member of Parliament for Jerusalem, and ex-Minister of Defence for Jordan

9. Dr. Nabih Mu'mer, for the Union of Dockers

10. Sheikh Ali al-Taziz, President of the Chamber of Commerce for Arab Jerusalem

11. Taysir Kan'an, President of the Court of First Instance in Jerusalem

12. Na'im al-Ashaf, Representative for Trade Unions

13. Fouad Abd al-Hadi, Senator

14. Sa'ed Ala al-Dein, ex-Jordanian Minister for Economic Affairs

B. Memorandum concerning the measures taken by Israel with respect to the City of Jerusalem, submitted by Mr. Rauhi El-Khatib on 26 August 1967

The Israel occupation authorities have not complied with the two United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem. Notwithstanding these directives, they have proceeded with and given effect to annexationist measures without heeding world public opinion and against the wishes of the Arab inhabitants, thus violating fundamental and elementary international laws relating to occupied countries. These measures, the ultimate goal of which—territorial expansion—the occupation authorities have not succeeded in concealing, include the following:

(a) Basic measures

1. They have torn down the barriers separating the two sectors of the city, and they have tacitly authorized their army and their people to harass the civilian population by pillaging houses, shops and vehicles, by seizing hotels, and by restricting the freedom of the population for a long period of time.

2. They have tacitly authorized the desecration of Christian and Muslim Holy Places and have permitted access to them during hours of prayer. We must also protest the complete lack of decorum shown by both men and women in dress and behaviour. This complete lack of respect has grossly offended the religious sensibilities of the faithful of both religions.

3. One hundred and thirty-five houses in the Mughrabi Quarter adjoining the Wailing Wall and adjacent to the two Mosques of Omar and Aksa, which are Muslim Holy Places, have been dynamited and razed by bulldozers. Because of this, 650 Muslims, all of them poor and pious persons living near the Muslim Holy Place, were removed from their homes and driven away, after having been allowed no more than three hours to evacuate their homes, which they had to do while the curfew was in effect. One can easily imagine the consternation of these families, who had to see to the removal of their property and take care of their children and their aged. One part of these buildings, comprising some houses and two small mosques, belongs to the Muslim *Waqf*. The other part was private property over

which the Jews had no rights. They razed these buildings in order to make room for a Jewish religious institution.

4. The occupation authorities also took over some houses in the area known as the Jewish Quarter inside the boundaries of the Old City. They forced the evacuation of 3,000 residents after a one to three day period of grace and during non-curfew hours. Many therefore had to abandon their property when they fled and thus swelled the number of the refugees, many of whom are still completely destitute. We should bear in mind that most of these houses were Arab property.

5. They applied several oppressive measures to the remaining inhabitants of the city, depriving them of their means of subsistence and preventing the arrival of relief supplies from abroad. All this was done to force them to leave the city and thus reduce their number.

6. They proceeded to take a general census of the city and its environs lying within an arbitrary demarcation line which they established to limit the population of the City of Jerusalem. Closed shops and houses were marked with a distinctive sign. Absentee owners were, as a result, liable to summary requisitions.

(b) Measures taken against the Municipality of Jerusalem.

1. The Israel Parliament adopted a decision authorizing the occupation authorities to annex to the State of Israel whatever they deemed necessary without regard to international law or to the will of the inhabitants. Accordingly, their Minister of the Interior ordered the annexation of Arab Jerusalem and several neighbouring villages to the Jewish sector of the city and the placing of the entire area under the administration of the Jewish Municipal Council.

2. Consequently, their authorities dissolved the Arab Municipal Council and dismissed the Mayor and the members of the Council after having seized their files and their movable and immovable property.

3. The Jewish municipal authorities later dismissed some officials of the Arab Municipality and transferred others to the Office of the Mayor of the Jewish sector.

4. The unified Jewish Municipality continues to carry out Israel administrative measures, which are wholly at variance with the Jordanian administrative policies which the residents are supposed to continue to follow under the most recent resolutions of the United Nations and under international law.

5. The Jewish Municipality demolished many Arab buildings both inside and outside the walls of the Old City and it is continually taking similar measures in order to erase the last trace of the demarcation lines between the two sectors and to create a fait accompli while at the same time weakening the Office of the Arab Mayor as a separate authority in order ultimately to do away with it entirely.

(c) Measures taken against the Arab administration

1. The Jordanian postal and telegraph, income tax, health and customs services, police system, cadastral survey and other city offices have been abolished. This administrative structure has been placed under the authority of the administrative centres of the other sector.

2. Officials have been subjected to pressure to sign work applications bearing the seal of the State of Israel. Most of them have refused to sign them or to co-operate, although previously during the military régime they had done their work out of a spirit of solidarity with their colleagues in the so-called "occupied" areas.

3. All the Jordanian laws in force in the Arab sector of the city have been repealed and replaced by Israel measures and laws, in violation of international law, which stipulates that the laws in force in occupied territories must be respected.

4. The occupation authorities have erected barriers between Jerusalem and the other Arab villages on the West Bank and have obstructed the free movement of its inhabitants by instituting a system of passes issued by the occupying forces.

5. They have set up customs posts on the boundaries of the City of Jerusalem for the purpose of taxing merchandise originating in the occupied Arab areas, while merchandise of Israel origin is left tax-free, in order to compel the Arabs to buy Israel products.

6. They have asked owners of private vehicles to renew their licences and have required them to turn in their Jordanian "plates" for Israel plates and to insure themselves with Israel insurance companies, claiming that they do not recognize the validity of prior insurance and permits.

7. They have disregarded the Arabic language and, consequently, all their correspondence and documents have been drawn up in Hebrew.

8. Courts of justice have been suspended and made subordinate to the Israel courts. The judges have been asked to serve outside Jerusalem; they have refused, and continue to refuse, to do so, in order not to collaborate.

9. Government schools in the Arab sector of Jerusalem are now under the jurisdiction of the Jewish Municipality, which has forced them to adopt the Israel curriculum. The occupation authorities have requested some of the Arab teaching staff to transfer to the municipality and some to the Ministry of Education. Following the refusal of the teachers to co-operate, seals were affixed to the educational offices of the Jordanian Government.

(d) Matters relating to the Holy Places

1. Following repeated desecration of the Christian Holy Places, the Custodian of the Holy Places ordered the closing of some churches under his authority in the Arab sector and refused to open them to visitors. These Holy Places include the Church of Gethsemane, or Church of the Nations, the Church of Bethany, and the Church of the Prison of Christ on the Via Dolorosa.

2. The failure of the occupation authorities to prevent desecrations of the Holy Places has led to the burglary of one of the largest and holiest churches in the world. The priceless, diamond-studded crown of the Statue of the Virgin, Our Lady of Sorrows, on Calvary itself was stolen some ten days ago.

3. Armenian and Latin priests have been victims of aggression or offences committed by Jews, including, in some cases, Jewish religious officials, as well as by Israel soldiers or police.

4. The Chief Rabbi of the Israel Army, Brigadier Goren, with his escort and other Jews, on 15 August 1967 mounted to the Dome of the

Rock with liturgical vestments and prayer-books. They conducted a prayer lasting two hours within the confines of the Mosque of Omar, thus infringing the inviolability of a Holy Place venerated by all Islam. Far from stopping at this provocation, they made known their intention of repeating such religious acts. At an official meeting held in Jerusalem on 12 August 1967, the Israel Minister for Religion stated that the occupation authorities considered the Mosque of Omar and its outlying buildings as their property either by past acquisition or by recent conquest. He also expressly proclaimed that those authorities were determined sooner or later to rebuild their temple on the Dome of the Rock itself. That statement shows how far their aggressive intentions against the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem extend, and no Muslim, or any honest man, could ever accept that statement.

5. The occupation authorities are constantly drawing up plans for the expansion and erection of religious buildings near "Boraq"; one of the most recent statements, reported in the *Jerusalem Post* of 8 August 1967, tells us that the occupying forces will continue to demolish other buildings belonging either to the Muslim *Waqf* or to Arab owners.

6. They have occupied a government school for girls which was built on *Waqf* land in the Maghrabi Quarter near the Aksa Mosque with a view to transforming it into a supreme religious tribunal without having asked the permission of, or even informed, the Muslim *Waqf*. They have even planted Jewish and religious emblems on them.

7. They have claimed jurisdiction over the Muslim religious courts and control over the sermons preached from the Aksa Mosque; those claims were rejected by the Muslim judiciary of the City of Jerusalem as contrary to the precepts of Koranic Law and the commands of Muslim theology. The situation is still very tense between the occupation authorities and the Muslim Committee concerning this very important religious issue.

(e) Economic matters

1. The local banks were closed, their assets confiscated and their work suspended.

2. On the other hand, five of the main stores in the Arab sector were confiscated and turned into branches of Israeli banks.

3. The Israel authorities abolished transactions in Jordanian currency and forced the inhabitants of the Arab sector to change their money into Israel currency at a rate much below that recognized in the free world markets and even further below the official rate, thus causing the Arab inhabitants and other residents heavy losses.

4. The occupying forces destroyed a large plastics factory inside the Walls, where 200 manual and clerical workers were employed. The goods produced there were marketed in Jerusalem, in other towns on the West Bank and in some neighbouring Arab countries. The buildings were demolished and the machinery was pillaged before the owners had time to remove it. By this action, the occupation authorities deprived the inhabitants of one of the major projects on the West Bank.

5. The tax authorities began to notify the inhabitants officially that motor vehicles and telephones would be subject to taxation in accordance with Israel law. They would also collect income tax. Practical measures were taken to impose customs duties on all merchandise in Arab shops and warehouses, although the owners had already paid Jordanian duties.

6. The occupying forces seized the Pullman buses belonging to a Jerusalem tourist company and to date have not returned them. Thus, the employees of the company are denied the earnings they could have derived from tourism in Jerusalem.

7. The authorities recently declared that the law concerning absentee property would be applied, and they appointed a custodian for "absentee" property. This notoriously severe law gives the Israel Government the right to confiscate the movable and immovable property of Arabs who are absent from the country and to use it as they see fit. The property in question includes enormous tracts of land and buildings, shares in companies, movable property and a variety of merchandise, the whole amounting to millions of Jordanian dinars. This law is applied only to the Arab sector of Jerusalem, which is considered by the occupation authorities to form an

integral part of the State of Israel. It would not have been applied if this sector of Jerusalem had been considered an "occupied area" of the West Bank of the River Jordan.

8. In the Arab sector of Jerusalem there are a number of holy and historic places. A large number of tourist companies and Arab guides are established there. There are many hotels, souvenir shops and motor vehicles catering to the tourist trade. There was a very close link between all these businesses and Jerusalem Airport, which thus represented the main source of income for the inhabitants of the Arab sector of Jerusalem. With the annexation of this sector to Israel, however, tourist agencies and companies are landing their aircraft at Lod Airport, and Israel tourist companies transport companies, guides, hotels and souvenir shops are monopolizing the tourist trade. Only a small minority in the Arab sector is allowed to engage in these activities concurrently with their people. If this situation continues any longer, it will cause many persons employed in the tourist trade to close down their businesses and leave the country. This is the opinion of all those who still remain. The purpose of Israel's policy of annexation will then have been achieved.

(f) Social affairs

1. The annexation of Jerusalem to Israel separates those Arabs who remained inside the city limits from their brethren living on the West Bank and from those in the other Arab countries.

2. This annexation creates complicated situations for the inhabitants of Jerusalem and for those who work there. For instance, many city officials, workers and tradesmen reside outside Jerusalem, either in the Bethlehem or Jericho area or in the Ramallah and Bireh area. As in every large town in the kingdom and throughout the world, these persons come into town in the morning and leave in the evening. The separation of the city where they work from the areas where they reside causes them inconveniences, the least of which is the tremendous waste of time at the frontier posts or the trouble of having to set up homes inside the city, as a result of which they incur additional expenses and have to abandon their properties or sell them at ridiculous prices, not to mention the many cases where the members

of a family are separated.

3. Until 5 June 1967, the population of Jerusalem was about 75,000 and if the population of the surrounding areas—Sha'afat, Beit Hanina, Ram, Kalandia and Tour—is included the figure was about 130,000. All these people were natives of the country, and many of these inhabitants had relatives who had temporarily taken refuge in Jordan, having fled at the time of the last incidents; similarly, many of them have members of their families working for a fixed period in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Qatar, Bahrain or Abu Zabi, or in other Arab countries. With what they earn, these emigrants help their relatives in the annexed country, thus ensuring their subsistence. They even managed, with the help of their savings, to purchase land or housing in anticipation of their return to the country. In the meantime, they were receiving the rentals for these properties. Some had invested their whole fortune in various companies in the country to provide for their old age. These emigrants alone number more than 60,000. They have rights in the city, like all the other present citizens; yet the annexation of Jerusalem to Israel will prevent them from returning and enjoying their property and will also deprive their relatives here of the help they were providing. This situation will inevitably force some persons to leave the country to seek a livelihood elsewhere, and this alone will further reduce the number of emigrants included in the population figure by 190,000. This number probably exceeds the figure for the Jewish inhabitants of the other sector—with this difference, that the Arabs are natives of the country, while the Jews are mostly recent immigrants.

4. The Jews are beginning to unveil their projects for the construction of great buildings in the town and its surroundings to increase the number of the Jewish inhabitants to 500,000. The Arabs are afraid that these projects may be carried out at the expense of their properties and of their possessions by confiscation or under pressure. Likewise they fear that Jews may become the majority of inhabitants of Jerusalem, thus appropriating the city, of which the Arabs would retain only memories.

5. The occupation authorities have infringed the individual liberty of the Arabs of the city by arresting certain members of the national

committees who proclaimed their opposition to the annexation of the Arab sector of Jerusalem to the Jewish sector. They have also imprisoned other members of these committees for the same reason.

The inhabitants of the Arab sector of Jerusalem and those of the West Bank resolutely proclaim their opposition to all the measures which the Israel occupation authorities have taken and which those authorities regard as constituting a fait accompli not subject to appeal or reversal, namely, the unification of the two sectors of the City of Jerusalem. They proclaim to the whole world that this annexation, even camouflaged under the cloak of administrative measures, was carried out against their will and against their wishes.

In no event shall we submit to it or accept it.

Abdel Mughni El Natshe	Ali El Taziz
Khader Abu Swai	Nihad Abu Gharbieh
Faek Barakat	Dr. Rashi El Nashashibi
Members of the Municipal Council	
Rauhi El-Khatib	Dr. Ibrahim Tleel
Mayor	Deputy Mayor

C. Message dated 24 July 1967 addressed to the Military Governor for the West Bank by Mr. Anwar El-Khatib and twenty-three other personalities

Jerusalem 24.7.67

H.E. The Military Governor for the West Bank,

Whereas it is in the nature of an occupation by any country of any territory belonging to any other country that this occupation does not endow the occupying country with proprietor's rights over the occupied territory, nor does it endow it with sovereignty over such territory, but enjoins it to foster the interest of the occupied territory and to respect its laws and to protect the lives of the citizens as well as their rights and property, ensuring at the same time the freedom of conscience and worship, we therefore hereby declare that the orders issued by the legislative and executive authorities in Israel annexing Arab Jerusalem and its environs are null and void for the following reasons:

(a) Because Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of Jordan and because Israel is precluded by virtue of section 4 of clause 2 of the United

Nations Charter from taking any action against the physical safety and political independence of Jordan territory and has therefore no right to annex any part of Jordan territory to Israel.

(b) Because the Assembly of the United Nations has resolved that the annexation is unlawful, such resolutions having been taken by the said Assembly in the course of its Emergency Session on 17.6.1967 and 21.7.1967 respectively.

(c) Because the Israeli Knesset has no authority that can enable it to annex territory belonging to another State.

(d) That while we declare that the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem and its environs had already exercised their right of self-determination together with the inhabitants of the West Bank in full freedom when they had opted for Union with the East Bank thus constituting the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the Jordan Parliament dated 24.4.1950,

And that in placing on record that the annexation of Arab Jerusalem is illegal and unilaterally imposed by the occupying power contrary to the wishes of the inhabitants of the city who oppose the annexation and who uphold the integrity of Jordanian territory,

We, at the same time, place on record that the Israeli occupying authorities have interfered illegally and in a manner which is contrary to Islamic Law in Muslim religious matters of which the following are some examples:

(a) The supervision by the Ministry for Religions in Israel over the Friday Sermon which is usually delivered in the Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem and the deletion from the sermon of much of its contents including chapters from the Holy Quran.

(b) Allowing Israeli visitors, men and women, to enter the Aksa Mosque while unsuitably dressed and in a manner which is inconsistent with religious belief and Arab and Islamic traditions.

(c) The destruction of two Muslim Mosques in the Maghrabi Quarter in Jerusalem in addition to the destruction of the whole quarter which is entirely owned by charitable Muslim *Waqf* property.

(d) Violation of the sanctity of the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron and its closure thus preventing

Muslims from visiting it throughout the week, with the exception of a few hours on Friday, while at the same time allowing Israelis to visit it throughout the week and perform within it certain ceremonies which are not allowed by Muslim Religious Law.

(e) The interference by the Ministry for Religious Affairs in Israel in matters pertaining to Muslim *Waqfs*.

(f) The appropriation of *Waqf* Land known as Al-Nather and situated on the Tour Road in Jerusalem without the knowledge of the *Waqf* Department and against the interests of the *Waqf* administration.

(g) The attempt by the Israeli Ministry for religious affairs to interfere in the Muslim Religious Courts including the Supreme Religious Court in Jerusalem.

In view of all the above we request the following:

1. To refrain from infringing upon the safety and political independence of territory belonging to the State of Jordan and to respect the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of Public International Law and the two resolutions of the United Nations Assembly which were adopted during its recent session and which declared as illegal the act of annexation and which called upon Israel to annul the annexation of Arab Jerusalem and its environs to Israel.

2. To desist from interfering with Muslim religious matters including matters of personal status and the system of Muslim Religious Justice and matters pertaining to religious guidance, and to respect the sanctity of the religious ceremonies and Holy Places and not to interfere with Muslim *Waqf*.

3. To respect Arab Judicial religious or administrative and municipal institutions in Arab Jerusalem and to allow the same to undertake all their responsibilities which they have performed before the occupation.

And whereas the principles of Islamic Jurisdiction are clear and enjoin Muslims to undertake all their religious responsibilities in person in circumstances such as those existing now, and whereas the principle of Muslim Jurisprudence precludes non-Muslims from taking charge of Muslim religious matters, and whereas we, the

representative Muslim citizens in the West Bank including Jerusalem have met on this day in the Hall of the Muslim Court of Appeal in Jerusalem, and after discussing the problems relating to Muslim matters in every way in the light of Muslim jurisprudence, we have resolved as follows:

1. The signatories hereunder have constituted themselves as the Muslim Body in charge of Muslim affairs on the West Bank, including Jerusalem, until such time as the occupation lapses.

2. The said body has decided as follows:

(a) Empowering His Eminence Sheikh Abd Al-Hamid Sayeh with the authority enabling him to undertake responsibilities of Chief Justice in the West Bank as defined in the Laws of Jordan.

(b) Empowering the Muslim Court of Appeal in Jerusalem to undertake all the responsibilities of the Council of Islamic *Waqfs*, the Council empowered to repair Al-Aksa Mosque and the Holy Dome of the Rock as defined in the Laws of Jordan, as well as all the responsibilities and powers vested in the Director-General of Muslim *Waqfs*.

(c) Empowering Sheikh Hilmi El-Muhtaseb to assume the responsibilities of Director of Muslim Law in addition to his present office as member of Islamic Court of Appeal.

(d) The appointment of H.E. the Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Sa'ad El-Din El-Alami as an additional member of the Muslim Court of Appeal in addition to the present office.

(e) The appointment of H.E. The Muslim Religious Judge of Jerusalem, Sheikh Sa'd Sabri to the membership of the *Waqf* and Islamic Affairs Council aforesaid and to the Council for the repair of the Mosques as aforesaid.

(f) The above persons shall exercise their jurisdiction and responsibilities in accordance with the Jordan Law applicable on the West Bank including Arab Jerusalem until the occupation lapses.

Signed by:

Anwar El-Khatib, Governor of Jerusalem
Abd El-Hamid Sayeh, President of the Supreme Religious Court
Sa'd Sabri, Religious Judge in Jerusalem
Lawyer Kamal Dajani

Aref El-Aref, Director of the Jerusalem Museum
Abd Rahim El-Sharif, Lawyer and Senator
Lawyer Sa'd Ala' Eddin
Lawyer Abd El-Muhsen Abu Mizer
Ishaw Duzdar
Dr. Daoud Hussein
Lawyer Anwar Zaki Nusseibeh
Fack Barakat
Rauhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem
Hilmi Al Muhtaseb, Member of the Supreme Religious Court
Sa'd Ed-Deen El-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem
Lawyer Ibrahim Baker
Fouad Abd Hadi, Lawyer and Senator
Lawyer Hafez Tahbob
Lawyer Omar Wa'ri
Ishaq Darwish
Hasan Tahhub, Director of Jerusalem Waqf
Dr. Subhi Ghosheh
Ali Tazziz, President of the Chamber of Commerce
Nihad Abu Gharbieh

D. Resolutions adopted by the Higher Waqf Council and the Committee for Muslim Affairs on 14 August 1967

The Higher *Waqf* Council and Committee for Muslim Affairs read in its meeting held on 9 August 1967 the report published by the *Jerusalem Post* in its issue of 8 August 1967 under the heading "The need to clear 82 metres in the area of Al-Baraq Wall" and discussed the evolution of the question of the Wailing Wall in its different phases and adopted the following conclusions.

1. The Jews have right of access to the Holy Place called the Wailing Wall, which is the Western Wall to the Holy Mosque, and the Muslims have preserved the Wall throughout the centuries and saw to it that no damage ever occurred.

2. The Jews enjoyed full freedom in using their rights of access to this Wall to conduct prayers and supplications until the 1948 war.

3. The Jews' rights in the Wailing Wall have been established by *status quo* and tradition.

4. In 1927 during the British Mandate Government, the Jews tried to go beyond their rights, and a bloody incident ensued between them and the Arabs. An official paper (The Western or Wailing Wall) was published by H.M.

Mandatory Government in Palestine in 1931, following the resolution adopted by the League of Nations on 14 January 1930 and this paper announced the formation of a judicial Commission to consist of three non-British members. This International Commission, after investigations, gave the following ruling:

(a) The Western Wall is exclusive Muslim property, and Muslims exercise right in rem over the Wall since it is part of the area of the Holy Mosque which is Muslim *Waqf*. Muslims also have right of property over the rasif facing the Wall and over the Maghrabi Quarter in the vicinity of the Wall since they are charitable Muslim *Waqf*.

(b) The Jews have right of access to the Wall where they can conduct prayers and supplications subject to the following rules.

(c) The door at the northern end of the Wall should be kept closed at certain hours which have to be decided upon and become binding, seeing to it that the Muslims' right of passage on the rasif in the customary way is respected and preserved.

(d) It is prohibited for any person to use the area in front of the Wall or the area adjoining for speeches or political demonstrations of any type.

(e) Since the Wall is an historical site, the Administration in Palestine should undertake its reconstruction and preservation after consultation with the Higher Muslim Council and the Rabbinical Council.

(f) Failing any action by the Muslim authorities to reconstruct the rasif, the Administration in Palestine should then take the necessary steps to reconstruct it.

(g) The wooden door leading from the rasif to the corner in the northern end of the Wall should remain closed on Saturdays and on Jewish Feast days... etc.

Reference: Palestine Laws 1933, Volume 4, page 3397 and following—Arab Edition.

5. When the Israeli Authorities occupied Arab Jerusalem with other Arab territories after the June war, they contravened all local and international law or conventions. In the Wailing Wall area they destroyed two Muslim Mosques and a whole quarter, the Maghribi Quarter,

rendering its population homeless, although the quarter is a charitable Muslim *Waqf*, in order to expand.

6. It is established in international laws, and conventions that it is not allowed to infringe upon other peoples' rights in an attempt to expand one's own through the exercise of a claim to expand. Therefore the above-mentioned actions contravene all laws and conventions.

7. The Israeli Authorities went further in the publication of a story in the *Jerusalem Post* under the heading "The need to clear 82 metres in the Area of the Al-Baraq Wall" which contained the following:

It is possible to settle the dispute which arose over the issue of decent behaviour in the area facing the Wall, and specially as regards the separation of women from men in the Area, if the plan drawn up in the Ministry for Religious Affairs to clear 82 metres is executed.

A Committee for Education attached to the Knesset toured the Jewish Holy Places yesterday, and was informed by Chief Rabbi Torin, an official in the Ministry of Religion, that the concerned area is concealed by a number of buildings adjoining the Wall, and that it is possible to destroy these buildings and thus clear 48 metres for those who wish to pray whilst the rest of the area will remain open to the general public.

Chief Rabbi Torin also said that it has been proved that the northern part of the Wall also existed but was concealed by a number of buildings constructed over the centuries, and that the excavations carried out by the Jordanian Authorities showed that the Eastern part of the Wall existed in its entire length, and it is thought that the site for the Southern part also exists, and thus the Walls surrounding the Temple should extend for 480 metres.

In view of all this.

The Higher Council for Muslim *Waqf* in the Western Bank, in its mentioned capacity and in its capacity as a Muslim Committee responsible with the Director of the Office of Muslim *Waqf*, has convened and discussed the dangerous situation referred to by the aforementioned paper, and has decided to put the following on record:

1. The Muslim Committees in the occupied territories on the West Bank do not deny the Jews their traditional rights in the Western Wall.

2. The Muslim bodies, though, point out that the actions referred to in the *Jerusalem Post*, if accurate, imply the destruction of the honorary corner adjoining the Blessed Aksa Mosque, which is a Holy Muslim Shrine, together with other

buildings, the destruction of the Tankizi School, the site of the Old Religious Court, where a Mosque stands, the destruction of the Institute for Muslim Studies and the Secretariat of the General Islamic Conference, all of which are religious and historical Muslim sites and charitable Muslim *Waqf*.

The above-mentioned Muslim bodies hope that the Authorities will take into consideration the consequences of such actions and its repercussions in the Muslim and international communities, and the damage which such actions would cause to the Aksa Mosque, and that it will further take into consideration that it is not permissible to infringe upon the rights of Muslims or to violate the sanctity of their Holy Shrines, and that such actions would contravene all international laws and conventions.

We hope that the Israeli Authorities will reassure the Muslim Community that it does not contemplate hurting Muslims' susceptibilities concerning their Shrines, *Waqf* and charitable institutions, and further that the story published in the *Jerusalem Post* is not accurate and has no support from the Ministry of Religious Affairs or any other official body.

We have asked the Director of the Office of Muslim *Waqf* to inform the Military Governor of this meeting and the resolutions adopted in it.

Signed:

Said Sabri, Member of the *Waqf* Council and Judge of the Muslim Religious Court in Jerusalem

Hilmi Al Muhtaseb, Member of the *Waqf* Council and Member of the Supreme Muslim Religious Court

Abdel Hamid El Sayeh, President of the *Waqf* Council and President of the Supreme Muslim Religious Court

Hassan Tahboub, Director of the Muslim *Waqf* in Jerusalem

Sa'd El-Din Alami, Member of the *Waqf* Council and Mufti of Jerusalem

E. Document dated 22 August 1967 submitted by Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Al Sayeh and twenty-eight other personalities

*In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Ruling by the Muslim Jurists*

In view of the publication of an article in the *Jerusalem Post* on 8 August 1967 under the heading: "The need to clear 82 meters adjoining the [Baraq Wall]" which stated that the Ministry for Religious Affairs in Israel had drawn up a plan to clear that area, and that the Committee for Education in the Knesset has toured the Holy Places and was informed by Chief Rabbi Torin, an official in the Ministry for Religion, that the area concerned was hidden by the buildings adjoining the Wall, and that the southern end of the Wall had existed before but was covered by buildings erected over time etc. . . .

And in view of the prayer conducted by the Chief Rabbi of the Israeli Army, Brigadier Goren with some followers in the area of the Al-Aksa Mosque on 15 August 1967, and his statement that he intends to conduct other prayers in the area, and to build a synagogue there, on the pretext that it is some distance from the Al-Aksa Mosque, and Holy Dome of the Rock, and further his statement that the aforementioned area is part of Mount Mora, as alleged in *Haaretz* in its publication on 16 August 1967.

And in view of the statement by the Minister for Religion in a conference held by Jewish Rabbis for Jewish communities outside Israel in support of Jerusalem, which was held in the Hall of "The Suleiman Temple" in Jerusalem, and which was attended by the world Mizrahi party, representing Jewish communities in Britain, Canada, France and America, and in which the speakers included Dr. Samwel Yorsky, the Chief Rabbi of New York, and its Zionist leader, the Minister for Religion, and Dr. Mitchin, the Chief Rabbi in Britain.

And in view that the aforesaid statement of the Minister contained the following:

The Liberation of Jerusalem has placed all the Christian Holy Places, and an important part of the Muslim Holy Places, under the province of Israel, and has returned to the Jewish their Holy Places. But Israel has other Holy Places in East Jordan, and the Holy Mosque in Jerusalem, though Holy to other religions (referring to Islam) is a Jewish shrine, but we are not thinking at the present of building our temple there, though we will do all we can about it,

and we will build all the Jewish Synagogues in the Old City and enlarge the area of Al-Baraq Wall as soon as possible.

As to the Holy Ibrahimi Mosque, the Cave is a Jewish shrine which we have bought, in the same way we have bought the Holy Rock in the days of David and the Yabusions, and our rights in the Cave and the Rock are rights of Conquest and acquisition.

And in view of what was reported in a talk with the Minister for Religion in the 18 August 1967 edition of *Haaretz* that the Cave of Makfila and the Beraq Wall are Jewish by right of conquest and acquisition.

And in view of the far-reaching consequences of the above statements and actions for Jerusalem and the Holiest Muslim Shrines.

We, the Muslim Jurists, Ulama, and Muftis in Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan announce and declare the following rulings:

1. That the Al-Aksa Mosque and the blessed Ibrahimi Mosque are Muslim Mosques which are Holy to Islam.

2. That the Aksa Mosque is the first place towards which the Muslims turn their faces in prayer, and the third Holiest Mosque in Islam the pilgrimage to which is imperative on all Muslims according to the Hadith of the prophet, may God's blessings and peace be upon him, as reported by the Imam Bakhari and others. (The pilgrimage of Muslims should be directed to three Mosques only, this my Mosque [the Prophet's Mosque] and Al-Aksa and Al-Haram Mosques.)

And that the blessed Al-Aksa Mosque was the terminal point of the Prophet's Holy journey, may God's blessing and peace be upon him, and the starting point of his Holy passage, and that it is imperative on all Muslims throughout the world to safeguard the sanctity of Jerusalem and the blessed Mosque with the same care they safeguard the sanctity of Mecca and its Mosque and protect it from aggression, so that the two terminal points of the Prophet's Holy passage are cared for and cherished, and seen to that easy access to those Mosques is guaranteed to all Muslims throughout the world.

God the most high has ordained; (Mighty is He who transported His Servant at night from El-Haram Mosque to El-Aksa Mosque which We have blessed, as We have blessed the area surrounding it)—from Surat Al-Isra.

3. That the Aksa Mosque referred to includes all the Mosque, which is the Mosque, the surrounding walls, and the doors, which today includes Al-Aksa Mosque, the Holy Dome of the Rock, and the adjoining area.

And that any violation of the sanctity of the area contained within the walls of the Holy Mosque is a violation of the sanctity of the Holy Mosque itself.

And that the jurists and historians have ruled that this area concerned extends 700 pics in length and 455 pics in breadth, whilst others maintained that the area was larger, because of the controversy over the principle of measurement used and the exact measure of a pic.

And that during the Mandatory period it was established after detailed study that the aforesaid area was 140 dunums and 900 metres.

References: Ibn Al-Fakih in 903 A.D., Ibn Abd Rabboh Al-Andalusi in his book: *Al-Ukd Al-Farid* 913 A.D., Al-Makdasi in 985 A.D., and the Map of the Holy Mosque published in 1944 by the Survey Department, the British Mandate Government.

4. That the Jews have rights in the Wailing Wall established by the *status quo* and tradition, both during Muslim-Turkish rule and Christian Mandate Government, and that they had fully and freely utilized these rights until the Arab-Jewish war in 1948.

And that the Jews wished to expand these rights in 1929, causing bitter conflict with the Muslims and Arabs, leading to violence and revolution in 1929, and that, as a result of that bloody incident an official paper "The Western or Wailing Wall" was published in Palestine in 1931 by Britain following the resolution adopted by the League of Nations on 14 January 1930, and that this paper announced the appointment of an International Commission to consist of three non-British jurists, and that the Commission after the hearings from leading Muslim and Jewish lawyers, concluded the following ruling:

(a) That the Western Wall is exclusively Muslim property on which Muslims exercise right *in rem*, since it is contained within the area of the Holy Mosque which is Muslim *Waqf*, and that Muslims have rights of property over Al-Rasif, which stands before the Wall and before the area known as Moghrabi Quarter adjoining

the Wall, since it is, according to Muslim jurisdiction, a *Waqf* property dedicated to charity.

(b) That the Jews have right of access to the Western Wall to conduct prayers and supplications subject to the following rules.

(c) To keep the door on the tip of the Southern Wall closed on certain hours but to respect the right of access and passage to Muslims on Al-Rasif as customary.

(d) To refrain from using the area before the Wall or its surroundings for speeches or political demonstrations of any kind.

Reference: Palestine Laws 1933, Fourth Volume, page 3397 and following in the Arabic translation editions.

And that this ruling has settled that Arab-Jewish dispute concerning this Holy Place, and has become an international document which has universal application, and under no circumstances should this dispute be allowed to arise again, in the same way that judicial ruling should settle any other dispute.

Thus the expansion in the area of the Wailing Wall is a violation of the right of Muslims in the Moghrabi quarter which is a Muslim Charity *Waqf*, and the intended expansion, reported in the *Jerusalem Post*, will imply the destruction of the adjoining corner to the Holy Mosque, and includes a Mosque amongst other houses and buildings, and the destruction of the Tankizi School, on the site of the old Muslim Jurisdiction Court, on which a Mosque, the Institute of Muslim Studies, and the office of the Muslim Conference stand, all of which belong to Muslim Charity *Waqfs*, and are historical sites which should not be tampered with or touched, and that the afore-said intention violates Muslim rights and is in contravention to international laws.

5. That the rights of property over the Holy Rock and the Makfila Cave in the Holy Ibrahimi Mosque, established by old traditions and rulings after the passage of fourteen centuries during which the Muslims exercised these rights, are undisputed and that to dispute them is not permissible by any religious convention or rule, or any local or international law, and that to dispute these rights will subject personal and international rights to grave dangers, especially since the Muslims, on entry into this country after the Roman rule, have never violated the sanctity of the

Temple or its relics but acted as custodians for Jews and offered them refuge from the aggression which they suffered throughout the non-Muslim world and that, finally, the site of the Temple has not been established categorically in any religious text, and is controversial issue amongst historians and archaeologists.

In view of all this, and following the juridical rulings and historical facts, we declare the following:

1. Any violation of any part of the area of the Holy Mosque is a violation of the sanctity and holiness of the Mosque itself.

2. That the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron is a Muslim Mosque in its entirety, and that any violation of any part of the shrine is a violation of its sanctity.

3. That the area surrounding the Status of the Wailing Wall, which is the Western Wall to the Holy Mosque, has been settled in the International Ruling mentioned above, and published by the International Commission in 1931, as Muslim property, and this ruling is categoric and binding.

4. That to change the *status quo* in the Holy Mosque and the Ibrahimi Mosque, or to expand the area of the Wailing Wall is a blatant violation of the sanctity of the Muslim shrines, and constitutes a naked aggression which will have far-reaching consequences not only within the Muslim community in Jerusalem, but throughout the Muslim world and the international community.

5. That the Muslims offer free access to Jews and non-Jews to the Muslim holy places, subject to the condition that this access is treated with the behaviour and decency imperative in respecting the sanctity of these Holy shrines.

Jerusalem, 22 August 1967

Signed by:

1. Abd Al-Hamid Al Sayeh, Chief Jurist in the Western Bank and President of the Court of Appeal
2. Said Abd Allah Sabri, Chief Judge of Jerusalem and Member of the Muslim Institute
3. Suleiman Al Ja'bari, Religious Instructor in the Ministry of Education
4. Mustafa Tahbub, Chief Judge of Hebron
5. Wasef Abdo, Chief Judge of Jennin

6. Sufian Al-Khalidi, Chief Judge of Tulkarem
7. Abd Al-Hai Arafah, Mufti of Hebron
8. Rashad Al-Hilwani Tamimi, Member of Muslim Institute and Teacher at the Ibrahimiyah Mosque
9. Yasin Sadeq Al-Bakri, Imam and Teacher at the Al-Aksa Mosque
10. Abd El-Kader Abdeen, Teacher at the Aksa Mosque
11. Ahmad El-Khatib, Roving Preacher for the Ramallah area
12. Yunis Abu Rab, Preacher for Jennin
13. Fath Allah Salmudi, Preacher and Imam of Silwad Mosque
14. Saleh El-Silwadi, From the Ulama
15. Rateb Al Duwick, Chief Clerk in the Court of Bethlehem
16. Hilmi Muhtaseb, Member of the Court of Appeal
17. Said Eddin Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem
18. Mohd. As'ad Imam Husseini, Chief Judge in Ramallah
19. Jum'ma Al-Silwadi, Chief Judge in Nablus
20. Rajab Bayood Tammimi, Chief Judge in Bethlehem
21. Mohd. Said Al-Jamal, Assistant Chief Judge in Jericho
22. Tawfiq Jarrar, Mufti of Jennin
23. Jamil El-Khatib, Preacher and Imam of the Aksa Mosque
24. Mohd. Khalil El-Takruri, Imam and Teacher at the Aksa Mosque
25. Akramah Sabri, Teacher at the Muslim Institute
26. Yousef El-Silwadi, Chief Preacher in Ramallah area
27. Mohd. Khalawi Jolani, Chief Preacher in Bethlehem
28. Abd El-Sam'eh Hasan Rifa'ei, Imam and Preacher in Mosque of Bethlehem
29. Mahmoud Al-Habeeh, From the Ulama

ANNEX II

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY
ISRAEL AUTHORITIES*A. Survey of Activities Undertaken by Government Ministries to Implement the Reunification of Jerusalem*

This survey summarizes the activities undertaken by the Government Ministries in charge of services and economics after the reunification of Jerusalem. These activities were primarily concerned with the renewal and establishment of vital services to the civilian population and the return to normal of economic and commercial conditions.

During this period preparations were also made for the expansion of government services, such as preparations for opening the schools for the new academic year beginning September 1, arrangements for introducing student medical services and opening of social welfare offices under the auspices of the Ministry for Social Welfare and the Jerusalem Municipality.

*I. Activities of Service Ministries and the Jerusalem Municipality**1. Ministry of Health**a. Activation of Services*

All health services functioning before June 5 have been reinstituted with the former medical, administrative and maintenance staffs remaining at their posts under the supervision and professional direction of the Ministry of Health.

Because organisation and level of services are of a lower standard than those in Israel, the Israeli supervisory staff is working with the local employees to improve gradually the quality of services.

b. Institutions Operating

1. Government hospital with a 104 bed capacity.

2. Health Bureau which sponsors a general clinic offering basic medical services to the population without charge.

In addition to its role as a professional and administrative authority, the Bureau is also

concerned with general questions of public health, prevention of malaria, enforcement of work safety ordinances and registration of births and deaths.

3. A blood bank serving the city hospitals and, at present, the hospitals of the West Bank.

4. A central laboratory which provides services for the hospitals of the region (Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem and Hebron).

5. A Tuberculosis Prevention Centre serving the city and the West Bank.

6. The Ministry assists the Mother and Child Welfare Stations by supplying midwives to some of the stations and granting other forms of aid according to need.

c. Health services functioning with the help of the Ministry of Health:

Jerusalem has six philanthropic-public hospitals with a 383 bed capacity. Attached to these hospitals are clinics offering ambulatory and consultative services. The Ministry of Health provides these institutions with laboratory and blood bank services, vaccines, etc.

d. The licensing of medical personnel is in process, on the basis of a list compiled by the Health Bureau.

e. Standard inoculation given to the Israeli population will be extended automatically to East Jerusalem residents.

f. The Minister of Health appointed a Commission to study East Jerusalem health services and submit a comprehensive health programme including recommendations on organisation and activities of health services and delineation of areas of responsibility of the various service bodies involved.

g. The Hospital Authority is at present examining the question of hospital facilities available in United Jerusalem, including those of East Jerusalem and Mt. Scopus.

2. *Ministry of Posts*

a. Mail and Telegraph Service.

On July 5, 1967 the first East Jerusalem Post Office branch was inaugurated across from Herod's Gate. All branch workers are former employees of the Jordanian Postal Services. The branch is open 7 days a week and offers a complete range of postal services. These include telegram

delivery to all of East Jerusalem, with the exceptions of Shufat and Beit Hanina where branches are to be opened shortly.

b. Telephone

After the East Jerusalem telephone system was repaired, the lines were connected to the national network on July 31, 1967. All services, including international connections, are now available in East Jerusalem. Some lines are still undergoing repairs, but the Ministry of Posts hopes to have the entire network completed within 4 weeks.

3. *Ministry for Religious Affairs*

a. Activities of the Department for Moslem and Druze Affairs.

This Department is in contact with the various Moslem institutions in East Jerusalem, including the Shari'a Court of Appeals, the Shari'a Kadi, the School for the training of Religious leaders and the administrators of the Moslem religious sites.

The Ministry for Religious Affairs has allotted the sums requested by the Moslem leaders to pay the June salaries of their employees.

The Minister for Religious Affairs has met with the Moslem Kadi to discuss various problems concerned with the Shari'a Courts. Arrangements have been made to continue with the repair work at the al-Aksa Mosque.

In response to the request of the Kadis, and in consultation with them, an agreement concerning visits to the Moslem Holy Places has been reached.

b. Activities of the Department of Christian Affairs.

Immediately after the cessation of fighting, contact with Church leaders residing in East Jerusalem was resumed. It should be pointed out that most of the Jerusalem Patriarchs and Bishops remained in communication with the Ministry for Religious Affairs over issues including the unification of Jerusalem during their visits to Church institutions in Israel.

The Ministry assisted the Church leaders with such problems as war damages, exemption from taxation, travel permits and documents for travel abroad.

In consultation with Christian leaders, arrangements were made concerning access to the Christian Holy Places.

The Ministry for Religious Affairs, in cooperation with the Police and the Ministry of Labour, cleared the approach to the Western Wall. Necessary improvements of paths leading to the Wall have been made, as well as plans for the paving of existing and constructing of new approaches.

4. *Ministry of Education and Culture*

a. *Children and Schools*

Establishing of compulsory kindergartens—

The Jordanian Compulsory Education law does not include kindergarten attendance for children above the age of five. To remedy this, the Ministry of Education and Culture has prepared a programme for the gradual introduction of compulsory kindergarten education and the establishment of such kindergartens. At the commencement of the 1967 academic year, parents will be informed of the opening of kindergartens attached to government elementary schools as is done in the Arab schools in Israel.

During the coming academic year, the Ministry of Education will retain the educational structure prevailing in East Jerusalem before the War. Accordingly, Junior High School comprises the 7th, 8th and 9th years of schooling. The Ministry will administer examinations for passing into the 10th grade as was done under the Jordanian regime, and will set graduated school fees for the 10th, 11th and 12th years.

The Ministry of Education has made arrangements to retain the teaching and administrative staff formerly employed by the Jordanian Government. Nine former officials of the Regional Education Office of Jordan are assisting with the necessary preparations for the opening of the academic year.

b. *Department of Antiquities and Museums*

Immediately after the War, the Department of Antiquities and Museums was entrusted with the responsibility for the Rockefeller Museum and its collection. The Department immediately began examination of the exhibits and has taken the necessary steps to safeguard the building and collections. Though the building and some of its exhibits were damaged during the war, the

museum was reopened to the public on July 11, 1967. The Dead Sea Scrolls which were removed to safety before the fighting were found. A number of former Jordanian employees have resumed their work at the Museum.

Archaeological work in East Jerusalem has been renewed; and, Kathleen Kenyon, the British archaeologist, has resumed with her 4 excavations in East Jerusalem.

5. *Ministry of Police*

The activities of the Ministry of Police may be divided into two major periods:

- end of hostilities until reunification (June 29, 1967);
- from reunification onward.

During the first stage, the police was primarily occupied with assisting the military forces in protecting the historical and holy sites, preventing looting, directing traffic, supervising traffic between the two sectors of the city, etc.

With the transfer of Jerusalem from military to civilian responsibility, the police were given the task of controlling traffic to the Holy Places. To date 36 local policemen and officers have been hired out of a total of 100 planned to be added to the Israeli Police Force. Former regional police personnel are now working with the Israeli force. Thirty policemen will be placed at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Mosques of Omar and al-Aksa and the Western Wall.

6. *Ministry of Justice*

The Ministry has taken over the existing Land Register Books in order to allow continuation of land transactions.

According to regulations promulgated by the Minister of Justice, East Jerusalem lawyers may continue to practice without the need of additional examinations.

7. *Ministry for Social Welfare*

The Ministry for Social Welfare conducted a study of welfare institutions in East Jerusalem to facilitate continuation of their food distribution activities. In coordination with the Juvenile Court and the Police, arrangements were made for

probation Officers to continue their work with children under their care.

In coordination and cooperation with the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry is basing its activities upon the following:

Continuation of welfare payments at their previous standard, to persons deemed needy by the Jordanian Government;

Registration of new welfare cases since the War;

Opening of a Welfare Bureau in the Old City;

Employment of 5 former Jordanian welfare workers who previously served in East Jerusalem.

The Regional Bureau of the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Municipal Social Department are drawing up a programme for the gradual improvement of welfare services to the level in West Jerusalem.

8. *Ministry of Labour*

a. Surveys of the various areas within the Ministry's sphere of responsibility are being carried out. These cover cooperative enterprises, vocational education institutions, industrial plants, trades, services and labour relations. With completion of the surveys in the near future, a comprehensive programme of activity will be formulated.

b. Legal aspects concerning the labour situation are being studied—for example, corporations which were registered under Jordan as cooperative societies, or labour contracts which were registered as collective agreements.

The Ministry will make special budgetary allotments for implementation of its services in eastern Jerusalem.

d. Services offered to the public:

1. A Labour Bureau was opened which operates according to the 1959 Labour Services Law and handles registration of job-seekers, centralization of requests for labour and notification of suitable job-seekers and provision of relief work.

2. Establishing contact with employers (governmental and public bodies during the first stage) to bring to their attention the responsibilities of employers toward their workers and the work-safety regulations (work accidents, building activities, overtime-work hours, etc). The distri-

bution of such information has already started, though communication problems related to the difference between the spoken and written language have arisen.

3. Investigations of work accidents and safety-inspection visits have begun.

4. The Ministry's Public Works Department is executing the following:

Building for the Ministry for Religious Affairs near the Western Wall;

Repairing of the Church at David's Tower;

Repairing of war damage to the Rockefeller Museum;

Completing of government hospital (at Sheih Jarra);

Repairing of war damage to Old City Walls near Damascus Gate;

Constructing of Post Office;

When possible the Department responds to request from various government ministries (Tourism, Prime Minister's Office, etc.) and at present is negotiating with UNRWA concerning work on their buldings.

9. *Ministry of the Interior*

On June 26, 1967 a census was taken by the Ministry of the Interior, in cooperation with the Central Bureau of Statistics.

The Ministry has opened a Bureau for registration of citizens and offering necessary services, principally distribution of identity cards.

10. *Ministry of Transport*

a. After a survey, the Ministry of Transport issued new automobile and drivers licenses (private and commercial vehicles) to East Jerusalem residents. With the exchange of licenses, third person liability insurance was also arranged. The Ministry is preparing qualifications regulations for public transportation.

b. Licenses for operation of buses in East Jerusalem have been issued. Permits are valid for a three-month period, until vehicles are inspected and the traffic schedule organised.

c. The Ministry has made the necessary arrangements for testing all vehicles in the city.

d. The Ministry is conducting a survey of

all automobile owners in East Jerusalem. When the survey is completed, the Ministry will decide upon issuance of licenses to East Jerusalem residents, according to the criteria applied in West Jerusalem.

e. The Ministry has permitted the operation of two car rental agencies and, in coordination with the Ministry of Tourism, of touring cars.

f. The Minister of Transport appointed a Commission to study transportation problems resulting from the reunification of the city. The Commission's recommendations will be implemented by the Ministry of Transport, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and the Jerusalem Municipality.

11. The Jerusalem Municipality

With the decision to reunite Jerusalem, the Municipality extended all its services to East Jerusalem, though, in reality, vital services were provided immediately after the War.

a. Municipal Services

The Supply of water, the most important municipal service, was resumed with the connection of the water networks of both parts of the city shortly after the War ended. The water allotment of East Jerusalem was increased and a plan for further expansion of the water supply is being executed. The Jerusalem Municipality accepted responsibility for the maintenance of its water sources though these lay outside the municipal area. The Municipality also improved and repaired the water supply system in the villages within her jurisdiction (Shufat and Sur Bahar).

Sanitation and Public Health services were considerably expanded and the Municipality ordered new mechanized equipment and trash containers. The Public Health Department conducted anti-malaria examinations and improved municipal health installations.

The Central Bus Station has been repaired and the fire-fighting services reorganised.

The Municipality is devising a plan for those areas which were previously "no-man's-land." As the first step, it has torn down several structures and cleared roads for passage between the 2 parts of the city.

b. Reorganisation of Administration in the United City

1. Municipal departments have been merged and their employees have joined the unified departments. The Departments of Public Health and Sanitation and Municipal Supervision have moved to the East Jerusalem Municipality building.

2. Former employees whose jobs were eliminated by the department mergers were placed in a "pool" and efforts are being made to find them other employment.

3. Absorption of workers in government services transferred to the municipality has begun (education, welfare, public health).

4. Labour procedures and registration rules have been set.

II. Activities of Government Ministries concerned with Economic Conditions

1. Ministry of Finance

The Ministries of Finance and Commerce and Industry are working toward the resumption of normal economic activity as rapidly as possible. The Foreign Currency Department has instituted the procedures necessary to handle the requests of East Jerusalem residents. Sections of the Foreign Currency Act are being translated into Arabic, particularly those dealing with tourism in order to facilitate resumption of tourist activities in Jerusalem. The Income Tax and Import Tax Departments have also take all necessary action to permit normal functioning within their spheres of responsibility.

2. Ministry of Commerce and Industry

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is conducting a survey of trade in East Jerusalem. The Ministry is in contact with the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce which has a membership of 1,500. Ministry controllers have visited factories and workshops and have advised their owners on such subjects as acquisition of raw materials, import licenses, etc. Food wholesalers are being informed that they must hold permits from the Ministry in order to continue their trade.

3. *Ministry of Tourism*

The Ministry surveyed and registered all persons connected with tourism in Jerusalem. Representatives of the Ministry met separately with all those involved in the tourist industry in order to gather information and clarify existing problems.

a. Hotels

A general survey of hotels was conducted, including establishing the number of rooms and level of services offered. Once hotels were classified according to the system prevailing in Israel, they were permitted to accept tourists. Hotel owners met with Ministry officials and decided upon price levels, which were then published in Israel and abroad. The Ministry of Tourism is processing requests for loans for hotel renovations. Negotiations on the Inter-continental Hotel have been concluded and management will pass to the company within a few days.

b. Publications

A new map of Old Jerusalem and a pamphlet on Christian and Moslem Holy Places have been published, as has a booklet on the Jewish Holy Places. A revised pamphlet on Jerusalem is in the final stage of execution and a new publication on Christian pilgrimage is being prepared.

c. Travel Agencies

Temporary permits have been issued to travel agencies which will gradually be exchanged for permanent licenses once the agencies fulfill the Israeli requirements.

d. Tourist Guides

East Jerusalem guides will be able to escort tourists on the basis of a temporary permit. To receive the permanent license, a guide is required to undergo instruction according to existing regulations.

e. Stores

Registration of East Jerusalem stores is in process.

f. Tours

Tours which include all the historical and holy places of the three religions have been organized.

B. *Activities Report of the Joint Municipality in East Jerusalem—July 1967*

Municipal services have been in full operation since 29 June. In fact, they began to function right at the beginning of June, when the municipality was acting as the agent of the Military Government. In providing the services, the following principles were observed:

- a. Union of the two parts of the city.
- b. Equalisation of services.
- c. A standard of services compatible with the needs of the capital of Israel.

The Municipality did not confine itself to the services which it is required by law and custom to supply. It also dealt with such other matters as care of refugees, repairing war damage, tackling economic and employment problems, transportation, and the safeguarding of the Holy Places.

I. *Plans, Surveys and Coordination*

1. A provisional programme of activities and a draft budget has been drawn up. After the financial committee had reviewed the draft budget, it was submitted to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior and by the end of the month items of its several sections—an ordinary, extraordinary and a development budget—were generally approved.

2. A Population and Housing Census was carried out to gather the data necessary for planning municipal operations and drawing up the tax assessment schedule and the overall system of taxation.

3. A Business Census is being planned for the purposes of statutory commercial taxes and licensing processes.

4. Meetings were held with institutions interested in statistical material, and Jordanian statistical sources, dispersed as a result of the War, were located.

5. Meetings were also held with organizations interested in physical and mapping data and again Jordanian sources of information were located and made available.

6. A survey of municipal lands and buildings was conducted and an inventory drawn up. The former municipality's assets and liabilities,

were checked, contracts and the system of taxation were examined.

7. A water supply scheme, to be operated until 1969, was prepared.

8. The Falk Project for Economic Research was asked to prepare a medium-term, economic, social and cultural development plan, and a "brains trust" was assembled to help the planners in their work.

9. A commission of sculptors and painters, architects and graphic artists was set up to draft directives for "street furnishings" in the Old City such as street signs and lighting.

10. A survey of school premises was conducted with a view to opening the new school year in September.

11. A transport survey was carried out and road building priorities were determined in the light of transport problems arising out of the unification of the City.

12. The municipality was represented in planning teams formed to restore the Jewish quarter of the Old City.

II. Administrative Reorganisation

1. The unification of Departments and the redistribution of workers were completed. The Sanitation and Street Cleaning Department and the Municipal Inspection Department were shifted to the Old City municipal offices.

2. Workers were integrated into Departments; those awaiting integration have been placed in a "pool" and efforts are being made to find suitable employment for them.

3. Integration was begun of Old City civil servants in municipal departments such as education, social welfare, and public health.

4. Work and registration procedures were laid down.

III. Municipal Services

1. Street Cleaning and Sanitation—Garbage-disposal was partly rationalised and mechanised. Over 150 people were taken on in this department. New mechanical equipment, garbage containers and dust-bins were ordered. The Sanitation Department of West Jerusalem carried

out anti-malarial tests and found many anopheles-infested drains. The abattoir is being overhauled and the garbage dump has been transferred to an empty site east of Anatot.

2. Maintenance of Public Property—Damaged street lamps were repaired and part of war-damaged roads; public parks were put in shape again and repairs of the central bus terminal were started. The fire brigade was re-organised and a temporary station set up at the airport.

3. Town Planning—The demolition of buildings in the former no-man's land was completed. Rubble was cleared away, and dividing barriers were taken down in the Jaffa, Mamilla, St. George, Hebron and Bethlehem roads, and Pope's-Mount Zion-Gate Road, and in a temporary track next to Suleiman Road, all of which are now open to traffic. Traffic regulations have been laid down and entry of vehicles into the Old City is barred.

4. Stores and Supplies—The municipal stores were transferred to suitable buildings in the eastern part of the City.

5. Municipal Inspection—Inspection of compliance with municipal by-laws began. At first, municipal inspectors were posted at the entrances to the El Aqsa mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to ensure that visitors behave with due respect, but the Police are now in charge.

6. Miscellaneous—Hebrew names were given to twenty-two streets in the Old City. The by-laws of West Jerusalem were translated into Arabic.

7. Tourism—The Citadel is being cleared so that it may be opened to the public. A Tourist Information Office run by the municipality and the Ministry of Tourism jointly has been opened at Jaffa Gate. The Cave of Zedekiah is under preparation for tourists' visits. Plans for a "son et lumière" spectacle are under way. The municipality has attended discussions between the Ministry of Tourism and the agencies and parties concerned to deal with the problems of the tourist industry.

8. Water—The networks of the two parts of the city were joined and the amount of water supplied to East Jerusalem was greatly increased. Expansion of the system in East Jerusalem is proceeding according to an approved development

programme; consumers were registered and meters are being installed. Besides current maintenance of the sources outside the city—Ein Farrah, Ein Fuar, Ein Kelt and Solomon's Pools—the supplies to the villages of Shaafat and Tsur Baher, which are under municipal jurisdiction, were repaired and improved.

IV. National Services

1. Education and Culture—The necessary arrangements were made in coordination with the Ministry of Education and Culture for the commencement of the school year on 1 September. Buildings were prepared, furniture was examined and textbooks were ordered. Meetings were held with the administrative staff and school inspectors, and the public libraries were checked.

2. Youth and Sports—A basketball match has already taken place between teams from East and West Jerusalem.

3. Social Welfare—The Social Welfare Department are to begin operations shortly: funds and instructions are awaited from the Ministry of Social Welfare.

4. Public Health—Preparations were made for school health services to be extended once the new school year begins. Ten nurses and two doctors will be required. It is also proposed to open at least two Mother-and-Child Clinics in East Jerusalem, and one in Silwan.

V. Public Relations

Meetings between corresponding professional and social organizations in East and West Jerusalem were arranged, and meetings and tours in the villages incorporated within the municipal bounds were held. Contact was maintained with ecclesiastical and other organizations principally to assist them in repairing war damage that may have been caused to their buildings. The mayor and his officers made the acquaintance of the new Arab employees of the municipality at a special meeting.

Steps were taken to obtain loan funds for commercial enterprises suffering from a shortage of working capital. Workers referred to the municipality by the Labour Exchange were employed on relief allocations.

ANNEX III

LIST OF PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED BY THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Israel officials and other personalities

Mr. Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel
Dr. Y. Herzog, Director of the Prime Minister's Office
Mr. Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Rabbi Warhaftig, Minister for Religious Affairs
Mr. A. Levavi, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. A. Lourie, Acting Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Y. Tekoah, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem
Mr. J. Gadish, Director of the Arab Department at the Ministry of Education
Mr. D. de Shalit, Ministry of Tourism
Mr. I. Zuriel, Ministry of Tourism
Ambassador A. Chelouche, Director of the Economic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Menashe Eliachar, President of the Chamber of Commerce
Dr. Carpas, Acting Director of Hadassa Hospital
Mr. Raphael Levi, Assistant District Officer

Arab personalities

Abd Al-Hamid Al Sayeh, President of the Sharia Court of Appeal
Hilmi Al-Muhtaseb, Member of the Sharia Court of Appeal
Sa'ad El-Din Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem
Mr. Anwar Zaki Nusseibeh, Lawyer, Member of Parliament for Jerusalem, ex-Minister of Defence, and former Jordanian Ambassador to London
Mr. Anton Attallah, Senator and former Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Rauhi al-Khatib, Mayor of East Jerusalem
Dr. George Farah, Director of Augusta Victoria Hospital

Mr. Ayoub Musallam, ex-Minister, ex-Mayor of Bethelern

Mr. Hassan Abdul Fattah Darwish, ex-Member of Jordanian Parliament

Mr. Jalil Harb, Cinema and hotel owner

Religious authorities

Rabbi Y. Untermann, Chief Rabbi of Israel

Patriarch Benedictus of the Greek Orthodox Church

Patriarch Gori of the Latin Church

Patriarch Deridian of the Armenian Church

Monsignor Sepinski, Apostolic Delegate

Archimandrite Antony, Head of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Jerusalem

Archbishop McInnes of the Church of England

Abbot Rudloff (Benedictine), Dormition Monastery

Bishop A. Yossef of the Abyssinian Church

Bishop Bazileus of the Coptic Church

Bishop Qubaim (Arab) of the Anglican Church

Bishop Elias Ziadé of the Maronite Church

Monsignor Naoum, Syrian Catholic Church

Father Joseph Alliot (Franciscan), First Assistant to the Custodian of the Holy Land

271

Report of Secretary-General U Thant on Mr. Gussing's Mission in the Occupied Territories, September 15, 1967.¹

INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, the Security Council called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities, recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and

the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council. This resolution was later welcomed with great satisfaction by the General Assembly in the latter's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967.

2. On 6 July the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing as his Special Representative to obtain for him on the spot the information required for the proper discharge of his responsibilities under the above resolution of the Security Council.

3. An interim report on Mr. Gussing's activities was submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly on 18 August (A/6787, S/8124). The annual report which the Commissioner General of UNRWA will submit shortly to the General Assembly on his activities is of course related to some aspects of the work of Mr. Gussing. The present report is based on the information contained in the final report of Mr. Gussing to the Secretary-General.

I. MISSION OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

4. The Special Representative's mission was both complex and difficult. His main task was to report on conditions affecting civilian populations and prisoners of war in the aftermath of the war. The main subjects to be looked into were in themselves delicate and wide in scope. They were: the situation of the population in areas now under Israel control; the measures taken to shelter and to facilitate the return of those who had fled; the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilians.

5. This task involved extensive travel in an area where itineraries are often complicated by the absence of direct communications between the countries concerned. The gathering of accurate information is not easy in a period following active hostilities and when communications and administration are upset and strong tensions and emotions prevail. Some of the information received was contradictory and difficult to verify. Moreover, the time at the disposal of the Special Rep-

¹ U.N. doc. A/6797.

representative was very limited because of the obligation of the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly without undue delay. It was not expected therefore that he would or could undertake to investigate the large number of individual complaints submitted either to the Secretary-General or directly to the Special Representative himself.

6. In the light of these considerations, the Special Representative has concentrated on obtaining an over-all view of the situation and of the main problems which face the groups of the population affected by the recent hostilities with which he was particularly concerned.

7. The Special Representative's main activities during his time in the Near East were:

(a) Obtaining through travel and field visits (an itinerary of his travels is attached as annex I) to the maximum extent possible a direct impression of the areas where hostilities had taken place, and of their inhabitants, as well as of the condition of displaced persons elsewhere;

(b) Meeting government officials at the highest level of central government as well as at the level of province, district and local administration;

(c) Meeting spokesmen of the local populations, of refugees, and of detainees;

(d) Meeting representatives of United Nations agencies and offices with direct knowledge of the areas and populations involved, in particular, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offices, and the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB);

(e) Meeting representatives of other international agencies working in these areas, in particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of voluntary agencies.

8. During his visits to the Governments in the area, opportunities have arisen to discuss solutions to urgent problems, such as the return of displaced persons. The presence of the Special Representative has also served to remind displaced

persons, prisoners of war and the population of occupied areas that their problems are a serious preoccupation to the United Nations and that efforts are being made to alleviate their hardships.

9. The Special Representative received excellent co-operation at all levels in the countries he visited. He was allowed full freedom of movement and given every assistance, such as transportation and the necessary arrangements for visits. Nevertheless, when travelling officially, in all the countries concerned the Special Representative met with spokesmen of the civilian population, displaced persons, prisoners of war and local authorities only in the company of representatives of the Government. Particularly in the occupied areas it would have been of great psychological importance and would have provided for franker exchanges for the Special Representative and for the people to whom he spoke if he had the opportunity to meet and talk without witnesses to whomsoever he wished. This view was conveyed to Israel government representatives, but without result.

10. Although the Special Representative visited Jerusalem, he was not able to pay the same attention to this city as he was to other areas, nor was it necessary for him to do so in view of the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Personal Representative to gather information specifically on the situation in Jerusalem (see A/6793, S/8146).

11. The ICRC, in a spirit of full understanding and co-operation, has acquainted the Special Representative with the work of the ICRC representatives in the Near East area in so far as that work related to aspects of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) for which the ICRC traditionally takes direct responsibility. On the basis of the Special Representative's direct observations in the Near East, the Secretary-General wishes to express his great appreciation for the untiring and selfless efforts of these representatives in their difficult and delicate task, aimed at reducing human hardship and suffering wherever possible.

12. The Special Representative has advised the Secretary-General that he received excellent co-operation from the representatives of the United Nations and other international organizations referred to above, particularly from UNRWA. This co-operation greatly assisted him

in carrying out his task. The Special Representative has also reported the great efforts being made in all the areas he visited by a large number of international and national voluntary agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian populations and to refugees uprooted because of the war and living often under miserable conditions in temporary shelters, and not infrequently without any shelter at all. This combined effort of so many different organizations, which has greatly contributed to a reduction of the human suffering in the wake of the war, is much appreciated.

13. The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express his warm appreciation to Mr. Gussing, who has already served the United Nations with distinction on two previous occasions, and to his two collaborators, Mr. Hubert Morsink and Mr. Robert Prevot, for having gathered under trying circumstances the extensive information which constitutes the basis of this report. The Secretary-General also expresses his sincere thanks to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for making Mr. Gussing's services available.

II. SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE POPULATION IN AREAS UNDER ISRAEL CONTROL

A. Syrian area

General situation

14. In south-western Syria an area of some 80 kilometres long and 36 kilometres deep is at present under Israel military control. The original population, assumed to have been some 115,000 according to Syrian sources, and some 90,000 according to Israel sources, included 17,000 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA. At the time of the Special Representative's visit, this entire population had left the area, except for some 6,000 Druses living in agricultural villages and for some 250 other civilians living mainly in the town of Kuneitra.

15. In most of this area, villages were empty, without a human being or animal left. For instance, in the village of Kafr-Nafagk, composed of primitive houses built of black basalt stone, sometimes with a complement of concrete, which

the mission visited, there was no sign of life. The town of Banias was in ruins and the nearby archaeological site was undamaged and was attracting Israel tourists.

16. In the main town of Kuneitra only a handful of local inhabitants were seen in the streets. Of an original population of 20 to 30,000, some 200 civilians, mostly old people and women and children, had remained, some of them carrying on such activities as work for different military services, road repairs and town cleaning. The military authorities had regrouped these remaining inhabitants in the so-called Christian quarter of the city and had appointed from among them a *Mukhtar* (local government officer). The Israel authorities informed the Special Representative that they provided the civilian population with the necessary day-to-day assistance. The *Mukhtar* told the Special Representative during a meeting which was also attended by an Israel officer that the civilian population was satisfied with their present treatment.

17. Entirely different was the feeling of active life and peaceful existence in the Druse¹ villages. During the hostilities the Druse population of the occupied area had assembled in one village, and after the hostilities had ended they returned to their original villages. The Special Representative visited the prosperous fruit-growing Druse village of Majd-el-Shamsh. The villagers stated that the Druses had not wanted to leave their area because it had not been touched by military operations, because they did not want to lead the life of refugees, and also because in line with their religion and tradition they wished to keep their lands to safeguard their identity and dignity as a community. The Israel authorities had already made efforts to improve their living conditions by fulfilling requests for food and clothing, by setting up a medical clinic in the village, by resuming postal services, by introducing a telephone exchange and by promising assistance in food production and in the marketing of agricultural products.

18. The entire occupied area had been placed under Israel military administration.

¹ Adherents of a religious sect of Moslem origin, living mainly in agricultural communities in mountainous areas of Israel, Lebanon and Syria. [Footnote in source text.]

The military authorities were assisted in their civilian tasks by representatives from various ministries, for instance those dealing with finance, road repairs and transport. The military governor of the area had a budget obtained from different ministries and in line with the specific projects envisaged. These projects were co-ordinated at a higher administrative level.

19. In letters to United Nations bodies and in discussions with the Special Representative, officials of the Syrian Government listed numerous complaints regarding alleged violations of humanitarian principles by the Israel occupying forces: these complaints, which for the most part could not be investigated individually by the Special Representative, have not therefore been verified by him. They may be grouped into the following categories:

(a) Atrocities committed by the Israel forces, such as the torture of civilians, killing of civilians after they had been forced to say that they were members of the Syrian army or because their sons were in the Syrian army, shooting of prisoners, execution of young men, in particular, those carrying the service-to-the-flag booklet;

(b) Capture of nationals suspected of having participated in the 1948 war, of innocent civilians in several villages—in particular, of men under thirty-five years of age in one village and of patients in another;

(c) Rape of women and young girls and assault and insult of religious dignitaries;

(d) Neglect of wounded and of children separated from their parents;

(e) Intimidation and frightening of the population by such acts as indiscriminate shooting, burning of fields and killing of people in front of other people;

(f) Efforts to expel the population from certain villages; deportation of all civilians who had once served in the army and of all able-bodied Syrian young men;

(g) Indiscriminate looting of all houses and shops in Kuneitra; seizure of cattle and flocks of sheep. Looting, through excavation, of the historic site of Banias;

(h) Destruction of several villages with dynamite and bulldozers after the hostilities had ended. (Among the places mentioned are Banias,

Jbeita-el-Zeit, Kfar-Harim and Nukheila.) The last such destruction allegedly took place on 13 July;

(i) Starvation of the population.

20. It should be noted that the complaints grouped under categories (a) through (d) above refer essentially to situations which may have prevailed during the period of active hostilities or immediately thereafter, and therefore would have required detailed on-the-spot investigation for each particular case. Some of the complaints grouped under (e) through (i) refer more directly to events and situations which allegedly continue to occur up to the present day. In letters to United Nations bodies and in discussions with the Special Representative, officials of the Israel Government have rejected these allegations.

Civilian population in the occupied area

21. In order to assess the conditions relevant to the safety, security and welfare of the population, the Special Representative heard the views of a wide range of persons in both Syria and Israel, visited the refugees in their temporary shelters in Syria, and made a tour of the occupied area. During this tour, on 7 and 8 August, the Special Representative was able to visit the towns of Kuneitra and Banias, and to observe, on the spot or through field glasses, the present conditions of the Arab villages of Kafr-Nafagh, Nukheila, Kfar-Hareb, Tawfik-el-Foka and Skopia and of the Druse village of Majd-el-Shamsh.

22. These field visits have enabled the Special Representative to gather a general impression of the situation now prevailing, to obtain an over-all perspective in viewing this situation, and to look into a number of selected issues affecting the security and welfare of the population in the area during the period following the cessation of active hostilities. Several aspects of Israel policy in the occupied area were looked into in more detail by the Special Representative during his visit. They are: the alleged systematic efforts to expel its entire original population from the area; the alleged wide-scale looting and the alleged demolition of entire villages after the cessation of hostilities.

Movement of population

23. Israel sources claimed that already around 6 June (at the beginning of the war, but before the Israel forces moved into Syrian territory) wealthy persons and government officials had started leaving the area. Once active hostilities reached the area, the population started moving out *en masse*. With regard to this population movement, the Israel authorities put forward the view that as a result of the widely publicized Syrian intentions concerning the fate of the civilian population of Israel in the aftermath of an Arab victory, the Syrian civilian population feared a similar fate at the hands of the Israel forces. Israel spokesmen also claimed that the Syrian Government at that time had sent messages warning the local population not to fall under Israel control and to move out of the area. However, no proof of this claim (e.g., records of monitored radio broadcasts) was given. Some persons may have left for practical reasons such as the desire to retain the possibility of receiving pensions or remittances from Syria.

24. While there were strong indications that the majority of the population had left before the end of the hostilities, reports were conflicting (or, at least, not entirely mutually supporting) as regards events after that period.

25. The Special Representative found it difficult, in such circumstances, to determine the line between physical and psychological pressure. It is equally difficult to ascertain to what extent an occupying force is responsible for the interpretation which a local population may put upon its actions. This issue has to be viewed in the context of prevalent feelings of hate, apprehension and panic in the area.

26. Reports made available to the Special Representative indicate that the local population felt frightened by incidents such as shooting in the air, or the rounding up of civilians, or in one case by the staged repetition (without prior warning and for the purpose of a film production) of how a city was occupied by the Israel army. As late as 29 August the Special Representative was informed by the Syrian Government that seven or eight persons who wished to remain in Kuneitra had recently been forced to leave that city and been expelled over the border. Allegedly

the Israel Government had later agreed that these particular refugees should be allowed to return to Kuneitra.

27. The Special Representative felt that it was likely that many such incidents had taken place and that the Israel forces had not viewed unfavourably the impact of such incidents on the movement of population out of the area. At no point during discussions on this subject was the Special Representative ever informed of any action taken by the Israel authorities to reassure the population.

28. Whatever the policy of the Israel Government may have been as regards the population, it seemed clear to the Special Representative that at the local level certain actions authorized or allowed by local military commanders were an important cause of their flight.

29. There are indications that providing reassurance to the frightened population could have been of great importance. Officers of UNTSO informed the Special Representative that after the creation of United Nations Observation Posts people came back, closely following the movement of United Nations military personnel. (On the Syrian side of the observation line the Syrian military command did not stop civilians from approaching the buffer zone and seems to allow them to return freely.) Furthermore, in spite of the fact that United Nations Observers had advised the population against working in the fields in the buffer zone, some individuals continued to try to do so, most probably feeling reassured by the United Nations presence.

30. At the time of the Special Representative's visit, several persons, Syrian and non-Syrian, were held in detention in Kuneitra, including some Israel soldiers sentenced to imprisonment for looting. During his visit and in his presence, a recently arrived team of the International Committee of the Red Cross obtained confirmation by the military governor of the permission for the ICRC to visit the detainees in prison, who had already been visited by their predecessors. Since then Lebanese civilians among those detained in Kuneitra have been returned to their homes in connexion with the exchange of prisoners of war.

Looting

31. Although reports from Israel sources indicate that Kuneitra was taken without fighting, the Special Representative observed all over the city that nearly every shop and every house seemed to have been broken into and looted. A visit to one apartment building confirmed the thoroughness with which the looting had been done, and showed that in some cases dwellings had been set on fire after looting had occurred.

32. Israel spokesmen did not deny the looting but pointed out that looting is often associated with warfare. They also claimed that the Syrian army had announced the capture of Kuneitra twenty-four hours before it was actually taken by the Israel forces and that this would have allowed the Syrian army to loot the town for this period of time.

33. They pointed out that several divisions, both Syrian and Israel, as well as fleeing population from villages closer to the Israel border, had passed through the city of Kuneitra during and after the hostilities. However, on the strength of reports received from different sources, the Special Representative felt reasonably sure that the responsibility for this extensive looting of the town of Kuneitra lay to a great extent with the Israel forces, and he expressed this view to the Israel officials accompanying him during his tour of the city.

34. Syrian authorities in their statements attached special importance to the looting in the occupied area and particularly in the historic site near the town of Banias. These statements, addressed to the United Nations, to UNESCO and to several embassies, persistently alleged "excavations" and "international robbery" of historic treasures. The Special Representative, during his extensive tour of the site, could find no trace of any recent digging in those parts of the site that were shown to him.

Demolition of villages

35. The Special Representative visited several of the villages mentioned in Syrian complaints which alleged destruction by dynamite or bulldozers and implied premeditated demolition for non-military reasons. He visited the heavily damaged town of Banias. Pieces of heavy

artillery visible among the ruins, and the detailed description by senior officers of the Israel forces of the route of military advance in the area, left him reasonably sure that the vast destruction had been caused mainly during actual fighting and to some extent after the fighting had ended by the military necessity of blowing up structures on the point of collapsing or which possibly still contained unexploded ammunition or mines.

36. Because of mined roads, the Special Representative observed through field glasses the partly destroyed village of Nukheila, west of Banias. Its destruction could be explained by similar military reasons.

37. In late August demolitions were reported in the village of Kafr El Maa, which lies within the buffer zone east of Lake Tiberias. South of the lake the Special Representative observed through field glasses the entirely destroyed village of Tawfik-el-Foka and the heavily damaged village of Kfar-Hareb. The two villages, which formed part of a chain of military fortifications, were located on a military advance route, and heavy fighting had allegedly taken place in both. It was pointed out to the Special Representative that the village of Skopia had not suffered damage, since it was not located on the route of the advance of the Israel military forces.

38. To sum up on the question of the destruction or demolition of villages and towns, the Special Representative felt that the localities he observed, including three of the four persistently mentioned in Syrian complaints, did show vast destruction, but that this destruction could largely be attributed to military operations.

39. In connexion with his tour of the occupied areas of Syria, the Special Representative also paid visits to the Israel frontier *kibbutzim* of Gadot, Lahavot Habashan and Tel-Katzir and the small locality of Ashmora, all of which were said to have been shelled during the war. He was informed by the Israel authorities that during the war over 1,000 shells fell in the *kibbutz* of Gadot alone.

B. Jordanian area*General situation*

40. The area of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan now under Israel military control,

which is bounded by the Israel-Jordan armistice demarcation line and the river Jordan, is commonly known as the West Bank. The population was approximately 600,000 to 700,000, including the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, plus about 430,000 UNRWA registered refugees, or a total of about 1 million to 1.1 million persons. During and after the fighting an estimated 200,000 persons left for the East Bank. In addition, a substantial number of persons were displaced within the West Bank area.

41. The West Bank area came under Israel military administration after the hostilities, while the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem and some surrounding areas were promptly incorporated in the Israel municipality of Jerusalem.

42. Complaints by the Jordanian authorities relevant to the safety, welfare and security of the population of the West Bank could not all be investigated in detail or verified by the Special Representative. They can be grouped into the following categories:

- (a) Efforts to expel the population from the area;
- (b) Acts of deliberate intimidation, terror and oppression of the population;
- (c) Atrocities against civilian populations;
- (d) Demolition of houses, buildings and entire villages after hostilities had ended;
- (e) Looting;
- (f) Use of napalm and fragmentary bombs during the fighting;
- (g) Limitations and conditions put up by Israel and impeding the free return of all refugees;
- (h) Inhuman treatment of prisoners of war.

43. Israel has either rejected these complaints as unfounded, or has put forward its views on them, particularly as regards demolition of villages.

44. Before proceeding to the West Bank, the Special Representative paid a first visit to Amman on 18, 19 and 20 July. The discussions between the Jordanian Government and the Special Representative were almost entirely devoted to two problems of particular concern to the Government; namely, the provision of adequate relief to those persons who had fled to the East Bank as a consequence of the June hostilities, and their return to the West Bank. In

this connexion the Special Representative visited a number of refugee camps on the East Bank which were providing temporary shelter for the displaced persons.

45. During several tours of the West Bank, the Special Representative visited the towns of Nablus, Qalqiliya, Bethlehem and Hebron, as well as a number of villages and refugee camps. During these visits contact was made with the Israel military authorities and their advisers concerned with the restoration of normal civilian life, and also with Arab representatives of local government bodies and spokesmen for local economic interests, the Moslem religious authorities and the refugees.

Efforts to expel the population

46. In letters circulated to the Security Council (e.g. S/7975, S/8004, S/8110, S/8115 and S/8117), Jordan complains in general terms about Israel attempts to create "yet another Arab exodus," and in precise detail about the expulsion of specific numbers of inhabitants and about intimidation of the population, for example, by dynamiting houses in Nablus.

47. These complaints raise two distinct but related issues: the alleged Israel attempts to create another exodus to the East Bank, affecting the whole West Bank population, and the expulsion of populations from specific localities on the West Bank (which were subsequently demolished), whether or not the populations involved in fact moved to the East Bank.

48. On the first issue, affecting the West Bank as a whole, the Special Representative finds difficulty in defining what constitutes "expulsion" or "use of force" in relation to the movement of populations. During his visit to the area, the Special Representative received no specific reports indicating that persons had been physically forced to cross to the East Bank. On the other hand, there are persistent reports of acts of intimidation by Israel armed forces and of Israel attempts to suggest to the population, by loudspeakers mounted on cars, that they might be better off on the East Bank. There have also been reports that in several localities buses and trucks were put at the disposal of the population for travel to the East Bank.

49. During his visits to several refugee camps on the East Bank, newly displaced persons consistently informed the Special Representative that they had left the West Bank under pressure and that they had suffered many atrocities.

50. The truth seems to lie somewhere between an Israel statement that "no encouragement" was given to the population to flee, and the allegations about the use of brutal force and intimidation made by refugees. The inevitable impact upon a frightened civilian population of hostilities and military occupation as such, particularly when no measures of reassurance are taken, has clearly been a main factor in the exodus from the West Bank.

Demolition of villages

51. More specific details are available concerning the second category of persons displaced by Israel military forces in connexion with the demolition of certain villages and towns. Jordanian complaints submitted to the Security Council claim that 12,000 people from Qalqiliya were living in the open air around 22 June, that the villages of Beit Awa and Beit Mersim as well as three villages in the Latrun area had been levelled, leaving 5,000 to 7,000 inhabitants homeless. The Special Representative has been able to gather information covering those and other localities mentioned in other Jordanian complaints submitted directly to him.

Qalqiliya

52. Qalqiliya was a town of some 13,000 to 14,000 inhabitants located west of the city of Nablus and near the Jordan/Israel border where a large number of houses have been destroyed.

53. Israel, in a letter to the Security Council (S/8013), mentions that Qalqiliya was one of the concentration points of the Jordanian general attack on Israel and that large numbers of troops and artillery pieces were located in and around the town from which shelling of Tel Aviv and Israel villages took place. The letter states that the inhabitants left before the arrival of the Israel troops, that only houses in which Jordanian troops were found were damaged and that since the end of the battle no further buildings had been destroyed. In support of the statement that destruc-

tion had been caused by actual fighting, reference is made in the Israel statement to the nearby town of Tulkarm where allegedly no damage was done since no fighting took place there.

54. During a visit by the Assistant to the Special Representative, the Arab Mayor of Qalqiliya stated that most of the people had left the city and taken cover in the hills before and during the fighting and that about one quarter of the population had remained in the city. After the occupation of the city by the Israel forces, the remaining population was advised by the Israel Military Commander to leave. The Mayor asserted that up to that moment, perhaps some fifteen to twenty houses had been destroyed or damaged through actual fighting. The population was taken to the town of Azun, twenty kilometres from Qalqiliya; from Azun they left for Nablus, where they stayed for about three days, when they were told they could go back. But when they were going back they were stopped in Azun. The Mayor requested and was allowed to see the Minister of Defence in Jerusalem; three weeks after they left their city, the population was allowed to go back to Qalqiliya. Upon their return they found that out of a total of some 2,000 dwellings approximately 850 had been demolished. The Mayor repeatedly stated that he did not know the reasons for this large-scale destruction.

55. The Israel military governor stated that the destruction had been caused partly by tanks and partly by dynamite. He stressed that Qalqiliya "fought," by which it was meant that there was general resistance to the Israel military forces, and that it was the first Jordanian town taken. Houses from which sniping took place were dynamited. Others were destroyed for "safety" reasons, e.g. houses on the point of collapsing and possibly containing unexploded ammunition, or for sanitary reasons, e.g. because of the presence of dead bodies. Fear of the possible collapse of houses was also given by the military governor as a reason why the population was not allowed to return for some time.

56. The military governor said that he was willing to support the population in their plans for reconstruction and that he had already taken measures to get food supplies to the city and to get shops opened again.

57. The city was heavily guarded by Israel military personnel and no signs of friendly contact between local inhabitants and the occupying forces were observed.

Villages in the Latrun area

58. In the Latrun area are located the border-line villages of Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba, together containing a population of some 4,000 according to Israel information, and 10,000 according to information from the refugees. In the same area are located the villages of Beit Likquia, Beit Sira and Beni Hareth, with an estimated total population of 3,300. The first three villages mentioned have been destroyed.

59. An Israel liaison officer stated that the destruction had taken place mostly during the fighting, that the Jordanian Army in the area had been assisted by one battalion of Egyptian commandos, that the area had been heavily shelled, that fighting had gone on all through the night and that tanks had gone through the villages because these are located on the way from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

60. The Israel Minister of Defence, in his meeting with the Special Representative, stated that he had ordered the destruction of these damaged villages for strategic and security reasons since they dominated an important strategic area.

61. According to one of the military liaison officers assigned to the Special Representative, the State of Israel had informed the representatives of these three villages that it would help their population "to develop other areas."

62. According to accounts from displaced persons, the Israel forces entered the three villages of Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba at 4.30 a.m. on 6 June and called the inhabitants to assemble, after which they were ordered under threat to leave in the direction of Ramallah. They were joined on the road by people from the "second line" villages of Beit Likquia, Beit Sira and Beni Hareth. After three days they were told that they could go back but they were allowed to reach the "second line" villages only. Those who wanted to go on to Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba were turned back. They then returned to Ramallah and some of them went to the East Bank.

63. According to the same sources, those who stayed behind in and around Ramallah or in the "second line" villages persisted in their demands to the Israel Commander that they should be allowed to return to their homes. After two days, the Commander of the Latrun area came to Ramallah and met with representatives of the displaced villagers, who were informed that 70 per cent of their houses had been destroyed but that arrangements for their return could be made if they so desired. They were also told that there was a need for their labour in order to cultivate the extensive monastery lands in the Latrun area. The representatives of the villagers replied that their people wanted to go back, even though their houses had been destroyed.

64. According to the information available to the Special Representative, however, these displaced villagers had not yet been able to return. They felt encouraged, apparently, by the Israel decision to allow the people of Qalqiliya to return.

65. As regards the "second line" villages, to which the population has now been allowed to return, the situation can be summarized as follows:

(a) At Beit Likquia out of a pre-war population of about 2,000, including fifty UNRWA refugees, 300 had left for unknown destinations (probably the East Bank). Five hundred had come from the above-mentioned frontier villages; these people, who were living in houses, schools or under trees, wanted to go back. The food situation was under control, although there was a slight shortage of water.

(b) At Beit Sira, where there was a pre-war population of 1,250, about 1,000 had remained. Two hundred and fifty additional persons had come from the three above-mentioned villages.

(c) No information was available as regards Beni Hareth, which consisted of a few houses only. Both UNRWA and the Lutheran World Federation were providing emergency relief to the populations now living in these "second line" villages.

Hebron area

66. At Beit Awa in the Hebron area (original population some 2,500 persons), out of some 400 houses, more than 90 per cent have been

completely demolished and the remainder partly damaged. A second village in the area, Beit Mersim (original population approximately 500), was completely destroyed.

67. The Special Representative visited Beit Awa on 11 August. The Arab *Mukhtar* stated that Israel troops entered the village on 11 June at 5.30 a.m. The inhabitants were then asked to take two loaves of bread and to go to the hills surrounding the village. At 7.30 a.m. the Israel troops started to demolish the houses with dynamite and bulldozers. Groves around the village were burnt. The belongings of the inhabitants were also burnt since they were unable to take them along. The population stayed in the hills for a week. They were then authorized to return by the military governor. Out of the original population of 2,500, some 300 had left for other areas.

68. The *Mukhtar* said he presumed that the reason for the demolition was that the Israel authorities believed that there were members of the "El Fatah" organization coming from the village. He claimed that members of this organization used to pass through the village but did not live in it and that the inhabitants never co-operated with them. In this connexion, the Israel authorities informed the Special Representative that this village was an "El-Fatah" base where members of this terrorist organization used to stay overnight and where they received ammunition and supplies.

69. The Israel military liaison officer informed the Special Representative that a decision had been made to rebuild the village but that it had not yet been decided whether this would be done by the Government alone or with the help of voluntary organizations. In principle, he said that the Israel authorities were going to supply technicians and provide cement to help in the rebuilding of the houses. The *Mukhtar* said that the Israel authorities had promised them all this, but that so far nothing had been received.

70. In Beit Mersim, located fifteen kilometres from Beit Awa, a similar situation prevailed, according to the *Mukhtar* of Beit Awa.

71. Some other villages where destruction had allegedly taken place were Beit Illo (near Ramallah), Kharas, Sourif and Edna. According to the Israel military liaison officer, only the village

of Beit Illo had suffered some war damage, while the villages of Kharas and Edna had not been touched. According to one of the villagers of Beit Awa, eighteen houses had been demolished in Sourif.

Number of homeless persons

72. As regards the number of people from the town of Qalqiliya and from the villages located in the Latrun and Hebron areas, rendered homeless for a shorter or longer period, the situation can be summarized as follows:

(a) In the Latrun area at least 4,000 persons from the front line villages of Emwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba had not yet been allowed to return to their villages. About 3,300 persons from the "second line" villages of Beit Sira, Beit Likquia and Beni Hareth had been allowed to return.

(b) In the Hebron area 3,000 persons had been allowed to return to Beit Awa and Beit Mersim.

(c) Qalqiliya. According to the Arab Mayor, about one quarter of the total population of approximately 14,000 stayed in the town during the hostilities. Thus a maximum of some 4,000 persons might have remained and been ordered out by the Israel military authorities after actual fighting had ended. Houses destroyed belonged both to this group and to the persons who left before complete or partial destruction of the 40 to 50 per cent of the housing had taken place. The populations had been allowed to return, but it was not known how many actually did return.

Looting

73. There are Jordanian complaints about alleged looting "of everything" found in banks by Israel occupying forces. This allegation has been rejected by Israel as "unfounded." During his tour of the area, the Special Representative was informed by Israel spokesmen that in fact Israel had taken away the bank books and money found in the banks, but against duly signed receipts and for the sole purpose of making a systematic check on the situation of these banks at the time Israel took over control of the area.

74. Jordanian complaints also allege looting of commercial stores, houses, the hospital in

Nablus and the theft of church jewellery from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. According to press reports, the latter items had been found and restored. The Special Representative received the specific Jordanian complaints about looting only after his visit to the areas concerned and was therefore unable to look into the alleged looting of the Nablus hospital.

75. The Special Representative also received reports concerning looting in Jerusalem by Israel military personnel, including cars, vacant houses and shops. Since the alleged events took place, some two months before the arrival of the Special Representative, it was difficult for him to form a firm opinion about these allegations.

76. The Assistant to the Special Representative, during his visit to the hospital of Qalqiliya, was informed by the doctor in charge that the X-ray machine, the operating table, overhead lights and other equipment in the operating theatre, as well as stocks of hospital linen had disappeared. Israel officers present during the tour of the hospital stated that the Israel authorities had promised to provide the hospital with a new operating theatre.

77. Israel spokesmen informed the Special Representative on several occasions that the Israel authorities had taken measures to prevent looting and to stop it when it occurred, including the court-martialling of army personnel caught in the act of looting.

Economic and social conditions and needs

78. Views on the economic and social conditions of the civilian population on the West Bank were conflicting. According to statements by spokesmen of the Jordanian Government, the economy of the area was paralysed, there was a threatened shortage of food approaching a situation of famine for the population, there was no circulation of money owing to the confiscation by occupying forces of cash on hand in the Jordanian banks which were closed for business by these forces, and moreover, confiscation of property has taken place. The Jordanian views of the situation are presented in more detail in statements presented by the Jordanian Government to the Special Representative. These state-

ments are attached as annexes to this report (see annexes II to IV).

79. The Israel views on the situation, set forth in statements also attached as annexes to this report, stress the speedy return of normal life in the occupied area and the measures taken by the Israel Government to facilitate and encourage this process in relation to local government, currency problems, price levels, employment, the reactivation of agriculture, industry and commerce, the re-establishment of basic services such as electricity, water, communications and transportation, and the resumption of services in the fields of health, education, welfare and religious and judicial life.

80. The Special Representative was not able, in the time at his disposal, to assess completely the social and economic situation prevailing on the West Bank or to establish a complete review of measures taken by the Israel Government, and even less to analyse all the implications of Israel measures taken so far. He has been able, however, to obtain an impression on these points by direct observation during his visits to the main West-Bank towns of Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus and Qalqiliya, and through detailed and specific discussions with representatives of the local population and of the Israel authorities.

81. The information gathered in this way is presented here classified according to main items relevant to the situation prevailing in each of the four towns. Since these situations differ, not all subjects are covered for each town. Secondly, because of the variations in the time at the disposal of the Special Representative in each town and the differences in background and knowledge between the spokesmen consulted, the information is more complete on some subjects for some towns than for others.

Qalqiliya

82. The information concerning Qalqiliya, which was visited by the Assistant to the Special Representative on 12 August 1967, was as follows:

(a) *Local government.* The Arab Mayor stated that the employees of the municipality had returned to work and that the municipality had received 4,000 pounds from the Jordanian Government and 3,000 pounds from the Israel Govern-

ment and that he was expecting more funds from the Israel Government. He stated that it was necessary to strengthen the budget of the municipality to carry out the reconstruction of this largely destroyed city. Moreover, additional funds would be required once the agricultural season began. So far, he said, no plans had been made regarding reconstruction, but a budget had been submitted to the Israel authorities. The legal adviser to the Israel military governor stated that in a few days the municipality would receive long-term loans to help the shopkeepers to start buying goods. According to the Mayor, the main problems facing the city were the financing of the budget and the general shortage of money.

(b) *Banks*. There were no branches of Israel banks in the area.

(c) *Basic amenities*. The Mayor stated that the Israel Government had helped in the restoring of the water and electricity systems.

(d) *Food*. Food was provided by UNRWA. For the first month UNRWA supplied food to everyone; as from the second month, no rations were issued to those who had their own means.

(e) *Shelter*. Some of those whose houses were destroyed are at present living with relatives or outside Qalqiliya (in Nablus, for instance) or in their former houses in Qalqiliya, where they had covered the destroyed parts with tents. About 200 tents were distributed by the Israel Government and about 30 by UNRWA. The tents provided by the Israel Government were cut into pieces and shared by several families in order to cover damaged parts of their houses. The Mayor stated that there were no official plans to reconstruct the town but that he had read in newspapers that the Israel Government intended to carry out the reconstruction.

(f) *Education*. The Mayor stated that the schools would be functioning. He had heard of teachers elsewhere who had been asked to fill in a special form before resuming their work, but this had not happened in Qalqiliya.

(g) *Health services*. The Mayor stated that when the population returned to Qalqiliya there were a number of human and animal remains in many places; the Health Department proceeded to their removal and to a disinfection campaign. A medical doctor was now visiting the city twice a week, but the Mayor considered the present

health services inadequate. He would prefer that the doctor be permanently stationed in Qalqiliya. The UNRWA hospital was still functioning, but without its previous operating theatre, as stated elsewhere in this report.

(h) *Economy*. The main source of livelihood for the 12,500 non-UNRWA residents was agriculture and remittances of money from those who emigrated to other countries. Agriculture was being resumed since no fields were destroyed. However, there was a problem of unemployment. Through the Israel Government about 120 workers were now working on cleaning the town.

(i) *Confiscations*. The Mayor stated that no goods or properties had been confiscated in Qalqiliya.

Nablus

83. The information regarding Nablus, visited on 24 July, may be summarized as follows:

(a) *Curfew*. There was a curfew throughout the area from 7 p.m. to 4 a.m., when farmers start going to their work.

(b) *Municipality*. An Israel spokesman said that the Israel military authorities had authorized the head of the municipality to run the services himself and that they had given him the practical possibilities to do so by providing supplies and assistance. The Mayor was the elected Arab Mayor of the city who did not leave the city during the hostilities.

(c) *Police*. The police force was operating and consisted of about eighty-five policemen in Nablus only. Those who were found were all remobilized and back on duty. They were wearing uniforms, and the Israel authorities had supplied them with weapons to safeguard the town against looting.

(d) *Employment of government officials*. According to an Israel official, there were 1,300 teachers in the district of Nablus. All of them would receive their salaries. Moreover, salaries were also being paid to policemen, to the staff of government hospitals, and to the personnel of post offices. In principle, all officers working for the administration would be paid. The Israel official stated that already some 350 workers were working in the projects of the municipality, such as construction of municipal roads and new buildings.

The Arab Mayor stated that even though the present Government was paying most of the teachers, unfortunately most of the other departments had not yet received any money, from either the Jordanian or the Israel Government. This situation, in his opinion, affected "thousands of people," many of whom were coming to see him daily about their problems. He mentioned in this connexion the Department of Land Registry, the religious courts, the pension office, the civil law courts, etc., which were located in Nablus and served the wider Nablus district. The Israel spokesman stated that the Israel authorities did not know about the existence of these offices and their specific tasks. According to their information, there were about twenty-one government departments in Nablus, and payment of salaries to their officers was now beginning, except for some civil servants who were felt by the Israel authorities to be redundant.

(c) *Banks*. According to an Israel official, the banks were functioning.

(f) *Basic public facilities*. An Israel spokesman said that the electricity supply had not been interrupted; postal and telephone services were operating.

(g) *Water*. According to an Israel spokesman, the water pipeline was blown up during the fighting and was being renewed. In midsummer it was usually dry in Nablus, and the city needed water from outside.

(h) *Food*. An Israel spokesman said that the Israel authorities supplied the most essential things which were not in stock in sufficient quantity in Nablus, such as flour. In some villages around Nablus there was no flour either. The Israel military authorities told the village *Mukhtars* that they could bring their problems before the municipality in the areas in which their villages were located, and through the Mayors the population had been supplied with flour. There was no problem of starvation whatsoever. The Arab Mayor stated that there was enough food but the population lacked the money to buy it and that the municipality had started to give help to about 16,000 people in Nablus city alone (out of a total population of 75,000 to 80,000).

(i) *Health*. According to an Israel spokesman, hospitals were operating. The Israel authorities gave the head of the municipality the power to

run the services in town, including the health services. The Arab Mayor stated that the medical services were working, but not as they used to. Some of the personnel of the clinics and some of the manual workers had left, some of the instruments had been lost, and there was not as much transport as was needed. Moreover, apart from the traditional medical services, there were some special projects, such as a malaria eradication project and a tuberculosis centre and a maternity and child health programme, all of which had come to a standstill. The Arab Mayor stated that the municipality had discussed these problems with the Israel authorities who showed "an eagerness to co-operate" and that weekly meetings had been arranged with the health authorities in Jerusalem.

(j) *Agriculture*. According to an Arab spokesman (formerly Minister of Agriculture in the Jordanian Government), at least 50 per cent of the harvest in the Nablus area was destroyed during the war. However, an Israel agricultural specialist felt sure that more than 80 per cent of the crops of the area had been saved. After hostilities ended, the Israelis had proceeded to the harvesting of abandoned crops; in the case of wheat, to prevent it from burning out; in the case of tomatoes and melons, to avoid rotting. Surplus perishable agricultural products had been sent to Israel canning factories. He stated that the Israel authorities had assisted local agriculture, first, by doing this emergency harvesting, sometimes using machines brought in from Israel, and secondly, by assisting in the sale of agricultural surpluses to industries in Israel now that the usual export outlets to countries like Kuwait had been closed. In addition the authorities would be willing to supply seeds for the new agricultural season. Arab spokesmen stressed the difficulty of resuming agricultural activities because of the great number of people who had left for the East Bank. Difficulties would soon be felt when the olives had to be picked. They felt that the reduced labour force would lead to a reduction of agricultural production which would result in a shortage of food in the area. The Israel agricultural spokesman said that the Israel authorities had started to prepare plans for the next agricultural season and felt sure that they would be able to plant all the areas where no war damage had been done. He was surprised to hear that there was so

much concern about the alleged shortage of agricultural labour.

(k) *Commerce*. All marketing had been arranged as from the first week after the war, according to an Israel spokesman. During the war the Israel military authorities stopped all traffic. The day after the war traffic resumed with private cars. Commodities which were lacking were brought in from Israel. The Israel authorities arranged for the sale of manufactured products from Nablus in the Arab part of Jerusalem. However, the Arab Mayor stated: "The commercial situation is a little better but is not what it should be."

(l) *Shops*. An Israel spokesman said that shops were open; everything was as before. A few of the shopkeepers had left, and some others kept their shops closed. Some travel agencies had closed down because they had no business. He stated: "We give all the opportunities, but it is up to the municipality." He drew attention to the fact that much tourist trade was now coming from Israel. The Arab Mayor stated that a large number of shops had opened and that a large number of Israelis had started to come to the area and were buying; but apart from these visitors, there were no tourists of the usual kind.

(m) *Price level*. According to an Israel spokesman, prices generally were going up, but compared with Israel prices in Nablus were lower as the local standard of living was lower.

(n) *Unemployment situation*. The Arab Mayor indicated that there was a problem of unemployment affecting a large number of labourers. This was unusual as, before the war, there had been no unemployment during the summer season but only in winter. He declared that unemployment was felt in all sectors of the economy and gave as examples both private and public building and, related to this, unemployment in many industries, such as ironwork and furniture, in which a large number of labourers worked. Unemployment was also found, for example, in dressmaking, he observed. According to an Israel official, soap factories in Nablus were resuming work gradually and would again provide employment to about a hundred workers.

(o) *Unemployment relief*. An Israel official said that efforts were being made to relieve unemployment in the area, especially through public works. Many roads were being repaired,

and there were plans to enlarge other roads. These works were expected to absorb hundreds of labourers. Moreover, the military authorities had asked the municipality to operate projects which had been planned before the war. If the municipality needed money to start the projects, the Israel Government would be ready to give it and had in fact already done so to some extent. Many people were working on these projects, which included the reconstruction of the pipeline, road construction and road repair, and the continuation of construction work on schools, hospitals and other public buildings.

(p) *Looting*. An Israel official said that there had been complaints about the looting of shops at night. The Israel defence forces had been able to catch the looters, who had been tried before a military court, since breaking the curfew and looting were military offences.

Bethlehem

84. The information concerning Bethlehem, which was visited on 11 August, was as follows:

(a) *Municipality*. The Mayor of Bethlehem informed the Special Representative that the services of the municipality were running 100 per cent. Some projects were being carried out with the help of the Israel Government. Salaries for the month of June had been paid. As regards July salaries the Mayor had roughly half of the amount required available for payment. Approval of the budget was expected for August and September. As soon as the budget was approved, work could be given to another 155 municipal workers.

(b) *Banks*. He stated that all money was frozen in the banks and that there was no liquidity. Only one Israel bank had opened, with very limited transactions. The Mayor had been informed that efforts were being made to obtain funds from London to reopen the Ottoman and British banks in Bethlehem, which were still closed.

(c) *Food*. Immediately following the end of hostilities, there had been a shortage of flour, but new supplies had arrived within a few days. There were no food problems.

(d) *Education*. The Arab Mayor asserted that schools would be opening in September. Most of the teachers were from the area.

(e) *Health*. The Arab Mayor remarked that the health situation was good and that hospitals were working.

(f) *Courts*. There were no problems, according to the Arab Mayor.

(g) *Economy*. Bethlehem's main source of income was tourism, but foreign tourists had stopped coming. The head of the department of tourism in Jerusalem had promised to give the fullest attention to this point. The Israel military governor stated that Bethlehem could not exist without tourism coming through Israel and that therefore it was in the economic interest of the local population to co-operate with the Israel authorities.

(h) *Employment*. The Arab Mayor stated that there were some "jobless" but that road construction works were going on. However, construction on the Bethlehem-Jerusalem road, involving some forty to sixty employees, had been interrupted because the contractor had disappeared.

(i) *Movement of population*. According to the Arab Mayor, there were three camps of Palestinian refugees in the area, with a total refugee population of some 20,000. About 30 per cent of them had left. Very few of the local residents of the Bethlehem area had left, however.

Hebron

85. As regards Hebron, which was also visited by the Special Representative on 11 August, the information received by him may be summarized as follows:

(a) *Municipality*. The Arab Mayor informed the Special Representative that the officials who originally were working with the Government had all been re-employed except for about 20 per cent who had to be terminated upon the request of the Israel authorities.

(b) *Food*. Immediately after the war, basic commodities had been gathered together, and the municipality, together with the chamber of commerce, had carried out an inventory of stocks. The Israel authorities had supplied flour and fuel, of which there was a shortage.

(c) *Education*. Schools would reopen on 1 September. Some teachers, mainly those who had been recruited from outside the area, had left.

The places of teachers who did not return would be filled by university students.

(d) *Economy*. The main economic activity in the region was fruit-growing. The Mayor observed that at present it was not possible to export fruit to the East Bank and that, moreover, it was not possible to send trucks to the Jericho area on the West Bank. Secondly, a large number of people from the area used to work in the Arab peninsula and to send money home or to come to Hebron themselves for holidays and thus spend their earnings but they were no longer doing so.

(e) *Commerce*. He stated that except for the absence of imports, commerce was going on normally. Before the war a large number of merchants had placed orders through Amman for all sorts of goods which were now waiting in the port of Aqaba, and the merchants were now unable to bring these goods to Hebron. During his subsequent visit to Amman, the Special Representative took this matter up with the authorities there, who informed him of their willingness to seek a satisfactory arrangement for the merchants concerned.

(f) *Employment*. From the point of view of manpower and employment, there were no difficulties in the agricultural sector nor in other sectors of the economy, where work and life were continuing normally.

(g) *Confiscations*. The Israel custodian of absentees' property had seized the houses of those who were away since the houses were empty. However, in some cases the inhabitants were only temporarily away on a visit to Amman. In other cases, when a relative of the owner had been present but not the owner himself, the property had still been considered as absentee property by the Israel authorities.

(h) *Abraham's Tomb*. The Mufti informed the Special Representative that Moslems had at first been forbidden to go and pray in the main mosque, built over Abraham's Tomb. They had protested, and the Israel Minister of Defence had to discuss the matter directly with them. It had been agreed that the Moslems would conduct their prayers at certain hours, while other hours would be reserved for visitors. An Israel officer explained that the difference of opinion arose from the fact that the shrine of Abraham's Tomb is equally holy to Moslems and Jews. The latter

were now allowed to pass through the mosque.

(i) *Moslem religious courts.* The Mufti also declared that the main chiefs of the Islamic community had met and decided to appoint one of their number to represent them in Jerusalem and deal with the Israel authorities. Any relevant Israel orders were now received through this representative. No difficulty had been encountered in carrying on the normal Moslem legislation and court affairs.

(j) *Movement of population.* The Mayor mentioned that before the entry of the Israel troops, an agreement had been reached that no fighting would take place in this area, and that in fact no fighting had taken place. Yet when the Arab Legion withdrew from the area, people began to flee. Approximately 15,000 to 18,000 out of a population of 150,000 in the area had left. The majority had left before the arrival of the Israel troops; some were still leaving. They had left of their own free will without any pressure from the army. Many had come back, and about 90 per cent of all those who had gone would like to come back. The army treated the population well. There were about 50,000 Palestinian refugees in the area, out of whom approximately 10,000 left. (Forty per cent of the refugees lived in camps.)

86. The above data from various sources seem to indicate that as a result of the hostilities the general economy of the West Bank came to a standstill. Trade between the West Bank and the East Bank was suspended; banks were closed, and credit facilities had been withdrawn. Many businesses were closed, and employees no longer received their salaries. The general impression was that food had soon become available, but not the money to buy it. The three major problems facing the economy were lack of liquidity, unemployment, and changing price levels.

87. The Israel Government assured the Special Representative that it had taken initial measures to restart the West Bank economy, including the purchase of West Bank agricultural surpluses formerly exported to East Jordan and to other Arab countries, to re-employ former Jordanian Government and municipal employees, including teachers, as well as to create employment by public work projects, and to authorize some Jordanian banks to reopen and create branches of the Bank of Israel in the principal

West Bank centres.

88. An economist, a member of the Israel planning committee for the development of areas under Israel control, stated that at the beginning the idea had been to do whatever Israel could do to maintain the existing price levels in the occupied area. However, it was found that it would be impossible to operate separate customs controls for the West Bank and for the Gaza area and that in general it would be physically impossible for Israel to ensure a complete separation between the economies of the three areas. Therefore, at a later stage, a more flexible policy was adopted accepting the idea that in principle there would have to be an adjustment of the level of prices between Israel and the occupied areas. Thinking then focused on measures to ensure a gradual adjustment so that the shock would not be too great. Such a gradual adjustment would be obtained by ensuring an effective rise in salaries and in the purchasing capacity of the population, in order to nullify the negative effect of the rise in price levels. In this connexion it was found that opening the area for Israel tourists would allow the population to sell whatever they had to sell, which in turn would increase their purchasing power.

89. According to the same spokesman, a representative of the Israel National Bank went to discuss the rate of exchange of the Jordan dinar with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund had reservations regarding Israel's rate of exchange for the dinar. Israel informed the IMF of its readiness to modify the rate of exchange, provided that the convertibility of the dinar would be guaranteed for the future. Moreover, Israel was willing to let the local Arab banks resume business if the Jordanian banks transferred back all the balances being held in Amman. The IMF discussed this with the Jordanian authorities. These authorities drew up a list of proposals which, Israel felt, amounted to putting Israel in a situation where the economy of the West Bank would be run from Amman. Therefore, Israel decided, as a unilateral act, to raise the rate of exchange of the Jordan dinar (and of the Egyptian pound) in order to counter-balance the negative effect on the purchasing power.

90. According to the same spokesman, Israel wanted to secure facilities for the transfer

of remittances to the population; Israel felt that too much talk about this subject could bring about a situation where some Arab countries would not transfer money to their families in the occupied areas. Therefore, the IMF, the Red Cross and the United Nations were informed of the factual situation, namely, that Israel would see that any remittances transferred to persons in those areas would be made out to them through the banks. The banks were given orders to transfer any remittances which they received directly or indirectly for or on behalf of residents.

91. According to the data provided by the Israel authorities, little damage was done in agricultural areas, and agriculture as an economic activity was functioning fairly well in most areas, with the possible exception of the Nablus region. Israel set up a group composed of various experts attached to the Prime Minister to look into plans for water resources and agricultural development. The immediate problem was, however, what to plan for the next agricultural season. For the moment there were surpluses, and Israel was faced with the problem of what to do with them. Israel policy aimed, according to Israel sources, at maintaining the economic activity at its previous level, but it was not to be expected that next season's agricultural production could be exported to the East Bank. Instead, the Israel market would have to be used as a basis for planning of West Bank agriculture. Agriculturalists from the West Bank had already been taken on visits to Israel to show them the situation and orientation of agriculture there, in order to help them make adjustments in their own plans for the next season. The Special Representative was informed that whatever the future of the West Bank would be, it was the earnest wish of Israel Cabinet Ministers responsible that the West Bank population should be able to conclude that the Israel administration had done whatever it could to raise the standards of living of the population.

92. The Special Representative considered that, if there should be a delay in the resumption of normal economic life both on the West Bank and in the Gaza strip, a considerable portion of the population in these areas would suffer a decline in living standards and that nutritional problems might develop. Under these conditions, there would be a continued need to provide food

relief for those persons who were not at present under UNRWA's care. Early consideration would therefore have to be given to the continuation or the expansion of existing feeding programmes, such as those that were being discussed between the Israel Government and CARE. Discussions were also taking place between UNICEF and the Israel authorities on this subject.

C. The United Arab Republic and areas administered by the United Arab Republic

General situation

93. There are striking differences in population density and composition as well as in economic and social life between the United Arab Republic-administered Gaza strip and Sinai. The Gaza strip is a small but densely populated area with a total pre-war population estimated at about 455,000, of whom 315,000 or about 70 per cent, were UNRWA registered refugees. Sinai is a vast peninsula still characterized in the interior by the traditional Bedouin way of life. The settled population in this peninsula is largely concentrated in the town of El-Arish on the Mediterranean coast and in the eastern part of the town of Kantara on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. According to local Arab sources, the pre-war population of El-Arish was estimated at between 30,000 and 40,000 and that of East Kantara at about 15,000.

94. Prior to his visit to these areas the Special Representative proceeded to Cairo on 27 July for discussions with representatives of the United Arab Republic Government. These discussions highlighted three issues to which the United Arab Republic attached particular importance: the alleged shortage of food and the starvation of the population in El-Arish, the shortage of water in East Kantara and the responsibility of the occupying authority for this state of affairs, and finally, the alleged expulsion of Palestinians across the Suez Canal by the Israel forces. Arrangements were made for the Special Representative to visit newly displaced persons who had been given temporary shelter in recently constructed villages in the land reclamation projects of the Liberation Province north west of Cairo. A visit to Israel prisoners of war held in

the United Arab Republic was also arranged at the request of the Special Representative.

95. The Special Representative visited El-Arish and East Kantara on 14 August and Gaza town and its surrounding areas on the next day. In each locality meetings were held with the Israel military forces in charge of the administration as well as representatives of Arab local government bodies and other spokesmen for the local Arab population and for Palestinian refugees.

96. The Israel authorities submitted to the Special Representative two aide-memoires on the situation in the Gaza strip and northern Sinai, which are annexed to this report (see annexes VIII and IX).

Gaza

97. Besides considering the alleged expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza strip, the Special Representative gave attention during his short visit to the area to a number of questions affecting the safety, welfare and security of the population.

98. The information obtained by the Special Representative is set forth below according to subjects. In this connexion it should be pointed out that because UNRWA registered refugees made up 70 per cent of the total population, UNRWA played an essential role in the economic and social life in the area which affected not only the refugees but also the population as a whole.

(a) Movement of population

99. Until recently the population living in the Gaza area could be divided into three categories: the original Gaza population which had inhabited the area for centuries; Palestinian refugees and persons of Egyptian origin, mostly government civil servants, teachers, and professional persons.

100. The Israel military commander of the Gaza area stated that there were still some 200 Egyptian civil servants in Gaza together with their families, who wanted to return to the United Arab Republic. He declared that they did not want to work in Gaza now since if they did so, they would lose their job potential in the United Arab Republic. However, if they stayed in the area under Israel control, they would have to work. According to other sources some 600 or

700 persons were imprisoned initially. Of these the Israel authorities later retained only men between eighteen and fifty-five years of age and allowed the others to leave for the United Arab Republic. The men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five were then transferred to El-Arish. The Special Representative had the opportunity to visit 289 United Arab Republic officials detained in El-Arish.

101. Some sources claimed that after the hostilities ended in the Gaza area, Israel military forces rounded up about 3,000 persons who were thought to be members of the Palestine Liberation Army, and subsequently took them to places outside the Gaza strip. During his visit to the prisoner-of-war camp in Atlit (Israel) the Special Representative was informed that some of these Palestinians were detained there. According to various sources, others were taken to Kantara. There they were authorized by the Israel authorities to cross to the west side of the Suez Canal.

102. The Special Representative had not been able to find official confirmation of the above-mentioned figure of 3,000 persons involved, or to determine how many of these had been released and how many were still being detained inside or outside the Gaza strip by the Israel authorities.

103. The Israel authorities had made arrangements enabling residents of the Gaza area to visit relatives on the West Bank. At the time of the visit of the Special Representative to the Gaza strip, Gaza residents desirous of visiting the West Bank had to apply for permission to the military authorities. Upon approval of their request they received two passes—one to go to the West Bank and one to come back. It was said that about six large buses were leaving every day for the West Bank. It was not known to the Special Representative whether on an average six busloads of people also returned every day and to what extent the authorities checked whether individuals returned on or before the return date mentioned on their return passes. According to information subsequently received, the requirement for permits to visit the West Bank had been lifted and only identity cards were required.

(b) Municipality

104. According to the Israel military governor of the Gaza strip, the municipality was

working normally. The Arab personnel of the municipality had not been replaced and were receiving their salaries. All services were functioning.

105. The Arab Mayor of the municipality declared that 450,000 Egyptian pounds belonging to the municipality had been taken from banks by the Israel authorities. Israel spokesmen denied this.

106. The military commander of Gaza town declared that the municipality budget was given priority as regards payments. The municipality had already received 20,000 Egyptian pounds from the Israel military government, but in addition the municipality was requesting grants similar to those received in the past for carrying out projects.

(c) Banks and currency

107. Members of the Gaza municipal council complained that economic life was at a standstill because depositors could not withdraw money from the banks. In this connexion, one Israel senior military officer asserted that 70 per cent of the local currency in the banks had been taken to the United Arab Republic; another Israel officer declared that the Israel authorities found altogether 526,000 Egyptian pounds in the banks in the Gaza strip, that the local banks were bankrupt and that banking was now functioning through Israel banks.

108. During his visits to Cairo, the Special Representative was informed by the United Arab Republic authorities that in the whole of Gaza and Sinai, Israel forces had taken 1 million Egyptian pounds from the banks, as well as 40,000 Egyptian pounds found with the United Arab Republic troops and earmarked for their next salary payment. Israel spokesmen in the Gaza strip and elsewhere insisted that wherever bankbooks or money had been taken from banks, this had been done only upon receipts handed over to the directors of the banks concerned. Moreover, they stated that the cash held in banks did not suffice to refund the deposits made by the inhabitants.

109. Exchanges of currency according to the latest Israel regulations could officially be made in the Gaza strip until 15 August.

(d) Food

110. During his visit to Gaza town, the Special Representative noted that there seemed to be an ample supply of food there. According to the information received by him, supplies left behind by the United Arab Republic authorities had been used to a large extent. Food prices had increased somewhat, for instance, those of fresh meat, canned meat and fish. People were coming from Israel and buying these foodstuffs, and this was one reason for the rise in prices.

111. Though food seemed to be available, money to buy it was scarce. The CARE representative stated that CARE was giving food and assistance to approximately 80,000 persons, who were not UNRWA refugees of whom 10,000 were in El-Arish. CARE was carrying on that activity in close co-operation with UNICEF. UNICEF would distribute the same rations as CARE, reaching those persons who were not covered at present by either UNRWA or CARE, particularly nursing and expectant mothers. CARE supplied food to other categories such as old people, widows, orphans, disabled people, and people who were able to work but had been unemployed for at least four weeks.

(e) Health

112. According to the Israel military commander, health services continued under the same conditions as in the past when they were provided by the Government free of charge. He stated that the hospitals were functioning, but that some people had asked the military government to provide them with better hospitals. He stated that an Israel doctor was touring the area regularly.

113. However, according to other sources, the hospital in Rafah had been destroyed, and only the UNRWA hospital there was functioning.

(f) Education

114. The military commander informed the Special Representative that he expected the schools to reopen with adequate equipment. He hoped that enough teachers would be available.

115. Some sources indicated that about 200 teachers had left the Gaza area, most of them

before the war, and that some equipment had been looted during and after the war.

116. The Special Representative heard from both sides many expressions of grave concern regarding the course of future developments in the education field. Israel spokesmen repeatedly expressed their disapproval of the textbooks in use, which allegedly contained hate propaganda against Israel. According to the latest reports received by the Special Representative but which had not, as far as known, been officially confirmed by the Israel authorities, Israel would continue to use the old textbooks, but would delete from them those passages which were offensive to Israel.

(g) Economy

117. Traditionally, the Gaza area is a citrus-growing region. According to the Arab Mayor of Gaza town, citrus exports represented 25 to 30 per cent of the local revenue before the hostilities. These exports had now been blocked, and there was no prospect as yet of the resumption of these exports. One member of the Gaza municipal council mentioned that there were 40,000 workers involved in the citrus sector, from the groves to exportation.

118. The military governor stated that the matter of exports was under consideration and that the Ministry of Agriculture was studying plans for using Gaza citrus fruits in Israel canning factories and for improving the quality and packing of the fruits for marketing.

119. Before the war salaried workers were mainly dependent on a few main employers, including the United Arab Republic Government, which employed some 5,000 persons, UNRWA and UNEF. An Israel spokesman stated that most of these Government employees were still in the area and that 30 per cent of them were working.

120. A third source of income had been remittances to persons living in Gaza from relatives in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other oil-rich countries. Those remittances had now stopped, but might be resumed through the channels opened by the ICRC. One source indicated that more than half of the Palestinian refugees depended in varying degrees on money remitted from abroad.

121. From persons in each of the above-mentioned three main income categories, the present situation was characterized by unemployment and hardship. A member of the municipal council of Gaza stated that every day about 2,000 workers applied for work, but that only half of them were successful.

122. The military governor of the Gaza area stressed that the military authorities, instead of giving money to able-bodied persons not engaged in any productive activity, had very much encouraged the population to work on projects such as the reconstruction of roads, the building of new roads, the cleaning of streets, and the reconstruction of public buildings but the local population seemed reluctant to work on these projects for a number of reasons. He stated that the Israel military authorities would open a labour exchange shortly. Every unemployed person who wanted to work should register his name. If no work could be given, assistance would be provided to the applicant. He mentioned that the population had been informed that those who wanted to go and work on the West Bank could do so.

(h) Civilian casualties and property damage

123. The Special Representative received reports from various sources that not only during but after the active hostilities civilians had been killed and houses destroyed.

124. Regarding the destruction of houses after the war, the Israel military commander of the Gaza strip stated that two or three houses had been destroyed for security reasons because explosives and weapons had been found in them. As regards Rafah, he stated that, after having himself made a tour of the area, he did not have the impression that the town was destroyed, but only that some of the houses were damaged. In Rafah, to his knowledge, there had been no destruction for such security reasons as those referred to above.

125. During the Special Representative's visit to a refugee camp, spokesmen for the refugees drew his attention to continuing searches of the camp by Israel forces and requested that in order to avoid frightening women and children, such searches should not be conducted during the night. The military commander of Gaza town

who attended the meetings, stated that until very recently some Egyptian officers and soldiers and ammunition and weapons had been found in the camp and that on questions of military security there could be no bargaining whatsoever.

126. A member of the Gaza municipal council stated that the looting of shops continued creating fear among the shopkeepers. He added that there were fewer police now than in the past. The military commander of Gaza town indicated that there were about 250 local police there and that this number would be increased. According to him, the military authorities were in fact trying to reorganize the whole police force. The police, who used to work only four hours a day were now working eight hours a day. Moreover, the Israel police and the local police would be combined. The military authorities could not rely on the local police, he declared, and mixed patrols of Israel and local police were planned. An increase in salaries was also being considered. The entire reorganization was expected to take approximately two weeks. A new police station had just been opened.

El-Arish

127. During his visit to El-Arish, the most important city of Sinai, the Special Representative gave attention to the food situation as well as to a number of other problems of particular interest to the local population. The information obtained by him is summarized below.

(a) Food

128. During his first visit to the United Arab Republic, the Special Representative was informed by a Government spokesman that the population in El-Arish was starving and that the United Arab Republic authorities therefore had intended to send a ship with food to El-Arish. According to an Israel spokesman, Israel had let it be known that the population was not starving in El-Arish, but if the United Arab Republic wanted to send food, Israel would not object provided the ship flew a Red Cross flag. Subsequently, according to the same Israel spokesman, the United Arab Republic Government had abandoned the idea. The United Arab Republic spokesman informed the Special Representative that the decision not to send the ship to El-Arish

had been taken when the news of the Special Representative's imminent arrival in Cairo had been received. The United Arab Republic Government wished to avail itself of this visit in order, first, to clarify the question of principle that it was the exclusive responsibility of the occupying authority to supply food in sufficient quantity to the local population of El-Arish.

129. According to Israel, as well as Arab and neutral spokesmen, there was no immediate food problem in El-Arish, but there was a scarcity of money to buy the food that was available.

130. Israel sources indicated that food was now brought into El-Arish by rail. As mentioned elsewhere, CARE was supplying rations to some 10,000 inhabitants.

(b) Municipality

131. According to the Israel military commander, the Israel authorities gave money to the Mayor of the municipality to pay municipal workers (numbering about 400); the water and electricity supplies were functioning. He mentioned also that the local police force was operating.

(c) Banks

132. The two banks of El-Arish were closed. As soon as postal services were restored, the military government opened the Israel Postal Bank.

133. From 16 August only Israel currency was to be accepted. The rate of exchange had been established at six Israel pounds for one Egyptian pound. The Israel authorities would not object if after that date customers still paid for goods in Egyptian pounds, but the exchange rate would be different, namely 3.5 Israel pounds for one Egyptian pound.

(d) Housing

134. Israel spokesmen claimed that there had been no heavy fighting in the town of El-Arish, and only a few houses had been damaged. The local municipality had called in tenders from local contractors to carry out the repairs, which would be paid for from the municipal budget provided by the Israel authorities.

(e) Health

135. According to the Arab director of the El-Arish hospital, the health situation was normal. Medical staff numbering about 100, who had previously been responsible for health services in different parts of the Sinai peninsula, were now concentrated in El-Arish, with the result that there was a relatively high number of medical personnel per hospital bed.

(f) Income and employment

136. According to Arab spokesmen, almost all the population of El-Arish had previously depended indirectly on the salaries and purchasing power of civil servants who were stationed in El-Arish for the administration and servicing of the town itself and of the wider Sinai peninsula, as well as of the army. It was said that there were some 4,000 heads of families of both categories who were now without jobs or salaries. Of these 4,000, some 1,000 heads of families had originally been recruited west of the Suez Canal. Israel spokesmen stated that the Israel authorities in El-Arish were now employing and paying 700 permanent civil servants, namely, 400 employed by the municipality and some 300 employed in the police force and in services such as water supply. In addition, the military authorities needed about 400 personnel to work for the Israel defence forces, but up to that time, they had found it difficult to recruit as many workers as were needed.

137. Economic production in the primary sector in El-Arish consisted mainly of fishing and date growing. The military authorities had granted permission for the resumption of fishing and were ready to send fish to the West Bank of Jordan.

(g) Civil servants of United Arab Republic origin

138. During his visit to El-Arish the Special Representative's attention was drawn to the presence of about 1,000 civil servants (together with their families totalling about 5,000 persons) who, it was stated, had originally been recruited from parts of the United Arab Republic west of the Suez Canal and who now wished to return to what they considered their homes.

139. Agreement had been reached that

these 5,000 persons should be transferred to the West Bank of the Suez Canal. A first group had crossed the Canal, but the United Arab Republic authorities had detected some Palestinians among them and had subsequently stopped the whole project, requesting lists of the names of all officials wishing to return. These lists were immediately forwarded to the United Arab Republic authorities, but the movement of the civil servants from El-Arish across the Suez Canal had not been resumed since.

140. The Special Representative found the 1,000 officials concerned in a difficult position as they had received no salaries since the hostilities and on the other hand were not interested in taking new employment, since they believed they would cross the Suez Canal any day. Neither the Israel authorities nor any voluntary agency had taken steps to assist them for the same reason.

141. On 26 August the Special Representative discussed the problem in Cairo with United Arab Republic Government officials. He was informed that the United Arab Republic Government no longer wished any of these persons to cross the Suez Canal but wished them to stay in the occupied area so that their presence might bolster the morale of the population.

(h) United Arab Republic civil servants from Gaza

142. As mentioned before, some 290 United Arab Republic civil servants whose original duty station was in the Gaza area had been transferred to El-Arish pending their return to the Nile valley area of the United Arab Republic. Their families had already been allowed to cross the Suez Canal. The Special Representative visited the camp where they were being held. He found they were not under military guard; there was only a local policeman at the gate. The detainees stated that they were allowed to go to town in groups of up to twenty at a time.

143. During his meeting with the spokesmen of the detainees, they made some complaints about the quality of their food, the lack of mattresses, the poor accommodation and the absence of letters from their families. The Israel governor, who participated in the meeting, promised to look into these matters. The Special Representative was subsequently informed that improvements had been made.

144. The United Arab Republic Government strongly objected to the detention of this group of officials, for which it found no justification whatsoever. It also requested that they be allowed to rejoin their families now living west of the Suez Canal.

East Kantara

145. The information obtained by the Special Representative during his visit to East Kantara is set forth below.

(a) Water supply

146. In a letter dated 13 July 1967, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Arab Republic Government informed him that the Israel forces had threatened to expel United Arab Republic citizens residing in East Kantara to the West Bank of the Suez Canal if the United Arab Republic Government refused to provide water to the part of the town situated on the East Bank. The United Arab Republic Government stated that the population of Kantara always depended on water from artesian wells in the city, and that additional water from the West Bank had in the past been furnished to the East Bank only to meet the needs of the United Arab Republic armed forces after they moved into Sinai.

147. On the occasion of the first visit of the Special Representative to Cairo, the question of water supply at East Kantara was discussed. The United Arab Republic Government reiterated that the civilian population of the eastern part of Kantara (normally about 15,000 inhabitants) had always used the water supplied by wells in the city, but it stressed that those wells had to be properly maintained. On the other hand, when the Special Representative visited refugees from Sinai in the United Arab Republic, some of those who had come from East Kantara stated that they had always received their drinking water from the West Bank of the Canal.

148. When the Special Representative visited East Kantara on 14 August, it was explained to him on the spot by the Israel authorities that the whole drinking water system of that part of the town was connected with and dependent on supply from the West Bank. Local inhabitants confirmed that this was the case. They stated that

for decades water from local wells had been used only for watering gardens but that now they were forced to drink it. Even though they were boiling the water, the inhabitants were afraid that it was still not suitable for drinking.

149. During his second visit to Cairo, the Special Representative informed the United Arab Republic Government of his findings in East Kantara and suggested that they should resume pumping water across the Canal in sufficient quantity to supply the remaining civilian population only. If the Israel Government would agree to such an operation, the Special Representative would then see to it that the water was distributed to the civilian population under a system of reliable control. However, the representatives of the United Arab Republic did not respond favourably to this suggestion, since they felt it was the sole responsibility of the Israel authorities to provide the population in occupied areas with proper drinking water.

150. The Special Representative discussed this matter with the Israel authorities. They pointed out that water supply was a great problem also for the Israel troops, as drinking water had to be brought across the desert by tanker.

(b) Movement of population

151. The president of the municipality declared that out of a population of about 15,000, only 1,116 persons had remained. He informed the Special Representative that some 900 of them desired to be allowed to cross the Canal to the West Bank. In this connexion, the Israel military commander of the area informed the Special Representative that the Israel Government had no objection to the population leaving East Kantara if they so desired. This point was raised by the Special Representative with the United Arab Republic Government, which informed him that it wished the inhabitants to stay in East Kantara.

(c) Food

152. The Special Representative was informed by the population of East Kantara that there were shortages of certain foodstuffs in the town. Vegetables, fruits and meat, which they said were usually brought in from the West Bank of the Canal, were no longer available. All shops

were closed and the Israel authorities had only supplied a few basic foods, namely, flour, sugar and tea.

153. The Israel commander recognized that some foodstuffs were in short supply in the area. He pointed out that the supply of food was also a great problem for the Israel troops in the area, since most of the commodities now had to be brought there across the desert from Israel in refrigerated trucks and were therefore strictly rationed.

154. During his visit to Cairo, the Special Representative took up this matter with the United Arab Republic Government. He suggested that the United Arab Republic Government might allow vegetables and fruits to be brought over the Canal, perhaps once a week; but the United Arab Republic Government declared that the responsibility for ensuring an adequate food supply rested with the occupying authority.

(d) Health

155. The inhabitants complained that it was not enough for an Israel doctor to be available only once a week. They pointed out that the hospital had been broken into and looted and was no longer functioning. There was no clinic and only two local nurses, neither of them qualified.

156. The Special Representative raised this matter with the Israel military commander of the area, who promised to look into the possibility of improving the medical facilities.

(e) Employment

157. The population of 1,116 persons consisted mainly of women and children. Some fifty to sixty men were employed with the United Nations observers or had found other remunerated employment in the area.

(f) Mail

158. The president of the municipality complained that the people were not receiving letters. The ICRC delegate was, however, going there to arrange the exchange of letters between the inhabitants and their relatives elsewhere.

III. SITUATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM AREAS UNDER ISRAEL CONTROL AND THE QUESTION OF THEIR RETURN

Situation of displaced persons

159. The number of persons who had fled from the areas under Israel occupation during and after the June hostilities is roughly estimated at about 350,000. This figure includes:

(a) About 200,000 persons (of whom about 93,000 were refugees registered with UNRWA) who had moved from the West Bank to the East Bank in Jordan;

(b) About 110,000 persons according to Israel sources (of whom about 17,000 were UNRWA-registered refugees) who had moved from the south-western corner of Syria, mainly to the areas of Damascus and Dera'a;

(c) About 35,000 persons (of whom 3,000 were UNRWA-registered refugees in the Gaza strip) who had moved across the Suez Canal from the Gaza strip or Sinai.

160. Immediately after the hostilities, emergency assistance was given to those displaced persons to alleviate their hardship. As the Commissioner General of UNRWA pointed out, this emergency assistance was a combined operation to which the Governments directly concerned, other donor Governments, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, UNRWA, UNICEF, the specialized agencies, national and international non-governmental organizations and individuals in many parts of the world all made important contributions.

161. The assistance provided to the displaced persons included donations in cash, as well as donations in kind, such as tents, blankets, clothing, mattresses, kitchen utensils, food, milk, medicaments and vehicles. Some of this assistance was channelled through UNRWA and the Red Cross or Red Crescent organizations, and some was distributed by voluntary agencies. The Special Representative had discussed in some detail the assistance given to displaced persons and their needs with the Governments and organizations concerned with this problem. These discussions highlighted the importance of continuing and intensifying the assistance given to displaced persons. Certain pressing needs are

set forth in the sections below. It should be pointed out that this question will also be dealt with by the Commissioner General of UNRWA in his annual report to the General Assembly.

(a) Needs in Syria

162. The Syrian Government took full charge of the displaced persons, with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Programme, the Lutheran World Federation, UNRWA, etc., while UNRWA assumed responsibility for meeting the needs of the 17,000 displaced Palestinians already registered with it, with UNICEF's help in providing protein supplements.

163. The Special Representative reported that one of the most immediate and acute problems would be that of shelter, as about 80 per cent of the displaced persons were now accommodated in schools which should be vacated before the new school year. In connexion with this new emergency, the pressing needs would be for 200,000 blankets, 50,000 mattresses and 15,000 tents. The food situation might also become precarious when the present World Food Programme assistance ran out at the end of October.

164. The necessary clinics, sanitation facilities and social services would have to be established before the cold weather arrived and before health conditions deteriorated. New schools would have to be opened and supplementary feeding would be required for the next six to nine months.

165. Emergency feeding would probably be needed also for another three months and World Food Programme assistance in ensuring further supplies would be most desirable.

166. UNICEF had advised the Syrian authorities that it could provide further assistance in the form of equipment for clinics, supplementary feeding kitchens and schools, as well as assistance for sanitary facilities and drinking water supplies, sewing machines and possibly training aid for the production of children's clothing, and supporting transport if required. UNICEF also indicated that it could give consideration to providing assistance in the operation of supplementary feeding programmes, including the provision of vitamins and other dietary supplements, and, in case of special emergency needs, the supply of imported slotted angle-irons

as a supporting framework for local structures to house the facilities mentioned above.

167. The Special Representative noted that, as the Syrian Government had received less external aid in the present emergency in proportion to the number of refugees than the other areas concerned, material and financial aid to carry out the necessary projects for shelter and community facilities would be needed.

168. In connexion with the import of relief supplied for Syria and also for east Jordan, the Special Representative was informed that since 5 June, vessels flying certain flags had been unable to discharge cargoes at Beirut. These relief supplies had therefore been unloaded at various other Mediterranean ports, entailing losses, delay and substantially increased costs. The Special Representative believed that this difficulty could result in the interruption of some refugee assistance projects at a most critical time.

(b) Needs in East Jordan

169. In this area, the Jordan Government and UNRWA had pooled their resources in a joint effort to assist the displaced persons. The World Food Programme and UNICEF, together with the Red Cross and other voluntary agencies, were also helping these persons.

170. The Special Representative noted that the new refugee camps which had been hurriedly set up coincident with the hostilities to provide shelter for the displaced persons were unsuitable for continued occupancy, particularly in cold weather. Improved shelters would have to be provided in substantial numbers, together with expanded facilities for health, education and social services.

171. To preserve the health of the children, adequate sanitation was urgently needed, including arrangements for refuse disposal. It would also be necessary to keep the children reasonably dry and warm. For this purpose, footwear, particularly rubber boots, additional blankets and warm clothing would be required. Supplementary feeding schemes in each camp would be necessary to provide at least one hot meal a day for the children.

172. Another urgent problem would be schooling for the children. Although Jordan was normally well provided with teachers, tents, to

be used as school rooms, and textbooks were lacking.

173. The displaced persons who were living in the homes of friends or relatives constituted a group which had been overlooked until recently. The distribution of certain food-stuffs might alleviate the economic hardship incurred by their hosts, as they might have difficulties in feeding the relatives and friends they were housing.

(c) Needs in the United Arab Republic

174. During his stay in the United Arab Republic, the Special Representative visited several villages in the Liberation Province, where about 10,000 displaced persons had been given shelter. These villages were recently constructed as part of a vast land reclamation and settlement programme and were intended to house new agricultural communities at the beginning of the next agricultural season. The United Arab Republic authorities had made space available to displaced persons in these villages although this would interfere with the scheduled agricultural development in the area.

175. UNRWA, in agreement with the United Arab Republic Government, undertook to make food supplies available to the 3,000 Palestinian refugees from Gaza, and to contribute towards the provision of medical and sanitation services.

176. In addition, the World Food Programme was arranging for a programme of food assistance and the Pontifical Mission was planning a distribution of blankets, cooking stoves and clothing.

Return of displaced persons

177. In its resolution 237 (1967) the Security Council called upon the Government of Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.

178. The Special Representative devoted much of his time in the area to discussing this problem with the Government of Israel, the Governments of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, as well as the United Nations agencies and other international organizations. The information obtained by the Special Representative on this subject is set forth below.

(a) Displaced persons in Syria

179. The problem concerning the return of displaced persons was quite different in Syria from what it was in Jordan, for instance. The long-standing and intense antagonism between Syria and Israel permeated discussions on every issue and at any level. Moreover, the occupied area of Syria was now virtually empty and under military administration, so that there was no civilian organization to take care of the arrangements for the reception of displaced persons in the case of their return, or to keep the issue alive by its sheer presence and activity.

180. During his discussions with displaced persons, the Special Representative found them divided on their desire to return. Some wanted immediate return, whether Israel continued to control the area or not. Others insisted on the prior condition of complete liberation of the territory from Israel occupation.

181. In their first discussions with the Special Representative, the Syrian authorities indicated their willingness to allow displaced persons to return to the area under Israel occupation. They designated two possible channels for discussion on the return of displaced persons: the ICRC and UNTSO. Later discussions indicated that the Syrian Government in fact strongly desired the immediate return of the displaced persons to their homes.

182. The Israel Government informed the Special Representative of its official attitude to the return of displaced persons to the occupied area in the following terms, applicable to both Syria and the United Arab Republic:

Israel and Jordan have reached agreement for the return of residents to the West Bank. When talks are initiated with Syria and Egypt the Israel Government will be prepared to discuss with them any outstanding issues including the return of civilians who have left the territories under Israel control.

183. On the last visit of the Special Representative to Damascus on 29-30 August, the question of the return of displaced persons to the occupied area became the main topic of discussion. The Syrian Government advocated an intervention by the United Nations to negotiate such a return. Pointing out the agreement reached with the Government of Jordan on this subject, the Special Representative stressed that the Israel

Government had not refused the return of displaced persons but had left the door open for discussions. Since the Government of Syria was not willing to enter into direct negotiations with Israel, and since the Special Representative was about to leave the area, he drew their attention to the possibility of pursuing this matter through the ICRC, which had acted with success as an intermediary between Israel and Jordan on the matter of the return of displaced persons.

184. In this connexion it should be mentioned that a return of the displaced persons in Syria would be a much more complicated and difficult operation than the return of the residents to the West Bank, since the occupied areas in Syria were almost completely abandoned and had been so for a considerable period. More detailed and thorough planning would therefore be necessary, including the reconstruction of whole villages, as well as a major relief and rehabilitation programme.

(b) Displaced persons in Jordan

185. In early July the Government of Israel announced its intention of authorizing the return of displaced persons to the West Bank on certain conditions. In order to obtain the authorization to return, each head of family was to fill in an application form for himself and his family, and submit it with adequate identity documents. The date of 10 August 1967 was set as the deadline for the return.

186. Agreement was reached between the Israel and Jordan Governments through the ICRC acting as intermediary on a draft text for the application forms and the Israel Government undertook to print them. The forms as first printed carried a heading reading "State of Israel; Ministry of the Interior."

187. When the first batch of several thousand application forms with this heading was transmitted to the Jordan Government on 17 July, it returned them four days later as unacceptable. An Israel Government spokesman later explained to the Special Representative that the printing of official documents with this heading by the Israel State Printing Office was such a routine matter that in this case the heading was included in the application forms without prior explicit instructions from the Government au-

thority concerned. All subsequent efforts to persuade the Israel Government to delete the heading or to accept the insignia of the Red Cross instead proved unavailing. Israel spokesmen accused the Government of Jordan of having unnecessarily made a political issue of what they considered a rather unimportant formality.

188. Meanwhile, the Israel Government insisted that in order to settle the many practical arrangements concerning the return of the displaced persons, direct contact with the Jordan representatives was essential. On 6 August, during a meeting at the Allenby Bridge, in which representatives of the Israel Government, the ICRC, and the Jordan Red Crescent participated, it was agreed to adopt a heading on the application forms mentioning the ICRC in the centre, the State of Israel on the left side and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the right. In addition, a number of other problems were discussed, in particular, the question of the deadline for return set by the Israel Government. It was agreed that the new forms would be printed in Israel and transmitted by the ICRC to the Jordanian authorities, who would distribute them to the displaced persons. The distribution of the application forms began on 12 August. Subsequently, the Israel Government agreed to postpone the deadline for the return operation until 31 August.

189. On 18 July, before this operation began, some fifty families had already returned to the West Bank, following an Israel Government decision to allow the return of special hardship cases on that date.

190. After agreement on the application forms had been reached, information was received from the Jordan Government that it had transmitted through the ICRC about 40,000 applications, involving some 170,000 persons. According to the Jordanian authorities, the Israel Government approved, during the period of 13 through 28 August, only 4,763 applications, covering 16,266 persons. The first displaced persons under this scheme crossed the Jordan river on 18 August. On 9 September, the total number of those who had returned was given by Jordanian sources as 14,150 persons and by Israel sources as 14,056.

191. Later, the Israel Government claimed that "for reasons never satisfactorily explained

by the Government of Jordan, the Jordanian authorities did not make full use of the permits issued, and only 60 per cent of the displaced persons who had been authorized to return did actually show up at the crossing points." It further claimed that it had opened two bridges across the Jordan river to receive returnees at the rate of 3,000 a day.

192. The Jordan Government asserted that the procedure insisted upon by the occupying authority had proved to be an impediment to a smooth functioning of the return operation, and mentioned in this connexion that only a fraction of the forms submitted had been approved and that only short notice, often of less than twelve hours, had been given of this approval on a day-to-day basis. The lists of approved cases submitted daily by the Israel authorities were said to cover, in a single document, refugees accommodated in several localities and camps, who then had to be contacted and transported to the crossing points over the Jordan river within a few hours.

193. The Jordan Government also complained that the Israel authorities sometimes approved the return of some members of one family while denying its approval to other members of the same family. Moreover, displaced persons were not allowed to bring with them all their personal belongings, such as their cars. These factors had had, according to the Jordanian authorities, a negative effect on the desire of displaced persons to return.

194. Finally, the Jordan Government claimed that the approvals given by the Israel authorities excluded UNRWA-registered refugees and those displaced persons accommodated in emergency camps on the East Bank as well as displaced persons originating from the areas of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho. These restrictions had made the organization and administration of the operation extremely difficult for the Jordanian authorities and this was the main reason why many displaced persons authorized to return did not actually appear at the crossing points.

195. The Jordan Government expressed through many channels its insistence on the inalienable right of every displaced person to return to his home and on the necessity of extending the deadline beyond 31 August.

196. The Special Representative considered

that, even without the many initial difficulties which were bound to arise during such an extensive and delicate operation, the deadline set by the Israel Government could not have allowed the return of all those who wished to do so. Even if the potential daily rate of 3,000 returnees mentioned by Israel had been reached every day during the period of 18 through 31 August, only some 35,000 displaced persons could have returned.

197. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 16 August, the Israel Government asserted that while it was directing its efforts to alleviating the consequences of the hostilities in order to bring back normalcy and to restore peaceful conditions, including the return of displaced persons to their former homes, the Government of Jordan was conducting a campaign of increasing violence, vituperation and direct incitement, both of the prospective returnees and of the Arabs in Israel-controlled territories.

198. The Israel authorities repeated these allegations to the Special Representative during his stay in Israel and claimed that the alleged attitude of the Jordan Government seriously impeded the whole question of the return of the displaced persons. After a short visit to Amman, the Special Representative brought to the Israel Government the assurance that the Jordan Government wished to proceed with the return operation in an atmosphere of restraint and in accordance with humanitarian principles.

199. In a note dated 24 August addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel, (see A/6789, S/8133), the Secretary-General requested the Government of Israel to extend the deadline for the return of displaced persons beyond the date of 31 August. In a reply dated 11 September (see A/6795, S/8153), the Permanent Representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General that the Government of Israel had decided:

(a) To allow former West Bank residents holding previously issued permits who were unable to make use of them before 31 August to return to their former homes within a fixed period of time. Arrangements to this effect were being made.

(b) To authorize the Israel authorities to accept applications from residents of the West Bank for the reunion of their families. Such appli-

cations would be reviewed in each case by the Israel authorities with sympathetic consideration.

(c) To study individual applications based on conditions of special hardship.

(d) To discuss with UNRWA representatives in Israel ways by which Israel might contribute to a solution of the urgent problem arising from the adverse physical conditions in the camps now occupied by those who were previously UNRWA refugees, particularly in the Jericho camps.

It should be noted that the category of displaced persons referred to under point (a) above would include 4,086 persons according to Jordanian estimates and 6,602 persons according to Israel estimates.

(c) Displaced persons in the United Arab Republic

200. The displaced persons whom the Special Representative met during his visit to the United Arab Republic all expressed their desire to return to their homes. The governor of the Liberation Province stated that upon their arrival in the land reclamation project he had offered free plots of land to some displaced persons but that they had refused, insisting on their desire to return to their areas of origin. It may be noted in this connexion that some of these displaced persons, particularly bedouin families from the Sinai peninsula, had no agricultural experience.

201. The official position of the Israel Government concerning the return of displaced persons from the United Arab Republic is similar to that concerning displaced persons in Syria and has been set forth earlier in this report (see paragraph 182).

202. The Government of the United Arab Republic, in its second round of talks with the Special Representative on 26 August, held the view that discussions concerning the return of displaced persons should be initiated by the Special Representative in pursuance of Security Council resolution 237 (1967), while the ICRC might assume responsibility for the practical implementation of any agreement reached on this subject.

IV. TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

203. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 237 (1967), the Security Council recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

204. Under the Geneva Conventions it is incumbent on the ICRC to work for the faithful application of these conventions and to take cognizance of complaints regarding alleged breaches of the conventions and to endeavour to ensure the protection of and assistance to prisoners of war. Consequently the Special Representative kept in close contact on this question with the ICRC headquarters in Geneva, with the Regional Representative of the ICRC stationed in Cyprus as well as with its representatives in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic and had ample opportunity to appreciate the untiring efforts of these officers in pursuing their delicate mission.

205. In this connexion it should be stressed that the ICRC had, in view of the increasing tensions in the Near East, already sent representatives about ten days before the outbreak of hostilities to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Tel Aviv, and that this organization was therefore on the spot from the very beginning of the conflict and has been there ever since to verify the application of the Geneva Conventions. On the whole the ICRC has, as far as is known to the Special Representative, been able to play in the area of conflict its important role as agent and neutral intermediary.

206. Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic, in letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations accused Israel of inhuman acts against, and maltreatment of, prisoners of war from their countries and also of executions of prisoners of war. Israel denied these allegations in letters addressed to the Secretary-General. It also expressed grave concern over the treatment and conditions of the Israel prisoners of war in the Arab countries, alleging that public lynching of Israel pilots had taken place in the United Arab Republic and that of two Israel pilots brought down over Syrian territory during the war, one had been murdered and the other mutilated.

207. The Special Representative was not in a position to investigate any of the above accusations, which referred to events alleged to have taken place well before his arrival in the area, but he paid a visit to the remaining prisoner-of-war camps in Israel and the United Arab Republic and gathered the impression that the treatment of prisoners was correct on both sides. The contact between the prisoners of war and their families had been established, after some initial difficulties, through the ICRC and on both sides they had received mail and parcels, all of which had helped to bolster the morale of the prisoners, who were extremely unhappy about the slow pace of the negotiations concerning their exchange.

208. An exchange of prisoners of war had been successfully concluded through the ICRC between Israel on one side and Jordan, Syria and Lebanon on the other. Negotiations between Israel and the United Arab Republic concerning an exchange were continuing through the intermediary of the ICRC but had apparently not yet led to any agreement.

209. Israel stated that it had returned some 200 wounded prisoners of war to the United Arab Republic, and immediately after the cease-fire had carried out an extensive operation, in which the ICRC also took part, aimed at tracing and assembling those United Arab Republic soldiers who were scattered all over Sinai and in great distress. According to Israel sources, some 12,000 soldiers were allowed to return to their country and were not taken prisoner.

V. THE QUESTION OF THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES

210. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 237 (1967), the Security Council recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949.

211. Certain information concerning the safety, welfare and security of the civilian population in or from Arab territories at present under Israel control and the situation of the prisoners of war is presented in other chapters of this report.

212. Since the outbreak of the recent hos-

ilities, Israel has expressed concern about the treatment of Jewish minorities, particularly in certain Arab States. Upon his arrival, the Special Representative was approached on this subject by the Israel Government. The Special Representative, not being sure whether this particular humanitarian problem should be inquired into under his terms of reference, consulted the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General informed him that the provisions of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) might properly be interpreted as having application to the treatment, at the time of the recent war and as a result of that war, of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States which are directly concerned because of their participation in that war.

213. Since this particular aspect of the protection of civilian persons in time of war could be taken up only towards the end of his stay in the area of conflict, the Special Representative had very little time for discussion or investigation of the actual situation of minorities.

214. On 17 August, i.e. shortly before his return to New York, the Special Representative requested, in writing, the Governments of Israel, Syria and the United Arab Republic, information on the treatment and protection of Jewish persons in Syria and the United Arab Republic and of Arab persons in Israel. He stressed that it would be particularly helpful for him to know how the personal and property rights of such persons had been affected by the recent war, how many of them might have been and continued to be confined and for what reason, and whether they were free to leave the country in which they were resident.

215. The Government of Israel, in a letter dated 27 August, informed the Special Representative that, according to Special Emergency Defence Regulations, forty-five Arab citizens considered as security risks had been placed in detention on the outbreak of the war. Most of these had been released by 18 June and the others twelve days later. Moreover, a curfew from 1900 hours to 0500 hours had been ordered in one or two areas contiguous with Israel's border with Arab territory, and for exit from those areas a special permit had been required. All these precautions had, however, been rescinded on 21 June.

216. Except for the above security measures, there had been, according to the Israel Government, no discrimination against Arab citizens: their property rights had been fully upheld and respected and they were at liberty to leave the country whenever they so wished.

217. For reasons explained above, the Special Representative was not able to look into this particular problem extensively while visiting Israel. In Arab countries, the Special Representative heard allegations that the Arabs in Israel were looked upon and treated as second class citizens. Against this, the Israel Government maintained that the Arab citizens of Israel, in peace-time or in war, were treated in the same way as the rest of the population and that there was no discrimination against them.

218. During his last visit to Cairo, the Special Representative raised the question of the Jewish minority in the United Arab Republic with the United Arab Republic Government, which had just received his letter on this subject. The United Arab Republic Government expressed the firm opinion that the Security Council resolution did not apply to the Jewish minority in the United Arab Republic and requested clarification on this interpretation before replying to the letter of the Special Representative. The United Arab Republic Government pointed out in this connexion that the Jewish minority in the United Arab Republic consisted of three categories. First, those of foreign nationality or origin, for example, French and Italian citizens, who were looked after by the ambassadors of their countries of origin. Some of this group had left the country already. Secondly, the stateless Jews. These were under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who has an office in Cairo. Thirdly, Jews of Egyptian nationality. These were, so it was maintained, solely the responsibility of the United Arab Republic Government.

219. The Special Representative indicated that there were persistent allegations that 500 to 600 Jewish men (the Jewish minority in the United Arab Republic is estimated at about 2,500 persons) had been kept in detention since the beginning of the war, and held incommunicado, although allowed to correspond by letter with their families and to receive relief assistance, and moreover that

the property of the Jews in Cairo had been confiscated.

220. The Secretary-General also took up this question with the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic in New York and received essentially the same response as the Special Representative. The Secretary-General raised this question also with the Permanent Representative of Israel, who assured the Secretary-General that if his Special Representative approached the Government of Israel on the matter, he would find the Government responsive.

221. During his last visit to Damascus on 29-30 August 1967, the question raised by the Special Representative in his letter to the Syrian Government on the Jewish minority in Syria was discussed at some length. Pending a written answer to this letter, the Government explained that they welcomed the chance to assure the Special Representative that the Jewish minority in Syria, numbering about 4,000 and mainly concentrated in the cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Kamishli, was treated in exactly the same way as other Syrian citizens. As among the Christian and Moslem population, there were among the Jews certain individuals who were under suspicion for anti-Government activities and were therefore restricted in their movements for security reasons. Otherwise they had the same freedom of movement and of work as other Syrian nationals.

222. The Special Representative was invited to visit some Jewish shops, and during a tour of the shopping district of Damascus in the company of officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Interior he saw a number of Jewish shops which all seemed to be working normally.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

223. This report gives a wide-ranging impression, which clearly could not be exhaustive, of the problems, the sufferings and the condition of the peoples in the areas of the Near East affected by the hostilities of last June. This tragic human aftermath of war is a world-wide responsibility and must touch us all.

224. The report leaves no room for doubt about the grave hardships which the peoples affected have undergone, and it is clear that in many places hardship and distress on a large

scale continue. I hope very much that the Governments concerned will find it possible to divorce the purely humanitarian aspects of the situation in the Near East from the political and military aspects, so that measures to relieve the suffering of the innocent civilians involved can be taken with humanitarian considerations mainly in mind. It would be doubly tragic if the victims of the war should continue to be victims of the animosities and tensions of the parties to the conflict and if efforts to alleviate their sufferings were rendered ineffective by any spirit of retaliation or vindictiveness. It is clear from the report that the Governments concerned have themselves exerted efforts to help the people affected by the war. I very much hope that, pending some more basic settlement, these efforts can go forward and be increased. UNRWA's efforts also have now become more indispensable than ever, and I hope that co-operation with UNRWA in the area itself as well as support for it from outside will be commensurate with the new challenges which UNRWA now has to face.

225. I wish to express my appreciation to all the Governments that have made voluntary contributions of one kind or another to aid the distressed peoples of the Near East. Many of these voluntary contributions are set forth in detail in document A/6792 and Add. 1. I would also like to record my appreciation and admiration to the many voluntary and national agencies which have given practical succour to the afflicted peoples of the Near East in this tragic time. In expressing these sentiments, I feel it my duty to point out that the onset of winter will greatly increase the sufferings of many and that more assistance of almost all kinds is still urgently required. I appeal to all Governments, and to voluntary agencies as well, to continue to contribute to the humanitarian task which faces the international community in the Near East.

ANNEX I

Itinerary of the Mission of the Special Representative (11 July—1 September 1967)

- 11 July — Arrival at Beirut by air from New York.
- 16 July — Beirut — Damascus by car.
- 17-18 July — Visits to refugee camps in and around Damascus.
- 18 July — Damascus — Amman by car.
- 20 July — Visits to refugee camps in the Jordan Valley close to Allenby Bridge, Karameh, Salt and a new camp in the desert north of Amman.
- 20 July — Amman — Beirut by air.
- 23 July — Beirut — Jerusalem via Tel Aviv by car.
- 24 July — Jerusalem — Nablus — Jerusalem by car. Visit to the Old City of Jerusalem. Visit to camps at Kalandia and Amara.
- 25 July — Jerusalem — Tel Aviv — Jerusalem by helicopter. Visit to POW camps at Atlit.
- 26 July — Jerusalem — Tel Aviv by car. Tel Aviv — Nicosia by air. Meeting with the Chief Delegate of ICRC in Nicosia.
- 27 July — Nicosia — Cairo by air.
- 28 July — Cairo — Liberation Province (north-west of Cairo) — Cairo by car. Visit to refugee camps.
- 29 July — Cairo — Beirut by air.
- 4 August — Beirut — Amman by air.
- 6 August — Amman — Jerusalem via Allenby Bridge by car.
- 8 August — Jerusalem — Safad by air. Safad — Kuneitra — Majd-el-Shams — Safad via Banyas and Tel Azzaziat by car.
- 9 August — Safad — Jerusalem via the kibbutzim of Lehavot Habashan, Gadot and Tel Katzir by car.
- 11 August — Jerusalem — Hebron — Beitaua — Bethlehem — Jerusalem by car.
- 12 August — *Special Representative:* Jerusalem — Amman — Jerusalem via Allenby Bridge by car. *Assistant to the Special Representative:* Jerusalem — Qalquiliya — Beitnuba — Yalu — Imwas — Jerusalem by car.
- 13 August — Tour of the outskirts of the Old City of Jerusalem.
- 14 August — Jerusalem — El Arish — El Kantara (Sinai) — Ashqelon by helicopter.
- 15 August — Ashqelon — Gaza — Jabalia — Jerusalem by car.

17 August — Jerusalem — Beirut by car.
 25 August — Beirut — Cairo by air.
 27 August — Cairo — Beirut by air.
 29 August — Beirut — Damascus by car.
 30 August — Damascus — Beirut by car.
 1 September — Departure from Beirut for New York.

ANNEX II

Aide-memoire submitted to the Special Representative by the Jordanian authorities

1. At the meeting held today in the office of the Prime Minister in Amman attended by Mr. Gussing and his aides on the one hand, and members of the Ministerial Committee for Refugees' Affairs on the other, a complete review was made of the background, causes and development of the refugee problem involving about 215,000 Jordanian nationals who were displaced from their camps, villages and towns on the West Bank of Jordan.

The review included also measures taken by the Jordanian authorities in collaboration with UNRWA and with the help of sister and other friendly countries to provide whatever measure of relief was possible and practicable under very different circumstances of influx of large numbers of refugees during the Israeli aggression and directly thereafter with very limited supplies of tentage, blankets, foodstuffs and medicines at the disposal of the authorities.

2. The Jordanian Government hastened to set up a Ministerial Committee composed of the Ministers of Finance, National Economy, Education, Social Welfare, Health and Reconstruction and Development as well as the Director of Public Security and the President of the Jordan Red Crescent Society. This group was to be joined at a later stage by two representatives of the private sector and the Governor of Amman. This Committee organized relief work and controlled all stocks of contributions in kind on receipt and distribution. It also conducted through sixty-two centres throughout the East Bank which were managed by committees consisting of civil servants and UNRWA officials, a registration of those refugees who were mainly housed in schools, social centres, public buildings and mosques, living in a very unhygienic manner, mixed up in

a socially unacceptable manner and overcrowded with very poor nutrition especially for children. The registration date set for 1 July 1967 was announced ahead of time to all, but particularly for the purpose of those who were not in such public buildings but had stayed with other refugees in camps around Amman, Zerka and Irbed or had no shelter at all, and stayed in the open fields. The forms they filled in triplicate (copies presented at meeting) contained many details about the family whose head filled the form after being cautioned against untruthful statements. It contained items relating to previous registration card with UNRWA, place of residence and such other relevant information. Once the registration was completed, the refugees were taken to the eleven camps set up by the Government, in respect of six of which UNRWA had accepted to take managerial and maintenance responsibility. These camps were located at: Souf, Zezia, Wadi Dhuleil, Ma'an, Tafeeleh, Kerak (on the highlands), and Karameh, Shunch, M'adi, Deir Alla and Wadi El-Yabis (in the Jordan Valley). Those camps that were not taken by UNRWA were managed by the Government with help in certain respects from UNRWA.

The result of the registration showed a total of 177,165 refugees but did not include a large number who were not registered. The number registered is estimated to be 70 per cent of the total number of refugees and displaced persons.

3. It can hardly be said that, in spite of all the efforts on the part of both the Government and UNRWA, the general conditions of the refugees was in any manner or description satisfactory. It is true to say, however, that their problem continues to be humanitarian, social and political of an undefinable magnitude. The Jordan Government had noted with satisfaction the Security Council's resolution No. 237 adopted at its 1361st meeting on 14 June 1967, and had on more than one occasion made appeals to the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of said resolution:

A. With respect to total or major destruction by the Israel attacking forces, whether during combat or after the cease fire, of many Jordanian towns and villages on the West Bank of Jordan including but not limited to: Kalkilya, Beit Nuba, Imwas, Yalu, Beit Aou, Nuba, Khares, Idna,

Souref as well as the Magharbeh Quarter and Sa'diyah Quarter in the City of Jerusalem.

All of this resulted in making homeless and destitute all the innocent civilian dwellers and inhabitants of these places, turning them into helpless refugees and displaced persons. A visit by Mr. Gussing to these places is most important to establish the facts with regard to the damage caused by Israeli forces.

B. With respect to returning the refugees who have fled from the West Bank of Jordan since the outbreak of hostilities to their homes, camps, towns and villages.

4. The UNRWA COMMISSIONER GENERAL put out his report on "HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST" on 18 June 1967 and his second report on 4 July, which has since been issued as a United Nations General Assembly and Security Council document. Both of these reports showed clearly the pitiful condition in which the peaceful inhabitants of the West Bank of Jordan had found themselves and in some cases becoming "refugees square" (for the second time), since 1948.

5. The Government of Jordan has consistently maintained that the West Bank of Jordan, which was under temporary and forcible military occupation by the Israeli army, was an inseparable part of the territory of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and that the right of those who have been displaced from their lands and homes to return thereto and to maintain possession and ownership thereof was an established and inalienable right. It appealed to the inhabitants of the West Bank still resident there to stay in their homes and lands, and made continued appeals to the United Nations for the return of the refugees who moved from the West Bank or who have been displaced therefrom.

On 3 July and after the Israeli announcement of 2 July, the Jordan Government reiterated its stand as above described and conveyed it again officially to the Secretary-General through the Jordan Permanent Delegate at the United Nations.

Then followed the General Assembly's resolution on Humanitarian Assistance adopted on 4 July, which welcomed with great satisfaction

the Security Council's resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June.

6. Cables were exchanged between the International Committee for the Red Cross and the Jordan Government between 5 and 7 July regarding setting up two pedestrian and two transport bridges on the River Jordan for the purposes of returning refugees and displaced persons. The Jordan Government gave all the approvals required on very practical and reasonable conditions.

7. Continued consultations were maintained by the Jordan Government with the Commissioner General, Deputy Commissioner General and the Representative in Jordan of UNRWA for the purpose of administering relief to UNRWA registered refugees who moved to the East Bank from the West Bank of Jordan, as well as to other displaced persons. The Government also paid a great deal of attention in said discussions to:

A. Deteriorating conditions of inhabitants of the West Bank of Jordan, where the economy has been paralysed, a shortage of food approaching hunger was becoming a threat, means of transportation were confiscated by the occupying forces, and there is no circulation of money due to confiscation by occupying forces of cash on hand at the Jordanian banks who were closed for business by these forces.

B. Return of the refugees and other displaced persons who moved from the West Bank of Jordan during and as a result of the hostilities.

Similar contact was being maintained with the President of the International Committee for the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the Red Cross delegates in Jordan. A meeting was held by top Government officials and the President on 15 July in Amman.

8. The Jordanian stand has always been very clear:

A. The West Bank has been and continued to be an inseparable part of the land and territory of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan inhabited by citizens of the Kingdom.

B. The right of the refugees and other displaced persons to return to their homes and lands in the West Bank of Jordan was sacred, indisputable and inalienable. It is a right that stands no condition and should not be subject to any.

C. The return of the refugees and other displaced persons in exercise of the right above mentioned should be under the supervision of the ICRC and any request for such return by the families should be made to the ICRC, who is fully empowered by the Jordan Government to satisfy itself of the identity and place of residence on the West Bank of the refugees and displaced persons in addition to verification of any other information regarding any of the refugees. The Government is willing to facilitate the work of the Red Cross to the utmost.

D. The occupying forces should return to their rightful owners all properties confiscated whether in the form of transport vehicles, other material assets and all monies confiscated unlawfully and forcefully from Jordanian banks in the West Bank of Jordan which amounted to about JD 600,000.

E. As very few refugees have ever had an identity card issued them and even fewer were able to bring with them any identification papers in the very difficult circumstances of their influx and flight from the West Bank, it was proposed to the Red Cross:

(i) The forms customarily used by the Red Cross for such repatriation operations are acceptable to the Jordan Government. This is a humanitarian operation and should not form a part of any political involvement.

(ii) To have UNRWA issue certificates for those who have been UNRWA registered refugees in the West Bank and who had received UNRWA rations in May 1967, and were eligible for such rations on 5 June 1967.

(iii) To accept the 1 July registration form filled and certified as stated in paragraph 2 above as adequate evidence of the status and place of residence of persons other than UNRWA registered refugees in respect of whom UNRWA certificates would be issued as in (ii) above.

F. The Jordan Government would like to provide the returning refugees with some food-stuffs and some cash for their livelihood and this should be facilitated by the Israel Authorities.

G. The Jordan Government has arranged with UNRWA for administering relief assistance to the returning refugees en route to their camps and at their camps after return thereto. Also an

international appeal has been made through the Red Cross for urgent relief assistance to other inhabitants of the West Bank who live under very difficult economic, political and social conditions.

H. The Jordan Government is attempting at making some suitable arrangements for the reopening of Jordanian banks on the West Bank under the auspices of the IMF in order to serve Jordanians in rehabilitating economic activities on the West Bank pending withdrawal of the occupying forces from Jordanian territory.

ANNEX III

Aide-memoire prepared by the Jordanian authorities concerning talks held with the Special Representative by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy of Jordan, on 5 August 1967

1. This meeting took place at the office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 10.15 a.m., and was followed by another meeting between Mr. Gussing and the Prime Minister.

Mr. Gussing was desirous of reviewing developments that have taken place since his last visit to Amman which ended on 19 July, and stated he intended to go over to the occupied territory on Sunday, 6 August, for a more extensive visit.

2. The viewpoint of the Jordan Government was stated as follows:

A. The Government is still desirous of repatriation of the refugees and other displaced persons who have moved over to the East Bank from the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during, since and because of the Israeli aggression of June 1967.

The Government has done all it could to have this humanitarian operation successfully effected, including authorizing the Jordanian Red Crescent Society and the International Committee for the Red Cross to take all measures and steps in accordance with their conventions and principles of International Law (with special relation to inhabitants of occupied territories), to return the refugees and displaced persons to their homes, towns, villages and camps on the West Bank, presently under temporary military occupation.

The Government, therefore, hoped that Mr. Gussing will continue his efforts to achieve this

end in fulfilment of the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 (No. 237/1361). The Government being ready to facilitate his work, affirms its previous stand in welcoming Mr. Gussing to visit any part of the country and to meet whomsoever he finds necessary to meet and talk to, but it feels it is only proper not to allow such rightful return to Jordanian territory by the refugees and displaced persons who are all citizens of the Kingdom, nor such a humanitarian operation to form part of any political involvement.

Equally, the Government of Jordan felt that it was most essential for Mr. Gussing to be given the freedom and opportunity to visit all places and to meet all people in the West Bank of Jordan whom he deems would contribute towards better enabling him to report more fully to the Secretary-General regarding the situation on the West Bank and the conditions under which its inhabitants are today living. This would particularly be true in the case of the towns and villages wholly or partially demolished by the occupying forces (paragraph 3 A, page 2 of the Aide Memoire dated 19 July). Equally important would be the visit by Mr. Gussing to the detained personalities whose matter will be alluded to hereinafter.

It was promised that Mr. Gussing would be informed of the outcome of Jordan's discussions with the Red Cross as soon as possible. (Mr. Gussing was given a fuller and up to date briefing by the Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Refugees Affairs during the course of the evening.)

3. Mr. Gussing's attention was drawn to the unlawful detention and expulsion by the military forces in the occupied territory of leading Jordanian citizens in Jerusalem, some of whom are high Government officials, and other professional personalities.

The following have been detained and/or expelled to other parts of Palestine:

- (i) Mr. Anwar Al-Khatib, Governor of Jerusalem.
- (ii) Dr. Daoud Al-Husseini, one-time a Member of Parliament.
- (iii) Mr. Ibrahim Bakr, an advocate and member of the Jordan Bar.
- (iv) Mr. Abdul Muhsin abou Meizer, an advocate and member of the Jordan Bar.

The Government takes the firm stand that the action in respect of the above gentlemen is highly illegal, contrary to recognized principles of International Law and contravenes both The Hague Rules and the Civilian Convention of Geneva. It is, in addition, in direct conflict with paragraph 1 (a) of the Security Council resolution No. 237, whereby Israel was called upon "to insure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the area where military operations have taken place."

4. Mr. Gussing's attention was also drawn to the attempts by the military authorities in the Occupied Territory to require Jordanian teachers to fill forms by or before 6 August 1967, which provide for a statement by the teacher filling such form to the effect that his "previous nationality was Jordanian" and "present nationality is Israeli." This is absolutely and flagrantly contrary to Rule 45 of The Hague Rules of 1967, whereby it has been forbidden to force the inhabitants of the Occupied Territory to swear allegiance to the occupying force.

5. The same treatment meted to the teachers has also been attempted at:

A. Judges of the courts of justice, who have been required to owe allegiance to the occupying forces, who have been required to sit in Ramallah while their normal area of jurisdiction under existing Jordanian laws is in Jerusalem, and whose working conditions were being made so impossible that they cannot exercise justice in accordance with the laws of the land.

B. Doctors and other professional people whose working conditions were being made impossible, especially in the case of doctors where the question of allegiance and extremely poor pay combine to cripple their most needed services to the inhabitants.

6. In addition, the Occupying forces have announced their intention to change the curriculae and teaching programmes at the schools in the West Bank of Jordan while it is also a recognized principle of International Law that schools and educational establishments must be permitted to continue their ordinary activities, and the occupant is bound to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children. Kindly refer to article 50 of the Geneva Convention "The Civilian Conven-

tion" of 1949.

7. All the above being basic aspects of the welfare of the inhabitants of the West Bank, the Government "requests the intervention of Mr. Gussing, to seek an end to such unlawful measures," which might lead to injurious results harmful to the whole population of the West Bank of Jordan including Jerusalem.

8. The illegality of all actions taken by the occupying forces with regard to Jerusalem was also discussed. It was becoming very apparent that these forces were not getting any response or co-operation from the people of the city in respect of such illegal acts. On the other hand, such acts have prejudiced the safety and well-being of the inhabitants. Some attempts have been made at changing existing Jordanian laws, imposition of taxes and customs duties on goods coming into the city from other parts of the West Bank of Jordan, in addition to other arbitrary and illegal measures, with the result of causing extreme hardships, obstructing and disrupting the minimum of economic activities and causing unemployment.

It was requested, therefore, that such a situation should "receive the attention and care" of Mr. Gussing as touching on the welfare of the inhabitants. It will also be brought to the attention, at a later stage, of the United Nations Secretary-General's Personal Representative for Jerusalem.

ANNEX IV

Statement on the situation on the West Bank by an official Jordanian spokesman, submitted to the Special Representative by the Jordanian authorities

1 August 1967

An official Jordanian spokesman announced the following:

The occupying authorities broadcasted that they have carried out an economic survey on the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in which they claimed that the Jordan Government has not invested in the West Bank except one third of total investments and that it adopted other economic discriminatory measures against Jordanian nationals in the West Bank.

The Jordan Government declares that all

these claims constitute a clear distortion of facts and falsification of the simplest principles of economics and do not represent except cheap intrigue meant to create confusion and cover up for the enemy's responsibility for stagnating the economic conditions in the West Bank by various means and pressures so as to destroy economic, construction and touristic activities, thereby creating unemployment, decreasing output and income and throttling business activity.

The Jordan Government views and continues to view the Kingdom with its two Banks as constituting one entity from the political, economic and social aspects. On the basis of this principle it has formulated, financed and implemented plans to develop all of Jordan's human, natural and economic resources with the aim of raising living standards of its people wherever they are and without any discrimination whatsoever, with special emphasis on the development of all these resources in order to increase income and production and create additional employment opportunities without neglecting the development of social sectors such as health, education and social welfare. In addition, adequate attention has been given to road construction, public utilities and other social services which would support the development of productive sectors and strengthen its effectiveness.

As it is well known to international economic circles, Jordan has faced since 1948 tremendous obstacles consequent to the Israeli aggression which resulted in the influx of one million Palestinian refugees. This has led within few months to tripling the population of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan without a proportionate increase in the country's resources. Moreover it has necessitated complete rerouting of Jordan's trade and lines of communication. Notwithstanding all these problems, Jordan has, under the wise and dedicated leadership of H. M. King Hussein and efforts of its people, achieved rapid economic growth. Gross National Product has risen from JD 52 million in 1954 to JD 187 million in 1966 thereby raising *per capita* income from JD 37 in 1954 to JD 95 in 1966.

In spite of the non-stable conditions in the Middle East engendered by the continuous encroachments and acts of aggression by the Israeli forces of evil, the profound confidence of Jor-

danians in the growth and prospects of Jordan economy has been the major incentive underlying their participation in the development of the various sectors of the economy by investing their savings which raised the proportion of capital formation to gross national product from 10 per cent in 1954 to 16 per cent in 1966. The role which the Government exercised in this respect has contributed significantly towards strengthening this confidence through the maintenance of financial and monetary stability as well as the creation of close co-operation between the public and private sectors towards attaining the objectives of comprehensive development.

According to official statistics, the direct contribution of the West Bank amounted to 40 per cent of gross domestic product, and about 50 per cent of gross national product if the appropriate economic components were taken into consideration. This plainly refutes the figures given in the misleading report which was broadcasted by the occupying forces. Therefore *per capita* product in the West Bank is higher than was cited in the referenced report.

Moreover available data indicate clearly that investment by the private and public sectors was almost equal in both Banks. For example, investments in the West Bank of the Kingdom represented about 95 per cent of total investment in tourism, 60 per cent of private constructions, 52 per cent of Government buildings, 48 per cent of municipal and rural development schemes and 44 per cent of highways and roads.

The Government of Jordan has, through its financing agencies, provided necessary funds to develop the agricultural sector in the West Bank in accordance with a sound and well conceived plan. This led to the prosperity of this sector and expanded production whereby it produced 87 per cent of the country's production of olives, 80 per cent of fruits and 45 per cent of vegetables. This has been achieved in spite of the fact that the agricultural area of the West Bank does not exceed 28 per cent of the total cultivated area in the Kingdom.

The Government has also established and financed 239 co-operative societies in the West Bank out of a total of 464 societies in the Kingdom. In addition investments have been made in irrigation, water supply, and electricity projects. The implementation of Jordan's electrification

plan has been commenced and it aims at providing electric power to all villages in the Kingdom with population exceeding 2,000 inhabitants by 1970. Similarly work was underway on the expansion and improvement of the Jerusalem Airport and the construction of a modern highway connecting Jerusalem and Bethlehem. These two projects were planned to be completed this year had it not been for the Israeli aggression.

Industrial planning in Jordan, as is the case with other countries, is based on sound economic bases, and thus Jordan industries have been established in the various parts of the Kingdom in a way befitting the conditions of each industry and the attainment of its economic and technical feasibility so as to contribute to the development of the Kingdom as a whole giving equitable employment and ownership opportunities for all Jordanians.

There is no doubt that all attempts by the enemy to distort facts and spread confusion are doomed to failure particularly since all citizens in both Banks are aware of the extent of the joint efforts by the Government and the public which were made and continue to be made in the various fields of economic and social development which have effectively contributed in raising living standards and income to all Jordanians.

Our citizens in the West Bank have experienced all means of enemy twisted propaganda which aims at diverting the attention of the people from the indisputable fact of the unity of Jordan soil and their deep faith in the national, social, economic and political ties which unite all Jordanians together in one family and with one goal in mind, namely, the invincibility of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its prosperity as an indivisible part of the Arab World.

ANNEX V

First aide-memoire submitted to the Special Representative by the Israel authorities on the situation on the West Bank

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Some characteristics of West Bank economy

The West Bank had almost half of Jordan's population (900,000 out of two million) but it accounted for only one-third of the output. Ave-

rage income in Transjordan was U.S.\$335 per person; in the West Bank only U.S.\$216. One cause was the bias in investment policy, another the presence of refugees. Of U.S.\$84 m. invested in 1966, two-thirds went to Transjordan, seat of all the country's sizeable industries, such as oil refining, cement and phosphates. On the other hand economic activity in the West Bank, concentrated on agriculture, supplying 12 per cent of Jordan's farm output, and on tourism.

The West Bank had only 22 per cent of Jordan's industry and 16 per cent of her transport. Total industry output in the West Bank equals two per cent of Israel's production.

Employment

Several steps have been taken in order to provide wider employment to local labour. The Public Works Department was instructed to follow the same work methods as in the past. A large number of labourers (500) have been engaged by the authorities to work on road repairs on the Nablus-Ramallah and Megiddo-Jenin roads. Another 300 are working on road repairs in the Ramallah and Jericho areas. 130 workers have been employed in the same areas in afforestation and irrigation. Street repair work is conducted in Jenin. The Nablus municipality received a loan from the Israel authorities for current public works and the road leading to Mount Gerizim will be widened. The road from Tul Kaream will be repaved. 18 large public buildings the construction of which was interrupted by the outbreak of war, will now be completed, mainly in order to provide employment. The Public Works Department is resuming work on projects which employ 15,000 persons.

The Ministry of Labour is setting up vocational training centres for unskilled adults. "Ort" is preparing to open 4 vocational schools in the West Bank.

Agriculture

Agricultural institutions operating before 5 June have been reopened and are manned largely by the original staff. Also operating are Government research stations, plant nurseries, offices of afforestation, veterinary supervision centers. The next agricultural season is being planned with a view to avoiding surpluses. Commercial marketing

of agricultural production has been organized; in order to solve the problem of agricultural surpluses it has been agreed that they would be used in Israeli processing plants. In the field of agricultural exportation a trial shipment of plums from Hebron was air-freighted by El-Al to West Europe.

Industry

The Nablus factory producing special oil used in Arab cuisine has reopened. It employs 150 workers. The local match factory is operating again.

Commerce

Branch offices of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry will be opened in the major towns of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights to help local businessmen. A senior Ministry official has been appointed to coordinate commercial and industrial activities in these areas.

Trade will be permitted between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Plateau.

SERVICES

Posts

The Post Office in Jenin was reopened, bringing up the number of post offices that have resumed work on the West Bank to six—in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Jericho, Nablus and Tulkarm. Distribution of mail in all villages has been arranged.

Phones in East Jerusalem have been linked to the national direct dialing system. Work has also been ordered to proceed on the restoration of interurban telephone connections between the West Bank towns.

Electricity

A survey has been carried out of electricity supply. Damaged lines and wires have been repaired. The whole Western Bank electricity network is operating except for the Jericho high voltage line scheduled for reopening on 15.8.67. At present Jericho gets its electricity supply from a local generator.

Water

Thorough water supply system surveys were carried out. Existing installations are operating

and those under construction are being completed.

Health

Hospitals and clinics are functioning normally. The 1,700 beds that were at the disposal of the local population are used as before. Health and sanitary conditions are satisfactory. This results in low occupancy of hospitals. In special cases, where local facilities cannot supply adequate medical treatment, patients are transferred to Israeli hospitals.

The Israel authorities assist in the operation of 8 governmental hospitals, 6 health clinics and a central laboratory. A blood supply was arranged for urgent cases, and preparations are under way for the establishment of a Blood Bank.

Vaccinations against epidemics are carried out in cooperation with UNRWA.

The local staff of public health organizations which amounts to 700 persons, receives wages from the Israel Ministry of Health.

A special commission under the chairmanship of a deputy director of the Ministry of Health was appointed for the purpose of planning preventive medicine, public health and sanitation.

The Israel Medical Association has announced that it is ready to admit to its membership all medical institutions and personnel within areas now under Israel control. It has also announced that Israel doctors would extend to these areas all necessary assistance to solve their health problems.

Education

Registration of educational staff was completed as schools are scheduled to open on 1.9.67 after the end of the summer holiday. 4,575 teachers are being paid their salaries by the authorities.

The number of school children in the West Bank is about 180,000 of whom 130,000 attend governmental schools; 42,000 are in UNRWA schools and the rest in private institutions.

The Israel authorities have set up a special budget for repair of schools damaged during the war.

Welfare

3 district welfare officers operate in Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus granting allowances to individuals and supporting various welfare organi-

zations. Also operating are 8 welfare institutions, 9 juvenile delinquency institutions, a home for aged, for the blind and one for homeless children.

150 persons are employed in the above-mentioned institutions.

Communication

The Egged Transport Company has opened recently a new bus route from Gaza to the West Bank, via Beer-Sheba. Buses will ply the route twice daily with stops at Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramallah and other West Bank towns.

RELIGION

8 Moslem religious courts are functioning. The staff (40) is being paid by the Israel authorities.

Protection of the Holy Places

The Ministry of Police is about to set up a "Holy Places guard" consisting of 48 unarmed watchmen of various denominations, with full police authority. The Ministry of Religious Affairs is helping the Moslem religious trusts in East Jerusalem to repair the few mosques that were damaged during the fighting. The Egyptian architect supervising the restoration work at the Dome of the Rock at the El Aksa Mosque, Mr. Abdul Moneim Abd-el-Wahab, is back at work.

LAW

Civil courts have resumed their work in Nablus on 3 July. They are adjudicating under Jordanian law.

ANNEX VI

Second aide-memoire submitted to the Special Representative by the Israel authorities on the situation on the West Bank

Israel's policy in the areas under its control is guided by the following principles:

- a. Speedy restoration of normal civilian life in all its aspects;
- b. Continued functioning of existing local authorities;
- c. Return of West Bank inhabitants who fled following the outbreak of hostilities;

- d. Co-operation with UNRWA, the International Red Cross and welfare organizations operating in the areas;
- e. Study of possibilities of solving the refugee problem;
- f. Buttressing the economic fabric of the towns and the countryside.

THE WEST BANK

The effects of the hostilities

The fighting was brief. Consequently, physical damage and casualties were limited. Nevertheless, by the time cease-fire between Israel and Jordan was established, life on the West Bank was seriously disrupted. During the fighting, considerable numbers of inhabitants crossed the Jordan River eastwards. In many cases they were motivated by fear; but the main impulse was economic: the desire to ensure the continued receipt of money transfers from relatives in other Arab States or of salary payments by the Jordanian Government. Many of those who left the West Bank were registered with UNRWA as refugees. The certainty that they would continue to receive UNRWA assistance served as encouragement.

As a result of the hostilities there was a general breakdown of public administration. Many of the Government and municipal officials crossed to the East Bank during and after the fighting. Frequently they took with them the public funds in their charge. The shortage of funds was further accentuated by the fact that banks were found to have a liquidity of less than ten per cent. The remainder was usually held at the head offices in Amman. Furthermore, such services as electricity and telephone communications were seriously damaged during the fighting.

A number of measures of an administrative and economic nature have been adopted with a view to restoring normal life.

Municipalities and local councils

Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, all municipal and local councils were urged to pursue their activities as usual. They are now in the course of preparing ordinary and long-term budgets. Advances on municipal budgets have already been made by the Israel authorities.

These advances, paid in Jordanian dinars, are intended for salary disbursements and other routine expenses. The salaries of all municipal employees are paid regularly. This applies also to most of the former Government officials, including all teachers. The latter are now on summer vacation but have already begun preparations for re-opening schools in accordance with the regular schedule.

Public Health

Health services are functioning normally. Hospitals are fully staffed and equipped. Medical supplies are distributed where needed, but ample stocks are in general available locally.

Freedom of movement

Curfew has been rapidly reduced. There is complete freedom of movement within the West Bank. Movement from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, not permitted in the past, is being gradually introduced. Visits are being arranged from the West Bank to various parts of Israel.

Transportation

Almost all private vehicles requisitioned during the hostilities have been restored. This is true also of all agricultural machines and equipment.

Public transportation, including inter-urban bus services, has been fully resumed. Fuel supply is normal.

Local Police

Arab policemen have been re-employed on a large scale.

Administration of Justice

Local Courts, including District Courts, have been reactivated. They are functioning on the basis of laws in force before 5 June.

Postal Services

All major post offices have been re-opened.

Commerce

Most shops and other commercial enterprises have re-opened. The influx of tourists has contributed to a considerable upsurge of commercial activity.

Welfare

All international and local welfare organizations, including religious welfare institutions, are being encouraged to pursue their normal activities. Most have resumed their regular work. Arrangements are also being made for continuing the welfare activities formally supported by the Government of Jordan.

Financial and economic measures

All personal remittances from abroad reach their destination through banks. With a view to channelling new funds into the economy and encouraging development, Israeli banks have been permitted to open branches (one to a town) on the West Bank. One of the main activities is to grant loans to industry, commerce and agriculture.

Returnees from East Bank

Persons who had resided on the West Bank, and who crossed over to the East Bank between 5 June and 4 July 1967, have been permitted to return to the West Bank, under an Israel Government decision adopted as a gesture of goodwill. Arrangements for the return of such persons are being made through the good offices of the International Red Cross.

Refugees

A special agreement was reached with UNRWA for the continuation of its activities. In addition, the Prime Minister of Israel has appointed a team of experts who will be charged with drawing up proposals concerning ways and means of rehabilitating the Arab refugees. The team comprises experts in the fields of economics, agriculture, irrigation, industry, crafts, commerce, development, social problems, demography and related areas.

ANNEX VII

Aide-memoire submitted to the Special Representative by the Israel authorities entitled "Foundations of Israel's economic policy in the areas under its control"

Ever since the termination of hostilities, the Government of Israel has striven to restore normal social and economic conditions in the areas under Israel control. Vital services had to be revived

immediately to ensure an uninterrupted supply of food for the civilian population as well as for the large number of refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Refugee needs were subject of an agreement signed by the Government of Israel with UNRWA enabling the agency to continue its activities in these areas as heretofore. Permission was also granted to voluntary relief organizations previously active there to resume their assistance to the needy.

During the five weeks of Israeli administration, the following basic steps have been taken:

1. All municipalities and local councils are operating again and such local services as electricity, water, sanitation, and police have been re-established.

2. Medical and health services are functioning satisfactorily.

3. Post offices have been reopened in the main towns, and municipal telephone networks repaired.

4. Following the return of private vehicles to their owners, public transport is being reorganized—vehicles are being tested, licensed and insured for third party damages.

5. Banks have been opened to serve the public in the main towns of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

A. FINANCE AND CURRENCY

The legal tender in these areas remains as it was before hostilities (Jordanian Dinar, Egyptian and Syrian Pound).

Regulations have been issued to bar trading in all other currencies. Implementation of this policy met with some difficulties owing to the very low liquidity of the local banks, which in general hardly reached 10 per cent. Banks, were, therefore, unable to reopen their doors to the public, and this meant much hardship to depositors, who were unable to draw on their savings. The scarcity of means of payment in circulation greatly hindered economic activity in the first days.

B. PRICE POLICY

The policy of the Government of Israel is to maintain as far as possible the level of prices in all the areas under control, with the exception of those of fuel, cigarettes and alcoholic drinks,

in respect of which equalization with prices prevailing in Israel will have to be ensured, to prevent smuggling.

C. AGRICULTURE

All necessary steps have been taken to renew the rural pursuits which constitute the mainstay of the economies of the controlled areas. Representatives of the Israel Ministry of Agriculture, together with local elements, have already organized methods of supply and marketing of produce and primary materials through a central organization. All agricultural vehicles and equipment have been restored. Wells have resumed pumping and the necessary fuel is being supplied. With the assistance of employees of Israel farmer organizations, fruit orchards and Government farms are again under cultivation. The local farmers have gone back to work their fields and plantations and to deliver the produce. Abandoned groves are being cared for again.

D. SUPPLY AND TRADE

The guiding lines of this sphere are aimed at guaranteeing the incomes of wholesalers and retailers. To that end, Israelis have been forbidden to trade directly with the inhabitants of the areas under control or to open branches of Israel firms or other businesses there. Land and property deals are prohibited. A central supply company has been ordered to supply the needs of wholesalers on their application—payments to be effected for the goods in local currency (Dinars or Egyptian and Syrian Pounds). Israeli Pounds may also be used.

E. THE BALANCE OF TRADE

It should be noted that, prior to the hostilities, the West Bank economy suffered from a negative balance of trade, covered mainly by tourism, transfers of private funds and foreign aid. The maintenance of that economy at its pre-war level, and the upkeep of services at previous standards, will require an estimated import of capital totalling about 50 million U.S. dollars a year. The Gaza Strip's foreign trade deficit amounted to 14.8 million U.S. dollars (24.7 million U.S. dollars worth of imports and 9.9 million U.S. dollars worth of exports).

F. TOURISM

A brisk tourist trade existed previously in the West Bank only. All efforts are being made to restore fully this trade. It has been decided to open the tourist hotels and to resume organized tourism in the Jerusalem region, the West Bank and the Holy Places, and also in the city of Gaza and the regions of Banias and El-Hamma. Two bus companies have been allowed to conduct organized tours and permission has been granted for authorized bodies to engage in transporting tourists to the various areas. Courses have been organized by the Ministry of Tourism, for 200 guides resident in the West Bank, to bring their knowledge up-to-date and to license them as guides. As from 19 July, all the areas are open to organized tourism from Israel and abroad.

G. GOVERNMENT-INITIATED WORKS TO SPUR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

1. Israel authorities have begun paying the salaries of all former civil servants, including teachers who have come back to their jobs.

2. Means of payment have been allocated to UNRWA and CARE to pay the salaries of their employees, who are numbered in the thousands.

3. Loans have been granted to municipalities to enable them to pay salaries and current expenses. These are equal in amount to their monthly budgets.

4. Banks have been instructed to convert into local currency all foreign currency remittances addressed to local inhabitants.

5. Tourists and Israeli troops are allowed to exchange Israel Pounds for local currency to enable them to make purchases in controlled areas.

6. The Government of Israel has decided to make provision for underwriting some of the banks to encourage them to grant loans for capital flow to industry, trade and agriculture.

7. Instructions have been issued to complete public works and construction begun before 5 June, utilizing local manpower and equipment.

8. Arrangements have been made for the continuation of social assistance payments to those who had been on relief before the hostilities.

9. Full assistance and encouragement are being given to all relief activities of such international bodies as UNRWA, CARE and the Red Cross.

In co-operation with the Ministry of Labour, Israel authorities have drawn up plans for the immediate employment of the chronically unemployed. They will be engaged primarily in public works, such as road laying and repairing, clearing debris, upkeep and completion of public buildings, and afforestation. In the first stage the Israel authorities will provide employment for 6,000 in the Gaza Strip. These will be supporters of families. In the meantime, teams of experts are examining plans for medium-term employment.

It may be said here, that, despite the acute problems arising from the war, life is being quickly brought back to normal, and that the local inhabitants, by and large, are co-operating with the Israel authorities in reactivating the economy. Although short-term implementation is as yet incomplete, attention is already being given to medium- and long-range economic planning designed to ensure productive employment which will allow thousands of refugees and other needy persons to earn a sufficient and honourable living.

ANNEX VIII

Aide-memoire submitted to the Special Representative by the Israel authorities on the situation in the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai

Administration

The area is divided into three administrative districts headed by Military Governors (Gaza, Rafa/Khan Younis, El Arish). The local administration has been reinstated throughout the area. This consists both of a central area administration divided into ten departments and municipal and local councils. Elected mayors and village chiefs (mukhtars), as well as municipal and rural officials, including those appointed by the Egyptian administration, are continuing in office, except for some senior Egyptian officials and a few local officials who had to be replaced for reasons of security. Salaries for all local Government officials are unchanged and are being paid by the Israel Treasury. Local government administrations are

being granted loans in order to enable them to discharge their liabilities, until new budgetary proposals will have been drawn up and the collection of local rates reactivated.

Local administration is functioning smoothly and satisfactorily, and it is not intended at present to introduce any changes in its structure.

Services

Essential services—electricity and street lighting, water supply, garbage collection, bus service (local and inter-urban), taxi service, local Police (partly armed)—are functioning normally, having been progressively reactivated since the first week after Israel assumed control of the area. Eleven police stations are in operation. Postal facilities are being resumed. The railway line in the Strip has been linked up with the Israel network, and its capacity is sufficient to cope with any foreseeable traffic requirements.

Freedom of movement

The hours of curfew prevailing in the area have been steadily shortened. They extend at present from 9 pm to 4 am. The population enjoys free movement throughout the Gaza Strip. As from 16 July, a system of permits is in operation, enabling permit holders to visit the West Bank. It is intended to extend this system in the near future.

Health

Hospitals are functioning normally. The Israel Ministry of Health has delegated a senior medical officer to establish liaison with local health administrations and public hospitals. The necessary medical supplies are being made available from Israeli sources. There is no shortage of medical staff, and the number of hospital beds available is amply sufficient.

Legal status

All laws and ordinances in force in the area at the moment the Israel forces assumed control remain valid, except where changed by military ordinances, proclaimed by the Military Governor. At present there are thirty-one such ordinances, dealing mainly with security matters and economic problems.

Administration of Justice

All local Courts are functioning. Magistrates who were officiating under the Egyptian administration have taken up their posts and are holding court normally. All lawyers admitted to the Bar under the Egyptian administration are practising, and the basic rights of the accused are protected.

Legal Tender

On 19 July, the official rate of exchange of the Egyptian pound was fixed at six Israeli pounds, to one Egyptian. This replaces the previous rate of three to one. This modification in the rate of exchange will enable the population to double its purchasing capacity. It is to be observed that real value of one Egyptian pound is U.S.\$1.20.

Finance and Banking

Local banks had to be closed for lack of available funds, all local banks are branch-banks with headquarters in Egypt, and their liquidity was about ten per cent. An Israel bank has opened a branch in Gaza and is offering normal banking facilities to local residents and institutions. Other Israel banks are scheduled to open branches in the area in the future.

Arrangements are being worked out for the resumption of capital transfers from abroad to local inhabitants.

Commerce

Most shops are open and functioning. Basic necessities such as foodstuffs and petrol are supplied to local outlets by the Israel authorities. Fruit, vegetables and meat are supplied to the market from local sources, and so far the supply is plentiful. Preparations for the resumption of normal commercial contacts with foreign markets are under way. As soon as commercial channels with Israel are established, the Government will withdraw from the local market.

Employment

A labour exchange bureau was opened on 16 July in the Gaza Strip. An interim programme for the immediate employment of 15,000 workers has been launched. During the first stage, workers will be employed on public works and the re-vestment of Wadi Gaza and the seashore. Fishermen have been allowed to start going out to sea again.

The Israel Treasury is prepared to invest about one million Israel pounds in ensuring employment for inhabitants of the Gaza Strip.

Education

Preparations are under way for the re-opening of schools after the summer holidays. The Israel Ministry of Education and Culture, in co-operation with the local Administration and with the aid of the Military Government, is beginning to repair buildings and equipment which were damaged during combat.

Welfare

The Israel Ministry of Welfare, in co-operation with the 'Care' organization has reestablished an assistance programme for 70,000 needy non-refugees. It has been agreed to extend this programme to include another 10,000 needy persons in the El Arish area, and there are plans eventually to bring it up to a ceiling of 120,000 beneficiaries.

An adequate amount in the welfare budget allocation has been set aside as a Government contribution to the local orphanage.

In addition to the welfare offices functioning in Gaza, offices are being set up in Dir-el-Balah and Khan Younis. All three offices are handling applications for cash grants to needy families. These grants are in addition to 'Care' or UNRWA rations.

Other welfare organizations have sent study missions to the area and are now working out programmes in various fields. In contacts with representatives of these organizations, Israel authorities have stressed the need for aid programmes of a constructive character, enabling a growing number of refugees to be provided with productive work.

Agriculture

The agricultural services are functioning normally. The following projects deserve special mention:

El Arish Development Scheme. This scheme, projected by Egyptian Administration, affects 10,000 dunams of various plantations. An effort is being made to develop the irrigation system by improving existing and drilling new artesian wells.

Bar Dawile. This lake, situated twenty kilometres to the west of El Arish, is now being surveyed with a view to establishing its fishing potential. A research vessel is operating in its waters and experts from the Israel Fishing Service are conducting a research programme.

A study project on the salinity of underground wells and a soil conservation project in the Wadi Gaza area have been initiated. Preparations are under way to make the necessary arrangements for the marketing of the coming citrus harvest.

Small loans as well as supplies of insecticides and fertilizer are being made available to owners of orange groves.

Crop Spraying. The local company has been revived and provided with the necessary insecticides and equipment.

Veterinary Services.

The veterinary services have been strengthened by the addition of two veterinarians.

UNRWA

UNRWA food distribution and health services are back to normal. Food distribution was resumed three days after the end of hostilities. UNRWA education services are expected to continue normally when the new school year opens.

ANNEX IX

Aide-memoire submitted to the Special Representative by the Israel authorities on the situation in the Gaza Strip

THE GAZA STRIP

Employment

Unemployment registration has begun in the Gaza Strip. The number of unemployed is estimated at 15,000 with some 10,000 in Gaza proper. The Israel authorities report that they will try to place some of them in their previous jobs in various Government offices.

Welfare

Two welfare bureaus were opened in Khan Yunis and Rafah with local personnel. Welfare recipients will be paid on the same scale as before. Arrangements are also being made to reopen the

Gaza Orphanage in time for the new school year in September.

Food Supply

Flour and sugar are being provided to Gaza through the centralized marketing agency, thus helping to stabilize prices.

Facilities to stimulate economic life

Residents of the Gaza Strip will be able to go abroad, after receiving an appropriate visa from the authorities. They will thus be able to settle their financial affairs abroad and arrange for future transfers. This is expected to stimulate the economic life of the city.

272

Report of Secretary-General U Thant on the Work of the Organization (16 June 1966-15 June 1967), September 15, 1967.¹ [Excerpt]

(V) The Middle East

42. The eruption of full-scale war in the Middle East in early June of this year came as a terrific shock, but hardly as a surprise. This 1967 outbreak was the third war between Arabs and Israelis in that area within a score of years, each threatening the general peace. That is more than enough war in any one area.

43. For eighteen of those twenty years the sole barriers against continuous war were the four Armistice Agreements concluded by means of United Nations mediation in the spring and summer of 1949 and the United Nations peace-keeping machinery in the area—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and later the United Nations Emergency Force. Those agreements, as is made explicit in each of them, were considered at the time of their negotiation as only a step towards peace, and not as a basis for a more or less permanent way of life in the Middle East. They are not peace treaties and, although they were firm and

¹ U.N. doc. A/6701/Add. 1.

voluntary undertakings by the signatory Governments and were entered into in good faith, they did not represent any fundamental changes in attitude on the part of Governments or peoples. On the other hand there has been no indication either in the General Assembly or the Security Council that the validity and applicability of the Armistice Agreements have been changed as a result of the recent hostilities or of the war of 1956, each agreement, in fact, contains a provision that it will remain in force "until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved." Nor has the Security Council or the General Assembly taken any steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the earlier cease-fire demands. The Agreements provide that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or suspend them. There is no provision in them for unilateral termination of their application. This has been the United Nations position all along and will continue to be the position until a competent organ decides otherwise.

44. The suspicion, fears and animosities which have characterized the relations between Arabs and Israelis since the resolution on the partition of Palestine have been ever-present and always apparent. Dangerous tensions have never ceased nor greatly eased, and United Nations peace-keeping personnel have had to be constantly on the alert for incidents of fighting. There have been periods of relative quiet, but there was never real peace or the prospect of real peace. The threat of war was ever present. Finally—and, it seems, inevitably in the historical circumstances—in June, once again all-out war came to the area.

45. There is a profound lesson to be derived by this Organization from recent developments in the Middle East. United Nations peace-keeping and peace-making activities had their genesis in Palestine. They have been more prolonged, more intensive and more varied in that area than in any conflict situations elsewhere. It may be registered here that the United Nations has had considerable success over these twenty years in stopping fighting in the area by means of mediation, cease-fire, truce and armistice agreements, in restoring quiet along acutely troubled lines and generally in containing explosive situations. But

the basic issues which provoke the explosions remain unsolved and, indeed, except for a few sporadic and inconclusive debates over the years, largely untouched by the United Nations. There has been no enduring, persistent effort in any United Nations organ to find solutions for them. In my view, the failure of the United Nations over these years to come to grips with the deep-seated and angrily festering problems in that area has to be considered as a major contributing factor to the war of last June, although, naturally, primary responsibility inescapably rests with the parties involved. I am bound to express my fear that, if again no effort is exerted and no progress is made towards removing the root causes of conflict, within a few years at the most there will be ineluctably a new eruption of war.

46. There is a desperate need for a determined, immediate and urgent effort by the United Nations to help bring about the conditions essential to peace in the Middle East. That effort should be constant and unrelenting until those conditions have been achieved.

47. This summer, at the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly, the basic issues of the Middle East were discussed fully, but unhappily without conclusive results, except for the two resolutions on Jerusalem and one on the humanitarian aspects relating to refugees, displaced persons and prisoners of war. The Security Council, of course, took prompt cease-fire actions and also adopted a resolution on humanitarian aspects. On each of the basic issues, if taken separately, there could be agreement by a large number of the Members on a reasonable solution; on some, the support would be very great. But because of the nature of the issues, complicating considerations of priority, timing and simultaneous decision intrude, and thus far have blocked United Nations action. There is the immediate and urgently challenging issue of the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from the territory of neighbouring Arab States occupied during the recent war. There is near unanimity on this issue, in principle, because everyone agrees that there should be no territorial gains by military conquest. It would, in my view, lead to disastrous consequences if the United Nations were to abandon or compromise this fundamental principle. But in the context of the current problems of the

Middle East, the issue of withdrawal loses sizeable support when taken alone by separating it from other vital issues and particularly that of national security. The unwillingness of the Arab States to accept the existence of the State of Israel, the insistence of some on maintaining a continuing state of belligerency with Israel—although those maintaining belligerency may themselves refrain from committing belligerent acts—and the question of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal are also fundamental issues which present hotly controversial problems and sharp division, even though there is much agreement on the principles involved. The problem of the more than a million Palestinian refugees has persisted with little effort at solution since the summer of 1948, and now that problem has been enlarged by the substantial increase in the number of refugees as a result of the recent war. Another serious problem for which no solution had been found at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in June was that of the Al Fatah-type sabotage and terrorist activities across the borders into Israel, with resultant retaliation.

48. The United Nations may again be able by new peace-keeping endeavours and strengthened machinery to achieve a measure of quiet in the Middle East—for a time—but it should now be fully clear that this is not good enough, that more than this must be done in order to avert another round of hostilities later on. A determined effort is needed now to find solutions to the issues which have thrice in the past led, and no doubt will again in the future lead, to war between Arabs and Israelis. Naturally, it would be most encouraging if it seemed likely that Arabs and Israelis could themselves undertake to try to find the way to solutions of the issues between them, but I am aware of no sign that this is in the realm of present possibility. It seems to me, therefore, to be certain that international effort, assistance and concerted action will be indispensable to any move towards solutions and away from a new recourse to battle. One helpful step that could be taken immediately would be an appropriate authorization for the designation by the Secretary-General of a special representative to the Middle East. Such an appointee could serve as a much needed channel of communication, as a reporter and interpreter of events and views for the Secretary-General and

as both a sifter and harmonizer of ideas in the area.

49. It seems to me also that there are certain fundamental principles which have application to the issues of the Middle East and which no one would be disposed to dispute as to their intrinsic worth, soundness and justness, at least when taken separately. It is indispensable to an international community of States—if it is not to follow the law of the jungle—that the territorial integrity of every State be respected, and the occupation by military force of the territory of one State by another cannot be condoned. Similarly, every State's right to exist must be accepted by all other States; every State is entitled to be secure within its own borders; people everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestinian refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future; and there should be free and unimpeded navigation for all through international waterways according to international conventions. The fact is that the parties themselves are firmly and solemnly committed to these principles. In the Armistice Agreements, for example, they have undertaken scrupulously to respect the Security Council injunction against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question; they agreed that no aggressive action by the armed forces of either party would be undertaken, planned or threatened against the other party; they agreed to respect fully the right of the other party to security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other and they agreed that no warlike or hostile act would be committed by one party against the other.

50. Similar commitments have been undertaken by the parties in their membership in the United Nations and in their acceptance of its Charter provisions, which in Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, require that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered" and that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

51. It would be difficult but, I believe,

definitively possible to work out in detail a blueprint for the solution of the major Arab-Israel problems in the Middle East which would go some way towards meeting the demands of justice, reason and practicality. However, the real and stubborn obstacle to solutions and to peace, unmistakably, is the unwillingness of the parties for their own reasons to give consideration to any proposals unless they conform very closely to their long-established and rigidly held positions. These attitudes are backed by strong emotions. The essential precondition for an advance towards peace in the Middle East is an end to incitement to hatred, the achievement of calm and a recourse to reason.

52. In the Middle East today, as an aftermath of the recent war, there are expressions of disappointment with the United Nations, in some quarters even bordering on hostility towards its presence in the area. On the one hand, there is the feeling among Arabs that the United Nations has not done enough and is not to be relied upon. On the other hand, there seems to be a decided feeling in some quarters in Israel these days that a United Nations presence there is no longer needed, that it tries to do too much and is in the way. Such attitudes, of course, are both misguided and short-sighted. However faulty or selective the memories of Governments and peoples may be, the record stands indelibly that the United Nations in its twenty years of intensive effort to achieve and maintain quiet and ultimate peace in the Middle East, has rendered invaluable services to both sides in that area, and has saved countless lives and endless destruction there. That effort has been very costly to the United Nations in both men and money. In this regard, Count Bernadotte gave his life, the Truce Supervision Organization has suffered 21 fatalities (8 civilian and 13 military) and the Emergency Force had 89 fatal casualties. The record also shows that Governments and peoples in the area, Israelis and Arabs alike, have at various times in the past not only welcomed but acclaimed in glowing terms the United Nations presence in the area and its helpful actions, by means of media-

tion. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Emergency Force, as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Technical Assistance Board, now merged in the United Nations Development Programme. I have no doubt whatever that the impartial United Nations presence there continues to be helpful to both sides, is needed now as much as ever, and that the time will come when this will once more be understood and appreciated by all parties concerned.

53. The role of peace-keeper is never likely to be continuously popular with any of the parties to a conflict. By the very nature of its status and its moderating functions, a peace-keeping operation can never espouse the cause of any of the parties. There thus tends to be an underlying element of dissatisfaction and frustration in the relations of the Nations with the parties to a conflict. This condition may even at times border on a breakdown in those relations. This, however, does not signify that the peace-keeping work of the United Nations has served no purpose, nor that it would be in the interest of the parties to a conflict to do without the assistance which the Organization alone can give them. Quite apart from its more positive functions, the United Nations provides an invaluable repository and a safe target for blame and criticism which might otherwise be directed elsewhere. The Organization has, during all its years and in many situations, performed a vital function as an international lightning rod, as, in fact, it is now doing in the Middle East. These are facts of international life which should not be lost sight of when the effectiveness and the future of the peace-keeping function are being considered. The basic problem, now as always, lies in the acceptance by Governments of international decisions and machinery and the degree of their realization that the wider interests of international peace may in the long run also coincide with their own best interests. We are today, I need hardly add, very far, in general, from such a realization.

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PART VII

The Palestine Refugees

273

Report of the U.N. Conciliation Commission on Repatriation or Compensation of Palestinian Refugees, September 30, 1967.¹

[Note by the Secretary-General: The following report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been transmitted by the Chairman of the Commission for communication to the Members of the United Nations in accordance with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 512 (VI) of 26 January 1952 and pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966.]

1. Following the adoption by the General Assembly, on 17 November 1966, of resolution 2154 (XXI), the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine gave continuing and serious attention to how it might best fulfil the Assembly's mandate on the Palestine refugee problem, and in particular to paragraph 8 of the resolution which called upon the Commission to "intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III)² and to report thereon as appropriate and not later than 1 October 1967."

2. The Commission has continued to examine various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). As it concluded and reported on 30 September 1966,³ all of the

ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. Upon reviewing prospects after the adoption of resolution 2154 (XXI), the Commission was unable to discern evidence of any such changes. The developments which have taken place since June of this year have served to further complicate an already very complex problem.

3. As it reported last year, the Commission extended the duration of its technical programme until 30 September 1966, at the official request of the representatives of the host countries. On that date the Technical Representative concluded his activities. Since the termination of the programme only a very few inquiries have been received from individual refugees, some representing the continuation of correspondence begun while the technical programme was still officially operating.

4. In late May the former Technical Representative Mr. Frank E. Jarvis, returned to New York and dealt with these inquiries. During his stay he attended two meetings of the Commission and offered his advice and assistance to the members. The Commission once again wishes to thank Mr. Jarvis for his services.

5. During the past year much attention has been given to the question of utilization of the materials collected during the course of the technical programme. The Commission has not taken a decision on this matter and is continuing its consideration of it.

¹ U.N. doc. A/6846.

² Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 is as follows: [The General Assembly] *resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Government or authorities responsible."

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 32, document A/6451.* [Footnote in source text.]

274

Report of UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmores Covering the Period 1 July 1966-30 June 1967.¹

INTRODUCTION

1. On 5 June 1967 armed conflict erupted between Israel and certain Arab States. When the firing ceased, Israel was in occupation of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan and the Jolan Heights and Quneitra area in the south-western corner of Syria. More than half of the refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had been living in these areas; over 300,000 persons, including some 120,000 registered refugees, are reported to have been rendered homeless or to have left their homes as a result of the hostilities. Many had lost their homes for the second time in their lives. In addition to the grave

political issues at stake, the plight of these people confronted the international community, and UNRWA in particular, with new and urgent problems of a humanitarian character.

2. The following report is submitted to the General Assembly in compliance with paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 and of paragraph 11 of resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955.² More than eleven months of the customary reporting period had elapsed before the outbreak of hostilities, which resulted in a radical change in the Agency's priorities. Part I of this report accordingly covers UNRWA's "normal" programme, as it functioned prior to June 1967. Part II presents a budget for the calendar year 1968, with comparable figures for 1966 and 1967, setting out the estimated costs of the normal programme and also the additional costs resulting from the emergency, so far as these can be foreseen. The detailed information in the annexed tables relates largely to activities before the hostilities. The effect of the conflict

¹ U.N. doc. A/6713, 15/9/1967.

² Information concerning the origin of the Agency and its mission and work prior to 1 July 1966 will be found in the following annual reports and other United Nations documents:

A. Final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (28 December 1949) (A/AC.25/6, parts I and II).

B. Report of the Secretary-General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes*, vol. II, (document A/1060).

C. Proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees; document submitted by the Secretary-General to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly (A/4121).

D. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) (A/6787).

E. Reports of the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA and special reports of the Director and Advisory Commission to the General Assembly:

(a) *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19* (A/1451/Rev. 1);

(b) *Ibid.*, *Sixth Session, Supplements Nos. 16 and 16A* (A/1905 and Add. 1);

(c) *Ibid.*, *Seventh Session, Supplements Nos. 13 and 13A* (A/2171 and Add. 1);

(d) *Ibid.*, *Eighth Session, Supplements Nos. 12 and 12A* (A/2470 and Add. 1);

(e) *Ibid.*, *Ninth Session, Supplements Nos. 17 and 17A* (A/2717 and Add. 1);

(f) *Ibid.*, *Tenth Session, Supplements Nos. 15 and 15A* (A/2978 and Add. 1);

(g) *Ibid.*, *Eleventh Session, Supplements Nos. 14 and 14A* (A/3212 and Add. 1);

(h) *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3686 and A/3735);

(i) *Ibid.*, *Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/3931 and A/3948);

(j) *Ibid.*, *Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4213);

(k) *Ibid.*, *Fifteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4478);

(l) *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/4861);

(m) *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 14* (A/5214);

(n) *Ibid.*, *Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5513);

(o) *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/5813);

(p) *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6013);

(q) *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 13* (A/6313);

(r) A/6723 and Add. 1. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*, documents S/8001 and Add. 1.

F. Pertinent General Assembly resolutions:

194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 212 (III) of 19 November 1948; 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 393 (V) of 2 December 1950; 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952; 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952; 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953; 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954; 916 (X) of 3 December 1955; 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957; 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957; 1315 (XIII) of 21 April 1961; 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961; 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962; (1912) (XVIII) of 3 December 1963; 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965; 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965; 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966; 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. [Footnote in source text.]

on UNRWA's operations and the Agency's efforts to provide emergency aid to refugees already registered with it, and to carry out the wider mandate entrusted to it under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, are described below in paragraphs 24 to 45, which cover the period up to the end of August 1967. The introduction also attempts to forecast the situation and the needs which will emerge in 1968 and seeks the General Assembly's guidance on the part which UNRWA should endeavour to take in meeting those needs and the means by which it might be enabled to do so.

The situation before June 1967

3. Until June 1967, there was no change in the trends which had been apparent in recent years and no solution of UNRWA's basic dilemma—the ever-widening gap between resources and needs—was in sight. The number of registered refugees continued to grow and by the end of May 1967 had reached 1,344,576. The number of persons entitled to receive UNRWA's health services increased correspondingly. The number of children attending UNRWA schools grew even more rapidly, by more than 6 per cent over the previous year. The distribution of foodstuffs continued to be limited by ration ceilings, with the result that the number of children registered but excluded from food distribution lists mounted to 284,304.

4. The effect of these trends over the last several years is indicated in the Agency's expenditures, which have been as follows (in millions of US dollars):

	Relief	Health	Education	Total
1963	17.3	4.9	14.0	36.2
1964	17.7	5.0	14.5	37.2
1965	17.8	4.9	14.9	37.6
1966	17.3	5.0	15.2	37.5
1967 (est. at 1.6.67)	17.5	5.1	16.5	39.0

It may be seen that the total expenditure on relief services as a whole did not increase significantly and this was in spite of an increase of over \$1 million in food costs and unavoidable increases in salaries and wages. Similarly expenditure on health services did not increase significantly, although the population entitled to these services had grown by over 125,000 persons. For education, however, the annual rate of expenditure increased

by \$2.5 million between 1966 and 1967.

5. The increased demands on the Agency's services continued to press total expenditure upwards, despite further efforts to restrict administrative and overhead costs and further reductions in the number of international staff. Income continued to lag far behind the cost of essential services for the refugees and, after four successive years of deficit, it seemed likely by the end of May that even if some hoped-for additional contributions were received, the 1967 budget would still be unbalanced by as much as \$4 million. This continuing financial crisis, which, in the absence of increased income, confronted the Agency with the harsh alternatives of progressively curtailing various services to the refugees or of risking an abrupt collapse when in a year or so its last remaining reserves ran out, had been discussed at two sessions of the Agency's Advisory Commission earlier in the year, and it had been intended to have another meeting about mid-year to consider the problem further.

6. In order to secure greater flexibility in the use of the Agency's dwindling assets, the Commissioner-General, with the approval of the Advisory Commission, presented to the Secretary-General and to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions a proposed amendment of UNRWA's financial regulations which would give him wider latitude in treating governmental pledges announced, but not yet paid, as funds to meet future, long-term commitments and thus release cash which up to the present had been earmarked to meet such commitments. The Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee gave their approval to this amendment on 23 June 1967.¹

7. UNRWA's basic financial predicament,

¹ The amended regulation 9.5 reads as follows: "After consideration by the General Assembly the budget shall constitute authority to the Commissioner-General to incur commitments and to make disbursements for the purposes provided, to the extent that contributions are actually received or other funds are actually available, provided the Commissioner-General may additionally incur commitments against contributions pledged by Governments but not yet received where the contributing Governments have confirmed that their contributions will apply to the budget of the current or a prior fiscal year and will be paid in a currency which the Agency can use to meet commitments incurred against such contributions." [Footnote in source text.]

however, remains and has recently become more acute by reason of the new and urgent needs emerging both as an immediate result of the recent conflict and in the longer term. These questions have been discussed in a report by the Secretary-General (A/6787) and are further considered in a later section of this introduction; it suffices to recall here that UNRWA could not hope to play any useful additional role that might be assigned to it if it remained crippled by a lack of financial resources. In the last four years its income has not even been adequate for the proper discharge of its normal responsibilities; consequently it has had to draw down its operating reserve to meet the deficit.

8. Consideration of this problem seems to lead inescapably to a re-examination of the whole method of financing the services now being provided for the refugees. The financial difficulties besetting UNRWA are not temporary; as had been pointed out in previous annual reports and in the Commissioner-General's statement to the Special Political Committee on 17 October 1966 (497th meeting), their core is that, under the mandate and directions given to it by the General Assembly, UNRWA is called upon to provide continuing essential services for a community which is growing larger year by year, while at the same time, in order to finance these services, it has to rely on uncertain, voluntary contributions, most of which are made for one year at a time. The Commissioner-General believes that he must, for the third successive year, renew his appeal for effective action to put UNRWA on a sound financial basis and to ensure that it has adequate funds to carry out its task.

9. The Commissioner-General does not consider that it is within his competence to make any specific recommendation regarding possible changes in the method and basis of financing UNRWA. It may, however, be helpful to recall the suggestions on the subject that were ventilated by representatives of Governments during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly in the Special Political Committee and in plenary meetings. Three possibilities were mentioned:

(1) That some method should be found by which the refugees would be enabled to benefit from the property which they left behind in 1948. It has been suggested that this would yield an

annual sum which would more than cover the needs of the refugees and which would be considerably in excess of the income at UNRWA's disposal, and that this sum could be applied to providing better services for the refugees and to rendering many of them independent of international assistance;

(2) That the whole of the UNRWA budget should be transferred to the assessed budget of the United Nations and that all Member States would then contribute in accordance with the current scale of assessment;

(3) That part of the Agency's budget, representing administrative expenses, should be transferred to the assessment budget, while operational services should continue to be financed by voluntary contributions. Depending on the definition of "administrative expenses," expenditure included in the Agency's administrative budget might vary from \$3.2 to \$4 million a year. If UNRWA were to receive additional revenue of this order, this would go far to restore solvency to the Agency's present scale of "normal" operations, at least for some years to come. If, however, the Governments already contributing to UNRWA were to reduce their voluntary contributions by the amount of their assessed share of the administrative budget, the relief to the Agency afforded by this proposal would be largely nullified.

Regarding the first possibility, the Israel Government has pointed out that, in its view, there is no juridical or practical basis for paying alleged income from abandoned property taken over by the State, subject to a compensation offer; and that compensation payments could be made only to the former owners, and not to UNRWA for its budgetary purposes. On the other hand, certain delegations have proposed the appointment by the Secretary-General of a custodian to protect and administer Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel, but a resolution to this effect was not adopted.

The expansion of the Agency's education programme

10. The year under review saw one development of potential importance in the field of education. As part of the Agency's continuing effort to harmonize its educational activities with

those of the host Governments, conferences were held in Beirut in the autumn of 1965 and 1966 and attended by representatives of the Ministries dealing with education and refugee affairs in the host Governments, of the UNESCO headquarters in Paris and of UNRWA. To serve as a basis for discussion, the Agency's Department of Education presented to each conference a draft programme and budget for the coming school year. The conclusions reached at each conference were summarized in the form of recommendations and the Commissioner-General undertook to implement these recommendations, subject to the availability of funds, to the technical advice of UNESCO and to any directions given to him by the General Assembly.

11. One of the recommendations emerging from the conference in 1966 was that the Agency's educational advisers should attempt to draw up a comprehensive programme of educational services for the refugee community, based not on an estimate of the funds which the Agency considered it might be able to devote to this purpose in future but on a professional judgement of the developing educational needs of the refugee community, irrespective of the funds actually available. In the programme and budget which were drawn up in the spring of 1967 for the school year 1967-1968, the Agency's Department of Education included, together with the usual information relating to the continuing operation of the existing UNRWA/UNESCO education services, an outline of the main deficiencies in those services and of the objectives which should be attained in order to provide a reasonably satisfactory range of educational services for the children of the refugee community. These objectives had been fully agreed with UNESCO headquarters in Paris. Approximate estimates of the cost of attaining these objectives were included, together with suggested priorities as between the various objectives.

12. The resulting list of objectives, costs and priorities was a natural development of the existing services but did not constitute a detailed and concrete programme for their expansion and development over a given period of time. The preparation of such a detailed programme would require more time and study. The main conclusion which emerged from this essay in educational

planning was that the Agency could usefully spend some \$ 10.5 million on buildings and equipment and about \$ 7 million a year on recurrent operations over and above the \$16.5 million which it is currently spending on its existing educational services.

13. The Director-General of UNESCO, Mr. René Maheu, visited the Middle East in January 1967 and took the opportunity of seeing some of the schools and training centres, including the Institute of Education, which are operated under the joint UNRWA/UNESCO education and training programme. In his report to the seventy-sixth session of the UNESCO Executive Board in April 1967 (76 EX/SR.1-17), Mr. Maheu remarked that he had been very much impressed not only by the quantity but also by the quality of the education thus being provided for the Palestine refugees and that the programme was a work in which UNESCO could rightly be proud to participate.

Relations with host Governments

14. The function which UNRWA performs in providing services of a kind normally provided by governmental agencies for large numbers of economically depressed and politically sensitive refugees living in the host countries cannot but give rise from time to time to problems of co-ordinating action and reconciling differing interests between UNRWA and the host Governments. Many of the Agency's activities impinge on matters of public interest and governmental policy in the host countries and must therefore be of legitimate concern to the host Governments. The Agency operates in these countries by consent of their Governments and it is always open to any of the host Governments to withdraw its consent for the continued operation of UNRWA. On the other hand, the Commissioner-General is responsible to the General Assembly for his administration of the Agency and is answerable, *inter alia*, for maintaining its independence and integrity as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations.

15. The relationship in which the host Governments and UNRWA are thus involved is not an easy one and requires goodwill and co-operation on both sides if it is to be maintained satisfactorily. It is not necessarily an adverse reflection on either side if difficulties do arise from

time to time. It should be borne in mind that UNRWA's operations are widely ramified and reach levels of administration where it would be unreasonable to expect among the government officials concerned the same appreciation of the Agency's special, independent status as may be accorded at the higher levels of government. The concept of an international organization functioning independently of, but in co-operation with, the local Government in fields of activity which are normally the domain of the Government itself is not easily understood. Many of the problems that do arise between the host Governments and UNRWA have their origin in a lack of understanding of the Agency's status by some officials or departments of government whose duties do not normally involve dealing with international organizations. Some of the specific forms which these problems have assumed are more fully described in annex II, dealing with the legal aspects of the work of the Agency.

16. There is, however, one particularly difficult and troublesome aspect of the relations between the host Governments and UNRWA which merits discussion in this introduction because it is on this aspect that UNRWA has encountered criticism from quarters external to both the Agency and the host Governments. This concerns the Agency's freedom to verify need and eligibility for relief assistance, especially rations, among the refugees in order to ensure an equitable distribution of relief. From time to time in the past, when the Agency has sought to make such verifications, it has met with representations from the host Government concerned to the effect that such actions would be resented by the refugees and would provoke violent reactions among them and a disturbance of public order. Clearly the Agency cannot ignore or challenge the host Government's judgement in matters affecting public security and the General Assembly has indeed directed the Commissioner-General to pursue his efforts to assure "in co-operation with the Governments concerned" the most equitable distribution of relief based on need. But there remains the question of what course the Commissioner-General should follow in circumstances where a host Government, for reasons which it judges valid and compelling, is unable to co-operate with the Agency in these efforts. In such circumstances there would appear to be

three possible courses: (1) for the Agency to continue distributing on the present basis, which is admittedly defective and inequitable in certain areas, while also continuing its efforts to secure the co-operation of the host Government for more effective measures; (2) for the General Assembly to decide that the Agency should be relieved of the responsibility for distributing relief and that other arrangements should be made for the purpose (which might take the form of inviting the host Government to undertake the responsibility); or (3) for the General Assembly to authorize the Agency to take certain measures (which the Assembly would itself specify), if possible in co-operation with the host Government concerned, but, if that proves impossible, unilaterally. If the last course were adopted, it would, of course, still be open to the host Government concerned to refuse its consent; but that would presumably raise for the Assembly the question of continuing the Agency's operations in that country, at least in so far as the distribution of relief was concerned. In the past, suggestions on the lines of the second course have not proved acceptable to the host Governments.

17. To conclude the present discussion, it may perhaps be helpful to review briefly the state of the Agency's relations with the host Government in each of the countries in turn.

18. In Lebanon, co-operation between the Agency and the Government has continued to be effective and satisfactory throughout the year. The entitlements of all the ration recipients in Lebanon have been systematically reviewed and verified in the course of the last four years. This is a continuing process carried out with the co-operation of the authorities concerned in the Government. The ration rolls can therefore be regarded as reasonably accurate in regard to need as well as presence and existence. The only major problems outstanding are the settlement of various claims by the Agency against the Government, some of which involve substantial amounts of money (see annex II), and the provision of land to enable removal of three unsanitary and squalid camps which accommodate some 18,000 refugees on the outskirts of Beirut.

19. In Gaza the close and effective co-operation established over the years between the Agency and the government authorities, both in

Gaza and in Cairo, has undoubtedly been of great benefit to the refugees. A steady, though limited, flow of rectification of the ration rolls was maintained with the co-operation of the government authorities.

20. In Jordan, a highly satisfactory degree of co-operation has been maintained between the Government and the Agency in all matters except the rectification of the ration rolls. For years past the issue of rectification has been deadlocked because of the authorities' apprehension of adverse reactions among the refugees and of the effect which this would have on public order. However, during the emergency of June-August 1967 there has been an obvious need to ensure that assistance reaches only those persons for whom it is intended, and, with the co-operation of the Jordanian authorities, it has been possible to apply more effective procedures for verifying the eligibility of the recipients and for checking abuses by merchants trafficking in ration cards. This is likely to produce a considerable improvement in the ration distribution provided the controls are systematically maintained in future. The only other major problem outstanding between the Government and the Agency in Jordan is the settlement of the Agency's claim for excess railway charges (see annex II).

21. In the Syrian Arab Republic the relations between the Government and the Agency have at various times presented special problems, some of which are enlarged upon in annex II. For many years past the Government has not permitted systematic investigations to ascertain whether ration recipients were genuinely in need of this form of help. In other respects, however (such as the verification of existence and presence in the country), the rolls are believed to be reasonably accurate. As in Lebanon and Jordan, the large claim by the Agency against the Syrian Government for excess railway charges remains outstanding. In Syria there are also special problems regarding the importation and movement of supplies.

22. Between 7 and 9 August 1967 representatives of the Agency joined in discussions in Damascus between the Secretary-General's representative, Mr. C. A. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary and Legal Counsel, and representatives of the Government in an attempt to reconcile the

differences which had led to the problems referred to in paragraph 21 above. The outcome of these discussions was an exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Secretary-General, dated 9 and 25 August, in which the Foreign Minister reaffirmed his Government's desire to co-operate with the Agency. It is believed that this exchange of letters, and the particular arrangements agreed in these discussions, can afford a basis upon which these problems can be eliminated for the future. The Commissioner-General hopes to be able to confirm, in next year's report to the General Assembly, that experience has fully justified that belief.

23. On the other hand, the Commissioner-General wishes to record that successive Governments in the Syrian Arab Republic have been outstandingly generous in the education which they have made available free of charge for the refugees in government schools, training institutions and universities and in the help which they have given to refugee families in the form of shelter and communal services.

The aftermath of the hostilities

24. A report by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 10 of the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 on humanitarian assistance and two reports by the Commissioner-General on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in the Middle East have been submitted to the General Assembly.¹ The present account brings the information presented in these documents up to date and attempts to outline the main developments in the humanitarian field that occurred during the three months following the outbreak of hostilities. No factual and necessarily brief account can, however, portray the overwhelming sense of bewilderment and shock felt by the inhabitants of the areas affected by the hostilities as the cataclysm swept over them. The disruption of the lives and careers of countless persons, the anxiety caused by the sudden loss of earnings and remittances from abroad, the personal tragedies resulting from the separation of husbands and wives, parents and children, are only some of the problems which

¹ A/6787 and A/6723 and Add. 1. [Footnote in source text.]

confront so many of the former Arab inhabitants of Palestine. They will need the sympathy and understanding of the international community, quite as much as the financial help which has been forthcoming on such a generous scale, as they face the often bitter problems of readjustment which now confront them.

25. UNRWA, as an operational agency already on the ground, was quickly able to resume its services to the refugees; indeed in Lebanon these services were never interrupted, except for the temporary closure of schools, while in East Jordan and in most of Syria it was possible to resume normal operations almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Shortly after the outbreak of the conflict, the Commissioner-General authorized his staff to distribute certain supplies, on an emergency basis and subject, where appropriate, to reimbursement to persons in need not registered with UNRWA, and to institutions. This decision was reported to the General Assembly (A/6723, para. 6) and endorsed in resolution 2252 (ES-V), paragraphs 5 and 6, which read:

The General Assembly,

5. *Commends* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue the activities of the Agency in the present situation with respect to all persons coming within his mandate;

6. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities.

26. On 14 June 1967, the Security Council had adopted a resolution calling on the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those that had fled; recommending to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war; and asking the Secretary-General to follow the effective

implementation of the resolution and to report thereon. On 6 July the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Nils-Goran Gussing as his representative to obtain on the spot the information required for the discharge of his responsibilities under this resolution. UNRWA has given Mr. Gussing all the assistance that lies in its power and has transmitted to him such information as has become available to it concerning matters within his field of competence. The present report, therefore, does not deal with such questions as the protection of civilians in occupied areas, although the Agency's staff in those areas necessarily encounter problems of this nature during the day-to-day performance of their duties.¹

Areas in which major hostilities took place

27. Soon after the cessation of hostilities, and following a request from the Israel Government, basic arrangements were agreed between UNRWA and the Government in an exchange of letters dated 14 June to enable the Agency to continue its services to refugees in the West Bank area of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip (see annex III). These arrangements imply no commitment or position by UNRWA with regard to the status of the areas in question or any instrument relating to them and do not affect the Agency's subjection to any relevant instructions or resolutions emanating from the United Nations. Co-operation between the Government and the Agency in pursuance of the exchange of letters has been effective. The Israel authorities have also offered the Commissioner-General their full co-operation in rectifying the ration rolls and contemplate that progress will be made in this respect after a census of the inhabitants of these areas has been completed.

28. During the brief period of actual hostilities, UNRWA's activities in these areas were completely disrupted except in the field of health, where many clinics continued to function in order to provide emergency medical care. When the fighting ceased the Agency had to overcome formidable obstacles. The movement of staff

¹ The report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967) was issued on 15 September 1967 as documents A/6797 and S/8158. [Footnote in source text.]

on the West Bank and in Gaza was greatly hampered by curfews and other limitations; many vehicles had been destroyed, requisitioned or stolen; telephone communications were non-existent and in some areas had not been fully restored by the end of August; losses of equipment and supplies, through destruction and looting, were heavy and were later found to total an estimated \$0.8 million; some Agency premises and other installations serving the refugees, including the Agency's Jerusalem Field Office and the Augusta Victoria Hospital, both in the Mount Scopus area, had been damaged in the fighting or occupied by military forces. Despite these difficulties, steps were taken as soon as the fighting ended, in co-operation with the Israel authorities, to restore the distribution of food and other relief services and the full range of health activities. Fortunately, civilian casualties were fewer than had been feared.

29. Both on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip a grave problem facing the Agency was to ensure that supply lines were kept open, despite the difficulties and delays caused by the disruption of shipping following the closure of the Suez Canal and the consequent necessity of transshipping cargoes. The problem was not only one of maintaining the basic ration distribution for a population of 430,814 ration recipients, but of meeting the emergency needs of the many thousands who were no longer self-supporting because of a sudden temporary loss of employment with Governments or the United Nations Emergency Force or of income from remittances from abroad. The Government of Israel has stated its willingness for residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to continue to receive these remittances, through suitable banking channels. The food situation was temporarily eased by a loan of 2,800 tons of flour from the Government of Israel and by an arrangement with the Government of the United Arab Republic for the shipment of UNRWA supplies from warehouses in Port Said to the Gaza Strip. Arrangements for receiving new supplies through ports in Israel were subsequently made and from mid-July onwards the major difficulties appeared to have been largely overcome. An additional problem generally on the West Bank and in Gaza stemmed from an acute shortage of currency; but this has subsequently eased. In the Gaza Strip, fighting had

taken place in Gaza Town and in some of the Agency's camps and in certain places refugee shelters had been demolished, after the cessation of hostilities, reportedly as a reprisal for mining incidents. The rebuilding of the refugees' damaged huts, as well as of schools and other installations, is proceeding.

30. During June, July and August a total of some 200,000 persons, among them at least 100,000 UNRWA registered refugees, are believed to have crossed the River Jordan from west to east. In the Jericho area alone, 65,000 persons are reported to have fled from their homes, leaving only about 7,500 persons. In Qalqilya (near Nablus) and in five other smaller frontier villages in the Latrun and Hebron areas many houses were damaged or destroyed during the fighting or were subsequently demolished. The extent of the destruction varies from rather less than half the houses in Qalqilya to virtually total destruction in some of the smaller villages. The inhabitants fled during the fighting or moved out or were moved out afterwards. The extent to which they were forced to leave is disputed. It was not possible for the Agency's staff to verify the facts because they were not allowed to move freely during the days in question. At one time the total number of persons thus rendered homeless exceeded 20,000. However, those displaced from Qalqilya and the two Hebron border villages have now been allowed to go back to their villages and work on rebuilding their homes is beginning. The inhabitants of the three villages in the Latrun area, who number about 4,000, are still not allowed to go back and these villages are reported to be wholly destroyed. Emergency assistance given to the people of these six border villages by the Agency and other organizations is described below in paragraph 46.

31. Up to the end of August no UNRWA staff had been able to enter the south-western area of Syria occupied by Israel, but arrangements were made for a senior officer to visit the area early in September. Of the estimated 125,000 inhabitants of the area, only some 8,000 are reported to have remained there.

Areas in which no major hostilities took place

32. It was towards the refugee problem in East Jordan that international attention and

concern were primarily directed, and it was here that UNRWA faced the greatest demand on its resources for emergency aid. Some 100,000 of the 200,000 persons who had fled from the West Bank were refugees already registered with the Agency. This influx added to the formidable problems facing a country threatened with economic collapse because of the loss of a large part of its main sources of income. While roughly half the displaced persons found refuge with friends and relatives, some thousands had at first to remain under the shelter of trees or in the open air, while the remainder were housed in government and UNRWA schools, in mosques and in other public buildings. The intolerably crowded conditions, with totally inadequate cooking and sanitation facilities, under which these unfortunate people were living, posed a serious health hazard, not only for the refugees themselves, but also for the surrounding communities.

33. The Agency has at all times stood ready to co-operate to the fullest extent in the Jordan Government's own emergency measures. Resources have been pooled; and some two weeks after the firing ceased, the Government asked UNRWA to take responsibility for establishing and running six of the nine tented camps which it had been decided to set up. UNRWA immediately agreed to this request. By mid-August, 73,200 persons had been housed in the new camps, 49,200 in camps run by UNRWA and 24,000 in the three other camps. In the camps operated by UNRWA, the population consisted of both registered refugees and newly displaced persons.

34. There were, however, reasons to hope that this would be a purely temporary arrangement. On 2 July, the Commissioner-General had learnt of the announcement by the Government of Israel that they were prepared to allow the return to the West Bank of the Jordan of those persons who had fled across the River Jordan as a result of the hostilities. He immediately appealed to all those who might still be contemplating leaving their homes to stay where they were, and urged all concerned, on grounds of common humanity, to encourage those persons who had already left to return to their former place of residence, and to do everything to allay the fears which deterred them from going back. In making this appeal, he stressed the fact that

UNRWA's capacity to assist these persons was far greater on the West Bank, where the Agency had the necessary camps, installations and other facilities.

35. On 10 July, the Government of Israel issued rules concerning the return of these persons. The arrangements for the return were the subject of prolonged negotiations between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Governments of Israel and of Jordan. The date of 10 August 1967 had originally been set by the Israel Government as the final day of submission of applications for return; at a later stage, however, the date of 31 August was set for the completion of the actual return. The rules provided that applications were to be submitted on special forms, through the Red Cross, by heads of families and other adults whose permanent place of residence as on 5 June was on the West Bank, and who had crossed over to the East Bank in the period between 5 June and 4 July. The application forms were to be accompanied by passports, identity cards, UNRWA registration cards or specially designed UNRWA certificates which would afford evidence of residence on the West Bank. No application would be approved if the return of the applicant was considered by the Israel Government to involve a risk to security or legal order. The cases of residents of the West Bank who went abroad prior to 5 June and who wished to return would be treated separately, within the framework of arrangements for the reunion of families, by means of application to the diplomatic missions of Israel abroad.

36. The application forms were issued on 12 August and in the following days UNRWA staff members worked with Jordan government and Red Cross officials to help the many thousands of persons anxious to submit applications for return to the West Bank. In the event permits were issued only during the remainder of August and the return arrangements came to an end on 31 August. However, with the expiry of the 31 August deadline, the Government of Israel informed the Secretary-General (A/6795) that those whose applications had been approved but who had not managed to return would be permitted to do so within a fixed period of time. In addition, it announced that West Bank residents could apply for the return of members of their

families, and that individual applications based on special hardship could be made. In the time available before putting the text of this report into final form, it has not been possible to reconcile entirely the figures relating to the return arrangements. From Amman it is reported that some 40,000 application forms were completed and submitted in respect of approximately 150,000 persons (out of the 200,000 who are reported to have crossed over to the East Bank). Israel has stated that the number of applications actually received by them amounted to only some 32,000 and related to only about 100,000 persons. The number of applications approved and permits issued is stated on the Jordan side to be 5,122 (relating to 18,236 persons) and on the Israel side to be 5,787 (relating to 20,658 persons). The number of persons who had actually crossed by 31 August was reported from Amman to be 14,150 and from Jerusalem to be 14,056. It is evident that only a small fraction of the total number of persons applying to return have so far been permitted to do so. Among those permitted to return, it appears that there were very few former inhabitants of the Old City of Jerusalem, very few from among the refugees formerly living in UNRWA camps on the West Bank and from among the displaced persons who were accommodated in the tented camps set up in East Jordan since the hostilities. The number of refugees registered with UNRWA who have been permitted to return is reported to be only about 3,000 out of the 93,000 who crossed to the East Bank before 4 July and who were therefore *prima facie* eligible to return in accordance with the conditions stipulated by the Government of Israel. The Jordanian authorities have also reported that, in some cases, permits have been issued for some members of the family but not for others; the procedure for the submission of applications required that adult sons and daughters should apply separately from the rest of the family and this has resulted in cases where families were faced with the choice of either leaving a son or daughter behind or of losing their opportunity of return. It is clear from the figures given above that the hopes which were generated at the beginning of July that at least the bulk of the displaced persons would be able to return to the West Bank in pursuance of the terms of the Security Council's resolution 237 (1967) have not

been realized. The reasons for the frustration of these hopes are disputed and are not a matter on which the Commissioner-General believes he can helpfully comment in present circumstances. However, from personal observation, he and his staff in Amman are able to record that the Jordanian authorities did all that was humanly possible to ensure that those whose applications to return were approved were promptly informed and were given every assistance in re-crossing the river. Nevertheless the bulk of the displaced persons remain on the East Bank and, whatever the reason may be and wherever the responsibility may lie, have not been able to return to their former homes.¹

37. Faced with this massive human problem, the Commissioner-General feels that he can only reiterate that UNRWA's capacity to help will be much greater if the refugees return to their previous camps and homes on the West Bank where UNRWA's installations and facilities already exist. In a statement issued on 3 July the Commissioner-General observed: "Our mission is purely humanitarian and it is on grounds of common humanity that I urge this action—the return of the displaced persons—on all concerned. For this is a situation where the obligations of humanity must, I believe, prevail." These obligations have lost none of their urgency in the interval since that statement was made. Indeed, with the approach of winter, which can be very severe in this region, the humanitarian arguments against leaving tens of thousands of displaced persons to face the coming months in the misery and discomfort of temporary tented camps become all the more urgent and compelling.

38. The Agency maintained liaison in regard to the practical arrangements for return with the two Governments concerned and with the Red Cross. It joined with the Jordan Government in erecting and operating a transit camp at Ghor Nimrin in the Jordan Valley. On departure, each refugee was to be given by the Government the sum of five Jordan dinars. In addition, it had been intended by the Jordan Government that all those returning would be able to draw rations

¹ See also the report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council resolution 237 (1967), document A/6797, paragraphs 185-199. [Footnote in source text.]

from UNRWA on arrival at their former place of residence, and that the rations issued to those who were not registered with UNRWA would be for three months and would be replaced by the Government. The Agency was prepared to carry out this arrangement, but the Government of Israel objected on the ground that returning West Bank residents who were not refugees registered with UNRWA would be the responsibility of the Israel authorities on the same footing as other residents, and that it would be inadvisable to create within the general population a new and separate category of ration recipients.

39. In the Syrian Arab Republic, over 115,000 people moved northwards and eastwards from the area occupied by Israel, mainly to Damascus and Dera'a. As in Jordan, they were temporarily housed in schools and other public buildings or had to live in the open air, pending the arrival and installation of tents. Amongst these 115,000 or more people were some 16,000 Palestine refugees already registered with UNRWA. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has not so far asked for emergency help from UNRWA for the Syrian displaced persons, but given the fact that the assistance for this group of people from the World Food Programme is limited in time, the possibility of a request in the future cannot be excluded. The Agency's emergency help has thus been limited to the displaced Palestinians. Full UNRWA assistance to the bulk of the registered refugee population has meanwhile continued without interruption.

40. In addition to the 35,000 people who reportedly moved from the Sinai Peninsula to the United Arab Republic, between three and four thousand young men among the registered refugees in Gaza were forced to leave the Gaza Strip because the Israel authorities believed them to be members of the Palestine Liberation Army. They are now housed in a government-run camp in the Tahrir Province. UNRWA regards this group as falling under paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) and has at the request of, and in agreement with, the Government of the United Arab Republic, undertaken to give assistance to the group (see paragraph 48 below). There are also some thousands of Palestinians from Gaza and Jordan who were in the United Arab Republic for educational and other

reasons and who have not been able to return to their homes.

41. Displaced refugees in both the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic have also made oral representations to the Commissioner-General and the Deputy Commissioner-General asking them to convey to the General Assembly their urgent desire that they should be allowed to return to their former places of residence.

Emergency assistance

42. The emergency assistance for Arab refugees in the Middle East in the summer of 1967 has been a combined operation to which the Governments directly concerned, other donor Governments, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, UNRWA, UNICEF, the specialized agencies, national and international non-governmental organizations and countless individuals in many parts of the world all made essential contributions. As a United Nations agency long established in the area and intimately connected with the problem, UNRWA found itself acting as an intermediary and a source of information on matters of general concern. UNICEF contributed food, blankets, drugs, vaccines, sanitation supplies, vehicles for mobile clinics and other equipment to a value of approximately \$350,000. This aid was directed to mothers and children amongst both the UNRWA and non-UNRWA refugees in Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, also to groups in temporary economic distress in the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai areas. In addition, UNICEF representatives played an active role in co-ordinating inter-Agency activities and in rationalizing the distribution of certain foodstuffs. Efforts were made to set up central co-ordinating machinery, but this proved to be impracticable. The widely differing viewpoints of the parties, the necessity for rapid decisions and the almost insurmountable difficulty of travel between one country and another, made it necessary to rely largely on *ad hoc* consultations on the spot rather than on any area-wide master plan agreed in advance. The willingness of all concerned to approach mutual problems with common sense and in a humanitarian spirit resulted in the avoidance, to a very large extent, of wasteful and unnecessary duplication of effort.

43. The Commissioner-General wishes to pay tribute to the staff of the Agency, and particularly to those in areas which in one way or another felt the impact of the hostilities, for the untiring devotion with which they faced up to the problems arising out of the conflict. He has no doubt that the staff, nearly all of whom are themselves Palestine refugees, will continue to tackle with patience and courage the difficult tasks that lie ahead.

44. The following brief account does not attempt to be exhaustive and merely indicates examples of the practical co-ordination of efforts that has been achieved. The Commissioner-General has no record, other than reports which have appeared in the press, of contributions made directly to the Governments concerned or to the voluntary agencies, but he understands that very substantial emergency help has been forthcoming.

45. In East Jordan, as was mentioned in paragraph 33 above, the resources of the Government and of UNRWA were pooled. The Agency continued its normal programme of ration distribution and supplementary feeding to displaced persons already registered with it and, in addition, with assistance from UNICEF, gave these persons protein supplements and, to all children up to the age of fifteen, milk, vitamins and a daily hot meal. During the first few weeks it also supplied cooked meals to other displaced persons besides the registered refugees and at one time the total number of cooked meals supplied daily reached 75,000. The Agency also extended its basic ration distribution by some 30,000 rations to meet the need of registered refugee families impoverished by the emergency and distributed to non-registered persons foodstuffs made available by the Government. Of the nine new tented camps, UNRWA undertook to run six, in one case on behalf of the German Evangelical Relief Organization; the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society had established and was operating a seventh camp, and the two remaining camps were run by the Jordan Government. The World Food Programme, with a view to avoiding discrimination between UNRWA-registered refugees and other displaced persons, had decided to distribute to 100,000 persons in the latter group, for a period of three months, UNRWA-type dried rations, supplemented by canned meat, dried milk and

small quantities of dates, with immediate distribution authorized by the Jordan Government from its own stocks, pending the arrival of World Food Programme foodstuffs. As the August-September distribution proceeded, the World Food Programme intended to review the question of the need for a second three-month distribution period, in the light of the anticipated return of substantial numbers of displaced persons to the West Bank. UNICEF has provided the Government with sanitation supplies, drugs, vaccines and blankets; it has also proposed a co-ordinated plan for the next five months for the distribution of 500 tons of skimmed milk available in Jordan from its own supplies and from those of the World Food Programme and of the League of Red Cross Societies. This proposal envisaged the distribution of reconstituted milk to all children up to the age of fifteen and pregnant and nursing women in the nine new tented camps, and of milk powder to all non-UNRWA displaced persons living outside the camps. Meanwhile, to take only a few random examples of the part played by the voluntary agencies, the Lutheran World Federation had agreed to finance for three months medical services in two of the UNRWA tented camps, to supply medical equipment and supplies and some staff, probably to the end of 1967, in a further two camps, and to establish bakeries in all nine camps. The Pontifical Mission for Palestine, Caritas and Catholic Relief Services worked closely together in supplying food, blankets and other commodities and in ascertaining the personal, individual needs of the displaced persons. British voluntary agencies donated tents for one new camp of 10,000 inhabitants and contributed field kitchens and a pharmacy; the Commonwealth Save the Children Fund provided medical care for mothers and children in one camp, as well as supplementary feeding, blankets and cooking utensils; it also made medical care available, and supplied daily hot meals, in another camp; the Belgian Caritas and Entr'aide socialiste donated tents, blankets, foodstuffs and medical supplies, all of which were airlifted from Belgium in two planes made available by the Belgian Government (which also offered UNRWA the use of these planes for other purposes, as a contribution to the Agency's emergency expenses); Norwegian voluntary agencies sent several plane-loads of blankets, medicines and foodstuffs and

four mobile health clinics are on the way; CARE imported foodstuffs for distribution by the Governments; the Near East Christian Council made blankets and food available, primarily to displaced persons living outside camps; and the League of Red Cross Societies has imported tents, blankets, foodstuffs, clothing and medical supplies and has set up ten milk distribution centres.

46. In the West Bank area and the Gaza Strip, emergency aid followed a similar pattern and after the cessation of hostilities all UNRWA relief services were brought back into operation as rapidly as possible. Ration distribution recommenced on the West Bank as early as 12 June and the main medical, sanitation and supplementary feeding services were also quickly reinstated. An increased ration issue was authorized, to cover persons other than normal ration recipients, including 50,000 children, over 6,000 displaced frontier villagers and over 1,000 other needy refugees. Similarly in Gaza an increased basic ration distribution was authorized, to meet the needs of persons suffering hardship through loss of income as a result of the hostilities. In both areas, special milk issues and daily hot meals were available for needy children under the age of fifteen. The Agency also gave protein supplement in the form of canned meat and cornflour-soya-milk mixture and extra dry rations to certain categories, among them expectant and nursing mothers. The repair of 400 war-damaged refugee shelters in Gaza proceeded without delay, and was expected to be completed by the end of September. Meanwhile UNICEF arranged for dry rations for three months for 20,000 mothers and children not registered with UNRWA in Gaza and northern Sinai. It also provided 39,000 dry rations and 16,000 blankets as a one-time emergency issue to mothers and children on the West Bank in temporary economic distress and concluded a provisional agreement with the Government of Israel, providing for the resumption of a quarterly supplementary feeding programme for 51,000 children among the frontier villagers. Ambulances, medical supplies, tents, blankets, food and some clothing were flown into the West Bank by the Swedish Organisation for Individual Relief and by the Norwegian Refugee Council. Notable assistance was also given by the Lutheran World Federation, which operated its own independent programme in close

co-operation with UNRWA. CARE also made foodstuffs available to non-refugees on the West Bank and planned to continue, and probably expand, its normal programme of food distribution to non-refugees living in the Gaza Strip. Catholic voluntary agencies, working through the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, Catholic Relief Services and Caritas Internationalis made donations in cash and kind for relief of distress on the West Bank and planned a supplementary feeding programme for children not covered by UNRWA assistance.

47. In the Syrian Arab Republic, the Government, within the limits of its resources and with assistance in the form of foodstuffs from the World Food Programme, UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross, took charge of the 100,000 displaced Syrians. The Government also received from UNICEF insecticides, disinfectants, antibiotics, vaccines, vehicles for mobile health teams, and from the International Committee of the Red Cross, clothing, tents, blankets and cooking utensils, while the Lutheran World Federation contributed clothing and planned to make tents available. Meanwhile, UNRWA assumed the main responsibility for meeting the needs of the 16,000 displaced Palestinians already registered with it, by providing tents, blankets, additional basic rations, supplementary feeding and, with the help of UNICEF, protein supplements. Supplies of tents were in fact not forthcoming for displaced persons in Syria on anything like the scale on which they were contributed to Jordan, so that in August the Agency was forced to place orders for the manufacture of some 1,200 tents in order to provide shelter for the UNRWA-registered refugees. The Agency also gratefully records that the Syrian Government gave foodstuffs and cash grants during a period of over two months to UNRWA-registered refugees as well as to Syrian displaced persons.

48. The World Alliance of YMCA's and of YWCA's took under their charge Arab students dispersed in various countries and unable either to return to their homes or to receive any funds from their families; and the World Council of Churches launched a \$2 million world-wide appeal on behalf of all victims of the conflict. The total value of emergency donations in cash and kind from Catholic sources for the areas affected

by the hostilities as a whole amounted in August to over \$4 million. During August an encouraging and potentially very important initiative was launched in the United States of America with the formation of Near East Emergency Donations to raise funds for use by UNRWA on behalf of the displaced persons. Former President Eisenhower has consented to serve as honorary chairman of the Board of Directors.

49. For refugees from Gaza and Sinai, UNICEF is providing assistance to the United Arab Republic Government in the form of 1,000 family emergency kits, 15,000 blankets, drugs, vaccines and equipment, including vehicles, for the establishment of delivery room facilities, diagnostic laboratories and community kitchens in two settlement camps. Meanwhile UNRWA, as indicated in paragraph 39 above, has undertaken to make food supplies available for a group of 3,000 young registered refugees from Gaza and to contribute towards the provision of medical and sanitation services.

Special contributions

50. In the week following the outbreak of hostilities the Commissioner-General appealed to Governments, voluntary agencies and private donors to contribute money or emergency supplies to UNRWA. The President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General also called for generous emergency donations and the General Assembly itself in paragraph 9 of resolution 2252 (ES-V) appealed to all Governments, organizations and individuals to make special contributions to UNRWA as well as to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned. Even while the fighting was still going on, offers of help had already begun to pour in to the Agency's offices in Beirut, Geneva and New York. They took the form of donations in kind or in cash or of offers of services by individuals from many countries who were anxious to help the displaced persons in their plight. By the end of August, donations to a value of some \$6.4 million had been pledged or received. Details of these contributions will be found in annex I, tables 20 and 21. On behalf of those who have suffered as a result of the hostilities, the Commissioner-General wishes to express his heartfelt gratitude to all donors for their prompt and

generous response. He also wishes to place on record that the Agency gratefully received from the United Nations Emergency Force substantial quantities of supplies and equipment.

Longer-term prospects

51. The Commissioner-General believes that the General Assembly will wish him to offer some comment on how the future of the refugees from the 1948 conflict may develop in the longer term and how the role of UNRWA may be affected by recent events. In so doing he would emphasize that the present is fluid and the future uncertain. He will seek as far as possible to confine his comments to the humanitarian aspects, but political issues underlie the whole Palestine refugee problem and cannot be ignored if comment is to be meaningful.

52. Among these issues are the long-deadlocked questions of repatriation, compensation and resettlement. In December 1948, only a few months after the refugees had fled from their homes, the General Assembly adopted resolution 194 (III),¹ in paragraph 11 of which it resolved "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." In the same paragraph, the Assembly instructed the Conciliation Commission "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United

¹ The resolution, as has been frequently pointed out by the Government of Israel, also called in paragraph 5 for negotiations between the parties in the following terms: "The General Assembly calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them." [Footnote in source text.]

Nations.” Paragraph 11 has been reaffirmed year after year by the Assembly but has remained unimplemented. After nineteen years the refugees have still had neither an opportunity of returning to their homes nor compensation for their property. Since the two issues of repatriation and compensation are linked together as alternatives in the resolution, the continuing deadlock over repatriation has had the result of denying the refugees of any benefit from the property they left behind in 1948. It would hardly seem that this can have been the intention of the Assembly in adopting its resolution nineteen years ago. Suggestions have been made from time to time for measures to enable the refugees to receive compensation, irrespective of whether they would have the opportunity of returning to their homes and without prejudice to this or any other political claims they may have; but these suggestions have not been pursued.

53. Under the surface of this continuing deadlock on the political plane, much solid, constructive progress has been made in dealing with the economic and social aspects of the problem. As the Secretary-General has pointed out in a report circulated on 18 August 1967 (A/6787), the widespread assumption that the refugees have been stagnating in idleness in the refugee camps throughout all these years is untrue. Nor is there validity in the widespread belief that, because many of the refugees (in fact less than 40 per cent of the total) were still living in camps so many years after their displacement from their homes, therefore no progress had been made towards their rehabilitation. These mistaken assumptions have given rise to the equally mistaken view that UNRWA was engaged in an endless operation of merely keeping the refugees alive to remain a charge on the charity of the international community. Finally, there is the widespread belief that the host Governments have been deliberately and inhumanely keeping the refugees in a state of destitution and dependence on international charity as a weapon in the prosecution of their political aims. This also needs correction. Although the host Governments have opposed mass schemes of direct resettlement, on the grounds that this would be contrary to the interests and expressed wishes of the refugees themselves, their record in promoting the rehabilitation of the refugees as individuals through education,

training and employment has been notably humane and helpful. They have extended this aid to the refugees in spite of the grave difficulties which already confronted them in providing a livelihood for their own rapidly expanding populations.

54. The truth is that, up to the time of the recent hostilities, a slow but steady process of rehabilitation had been at work among the refugees and, in recent years, had begun to make an evident impact in improving their economic and social condition. This improvement was not uniform in all areas and necessarily Gaza lagged behind, owing to the lack of opportunities for the very large numbers of refugees to engage in productive work. The process of rehabilitation was being achieved not by ambitious and costly works projects and schemes of mass resettlement but by the operation of normal economic and human factors. It is these factors which have in the past proved most effective in this part of the Arab world in coping with the human problems arising from movements of population. As the Secretary-General has stated:

This progress has been primarily due to three factors: first and foremost, the rapid economic development of the Arab host countries and of the Arab world generally in recent years; second, the energy, intelligence and adaptability of the refugees themselves, who have fortunately shown themselves to be eager for work and very capable of profiting by any opportunity given to them; and third, the education and training which the host Governments, various voluntary agencies and UNRWA have been able to give the young refugees to enable them to take advantage of any opportunities of employment that might come their way. A subsidiary but not unimportant adjunct to these principal factors in the rehabilitation of the refugees has been the economic aid supplied by UNRWA in the form of rations, shelter, and other relief services. The regular provision of this relief assistance over an extended period, even though on a meagre scale, has certainly helped the refugees not merely to survive but to recover their capacity to support themselves.

It is true that it has not proved possible for UNRWA to reflect adequately the extent of this rehabilitation in its published statistics of the number of refugees who have been rendered self-supporting and from whom relief assistance has therefore been withdrawn. But, however regrettable this may be—and, in fairness to UNRWA and the Arab host Governments, the difficulty of measuring degrees of progress in economic rehabilitation among a mass of people living not much above subsistence level needs to be recognized—it does not alter the reality of the progress that had been made.

In Jordan, official and authoritative statements have been made in recent years indicating not only a very high

level of economic growth for the country as a whole but also suggesting that the problem of unemployment and underemployment which has chronically beset the Jordanian economy was within sight of solution. These statements implied that within a few years Jordan, in spite of its not having been endowed with abundant natural resources, might look forward to becoming economically viable and independent of external aid. This could only mean that, in common with the other citizens of Jordan, the 720,000 refugees, representing over half of the whole refugee population, were rapidly achieving the capacity to support themselves and, hence, that the social and economic aspects of the refugee problem in Jordan, though not the political, were well on the way, if not to a solution, at least to a partial remedy.¹

55. The numerically smaller problems of the refugees in Lebanon and Syria also showed encouraging signs of progress towards social and economic rehabilitation. Even in Gaza improvement was discernible in recent years, including even a positive shortage of unskilled labour at certain seasons of the year. But of course this improvement in the level of economic activity rested primarily on the artificial and precarious base of a high level of expenditure injected into the Strip by the United Arab Republic Government, UNEF and UNRWA. A more solid element of improvement in the condition of the refugees in Gaza in recent years was the placement, with the active co-operation of the Gaza authorities, of some thousands of young refugees in employment in the United Arab Republic and elsewhere and the remittances which they were then able to send back to Gaza for the support of their relatives.

56. This gradual but hopeful process of economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees has now, for the time being at least, been halted and indeed reversed as a result of recent events. At the present time too many uncertainties overhang the future of the refugees in Gaza and on the West Bank to permit any prediction of how long this adverse effect will last in those areas. It is understood that some remedial action is already being taken by the Government of Israel to restimulate economic activity in both areas. But clearly if the refugees living in Gaza and on the West Bank remain cut off from opportunities of education, training and employment in the rest of the Arab world, this cannot but increase the difficulty of promoting their rehabilitation.

Whether it may be feasible to offset this disadvantage by some basically different approach which would not depend for its success on educational and employment opportunities elsewhere in the Arab world is not a matter on which the Commissioner-General feels entitled to express an opinion. In East Jordan it is possible to say with more certainty that, so long as the separation of the West Bank from the remainder of Jordan lasts, the whole process of rehabilitating the refugees on the East Bank, both those already living there before the hostilities and any of those displaced from the West Bank who may not be permitted to return by the Government of Israel or may not wish to return, will be gravely, perhaps irremediably, set back. In Syria, too, for so long as the Palestinian refugees displaced from the south are not able to return to their former places of residence, they will be faced by many new difficulties in their struggle to recover economic independence.

57. The longer the present state of affairs lasts, the greater will be the need for action to promote economic recovery in the areas affected. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency's most effective contribution would appear to be the maintenance of its existing services, possibly with some extension to new groups of displaced persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young refugees. But not even the existing UNRWA services can be maintained, let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism.

Budget for 1968

58. In present circumstances the preparation of a budget for the Agency's operations during the coming year, 1968, has necessarily involved much guesswork and many assumptions. The estimates of expenditure included in part II should therefore be treated as tentative and subject to substantial adjustment in the light of developments as yet unknown and questions still open. How many of the displaced persons will ultimately return to the West Bank? Will displaced persons from other areas be permitted to return and, if so, when? Is any further movement of population out of the areas occupied by Israel in

¹ A/6787, paragraphs 32-34. [Footnote in source text.]

prospect? (There have recently been disturbing reports of the arrival of substantial numbers in East Jordan from the Gaza Strip.) What will be the continuing needs in 1968 of any groups who still remain displaced at the end of this year? Will UNRWA be expected and authorized to continue assistance during 1968 to persons other than refugees from the 1948 conflict? What will be the longer-term impact of the hostilities and their aftermath on the Agency's operating costs? Will the General Assembly wish UNRWA in present circumstances to enlarge its efforts in the field of education and training? (The need and scope for expanding these activities was illustrated in the outline assessment prepared by the Agency's Department of Education and referred to in paragraphs 10 to 12 above, and the economic consequences of the hostilities may well be regarded as providing additional and urgent justification for greater efforts, not necessarily by UNRWA alone, in this field.) Finally, what level of funds is likely to be available to the Agency in 1968 and will action be taken to place the future financing of the Agency on a sounder basis than in the past?

59. These uncertainties greatly complicate the process of budgeting for the coming year. The budget which is contained in part II of this report has been framed on the basis of the following, necessarily tentative and even in some respects arbitrary, assumptions:

(1) Continuation of normal UNRWA services, as before the hostilities, without reduction;

(2) Continuation of issue of rations on a temporary and emergency basis for up to 75,000 recipients over and above the pre-hostilities number (861,000);

(3) Reversion of the supplementary feeding programme to its normal pre-hostilities pattern and scope by April 1968, except for increasing by 3,000 the number of hot meals provided in Gaza;

(4) Cessation of issue of emergency supplements to certain categories of recipients and reversion to the normal scale of basic rations by April 1968;

(5) Contingent provision for possible replacement of tented camps by normal shelters (and ancillary buildings) to accommodate 30,000 displaced persons;

(6) Provision of a special contingency item of \$1 million to meet the needs of individual cases of hardship attributable to the emergency and its aftermath;

(7) Continuation of UNRWA medical services on a temporary and emergency basis for up to 30,000 additional beneficiaries;

(8) Provision of environmental sanitation for the increase in the camp population;

(9) Provision of general education for a net addition of 6,000 children attending UNRWA/UNESCO schools in East Jordan;

(10) Provision for two training centres in East Jordan; for reopening the training centre at Homs in Syria (now occupied by displaced persons) in the autumn of 1968; for expanding the Gaza vocational training centre to accommodate 200 more trainees; and for continuing to operate all the other UNRWA centres on a normal basis;

(11) Contingency provision of a block sum of \$1.5 million against possible increases in unit costs in Gaza and West Bank arising from currency changes and other factors.

Regrettably, since the report was drafted it already seems probable that the above assumptions may underestimate the continuing needs arising from the emergency.

60. No provision has been included in the budget for 1968 for the improvement and expansion of the Agency's education services on the lines mentioned in paragraphs 10 to 12 above. However, if special contributions, either governmental or non-governmental, were forthcoming for this purpose, UNRWA would propose to spend up to \$5 million during 1968 as a first instalment of this programme. Action would be initiated first in East Jordan and Gaza as being areas where the economic impact of recent events is most severe and where intensified effort to promote rehabilitation by education and training would appear to be especially necessary.

61. Looking back over the past decade at the gradual but substantial improvement which has taken place in the economic condition of the refugees and at the crucially important contribution which the expansion of the UNRWA/UNESCO programmes of education and training has made to this process of progressive rehabil-

itation, the Commissioner-General feels that he is fully justified in urging the international community to look afresh at the dynamic role which education and training can play in ameliorating this long-standing human problem and at the cogent arguments which emerge for financing these programmes on a more ambitious and more liberal scale than ever before. With the shadow of recent events still obscuring the future of the refugee community, he feels that present difficulties and uncertainties only reinforce the case for bold and generous action in this field. In retrospect a striking feature of these past eight years or so is how much solid achievement has been gained at how little cost. The turning-point was in the period 1959/1961 when, aided by large special contributions from World Refugee Year and other sources, the Agency was able to invest nearly \$6.5 million principally in the expansion and improvement of its schools and training centres but also in the improvement of the qualifications of its teachers. In the following years, 1962 through 1967, the Agency was provided an additional sum totalling \$4.5 million for these purposes, with the larger share going to the expansion of schools and the improvement of teaching methods. These are not large sums in relation to the size of the social and economic problem of the Palestine refugees or to the cost of trying to tackle that problem by other means; and any fresh investment in these programmes from both governmental and non-governmental sources would be an investment in a proven success. Recent events have served to stimulate renewed interest and concern throughout the world regarding the protracted tragedy of the Palestine refugees. It is no doubt the general hope that this renewed interest and concern will be channelled principally towards a new, constructive effort to promote a just and lasting solution of the political issues which underlie the refugee problem. But, on a lower and more limited plane, there is certainly scope for a still more ambitious and imaginative approach to the amelioration of the refugee problem, in its social and economic aspects, by means of education and training.

62. For 1968, the Agency has not felt that its existing financial predicament permitted it to make any specific provision for initiating any such large programme for expanding its education and

training activities and it has therefore budgeted only for the continuation of its pre-hostilities programme and for such unavoidable increases in the scope and cost of that programme as may be necessitated by natural population growth and by the aftermath of the emergency situation of 1967. For these purposes the Agency estimates that it will require to expend approximately \$45.8 million as set out in part II of this report, including \$40.1 million to continue its pre-hostilities programme and \$5.7 million for increased scope and costs of programmes arising from the hostilities.

63. To meet this budget, the Agency further estimates that it will need to receive \$41.6 million in contributions from Governments, after taking into account estimated income of \$1.5 million from non-governmental contributions and miscellaneous sources and \$2.7 million unexpended balance of special contributions received in 1967 for the emergency.

64. It is more than ever essential that the Agency's requirements be adequately financed if it is to continue to carry out its mandate. As shown in section F of part I of this report, although in 1967 UNRWA received or expected to receive special contributions for the emergency materially in excess of its estimated increased expenditure arising from the emergency, it also expected to incur a deficit—for the fifth consecutive year—on its normal programme, amounting to some \$2.8 million. As a consequence, it expects to enter the fiscal year 1968 with barely \$11.5 million of working capital (operating reserve), excluding the estimated unexpended balance of \$2.7 million of special emergency contributions which are referred to above and which are expected to be used towards financing continued emergency expenditure in 1968. This amount of working capital (\$11.5 million) is far less than UNRWA requires in order to operate properly, and exposes it to the risk of having to halt or abruptly reduce operations at any time during the year if payment of contributions is unduly delayed.

65. For several years the Commissioner-General has called attention to the Agency's steadily worsening financial position and its possible implications (see also paragraphs 3 to 9 above). He feels constrained to do so once again, and to appeal to the General Assembly to place

the Agency on a sound financial basis, both with respect to current funds to cover its budget and with respect to working capital adequate to meet its requirements.

Summary and conclusions

66. In summary, the questions affecting UNRWA which seem to the Commissioner-General to require consideration and decision by the General Assembly are the following:

(1) Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?

(2) It is desired that UNRWA should continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need?

(3) Is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?

(4) How is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?

(5) If in fact adequate funds cannot be secured, will the General Assembly give the Commissioner-General guidance as to the action he should take to bring the Agency's expenditure and income into balance? Failing this, the harsh and highly political decisions as to which services must be reduced or eliminated fall upon the Commissioner-General and expose him to inevitable criticism.

It will be appreciated that affirmative answers to any or all of the first three questions will in practice be meaningful only to the extent to which a correspondingly positive answer can be given to the fourth question. If that is not forthcoming, then the fifth question assumes crucial importance. When this report is considered in the General Assembly, the Commissioner-General intends to report further on the needs in the area, and to offer additional comments on the above questions, based on the latest information then available.

PART I

REPORT ON UNRWA OPERATIONS FROM 1 JULY 1966 TO 31 MAY 1967

67. The following section of the report describes the Agency's main activities during the period 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967. As explained in the introduction, information on the period following the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June is given in paragraphs 24 to 47 above. Supplemental information on the estimated expenditure for each activity in the calendar year 1967 and the actual expenditure in 1966 is given in part II of the report, which presents the Agency's budget for the year 1968. A note on the legal aspects of UNRWA's work is appended as annex II to the report.

A. Relief services

68. The Agency's attempts to tackle the stubborn problem of the rectification of the ration rolls continued, once again with only limited success. In all host countries some progress was made in identifying refugees living in conditions of extreme hardship. Certain commodities, such as clothing and blankets, were issued on a selective basis only to these hardship cases, with the exception of the Gaza Strip, where such commodities continued to be generally distributed, although at a reduced rate. Otherwise, the relief services were made available on the same basis as in the past.

69. The number of refugees registered with the Agency continues to increase and on 31 May 1967 totalled 1,344,576, as compared with 1,317,749 on 30 June 1966. The number of refugees registered for rations in May 1967 was 860,951, as compared with 861,122 in June 1966, while the number of persons registered with the Agency but not receiving rations increased from 456,627 to 483,625. Tables 1 to 4 of annex I give statistics of the number of registered refugees and distribution according to age, country of residence and the categories of services to which they are entitled, and changes in the composition and entitlement of refugee families.

Eligibility and registration

70. In the Gaza Strip, rectification continued at its regular pace and resulted during the

year in the cancellation of 3,886 rations. As a result of normal eligibility procedures, 2,122 rations were transferred to needy children on the waiting list. In Jordan, a programme of eliminating the most flagrant abuses of the ration system by withdrawing rations from refugees known to be enjoying a substantial income was less successful than had been hoped, as its introduction coincided with parliamentary elections. The Government requested that action be postponed; on its resumption, however, satisfactory progress was made until the outbreak of hostilities, when circumstances forced the temporary suspension of the programme. In Lebanon, the process of reinvestigating all refugee families entitled to rations was successfully completed. A scale of income above which the rations of refugees are cancelled was agreed with the Government on the basis of the legal minimum salary. In the Syrian Arab Republic, the Agency believes that its ration rolls are reasonably accurate so far as the existence and presence of ration recipients are concerned, but it has not been possible so far for it to investigate the income of the refugees and thus be in a position to delete from the rolls those who are self-supporting.

71. In the four host countries, the names of 21,591 persons, including 16,986 ration recipients, were removed from the rolls during the eleven months ending 31 May 1967 (as compared with 33,607 in the year ending June 1966 and 31,630 the previous year). In the place of deleted names, 8,020 rations were issued during the year to children on the waiting list and 8,528 rations to other needy refugees.

72. The Agency has continued to maintain a limit on the maximum number of ration recipients in each country, with no allowance for population increase. As a result, the number of children over the age of one year for whom no rations are available continues to grow. By May 1967, these children totalled 284,304, of whom 221,035 were in Jordan, 5,118 in Lebanon, 23,217 in the Syrian Arab Republic and 34,934 in the Gaza Strip.

Basic rations

73. The content of the basic food rations, which provided approximately 1,500 calories per day in summer and 1,600 in winter, remained

unchanged during the period covered by this report. Details of the rations and of other supplies distributed to the refugees are contained in table 5. During the year, the Agency imported for its normal programme some 111,300 tons of flour and some 25,000 tons of other foodstuffs for distribution to the refugees. The cost of these supplies, together with the cost of distribution, accounted for approximately 37 per cent of the Agency's budget.

Supplementary feeding

74. The Agency's programme of supplementary feeding and milk distribution is designed to protect the health and nutrition of certain beneficiaries among the more vulnerable groups of the refugee population, including infants and children in the pre-school age, school children, pregnant women, nursing mothers and tuberculous out-patients. This is desirable in view of the fact that the basic rations, issued monthly to entitled refugees, contain no items of fresh food or animal proteins.

75. The Agency's milk distribution programme is largely made possible by a special annual contribution of skimmed milk by the United States Government. This contribution amounted during the year under review to 1,009 metric tons, as compared with 1,688 metric tons in the various previous year. Due to this reduction of supplies, the programme had to undergo various changes. The school milk programme, under which an average of 10,000 elementary school children received milk for twenty-two days a month during the school year, was suspended, as was distribution of reconstituted skimmed milk to children aged from six to fifteen. It was, however, possible to maintain for most of the period under review the daily issue of a mixture of whole and skimmed milk for approximately 6,600 babies from the age of six to twelve months and for infants under six months who could not be breast-fed, and the daily portion of reconstituted skimmed milk available on twenty-six days a month for children aged one to six, pregnant and nursing women and patients on medical recommendation (in all 42,572 beneficiaries, as indicated in table 7 of annex I).

76. The Agency operated 105 supplementary feeding centres in its camps and in places

where large numbers of refugees live. In these centres, a nutritionally balanced hot meal was provided on six days a week for an average of about 38,000 beneficiaries, drawn largely from children below the age of six, although some older children were also admitted on medical recommendation. A special bland high-protein diet was also provided for the treatment of infants and young children suffering from gastro-enteritis and/or malnutrition. Vitamin A and D capsules were issued to children attending the supplementary feeding centres twenty-six days in each month. Elementary school children had formerly received the vitamin A and D capsules twelve days a month, but as from 1 February 1967, this issue was replaced by the distribution of multi-vitamin tablets at the same rate. On medical certification, extra dry rations were issued to expectant mothers from the fifth month of pregnancy and for one year after delivery. Extra rations were also issued to tuberculous out-patients. A special contribution of 542 tons of cornflour-soya-milk mixture—an alternative source of protein—was also received from the United States Government for the supplementary feeding programme, the cost to the Agency being limited to that of ocean freight and distribution. The average number of refugees benefiting from various services, by country, is shown in table 6 of annex I.

77. As was mentioned in paragraph 17 of last year's report, an appeal by UNRWA for help to maintain its supplementary feeding programme was addressed to the World Food Programme in April 1966, but could not be acceded to under the terms of the basic texts governing the Programme. The possibility of amending those texts, in such a way as to enable UNRWA's request to be taken into consideration, was discussed by the Inter-Governmental Committee of the World Food Programme at its tenth session in November 1966, but was not found to be desirable.

Camps and shelter

78. The number of refugees living in camps maintained by the Agency rose from 517,518 in June 1966 to 532,990 at the end of May 1967. Because of UNRWA's continuing financial plight, however, no new major construction work could be undertaken except where funds previously

authorized were available. In Jordan 600 families who had formerly lived in squalid conditions in the Old City of Jerusalem moved in July 1966 to the nearby Shufat Camp. The extension to Kalandia camp was finished and by the end of May 1967 the rehousing of 600 families in Amman was nearing completion. Road construction was also carried out in some of the Jordan camps. In Gaza a small programme of shelter construction was successfully carried out with the co-operation of the refugees themselves. Because of budgetary limitations, shelter programmes in Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic were authorized only to meet the most urgent needs.

79. The number of refugees living in UNRWA camps, as compared with the total number of registered refugees in each host country, is shown in annex I, table 8.

Special hardship assistance

Clothing

80. The voluntary agencies, through the generous help of their contributors abroad, again continued to carry the main responsibility for meeting the needs of the refugees for clothing. During 1966, 465 tons of used clothing were received and distributed in Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to refugee families in special need; in Gaza, general distribution continued. The Agency itself spent some \$ 30,000 on inland transport costs and ocean freight costs for clothing shipped from countries other than the United States of America.

81. The following agencies generously donated the clothing:

- American Friends Committee
- Canadian Lutheran World Relief
- Catholic Relief Services (United States)
- Church of Scotland
- Church World Service (United States)
- Lutheran World Relief, Inc.
- New Zealand Council of Organization for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO)
- Norwegian Church
- Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (United Kingdom)
- Red Cross Society (Canada)
- Unitarian Service Committee of Canada
- United Church of Canada

Vastkustens Efterkrigshjälp (Sweden)
 Women's Royal Voluntary Service (United Kingdom)

Case-work among individuals

82. The Agency continued its programme of aid to the most needy members of the refugee community who, because of chronic illness, widowhood or unforeseen emergencies are in need of counsel and practical assistance. In all 11,000 such families received cash grants to help them surmount acute difficulties and others were given special issues of clothing, blankets and kerosene. In addition, the Agency's case-workers advised many thousands of refugees on their personal and family problems. They also enabled eleven refugees to rejoin their families and placed 150 orphans and fifty-four old people in institutions.

B. Health services

83. No major changes have taken place in UNRWA's health programme during the period under review, nor has there been any significant increase in the *per capita* cost of the health services. Such modest improvements as have been made were in general achieved either through internal economies or through the receipt of donations given specifically for health purposes. Thus in three camps it was possible to replace old unsatisfactory health centre buildings with entirely new and well-designed structures. A development of interest has been that, with the exception of four posts held by World Health Organization officials attached to the office of the Director of Health and WHO representative, all senior supervisory staff posts, both at Headquarters and in the four field health offices, are now filled with locally recruited staff members.

84. The health programme is carried out with the help of WHO, which provides advisory and consultative services as required and supervises the technical aspects of the programme. Due weight is given to the needs and requirements of the curative services, but the main emphasis continues to be laid on the promotive and preventive aspects, including communicable diseases control, environmental sanitation, health education of the public, nutrition and supplementary feeding.

85. The health services have been designed to keep closely in line with those provided by the host Governments for economically comparable sections of the local populations in their countries. Assistance has been received from a variety of sources, including charitable organizations, universities, commercial concerns, private individuals and especially from the Ministries of Health of the host Governments. Cordial relations have continued to be maintained with those Ministries and co-operation has been particularly fruitful in such fields as tuberculosis control and mass immunization campaigns. Donations have been received in the form of monetary gifts for the construction of health centres as well as for the training of refugee students, particularly in basic nursing education. Donations received in kind included medical supplies, vaccines, layettes and supplementary food items. Assistance has also been provided in the form of personnel, free hospital, X-ray and laboratory facilities as well as help in mass vaccination campaigns.

Curative and preventive medical services

Clinics, hospitals and laboratories

86. Curative and preventive services continued to be provided to refugees at 122 places. The Agency itself maintained services at 105 clinics and gave subsidies to Governments and voluntary societies to operate the remaining seventeen. Although the number of refugees entitled to UNRWA's medical care rose by some 2.5 per cent as compared with the previous year, the average monthly attendances for curative services dropped by 7 per cent, owing largely to a general decrease in the incidence of infectious eye conditions.

87. The Agency's curative services comprised medical consultations in UNRWA clinics, injections, dressings, eye treatments, limited dental care and the dispensing of medicines. Where indicated, patients were referred to specialists or hospitals for further investigation or treatment. Arrangements have also been made to enable patients to benefit from technological advances in such specialized fields as open cardiac surgery, facilities for which have recently become available in the Middle East. Table 9 of annex I contains a summary of clinic attendances.

88. The total number of hospital beds

available for refugees at the end of April 1967 was 1,869. Some 75 per cent of these beds were used for the treatment of acute cases (medical, surgical, paediatric, gynaecological and obstetrical); the remaining 25 per cent were reserved for patients suffering from chronic diseases (tuberculosis, mental diseases). The Agency itself maintains only two hospitals, both in Jordan (a tuberculosis hospital and a cottage hospital), nine camp maternity wards located for the most part in the Gaza Strip, seventeen rehydration/nutrition centres situated in the four host countries and a small paediatric ward in the Gaza Strip. In addition, UNRWA and the United Arab Republic Government health authorities jointly operated a tuberculosis hospital in Gaza. The majority of hospital beds were, however, located in Agency-subsidized governmental, university or private institutions. Statistical information on the number of beds available is given in table 10.

89. Laboratory services continued to be provided by university, governmental or private laboratories, generally on a subsidy or cost for service basis, though occasionally free of charge. The Agency itself has continued to maintain two small laboratories in Lebanon and one central laboratory in the Gaza Strip, as well as a small clinical laboratory attached to the newly established UNRWA/Swedish Health Centre. It is planned to amalgamate the two latter laboratories.

Control of communicable diseases

90. No cases of any of the six quarantinable diseases (cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus and yellow fever) was reported amongst the refugee population. However, in the face of the threat posed by an outbreak of cholera in a neighbouring country in August 1966, strict precautionary measures, including mass immunization, were applied throughout the Agency's areas of operation, in line with the policies of host Governments.

91. Gastro-enteric infections of a wide variety continued to present the Agency's curative and preventive services with their greatest challenge, and no striking decrease in either diarrhoeal diseases of infants or dysenteric diseases of older children and adults can be reported. Infectious hepatitis showed a sharp rise of incidence in the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Arab Republic, as

did enteric-group fevers in the latter country. There was a low incidence in poliomyelitis, the total for the refugee population in all host countries during the ten months ending in April 1967 being only twenty-eight cases. Aside from routine immunization against enteric-group fevers and poliomyelitis, improvement of environmental sanitation standards is given constant emphasis by the Health Department as the means of controlling this major group of infectious diseases.

92. The acute respiratory infections continued as a second major group of communicable diseases in terms of their prevalence and seriousness, especially for infants and young children. Whooping-cough and diphtheria continued to be well controlled through immunization, although cases of the former occurred in some number in the more remote areas not under close health coverage by the Agency. To combat measles, an ever-prevalent and serious childhood disease, the Health Department carried out mass immunization with inactivated vaccine in the past year and is now conducting pilot studies, in collaboration with WHO, on the use of a mixed smallpox and attenuated measles virus vaccine. The communicable eye diseases, including trachoma, continued their steady downward trend, largely as a result of modern methods of treatment.

93. The mass pulmonary tuberculosis survey and control programme which the Public Health Department in Gaza has been conducting for resident and refugee population alike over the past one and a half years, with financial assistance from UNRWA, brought to light a substantially increased number of cases; 238 reported, as compared with 213 reported last year. The Government of Jordan also embarked upon the pilot phase of a mass survey and control programme in September 1966 which includes the refugee population (24,000) of Amman New Camp. The Agency's Health Department initiated pilot projects of direct BCG vaccination for infants and elementary school entrants in Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic as a step towards eventual routine protection of all young children in the refugee population. In malaria control or eradication, the Agency's main efforts were directed to the Gaza Strip, where the Government Public Health Department and UNRWA's Health Division jointly carried out modified

surveillance and larvicidal measures. The Agency submitted an evaluation report on the programme for the year 1966 to the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office of WHO.

94. Table 11 of annex I summarizes the numbers of cases of communicable diseases reported for the refugee population during the ten months ending in April 1967.

Maternal and child health

95. Comprehensive health protection for the mother and child continued to be provided in eighty-one maternity clinics and seventy-nine infant clinics in the Agency's health units, as well as in a few clinics operated by voluntary agencies. Maternal services included prenatal care, delivery at home or in maternity centres and post-natal care, supplemented by hospital referral service in cases of abnormality. The infant health service comprised regular supervision at clinics, selective home visiting, a broad programme of immunization and systematic health teaching.

96. The nutrition of mothers and young children continued to receive special attention. Protective measures are described more fully in the section on supplementary feeding in paragraphs 74 to 76 above. Special efforts were made towards nutritional restoration of underweight infants through the supplementary feeding programme (see paragraph 102) and through timely referral to the rehydration/nutrition centres. Three additional rehydration/nutrition centres were opened during the year, making a total of seventeen centres with 202 cots in all four host countries.

97. Health services for the school child continued along established lines and comprised medical examination and follow-up care of school entrants, later examinations as indicated, immunity reinforcement with diphtheria toxoid and TAB vaccine, health education and school sanitation. Medical examination procedure and the system of reporting on school health services were revised. The Health Department is collaborating with the Education Department in a special study on scholastically retarded children.

98. A survey on health status, morbidity and mortality in the pre-school child (2-5 years) was conducted in all host countries. Analysis of

the survey data is proceeding and the findings will provide the basis upon which both to plan regular health care for this group and to make later evaluations.

99. Summarized information on pre-natal and infant care and on the school health services is presented in table 12 of annex I.

Health education

100. The Agency provided individual and mass health education through the channels of its clinics, feeding centres, maternal and child health services, schools, youth centres and women's activities centres. The basic aim of the programme is to encourage the refugees to recognize their health needs and to co-operate with the health staff in finding solutions to them. Monthly health drives and weekly health promotion days were organized, and use was made of group discussions, lectures, informal talks and audio-visual aids. Special emphasis was given to health education in schools, where school health committees and clubs have been formed and where a particular theme was developed on the month-by-month basis. The teachers themselves received health education in the Agency's training centres, where the subject now forms part of the curricula.

Nursing services

101. The Agency's nursing staff continued to provide nursing services in both the preventive and curative fields and were specially concerned with maternal and child health, layette distribution, school health, health education, home visiting, infant feeding supervision, tuberculosis and venereal diseases control, individual immunizations and mass immunization campaigns, special surveys and the care of the sick in clinics, hospitals and rehydration nutrition centres. They also participated in the Gaza Strip in the special health and education project in operation in preparatory girls' schools. At the end of April 1967, the Agency was employing 161 graduate nurses and midwives and 298 auxiliary nurses. The clinics and hospitals subsidized by the Agency also provided a substantial nursing staff.

Nutrition

102. Although a general nutritional survey was not carried out during the period under

review, the study of the health status of pre-school children (see paragraph 98 above) included appraisal of the nutritional status of each child examined. Close attention was also paid to the numbers and percentages of underweight infants among the age group 0-2 years attending infant health clinics. The number of severely underweight children is low (1.2 per cent), but those moderately underweight amount to about 8.3 per cent and those slightly underweight to about 13.9 per cent. These figures indicate the existence of a substantial nutritional problem, probably of complex origin, which merits close observation and surveillance and will necessitate the continued special protection, as far as may be possible within the limits of the Agency's restricted resources, of particularly vulnerable groups. The Agency's supplementary feeding and milk distribution programme described under paragraphs 74 to 76 above has been designed with this specific need in mind, though due attention is also given to environmental sanitation and health education, more particularly of mothers of families.

Environmental sanitation

103. This programme continued to be chiefly concerned with the provision of safe water supplies, sanitary waste disposal, and the control of insect and rodent disease vectors in the Agency's fifty-four camps. During the period under review, the number of public water points and taps as well as the number of private domestic connexions with public or private water schemes was increased. A sewerage scheme was completed in one camp and a number of similar schemes were being carried out by local authorities, with the financial assistance of UNRWA. The construction of family latrines continued to be encouraged by the Agency and about 39 per cent of refugee families living in camps now have private latrines. Garbage disposal is dealt with by composting, incineration or dumping, depending on local circumstances. Waste water disposal continued to present serious problems in a number of camps situated within or near municipal boundaries. As regards fly control, reliance was mainly placed on the prevention of fly breeding through improved environmental sanitation, combined with the judicious use of insecticides. Louse and bedbug control was carried out by means of selective

dusting and rodents were controlled principally by trapping. In malaria control, the Agency worked closely with the national malaria eradication programmes. During the period under review, the ratio of the sanitation labourer force in camps was reduced from 1.8/1,000 to 1.7/1,000 of the camp population, mainly as a result of the increase in the number of family latrines available and the consequent closure of some public latrines.

Medical education and training

104. The table in paragraph 136 shows that of the 255 scholarships held or awarded in the field of health under the Agency's university scholarships programme during 1966-1967, a total of 217 were in medicine, thirty-one in pharmaceutical chemistry, and seven in dentistry. In addition, eighty-four students were receiving training in nursing and midwifery: forty-two in basic nursing, thirty-six in mental nursing, five in midwifery and one in tuberculosis nursing for practical nurses. Forty-one students were under training as assistant pharmacists, twenty-seven as public health inspectors and sixteen as laboratory technicians. One Agency medical officer was awarded a WHO scholarship in public health, one nurse an Agency scholarship in public health nursing training, and one staff member a scholarship in basic statistics. An active programme of in-service training of staff, including doctors, nursing and auxiliary staff, continued to be carried out.

C. Education and training services

105. Since 1950, the educational services for the Palestine refugee community have been operated and developed by UNRWA and UNESCO in association, and over the years this collaboration has grown closer and more effective. In the early part of 1967 it was further stimulated by the visit to UNRWA's area of operations of the Director-General of UNESCO (see also paragraph 13 of the introduction to this report). In the course of this visit, arrangements were made for a further two-year extension of the agreement between the two organizations setting out their respective roles in this joint education programme. Fruitful discussions were held on various aspects of the programme and on ways and means

of strengthening it. Subsequently, the Director-General and senior UNESCO staff members accompanying him visited the UNRWA-UNESCO Institute of Education in Beirut and the Agency's two training centres in Ramallah, Jordan. Prior to this visit, and shortly after it, the Director of UNRWA's Department of Education had discussions in Paris with the UNESCO Secretariat on the Department's proposals for the school year 1967-1968.

106. In October 1966 a second educational conference was held in Beirut between representatives of the host countries, of UNESCO and of UNRWA, to follow up the results of the previous year's meeting and to consider the programme proposed for the school year 1966-1967. A representative of the League of Arab States was also present at this three-day meeting. As on the previous occasion, it led to a series of recommendations which the Agency has used as a guideline in framing its educational policies and in drafting the coming year's programme. One of the recommendations was that the Agency's Education Department should attempt to draw up an education programme based on a professional judgement of the needs of the refugee community, irrespective of the funds available to finance such a programme. Action on this recommendation is described in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the introduction to this report. Another recommendation, which the Agency has gladly accepted, proposed the establishment of joint co-ordination and implementation committees between UNRWA and each host country, to strengthen co-operation between them in the field of education. Discussions have been taking place concerning the setting-up of these committees.

107. The conference also proposed the holding of future annual conferences in the latter part of May of each year, before the preparation of the Commissioner-General's report to the General Assembly and before the beginning of the new school year. Accordingly the third meeting of this series was scheduled in Beirut from 31 May to 2 June 1967, but unfortunately had to be postponed to a later date owing to developments in the area.

108. During the past year, in response to appeals for help in meeting its financial deficit, UNRWA received not only the regular financial

assistance for its educational programme on which it depends, but also further special help, some of it of a most generous nature.

General education

109. During the period of the report, UNRWA operated 440 elementary and preparatory schools, 263 of them in Agency-built and 177 in rented premises. It employed 5,112 teachers in these schools and provided education in them for 187,000 refugee children out of the 246,500 who were enrolled in these first nine years, which are increasingly being accepted in the Arab world as the basic period of general education. Looked at from a purely quantitative angle, the situation of the refugee children was in this respect highly satisfactory, as the total enrolment quoted above represented over 75 per cent of the estimated number of refugee children in the age-group. In terms of the quality of the education given, however, much still remains to be done to overcome the handicaps of overcrowded classes and inadequate equipment and teaching aids, and to ensure that all teachers are adequately qualified.

110. In the upper secondary cycle of general education nearly 19,000 Palestine refugee students were in government or private secondary schools, many of them assisted by subsidies paid by the Agency on their behalf. It must be acknowledged that these subsidies covered only a small part of the actual cost of the education provided and that in this cycle of education the main burden was being carried by Governments of the host countries.

111. Details of the numbers and distribution of refugee children receiving education are given in tables 13 to 16 at the end of this report.

Elementary (primary) cycle

112. The total enrolment in the UNRWA/UNESCO primary schools during the period under review amounted to some 147,500 refugee children, compared with 140,000 during 1965-1966, representing an increase of 5.3 per cent over the previous school year. In addition, eligible refugee children enrolled in government and private elementary schools were estimated to total 29,700, as compared with 29,000 during 1965-1966.

Preparatory (lower secondary) cycle

113. Practically all eligible refugee children who had successfully completed the elementary cycle were admitted to UNRWA/UNESCO, to government or to private preparatory schools. The preparatory cycle covered a three-year course in Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Gaza Strip and a four-year course in Lebanon. The total number of eligible refugee children enrolled in UNRWA/UNESCO preparatory schools during the school year 1966-1967 was 39,500, in addition to which some 10,800 were enrolled in government and private schools compared with 36,150 and 10,350 respectively during the previous year. These figures represent an increase of 8.2 per cent.

114. In paragraphs 9 and 76 of last year's report, attention was drawn to the financial and other implications of admitting into the preparatory cycle all qualified refugee children seeking admission. The doubt was expressed whether the Agency would be able to continue to afford a rate of expansion of the order quoted in the two preceding paragraphs, and the suggestion was made that it might be preferable to limit expansion to some such rate as 5 per cent per year and to devote some resources to improvements in quality. It should be pointed out that any such restriction on the entry of refugee children into the preparatory cycle of general education would be strongly criticized by the responsible authorities in the host countries. At the meeting held in October 1966, to which reference was made in paragraph 106 above, representatives of the host countries placed on record their belief that compulsory education should cover the elementary and preparatory cycles, and they requested the Agency to give serious consideration to adopting this principle.

115. However, it must be borne in mind that annual expansions of the order of 8 per cent place a very heavy strain on an education service, and may lead to deterioration in quality. The Agency's Education Department is very conscious of this danger and is doing everything possible, within the limits of the financial and professional resources available to it, to combat deterioration. Its main hope in this respect lies in the work being done by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education for the in-service training of the Agen-

cy's teaching staff.

116. In the school year under review, the home economics programme for girls in the Gaza Strip, introduced in 1964-1965, was extended to the third preparatory grade to cover the full cycle, with an enrolment of 8,000 girls. Ten additional home economics units were built, bringing the total to twenty-six. To meet expected enrolment increases over the coming two years, an additional four units would be required. UNRWA's Education and Health Departments are now collaborating in this programme, as a special health education programme is being followed by the third preparatory girls under the professional guidance of Health Department staff.

117. In Lebanon, the teaching of French, which was introduced into grade one of the preparatory cycle of UNRWA/UNESCO schools in 1964-1965, has been extended to grades two and three, and will cover the complete cycle in 1967-1968. This activity now involves 2,100 students and fourteen French teachers. Plans to introduce a similar programme into the Agency's schools in the Syrian Arab Republic are under study.

Upper secondary cycle

118. UNRWA does not conduct classes at the upper secondary level in its own schools, but gives some assistance in the form of grants, allowances or subsidies to eligible refugee students enrolled in government or private schools at this level. In 1967 the total amount set aside by the Agency for subsidizing upper secondary education amounted to \$475,385. With an estimated 19,000 refugee students in the cycle, this represented an average unit cost of \$25 per student, a figure much below the actual cost of the education provided. However, so long as the deficit situation persists, and so long as priority has to be given to the provision of education at the elementary and preparatory levels on the unrestricted basis referred to above, UNRWA will not be in a position to revise its policy of limiting the amounts it sets aside for upper secondary education.

Youth activities

119. The Agency's youth activities programme continued to be carried on in thirty-two

refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The youth centres, now in their eighth year, were all directed by volunteer refugee leaders with the help of committees responsible for administration, community service and cultural, recreational and sports activities. There was a noticeable increase in membership of young adults, particularly of school teachers. Sports remained by far the most popular activity and fruitful co-operation was established in Jordan and the Gaza Strip between refugee youth centres and the sports federations of the host countries. During the summer vacation in 1966, 2,000 school-boys benefited from a recreational programme organized for them by young men in twenty-four camps. Over a hundred service and work projects, such as health education, the improvement of sanitary installations and camp roads, the planting of trees, and the making of playgrounds and gardens, were completed by young refugees in their camps last year.

120. The World Alliance of YMCA's continued to be responsible for the training of volunteer refugee youth leaders. This programme was sponsored and financed jointly by UNRWA and the YMCA at an estimated cost in 1967 of \$28,000, three-fourths of which was contributed by the YMCA. An international work camp was organized in Jordan in the summer of 1966, at which forty-two young men from Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States participated, together with refugees. The campers helped to establish garbage dumps and waste-water pits in three refugee camps where over 11,000 people live. Four Canadian YMCA student volunteers helped in the training programme and the work projects in refugee camps during the summer of 1966. One Canadian YMCA volunteer was assigned to work for the youth activities programme in the Gaza Strip for a year.

Pre-school play centres

121. Special contributions once again enabled the eighteen play centres in the four host countries to provide small refugee children with the rudiments of kindergarten training and enabled them to enjoy a cheerful and happy atmosphere. The refugee parents themselves contributed what they could towards the salaries of the supervisors in charge of each centre.

Vocational training (including teacher training)

122. The Agency's programme of teacher training falls into two distinct categories, pre-service training of refugees in its three residential training centres in Jordan and Lebanon and in government centres in the Gaza Strip and Cairo, and in-service training of those of the 5,000 teachers on its staff who are professionally under-qualified.

Teacher training in UNRWA centres

123. The three UNRWA centres provided a two-year post-secondary course, aimed at producing qualified teachers principally for the elementary cycle; the government centres offer a five-year post-preparatory course in Gaza and a four-year post-secondary course in Cairo, the latter producing teachers of university graduate standard for subject teaching at the secondary school level. The Agency had a fourth centre at Homs, in Syria, which has regrettably been closed for the last two school years. Negotiations are continuing with the Syrian Arab Republic authorities for the reorganization of this centre and its reopening in collaboration, it is hoped, with the Ministry of Education.

124. The total number of refugee students enrolled in the above-mentioned courses during 1966-1967 was 1,121. At the end of the 1965-1966 school year, 519 refugees graduated from these courses, and once again the majority of them found employment outside the UNRWA school system, mainly with Arab Governments other than those of the host countries. The Agency was thus unable to count on their help to close the gap between its trained and untrained teachers. Fortunately, it now has other resources, as the impact of its in-service training programme is beginning to make itself felt.

In-service teacher training provided by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education

125. About 630 elementary school teachers employed by the Agency successfully completed the first two-year basic course of the Institute in August 1966. This represented about 73 per cent of the initial enrolment in October 1964, and 85 per cent of the 741 candidates who completed the course and presented themselves for the final

examinations. Their professional training was provided through guided self-study correspondence courses, accompanied and reinforced by an efficient system of supervision. Seminar groups of twenty-five to thirty teachers were each placed under the tutorship of a field staff member of the Institute, and there was a close follow-up in the classroom over the whole period of training. Summer courses and yearly examinations were also an essential part of the training given.

126. The second two-year basic course, in which 717 teachers are enrolled, will be completed in August 1967. The third basic course started in October 1966 with an enrolment of 832 teachers. More than 2,200 UNRWA teachers, out of a total amounting at present to slightly over 5,000, have thus been involved in this programme of "on-the-job" training, which, although still in an experimental stage and considered by UNESCO as a pilot project, is already contributing effectively to the Agency's efforts to improve the quality of education in its schools.

127. The programme is recognized by the Agency, for salary and grading purposes, as being fully equivalent to the pre-service training provided by the Agency's teacher training centres.

Vocational training and technical education

128. In developing its vocational training programme, UNRWA has to some extent pioneered in the Arab Middle East and has become one of the most important purveyors of this type of technical assistance in the region. A development of interest during the year has been the encouraging employment record, noted in paragraph 132 below, of the young refugees, both men and women, who have successfully completed their courses.

129. In all, 1,855 men and 237 women were enrolled in the Agency's seven residential vocational training centres during 1966-1967. In addition, nineteen men and fifteen women students were following training courses in private and governmental technical schools at UNRWA's expense. The enrolment by field of training during each of the school years 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 is shown in the following table; further details of the courses of study and the centre attended will be found in table 17 of annex I:

<i>Field of training</i>	<i>1965/1966</i>	<i>1966/1967</i>
Vocational training for girls	299 ^a	237
Metal trades training	657	699
Electrical trades training	357	360
Building trades training	281	356
Agricultural education	59	—
Technical and commercial training	414	440
All fields of training	2,067	2,092

a Including thirty-two girls trained as home economics teachers for the Gaza Strip.

130. As was explained in paragraph 89 of last year's report, efforts to find jobs for young refugees trained at the Agricultural Training Centre at Beit Hannoun in the Gaza Strip had met with a disappointing lack of success. After consultation with the Government of the United Arab Republic, the Centre was accordingly converted at the beginning of the 1966-1967 school year into an institution for the training of elementary school teachers with a rural bias, and handed over to the government authorities. UNRWA paid subsidies for thirty-six refugee students.

131. At the suggestion of the Gaza authorities, plans had been drawn up to increase the capacity of the Gaza Vocational Training Centre from 368 to 568 places within a period of three years, partly through the use of double shifting. The Government had offered to finance the cost of construction of the new buildings required and to contribute to the recurrent training costs for the additional trainees, some fifty of whom were to be non-refugees—a figure which roughly corresponded to the proportion of non-refugees to refugees in the population of the Gaza Strip. UNRWA was to have met the cost of the additional equipment required. At the end of May 1967, negotiations with the Government were at an advanced stage, and it was expected that building would begin shortly.

132. The total number of trainees who successfully completed the vocational and technical training courses at the end of the 1965-1966 school year was 1,128. Of this number, 268 were given the opportunity of gaining further experience by working in industry in a number of

countries for periods ranging from six to twenty-four months. The receiving countries were the United Arab Republic (103), the Federal Republic of Germany (101), Sweden (50), Switzerland (8), France (4), Denmark (1), and Finland (1). The placement in jobs of the remaining 860 graduates and of the 225 young refugees who returned after periods of work experience in industry abroad was highly satisfactory. Six months after graduation, the Agency's records showed that at least 85 per cent had found employment in the host countries or in other parts of the Arab world.

Adult training courses

133. The Agency carried on its handicraft training course for some of the refugees who lack qualifications for admission to vocational training centres. Twenty-eight young men followed a one-year carpentry course at three centres in Jordan, and 1,607 young women completed a six-months' sewing course at thirty-five centres. Four hundred and fifty young women took part in the programme of women's activities carried out in fourteen centres and financed solely by special donations. It included literacy training and classes in handicrafts, needlework, child care, first aid and household skills. The products of the handicrafts and needlework classes were sold on a co-operative basis and the profits used for the improvement of the centres. The small libraries continued to be well patronized, and the cultural and recreational activities were especially popular. The women's activities programme is financed solely by special donations. During the year, 450 young women took part in the activities of the centres.

Training of the handicapped

134. A heartening feature of the Agency's programme of training and rehabilitation of young handicapped refugees has been the success of many of the disabled, on completion of their training, in finding useful work. In the Gaza Strip, for example, twenty blind boys who completed their training in June 1966 are now working, nine of them in a rug-making project and eleven in a project for the production of cleaning supplies. At the end of the 1966-1967 school year,

four deaf trainees who had been studying in UNRWA vocational training centres side by side with normal boys completed their two-year courses as plumbers and sheet-metal workers. This experiment, the first of its kind in the region, proved so successful that the Agency plans to admit additional handicapped refugees to its training centres during the coming year. In all, 322 blind, deaf and crippled refugee boys and girls were placed during the year under review in specialized institutions in the Middle East, 110 of them free of charge. In addition, fifty blind refugees received training at the Centre for the Blind in the Gaza Strip, financed by the Pontifical Mission for Palestine.

University education

135. UNRWA awarded a total of 590 scholarships for university study during the academic year 1966-1967. These scholarships are awarded only for one year at a time but are renewable from year to year for the duration of the course of study undertaken by the student, provided he successfully passes the end-of-year examination held by his faculty. Of the 590 scholarships, 444 were continuing and 146 were new scholarships. One hundred of these new scholarships were "open" awards and the balance of forty-six scholarships were "closed" awards. These terms imply that in the former case recipients are left free to choose both their university and their course of study. The "closed" scholarships are restricted to courses of study considered to be of direct use to the Agency, such as mathematics, science and education diploma courses, and are subject to acceptance of a bond obliging the recipient to work for the Agency after graduation for a stated period, if required to do so.

136. The distribution of scholarships by field of study and country of study is shown in the following table:

University scholarship holders by course of study and country of study during the academic year 1966-1967

<i>Course of study</i>	<i>United Arab Republic</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syrian Arab Republic</i>	<i>Jordan</i>	<i>Iraq</i>	<i>All countries</i>
Medicine	147	30	38	—	2	217
Pharmacy	22	5	4	—	—	31
Dentistry	5	—	2	—	—	7
Engineering	115	25	32	—	3	175
Agriculture	13	—	3	—	—	16
Forestry	—	—	1	—	—	1
Arts ^a	18	19	2	18	—	57
Science ^a	27	17	10	15	—	69
Commerce	3	—	—	—	—	3
Economics	1	—	—	—	—	1
Ed. diploma	—	—	2	11	—	13
All courses	351	96	94	44	5	590

^a Include students who may later enter the medical or engineering schools of their university.

137. Although it is unlikely that the Agency will be able to increase its own expenditure on this highly important cycle of education, there are other possibilities of adding to the total number of university awards open to Palestine refugee students. In the academic year 1966-1967, awards for both first degree and post-graduate courses of study were made by the Governments of Iraq and the German Federal Republic. The Agency, with the active assistance of UNESCO, is seeking to extend such opportunities by contacting other countries which are in a position to offer scholarships to foreign students, in the hope that they will make some of their scholarships available to Palestine refugees.

138. By the end of June 1967, the following numbers of scholarships had been awarded to Palestine refugees by the Governments of the countries outside UNRWA's area of operations: Federal Republic of Germany, 24; Yugoslavia, 9; Iraq, 5; Turkey, 2.

D. Other assistance to refugees

The Development Bank of Jordan

139. During the year the Development Bank of Jordan, of which UNRWA was one of the principal shareholders, was dissolved and all its assets and liabilities transferred to the Government's Agricultural Credit Corporation, which is

paying to the shareholders the par value of their shares. In UNRWA's case, the total sum involved is \$ 1,813,000, to be paid under an Agreement between the Agency and the Agricultural Credit Corporation in instalments over an extended period. These sums will be used, in agreement with the Government, for urgently needed school construction, to replace certain unsatisfactory and unsuitable premises currently in use, and to increase classroom capacity. Apart from the value which will result in terms of improved educational standards and facilities for refugee pupils in Jordan, the Agency will be able to achieve some indirect savings on recent [sic] and through the more efficient and economical use of teachers.

E. Common services and general administration

140. During the year under review the effort to lower administrative costs has continued and the over-all staff complement has been further reduced (see table 23). The gradual replacement of international officials by locally recruited staff members has also been continued and is reflected in these figures. The pattern of services remains unchanged; they comprise the general administration of the Agency at its headquarters and in the host countries, its public information services and the maintenance of offices in New York, Geneva and Cairo; the transport of persons and

goods within UNRWA's area of operations; market research, purchasing, control and warehousing of supplies and equipment; personnel administration, translation, legal, financial, statistical, recording and engineering services and the protection of the Agency's property.

F. Financial operations

141. The financial accounts of UNRWA

are published separately, together with the related auditors' report.¹ This section, therefore, presents in summary form the Agency's actual financial operations in 1966 and its estimated financial operations in 1967. (UNRWA's fiscal period is the calendar year, whereas the present report covers the period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967.)

142. The following summary table reflects the Agency's financial operations during 1966:

	<i>Millions of US dollars</i>
Working capital (operating reserve) at 1 January 1966	15.3
Income for 1966:	
Pledges by Governments	35.0
Other contributions	0.8
Other income and exchange adjustments	0.5
Total income	<u>36.3</u>
Expenditure and commitments for 1966:	
Relief services	17.3
Health services	5.0
Educational services	15.2
Total, expenditure and commitments	<u>37.5</u>
Excess of expenditure and commitments over income (deficit)	<u>(1.2)</u>
Working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December 1966 before adjustments of prior years' accounts	14.1
Add:	
Net adjustments of prior years' accounts	<u>0.2</u>
Adjusted working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December 1966	<u>14.3</u>

143. As the preceding table shows, UNRWA incurred a deficit of \$1.2 million in 1966, and working capital (operating reserve) was reduced by \$1.0 million after adjustments of prior years' accounts. This was the fourth successive year in which the Agency incurred a deficit, which had amounted in 1963 to \$0.5 million, in 1964 to \$2.0 million and in 1965 to \$2.5 million. These successive deficits have thus totalled some \$6.2 million, all of which has had to be met by drawing down the Agency's working capital.

144. At the end of 1966, working capital stood at only \$14.3 million, substantially less than the minimum of \$16 million which the Agency considers it should have at the beginning of a fiscal year in order to finance its "pipeline" of supplies and to provide operating funds during the first half of the year, when the rate of payment of contributions normally lags far behind the Agency's rate of expenditure.

¹ For the year 1966, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 6 D* (A/6706/Add. 4). [Footnote in source text.]

145. Unliquidated commitments carried forward from 1966 (or prior years) to 1967 totalled approximately \$0.8 million, a reduction of \$0.3 million from the \$1.1 million of such commitments which had been carried forward from 1965 to 1966. This reduction resulted primarily from the reductions in budget allocations for shelter and school construction in 1966 caused by the lack of funds. During 1966, savings on liquidation of commitments from prior years totalled some \$ 98,000, only slightly above the level of 1965.

146. At the end of 1966, unpaid pledges from Governments totalled \$7.2 million, compared with \$8.1 million at the end of 1965, reflecting a minor improvement in the rate of payment of contributions in 1966 by certain Governments. The free cash position at the end of 1966, however, reflected the deficit incurred by the Agency in 1966, cash resources in excess of current liabilities and provisions for future liabilities amounting to only \$1.6 million, compared with \$2.9 million at the end of 1965 and \$6.3 million at the end of 1964. Inventories of supplies and advances to suppliers at \$6.2 million were slightly higher than

at the close of 1965 (\$5.8 million). There was no significant change in other assets.

147. For 1967 the Agency's financial operations cannot be predicted with accuracy because of the effects of the hostilities of June and their aftermath. Prior to the hostilities the Agency had managed to reduce its estimated expenditure from the budget of \$39.3 million submitted to the General Assembly¹ to \$39 million. However, income then expected to be received from all sources totalled only \$34.5 million, so that the Agency faced a deficit for 1967 of some \$4.5 million.

148. Subsequently the Agency's estimates of both expenditure and income for 1967 have had to be substantially revised and the Agency's present (but highly provisional) estimates are \$42.8 million of expenditure and \$42.7 million of income. The following summary table reflects the Agency's projected financial operations for 1967 based upon these provisional estimates, divided between the Agency's "normal" programme for 1967 and its "expanded programme" arising from the hostilities of June:

	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	(millions of US dollars)		
Working capital (operating reserve) at 1 January 1967	14.3	—	14.3
Estimated income for 1967:			
Pledges by Governments	34.0	5.7	39.7
Other contributions	1.0	0.7	1.7
Other income	1.3	—	1.3
Total estimated income	<u>36.3</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>42.7</u>
Less estimated expenditure 1967:			
Relief services	17.5	2.2	19.7
Health services	5.1	0.1	5.2
Education services	16.5	0.3	16.8
Increased unit costs	—	0.3	0.3
Losses due to hostilities	—	0.8	0.8
Total estimated expenditure	<u>39.1</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>42.8</u>
Estimated surplus (deficit) 1967	(2.8)	2.7	(0.1)
Estimated working capital (operating reserve) at 31 December 1967, before possible adjustments for prior years	<u>11.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>14.2</u>

¹ A/6313, part II. [Footnote in source text.]

149. The estimate of \$39.7 million income from contributions by Governments is based upon \$28.3 million of pledges actually made to date (including \$5.7 million of special pledges made for the emergency situation arising out of the June hostilities) plus \$11.4 million of "normal" pledges which the Agency feels it has good reason to expect will be made in the light of previous experience.

150. The estimate of \$1.7 million from non-governmental contributions represents an increase of \$0.9 million over the figure for 1966, and includes \$0.7 million of special contributions received or expected to be received in respect of the emergency. Continuation of income at this level from non-governmental sources in 1968 appears highly unlikely.

151. The estimate of \$1.3 million of other income includes over \$0.8 million of extraordinary income, the principal item of which is the return to the Agency of \$0.5 million of funds previously invested in the Development Bank of Jordan (see paragraph 139). Little or none of this extraordinary income is likely to be again received by the Agency in 1968.

152. As the summary table above reveals, although the Agency expects to receive special contributions and other income considerably in excess of its estimated "expanded" programme expenditure, income related to its "normal" programme is expected to fall short of its requirements by some \$2.8 million. Since the estimated excess of special income over expanded programme expenditure must be reserved to cover, in part at least, continued expanded programme expenditure in 1968 (see paragraphs 157 and 158), true working capital at the close of 1967 is estimated at only \$11.5 million, following the estimated deficit of \$2.8 million in normal programme income. Even with the greater flexibility made possible to the Agency in its financial operations by an amendment to its Financial Regulation,¹ working capital at \$11.5 million is not really adequate to the Agency's needs.

¹ This amendment permits the Agency to enter into long-term commitments (e.g., staff separation payments) against unpaid pledges, where previously it could as a practical matter enter into commitments only against cash in hand. See also paragraph 6 of the introduction to this report. [Footnote in source text.]

153. Magnificent as the response has been in 1967 to the Agency's need for funds to meet its increased costs arising out of the emergency, therefore, this should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the Agency's basic financial position will further worsen markedly in 1967, for the fifth consecutive year. It seems clear that UNRWA cannot long continue on this basis; if it is to continue to provide the services that it is expected to provide, a more rational and a more dependable system of financing its operations is urgently needed.

PART II

BUDGET FOR 1968

A. Introduction

154. The budget for 1968 presented hereunder totals \$45,830,000, compared with estimated expenditure of \$42,760,000 in 1967 and actual expenditure of \$37,498,000 in 1966.

155. The budget for 1968 (and estimates of expenditure for 1967) can only be considered as provisional. The hostilities of June and their aftermath have made it extremely difficult for the Agency to forecast with any reasonable degree of accuracy the numbers of refugees who will require assistance and the nature and probable cost of such assistance, either during the remaining months of 1967 or during the whole of 1968. For this reason, the budget for 1968 has been presented in two parts, the first representing the Agency's estimate of its requirements under the conditions which prevailed before the hostilities of June ("normal programme") and the second representing the best estimate the Agency can presently make of its additional requirements arising out of the hostilities and their aftermath ("expanded programme").

156. For its normal programme, the Agency estimates that it will expend \$40,150,000 to provide services to the number of refugees entitled to assistance, at approximately the standards which applied during 1966 and early 1967, compared with estimated expenditure of \$39,024,000 on the same basis for 1967 and \$37,498,000 actual expenditure in 1966. The principal factor of expected increase in 1968 costs over those of

1967 is that of prices (including staff costs); this factor alone will probably account for \$0.8 million of the total expected increase of \$1.1. million. The remaining \$0.4 million increase results principally from the necessity to provide for a larger school population, after taking into account minor increases in medical and sanitation services, largely offset by effective savings of some \$0.25 million on common costs.

157. In addition to providing for the Agency's normal programmes, the budget provides \$5.7 million for possible increased activities arising from the hostilities and their aftermath. As emphasized above, this is only a provisional estimate based upon the best assumptions the Agency can presently make, and actual requirements could prove to be much higher.

158. This amount of \$5.7 million provides principally for the possible addition of some 75,000 persons to the Agency's ration rolls (at least during 1968), the provision of shelter for perhaps 35,000 additional persons and the provision of special hardship assistance to a considerable number of persons already on the Agency's

rolls. Other possible cost increases foreseen by the Agency are those of providing health and education services to additional numbers of persons and of higher operating costs arising from the higher costs of living, particularly in the occupied areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

159. In view of the very large increase which the Agency foresees both in the need for its services and in the unit costs of providing services, the problem of financing its budget for 1968 appears likely to be of crucial importance. This question is discussed in greater detail in the introduction to this report and in paragraphs 200 to 203 below. The budget estimates themselves are discussed in the paragraphs which follow.

B. Budget estimates

General

160. The following table summarizes the Agency's budget estimates for 1968 and gives comparative data for 1967 and 1966. The estimates are discussed in greater detail in the paragraphs following this table:

	1968 budget estimates		1967 estimated expenditure			
	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total budget 1968</i>	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total estimated expenditure 1967</i>
				(in thousands of US dollars)		
<i>Part I. Relief services</i>						
Basic rations	12,480	1,100	13,580	12,294	726	13,020
Supplementary feeding	1,340	220	1,560	1,287	583	1,870
Shelter	410	1,380	1,790	370	485	855
Special hardship assistance	480	1,000	1,480	469	300	769
Share of common costs from part IV	2,990	140	3,130	3,086	121	3,207
Total, part I	17,700	3,840	21,540	17,506	2,215	19,721
<i>Part II. Health services</i>						
Medical services	3,290	100	3,390	3,176	50	3,226
Environmental sanitation	1,030	110	1,140	884	50	934
Share of common costs from part IV	930	30	960	976	34	1,010
Total, part II	5,250	240	5,490	5,036	134	5,170
<i>Part III. Education services</i>						
General education	11,220	470	11,690	10,842	186	11,028
Vocational and professional training	3,200	60	3,260	3,236	36	3,272
Share of common costs from part IV	2,280	70	2,350	2,404	75	2,479
Total, part III	16,700	600	17,300	16,482	297	16,779
<i>Part IV. Common costs</i>						
Supply and transport services	3,070	200	3,270	3,057	150	3,207
Other internal services	1,980	40	2,020	2,095	40	2,135
General administration	1,150	-	1,150	1,314	40	1,354
Total, part IV	6,200	240	6,440	6,466	230	6,696
Costs allocated to operations	(6,200)	(240)	(6,440)	(6,466)	(230)	(6,518)
Net, part IV	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Part V. Provision for unit cost increases</i>	500	1,000	1,500	-	300	300
<i>Part VI. Losses and damage due to hostilities</i>						
Buildings and other installations	-	-	-	-	120	120
Vehicles and other equipment	-	-	-	-	130	130
Supplies	-	-	-	-	510	510
Other losses	-	-	-	-	30	30
Total, part V	-	-	-	-	790	790
Total, all parts	40,150	5,680	45,830	39,024	3,736	42,760
						37,498

161. As shown above, the Agency's budget is basically in three parts representing the three broad types of services which it provides: relief, health and education. Part IV is included to show the type and extent of costs incurred by the Agency applicable in common to its three major operations and allocated thereto on an estimated basis in order to indicate the approximate total cost of each of the three programmes.

162. In addition, however, it has been necessary this year to add parts V and VI, the former covering general increases in unit costs which may confront the Agency (and are not already reflected in the individual estimates) and the latter showing the cost to the Agency of replacing losses and repairing damage caused by the June hostilities.

163. A minor change has been introduced in part III by combining the former headings of "Vocational education" and "University education" under the title of "Vocational and professional training."

164. In the following paragraphs, in which the various estimates are discussed in greater detail, the distinction made in the budget summary above between the Agency's pre-hostilities programme and the increase in programme requirements expected to arise as a result of the hostilities is maintained for sake of uniformity and clarity.

	<i>Relief services</i>		
	<i>Basic rations</i>		
	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	\$	\$	\$
1968 budget estimate	12,480,000	1,100,000	13,580,000
1967 estimated expenditure	12,294,000	726,000	13,020,000
1966 actual expenditure	12,059,000	—	12,059,000

165. All costs of purchase and distribution of basic food rations and soap are charged under this heading (excluding, however, costs of warehousing and transport within the UNRWA area, for which see "supply and transport services" in paragraphs 192 and 193 below). The basic ration is briefly described in paragraph 73 of

part I and its composition is described in table 5 of annex I.

166. The normal programme provides for issues of rations to up to 861,000 beneficiaries, including approximately 15,000 half-ration recipients in the frontier villages, both figures being slightly less than in 1967. However, commodity prices are already known to have advanced somewhat, and the increased provision reflects this factor. Commodity prices may well advance further in the coming months and materially increase the necessary provision under this budget heading.

167. The expanded programme provides for the possibility of the Agency's being called upon to issue rations to as many as 75,000 persons who may have lost their means of livelihood as a result of the hostilities. In addition to providing for the purchase cost of rations, the estimate provides for the establishment and operation of the necessary distribution facilities.

168. Many of the Agency's ration distribution centres are old and still improvised from unsuitable premises. Others require structural modifications as well as improvements; some need entire replacement. Nevertheless, no capital expenditure is presently proposed for these works in view of the Agency's general financial difficulties.

Supplementary feeding

	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	\$	\$	\$
1968 budget estimate	1,340,000	220,000	1,560,000
1967 estimated expenditure	1,287,000	583,000	1,870,000
1966 actual expenditure	1,316,000	—	1,316,000

169. The supplementary feeding programme is described in paragraphs 74 to 76 and in tables 6 and 7 of annex I. Related costs of warehousing and transport within the UNRWA area are charged to "supply and transport services" (see paragraphs 192 and 193 below).

170. The normal programme provides for the same type of supplementary rations for the various categories of beneficiaries as in 1967, and for only slightly increased numbers of beneficiaries.

However, food costs—of both dry commodities and fresh foods—are rising, and provision has been made to the extent that such increased costs can presently be forecast. As in the case of basic rations, prices may well advance further and materially increase the requirements under this budget heading.

171. During the early part of 1967, a reduction in the availability of milk supplies necessitated the partial reduction of the milk programme, but it is hoped to restore the programme entirely in the latter part of 1967 and to continue it at its normal level during 1968.

172. The expanded programme provides for the continuation through the winter of 1967/1968 of a part of the special supplementary feeding made necessary by the hostilities. It also provides for the probable continued need of providing hot meals to some 3,000 additional children throughout 1968.

173. As with distribution centres, many of the supplementary centres and sub-centres are operated in old and unsuitable buildings, but the only capital expenditure proposed is \$4,600 to convert a former clinic building to replace a particularly unsatisfactory feeding centre in one camp.

Shelter

	<i>Normal programme</i> \$	<i>Expanded programme</i> \$	<i>Total</i> \$
1968 budget estimate	410,000	1,380,000	1,790,000
1967 estimated expenditure	370,000	485,000	855,000
1966 actual expenditure	381,000	—	381,000

174. The programme under this heading is described in paragraphs 78 and 79 and in table 8 of annex I. It includes provision for the continuing rental of camp sites (most of which are made available by the host Governments as contributions), for the construction and structural maintenance and administrative control of shelters and the construction and maintenance of roads and paths within camps.

175. The normal programme provides for only a relatively modest amount of further shelter

and road construction in existing camps, to meet the most pressing needs (\$100,000 for shelters and \$25,000 for roads).

176. The expanded programme provision would enable the Agency to provide semi-permanent housing for a considerable number of persons displaced by the hostilities. At the time this budget is being prepared, it is not yet possible to foresee how many displaced persons may for one reason or another not return to their former homes, but it is clearly possible that this number may be large. The estimate is sufficient to provide shelters of the normal Agency type for 30,000-35,000 persons should this prove necessary, plus the necessary administrative facilities, roads and paths (provision for other camp services is made under the appropriate headings of these estimates).

Special hardship assistance

	<i>Normal programme</i> \$	<i>Expanded programme</i> \$	<i>Total</i> \$
1968 budget estimate	480,000	1,000,000	1,480,000
1967 estimated expenditure	469,000	300,000	769,000
1966 actual expenditure	466,000	—	466,000

177. This budget heading covers all provisions, other than those for food, shelter and health and education services, for assistance to those refugee families who are demonstrably suffering special hardship. It includes the provision and distribution of used clothing, blankets and winter fuel and a certain amount of welfare case-work. The programme is more fully described in paragraphs 80 to 82.

178. The normal programme estimate provides only for a minimal programme of assistance, but the expanded programme provides for the possible need to give a much greater amount of special assistance to families displaced from their homes or deprived of such economic resources as they may have had prior to the hostilities.

179. The normal programme estimate reflects the fact that the Agency's straitened financial circumstances in 1966 and 1967 required almost a 50 per cent reduction in the amount of

used clothing for which it was able to provide the necessary ocean freight, warehousing and internal transport. For the same reason, the former general issue of one blanket per year for each three ration recipients and children was stopped and issues were restricted to persons suffering from special hardship.

Health services

Medical services

	<i>Normal programme</i> \$	<i>Expanded programme</i> \$	<i>Total</i> \$
1968 budget estimates	3,290,000	100,000	3,390,000
1967 estimated expenditure	3,176,000	50,000	3,226,000
1966 actual expenditure	3,104,000	—	3,104,000

180. The programmes of preventive and curative medical services are described in paragraphs 86 to 102 and in tables 9 to 12. No improvements or other changes in the standards of care are proposed in the normal programme in 1968, and it is hoped to achieve certain operational economies, especially in the consumption of medical supplies and in specialist treatments. Such economies as may be made will, however, be offset by higher unit costs of supplies and of rates for beds for refugees in subsidized hospitals and by normal population increases.

181. Provision has been made this year for the replacement, long overdue, of seven inadequate and sub-standard clinic premises and a maternity centre and for the construction of two infant health sub-centres, in the hope that special contributions may be received for these purposes. It is also proposed to construct and equip six clinical laboratories at existing health centres where the cost will be amortized by savings in fees presently paid for these services.

182. The expanded programme envisages the possible necessity of providing medical services for additional persons for whom it may be necessary to provide shelter (see paragraph 176 above) and certain others. The estimate therefore provides for the construction, equipment and operation of clinics in three camps, should this prove necessary, and for minor expansion of existing clinics.

Environmental sanitation

	<i>Normal programme</i> \$	<i>Expanded programme</i> \$	<i>Total</i> \$
1968 budget estimates	1,030,000	110,000	1,140,000
1967 estimated expenditure	884,000	50,000	934,000
1966 actual expenditure	929,000	—	929,000

183. Paragraph 103 describes this programme. Recurrent operational costs have been significantly reduced by more efficient techniques, notwithstanding the increase in unit cost of supplies and the growth of the camp population. However, in the normal programme a number of capital works have now become essential, including the construction of a water reservoir in one camp and the replacement of corroded water pipes; the connexion of certain large camps to municipal sewage systems; the replacement of a vacuum sewage tanker and the extension of the private family latrine scheme in camps (this latter cost will be amortized by economies in construction and maintenance of public latrines).

184. The expanded programme estimate provides for construction and operation of environmental sanitation facilities in the camps for the additional persons which it may prove necessary to shelter (see paragraph 176 above).

Education services

General education

	<i>Normal programme</i> \$	<i>Expanded programme</i> \$	<i>Total</i> \$
1968 budget estimate	11,220,000	470,000	11,690,000
1967 estimated expenditure	10,842,000	186,000	11,028,000
1966 actual expenditure	9,799,000	—	9,799,000

185. The Agency's elementary, preparatory and secondary education programmes are described in detail in paragraphs 109 to 118 and in tables 13 to 16. Under this budget heading are included also several minor educational activities conducted outside formal school operations, such as youth activities (see paragraphs 119 and 120),

women's activities (see paragraph 133) and pre-school play centres (see paragraph 121), the two latter being subject to the receipt of special contributions to fund their costs.

186. Although standards in Agency schools are not by any means luxurious (in general, conforming with those in government schools), the necessity to provide ever-increasing numbers of classes with teaching staff, equipment and desks, textbooks and educational supplies, inevitably augments costs each year. To this must be added normal increases in staff costs, which are the largest single cost element in education programmes.

187. On the other hand, the provision in the normal programme estimates for 1968 for additional schoolrooms is somewhat less than it might otherwise have been, since the closure of the Development Bank of Jordan in 1967 permitted the release to the Agency of a part of the capital it had invested in that institution, and these funds were allocated entirely to schoolroom construction in 1967.

188. The expanded programme estimate provides for the possibility of the Agency's having to construct and operate additional school facilities for displaced persons (see paragraph 176 above).

Vocational and professional training

	<i>Normal programme \$</i>	<i>Expanded programme \$</i>	<i>Total \$</i>
1968 budget estimate	3,200,000	60,000	3,260,000
1967 estimated expenditure	3,236,000	36,000	3,272,000
1966 actual expenditure	2,926,000	—	2,926,000

189. Details of this programme are given in paragraphs 122 to 135. To simplify the presentation, university education, which was formerly listed separately, is now included under this budget heading, which thus comprises teacher training, trade and commercial training in residential centres conducted by the Agency as well as in government and other installations, professional training in universities through the award of UNRWA scholarships, and on-the-job training

in industry for graduates from the training centres. Several minor training activities are also included such as adult crafts training in woodworking and sewing and the training of physically handicapped children, together with a placement service for graduates of the Agency's training programme.

190. To a large extent, expenditure has been contained by the training of local counterparts who, at lower cost, have replaced a great many of internationally recruited vocational training specialists. Further, better standardization for courses has been possible from actual experience; better use of training centre capacity and concentration by type of course at particular centres have all helped in achieving economies to offset rising costs.

191. Under the expanded programme it has been necessary to make provision for the possibility of the Agency's incurring increased costs for the training of displaced persons.

Common costs

Supply and transport services

	<i>Normal programme \$</i>	<i>Expanded programme \$</i>	<i>Total \$</i>
1968 budget estimate	3,070,000	200,000	3,270,000
1967 estimated expenditure	3,057,000	150,000	3,207,000
1966 actual expenditure	3,101,000	—	3,101,000

192. All operations involving procurement, control and warehousing of supplies and equipment and transport of passengers and goods within the UNRWA area are included under this heading.

193. In the normal programme further savings are envisaged, apart from the necessity of replacing a number of vehicles, but in the expanded programme provision has been made for the transport of a possibly increased number of rations (see paragraph 167 above) and for increased operation if additional numbers of persons have to be sheltered and provided with health and education services (see the related paragraphs above).

Other internal services

	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	\$	\$	\$
1968 budget estimate	1,980,000	40,000	2,020,000
1967 estimated expenditure	2,095,000	40,000	2,135,000
1966 actual expenditure	2,119,000	—	2,119,000

194. This budget heading comprises all the internal services of the Agency (other than supply and transport treated immediately above), including registration of refugees, personnel administration, internal administrative services, translation, legal, finance, technical (engineering) and data-processing services and the protection of the Agency's installations and property.

195. Significant operating economies have been attained progressively over the last several years and will be further achieved in 1968. Any further major reduction could be made only at the grave risk of endangering the Agency's ability to control its operations.

General administration

	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	\$	\$	\$
1968 budget estimate	1,150,000	—	1,150,000
1967 estimated expenditure	1,314,000	40,000	1,354,000
1966 actual expenditure	1,298,000	—	1,298,000

196. This budget heading covers all general administration of the Agency's headquarters, field offices and subordinate formations, the maintenance of liaison offices in New York, Geneva, and Cairo and the public information services. Significant reductions are expected to be made under this heading in 1968.

Allocation of common costs

197. The summary table in paragraph 160 above sets out the allocation of common costs in order to show as accurately as possible the total cost of each of the Agency's three main types of service—relief, health and education. Any allo-

cation of common costs is necessarily subject to a certain degree of judgement and estimation. Although the Agency does not claim to have achieved a precisely accurate allocation of common costs, it believes that the figures presented reflect to a reasonably accurate degree the amount of such costs properly attributable to each of its three operational programmes.

Provision for unit cost increases

198. To the extent possible, foreseen increases in the unit costs of supplies and services to be purchased by the Agency in 1968 have been reflected in the estimates discussed above. However, two very important factors which are, unfortunately, expected to affect the Agency's costs in 1968 are presently very difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy. These are cost of living influences on the salary scales of the Agency's 12,000 employees in all areas and the effect of currency changes in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank.

199. The first of these has been provisionally represented by the provision of \$ 500,000, under the "normal programme," while the latter is reflected in the provision of \$ 1,000,000 under the "expanded programme." It must be emphasized that these are provisional estimates, and the possibility is very real that actual cost increases may well greatly exceed these figures.

C. Financing the budget

200. After taking into account estimated normal contributions from non-governmental sources, estimated miscellaneous income and drawdown of working capital to the extent of special contributions received in 1967 to meet emergency costs and not expended in 1967, the Agency estimates that it must receive \$41.6 million of contributions from Governments if its budget is to be covered. The following table summarizes the problem of financing the budget in 1968, showing both the "normal" programme and the "expanded" programme:

	<i>Normal programme</i>	<i>Expanded programme</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>(millions of US dollars)</i>		
Budget for 1968	40.1	5.7	45.8
Estimated funds available from:			
Non-governmental contributions	1.0	—	1.0
Miscellaneous income	0.5	—	0.5
Drawdown of working capital	<u>—</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Total	1.5	2.7	4.2
Balance to be covered by contributions from Governments	38.6	3.0	41.6

201. The estimate of \$ 1 million of contributions from non-governmental sources assumes that the level of special contributions for the emergency achieved in 1967 will not be maintained. It is of course quite possible that such pessimism is not justified, but it does not in any event seem prudent for the Agency to assume that a materially increased level of contributions from

these sources can be expected, either for the normal programme or for its expanded programme in 1968.

202. Similarly, miscellaneous income at \$0.5 million is expected to revert to its pre-1967 level, as the sources of extraordinary income in 1967 will no longer be available.

203. Although the Agency's estimated total working capital at \$14.2 million at 31 December 1967 will apparently be only slightly below its normal requirements, some \$2.7 million of this in fact represents the unexpended balance of special contributions received in 1967 in respect of the emergency, and the Agency feels compelled to utilize this balance to meet, in part at least, the continued high level of costs expected in 1968 associated with the emergency. The Agency will in consequence enter 1968 with barely \$11.5 million of true working capital. It is therefore vitally necessary, if the Agency is to continue its programmes of assistance to the refugees, that at least \$41.6 million be contributed by Governments in 1968.

Table 1.

Total registered population according to category of registration 1950-1967^a

Year ended	Members of families registered for rations "R"/category							"S"/category		"N"/category		Grand totale 4 + 5 + 6 + 7
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
	Full ration recipients	Half-ration recipients ^b	Babies and children registered for services only ^c	Total 1 + 2 + 3	Other members receiving no rations ^d	Members of families receiving education and medical services ^d	Members of families receiving no rations or services ^d					
30 June 1950	f	f	f	960,021	-	-	-	960,021	-	-	-	960,021
30 June 1951	826,459	51,034	2,174	879,667	-	-	24,455	904,122	-	24,455	-	904,122
30 June 1952	805,593	58,733	18,347	882,673	-	-	32,738	915,411	-	32,738	-	915,411
30 June 1953	772,166	64,817	34,765	871,748	-	-	45,013	916,761	-	45,013	-	916,761
30 June 1954	820,486	17,340	49,232	887,058	-	-	54,793	941,851	-	54,793	-	941,851
30 June 1955	828,531	17,228	60,227	905,986	-	-	63,403	969,389	-	63,403	-	969,389
30 June 1956	830,266	16,987	75,026	922,279	-	-	74,059	996,338	-	74,059	-	996,338
30 June 1957	830,611	16,733	86,212	933,556	18,203	4,462	62,980	1,019,201	-	62,980	-	1,019,201
30 June 1958	836,781	16,577	110,600	963,958	19,776	5,901	63,713	1,053,348	-	63,713	-	1,053,348
30 June 1959	843,739	16,350	130,092	990,181	21,548	6,977	68,922	1,087,628	-	68,922	-	1,087,628
30 June 1960	849,634	16,202	150,170	1,016,006	22,639	8,792	73,452	1,120,989	-	73,452	-	1,120,989
30 June 1961	854,268	15,998	169,730	1,039,996	23,947	9,515	77,566	1,151,024	-	77,566	-	1,151,024
30 June 1962	862,083	15,805	176,772	1,054,660	20,004	9,027	91,069	1,174,760	-	91,069	-	1,174,760
30 June 1963	866,369	15,705	197,914	1,079,988	21,195	10,420	98,567	1,210,170	-	98,567	-	1,210,170
30 June 1964	863,284	15,617	226,494	1,105,395	23,369	13,168	104,653	1,246,585	-	104,653	-	1,246,585
30 June 1965	859,048	15,546	251,131	1,125,725	29,387	18,589	107,122	1,280,823	-	107,122	-	1,280,823
30 June 1966	845,730	15,392	284,025	1,145,147	39,485	24,367	108,750	1,317,749	-	108,750	-	1,317,749
31 May 1967 ^e	845,625	15,326	311,466	1,172,417	40,019	25,297	106,843	1,344,576	-	106,843	-	1,344,576

^a The above statistics are based on the Agency's registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths and undetected false registration.

^b Before 1954 half rations were issued to babies and bedouin as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan. Since then babies have been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Bedouin are eligible to receive full rations. Half rations are issued only to frontier villagers in Jordan.

^c Includes babies below one year of age and children, including some above the age of 15 years, who because of ration ceilings are not issued rations (221,035 in Jordan, 34,934 in Gaza, 23,217 in Syria and 5,118 in Lebanon at 31 May 1967).

^d Columns 5, 6 and 7 show the number of persons whose registration for assistance by the Agency has been reduced or cancelled according to their family income as known to the Agency and the income scale in force in their country of residence.

The members of "R" families receiving no rations (column 5) shown for 1957 to 1967 correspond to a level of income insufficient to cancel the whole family's entitlement to rations. Up to 1956, such persons were reported together with families of the "N" category (column 7). In 1966 a new sub-category of registration was introduced for persons registered for rations but whose entitlement has been temporarily suspended (e.g. by reason of their employment by the Agency, or placed in institutions). At the end of May 1967 persons registered in this sub-category numbered 10,713.

The "S" category of registration (column 6) was created in January 1965 in place of the previous "P" and "M" categories and is being extended to all the host countries in accordance with appropriate income scales.

"N" category (column 7) includes refugees whose income is such as to disqualify them for rations or normal services or who have received assistance to enable them to become self-supporting.

In general, it must be pointed out that the distribution of refugees by category of registration gives only a partial picture of the number of self-supporting refugees owing to the limitations faced by the Agency in determining their actual income or degree of need.

^e The total population as at 60 June 1952 included 19,616 refugees receiving relief in Israel who were the Agency's responsibility to that date.

^f Details not available.

^g Changes in June 1967 and position at 30 June 1967 not yet available because of the hostilities.

Table 2

Distribution of registered refugees according to country of residence, category of registration and age group as at 31 May 1967^a

Country	Category of registration ^b	Number of persons ^c			Total	Number of families
		Below 1 year	1 - 15 years	15 years and over		
Jordan	R	11,609	249,049	407,194	667,852	113,180
	S	50	1,018	2,567	3,635	642
	N	334	5,918	44,948	51,200	14,451
Total		11,993	255,985	454,709	722,687	128,273
Gaza	R	8,771	115,560	170,477	294,808	49,076
	S	27	614	760	1,401	285
	N	186	4,767	15,614	20,567	6,256
Total		8,984	120,941	186,851	316,776	55,617
Lebanon	R	3,061	56,471	63,162	122,694	24,129
	S	258	4,823	12,634	17,715	3,724
	N	162	3,138	17,014	20,314	9,145
Total		3,481	64,432	92,810	160,723	36,998
Syria	R	3,721	57,573	65,788	127,082	25,354
	S	33	698	1,815	2,546	435
	N	40	1,349	13,373	14,762	7,570
Total		3,794	59,620	80,976	144,390	33,359
Agency-wide	R	27,162	478,653	706,621	1,212,436	211,739
	S	368	7,153	17,776	25,297	5,086
	N	722	15,172	90,949	106,843	37,422
Grand Total		28,252	500,978	815,346	1,344,576	254,247

a Changes during June 1967 and position at 30 June 1967 not yet available because of the hostilities.

b See table 1 for explanation of category of registration.

c A number of children born since 1950 in "S" and "N" families are not registered with the Agency.

Table 3

Recapitulation of changes in composition and/or entitlement of families registered for rations ^a

Nature of Changes	1 July 1950 to 30 June 1962 ^b	Year Ended				11 months to 31 May 1967 ^c	Total 1950-1967
	30 June 1963	30 June 1964	30 June 1965	30 June 1966			
<i>Increases</i>							
Births	374,457	49,854	48,802	43,857	43,945	38,976	599,891
New registration	44,795	535	189	258	283	74	46,134
Loss of self-support ^c	59,055	4,555	4,475	6,136	7,340	6,789	88,350
Returned from absence	11,727	1,319	992	773	1,168	1,627	17,606
Miscellaneous ^d	29,042	859	515	1,135	212	484	32,247
Total	519,076	57,122	54,973	52,159	52,948	47,950	784,228
<i>Decreases</i>							
	^b						
Deaths	69,482	14,961	11,624	9,053	7,155	6,020	118,295
False registration and duplication	53,270	630	2,080	1,422	204	163	57,769
Self-support ^c	136,916	11,257	12,007	13,514	23,401	9,946	207,041
Absence	34,965	3,550	1,915	6,894	2,077	3,232	52,633
Miscellaneous ^d	130,426	1,341	1,846	747	770	1,617	136,747
Total	425,059	31,739	29,472	31,630	33,607	20,978	572,485
Population at 30 June	1962 1,054,660	1963 1,079,988	1964 1,105,395	1965 1,125,725	1966 1,145,147	31 May 1967 1,172,417	

^a This table recapitulates changes over seventeen years affecting the total number of ration recipients, their babies and children registered for services (column 4 of table 1). Births, new registrations, deaths, false registrations and duplications result in additions to or deletions from the registrations record. Self-support and absence reflect transfers to or from the lower categories of registration (shown in columns 5, 6 and 7 of table 1). Transfers within or between host countries, as well as issue of rations (when available) to children registered for services are not shown in this table.

^b Includes changes effected during the 1950-1951 census operation.

^c Covers income, employment with the Agency, assistance towards self-support, etc., or the cessation thereof.

^d Miscellaneous changes include up to June 1953 a number of additions to or deletions from the registration records as well as certain changes in category of registration. The deletion of refugees in Israel from the Agency's records is also reported mainly under this heading (40,930 persons over the period July 1950-June 1953).

^e Changes during June 1967 not yet available because of the hostilities.

Table 4

Recapitulation of changes in composition of total registered population^a

Nature of changes	1 July 1950 to 30 June 1962	Year ended				11 months to 31 May 1967 ^c	Total 1950-1967
		30 June 1963	30 June 1964	30 June 1965	30 June 1966		
<i>Additions</i>							
Births	377,295	50,921	50,298	46,059	46,212	41,228	612,013
New registration	45,578	748	333	412	351	160	47,582
Miscellaneous ^b	5,159	—	—	—	—	—	5,159
Total	428,032	51,669	50,631	46,471	46,563	41,388	664,754
<i>Deletions</i>							
Deaths	71,240	15,431	12,008	9,621	7,866	6,732	122,898
False registration and duplication	54,366	852	2,225	2,524	1,633	8,037	69,637
Miscellaneous ^b	89,165	—	—	—	—	—	89,165
Total	214,771	16,283	14,233	12,145	9,499	14,769	281,700
Total registered population at 30 June	1962 1,174,760	1963 1,210,170	1964 1,246,585	1965 1,280,823	1966 1,317,749	31 May 1967 1,344,576	

a This table recapitulates changes affecting the total number of registered population (column 8 of table 1) over seventeen years. Transfers within or between host countries are not shown herein.

In comparing the figures in this table with those in table 3 it should be borne in mind that deletions from the ration rolls do not necessarily entail deletions from the total registered population. Persons ceasing to draw rations because of absence or self-support continue to be registered within the total population. On the other hand some deaths and false and duplicate registrations are reported among persons registered but not receiving rations, and this accounts for the minor differences under those headings in the two tables. In the earlier years of the Agency's history the distinction between ration recipients and registered population was incompletely recorded.

b Nature of changes reported under Miscellaneous was not specified during the census operation. Figures reflect those amendments which resulted in addition or deletion in the total registered population, and removal of refugees in Israel from UNRWA registration records.

c Changes during June not yet available because of the hostilities.

*Table 5**Relief services*

Basic rations and other supplies distributed by UNRWA

1. *Basic dry rations*

A monthly ration for one person consists of:

- 10,000 grammes of flour
- 600 grammes of pulses
- 600 grammes of sugar
- 500 grammes of rice
- 375 grammes of oils and fats

This ration provides about 1,500 calories per day per person.

In winter the monthly ration is increased by:

- 300 grammes of pulses
- 400 grammes of flour

It then provides about 1,600 calories per day per person.

2. *Other supplies distributed*

1 piece of soap (150 grammes) per month to each ration beneficiary

1½ litres of kerosene were allocated to ration beneficiaries and to babies and children registered for services, in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic, during five winter months. In Gaza 1 litre was allocated to these beneficiaries, whether or not they live in camps, during five winter months.

Table 6
UNRWA supplementary feeding programme
Average number of beneficiaries
1 July 1966—30 April 1967

Country	Daily cooked meal beneficiaries				Monthly dry ration beneficiaries				
	Average for the period				Average for the period				
	Number of feeding centres	0-2 Years	2-15 years and special cases	Total	Pregnant women	Nursing mothers	TB out-patients	Total	Grand total
Jordan	47	1,420	14,786	16,206	2,634	10,715	455	13,804	30,493
	6 ^a	154	329	483					
Gaza	23	1,284	11,870	13,154	4,012	9,159	446	13,617	26,771
Lebanon	18	446	3,940	4,386	1,039	2,713	110	3,862	8,248
Syrian Arab Republic	17	360	3,734	4,094	624	1,435	101	2,160	6,254
	111	3,664	34,659	38,323	8,309	24,022	1,112	33,443	71,766

^a Centres operated by voluntary societies.

Table 7
 UNRWA Milk Programme
 Daily number of beneficiaries
 A. Average for July—October 1966

	Preparation and distribution	Distribution only	Milk ^a distribution centres	Schools	Orphanages medical prescriptions etc.	Total
Jordan	73 ^b	8	29,987	—	217	30,490
	10 ^c	—	286			
Gaza	23 ^d	—	19,388	—	75	19,463
Lebanon	21	3	25,707	—	250	25,957
Syrian Arab Republic	20 ^e	—	23,350	—	72	23,422
	147	11	98,718	—	614	99,332

B. Average for November 1966—April 1967

	Milk distribution centres	Orphanages medical prescriptions etc.	Total
Jordan	13,445	199	13,701
	57		
Gaza	8,200	78	8,278
Lebanon	9,814	236	10,050
Syrian Arab Republic	10,455	88	10,543
	41,971	601	42,572

^a Milk was distributed throughout the period to children below 6 years, pregnant and nursing women, while children 6 through 14 received milk during the period July – October, 1966 only.

^b One milk centre closed during January 1967.

^c Centres operated by voluntary societies, one centre closed in March.

^d Including one preparation centre only.

^e One milk centre closed during April.

Table 8

Number of refugees in UNRWA camps according to country
as at 31 May 1967^{a b}

Country	Number of camps	Number of families	Number of persons ^c	Percentage of total population
Jordan	25	41,827	232,686	32.2
Gaza	8	34,000	201,828	63.7
Lebanon	15	14,330	75,316	46.9
Syria	6	4,874	23,160	16.0
Total	54	95,031	532,990	39.6

a Situation at 30 June not yet available because of the hostilities.

b In general, refugees not living in UNRWA camps live in the villages and cities of the host countries and are eligible for the same range of services except that the Agency provides for them no sanitation services. Their economic status differs little from that of refugees in camps.

c Refugees enumerated are all those officially registered in camps irrespective of their category of registration. The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA but benefit from sanitation services only.

Table 9

Health services

Number of visits to UNRWA and subsidized clinics
1 July 1966—30 April 1967

	Jordan	Gaza	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	Total
Population served by medical services	672,092	296,445	140,704	129,854	1,239,095
General medical cases	538,018	330,970	321,927	288,791	1,479,706
Injections	382,194	304,519	179,742	135,627	1,002,082
Dressing and skin treatments	421,547	328,178	188,833	106,367	1,044,925
Eye cases	390,942	354,535	117,821	30,044	893,342
Dental	22,390	16,698	17,933	6,734	63,755
Total	1,755,091	1,334,900	826,256	567,563	4,483,810

Table 10

Hospital facilities available to Palestine refugees, 1966-1967

(Statistics refer to the actual situation as at 30 April 1967)

Hospitals

Government and local authorities	31
Voluntary societies or private	39
UNRWA	<u>2</u>
Total	72

In addition there are maternity centres—1 in Syria, 2 in Jordan and 6 in Gaza

Number of beds available	Jordan	Gaza	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	Total
<i>Population served</i>	672,092	296,445	140,704	129,854	1,239,095
General	483	338	140	82	1,043
Tuberculosis	116	150	36	20	322
Maternity	44	68	12	7	131
Paediatrics	114	103	19	—	236
Mental	75	—	61	1	137
Total	832	659	268	110	1,869
Beds per 1,000 population	1.23	2.22	1.90	0.84	1.50

Rehydration nutrition centres

	Jordan	Gaza	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	Total
Number of centres	5	5 ^a	3	3	16 ^a
Number of cots	58	78 ^a	25	21	182 ^a

^a A further centre of 20-bed capacity was opened on 16 May 1967.

Table 11

Infectious diseases recorded among Palestine refugee population
1 July 1966—30 April 1967

	Jordan	Gaza	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	Total
Population	672,092	296,445	140,704	129,854	1,239,095
Cholera	0	0	0	0	0
Plague	0	0	0	0	0
Yellow fever	0	0	0	0	0
Smallpox	0	0	0	0	0
Typhus (louse borne)	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (louse borne)	0	0	0	0	0
Ankylostomiasis	1	71	3	0	75
Bilharziasis	1	28	0	0	29
Brucellosis	0	0	0	0	0
Chickenpox	1,381	785	965	403	3,534
Conjunctivitis	19,641	8,306	6,228	5,404	39,579
Diphtheria	0	0	0	0	0
Dysentery	1,832	1,236	828	967	4,863
Enteric group fevers	6	51	0	128	185
Gonorrhoea	1	10	6	5	22
Infectious hepatitis	84	466	73	110	733
Leishmaniasis cutaneous	0	0	0	6	6
Malaria	1	8	0	0	9
Measles	1,449	1,440	1,170	784	4,843
Meningitis (cerebrospinal)	12	1	3	2	18
Mumps	751	1,710	955	681	4,097
Pertussis	172	14	458	32	676
Poliomyelitis	3	5	9	11	28
Rabies	0	0	0	0	0
Relapsing fever (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0
Scarlet fever	0	0	0	0	0
Syphilis	1	24	6	2	33
Tetanus	0	1	0	0	1
Tetanus neonatorum	0	14	2	0	16
Trachoma	823	613	595	261	2,292
Tuberculosis (pulmonary)	62	238	45	32	377
Typhus (endemic)	0	0	0	0	0

Table 12
Maternal and child health
1 July 1966—30 April 1967

Ante-natal services	Jordan	Gaza	Lebanon	Syrian Arab Republic	Total
Number of ante-natal clinics	30	9	18	24	81
Number of pregnant women newly registered	7,505	12,475	3,669	2,101	25,750
Average monthly attendance	2,827	4,751	1,408	723	9,709
Number of STS performed	2,280	2,212	1,217	442	6,151
Number of cases positive serology	1	13	6	2	22
Number of home visits (pre-natal care)	382	44	842	1,289	2,557
<i>Infant health care</i>					
Number of infant health centres	28	9	18	24	79
Number registered 0-1 year monthly average	8,580	12,200	4,109	2,382	27,271
Number attended 0-1 year, monthly average	6,580	10,133	3,363	1,657	21,733
Number registered 1-2 years, monthly average	9,277	10,919	4,334	2,884	27,414
Number attended 1-2 years, monthly average	3,407	2,067	1,538	1,129	8,141
Number of smallpox vaccinations	4,148	11,083	3,027	2,051	20,309
Number of TAB immunizations completed	6,059	5,633	2,665	1,352	15,709
Number of triple vaccine immunizations completed	6,905	6,465	3,479	2,173	19,022
Number of home visits (infant care)	13,595	3,948	8,610	7,103	33,256
<i>School health services</i>					
Number of school teams	2	1	1	1	5
Number of children examined	41,020	4,823	2,843	15,438	64,124
Number of school inspections	428	316	61	256	1,061
Number of TAB boosters given	52,070	0	0	10,171	62,241
Number of diphtheria boosters given	8,861	5,897	3,775	2,876	21,409
Number of triple vaccine (one dose)	1,766	0	0	0	1,766
" " " (2 doses)	1,165	0	0	0	1,165
" " " (3 doses)	1,795	0	0	0	1,795
Number of smallpox revaccination	22,194	0	0	4,812	27,006
Number of cholera boosters given	7,231	48,980	31,468	37,014	124,693
Number of BCG given	3,448	0	0	2,770	6,218

EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SERVICES

General education

Table 13

UNRWA - UNESCO SCHOOLS

NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY, PREPARATORY AND SECONDARY PUPILS, 1951-1967

COUNTRY	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
GAZA																	
Elementary	19,543	22,551	25,702	31,107	34,016	35,087	34,876	35,163	34,806	36,633	36,591	37,885	38,470	38,905	41,164	40,757	41,362
Preparatory	61	164	675	1,781	3,339	4,937	6,410	7,495	8,244	8,481	9,841	10,641	12,797	13,627	15,032	15,644	16,710
Secondary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	19,604	22,715	26,377	32,888	37,355	40,024	41,286	42,658	43,050	45,114	46,432	48,526	51,267	52,532	56,196	56,401	58,072
JORDAN																	
Elementary	16,345	15,882	30,118	39,188	42,144	43,649	42,431	41,600	39,519	38,223	38,309	41,000	45,531	50,220	55,713	60,802	65,849
Preparatory	-	-	87	790	1,612	2,862	4,274	5,357	6,714	6,898	7,437	8,384	8,492	8,868	9,623	11,113	12,838
Secondary	-	-	-	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	16,345	15,882	30,205	40,000	43,838	46,711	47,039	47,452	46,811	45,733	46,344	50,259	54,023	59,088	65,336	71,915	78,687
LEBANON																	
Elementary	4,564	6,291	9,332	11,695	12,567	12,983	13,155	13,936	14,881	15,422	16,292	17,124	17,411	18,041	19,836	19,547	20,744
Preparatory	-	-	86	384	620	948	1,003	996	1,325	1,668	2,159	2,676	2,680	3,491	3,710	3,648	3,451
Secondary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	4,564	6,291	9,418	12,079	13,187	13,931	14,158	14,932	16,206	17,090	18,451	19,800	20,091	21,532	23,546	23,195	24,195
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC																	
Elementary	2,599	2,895	5,410	8,758	9,700	10,288	11,042	11,332	12,256	13,354	13,685	14,430	15,618	16,463	17,631	18,720	19,564
Preparatory	-	-	166	864	671	936	1,180	1,562	1,916	2,592	3,589	4,122	4,459	4,946	5,284	5,740	6,449
Secondary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	2,599	2,895	5,576	9,622	10,371	11,224	12,222	12,894	14,172	15,946	17,274	18,552	20,077	21,409	22,915	24,460	26,013
GRAND TOTAL																	
Elementary	43,051	47,619	70,562	90,748	98,427	102,007	101,504	102,031	101,462	103,632	104,877	110,439	117,030	123,629	134,344	139,826	147,519
Preparatory	61	164	1,014	3,819	6,242	9,683	12,867	15,410	18,199	19,639	23,026	25,823	28,428	30,932	33,649	36,145	39,448
Secondary	-	-	-	22	82	200	334	495	578	612	598	875	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	43,112	47,783	71,576	94,589	104,751	111,890	114,705	117,936	120,239	123,883	128,501	137,137	145,458	154,561	167,993	175,971	186,967

Table 14

NUMBER OF REFUGEE PUPILS ATTENDING GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
AS OF 31 MAY 1967, SHOWING NUMBER FOR WHOM UNRWA PAYS SUBSIDY

COUNTRY	ELEMENTARY			PREPARATORY			SECONDARY			TOTAL				
	Attending			Attending			Attending							
	Govern- ment schools	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Subsidized	Private schools	Govern- ment schools	Subsidized	Private schools	Govern- ment schools					
Gaza	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3750	-	8264	3750		
Jordan ^a	14946	3100	14946	3100	6300	1100	5500	150	6000	1300	5050	250	32746	28996
Lebanon	805	4883	474	3040	151	1715	132	993	44	1173	27	878	8771	5544
Syrian Arab Republic	5707	260	5707	260	1115	420	1115	420	1041	1160	1041	1160	9703	9703
Total	21458	8243	21127	6400	7566	3235	6747	1563	15349	3633	9868	2288	95484	47993

a All figures are estimates, except those of elementary Government schools.

Table 15

UNRWA-UNESCO SCHOOLS SHOWING NUMBER OF PUPILS BY GRADES AS OF 31 MAY 1967

ELEMENTARY

COUNTRY	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Gaza	3766	3272	3457	3213	3821	3663	3294	3077	3374	3121	4076	3228	21788	19574
Jordan	6886	6731	6002	5888	6135	5852	5449	5107	4700	4274	5178	3647	34350	31499
Lebanon	1954	1861	1431	1270	1926	1612	1719	1437	1558	1178	2743	2055	11331	9413
Syrian Arab Republic	2028	1721	1845	1496	1988	1667	1836	1361	1682	1308	1557	1075	10936	8628
TOTAL	14634	13585	12735	11867	13870	12794	12298	10982	11314	9881	13554	10005	78405	69114
GRAND TOTAL	28219		24602		26664		23280		21195		23559		147519	

PREPARATORY

COUNTRY	I		II		III		IV		Total	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Gaza	2940	2921	2820	2802	2979	2248	-	-	8739	7971
Jordan	3584	2309	2785	1626	1713	821	-	-	8082	4756
Lebanon	429	178	781	321	523	303	600	316	2333	1118
Syrian Arab Republic	1604	949	1129	743	1334	690	-	-	4067	2382
TOTAL	8557	6357	7515	5492	6549	4062	600	316	23221	16227
GRAND TOTAL	14914		13007		10611		916		39448	

Table 16

DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEE PUPILS RECEIVING EDUCATION AS OF 31 MAY 1967

COUNTRY	Number of UNRWA- UNESCO schools	Number of pupils in elementary classes at UNRWA-UNESCO Schools			Number of pupils in preparatory classes at UNRWA-UNESCO Schools			Number of refugee pupils in government and private schools		Total number of refugee pupils receiving education
		Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Govt. Schools	Private Schools	
Gaza	101	21788	19574	41362	8739	7971	16710	8264	-	66336
Jordan	194	34350	31499	65849	8082	4756	12838	27246	5500	111433
Lebanon	59	11331	9413	20744	2333	1118	3451	1000	7771	32966
Syrian Arab Republic	86	10936	8628	19564	4067	2382	6449	7863	1840	35716
TOTAL	440	78405	69114	147519	23221	16227	39448	44373	15111	246451

Table 17

UNRWA-UNESCO VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION ENROLMENT, 1966/1967 SCHOOLYEAR

	JORDAN			LEBANON		S.A.R.	GAZA
	Vocational Training Centre Kalandia	VTC Wadi Seer	Women's Training Centre Ramallah	VTC Siblin	Technical and Teacher Training Institute Siblin	VTC Damascus	VTC Gaza
Trades and professions							
A. METAL TRADES							
Instrument mechanic	-	-	-	32	-	-	-
Fitter machinist	24	24	-	25	-	12	47
General mechanics	24	-	-	12	-	24	-
Diesel plant site mechanic	-	32	-	14	-	32	-
Auto mechanic	-	32	-	32	-	30	45
Re rigeration and air-conditioning	-	32	-	-	-	-	32
Panel beater paint sprayer	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Sheetmetal worker	-	-	-	14	-	16	-
Blacksmith welder	23	24	-	-	-	13	16
Welder	-	12	-	12	-	24	-
Moulder	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
B. ELECTRICAL TRADES							
General electrician	31	-	-	47	-	25	48
Power/overhead linesman cable jointer	32	-	-	-	-	-	-
Radio TV mechanic	-	31	-	26	-	30	16
Telecommunication mechanic	-	26	-	-	35	-	-
Auto electrician	-	-	-	-	-	13	-
C. BUILDING TRADES							
Builder/shutterer	17	30	-	-	-	15	32
Plasterer/tilesetter	-	15	-	10	-	-	-
Plumber	16	16	-	16	-	16	32
Carpenter/woodmachinist	12	28	-	14	-	32	48
Upholsterer	-	-	-	7	-	-	-
D. TECHNICIANS							
Land surveyor	24	-	-	-	-	-	-
Quantity surveyor	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Construction technicians	24	-	-	-	-	22	-
Architectural draughtsman	24	-	-	-	-	19	-
Engineering draughtsman	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Foreman/instructor	-	-	-	-	22	-	-
E. COMMERCIAL							
Business and office practice (men)	60	-	-	100	-	-	24
Secretaries (women)	-	-	77	-	-	-	-
F. PARA-MEDICAL							
Assistant pharmacist	-	-	-	-	-	39	-
Laboratory technician	-	-	-	-	-	16	-
Public health inspector	-	-	-	-	25	-	-
G. VOCATIONAL COURSES FOR GIRLS (other than commercial)							
Home and institutional management	-	-	18	-	-	-	-
Infant leader	-	-	19	-	-	-	-
Dressmaking	-	-	57	-	-	-	-
Clothing production	-	-	34	-	-	-	-
Hairdressing	-	-	32	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	336	334	237	361	82	378	364
GRAND TOTAL	1,855 men		237 women				

OTHER ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

Table 18

Voluntary agencies in the area of UNRWA operations
giving active help to Palestine refugees, June 1966 to May 1967

Baptist Mission United States

Church Missionary Society

Commonwealth Save the Children Fund

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

Lutheran World Federation

Mennonite Central Committee

Near East Christian Council Committee for Refugee Work

Pontifical Mission for Palestine Refugees

UNRWA Women's Auxiliary

World Alliance of YMCA's

World Council of Churches

World Young Women's Christian Association

Young Men's Christian Association

Young Women's Christian Association

Table 19

Summary statement of income, expenditure and working capital
1 May 1950—31 December 1966^a
(in US dollars)

For the period	Income		Expenditure	Adjustments to working capital ^b (decreases)	Balance of working capital (operating reserve)
	Pledges from Governments	Other income	Total income		
1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951	39,477,281	1,346,325	40,823,606	—	7,224,634
1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952	67,686,495	1,018,785	68,705,280	215,792	47,572,648
1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953	26,867,673	440,419	27,308,092	518,220	48,620,026
1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954	22,684,330	575,024	23,259,354	(157,264)	42,530,104
1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955	23,673,500	594,161	24,267,661	(114,217)	37,460,843
1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956	23,385,026	571,866	23,956,892	(164,814)	29,054,371
1 July 1956 to 31 December 1957	42,378,773	1,072,872	43,451,645	198,575	20,240,452
1 January to 31 December 1958	32,555,876	1,104,793	33,660,669	36,519	21,160,076
1 January to 31 December 1959	32,625,400	1,405,205	34,030,605	110,688	20,285,552
1 January to 31 December 1960	33,828,887	2,629,135	36,458,022	150,084	22,219,198
1 January to 31 December 1961	34,386,052	2,306,293	36,692,345	194,943	20,054,965
1 January to 31 December 1962	34,308,775	1,346,239	35,655,014	615,154	20,636,289
1 January to 31 December 1963	34,444,063	1,251,994	35,696,057	448,589	20,573,857
1 January to 31 December 1964	33,963,601	1,198,130	35,161,731	(922,665)	17,620,062
1 January to 31 December 1965	34,000,353	1,134,525	35,134,878	155,708	15,292,176
1 January to 31 December 1966	34,969,322	1,358,729	36,328,051	152,209	14,274,016
1 January to 31 December 1967	39,739,742 ^d	3,000,000 ^d	42,739,742 ^d	—	14,253,758 ^d
TOTAL	590,975,149	22,354,495	613,329,644	1,437,521	

- a The figures in this table are based on the Agency's audited accounts through 1966, modified to reflect, for each period, the income and expenditure (including commitments) applicable to the budget for that period, regardless of when the income was actually received or the expenditure actually incurred. This basis of reporting was first adopted in the Commissioner-General's report for 1961-1962 and a few minor changes have since had to be made in the figures contained in that report.
- b These adjustments represent principally the liquidation in subsequent years of liabilities and commitments at less than amounts originally charged to expenditure account. Also included are adjustments arising from revaluation of inventory, recovery of assets previously charged to expenditure, and price variations on supplies not chargeable to a particular budget heading. These adjustments are shown separately because of the difficulty in identifying the specific prior year to which the adjustments pertain. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1964 also include a transfer of \$1,761,792 to bring up the provision for deferred staff costs to the level required by the Agency's revised social security arrangements.
- c Includes \$2,646,909 deficit of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees paid by UNRWA.
- d Estimated figures.

Table 20

Detailed statement of income to UNRWA, 1 May 1950—31 December 1967 a
(in US dollars)

Contributor	1/5/50- 31/12/62	For the period					Total income	
		12 months to						
		31/12/63	31/12/64	31/12/65	31/12/66	31/12/67 b		
						Normal	Special d	
I. PLEDGES BY GOVERNMENTS								
Abu Dhabi	-	-	-	-	-	20,927	-	20,927
Australia	2 575,103	201,600	201,600	201,600	201,600	201,600	-	3,583,103
Austria	13,950	3,000	5,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	19,350	71,300
Bahrain	23,867	-	-	-	-	-	-	23,867
Belgium	306,000	30,000	32,000	30,000	30,000	35,000	-	463,000
Bolivia	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Brazil	25,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	25,000
Burma	9,546	-	-	-	-	-	-	9,546
Cambodia	6,570	571	-	-	-	-	-	7,141
Canada	1 506,688	925,000	925,926	1,111,111	1,111,111	1,388,889	1,070,701	21,039,426
Central African Republic	-	-	398	-	-	-	-	398
Ceylon	3,400	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	-	7,400
China	-	-	3,279	-	10,000	20,000	-	33,279
Congo	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,000	20,000
Cuba	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Cyprus	1,123	-	279	280	280	560	-	2,522
Denmark	532,410	59,680	79,540	114,733	209,348	279,630	217,171	1,492,512
Dominican Republic	5,000	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	6,000
El Salvador	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	500
Ethiopia	35,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	35,500
Federal Republic of Germany	1,607,076	625,000	400,000	503,145	500,000	750,000	2,800	4,388,021
Finland	13,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	15,000	50,000	118,000
France	11,589,905	190,213	228,564	213,238	229,778	242,197	1,020,408	13,714,303
Gambia	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Gaza authorities	513,005	104,492	104,072	155,302	167,437	155,611	-	1,199,919
Ghana	12,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	27,000
Greece	215,017	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	-	290,017
Haiti	6,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,000
Honduras	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,500
Holy See	12,965	1,000	6,000	1,000	2,500	2,500	10,000	35,965

Table 20 (continued)

Contributor	1/5/50- 31/12/62	for the period					12 months to		31/12/67 b		Total income
		31/12/63	31/12/63	31/12/65	31/12/66	31/12/67 b					
						Normal	Special d				
I. PLEDGES BY GOVERNMENTS (continued)											
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000	-	12,000	12,000
India	269,510	21,008	21,008	21,008	13,333	13,333	-	-	-	-	359,200
Indonesia	240,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	240,000
Iran	37,153	6,000	6,000	6,000	-	-	6,000	-	-	-	61,153
Iraq	-	-	2,000	-	100,000	100,000	100,000	-	-	-	202,000
Ireland	43,876	20,000	20,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	40,000	-	40,000	198,876
Israel	256,547	-	-	-	-	-	150,000	-	-	-	406,547
Italy	420,471	80,855	160,000	160,000	160,000	160,000	160,000	-	-	-	1,141,326
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	560	560	560	-	-	-	1,680
Japan	102,500	10,000	20,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	40,000	100,000	-	100,000	332,500
Jordan	1,240,833	95,732	105,357	105,320	173,819	173,819	170,822	-	-	-	1,891,883
Korea, Republic of	6,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,500
Kuwait	382,750	220,000	220,110	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000	-	-	-	1,482,860
Laos	2,707	1,980	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,687
Lebanon	541,682	41,787	29,241	33,495	37,231	37,231	45,531	-	-	-	728,967
Liberia	26,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26,500
Libya	24,000	-	20,000	20,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	-	-	-	264,000
Luxembourg	25,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	-	-	40,000
Malawi	-	-	-	140	140	140	140	-	-	-	420
Malaysia	9,000	15,738	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	10,000	-	10,000	40,738
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000	-	5,000	5,000
Mexico	115,691	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	115,691
Monaco	5,645	204	204	204	204	204	204	-	-	-	6,665
Morocco	79,761	19,802	19,763	19,763	20,000	20,000	25,000	-	-	-	184,089
Netherlands	541,402	110,497	114,883	166,228	140,625	140,625	124,874	-	-	-	1,198,509
New Zealand	1,736,000	140,000	140,000	140,000	140,000	140,000	84,000	-	-	-	2,380,000
Niger	-	-	-	-	510	510	510	-	-	-	1,020
Nigeria	-	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	-	-	-	25,000
Norway	529,569	56,000	63,000	70,000	77,000	77,000	84,000	209,497	-	209,497	1,089,066
Pakistan	499,578	20,964	20,964	20,964	31,446	31,446	20,964	-	-	-	614,880
Philippines	11,250	-	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250	-	-	-	16,250
Qatar	41,895	20,833	-	-	10,000	10,000	10,000	-	-	-	82,728
Rhodesia and Nyasaland	39,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39,200
Saudi Arabia	1,123,593	494,820	-	297,778	594,778 c	594,778 c	297,778	-	-	-	2,808,747
Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	-	1,000	1,000

Spain	16,667	-	33,333	-	-	-	167,000	217,000
Sudan	153,940	-	-	-	-	-	-	153,940
Sweden	1,091,495	224,751	354,959	447,445	409,641	145,773	-	2,674,064
Switzerland	-	-	-	-	1,945,000 e	2,000,000 e	-	3,945,000
	449,595	155,225	115,554	268,612	297,791	104,167	57,870	1,448,814
Syrian Arab Republic	1,071,128	93,902	90,226	88,965	91,480	93,742	-	1,529,443
Thailand	3,125	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	4,125
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	-	-	1,000	-	1,000
Tunisia	8,000	2,000	4,000	4,000	5,000	4,000	-	27,000
Turkey	43,759	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	10,000	-	85,759
United Arab Republic	4,319,107	282,909	248,591	246,712	255,960	117,883	-	5,471,162
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	74,324,004	5,400,000	5,400,000	5,400,000	5,000,000	4,500,000	500,000	100,524,004
United States of America	291,268,069	24,700,000	24,700,000	23,800,000	22,550,000	22,200,000	2,000,000	411,218,069
Uruguay	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000
Viet-Nam, Republic of	18,500	2,500	-	-	-	-	-	21,000
Yugoslavia	468,700	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	-	568,700
Sundry Governments through World Refugee Year Stamp Plan	238,211	-	-	-	-	-	-	238,211
Sundry Governments	-	-	-	-	-	-	200,000	200,000
TOTAL GOVERNMENT PLEDGES	413,858,068	34,444,063	33,963,601	34,000,353	34,969,322	34,026,945	5,712,797	590,975,149

II. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS

UNESCO	1,395,717	300,477	300,927	279,294	332,215	340,000	-	2,948,630
WHO	452,812	48,143	45,798	51,303	51,402	60,000	-	709,458
Sundry donors	4,817,793	422,763	455,397	485,453	438,770	600,000	700,000	7,920,176

TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS

	6,666,322	771,383	802,122	816,050	822,387	1,000,000	700,000	11,578,264
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III. MISCELLANEOUS INCOME AND EXCHANGE ADJUSTMENTS

	7,744,795	480,611	396,008	318,475	536,342	1,300,000	-	10,776,231
TOTAL INCOME	428,269,185	35,696,057	35,161,731	35,134,878	36,328,051	36,326,945	6,412,797	613,329,644

a The figures in this table through 1966 are based upon the Agency's audited financial statements, modified to show for each year the government pledges applicable to that year, regardless of when payment was actually made.

b The figures for 1967 are estimated.

c Includes a late contribution of \$297,000 for 1964.

d Special contributions for the emergency situation arising from the hostilities of June 1967.

e Special contributions. For 1966 the contribution was for the Agency's education and training programmes. However, for 1967, although the contribution was notified to UNRWA before the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967 and was then intended to be for education and vocational training, the Government of Sweden subsequently decided, in view of the emergency facing the Agency as a result of the hostilities, to leave the use of \$1,890,000 of the contribution to the Agency's discretion.

Table 21

Statement of income from non-government sources
1 January 1966 to 31 August 1967
(in US dollars)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special ^a
<i>Australia</i>			
UN Association of Australia—Victorian Division	502	502	—
UN Association of Australia—South Australian Division	139	—	—
UN Association of Australia	—	—	13,498
UN Junior Set of Sydney	112	—	448
Unilever	—	—	112
<i>Austria</i>			
Brunner, Robert	112	—	—
Caritas Austria	500	3,873	—
<i>Belgium</i>			
Entraide Socialiste Belge and Caritas Catholica	—	—	160 ^b
Special Stamp Sale (Entraide Socialiste Belge and Caritas Catholica)	9,836	—	—
Sundry donors	26	—	—
<i>Canada</i>			
Ambassador Maybee	—	—	92
Baird, Dr. R.P.	463	—	—
Canadian Embassy	—	75	—
Canadian Red Cross Youth	6,367	460	—
Canadian Save the Children Fund	4,630	—	—
Henderson, Mrs. D.C.	462	460	—
Peel County Secondary School	926	926	—
Unitarian Service Committee	1,343	—	—
United Nations Association of Canada	—	—	1,263
Wesley United Church Women	139	—	—
Sundry donors	—	—	137
<i>Denmark</i>			
Buck and Holm	250	—	—
Danish Refugee Council	634	18,209	36,042 ^b
Danish Statechurch's Relief Committee	238	—	—
<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>			
Abs, Dr. Hermann J.	500	—	—
Bayerische Motoren Werke A.G.	500	—	—
Bayerische Vereinsbank—Munich	1,000	—	—
Berliner Bank	—	500	—
Bosch, Robert—GmbH	1,509	500	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special a

Federal Republic of Germany (Continued)

Caritas	—	—	— b
Caritas and Knights Holy Sepulchre	—	—	— b
Daimler Benz Co. Stuttgart	2,006	—	—
Frankfurter Bank	—	500	—
Freimaurerisches Hilfswerk, Hannover	—	—	1,250
Index-Werke K.G., Hahn and Tessky	500	—	—
MISEREOR	6,289	—	12,500 b
Refugee Campaign—Bonn	—	—	21,000
Siemens and Halske—A.G.	500	—	—
Solms, Johann George Graf	—	—	1,250
The Near East Representatives of German Banks—Beirut	—	1,000	—
Volkswagen Werk A.G.	381	—	—
Sundry donors	3	42	44

Finland

Aalto, Miss Hilja—Julin, Mr. Eero—Sipilä, Mrs. Helvi—Vehnamaki, Mrs. Irja	500	—	—
Finnish Association of Folk High Schools and Folk Academies	500	1,500	—
Finnish Refugee Council	2,500	8,900	—
Finnish Association of Kindergarten Teachers	200	—	—
Finnish Elementary School Teachers Association	500	—	—
Hufudstadsbladet, Helsinki	—	1,000	—
Orion Pharmaceutical Co.	600	—	—
Paraisten Kalkkivuor, OY	—	500	—
Sipilä, Mrs. Helvi	500	—	—
Stockmann Department Store, Helsinki	—	1,000	—
Svenska Österbottns Folkshögskola Folkakademi, Yttermark	500	500	—
Tehtaanpuiston Yhteiskoulun Teinikunta	—	500	—
Union of Finnish Girls Guides	—	500	—

France

Alamichel, Claude	—	—	210
Cimade	—	—	1,020
Communauté de L'arche	—	—	612
Lycée Jeanne d'Arc—Nancy	—	163	—
Meyer, Georges	—	—	102
Secours Catholique de France	—	898	—
Sundry donors	—	—	41

Gaza

Abu Abdallah Family	101	67	—
Abu Middain Family	1,997	1,331	—
Abu Salim Family	490	327	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special a

<i>Gaza (Continued)</i>			
Abu Sha'b Family	442	294	—
Awada Family	2,005	1,044	—
Awada and Abu Middain Families	321	214	—
Daghma Family	110	74	—
El Mussaddar Family	281	187	—
Mussadar and Qur'an Families	374	249	—
Tarazi Family	115	77	—
Waqf Department	6,587	4,391	—
Sundry donors	1,117	300	—
<i>Ireland</i>			
Irish National Committee for UNICEF	—	—	560
<i>Italy</i>			
Sundry donors	23	—	—
<i>Jamaica</i>			
Manchester High School	—	—	264
<i>Japan</i>			
Sundry donors	—	52	—
<i>Jordan</i>			
The Carlton Le Willows Technical School	1,544	—	—
Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem	997	—	—
Municipal Council—Qalqilia	616	411	—
Save the Children Fund	—	266	—
Sundry donors	178	—	—
Anonymous	3,102	1,725	—
<i>Lebanon</i>			
Abela, Miss Nelly	387	—	—
Congregation of the Evangelical Church	62	—	—
Foreign Airlines	—	—	6,154
Greek Orthodox Community	645	416	—
Lebanese—Armenian Evangelical Community	—	—	— ^b
Mneimneh and Bohsaly	1,452	936	—
Heirs of Saaddine Shatila	1,290	832	—
Syrian Lebanese Mission	1,935	1,248	—
Anonymous	3,670	2,310	—
Sundry donors	—	11	—
<i>Liechtenstein</i>			
General and Metal Holding Co.	—	—	10,000
<i>Netherlands</i>			
UNESCO Centrum, Netherlands	—	—	10,000

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special ^a
<i>New Zealand</i>			
New Zealand Council of Organization for Relief			
Services Overseas (CORSO)	—	22,834	5,600
Sundry donors	28	—	—
<i>Norway</i>			
Kroksnes, Arthur	140	141	—
Norwegian Aid Society for Refugees and International			
Development	1,278	—	—
Norwegian Red Cross	—	—	456
Norwegian Refugee Council	13,027	37,771	34,188 ^b
Save the Children Fund (Redd Barna)	—	490	—
Sundry donors	3	—	—
<i>Portugal</i>			
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation	10,000	5,000	50,000
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>			
Baroudy, Jamil N.	—	—	1,000
<i>Sweden</i>			
Ericsson, Messrs. L.M.	994	583	—
Hult, A.	—	—	295
Lions Club—Västeraas	194	—	—
Shawe, Bill Robert	750	—	—
Swedish Save the Children Federation	12,775	23,301	63,485
Swedish Organization for Individual Relief	—	—	12,264 ^b
Sundry donors	119	—	—
<i>Switzerland</i>			
Anderson, Malte	—	500	—
Caritas—Switzerland	—	—	7,000
Feller, E.	—	—	231
Krbec, Miss Eva Marie	—	—	231
Morachi, V.	—	—	1,359
Mrs. Weeks and Miss Krbec	194	139	—
Waser, Pfr. Heinz	—	—	116
Sundry donors	—	8	198
<i>Syrian Arab Republic</i>			
Local Authorities	2,046	1,346	—
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i>			
British Bank of the Middle East	8,050	—	70,000
Cambridge University—UNA Refugee Department	700	280	378
Caroline Haslett Memorial	498	—	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special ^a

<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Continued)</i>			
Christian Aid	28,000	—	14,504
Collegiate School for Girls, Blackpool	504	—	—
Council for Education in World Citizenship	—	—	5,170 ^b
Eastbourne Freedom from Hunger Committee	5,040	—	—
European Campaign for World Refugees	—	28,000	—
Freedom from Hunger (Tenby) Committee	504	504	—
Girls High School—Burton-on-Trent	168	—	—
Luthwaite, Miss Hilda	—	—	140
May, E.G.	—	63	—
Mulford, Mr. and Mrs. W.	336	196	—
Nowell, Mrs. D.M.	504	—	—
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)	52,990	25,900	42,000
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, through World Council of Churches	—	—	— ^b
Petts Wood Methodist Church	—	504	—
Rogers, Miss M.	504	504	—
Schuller, Mrs. Thomas	—	—	62
St. Helen's School	504	504	—
Standing Conference of British Organizations for Aid to refugees	—	—	22,400 ^b
Symonds, Miss C.G.	504	—	—
Tomlinson, Miss Ruth	—	—	140
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	—	—	4,200
United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Freedom from Hunger Campaign Fund)	—	1,484	2,800
Veitch, G.	—	300	—
Wings of Friendship	459	506	—
Anonymous	4,200	278	—
Sundry donors	3	28	33
<i>United States of America</i>			
American Council for Judaism Philanthropic Fund	1,000	—	5,000
American Friends of the Middle East	500	—	—
American Middle East Rehabilitation Inc. (AMER)	78,534	11,286	13,959 ^b
American Mission, Beirut	1,026	662	—
American Women's Club of Lebanon	—	475	—
Arab American Community of Ann Arbor	—	—	1,454
Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO)	60,000	60,000	—
Astor Bursary Fund	—	—	22,500
Baird Foundation	43	114	—
Bencher, Emile P.	—	—	61

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special ^a

<i>United States of America (Continued)</i>			
Berry, Mrs. Dorothy B.	2,000	—	—
Buchrig, Dr. Edward E.	—	100	—
Chrysler Corporation	417	—	—
Cobey, James	100	—	—
Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)	473	—	—
Dahrn Women's Group (ARAMCO)	—	380	—
Davis, Dr. John H.	500	—	—
Fallers, A. Lloyd	—	—	100
Fellowship Club	—	—	50
First Congregational Church	—	—	50
Ford Motor Co.	—	26,826	—
Garrison, Roy	—	—	100
Garth, William Le Roy Estate	—	2,958	—
Glenview Community Church	500	—	—
Goldberg, Rabbi Robert E.	—	—	100
Graef, Mrs. Gretchen	—	—	50
Hansen, Ernest	—	—	100
Hibner, Mrs. Don T. Jr.	—	50	—
Holbrook, Dwight	—	—	100
Holy Land Centre Inc.	—	—	2,400
Hoppe, Denis and Family	—	—	100
Howard A. & Martha R. Wolffund	—	—	500
Howe, Miss Lotitia T.	—	—	500
Huntsinger, A.E.	1,500	—	—
Hurburt, G.W.	—	—	50
Islamic Centre of New York	—	—	3,212
Islamic Society of Western Michigan	—	—	2,375
Kellner, Mrs. Mary	—	—	50
Kirkpatrick, Mr. and Mrs. W.C.	—	—	50
Kirkpatrick, Virginia	—	—	50
La Bahn, Edmond	—	—	50
Lawyer, Capt. John E. Jr.	—	—	131
Lipton, Thomas J. Inc.	797	—	—
Lombardi, Miss Helen Brown	—	100	—
Mathews, Mrs. M.	—	—	50
McEachin, Miss Janet	—	—	100
McLanghlin, Mr. and Mrs. Ronald C.	—	—	50
Mukwonago Union High School	—	108	—
NAJDA—American Women for the Middle East	1,000	500	—
Near East Christian Committee	—	154	—
Nicely Mrs. Katharine T.	—	—	100
N.O.T.S. Hebrew Congregation	—	—	68

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special ^a

United States of America (Continued)

Ottinger Foundation Inc.	1,000	—	—
Organization of Arab Students, Milwaukee Chapter	1,000	—	—
Pal-Aid International Inc.	—	—	1,000 ^b
Pickerl, Mrs. Dorothea M.	9,000	—	—
Rollform Corporation	—	—	50
Sady, Emil J.	—	50	—
Selby, Peter Spengler	101	102	—
Scheller, Julius L.	—	—	50
Shanzer, Dr. Hilda	—	—	60
Smith, Richard T.Jr.	—	—	74
Sochaki, Mrs. Waltrand	—	—	100
Stewart, Mrs. Dunlop	—	—	92
United States Committee for Refugees	—	60	1,825
U.S. Omen	500	500	4,000
U.S. Brother's Brother Foundation	—	—	— ^b
Wagner, Miss Gloria W.	250	—	—
Yusuf, Dr. S.	—	—	75
Sundry donors	393	217	1,696

International Organizations

International Federation of Business and Professional Women			
Central Committee	500	—	—
Australia	504	1,020	—
Canada	3,241	—	—
New Zealand	504	—	—
Switzerland	500	500	—
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2,016	2,016	—
United States of America	1,500	—	—
International Rescue Committee	—	—	2,500 ^b
Lutheran World Federation	14,000	—	—
The Staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency	—	—	255
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO)	332,215	229,020	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)	1,436	—	—
United Nations Emergency Force (Canadian Army Contingent)	3,105	2,916	—
United Nations Emergency Force (XIX Danor Battalion)	448	239	—
United Nations Emergency Force (XXV Swedish Battalion)	196	1,163	—

Table 21 (continued)

Name of contributor	Year 1966	First eight months of 1967	
		Normal programme	Special ^a
<i>International Organizations (Continued)</i>			
United Nations Staff Fund for Refugees	600	—	—
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	90	—	—
Women's Auxiliary of UNRWA	8,487	3,364	—
World Health Organization (WHO)	51,402	40,602	—
Zonta Helsinki Congress	—	—	1,535
Zonta International	15,433	15,342	—
Zonta International—District XIII	3,000	—	—
Sundry donors	2,052	275	—
	822,387	611,533	521,781

- a Special contributions for the emergency situation arising from the hostilities of June 1967. This column should not be regarded as a complete report even for the period covered because documentation on donations in kind is not yet complete in all cases.
- b This organization has contributed tents and/or other supplies to UNRWA, for which it has not yet been possible to establish a valuation. Where an amount is shown in such cases, it represents cash contributions and/or contributions of supplies for which a valuation has been established.

Table 22

Direct contributions from host Governments to refugees ^{a b}
for the year ended 30 June 1967
(in US dollars)

Contributor	Education services	Social welfare services	Medical services	Housing	Security services	Miscellaneous services	Administrative costs	Total
Jordan	1,148,000	235,200	518,000	—	1,125,600	20,916	80,668	3,128,284
Lebanon	41,772	8,860	14,873	150,000 ^c	129,747	13,070	482,911 ^c	841,233
Syrian Arab Republic	692,235	213,942	55,288	1,263,073	36,058	96,226	293,029	2,649,851
United Arab Republic	1,565,000 ^d	324,000 ^d	382,000 ^d	—	112,000 ^d	31,000 ^d	100,000 ^d	2,514,000 ^d
Total	3,447,007	782,002	970,161	1,413,073	1,403,405	161,212	956,608	9,133,468

^a In addition to the foregoing contributions direct to the refugees, all Governments listed also made contributions to UNRWA for the latter's budget. These contributions are reported in the Agency's own accounts and are set out in tables 19 and 20. It is also to be noted that UNRWA (and, in some cases, voluntary agencies working with the refugees) enjoy exemption from customs duties and taxes. In addition, the cost of the normal services provided by the host Governments is increased by reason of utilization of these services by refugees.

^b All data shown are based upon information provided by the Governments concerned, and are expressed in dollars computed by applying the Agency's accounting rates of exchange, which are based on official or free market rates as appropriate.

^c Estimated. Total amount given for administrative and housing costs is \$632,911.

^d Estimated figures based on report for 1965/66.

UNRWA PERSONNEL

Table 23

Staff employed by UNRWA at 31 December 1965
and at 31 December 1966

	Locally recruited staff	International staff			Grand Total
		UNRWA	Seconded and loaned from other United Nations organs	Total	
31 December 1965	11,495	101	25	126	11,621
31 December 1966	11,404	85	27	112	11,516

Note: Virtually all locally recruited staff are refugees.

ANNEX II

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE WORK OF THE AGENCY

I. *General legal activities and problems*

1. The nature and scope of the Agency's operations inevitably pose a great number and variety of legal problems. As with any international organization or agency, there are many problems relating to the internal, administrative law of the Agency. The application and interpretation of the Area Staff Rules in relation to the 11,500 or more area staff, with occasional reference to the Joint Appeals Boards provided for in these rules, is a continuing process. So, too, is the revision of those rules with a view to improving conditions of employment although, in this matter, the financial difficulties of the Agency impose limitations upon what can be done. With regard to the International Staff Regulations and Rules, a continuing attempt is being made to bring these into conformity with the United Nations "common system." The arrangements made for entry of the Agency's international staff into full participation in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund came into effect on 1 January

1967 and the resulting changes in the International Staff Regulations and Rules also came into effect on that day.

2. The very fact that UNRWA is a substantial importer, purchaser and transporter of supplies, and the occupier of many premises in the various host States means that the Agency is continually concerned with commercial and other private law matters. It is rarely involved in litigation in the host States and even the procedures for arbitration, which are a common and necessary part of its thousands of contracts (necessary in view of its jurisdictional immunity), are rarely used. This is symptomatic of the general goodwill which exists in its relations in this field. The control mechanisms which operate in the Agency's contracting procedures also call for continuing legal scrutiny of the contracts made and of the use of delegated powers in the field.

3. As noted in the introduction to the present report, relations with Governments are for the most part satisfactory, but there are a number of problems which are persistent and which hamper the Agency in the execution of its mandate. Some mention of the reasons for the persistence of these problems has been made in that introduction.

4. The status of UNRWA, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, is in general well recognized, even if the full implications of this are not completely accepted. Apart from the United Nations Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946, the only other general agreement which, juridically, has effect in the host States is the Bernadotte Agreement of 1948, concluded in almost identical terms with the Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. There are, of course, further agreements, such as those concluded in 1950 with the Egyptian Government, with the Jordan Government in 1951, and in 1954 with the Lebanese Government; but, given that the Bernadotte Agreement is only partially implemented, the question remains whether there is not a need for a standard, basic agreement with host States, appropriate to an operational Agency like UNRWA and supplementing the 1946 Convention. Considerable effort was made in 1960 to draft such a basic agreement, although its conclusion was not accomplished then. There would be considerable advantage in renewing this attempt to secure a standard, basic agreement, at an opportune time, if the host States were agreeable. In the paragraphs which follow, some indication will be given of the problems which could usefully be covered in such an agreement.

5. UNRWA's exemption from direct taxes and customs duties as well as from restrictions on imports has never been given full effect and this has resulted in payments to host Governments which have materially increased the cost of its operations. It must be conceded that the concepts of "direct taxes" and "charges for public utility services," used in section 7 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, offer scope for genuine difficulties of interpretation. However, the Agency has maintained the position that section 7 cannot permit an interpretation which would render it liable to all forms of taxation merely because they are characterized as "indirect" by the Government concerned for this would offend the basic principle, expressed by Committee IV (2) at San Francisco, that:

... if there is one certain principle it is that no member State may hinder in any way the working of the Organization or take any measures the effect of which might be to increase

its burdens, financial or other.¹

Moreover, it will readily be apparent that States are free to adopt either direct or indirect modes of taxation for the benefit of the national treasury, so that to leave the Agency liable to "indirect taxation," as defined by the legislation of the host State, could nullify its basic exemption from taxation. Thus, the Agency has had to reiterate that it is not in this matter subject to the definitions or concepts of the particular system of municipal law of any host State. Similarly, it has had to reiterate that it is not subject, in presenting international claims, to periods of prescription prescribed by the local law. The nature of the Agency's difficulties will be made more apparent in paragraph 10 below in which its pecuniary claims against Governments are outlined, although these claims are by no means entirely dependent upon the interpretation of section 7 of the Convention.

6. The status of Agency staff is, of course, covered by article V of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. For the minority of this staff (some 80 or more persons) who are internationally recruited, there are relatively few problems. Certainly, in the Lebanon, there have been issues such as taxes on apartments and automobiles and on embarkation which have required negotiation, and which still require negotiation, with the Government. At one point a misunderstanding arose with the Syrian Arab Republic over the application of the principle of *persona non grata* but, happily, on this point an agreement was reached after the Agency, in conjunction with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, had explained that this principle had no application to United Nations officials; the agreement is contained in an Exchange of Letters between the Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Secretary-General dated 9 and 25 August 1967. The more serious issues concern the locally recruited staff of varying status (i.e. area and other staff) who comprise some 11,500 persons, mainly Palestinians. In their private capacity the local employees of UNRWA are, of course, subject to the jurisdiction and authority of the Governments of the host countries. The

¹ *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, vol. 13, p. 781. [Footnote in source text.]

lives they lead and the work they perform are much the same as those of public servants employed by the Governments and municipal authorities in the host countries, and it is understandable that government departments and officials should assume, without perhaps giving the matter much conscious thought, that the Agency's employees must be subject to the control of the local authorities in their public as well as their private capacities. On the other hand, the Agency's insistence that, as United Nations officials, its officers must be accorded the independence and immunity they require in order to enable them to discharge properly their official duties as employees of an international organization, has sometimes been misconstrued in the host countries as a claim that they should be accorded some totally privileged status incompatible with the sovereignty of the country in which they are living and working. The Agency does not believe that the privileges and immunities accorded under the 1946 United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities are more than the minimum necessary to ensure the independent exercise of the official functions of the officials and much of the opposition to according these privileges and immunities appears to be based upon a misunderstanding of their scope and effect.

7. In practice, UNRWA has encountered occasional attempts to exercise jurisdiction over such staff in relation to their official duties, either in the form of judicial proceedings or in the form of attempts to influence (other than via established procedures) appointments, transfers, disciplinary action or other matters falling within the employer/employee relationship of the Agency and its staff. The degree to which this has occurred is by no means uniform in all fields, and in many cases the interference has been at lower levels of governmental authority. It is also true that the locally recruited staff themselves occasionally manifest difficulty in understanding, or demonstrating, those standards of conduct which are required from United Nations officials: this has been apparent in some measure in relation to political activities and also in a readiness to involve Governments in issues, such as employment conditions, which are properly to be regarded as issues between the staff and the Commissioner-General exclusively. The Agency understands that, for a variety of reasons, and not

least because no other United Nations agency employs so high and numerous a proportion of locally recruited staff, there has been some feeling at governmental level in certain host States that such staff should not enjoy the status of United Nations officials and the privileges and immunities pertaining to that status. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, this feeling possibly overlooks the very limited extent to which these staff in fact enjoy privileges and immunities: in short, they enjoy them only in respect of their official duties. Thus, in final analysis, whether these privileges exist or not is determined by the more basic decision on whether or not the official duties of these staff are to be exercised independently of governmental control (but subject always to the authority and control of the Commissioner-General, who is in turn responsible to the General Assembly). If the Agency's operations are to be conceived as United Nations operations, then it has always seemed to the Agency that the independence of its staff, including local staff, in the performance of their official duties is an essential condition for those operations: otherwise, control would vest in a single host State rather than in the General Assembly as a whole. However, the Agency is prepared to examine this general question, in conjunction with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, and to explore with host States ways and means of alleviating the difficulties which may be caused to them by the employment, within their territories, of large numbers of locally recruited staff. The Agency hopes that, in close co-operation with the host States, these difficulties can be overcome without prejudicing the character of the Agency's operation as a United Nations operation. Indeed, discussions during the period 7-9 August 1967 between representatives of the Agency, the Secretary-General's representative, Mr. C.A. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary and Legal Counsel, and representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic ranged over this whole area of problems and resulted in an Exchange of Letters between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary-General dated 9 and 25 August. It is believed that this Exchange of Letters, and the particular arrangements agreed in the discussions, will afford a basis upon which these problems can be eliminated for the future within Syria.

8. It should be added, however, that the

Syrian Arab Republic has already enacted a decree of 1 August 1967 which has the effect of excluding all United Nations staff of Syrian nationality in Syria from the privileges and immunities of the 1946 Convention, other than the exemption from taxation on salaries: this will affect 100 or more Agency staff. The incompatibility of this measure with the Syrian Arab Republic's unqualified acceptance of the 1946 Convention is clear. However, since this measure was not known to the Secretary-General's representative at the time of these discussions, this formed no part of the agreed arrangements.

9. The Agency has also experienced special difficulties in relation to the movement and disposition of its staff following the hostilities which began on 5 June 1967. Certain nationalities among the internationally recruited staff have experienced difficulty in securing permission for transit across the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic: there also remains a reluctance, hopefully of a temporary character, to see such staff stationed there. Problems of greater magnitude arise from the fact that many locally recruited staff found themselves separated either from their homes or from their normal place of duty as a result of the hostilities and the cease-fire lines which came into effect pursuant to the Security Council resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June. For many of these staff, the rules governing the return of residents of the West Bank, published by the Government of Israel on 10 July, offered an opportunity to return to their homes. However, whereas Jordan hitherto constituted one single field of UNRWA operations, under a single direction with a unified staff, there now exist virtually two separate areas for operational purposes and regular movement between them is impossible for staff. Movement for locally recruited staff between their places of duty within the occupied areas and the Agency's headquarters in Beirut is also impossible. Moreover, apart from the West Bank, no general, agreed plans exist for the return to the occupied areas of Syria and Gaza of locally recruited staff who fled or who, for other reasons, were out of these areas at the time when hostilities began.

10. The Agency is aware of the security implications which complete freedom of movement for staff, both international and local, across cease-

fire lines would involve. It is, however, apparent that the consequent reorganization of its operations will involve some redundancy of locally recruited staff and, paradoxically, some duplication of staff and recruitment of new staff.

II. *Claims against Governments*

11. UNRWA has a considerable number of pecuniary claims against Governments, some of long standing.¹ The current financial difficulties of the Agency made it imperative for the Agency to renew its efforts to pursue these claims, despite the paucity of success which has marked earlier attempts. Accordingly, work has begun on the restatement and re-presentation of all the Agency's outstanding claims. The initiation of hostilities on 5 June brought an abrupt end to this work: staff were diverted to other, more immediate tasks and, more important, Governments could not be expected to devote the necessary time and study to such matters when preoccupied with questions of security in the Middle East. Therefore, as will be explained below, only the claims against the Lebanon and the claims against Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan jointly in respect of the excess rail charges have so far been formally re-presented or reinitiated. It is the Agency's intention to proceed with these in the near future as well as formally to present the other outstanding claims against Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic and Israel. The Agency will in subsequent reports to the Assembly keep the Assembly informed of the progress of these claims. Two points must, however, be emphasized. The first is that the statement of these claims, as presented below, is entirely the Agency's and is in no sense an "agreed" statement accepted by the Government concerned. The second is that none of these claims yet includes claims in respect of losses or damage to the Agency, its installations, property and staff arising out of the hostilities which began on 5 June 1967. The Agency is presently conducting a comprehensive loss survey and, on the results of this, future claims will be formulated and presented where appropriate. Subject to this, the following are the Agency's claims in outline.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4213)*, annex H. [Footnote in source text.]

Where figures are given, these represent the figures standing in the Agency's accounts at 31 December 1966.

(a) *Claims against Lebanon*

12. By note verbale of 2 May 1967 the Agency has submitted formally to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs its outstanding financial claims against Lebanon which appear susceptible to settlement (but excluding the excess rail claim, claims relating to the status of officials or claims relating to rental for camps). A disturbing feature about these claims is that, as compared with the position in 1962, the position at 31 December 1966 indicates that the Agency has twice the number of claims for approximately twice the amount. It has accordingly laid stress on the need to arrest this disturbing upward trend. In the brief summary of these claims below, the two categories of "Continuing Claims" and "Consolidated Claims" correspond respectively to those claims which arise from legislation still being applied against the Agency (and therefore increasing annually in value) and those which arise from legislation applied in the past, but which is no longer applicable to the Agency, so that the final amount of the claim can be stated.

A. *Continuing claims*: Stamp taxes and municipal taxes on insurance policies (£L. 281,199); municipal taxes on telephone bills, on internal telephone installations and electricity bills (£L. 20,927); port dues on tonnage unloaded (£L. 37,200).

B. *Consolidated claims*: Parking fees for UNRWA aircraft (£L. 43,020); taxes and customs dues on local purchases of cement and steel bars (£L. 83,322); taxes on sale of jute bags and legal costs arising out of the seizure of an Agency vehicle (£L. 1,006).

The total amount of the claims recently submitted in thus £L. 466,674.

13. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon has indicated its willingness to examine the Agency's claims in the near future, so that the Agency has reason to hope for a comprehensive settlement during the course of the year which can then be reported to the Assembly in next year's report.

(b) *Claims against the Syrian Arab Republic*

14. As of 31 December 1966 these totalled 272,780 Syrian pounds: there is, however, a Syrian counter-claim for £S. 19,000 in respect of the costs of a flour-mixing operation. For the most part these claims relate to customs duties and taxes on fuel and petroleum products which are no longer levied upon the Agency, so that the amounts of the claims under these particular heads are not subject to augmentation year by year. There are, however, two claims—the "continuing" as opposed to "consolidated" claims—which arise from legislation which is still being applied against the Agency. The claims can be summarized as follows:

A. *Continuing claims*: School and defence taxes on water and electricity bills (£S. 19,416); portage "fees" for inspection of Agency goods on trucks entering the Damascus Customs Zone (£S. 10,802).

B. *Consolidated claims*: Customs duties on fuel and petroleum products between 1949 and 1959 (£S. 87,600); emergency taxes on benzine and gas-oil, levied in 1958 (£S. 20,047); finance, municipal and schools taxes on fuel between 1949 and 1953 (£S. 112,781); cement taxes levied prior to 1961 (£S. 22,134).

15. The latter category of claims raises a specific difficulty in that the Syrian Arab Republic has not so far accepted the Agency's contention that it is not subject to the prescription rules of Syrian law: the point is important in that under these rules some of these claims would be "statute-barred." There is a further difficulty in that much of the documentation showing that Agency purchases of fuel in the past were subject to customs duties appears to have been lost and, since the petroleum companies have now all been nationalized in Syria, there is not the same ease of access to their records. Another difficulty has arisen from the contention by the Syrian Arab Republic that exemption from taxes could be claimed only from August 1953, the date on which the Republic gave internal effect, by law, to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946: the Agency does not accept this contention.

16. It should be added, however, that, in the Exchange of Letters between the Foreign

Minister and the Secretary-General dated 9 and 25 August the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has undertaken to help in finding a speedy solution to these outstanding claims. On this basis, the Agency intends to re-submit all the above claims within the next month and hopes to be in a position to report on a comprehensive settlement in next year's report to the Assembly.

(c) *Claims against Jordan*

17. The Agency does not appear to be subject to any current legislation which involves the payment of duties or taxes which could form the subject of a continuing claim. The only "continuing" claim is the excess rail claim, dealt with below. Thus, the following claims are all "consolidated" and the amounts are final amounts:

Losses and damage arising out of riots in 1955/1956 (J.D. 17,793); damage to the Agency resulting from the diversion of the Ramallah Road (J.D. 1,639); claim for the cost of electricity consumed by the Arab Legion but charged to the Agency (J.D. 1,336).

The Agency proposes, in due course, to represent formally these claims and to attempt to negotiate a settlement with the Jordan Government.

(d) *Claims against the United Arab Republic*

18. The Agency has only two major claims against the United Arab Republic, both of which relate to the question of the Government's obligation to ensure the safety of Agency installations in the Gaza Strip. The first is a claim for \$68,993 arising from damage to Agency property in the course of riots in 1955; and the second is a claim for \$1,970, arising from similar causes in 1962. Both claims have been rejected by the Government of the United Arab Republic on the ground that the damage was not due to a lack of adequate precautions by the Government. In regard to the 1955 claim, the Government further maintained that the cause of the riots and therefore of the ensuing damage lay in military action by Israel. The Agency has never accepted the rejection of its claims.

(e) *The claim against Lebanon, Jordan and Syria jointly in respect of excess rail charges*

19. The excess rail claim arises out of the fact that by two Agreements between Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and Syria and Jordan on the other, dated 27 June and 5 September 1950 respectively, the three Governments adopted a common policy on the transport of supplies to the refugees in Jordan which had the effect of preventing UNRWA from using the most economical means of transporting these supplies. In effect, UNRWA was made, despite its opposition, to transport the bulk of these supplies by rail. The three Governments recognized in the 1950 Agreements (to which UNRWA was *not* a party) that rail costs were then higher than road costs, since they embodied in those Agreements an understanding to reduce rail costs to the level of road costs. But this reduction was not achieved for many years (and is still not achieved in some sectors) so that over the past sixteen years UNRWA had paid approximately \$US 1.5 million in excess transportation costs.

20. The Agency has no doubt that it is entitled to recover these excess costs from the three Governments which, by their joint and concerted action, have caused them. The fundamental principle common to all United Nations operations is that particular Member States may not, by taxation or other restriction, divert United Nations funds from their intended purpose (in the present case the relief of the refugees) into their own hands or other hands (in this case into the hands of national railway companies). It is this fundamental principle which is reflected in the United Nations Charter, in the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 1946, and also in the Bernadotte Agreement of 21 September 1948, signed by the United Nations Mediator and all three Governments. This last Agreement in fact imposed on the three Governments an obligation to provide "free" transport by rail and road for all supplies to refugees: in practice UNRWA was not only not given free transport but was prevented from using the most economical means of transport available to it at its own cost.

21. The Agency has, at intervals from 1951 onwards, presented claims to the three Governments concerned on an individual basis. Not least

of its difficulties was that there existed no agreed criteria according to which the whole claim might be apportioned between the three Governments. Accordingly, and having raised this matter with the Advisory Commission in February 1967, the Agency communicated with all three Governments by identical notes verbales dated 15 March 1967, proposing a joint meeting between representatives of the Agency and all three Governments. It was made explicit in this note that the Agency was prepared to accept whatever method of apportionment between the three Governments that was agreed between them. Attempts to convene such a joint meeting did not succeed, with only Lebanon indicating its willingness to meet on the dates proposed (and this subject to the agreement of the other two Governments). However, the Agency intends, in the near future, to make further proposals for a joint meeting and will report to the Assembly on the extent to which this very considerable claim has proved susceptible to amicable settlement.

(f) *Claims against Israel*

22. Following the military occupation of Gaza in 1956, the Agency presented certain claims to the Government of Israel, which are listed below. The first three heads of claim relate to damage, death and injury caused to Agency property and personnel as a result of the hostilities. The last two heads relate to certain charges incurred as a result of shipments of Agency supplies through the port of Haifa and railway transportation onwards to Gaza. It was the Agency's understanding that the Government had agreed to meet these charges, although, in the event, the Government has declined to do so in respect of charges incurred after 6 March 1957 (the date of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza). However, since the supplies in question reached Haifa before this date, the Agency has taken the view that these charges are properly the liability of the Government. The heads of claim are the following:

Damage to Rahwa School	\$ US 3,744
Damage to Agency and staff property	319,656
Death and injury to staff members	16,950
Port charges	35,616
Rail charges	8,747

It should be added that the Government has made counter-claims against the Agency for \$ 55,875, this sum representing the value of certain telephone and railway charges and the costs of certain supplies.

23. After detailed discussions in 1960, when certain claims were settled by the Government, the parties failed to reach any final agreement on the settlement of the claims referred to in the preceding paragraph, so that these claims remain to be pursued by the Agency.

ANNEX III

TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN UNRWA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL EMBODIED IN AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS DATED 14 JUNE 1967 FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENABLING UNRWA TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO THE REFUGEES IN AREAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

14 June 1967

Dr. Lawrence Michelmore,
Commissioner-General,
United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

Dear Commissioner-General,

I wish to refer to the conversations I have had with you and your colleagues within the last two days, and to confirm our agreement that at the request of the Israel Government, UNRWA would continue its assistance to the Palestine refugees, with the full co-operation of the Israel authorities, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas.

For its part, the Israel Government will facilitate the task of UNRWA to the best of its ability, subject only to regulations or arrangements which may be necessitated by considerations of military security. On this understanding, we are prepared to agree in principle:

(a) To ensure the protection and security of the personnel, installations and property of UNRWA;

(b) To permit the free movement of UNRWA vehicles into, within and out of Israel and the areas in question;

(c) To permit the international staff of the

Agency to move in, out and within Israel and the areas in question; they will be provided with identity documents and any other passes which might be required;

(d) To permit the local staff of the Agency to move within the areas in question under arrangements made or to be made with the military authorities;

(e) To provide radio, telecommunications and landing facilities;

(f) Pending a further supplementary agreement, to maintain the previously existing financial arrangements with the governmental authorities then responsible for the areas in question, concerning:

(i) Exemptions from customs duties, taxes and charges on importation of supplies, goods and equipment;

(ii) Provision free of charge of warehousing, labour for offloading and handling, and transport by rail or road in the areas under our control;

(iii) Such other costs to the Agency as were previously met by the governmental authorities concerned;

(g) To recognize that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946, to which Israel is a party, shall govern the relations between the Government and UNRWA in all that concerns UNRWA's functions.

The present letter and your acceptance in writing will be considered by the Government of Israel and by UNRWA as a provisional agreement which will remain in force until replaced or cancelled.

I have the honour to be,

Michael Comay
Political Adviser to the Foreign Minister
and Ambassador-at-Large

14 June 1967

His Excellency Michael Comay,
Political Adviser to the Foreign Minister of Israel
and Ambassador-at-Large.

Your Excellency,

I refer to your letter of today's date, and wish to confirm that UNRWA is willing to con-

tinue its assistance to the Palestine refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas on the basis proposed in your letter. This will be subject to such further supplementary agreements as may be required, and to detailed arrangements which UNRWA representatives will make with the authorities in the two areas concerned.

Naturally, this co-operation implies no commitment or position by UNRWA with regard to the status of any of the areas in question, or of any instrument relating to them, but is concerned solely with the continuation of its humanitarian task.

As I explained in our conversation, the facilities enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (g) of your letter are essential if the Agency is to operate effectively. For this reason I expect that such restrictions as may for the time being be placed on the full use of those facilities will be removed as soon as considerations of military security permit this.

I agree that your letter and this reply constitute a provisional agreement between UNRWA and the Government of Israel to remain in force until replaced or cancelled. UNRWA's agreement is subject to any relevant instructions or resolutions emanating from the United Nations.

I have the honour to be,

Yours faithfully,

Laurence Michelmore
Commissioner-General

275

Statement by UNRWA Commissioner-General Michelmore in the Special Political Committee, December 11, 1967.¹

1. Mr. Chairman, the year which has passed since the Special Political Committee last considered the problems of the Palestine refugees has been one of crisis in the Middle East, and crisis in the lives of the refugees, and other inhabitants of the area. Thousands who were living in areas which were occupied by Israel in June have moved elsewhere. These new refugees

¹ U.N. doc. A/SPC/121.

may number 350,000 or 400,000. Many of these families are living in tents, and even more are dependent on the respective Governments, or on UNRWA, or on other organizations for their food, blankets and clothing, for medical care and the protection of their health, and for schooling for their children. Others who are still living where they were before June are in greater need than they were before because of the disruptions of the economies of the areas where they live, and the loss of their jobs, the freezing of bank accounts and the decrease in remittances from other countries.

2. As the Special Political Committee begins its review of UNRWA's programme for the Palestine Arab refugees, I feel sure that uppermost in all our minds is the earnest hope that the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (S/RES/242) may indeed mark a turning point in the history of the Middle East. Of particular interest for us is the Security Council's affirmation of "the necessity... for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." Everyone interested in the refugees must look forward to the translation into action of that declaration.

3. Meanwhile, the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children who make up the Palestine refugee community must go on: UNRWA must continue its day-to-day work of meeting the human needs, now so much greater than before. Indeed, I hope that the very presence of UNRWA in the area will be a steadying and reassuring influence at a time when emotional stress, malaise, anxiety, and uncertainty about the future are so widespread.

4. This year, I fear that I may take up more of the Committee's time than is customary on these occasions; but I believe that you, Sir, and the members of the Committee will wish to have an up-to-date report on the situation of those refugees who were in one way or another affected by the hostilities of last June, and on the resulting problems—sometimes of a complex nature—that are now confronting UNRWA. I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible.

5. UNRWA estimates that, after taking into account the 14,000 persons who returned to the West Bank area before 1 September, in accordance with arrangements made by the two Governments concerned and the International Com-

mittee of the Red Cross, the total figure of displaced persons remaining in East Jordan is now 577,000. To the 332,000 UNRWA refugees living on the East Bank before 1 June 1967 must be added 245,000 newly displaced persons: they include 110,000 Palestinians formerly registered with UNRWA on the West Bank; 120,000 other West Bank residents; and 15,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip. The problem is constantly becoming more acute; the Jordan Government has indicated that some 200 or 300 persons are daily crossing the River Jordan from west to east, the majority of them now coming from the Gaza Strip. Movement across the river in the opposite direction is said to be negligible.

6. I have already referred in my annual report to the humanitarian concern for tens of thousands of displaced persons who are facing the coming winter in the misery and discomfort of the temporary tented camps or in the even more precarious conditions outside the camps and have urged, on grounds of common humanity, that they should be allowed to return to their previous places of residence, where UNRWA has shelter, health centres, schools and other facilities, and can give them more adequate assistance. In the last few weeks, reports have reached me of heavy storm damage to the emergency camps. All but one of the tented camps have now been transferred to the Jordan Valley where some 51,000 persons both UNRWA-registered and non-registered, are now living under canvas. But even in the relatively less severe climate of the Valley, winter brings high winds, sandstorms and violent rain and only recently two more camps have been severely damaged and many of their inhabitants rendered shelterless. Work is now in hand, and will shortly be completed, to build concrete bases, skirting walls and surface water drainage around the tents to make them as weather-proof as possible and to replace some of the more fragile tents with framework shelters. Meanwhile, the Government and UNRWA have joined forces to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical and educational services for all displaced persons, both outside and inside the camps. But the storm damage in recent weeks has emphasized the precarious conditions under which the refugees are living in the tented camps and the serious hazard to their health, and particularly to the health of the women and children. With technical guidance

from the World Health Organization officers seconded to our staff, we are doing our best to guard against the possibility of epidemics, but it may not be possible to escape altogether the dangers which threaten. Babies and small children are, of course, especially vulnerable and we have found that many infants below two years are underweight, and therefore predisposed to illness. Not only do the refugees living in these unsatisfactory and sometimes wretched conditions face a cruel winter; we have seen and deplored only recently that they have also had to endure hazards to life itself, as a result of continued hostilities along the cease-fire river line.

7. In Syria, too, one of the four new tented camps housing 6,000 of the 16,000 Palestine refugees from the area occupied by Israel has suffered severely from storm damage. The UNRWA/UNESCO schools, which during the summer provided shelter for the newly displaced UNRWA refugees, are now back to normal, but new schools have had to be improvised and existing schools used on a double-shift basis to cope with the influx of refugee children from the south-western part of the country. Help for Syrian refugees, said to number 100,000, is being given by the Government, with some assistance from the FAO/World Food Programme, UNICEF, and other organizations.

8. In the United Arab Republic, I understand that the total number of persons who were displaced from areas occupied by Israel is now estimated by the Government to be 60,000 to 70,000. A much larger number of persons, perhaps as many as 300,000, is said to have moved from the West Bank of the Suez Canal to locations farther to the west. UNRWA's assistance has up to the present been limited to 3,000-4,000 young registered refugees from the Gaza Strip. The Government has now asked us to extend help to other needy persons of Palestinian origin—believed to number some 7,000—whose residence was Gaza before the June hostilities. We have arranged that UNRWA staff attached to our Cairo office should join with government officials to obtain accurate information about the number and whereabouts of these persons, both UNRWA refugees and local residents of Gaza not previously registered with the Agency. This information will, I hope, provide the basis for a decision whether

UNRWA assistance should be extended to this group (under paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)), and subject, of course, to any specific further directives from the General Assembly. In order to ease the acute difficulties of young Palestinians in the United Arab Republic who are unable to return to their homes and are endeavouring to pursue their studies, the Agency has set aside for them thirty-five of the fifty or so university scholarships it formerly allocated to Gaza refugees and plans to assist the Government of the United Arab Republic in respect of secondary school facilities, by financial assistance proportionate to the number of displaced Palestinian students at this level now in the United Arab Republic, in relation to UNRWA's former annual subsidy to the Gaza authorities for secondary schooling.

9. In the occupied areas of the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip, various problems relating to our education services have emerged since I submitted my annual report. In particular the question of textbooks used in UNRWA/UNESCO schools has received considerable publicity, some of it misinformed, and I believe that it requires clarification here. The educational activities of UNRWA and UNESCO on behalf of the Palestine refugees have consistently and deliberately been integrated into the educational systems of the host countries. As a general rule, UNRWA/UNESCO schools follow the same curricula and use the same textbooks as the government schools, a prerequisite for maintaining the essential unity in any system of education. So far as the general structure of the educational system is concerned, the subjects to be taught, and the sequence in which they should be taken, I understand that the Israel authorities have not proposed any change. I also understand that they have not objected to the continuance of the same cadre of teachers. The Israel authorities have, however, raised with UNRWA the question of textbooks in use in our schools in territories now occupied by Israel and have protested against the inclusion in certain of these books of passages which they regard as indoctrination with hatred of Israel. Subsequently, the Israel authorities informed UNRWA that they could not approve the use of certain books and wished to delete passages they considered objectionable in other books. My latest information is that our schools now have

eighty-nine out of the 120 textbooks normally in use in the West Bank area; nine out of the seventy-seven books in the Gaza Strip. These books have not been modified. After having reviewed the situation, the Executive Board of UNESCO, at its session held in October-November, approved a resolution authorizing the Director-General of UNESCO to co-operate with UNRWA in educational matters wherever UNRWA educational establishments may be available, with observance of the principles of international law regarding occupied territories and on the basis of certain principles recalled in the resolution. UNRWA and UNESCO officials are studying this resolution, and how it can be implemented, and I hope in the very near future to have the opportunity of discussing these questions with the Director-General of UNESCO. Meanwhile, during the first weeks of this school year, the attendance of students in UNRWA/UNESCO schools was considerably below normal levels, especially in the West Bank area. I am glad to report, however, that attendance has increased, and about 80 to 90 per cent of the children are in school in Gaza and in the West Bank area. Attendance at the UNRWA vocational and teacher-training centres also underwent some fluctuations, but is now close to the full capacity of these centres. Another difficulty, as yet unresolved, is that of the teachers (as well as other staff members and students) caught outside the area of hostilities by the events of last June, and who have not yet been able to return to their homes and duty stations.

10. At the beginning of September, a senior UNRWA member was able to visit for the first time the Jolan Heights and Quneitra areas of south-western Syria. He reported that all UNRWA-registered refugees had fled, but that the Agency's property and supplies were substantially intact. Arrangements have been made with the Israel authorities to move the supplies to areas where they can be used.

11. I believe the Committee would wish me to offer some comment on a matter that has also received much public attention—the alleged discrepancies between UNRWA's statistics and the results of the census carried out last September by the Government of Israel in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank area, excluding Jerusalem.

UNRWA did not participate in this census, having been informed that its primary purpose was to enumerate the general population, including refugees, as a basis for providing essential services. However, the results of the census, published on 4 October, included a comparison with UNRWA statistics and were presented in such a way as to give considerable prominence to discrepancies between the two sets of figures.

12. The fact that the purpose of the Government's census, in so far as it related to refugees, was to provide information on a different group of persons from the groups covered by UNRWA's registration statistics, has rendered any exercise in comparability very difficult. I shall be glad to discuss this matter outside the Committee with any delegate who may be specially interested in it. I would merely point out here that UNRWA has never claimed that its statistics are an accurate record of the refugee population; they are no more than a record of the number of persons registered with the Agency in various groups with different entitlements—to rations, health services, education, and so forth. Different categories of registration reflect these differences of entitlement.

13. Three separate estimates were given in the census report, dealing with place of birth, camp population and registration with, or receipt of aid from, UNRWA. A round-figure estimate was given of the number of persons in families whose head stated that he had been born in Israel. The definition which UNRWA uses in order to determine eligibility for its services, on the other hand, is "a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years immediately preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of that conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood" and this definition has been extended to cover the children of such persons. Since less than 40 per cent of the refugee population live in camps, the estimate of camp population does not appear to be relevant to any general comparison with UNRWA figures. It is the figure for the number of persons registered with or receiving aid from UNRWA that offers the best basis of comparison with the Agency's statistics. In Gaza, the Agency estimates that there are now about 270,000 persons eligible for rations and 234,000 actual ration recipients; the Israel census figure for

persons who reported that they were registered with UNRWA is 250,000. In the West Bank area the Agency's best estimate is that there are now approximately 270,000 refugees, of whom 182,000 are receiving rations: the census figure is 180,000, although this omits about 40,000 refugees in the Jerusalem area.

14. At this stage the true size of the discrepancies and the factors giving rise to them cannot be defined with any degree of certainty.

15. However, we have no wish to engage in an arid controversy over the validity of our own or anyone else's statistics. The Israel Government has offered to provide UNRWA, through the government statistician and his staff, with whatever clarification and data may be desired concerning the census. Arrangements are being discussed for a joint study on a technical level regarding appropriate methods for checking the refugee statistics in the light of the census. The important question for UNRWA, as always, is how best to improve the accuracy of its registration records so as to ensure proper distribution of rations and services. The Agency arranged that for the November distribution of rations, heads of families should appear, bringing with them the census slips issued during the census. Lack of a census slip did not result in a refusal to issue rations, but in such cases the Agency is carrying out a specific verification of the family's entitlement. The results of these reviews will not be available for some weeks yet. Other procedures for improving the UNRWA records will be examined and instituted as and when feasible.

16. Some progress can also be reported in rectifying the ration rolls in East Jordan, as a result of the clear necessity, during the emergency conditions following the June hostilities, of ensuring that food be distributed directly to the intended beneficiaries. Merchants are no longer able to traffic in ration cards. The present procedures have revealed false or duplicate registrations and absentee ration-card holders, and the necessary corrections have been made in the lists.

17. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say a few words on refugee education in its wider aspects. UNRWA remains convinced that education is the key to opportunity for the younger generation of refugees. They have started out on life with cruel disadvantages; as a result of the

recent upheaval, the lives of many of them have been disrupted for the second time. But in our modern technological age, there is much that education and training can do to offset these disadvantages. We are faced today with a more urgent need than ever before to promote the process of individual rehabilitation of the refugees; we may be faced tomorrow, as we must all hope, with the prospect of economic recovery and widening possibilities of development and progress in the area as a whole. UNRWA therefore believes that, after taking action to ensure survival and relieve immediate distress, it should devote as much as possible of any special contributions received in connexion with the emergency and its aftermath to improving and expanding its educational services so that the refugees can be equipped to take advantage of any employment opportunities that may come their way, wherever they may be living. I am glad to be able to report that, thanks to the generosity of certain governmental and non-governmental donors, and with their approval, it will be possible to implement in part the proposals referred to in paragraphs 12 and 60 of my annual report. Plans are now being drawn up for the creation of two new training centres on the East Bank of Jordan and for the expansion of the existing vocational training centre in Gaza. The centre at Homs in Syria will be reopened as a vocational training centre and the centres at Ramallah (West Bank) and Sibliin (Lebanon) will be expanded. If funds become available, other badly needed improvements to schools, laboratories and libraries will be carried out. Indeed, we have hopes that special contributions for these purposes may be forthcoming in amounts large enough to increase the capacity of UNRWA training centres and the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education (which conducts in-service training of teachers) by 40 to 50 per cent; of replacing all unsatisfactory school buildings over a period of about three years; of eliminating over-crowding and double shifting in the class-rooms, and of improving the teacher/pupil ratios.

18. This brings me to the question of the financing of UNRWA's programme as a whole, and the somewhat paradoxical situation that while funds are forthcoming to expand and improve the facilities for education and training, and in certain respects the health programme,

there is continuing and serious concern about the adequacy of funds needed to carry on essential basic services. In another context we might call these the "bread and butter" services, but there is no butter for the Palestine refugees. UNRWA food aid consists of flour, some rice, sugar, lentils or beans, and cooking oil. It provides 1,500 calories a day, and costs only four cents a day. Only two thirds of the registered refugees receive this ration; there are now 284,000 children whose claims are deferred because of the ration ceilings. Health services, both preventive and curative, are available to almost the entire registered population and cost about one cent a day per person. Basic education is provided at a cost of something like \$35 a year per pupil in the elementary grades and perhaps \$60 a year at the preparatory level (grades 7 to 9). These are truly minimal costs, but in total they add up to the figures shown in the budget presented in part II of the annual report.

19. That budget was prepared four months ago, on the basis of highly conjectural assumptions regarding the tasks that UNRWA would have to perform in 1968, in carrying on its normal activities and in meeting new, emergency needs. Since then, UNRWA has been faced with new demands, especially in the case of newly displaced persons, which have increased its expense this year, and which will require greater expenditures also in 1968.

20. The future is still full of uncertainties to such an extent that I doubt if it would really help the Committee if we were now to submit revised budget estimates, as we would be substituting for one set of highly conjectural figures another set which would still be based on conjecture. I am sure, however, that the total needs, as we would now estimate them, would be greater by something like \$1.5 million. The total budget for 1968, for normal activities and emergency services but not including the expansion of education and training services for which we may receive specially earmarked contributions, would be in the order of \$47.5 million, compared to the previous estimate of about \$46 million. Fortunately, we have received some additional contributions from both Governments and non-governmental sources, which approximately offset the increased costs. Among these contributions, some of which have been earmarked for the expansion of education

and training, were \$330,000 from the Government of Israel and a total of over \$3 million from non-governmental sources, including \$2.5 million from the American organization NEED, \$207,000 from British voluntary agencies, \$136,000 from Swedish sources and \$60,000 from Belgian organizations. Word has just reached me that a further \$1 million has been received from NEED bringing the total from that organization to \$3.5 million.

21. Since UNRWA relies mainly on governmental contributions for its basic support, the most significant question is how much will be needed from Governments, and how this compares with the level of support which Governments have provided in recent years. I would still estimate the amount needed from Governments at about \$41.6 million which is about \$7.5 million above the level of contributions before the emergency.

22. At the Pledging Conference held on 6 December, thirty-three Governments made pledges for 1968 totalling \$26.3 million. I would like to express appreciation to all of these Governments for their continued support, and in particular to those pledging increased help in 1968. I hope that in due course other Governments which have been regular contributors in the past, will be able to announce their pledges. I am happy to report that the Government of Iraq has subsequently announced that it will contribute \$100,000 again in 1968. Also some Governments supplement their regular pledges by allocations from their technical assistance funds, and I hope that this may be possible again in 1968. If these hopes materialize, and if we take into account the balance available from emergency contributions made in 1967, plus donations expected from non-governmental sources and miscellaneous income, we might envision total resources of about \$40 million. Even on these rather optimistic assumptions we would be confronted with a short-fall of \$7 million or \$7.5 million. Our crucial problem will be how to close that gap.

23. I should make it clear that the budget presented in the annual report, and the higher figures I have mentioned today, would by no means provide for the needs of all the persons displaced during 1967. Assistance for many of

these persons (not previously registered with UNRWA) has come from other sources, including non-governmental organizations, as well as a considerable volume of bilateral governmental help to the Governments of countries where the newly displaced persons are living. I should like to mention, moreover, two United Nations programmes that are giving substantial help. The FAO/World Food Programme has supplied food to provide rations for a three-month period for 100,000 persons in Jordan, 100,000 in the Syrian Arab Republic, and 35,000 in the United Arab Republic. In the last few days, the Director-General of FAO has authorized an extension of this assistance for a further three months. UNICEF has given emergency aid amounting to \$ 500,000 and is now considering additional assistance of an equivalent amount in support of feeding, health and educational programmes benefiting mothers and children.

24. The further extension of emergency help by the World Food Programme and UNICEF beyond that which is now being arranged is unlikely, I understand, because of limitations applying to this kind of assistance.

25. Mr. Chairman, in the concluding paragraph of the introduction to my annual report, five questions were suggested for the consideration of the General Assembly.

26. The first was "Is it desired that UNRWA should maintain its existing services during 1968 on the same basis as before the recent hostilities?" I hope and believe that the General Assembly will answer "Yes." These are vital services, essential to the lives, health and welfare of the refugees, and conducted at minimal cost.

27. Secondly, the General Assembly was asked whether it wished UNRWA to continue in 1968 giving help on a temporary and emergency basis to new groups of beneficiaries in urgent need. Here again, I hope that the General Assembly will answer affirmatively, and will give us as much guidance as possible on the nature and extent of the assistance that it would like UNRWA to provide.

28. The third question was "Is it desired that UNRWA should seek to expand and improve its existing education and training services, particularly in those areas severely affected by the economic impact of recent events?" It is

clear, I think, from my annual report and from what I have said today that UNRWA believes that the most constructive and lasting contribution that it can make to the young refugees is to teach them skills which will give them a chance for a better future, wherever they may live. As I have explained, we now have good hopes that substantial donations will be offered to expand and improve education and training.

29. The fourth question put to the General Assembly is a crucial one: "How is UNRWA to be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out whatever tasks may be assigned to it by the General Assembly?" For several years now, beginning with 1963, income has fallen short of what is needed, even on the basis of extreme austerity, to carry on the basic, essential UNRWA programme. So far as the regular UNRWA programme is concerned, by the end of this year, the cumulative deficit of the last five years will probably reach \$ 9 million, and our reserves will be reduced to a dangerously low level. I hope that the Special Political Committee will find a way to assure adequate funds for the future.

70. Lastly, the General Assembly was asked, in the event that adequate funds could not be secured, to provide guidance as to what action the Agency should take to bring its expenditure and income into balance. Clearly, the answer involves political decisions modifying the essence of the programme hitherto carried out and goes far beyond the administrative level on which I and my colleagues work. I therefore earnestly seek the General Assembly's advice on this very difficult question.

276

Resolutions on Assistance to the Refugees Adopted by the General Assembly, December 19, 1967.¹

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/2341 (XXII).

(V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1964, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1356 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;

4. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;

5. *Directs attention* to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

6. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;

7. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and, therefore, urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 15 September 1967,

Taking note also of the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

Concerned about the continued human suffering as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2252 (ES-V);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of that resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious

need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities;

3. *Appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

277

Draft Resolution on Appointment of a U.N. Custodian Not Voted-Upon by the General Assembly, December 19, 1967.¹

The General Assembly,

¹ U.N. doc. A/7004, Dec. 16, 1967. Adopted by the Special Political Committee by a roll-call vote of 42 to 38, with 24 abstentions, this draft was not put to the vote in the General Assembly following a formal motion to that effect by the Nigerian representative who explained that, since the draft had been taken up in the closing stages of the Committee's discussions, there had not been enough time to give it the thorough examination that a number of

Considering that the Palestine Arab refugees are entitled to their property and to the income derived from their property in conformity with the principles of justice and equity,

Recalling its resolution 394 (V) of 14 December 1950, by which it directed the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, in consultation with the parties concerned, to prescribe measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the Palestine Arab refugees,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps to have a custodian appointed to protect and administer Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel and to receive the income derived therefrom on behalf of the rightful owners;

2. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned to render all facilities and assistance to the Secretary-General to make the task and functioning of the custodian effective;

3. *Requests* the custodian to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on the fulfilment of his tasks.

members felt was necessary. The Assembly agreed to the motion without objection. (*U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 51).

Arab World

278

Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at the Opening of the Third Conference of Labour Unions in Support of Aden and Occupied South Yemen.¹ [Excerpts]

Damascus, January 15, 1967

Imperialism brought Israel into existence to make use of her, along with the reactionary regimes, to protect its interests. It provided Israel with very extensive protection and support, with moral and material aid, the latter being both military and financial. For Israel is its last bulwark, and a base which is essential for the protection of its monopolies and for the actual practice of imperialism, both old and new, not only in the Arab homeland, but in Asia and Africa too.

What imperialism had in mind in establishing Israel was that she should be a permanent base from which it could cast its nets. It hoped that through Israel it would be able to maintain the fragmentation of the Arab homeland. Imperialism also intended to use Israel as an instrument of terrorisation and intimidation. It was imperialism that supplied Israel with arms and incited her to commit aggression, in the service of its own aims and plans.

Israel's aggressive actions, which our gallant army crushed last week, were part of imperialism's overall plan, and a new proof of Israel's close involvement with imperialist interests. The question of Israel is not a Jewish question, as Zionist propaganda claims. Judaism as a religion is one thing, and Zionism as a form of imperialist invasion is another. It was from our homeland, after all, that the messages of all three revealed religions went forth into the world. It is, rather, a question of an imperialist invasion of our homeland, the dispersal of our people, and the exploitation of our wealth behind the screen of Judaism.

The Zionist invasion of Palestine must be seen as constituting the final and most ruthless stage of imperialism, because it replaced an indigenous people, who have indisputable rights to their homeland, by an alien group of usurpers. Thus the Zionist invasion is a greatly magnified

picture of what is happening in South Africa and Rhodesia.

The Revolution of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, which has achieved the organic cohesion of the toiling masses, of peasants, workers, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and wage-earners, has succeeded, through this cohesion, and in the name of the people, in confronting in a revolutionary manner the imperialist threat embodied in Israel.

It has declared, in the name of the millions of our people, that a popular war of liberation is the only way in which Palestine can be liberated from the Zionist-imperialist invasion. It has opposed Israeli aggression with well-aimed blows directed against the bases of aggression in the occupied territory of Palestine, in execution of our certain resolve, which the Party has constantly reiterated, that our response to aggression shall be to strike the aggressors in the heart of Israel.

Imperialism, which has armed Israel and incited her to aggression, has also employed the reactionary Arab regimes in its conspiracies against our Revolution. It has tried to encircle us and isolate us from the rest of the Arab homeland, in a desperate attempt to stem the revolutionary tide, and to prevent the spread of the liberal movement throughout the great Arab homeland.

But such an attempt is indeed desperate, and foredoomed to failure, because we here in Syria are part of the greater Arab people. Imperialism has, indeed, succeeded in dividing up our homeland, but it is incapable of dividing the one Arab people, erecting ideological barriers between the Arabs or preventing the interplay of revolutionary and liberationist ideas throughout the whole of the Arab homeland.

Long may imperialism remain attached to its fatal dream, which must inevitably lead it towards its inevitable end at the hands of the masses of our people in every part of the Arab homeland.

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, Damascus, 16/1/1967.

279

Address by Syrian Ba'th Party Assistant Secretary-General Jadid During a Visit to the U.S.S.R.¹ [Excerpts]**Moscow, January 24, 1967**

In our homeland today we are being subjected to immense imperialist pressures, and Israel, the great imperialist base in our homeland, is concentrating her forces on the frontiers of Syria and preparing for aggression, in full coordination with the oil monopolies which are angry at the revolutionary government's demand that they should revise accounts and pay the people their dues in full.

Israel is a great bank of world capitalism, a military base to protect its capital, through which neo-imperialism infiltrates into Africa, in particular, and Asia in general. When we learn that Israeli investments in Africa are greater than the revenues of the Israeli government, we can understand where these investments come from, and how imperialism, which has been driven out by the struggling African peoples, is trying to dupe these peoples, who are suspicious of the great imperialist powers, through Israel, which, while pretending to be eager for peace and to assist the peoples of the world, is really trying to dominate the economy of Africa in the interests of world capitalism and imperialism.

The existence of these bases of aggression and imperialism's continued plundering and tyranny are a constant threat to peace. Given our love for peace, we must all ensure that it is permanently established, through our unremitting struggle to eliminate colonialism, imperialist monopolies and all forms of exploitation from the whole world.

My friends; The Arab homeland is regarded by imperialism as the first and most important area for oil monopolies, the strategic base for the renewed domination of the peoples of Asia and Africa and the threatening of the friendly socialist coun-

¹ *Ibid.*, 26/1/1967. This address was delivered on the occasion of a visit to the U.S.S.R. from 20 to 26 January by a delegation representing the Ba'th Party in response to an invitation by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

tries. With these ends in view imperialism has planted its bases in many parts of the Arab homeland, established subservient reactionary regimes, and made Israel its principal instrument for the protection of these monopolies and corrupt regimes. It also uses Israel as its tool in the implementation of conspiracies against the progressive revolutionary Arab countries and for the crushing of movements of popular struggle in the reactionary countries.

Our scientific and revolutionary response to this imperialist strategy has been the slogan of the meeting of the progressive Arab forces which has been adopted by the Ba'th Party. We have also defined the principal contradiction between the toiling masses and the progressive forces linked to them by bonds of class, ideology and struggle on the one hand, and reaction, Zionism and imperialism on the other. This broad and well-defined front is the basis of the struggle in which our Party is engaged, side by side with all the toiling Arab masses, to pour these immense resources into the stream of the struggle for socialism, liberation and unity.

280

Speech by Jordanian King Husayn on Certain Arab Problems.² [Excerpts]**Jerusalem, January 25, 1967**

There was the first Summit Conference; pretences were abandoned, there was frankness, and we thought we had made a new start and turned over a new leaf, and that the new start was an auspicious one. We have always believed that the only way to solve problems in the Arab world is for its leaders to meet at the highest level to discuss and settle these problems. The Unified Command was set up, we played our part in setting up the Liberation Organisation, and we made a new start with sincere enthusiasm, forgetting the past for the sake of the interests and welfare of the Arab nation. We thought that the word of any president or leader was final

² *Al-Jihad*, Jerusalem, 26/1/1967.

as regards any situation, and that it could not be withdrawn or changed. At these meetings—I, for my part, did not regard myself as representing this country only; on the contrary, I thought it my duty to try to solve the problems existing between the other leaders and presidents—we made great efforts, we had high hopes, and made a start with the best of intentions. We met a second time, and imagined that the gravity of the stage that our nation was passing through, especially as regards the Palestine Question, would ensure continued agreement and continued cooperation. We thought that no one could possibly allow the clock to be put back after that, which would mean that we should lose even the reputation we had acquired in the eyes of the world as members of a single nation meeting again to work for the recovery of its rights and to achieve its objectives. Well, we did set to work, and we did indeed make considerable progress.

Before the first Summit Conference there had been problems and difficulties that worried us and that still worry us to this day. The most prominent of these problems was that of the Yemen, which had been turned into a bloodbath by the constant clashes between Arab troops and the Arab people of that country far away from the real front, where these troops should have been, on the frontiers of the occupied territories. This problem was in existence before the first Summit Conference, and, I am sorry to say, it is still in existence today. Then suddenly the Summit Conference, unified Arab action, and all we had achieved, were threatened. The Conference was sabotaged by the Arab President and leader who had summoned it in the first place. Naturally this had a great effect on our work and our hopes. After that we started going backwards fast, and things went from bad to worse until we reached the situation we find ourselves in today. At a time when we were awaiting the support and aid that we always expected for this country and for the Arab nation, we found that they had embarked upon a new path and adopted new methods which, they imagined, would lead to the destruction of this country, this country, which endured so much in the past before the Summit Conferences, and which had been exposed to so many trials during that period.

Efforts were made to sow dissension among

the inhabitants of this united country, who had stood fast together, and offered their lives and shed their blood freely, united in heart and in action. Efforts were made to sow dissension among you and to destroy the unity of your ranks to such a degree that it was only your realisation of what they were trying to do that prevented the occurrence of another disaster, whose effect on our nation might have been even greater than what happened in 1948 and what we have endured up to now.

From 1953 until today I have firmly opposed any suggestion that the people of this country are divided into Easterners and Westerners, or people of the North and of the South. For if there is no endurance, no unity, no work or planning, disaster will befall us again. The map is in front of you; it is a very simple matter. The enemy's present objective is the West Bank; after that it will be the East Bank, and after that they will expand throughout the Arab homeland to achieve their aims and ambitions. In 1948 we joined together in the fullest sense of the word, for we advocated unity; we joined together in the interests of our nation to achieve the aims we advocated and believed in. We joined together to serve, to build, to remain firm in the face of the challenge. And we did; there is no need for me to delve into the subject, for all of you are familiar with it. Once again this people, through its grasp of the situation, has succeeded in closing the door through which the enemy is trying to enter, to bring about a new calamity, a new disaster. When we met in Morocco the Unified Command was doing well and had progressed rapidly; so had Arab action. There was real appreciation of the situation. This made it the duty of all of us to take action in every part of the Arab homeland and to dedicate all our efforts and all our strength to the achievement of our aim, which was, of course, as you know, to stop the enemy's advance and to recover our rights. A time limit was specified in which to do this, for it was believed that if we achieved nothing during this period, the enemy might well spring new surprises on us, and acquire arms and make other gains which would render all our efforts vain. Then we should be back where we started.

In this country we set to work from the very first moment, and when I went to Cairo for the

first time I took with me full studies of the military situation. For, as far as we were able, we were always working and improving, planning and hoping that we might achieve such success as circumstances and our capacity allowed. So we made a start, and achieved much; we set to work in the proper way, for it had been agreed at the last Conference that certain measures should be taken, that the potential be provided and that effort be expended to make us strong enough to have a real effect on the situation, which, for us, was a matter of life and death.

It was also essential that the prevailing atmosphere in Arab relations should be improved.

Of course, our capacity was to a certain extent limited, and to meet this deficiency it was essential that there should be the utmost in cooperation between all of us. The problem of the Yemen had to be solved, Arab troops returned to the positions they should have been occupying, and the internal problems that beset most of the Arab countries solved. Naturally all this required the maximum of cooperation at all levels and in all fields if we were to achieve our aims. But what happened? The exact opposite. Once again, there is no need for me to tell you who was responsible. From what you have heard and read, you all know how the Summit Conference was sabotaged, and how all these problems have remained unsolved to this day.

As-Samu' was not unexpected. Two or three weeks before As-Samu', in fact, as a result of the situation prevailing on the armistice line between our brothers in Syria and our enemies in Israel, we rather felt that the next blow might well be directed at us, here in Jordan.

The question of the commandos or infiltration into the occupied territories is also a matter which was thoroughly studied at the Summit Conferences. It was also studied at Unified Command level. It was agreed that, at this stage, when we are working at building up our strength, it was only natural that the enemy should be watching us and waiting for us to provide him with a justification to force us into battle before we were ready. Clear and explicit instructions were issued forbidding infiltration into the occupied area at this stage. These operations had begun at about the time of the first Summit Conference, and at the very beginning we actually suspected

that the enemy might have been fabricating some of these incidents to be able to accuse us of being responsible for them, to justify a large-scale operation, as happened in 1956.

This is what was agreed on, and we were carrying out what was agreed on at the Summit Conferences and the instructions of the Unified Command. But a certain amount of tension arose, and incidents took place in the North that reminded us of 1956. At that time our villages, guard posts and positions were constantly being attacked, and then suddenly there came the major operation directed against Egypt with the intention of destroying the Egyptian army, opening the Gulf of Aqaba and bringing in U.N. forces.

We studied the situation. Certainly every one of us understood that the enemy's objective was this country, and the West Bank in particular. Our country was growing daily stronger, and our presence in this territory only twelve kilometres from the sea was a threat to our enemies. They were afraid of the growing strength of our nation, and there can be no doubt that they had their eyes on it. We thought that the situation on the armistice line in the North had been brought about simply to distract our attention in that direction, so that we might be taken by surprise somewhere else. So we took all possible precautions. We thought that perhaps Hebron, or part of it, might be the objective of some kind of operation, so we restored the forces there to their previous strength, and there was a state of complete preparedness all along the armistice line. How? When? Where? we asked ourselves. We had no idea. And then the raid took place. The strange thing is that the morale of the people of As-Samu' was higher than that of the people anywhere else in the country, as we found out when we visited them after the fighting. There can be no doubt that the enemy, or any one else, given a huge striking force, can penetrate to a short distance from his starting point to destroy and to do anything he pleases. But the land and air forces that we sent, although we felt that it was a suicidal operation, did their duty in a manner that does honour to every inhabitant of this country and to every Arab.

It was, and still is, my opinion, that the object of the operation was...to strike at the morale of the people of this country and destroy

their confidence in their capacity to endure. The great surprise was the way our brother Arabs attacked us. For about two weeks after the As-Samu' incident we had nothing but abuse and sabotage attempts in this country, and it was only the resolution of its inhabitants that stopped them. Nevertheless, these incidents kept us busy at a time when we should have been considering how to reorganise ourselves and prepare ourselves for another attack.

These attempts were aimed at destroying the confidence of the population in those whose duty it is to protect them, in their armed forces; at destroying the soldier's confidence in his arms, in his capacity to act and endure. It seemed as though attempts were being made to prepare the ground for the enemy, so that if he embarked on a new operation everything would be ready for him, so that he could gain his objective with the minimum of losses. There was a certain amount of hysteria, yet you managed to put an end to these attempts, for this sort of thing must be checked now and at all times. . . .

At the Summit Conferences we certainly found appreciation for this country, its stand and its resolution, and aid was promised to enable us to build up our forces to a specified standard. Indeed, many of our brothers complain from time to time that there is now rather too much pressure from taxes and so on. I hope very much that we shall be able to reduce them, but our responsibilities must be borne. I regret very much having to say that a large part of the aid which we are supposed to receive, with which we are to pay for the arms we have ordered—for the understanding is that the arms we have bought are to be paid for in instalments, otherwise the arrival of the arms may be delayed—has not reached us. Only a little of this aid has reached us; what happened in the days of the Arab Command established in 1956 is happening all over again; I regret to say that some of our brothers are procrastinating and trying to evade their obligations. But naturally we are meeting our obligations; we are getting everything we have undertaken to get and everything we feel will increase the strength of our forces—we shall get it and continue to do so. So I hope that you appreciate

how precarious is the situation, and that this is the only reason for our feeling that we must tighten our belts a little, so that we may be confident that it is impossible for our enemies to achieve their aims. Moreover, during this trip of mine¹ and during future visits to other Arab countries, I am going to make every possible effort to ensure that we receive the aid and support we need to increase our capacity to endure and do our duty in a proper manner. The amounts needed are not small, but we have every reason to hope that our brother Arabs also appreciate that this country is the bastion that defends them and that they have a duty to it. I am confident that most of them will not be found wanting.

After As-Samu' and during the last few days arms and equipment have been reaching us, and this will go on for some time. I must say that I was surprised to hear what you, too, must have heard, that the arms are coming across Israel, though of course, as long as we get the modern arms we need we do not care from whom or whence they come, but I think that the real point is that those who are making these allegations are none other than those who are allowing the planes to fly across their air space on their way to us. These planes, which bear 30 tons and more of arms and equipment each, are reaching Jordan via the air space of the United Arab Republic. Of course we don't mind where they come from, as long as they come quickly, but in fact they are not coming through Israel.

What about our attitude to the entry of troops? As you know, several unanimous decisions were taken at the Defence Council, and our position is that we call for the implementation of these decisions. And in fact the forces that are supposed to come, and about which there is so much controversy, are small, and intended for defence purposes only.

A short time ago I referred to the growth of our armed forces. At the first Summit Conference the estimate given was that we needed so many brigades to enable us to check an enemy attack long enough for our brother Arabs to come to our aid, after which we could move on to a new phase. Jordan did not then have such forces at its command. Since that date nearly all the

¹ King Husayn was speaking before his departure for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

required troops—Jordanian ones—have become available here in Jordan. In this connection, I must tell you that photocopies of documents and extensive information has been reaching us from certain quarters to the effect that if these troops were to be sent from outside they would engage in activities intended to cause confusion with a certain end in mind, and that the troops to be sent by a certain country would include saboteurs among them. These are the facts, but they have not caused us to change our attitude by any means, because we believe that any Arab who comes to this country cannot fail to recognise what his responsibilities are. It is inconceivable that he should commit any form of treachery; he will perform his duty side by side with his brothers in this country. What we are concerned about is that our enemies, as we know, are preparing to force us to fight before we are ready. They have more than once declared that they may exploit the entry of these troops, which are small in both numbers and capacity, and are intended for defence purposes only, to justify their mounting a major operation. They will not be able to destroy us, but they may be able to bring about a situation in the Arab world in which we shall have to fight without being one hundred per cent sure of the result. We are weary of losses and defeats, and we only live for the day when we shall fight the battle that we shall win. This is what we are bent on. Yet if troops did come and our enemies did not do something immediately that would be an admission on their part that their claims are untrue.

In the future, when more troops come, we feel and we have reliable information that the entry of troops may lead to such a war before we are ready, for the problem of the Yemen has not yet been solved. Arab troops are still there and are still fighting; many of the things we agreed on have been enforced only in this country, and the United Nations Emergency Force still stands between Egypt and the enemy. Our attitude to this force is well known. We all know what happened in 1956. It is said that this force is small and that it is possible to get around it when necessary. But President Nasser did say at the Summit Conference—and some of you are familiar with what he said—that the United Arab Republic, even supposing that the Emergency Force was not there, would need a

whole month's notice to mobilise its forces so as to be able to join battle with the enemy.

The Emergency Force is there. Yet if it is really ineffective and incapable of preventing us from getting at the enemy on the Egyptian front to engage him in fighting, what is it doing there? It may be small, but what reason, what justification is there for its remaining in our territory until now? We are boycotting countries, we are boycotting companies, we are trying to put pressure on our enemy Israel, and to wage an economic war with her. Yet, as far as Israel is concerned, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping in 1956, its remaining open to this day, the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Straits of Tiran and the presence of United Nations Forces there, by far outweighs all our efforts to impose a boycott. We should rather see Egyptian forces in the United Arab Republic than in the Yemen; we should rather see them in territory from which they and we could make a start on recovering our rights.

If the Emergency Force remains where it is, then only one explanation for its presence will be possible: that there is an agreement that it should stay there until either the problem is liquidated or a peace treaty is signed. There are many indications that this is the case. If I were in a position of responsibility in the United Arab Republic, able to advise our Egyptian brothers who say that merely by taking a decision they can remove this force, I would advise and I would do everything possible to remove this suspicion, so that we might shoulder our responsibilities properly. Then I would bring our forces, which are also an essential element in the conflict—the major striking forces—back to their proper place. This would mean that we could be sure of fighting at a time that suited us. The UNEF may be small in size, but it has a very great significance; as long as it remains any action will cause a lot of trouble. I only wish the Egyptians could put an end to the suspicion felt by so many people, and to the questions people are asking, by removing this force and stationing their own troops, as ours are stationed, on the long frontline, to await the hour when we shall be able to take action and recover all we have lost in Palestine.

In the past we have, of course, permitted and welcomed the presence of the troops of other

Arab countries here in Jordan, and this will always be the case in the future. There have been Saudi forces here; Iraqi troops have been here more than once, and we have also had Syrian troops. Now we are stronger than ever before in virtue of our own forces, and better prepared than ever before for when the hour strikes and the battle starts. The whole of this country and all its people are armed forces, which are the vanguard of the Arab nation in the battle to recover our full and undiminished rights in Palestine.

We have a feeling that action is being planned against us in secret, that there is a plot afoot, which may be the work of foreign agencies, in an attempt to solve the Palestine Problem at Jordan's expense, by weakening her. We feel that attempts are being made to destroy all our aspirations and objectives, to prevent us from reaching our goals. If this is not so, why all these quarrels, why all these problems? Why are we back where we started from? Why pick on Jordan which can never forget the cause of Palestine, which is her own cause, a matter of life and death for her? The years that have passed since 1948 have only increased our resolution and determination to recover our rights. In this we are supported by the objective integration of the Jordanian people, the geographical and strategic situation of this country and the increase in our military, economic and political strength. Something is going on in certain quarters—we can't precisely lay our fingers on it—either intentionally or unintentionally.

What I mean is, we are witnessing attempts to prepare the atmosphere for the implementation of such a plan, we are witnessing veiled attempts to liquidate the problem; it will be hard indeed if, God forbid, they are only disclosed after they have succeeded in achieving their objectives. Certain quarters are working in secret, exploiting and trading in the noblest of emotions and the most honourable of objectives—the love of the citizen for his country, and his readiness for sacrifice on behalf of his honour. It is essential that we should be aware of these attempts, these continuous and deliberate concealed plots to liquidate the problem, and we are absolutely determined to oppose them, whatever the cost. There was a conspiracy against this country hatched under the very aegis of the Summit Conference at the

time of my visit to Cairo on 10th March 1964. The object of my many visits to Cairo and Alexandria was, as I have told you before, to ensure that no one should disturb the atmosphere of our relations by any means whatsoever. If there was anything I heard of, anything that I felt might in any way have undesirable effects, I felt it my duty to go and discuss it frankly and quietly.

When I made that particular visit I took with me letters which certain people had received from the intelligence services of the United Arab Republic. They contained information to the effect that things were quiet and that probably the intelligence services in Jordan would therefore not be fully alert, those to whom the letters were addressed being instructed to continue their efforts to overthrow the regime in Jordan.

I took these letters and went to Cairo. There I met President Gamal Abd an-Nasir, and asked what he thought of the letters. Our meeting took place in the evening, and he promised me to study the matter and give me an answer in the morning. When we met next morning, he said: The intelligence service has been acting under its own impetus; we have stopped it, or told it to stop operations of this kind. But unfortunately the operations continued, and are still going on now. Every time I went I used to discuss the matter, until the Summit Conference in Morocco came to an end. When I returned, Cairo launched against us a smear campaign, a campaign of lies and slander, over the radio. The campaign was not really Egyptian, but however that may be, they could have controlled if it they had wanted to. Unfortunately the atmosphere was such that we were unable to continue meetings of this kind, and I had to resort to correspondence instead. This correspondence I have already mentioned. But the conspiracy is still going on, the attempts are still being made.

Again, as I have already told you, a number of Arab countries which had undertaken to make payments to build up the strength of this country, which means the strength of all the Arabs, have changed their attitude. What is going on is clear: if we do not succeed in implementing our programme in full, as a united Arab nation, within the period decided on, if this period passes without our doing what we have set ourselves to do, the consequences may well be unfavourable for us,

specially as far as the Palestine Question is concerned. In fact, it seems as though all that we see going on now is an attempt to put us in just such a situation. The next phase is therefore even closer at hand than we had imagined and the situation is far more critical than we had thought. These attempts may not be merely to dominate us economically and financially and, of course, to weaken our armed forces. There may be another explanation. No matter what, I trust that we are quite determined to endure it all, with God's help. We shall adhere to our programme, and we are determined that nothing should be allowed to affect it.

The Liberation Organisation picked a quarrel with us, in spite of our attitude to it, in spite of our meetings here in Jerusalem, the meetings which constituted the beginning, the starting point, directly after the Casablanca Summit Conference. It was trying, apparently, to impede our efforts and activities. Attempts were made through the Arab radio and press to split the unity of the army and the people, and to send so-called commandos across Jordanian territory to the occupied areas. All this was in contravention of what we had agreed on, and its object was to drag us into the conflict at a time fixed by the enemy rather than by us—witness recent events at As-Samu' and elsewhere. There was a remarkable agreement between the Arab information services and the foreign press to destroy confidence in the army and the state. This, I am sorry to say, was the line that our enemies were also following.

Instigation over the radio to stage demonstrations and strikes, even if it were successful—and it is not going to be successful—would distract the army from its duties along the front line, from its training and its developing a state of preparedness. It would cause us grave problems, and would provide a suitable atmosphere for the enemy to embark on hostilities which could well be on a much wider scale than ever before.

Amazing allegations have been made. There have been demonstrations in all sorts of places, including Bethlehem at Christmas, perhaps with the object of ruining the tourist season. Arms and all sorts of explosives have been smuggled into Jordan to be used for sabotage. All this has gone so far that it is clear that their aim is not

only individual persons but government establishments, and the armed forces in particular—some of their commands, their bases, perhaps even their arms. We have plenty of evidence of these diabolical attempts. There is an agent of, I am sorry to say, an Arab intelligence service, who planted explosives near a government building in Irbid. He was arrested and confessed that the object of those who had engaged him to carry out this operation was to make the Jordanian authorities arrest innocent people, and thereby destroy people's confidence in the state and cause incidents. I am sorry to say that they have got control, or tried to get control, of Palestinian organisations abroad, and are exerting all kinds of pressure on them to turn them away from preparing themselves for the battle of revenge and make them engage in sabotage activities in Jordan, to plan assassinations and plant explosives, even against those among us who call themselves the opposition, with the object of discrediting the government and causing disturbances. There is plenty of evidence that members of the military arm of the Arab Nationalist Movement are being trained for sabotage and assassination in certain Arab countries, especially in the United Arab Republic, by specialists and specialised organisations. Such attempts are being made in all fields.

We greatly hope that our brothers have given all this up. Our problem with the enemy is a simple one. All we need is determination, resolution and faith. The resources of the Arab homeland are immense. All we need is the courage to tell people clearly and frankly what they have to do if we are to achieve our aims. For surely no one could imagine that there is a single man in the whole Arab homeland who will fall short of his duty? We could have achieved all our aims before this. For example, take the case of the United Nations Emergency Force: I believe, I hope that there is no reason for the doubts we, or at least some people, feel as to there being any justification for its continued presence to this day. Even if there is a reason, I can respect any Arab who would disclose to the people, in all frankness, that in 1956 we were in a cruel and difficult situation, and were obliged to do this or that, to agree to certain things which we should not otherwise have done. What the Arab nation needs is that those in authority should tell everyone what must be done if we are to achieve our

aims, We have potentials, resources and intelligence, and our cause is one of right and justice, of life and death. All these attempts to destroy the Arab nation, to destroy our self-confidence and our links with our past—we do not say that we want to live in the past; what we must do is to take the best from our past but look to see what the rest of the world is trying to do, what it is doing. It is not the case that we are either Arabs or nothing at all.

All these attempts—for days, months, years, there has been talk about the Islamic Pact; it has become a bugbear, although it doesn't really exist; and even if it did exist, what harm would there be in that? I have often asked: What is the Islamic Pact? Where is the Islamic Pact? I have never found a responsible person who can talk to me about the Islamic Pact. Didn't we all meet and agree that it was our duty to find friends who would support us and our rights on a basis of mutual understanding and good relations with everyone? The whole world is regarded as a field of battle between right and wrong. There is only us and our enemies. They have even made Islam something to be afraid of. How much longer will this go on?

I wanted to meet you today and talk frankly about all the matters that concern us, and I can only hope that I have been successful in dealing with them. I am about to leave on a short journey abroad, to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. After that I shall return. I should like you to know, however, especially those few amongst us who may feel that even my leniency and my many efforts to ensure that we should all be members of a single family are a kind of weakness and that they can play around a little every now and then, that they can put such ideas out of their heads. I have said that I soon forget such things, and we have forgotten much in the past. This is not the case of a man in a position of authority who is expected to govern his people and to exercise absolute power over them. I am one of you. I belong to you. We may differ about certain things, but eventually we always agree to work together. However, I implore you, this is no time for mischief, if I may use the expression. The situation is extremely critical. We are strong now, but it is no time for intrigues of any kind. Life and death are matters ordained by God in

His own time, but as long as I am capable of continuing my work, be sure that I shall be one of you, that I shall belong to you. I shall tell you the truth about everything, no matter how great or trifling. I shall strive with you to build this country and to serve our nation. I thank you, and pray that God may grant us success and that He may take us by the hand. I am confident that, God willing, we shall have a prosperous future ahead of us.

281

Statement by Syrian Information Minister Zu'bi on the Israel-Syrian Joint Armistice Commission.¹ [Excerpt]

Damascus, January 26, 1967

The fundamental duty of the Joint Armistice Commission, and the real justification for its existence, is that it should supervise the enforcement of the Armistice Agreement concluded by the United Nations, the first clauses of which stipulate that the Demilitarised Zone should be kept in existence, and that neither party should take possession of it. But what has in fact happened is that the invading gangster state has, since 1948, over and over again taken possession of essential areas of the Demilitarised Zone within the sight and hearing of the United Nations, and of the Armistice Commission itself. Furthermore, to avoid being put in an embarrassing situation vis-à-vis the Armistice Commission, whose task is to maintain this Demilitarised Zone, Israel has, for the last eight years, boycotted the meetings of the Commission.

Now that Israel has given way in the face of the strong and courageous attitude of the revolutionary government in Syria and of the gallant Syrian army to the Palestine problem and has agreed to the resumption of the meetings of the Armistice Commission and to abide by their decisions, it is the duty of the Armistice Commission to shoulder its historic responsibilities

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 27/1/1967.

and put an end to Israel's assaults on the Demilitarised Zone.

It is essential that Israel should leave the Demilitarised Zone; there can be no compromise on this point if the United Nations and the Armistice Commission seriously want to ensure an atmosphere of quiet on both sides of the armistice line that will enable farmers to carry on their work in peace.

We hope that the Armistice Commission and Mr. Odd Bull will not neglect the task entrusted to them by the United Nations but call on the gangster state to leave the demilitarised territory it has wrongfully occupied immediately, as an indication of the Commission's serious intention to enforce the United Nations resolutions and not submit to the *fait accompli*.

282

Memorandum Submitted by Syria to the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission.¹

Damascus, January 29, 1967

Mr. Chairman: We have received the appeal of U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, which is in accordance with the efforts and proposals of General Odd Bull and includes the following: "It is clear that the situation threatens to erupt at any moment into a large-scale clash of military forces. I appeal to you in most urgent terms, and I am appealing to the other side in identical terms, to restrain your military forces from any action which might result in an armed clash. I also appeal to you to accept without delay or preconditions the proposal of the Chief of Staff for an immediate emergency or extraordinary meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission on an agreed agenda, with a view to reaching an understanding on the problems of cultivation in the area which have given rise to the incidents of recent weeks."

Syria responded to this appeal, informing the Secretary-General of its acceptance. Then,

on 19.1.1967, we received a letter from General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, informing us that the Israeli side had agreed to attend the meeting and approved the proposed agenda. Here it must be mentioned that Israel's permanent representative at the United Nations, and other Israeli authorities also, have tried to represent this as an unofficial meeting of the Armistice Commission with the object of covering up her aggressions against the Demilitarised Zone, her infringement of the Armistice Agreement and her repeated refusals to obey the resolutions of the Security Council.

These attempts went on for some days, as can be seen in the many official statements issued by the Israeli authorities, before we received the official reply to the effect that Israel had agreed to attend the meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. We therefore decided to send a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, quoting certain of these statements and defining our attitude to them. The statements we mentioned in this letter were the following:

(1) Part of the statement of Abba Eban, Israeli Foreign Minister, broadcast by Israel Radio on 17.1.1967:

The question of the cultivation of lands in the Demilitarised Zone has no connection with the Syrian aggressions of the last few days... Israel makes the holding of such a meeting conditional on there being an agreed agenda, and on the Chairman of the Commission not having power of decision.

(2) Part of the statement of the Israeli Prime Minister and Minister of Defence broadcast by Israel Radio on 17.1.1967:

The tense situation on the frontiers is not the result only of the cultivation of lands in the Demilitarised Zone.

(3) Part of the statement of Michael Comay broadcast by Israel Radio on 17.1.1967:

Israel's agreement to the holding of a meeting of the Armistice Commission cannot be regarded as in any way establishing a legal precedent, because the Demilitarised Zone is under Israeli sovereignty, and falls outside the jurisdiction of the Armistice Commission.

(4) Part of the statement of Abba Eban broadcast by Israel Radio on 17.1.1967. In this statement he declared Israel's readiness to agree to U Thant's proposal that the two parties should discuss the question of the cultivation of land in the frontier zone, but added that such agreement

¹ *Ibid.*, 31/1/1967. The first meeting was held on 25 January 1967. It is to be noted that Israel had boycotted the meetings of this Commission since 1951.

was conditional on the cessation of Syrian provocations, whether in the form of overt military activities or acts of sabotage, like the laying of mines and aggression against the lives of the inhabitants.

(5) Part of the statement of Sasson, Director of the Truce Department at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, broadcast by Israel Radio on 18.1.1967:

The Armistice Agreement stipulates that the Chairman of the Commission is responsible for organising its activities and restoring life to normal in the Demilitarised Zone, and for all other matters connected with the Demilitarised Zone. ... We have refused to regard Syria as party to any dealings connected with the affairs of the Demilitarised Zone. Whenever Syria tries to have the question discussed by the Commission we refuse. Syria always forestalls us and tries to get the question discussed; this is why we always refuse that Syria should call for such discussion, or be a party to the matter.

Then, after Israel had agreed to attend the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, on the eve of the date fixed for this meeting, the Israeli authorities made further provocative statements. On 24.1.1967, Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, repeated the old story of Israel's claims to sovereignty over the Demilitarised Zone and her refusal to relinquish these claims. This statement followed that of Levy Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister, in which he threatened that Israel reserved full freedom of action should frontier incidents recur.

It is obvious that this series of official statements conceals an underhand Israeli plan to attack and seize the Demilitarised Zone, with the following objects:

(1) To cover up persistent Israeli aggression in the Demilitarised Zone, in violation of paragraph 5b of Article V of the Armistice Agreement, which reads:

Any advance by the armed forces, military or paramilitary, of either Party into the Demilitarised Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives... shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

The Demilitarised Zone which is the object of Israeli aggression is an area which lies to the east of the cease-fire line occupied by the Syrian Army on 20.7.1949, the date of the signing of the General Armistice Agreement, a zone whose soil is mingled with the blood of Syrian officers and men, and which the Syrian army controlled on 20.7.1949. Thus, if it is permissible for any

armed forces to enter the Demilitarised Zone in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Syrian armed forces have the prior right to do so.

(2) Israel's continued defiance of the United Nations, and her violation of even the stipulations of the Armistice Agreement by imposing her sovereignty on, and her aggression against, the Demilitarised Zone, and her refusal to recognise the responsibility of the Mixed Armistice Commission to supervise the Zone, in violation of paragraph 5c of Article V of the Armistice Agreement, which reads:

The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article VII of this Agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

Moreover, Israeli manoeuvres to ensure that the meeting should be described as unofficial, in connection with which numerous letters have been exchanged between the United Nations side, represented by General Odd Bull, and the two Parties, the subject also having been raised at repeated meetings, the last of which was on 16.1.1967, between General Odd Bull and the Syrian Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, are consistent with the Israeli attitude of boycotting the Armistice Commission's meetings since 1951, with the exception of certain extraordinary emergency meetings, and are a cover for Israel's claim that the Armistice Commission is not competent to discuss matters connected with the Demilitarised Zone.

Our attitude, however, is consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Armistice Agreement, with respect for the United Nations, with our acceptance of the Secretary-General's invitation, and with General Odd Bull's efforts to resume the meetings of the Armistice Commission, which is competent to discuss matters connected with the Demilitarised Zone and to convene its 80th meeting in accordance with the proposed agenda.

Thus, the first meeting was held on 25.1.1967, and the head of the Israeli delegation to the Commission read a written statement which departed from the agreed agenda, with the object of exploiting the meeting to cover up Israeli intentions and aggressions. As a further act of exploitation the Israeli side published and broad-

cast the text of this statement without asking the permission of the Chairman of the Commission, and also broadcast comments on it in a manner entirely at odds with the discussions that took place at this session, which were restricted to the Israeli side's bringing up points not contained in the agreed agenda and contrary to the whole idea of the meeting:

(1) The Israeli communiqué claimed that this meeting constituted a resumption of direct contacts between the representatives of the Syrian and Israeli governments. This was a shameless misrepresentation of the facts and an attempt to exploit the meeting of the Armistice Commission for political and propaganda ends, and was rejected by us because the meeting was, in fact, a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission within the framework of the Armistice Agreement.

(2) The communiqué repeated the old story of the meetings of the Commission being unofficial, although it had been definitely agreed that the meeting was an official one and a resumption of the sessions of the Mixed Armistice Commission. This is further evidence of Israeli manoeuvres to deny the competence of the Commission to deal with matters connected with the Demilitarised Zone.

(3) The communiqué contained the following sentence:

The serious differences between our two countries make the necessity for direct contacts between them even more urgent.

This sentence raises important points which lie outside the competence of the Commission and were not included in the agenda of the meeting, and it is prejudicial to our firm and declared attitude to the Palestine problem. We therefore strenuously reject any possibility of such direct contacts.

(4) The Israeli communiqué stated that the object of the meeting was to "ensure a peaceful atmosphere all along the Armistice Line," deliberately omitting the phrase: "for cultivators and civilians near the Armistice Line." This, again, raises other problems not mentioned in the agenda.

(5) The Israeli side declared its readiness to observe the cease-fire, on condition that we did the same and that there should be no aggressive action against Israel from Syrian territory.

We have declared time and again that we are ready to observe the cease-fire on condition that Israel abide fully by the Armistice Agreement, which is an indivisible whole, that she leave the Demilitarised Zone and withdraw her troops to the west of the cease-fire line of 20.7.1949, abide unconditionally by the cease-fire decision and refrain from acts of provocation against Arab civilians in the Demilitarised Zone.

(6) The Israeli communiqué, which uses such expressions as "peace," the "elimination of armed struggle," the "desire to ensure a peaceful atmosphere in the frontier areas," "good neighbourliness," the "achievement of peaceful conditions for the frontier areas," "continued maintenance of peaceful conditions to ensure security, freedom from fear, attack," etc., is intended to persuade the Commission that Israel has good and peaceable intentions.

The Israeli communiqué's employment of these expressions taken out of their context in the text of the Armistice Agreement is an attempt to lure the Commission, through verbal misrepresentations and specious verbiage, into a discussion of subjects that lie outside its competence. It is also an obvious trick intended to deceive world opinion and the Armistice Commission, but it is a trick that will fool no one. It would have been better if, before engaging in such manoeuvres, the Israeli side at the Armistice Commission had declared Israel's readiness to enforce the Armistice Agreement in the Demilitarised Zone and put a stop to her acts of aggression against that Zone. It could also have declared Israel's respect for the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the Demilitarised Zone referred to by the Armistice Agreement and its Annexes.

The reiteration of such propaganda expressions devoid of all real meaning can in no way alter the fact of repeated Israeli aggression against the rights of the Arab people in Palestine, and has had no effect whatsoever on our clear national attitude to this just cause.

(7) The Israeli communiqué stated that "Israel's readiness to discuss effective measures as regards the problems of cultivation at an extraordinary meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission in no way alters our definitive attitude to the political and legal problems of the frontiers, which cannot be discussed here. Furthermore,

in engaging in these talks, we wish it to be understood that there is no change in our attitude to the situation in the Demilitarised Zone or to the functions of the Mixed Armistice Commission in that Zone."

This reveals an attitude of aggression and defiance of Security Council resolutions Nos. 93 of 1956, 111 of 1956, and 171 of 1952, an attitude of utter contempt for the Armistice Agreement.

The Israeli side, as we have said, is trying to exploit the meeting. It has absolutely no intention of removing any of the causes of tension on the Armistice Line; while speaking in a high moral tone and employing the expressions we have examined in a previous paragraph, it does not hesitate to make utterances like the one just quoted. In fact, what Israel is doing is to sabotage the Armistice Agreement and its Annexes completely, for everyone knows that when Israel refers to her "attitude to the Demilitarised Zone" she is referring to the claims made in the statements by Israeli authorities cited above of Israeli sovereignty over the Demilitarised Zone. This is an indisputable violation of the Armistice Agreement and its Annexes, and of the Security Council resolutions.

As regards Israel's attitude to the competence and powers of the Mixed Armistice Commission in the Demilitarised Zone, this is also clearly expressed in the same statements and communiqués of the Israeli authorities. It is an attitude that makes the very existence of the Commission worthless.

It is thus clear that the presence of the Israeli side at this meeting, after its long boycott of the Commission's meetings, is an attempt to mislead international opinion and conceal the real aims that are revealed in Israel's studied plans of aggression,

Mr. Chairman: Here it may be as well to remind the Commission of some of the stipulations of the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolutions on the Demilitarised Zone, and of the two reports of the Secretary-General, all of which condemn Israel for flagrant violations of these stipulations.

First: Paragraph 5b of Article V of the Armistice Agreement concluded on 20.7.1949, reads:

Any advance by the armed forces, military or paramilitary, of either Party into any part of the Demilitarised

Zone, when confirmed by the United Nations representatives referred to in the following sub-paragraph, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this Agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article VII of the Armistice Agreement concluded on 20.7.1949 reads:

The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organisation designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.

Paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Armistice Agreement concluded on 20.7.1949 reads:

Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

Second: Security Council Resolutions.
– Resolution No. 93 of 18 May 1951 reads:

The Security Council,

Noting that...the Chairman of the Israel Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission on a number of occasions ha[s] requested the Israel delegation to the Mixed Armistice Commission to ensure that the Palestine Land Development Company, Limited, is instructed to cease all operations in the demilitarised zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this project,

.

Endorses the requests of the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on this matter and calls upon the Government of Israel to comply with them,

.

Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to bring before the Mixed Armistice Commission or its Chairman, whichever has the pertinent responsibility under the Armistice Agreement, their complaints and to abide by the decisions resulting therefrom;

Considers that it is inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission or to fail to respect requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission as they relate to his obligations under Article V, and calls upon the parties to be represented at all meetings called by the Chairman of the Commission and to respect such requests;

Calls upon the parties to give effect to the following excerpt cited by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision

Organization at the 542nd meeting of the Security Council, on 25 April 1951, as being from the summary record of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Conference of 3 July 1949, which was agreed to by the parties as an authoritative comment on Article V of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria:

'The question of civil administration in villages in the demilitarized zone is provided for, within the framework of an Armistice Agreement, in sub-paragraph 5 (b) and 5 (f) of the draft article. Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a local basis, without raising general questions of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and sovereignty.

'Where Israel civilians return to or remain in an Israel village or settlement, the civil administration and policing of the village or settlement will be by Israelis. Similarly, where Arab civilians return to or remain in an Arab village, a local Arab administration and police unit will be authorized.

'As civilian life is gradually restored, administration will take shape on a local basis under the general supervision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

'The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, in consultation and cooperation with the local communities, will be in a position to authorize all necessary arrangements for the restoration and protection of civilian life. He will not assume direct responsibility for direct administration of the zone.'

The resolution goes on to say that [the Security Council]

... finds that:

(a) Aerial action taken by the forces of the Government of Israel on 5 April 1951, and

(b) Any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or around the demilitarized zone, which further investigation by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organisation into the reports and complaints recently submitted to the Council may establish,

constitute a violation of the cease-fire provision in Security Council resolution 54 (1948) and are inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations assumed under the Charter;

Noting the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the demilitarized zone:

(a) *Decides* that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarized zone by the government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission;

(b) *Holds* that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, armistice lines or within the demilitarized zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission;

Directs the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to take the necessary steps to give effect to this

resolution for the purpose of restoring peace to the area....

– Resolution No. 111 of 19 January 1956 condemning Israeli aggression in Tiberias:

The Security Council,

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Noting that, according to the report of the Chief of Staff, this Israel action was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by Israeli forces which entered Syria,

Noting also without prejudice to the ultimate rights, claims and positions of the parties that according to the reports of the Chief of Staff there has been interference by the Syrian authorities with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria,

1. *Holds* that this interference in no way justifies the Israel action;

2. *Reminds* the Government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions;

3. *Condemns* the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provision of its resolution 54 (1948), of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;

4. *Expresses its grave concern* at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations;

5. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council will have to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace;

6. *Calls upon* the parties to comply with their obligations under Article V of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the Armistice Demarcation Line and the demilitarized zone;

7. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the Lake of Tiberias without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate to the success of his efforts;

8. *Calls upon* the parties to arrange with the Chief of Staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners;

9. *Calls upon* both parties to cooperate with the Chief of staff in this and all other respects, to carry out the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions.

– Resolution No. 171 of 9 April 1962:

The Security Council,

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2. *Reaffirms* its resolution 111 (1956) of 19 January 1956 which condemned Israeli military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation;

3. *Determines* that the Israel attack of 16-17 March 1962 constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution, and calls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from such action in the future;

.

6. *Calls* for strict observance of Article V of the General Armistice Agreement, which provides for the exclusion of armed forces from the demilitarized zone, and annex IV of that Agreement, which sets limits on forces in the defensive area, and calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to cooperate with the Chief of Staff in eliminating any violation thereof;

7. *Calls upon* the Governments of Israel and Syria to cooperate with the Chief of Staff in carrying out his responsibilities under the General Armistice Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, and urges that all steps necessary for reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken.

Third: certain paragraphs in the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations No. 7572 of 1 November 1966, and No. 7573 of 2 November 1966, the first of which deals with Israel's boycott of the Mixed Armistice Commission, and establishes our cooperation with it, while the second deals with the present situation in the Demilitarised Zone, and Israel's infringement by establishing installations in it in contravention of the Armistice Agreement.

Paragraph 12 of the first Report reads as follows:

The inability of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function undoubtedly weakens the efforts to maintain quiet along the lines between Israel and Syria. As a result of this situation, matters which properly should first be considered in the ISMAC and which often might be well disposed of there, are brought instead directly to the attention of the Security Council where they can be considered primarily in a political context and atmosphere. The ISMAC, of course, is the machinery created by the parties and for whose operation they alone are responsible. It is the product of their solemn undertaking in the General Armistice Agreement. Its effectiveness depends upon the willingness of the two parties to abide by the General Armistice Agreement and to participate fully in and cooperate with it. The several appeals of the Security Council to the parties to this effect have thus far been unavailing. Serious consideration might well be given now as to whether there might be some more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling the ISMAC to function effectively.

The second report includes the following:

6. The above-mentioned Israel and Syrian complaints have been submitted daily for several years. Israel authorities have requested no investigation of their complaints alleging encroachment by Syrian fortifications upon the D/Zone. Syrian authorities have asked for the investigation of Israel fortifications in the D/Zone.

7. ... Since June 1956, United Nations Military Observers have been prevented from carrying out investigations in the Hagovrim and Susita areas. Access to the Dardara area, in the central sector of the D/Zone, has also been refused to United Nations Military Observers. Such restriction on the freedom of movement of United Nations Military Observers has prevented the investigation of recent Syrian complaints relating to Israel fortifications in the D/Zone. Israel contests the right of Syria, which it asserts 'has no *locus standi* in the D/Zone', to forward such complaints to the Chairman of the ISMAC....

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10. In 1956, the then Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that 'certain fortifications which the United Nations Observers have seen at Hagovrim and Susita go beyond what is required for the protection of civilian life'; that he 'requested the dismantling of the fortifications in question' and that Israel did not comply with this request and 'continued to extend the fortifications in this area'.

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13. In October 1952, the then Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General William E. Riley, reported (S/2833 paragraph 58): 'with the exception of Nuqeib, Al Hamma and Shamalne [which were under Syrian control] Israel police, acting under orders from police headquarters outside the Demilitarized Zone, exercise control over practically the entire Demilitarized Zone'. The Syrians continue to complain practically every day about the presence in the D/Zone of armed 'soldiers' who Israel states are Israel Border Police, a force which should not enter the D/Zone (article V, paragraph 5, of the General Armistice Agreement).

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16. The part of the central sector of the D/Zone which is on the eastern bank of the Jordan River is a narrow strip of land, generally controlled by Syria, while the western bank, generally controlled by Israel, is a large area. On the western bank Arab villages have been demolished, their inhabitants evacuated. The inhabitants of the villages of Baqqara and Ghanname returned following the Security Council resolution of 18 May 1951 (S/2517). They were later (on 30 October 1956) forced to cross into Syria where they are still living. Their lands on the western bank of the river, and Khoury Farm in the same area, are cultivated by Israeli nationals.

Mr. Chairman: In view of the above the Syrian Party to the Mixed Armistice Commission proposes the following:

(1) The enforcement of the Mixed Armistice Agreement and the Security Council Resolutions

on the Demilitarised Zone, it being understood that the Syrian side is ready to enforce them immediately.

(2) The evacuation from the Demilitarised Zone of military and para-military forces, the removal of military fortifications and arms, and a return to the cease-fire line of 20.7.1949.

(3) The return of the Arab inhabitants to their property, and the safeguarding for all of freedom to work and live in the Demilitarised Zone under the supervision of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

(4) As regards cultivation of land in the Demilitarised Zone, the Syrian Party to the Mixed Armistice Commission has views which it will disclose at the proper time.

Mr. Chairman: The Syrian Party to the Mixed Armistice Commission calls on the Chairman of the Commission and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation to establish the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission to deal with matters connected with the Demilitarised Zone and to refute Israel's claims to sovereignty over the Zone in the light of the stipulations of the Armistice Agreement, the Security Council Resolutions and the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to above.

Mr. Chairman: It should be known to all that these proposals, which are specifically within the competence of the Mixed Armistice Commission, have absolutely no connection with our firm attitude of principle to the Palestine question and the indisputable right of the Palestinian Arab people to their usurped homeland.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

283

Letter from Jordanian King Husayn to Tunisian President Burghiba on the Joint Arab Defence Council.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, February 1, 1967

1. My government has already informed

¹ *Al-'Amal*, Tunis, 18/2/1967.

Your Excellency's government through the normal diplomatic channels of the attitude we have recently adopted to the meeting of the Joint Arab Defence Council in February. In brief, our attitude is as follows: The other Arab countries have not so far fulfilled their obligations, as had been decided at the last meeting of the Joint Arab Defence Council. The Summit Conference, which is the supreme Arab organisation from which all the other organisations, like the Unified Command and so on, derive their authority, has, as your Excellency knows, been made inoperative, or, to speak more frankly, sabotaged, for no known reason or reasonable excuse. My government is of the opinion that any meeting within the framework of the organisations that derive from the Summit, to examine such matters of grave significance to our destiny as were discussed at the last meeting of the Joint Defence Council, will be useless, so long as the ultimate authority, which has the last word in such matters, is inoperative and in suspense. A further reason for this decision is that there seems to be no likelihood of the Summit being anything but a new medium for bargaining, overbidding, vituperation and damage to the common national interest. Nor is there any chance of its being more than a piece of political hypocrisy calculated to intensify the differences between the Arab countries, impede the execution of unified Arab plans and, consequently, result in the shelving of the Palestine problem. Proof of this is to be found in the delay and procrastination of certain Arab countries in meeting their obligations.

3. Jordan cannot understand how joint meetings can be held to discuss Arab planning and military action for the battle of liberation, when these meetings lead to the exchange of accusations and invective and the arousing of suspicions in accordance with the principle, so vociferously and continuously voiced by certain Arab leaders, that the Arab nation is divided into "reactionary" and "non-reactionary camps," "revolutionary and non-revolutionary meetings," and the rest of the rigmarole of slogans they take refuge in to excuse their failure to take part in the struggle and their lack of truthfulness and sincerity.

Nor can Jordan understand how there can

be any encounter or solidarity, so long as certain Arab countries frankly and openly declare that they are opposed to the Summit Conferences, and that they have neither faith nor confidence in them, and so long as all their efforts are directed to destroying and incapacitating these conferences. But these same countries are the first to hasten to meetings of the organisations derived from the Summit Conferences, and to pour reproaches on the countries which say that these meetings are useless as long as Arab solidarity is nothing more than an empty form, and that the meetings are intended for defamation, insults and the hurling of accusations, rather than for the restoration of concord, the healing of breaches and the renewal of solidarity.

4. Your Excellency knows that the head of the Liberation Organisation, Mr. Ahmad ash-Shuqairi, has deviated from the plan of unified action and adherence to the decisions of the Summit Conferences, preferring, instead, to make the Organisation a party to Arab—even to international disputes. He is, moreover, openly in favour of the stirring up of sedition in this embattled country, instigation to revolt, the wrecking of the Jordanian entity, the sowing of the seeds of discord between the inhabitants of Jordan, and the encouragement of sabotage, destruction and killing. Not content with this, he has announced frankly and openly at meetings of the organisations which derive from the Summit Conferences that he is not bound by any decision, and that he acts on his own account in the manner that best suits his fancy. How can any good come from any meeting with this man? We believe that to attend any meeting with him is sufficient to start a shouting match, to reopen old wounds and to intensify the differences between the Arab countries, whose duty it is to meet to avoid our unity being torn asunder and our ranks divided, not to renew the bargaining and invective which has resulted in the deplorable state in which our nation is living today. Moreover this man has, in our opinion, established that he is not to be trusted with any matter which it has been agreed at a meeting should be kept secret. Even in the offences he commits in this regard he is untrustworthy; not only does he disclose what should be kept secret, but when he does so he distorts and misrepresents it and so charges it with envy, intrigue and misrepresentation of one kind or another

er that he does the greatest service to the enemy and the greatest possible harm to the cause of Palestine, which is the first, greatest and most important cause in the Arab world. He consequently does untold damage to our higher national interests.

284

Interview Granted by Jordanian King Husayn to a Correspondent of the Kuwait Daily "Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam".¹

Kuwait, February 2, 1967

Q. In view of all the reports we have heard about what has happened in the West Bank since the treacherous attack on As-Samu', could Your Majesty give a picture of the true situation in Jordan?

A. The situation in Jordan now and since the recent events is normal; everything is quiet and stable as a result of the Jordanian people's awareness and understanding of the conspiracies that have been hatched against them to destroy their unity and weaken their strength in the face of the common enemy. These conspiracies were hatched within the framework of a plan drawn up by external forces in cooperation with certain Arab quarters which had begun to feel that they were failing to keep the promises they had made to their peoples as regards the liberation of Palestine. To escape from this embarrassing situation, they tried to persuade public opinion in their countries, and the Arab world in general, that Jordan was responsible for this failure, Jordan which, with the longest frontier with the enemy, is defending the whole Arab world, and has borne this heavy burden throughout the years at so high a cost in endurance and sacrifice. Without a grain of conscience or feeling of national responsibility, they planned to liquidate the Palestine problem and expose Jordan to a new calamity, as grave as that of 1948.

Q. The Jordanian authorities have said that they seized arms and explosives during the recent demonstrations, and arrested a number of agitators. Could Your Majesty say who were behind these agitators?

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 3/2/1967.

A. Everyone already knows who they were.

Q. Al-Ahram, quoting Ali Ali Amir, says that the Unified Arab Command may ask to be dissolved or suspended. What are Your Majesty's views on this matter?

A. We have heard nothing official, and think that it is a matter that should be discussed by the Summit Conference, which has the final say in the matter.

Q. Certain information media have suggested that the Unified Command asked Jordan to buy certain planes, and that Jordan insisted on buying reconditioned American planes which cost three times as much as those the Unified Command recommended. What are the facts?

A. The facts are that the Joint Arab Command bases its calculations on the purchase of arms from the Eastern block, which is prepared to sell them at low prices, even below cost price, for political reasons, namely to acquire a foothold in the Arab world. It is on this basis that the Command allots funds to the countries concerned to buy the necessary arms. Everyone knows that our army has always, since it was first created, depended on the West as its source of arms. To obtain arms for it from other sources at this stage would delay its arming, not to mention the fact that an operation of this kind would cost enormous sums. In view of this situation, Jordan has decided to continue buying arms of the same kind. Moreover, after exhaustive study and comparison we decided to buy American planes of a modern type that is much more effective than those advocated by the biased quarters which claim the contrary. Moreover, these planes were bought with the knowledge and approval of the Unified Command, at a cheaper price than that for which the Eastern block sells planes to certain Arab countries, also keeping in mind the superiority of the American planes in every respect.

Q. Your Majesty has said that you are in favour of the Summit Conferences. How is it possible that the Summit should meet again, in the atmosphere now prevailing in the Arab world? Does Your Majesty intend to take the initiative in calling a Summit meeting? And if the other side insists on not attending these conferences, does Your Majesty see any advantage in convening a Summit Meeting which certain Arabs will not attend?

A. We have more than once stated our opinion that it is essential that the Summit Conferences should meet and we opposed their postponement last September. That was before we had come to the present deplorable state, when smear campaigns and disunity are the order of the day. We made it known to all that the reasons put forward by certain Arab leaders for postponing the Summit Conferences were, if they were true, the very reasons which made the holding of such a meeting desirable. I did, in fact, through my government, call for a meeting of the Summit Conference, in a memorandum which the government sent to the Secretariat General of the Arab League at the end of December 1966. We hope that our invitation will be accepted by all the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries, with a view to reviving the organisations which owe their origin to the Summit Conference and to completing the military plans which must be implemented within a specified period, before the enemy achieves his objectives, after which it would be difficult to do anything at all for Palestine. We believe that any meetings of the organisations deriving from the Summit Conference are useless as long as those attending them must refer back to their Kings and Presidents for a final decision on any matter. We also think that the convening of the Summit Conference is the only way to improve the deplorable atmosphere now prevailing in the Arab world.

Q. What are the facts about the quarrel between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation?

A. We were the first to support and encourage the Palestine Liberation Organisation when it was established; we offered it our assistance and took part in the first conference in Jerusalem, at which the Organisation was formed, in the belief that it would be the symbol of the Palestinian entity and would keep the Palestinian identity alive in international circles. The quarrel you refer to is not between us and the Palestine Liberation Organisation; it is a quarrel with the Organisation's leadership, which deviated from the course leading to the objective for which the Organisation was established when it started acting as the instrument of the intelligence service of a certain Arab country, and dragged the Organisation into Arab and international disputes. This is in the interests neither of the Organisation

nor of the cause of Palestine. The head of the Organisation has stooped so low as to conspire, in the interests of others, against Jordan, as she confronts the enemy, in the hope of destroying her and splitting her unity and thereby liquidating the Palestine problem.

Q. Does not Your Majesty think that Arab disputes have injured the cause of Palestine? How can Palestine be recovered?

A. Yes, of course, it is obvious that Arab disputes have gravely injured the cause of Palestine, and it may be a long-term injury that has been done, for these quarrels are delaying the implementation of our plans as regards the cause of Palestine. They are also, to a certain extent, distracting our attention from the sacred cause, as we have to cope with the results of these quarrels.

As for the second part of your question, Palestine can be recovered if we never lose faith in the justice of our cause, appreciate the magnitude of our responsibilities and are prepared to make the greatest sacrifices to achieve our goal. This will only be possible if there is Arab unanimity and solidarity within a framework of candour, sincerity and unified action, regardless of the sacrifices involved.

Q. According to certain sources, Jordan has refused to allow Saudi and Iraqi forces to enter her territory, and the Jordanian delegate has said that the League has not fulfilled its obligations. Then Your Majesty announced that Jordan no longer needed forces other than her own. Would Your Majesty explain this?

A. Our armed forces have grown to such an extent that we believe that we no longer need token forces for defence purposes. All we need at present is that the implementation of the Arab plan should be completed, and that we should avoid all action liable to provide the enemy with a pretext to draw us into battle before the time set by the Unified Arab Command.

Q. Both your government and the Saudi Government have announced that they will not attend the meetings of the Arab Defence Council. Is this decision of your government final?

A. Our decision is final, as long as the Summit Conferences are suspended, for we see no point in the subsidiary organisations meeting.

News Conference Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir and Iraqi President Arif.¹ **[Excerpts]**

Cairo, February 4, 1967

Q. Obviously the Palestine issue is the first and foremost of Arab issues and the pivot on which all other Arab issues turn. This issue has now entered the stage of armed struggle in the occupied territory. Obviously, too, the news that reaches us of the guerrillas inside the occupied territories reminds us of the Palestine issue. Arab public opinion would like to hear from you and President Arif something about your talks, the preparations the liberated countries have made for this battle and the extent of cooperation with the guerrillas.

A. [President Nasir] As you say, the Palestine issue is what every Arab is thinking of. But we must not imagine that it is an easy problem to deal with. It is the problem of Israel and those who support her, or, to be more explicit, the problem of America. Every day we hear statements by the American President, the Vice President and other American authorities, announcing their support for Israel. The problem cannot be separated from that of world imperialism. Ever since 1948 there have been attempts to liquidate the problem—American attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and to scatter the people of Palestine. We all know of the attempts that have been made to achieve this object. But has America succeeded?

Have American and world imperialism succeeded in liquidating the Palestine entity, the Palestinian people? Have they succeeded? No, they have not succeeded. On the contrary, it is we who have gained something important in the last few years—I mean the creation and crystallisation of the Palestine entity. We regard this as a very important development, for it has given new life to the Palestine issue, and weakened our enemies.

Of course you all heard what I said when I called the first Summit Conference; I said we must complete our preparations. And you have also heard of America's conduct as regards the so-called "balance of armaments in the Middle

¹ *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, 5/2/1967.

East." What this means is that, if the Arab countries buy arms, then Israel will get arms too. My reply to this has always been that America cannot alter the fact that we have a vastly larger population.

As regards the guerrillas, if the Palestinian people and the Palestine entity are organised, they have the right to fight for their country. Naturally there may be loss of life, but it is clear to the whole world that the Palestinian people are determined to insist on their rights and to shed their blood on behalf of these rights.

Some time ago the slogan of "Palestine today, not tomorrow" was devised. But we cannot deal with the Palestine cause through slogans. If we deal with it through slogans, the cause will be lost. We must cope with the problem through scientific action, strength, and continuous stage by stage planning. The stage that is past was the stage of the creation and organisation of the Palestine people and entity, and this is the first success achieved by the cause in 18 years.

A. [President Arif] The fact is that the disaster that befell Palestine and the choice of Palestine by imperialism were the result of deliberate planning long ago. If we look at a map of Israel today, we see that it stretches from the port of Eilat to the Mediterranean, thereby cutting the Arab world in two. Israel constitutes a foundation or, to use a military expression, a bridgehead, from which imperialism can strike the Arab nation in the heart. Of course the calamity of Palestine awakened the Arab nation; if we look at the liberated countries today we find that there are more of them than there were in 1948, and that Arab awareness is greater than it was in the past. Although it is our Palestinian brothers who suffered, not Palestine but the whole Arab homeland was the objective. This is my view of imperialist planning. Palestine was chosen because it forms a barrier between Arab North Africa and the Arabs of Asia.

As regards the guerrillas, they are entitled to let the enemy know that there is a group that believes in its homeland and is fighting to recover its land.

Q. *There is obviously a division between the revolutionary and non-revolutionary forces. What will*

be the attitude of the revolutionary forces to keeping the gains that have already been achieved and to the confrontation of imperialism, now that the effects of this division are apparent in the Unified Arab Command, the Arab Board for the Diversion of the Jordan River and the Palestine Liberation Organisation?

A. [President Nasir] I called for a Summit Conference in December 1963. We all know what the situation was then in the Arab world; there were the revolutionary forces, and there was reaction, and I said that I had examined the minutes of the Defence Council, and found that certain Arab countries had announced that they were incapable of defending themselves. It was a situation that called for action, and the idea was that we should call a Summit Conference, and forget the differences between the revolutionary forces and reaction, coexist peacefully and agree on unified action on behalf of Palestine.

We followed this line in all sincerity. The first and second Summit Conferences met, and, for the sake of Palestine, we said nothing at all against the reactionary forces in the area.

But what happened?

The reactionary forces insisted on seizing this opportunity to form themselves into blocs to confront the revolutionary forces in the hope of destroying them. Saudi Arabia launched a poisonous propaganda campaign against socialism at the very time we were attending the Summit Conference, spending millions of pounds on it. These campaigns started on a vast scale. The reactionary forces began to combine against us, and it became clear that imperialism was not prepared to accept unified action on behalf of Palestine, and was inciting the reactionary forces to work for two ends—firstly to strike the revolutionary forces and liquidate or destroy them, and secondly to destroy unified action on behalf of Palestine.

First Faysal moved, then Husayn, and even earlier Burghiba had moved, at the instigation of imperialism. I had great hopes of Husayn, for he receives the money and support of the Summit Conferences.

The Unified Arab Command alarmed Zionism and imperialism. The Palestinian entity had made its appearance for the first time and the Palestinian people were united. But neither

reaction nor imperialism were pleased with these developments. Reaction started making moves; we began to hear talk of the Islamic pact, and then of the Islamic Conference. Then Faysal contacted the Shah of Iran. As we all know, talk of an Islamic pact is nothing new; in 1957 America wanted an Islamic Pact, as is mentioned in Eisenhower's memoirs.

When Faysal, Husayn and Burghiba moved, it meant that imperialism was urging its friends to take action. By imperialism here I mean America and Britain. Imperialism was urging its friends to do many things—to weaken the Unified Arab Command, to weaken the Palestine entity and the Palestine Liberation Army, so that imperialism might open the breach that now exists in the Arab world.

Q. What is this breach?

A. If there are regimes cooperating with imperialism in both Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it means that there is a continuous link between the Mediterranean and the Gulf. This link consists of Israel, then Jordan, then Saudi Arabia. It is my belief that this is one of the objectives of imperialism's overall strategy in the area. Subservient regimes in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, regimes in alliance and cooperating with imperialism in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and imperialism in alliance with Israel, its bridgehead. This is how imperialism hopes to split the Arab world.

After these moves by Burghiba, Faysal and Husayn, to proceed with the Summit Conferences would have been to deceive the Arab people; it would have been pursuing a will o' the wisp, once it became clear that King Faysal cared nothing for the cause of Palestine. All that King Faysal cares for is to strengthen his position and strike down all revolutionary forces.

Then, when we saw that Husayn had joined Faysal, and was conspiring against the progressive countries, when we saw the alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it was no longer any use to hold the Summit Conferences. If we had held them, we should have been merely putting on an act for the benefit of the Arab peoples while the two Kings were engaged in destroying the Palestine cause, implementing the plans of America and Britain to draw all the Arab countries into colonialist spheres of influence. This is why

the Summit Conference came to an end. We announced that we could not attend the Summit Conferences, and that the substitute for them was unity of revolutionary action and the unity of the revolutionary forces for liberation and the confrontation of imperialism and Zionism. And this is what we are trying to achieve.

Q. How do you think the Palestine problem can be solved when there are great world powers that possess nuclear weapons—I mean America—while Israel also has a nuclear reactor? What should be the Arabs' retort?

A. [President Nasir] I think that we Arabs have one great advantage over Israel, regardless of America. I mean our human potential. Of course, America is a great power which supports Israel, but let us leave the Sixth Fleet out of account—what I mean is, we are not going to have our own Sixth Fleet. But let us consider what happened in 1956. In 1956 squadrons of planes went to Israel, which also received aid from the navy. The battle with Israel will be a decisive one; the Arab world cannot afford to fight a battle in which it is defeated. It is we who must fix the time; we must first mobilise the Palestinian people, then the Arab people, then confront the fifth columns at home, so that we can devote all our energies to the cause. We have among us King Abdullah and worse. As you know, in 1948 King Abdullah negotiated with the Jews while the Egyptian army was fighting the Israeli forces. What I mean is, we must purge Arab territory of the forces that cooperate with imperialism, that cooperate with Zionism, either directly or indirectly, and, at the same time, prepare ourselves. As long as the enemy does not succeed in liquidating the Palestine problem we ourselves can fix the time.

As regards the political aspect, why have we taken this step with West Germany, which has recognised Israel? They say that it was we who wanted to break off relations with West Germany, but this was not so. Our opinion was that if West Germany recognised Israel, we should recognise East Germany and if the West Germans did not like it, we wouldn't care. Yet, because certain countries said they would not recognise East Germany as they would not start diplomatic relations with communist countries, we said the best way then would be to break off relations with West Germany.

At present contacts are being made by certain Arab countries with a view to restoring relations with West Germany.

Thus we are not being fanciful, and ignoring the present situation in the Arab world, to which we belong. The Arab world as it is at present requires revolution, it requires revolutionary struggle, for only through struggle will it achieve its aims. And I do not mean only the struggle of every man in his own country, but struggle for the cause of Palestine.

286

Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to Kuwait, 1-4 February.¹
[Excerpt]

Kuwait, February 4, 1967

The Palestine problem came at the head of the Arab problems that received the attention of the two Rulers, who expressed their determination to work for the restoration of the usurped rights of the people of Palestine.

The two Rulers also declared their firm belief in Arab solidarity and unity of ranks, because these are the essential manifestation of Arab strength and the true Arab spirit, and because the Arabs now more than ever stand in need of unity and mutual support.

The two Rulers also expressed their hope that circumstances may be favourable for the convening of the Arab Summit Conferences, in view of the great advantages that accrue to all Arabs from these meetings, where their leaders exchange views and discuss fundamental Arab problems in an atmosphere of frankness and candour.

287

Interview Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir to the British Weekly "Observer".²
[Excerpt]

Cairo, February 5, 1967

Q. Do you think that the efforts of the Palestine Liberation Organisation have brought about a change in the policy of the Summit Conferences and that because of these efforts there now exists a greater possibility of an armed clash with Israel, before what you consider to be the proper time?

A. No one can or has the right to prevent the Palestinians fighting to recover their homeland and their rights in it. The aim of the Summit Conferences was to raise the standards of the Arab armies and realise their defensive capacity. A further aim was to create a unified command to coordinate the efforts of the armed forces of the Arab countries and to mobilise and organise the Palestinians in a revolutionary organisation, which is the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Q. Is the United Arab Republic alarmed at the possibility of an Israeli nuclear threat? What is the reaction to this? Will you sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?

A. We announced in Vienna that we would sign the treaty. Israel has refused.

In fact we are not alarmed; if the Israelis continue to work on the production of a nuclear bomb, the final solution will be a preventive war to forestall and eliminate this threat.

¹ *Al-Jihad*, 5/2/1967.

² *Al-Ahram*, 6/2/1967.

288

Joint Communiqué on Iraqi President Arif's Visit to the U.A.R., 2-7 February.¹ [Excerpt]**Cairo, February 7, 1967**

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The two Presidents listened with interest to Mr. Ahmad ash-Shuqairi, the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as he made a comprehensive review of the Palestine problem and the responsible role the Palestinian people have assumed in the struggle for their country. In this connection the two Presidents reaffirmed their full support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation and expressed their admiration for the courage of the Palestinian people, and their heroism and endurance in the face of all kinds of intimidation and violence. They also expressed their appreciation of the Palestinian people's attitude in the face of the imperialist and reactionary conspiracies aimed at destroying their entity and their Organisation, obliterating their personality and delaying their advance along the road to liberation.

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289

Speech of Saudi King Faysal at a Dinner in Honour of Jordanian King Husayn.² [Excerpt]**Riyadh, February 12, 1967**

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Your Majesty has seen with what feelings of affection and loyalty you were received in this country which, with God's will, will support and reinforce you in your struggle against the common enemy who lies in wait on the frontiers of Jordan, ready to violate these frontiers in pursuit of his objective, which is to erase Palestine from the map of the Arab world. But if the Almighty so wills, his machinations will be frustrated, and Jordan will endure, and the faithful Arab peoples who believe in God and in their rights will continue

¹ *Ibid.*, 8/2/1967.² *Al-Bilad*, Jiddah, 13/2/1967.

to support Jordan and encourage her in her struggle, in expectation of the decisive battle to recover their usurped rights in stricken Palestine.

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290

Speech of Syrian Defence Minister Major General Asad at an Army Camp.³ [Excerpts]**February 13, 1967**

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Brothers;

But are we not entitled to look at the Arab countries which surround Israel to discover exactly what assets Israel has in some of them? Is not the reactionary regime in Jordan an asset to the gangster state? Has not every Arab throughout the whole Arab world, during the last few months, heard how very similar were the statements broadcast by Eshkol and Rabin over Israel Radio, and by Wasfi at-Tall over Amman Radio?

Has not every Arab heard the statements of Eshkol and Rabin that Israel is not against the Syrian people, but only against the Ba'th regime? Was not Wasfi at-Tall saying the same thing when he stated: "We are with the Syrian people but against the Ba'th regime"?

Comrades;

Israel is with the Syrian people; Israel is concerned for the interests of the Syrian people; Wasfi at-Tall is concerned for the interests of the Syrian people. Israel is against the Ba'th regime only; Wasfi at-Tall is against the Ba'th regime only. Every Arab has also heard Wasfi at-Tall's threats "to open the frontiers with a tank force if they are closed," although we have never so much as suggested closing the frontiers.

Israel has not been threatened in this way. Does not every Arab in every part of the Arab world know that the subservient regime in Jordan is at this very moment concentrating on our frontiers an armoured brigade, a heavy tank corps, a battalion of infantry and other elements drawn

³ *Ath-Thaurah*, Damascus, 14/2/1967.

from the police, the security forces, spies and so on, at a time when we feel that the national interest requires that such a concentration should be on Israel's frontiers rather than on ours?

But there is nothing whatsoever surprising in what we see and hear of the conduct of the subservient reactionary regime in Jordan, for its destiny is linked with that of the Zionists in Palestine, and this link alone explains the attack on As-Samu'. It also explains the failure of this subservient regime in Jordan to give Syria true information when the attack took place.

The attack on As-Samu', comrades, had two aims, and two only. The first was to strengthen the subservient regime in Jordan—it is a complete mistake to believe that the attack was directed against that regime. No, the principal objective of the As-Samu' attack was to strengthen it; its aim was to give the Arab people and the Arab masses the erroneous idea that the regime in Jordan was an obstacle in Israel's path, that it was a nuisance to Israel, that it was serious in its attitude to the Palestine problem and was protecting the guerrilla organisations. The aim of the attack was to make the Arab masses sympathetic towards this regime, to build up popular credit for it at the expense of the cause of Palestine, than which nothing is more important to the Arabs. The second aim was to further intimidate the Arab people on the frontiers of Israel. These were the only two aims of the attack, which can be explained by the linked destinies of Jordan and Israel.

291

Joint Communiqué on Lebanese President Hilu's Visit to Kuwait, 11-14 February.¹
[Excerpt]

Kuwait, February 14, 1967

As regards the Palestine problem, the two

sides affirmed their support for all the organisations deriving from the Summit Conferences, whose object is to realise the aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people to uproot Zionist aggression and restore to the Palestinian people their rights in their country.

292

Joint Communiqué on Jordanian King Husayn's Visit to Saudi Arabia, 11-15 February.² [Excerpts]

Riyadh, February 15, 1967

The two Rulers studied the situation in the Arab world, and expressed their regret at the deterioration of relations between the Arab countries as a result of the pursuit of aims and objectives which have nothing whatsoever to do with Arab interests. They expressed great anxiety for the future of the Arab nation if it persisted in refusing to cope with its problems with complete frankness. With this end in view they call on the leaders of public opinion and political leaders of this nation to call for the convening of a Summit Conference at which all should frankly disclose the reasons for their fears and suspicions, placing Arab higher interests above all other considerations.

The two Rulers affirm that they appreciate the responsibilities laid upon the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as regards the most important Arab problem, and the Saudi Ruler affirms his absolute support for the attitude of Jordan, which bears the greatest responsibility for the cause of Palestine and is situated on the front line of the defence of the Arab nation. The two Kings also declare their belief in the necessity to unify Arab efforts and to mobilise Arab resources for the recovery of this usurped part of the Arab world. They also stand beside all the Arab peoples which

¹ *Al-Hayat*, Beirut, 15/2/1967.

² *Al-Bilad*, 16/2/1967.

are struggling to win their freedom and independence.

293

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir on the Ninth Anniversary of the Union Between Egypt and Syria.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, February 22, 1967

Two years after the secession the requirements of the Arab struggle made some kind of unity essential. In December 1963 I called for unified Arab action on behalf of Palestine, and for the convening of the Summit Conference. The requirements of Arab defence, which I referred to in my speech at Port Said in 1963, made this essential. They made it essential that we should forget our differences and quarrels and try to achieve unified action on behalf of Palestine. If you remember, in 1963 I said that while certain Arab countries talked about Israel and the recovery of Palestine, in their secret councils they admitted that they were incapable of defending their existence on their own. We therefore had to meet at an Arab Summit Conference to discuss means of ensuring the defence of the whole Arab homeland, and then work for the restoration of Palestine to its people.

At that time we had differences with Saudi Arabia; at that time there were differences between us and Jordan and, as I said, the nationalist forces were struggling in Saudi Arabia, and the nationalist forces in Jordan were struggling against the reactionary regime there. There were also differences between us and Syria. But all this we ignored, and called for a Summit Conference. We started with the first Summit Conference; then there was the second. The Summit Conferences did, in fact, achieve unified action; amongst other things they achieved the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

They also resulted in the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Army, and, for the first time, made the Palestinian entity a reality in spite of America's constant attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem and the Palestinian people. For the first time since the disaster of 1948 the Palestinian people won a victory. The Palestinian entity really exists, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation exists to unite the Palestinian people, and the Palestine Liberation Army also exists. At the same time the Unified Arab Command was established, and a system of financing the Arab countries was also set up; Jordan received £E 21 million, and has recently received another £E 2 million—£E 23 million in all.

Then there was Syria. Credits were opened for the countries which have common frontiers with Palestine—Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, and we all said that we would cooperate in this. And, indeed, unified action on behalf of Palestine did achieve certain results. But did the enemies of unity—those who had been hostile to the union of Egypt and Syria—did they accept unified action on behalf of Palestine? The same alliance between imperialism and reaction which had been at work after 1958 went to work again in 1964, 1965 and 1966, and reaction was given a respite. Reaction had always been on the defensive, but the Summit Conferences and its support of the Summit Conference decisions gave it a respite, and so it started working against the forces of revolution and national struggle in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, or rather the rulers of Saudi Arabia, and the rulers of Jordan, embarked on their conspiracies with the Muslim Brotherhood, with the intention of destroying the revolutionary regime in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood took money from Saudi Arabia and subsidies from Jordan, as was disclosed in the course of the investigations of the Muslim Brotherhood affair, which all of you have read.

Thus unified action on behalf of Palestine was not genuine. Money was spent in the hope of destroying revolutionary, progressive and liberationist principles, and the subservient reactionary countries began conspiring with imperialism, exploiting unified action on behalf of Palestine to destroy the very objectives for which it was designed. Who was it who sabotaged the experiment of unified action that resulted from

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 23/2/1967.

the Summit Conferences? The first, of course, was Mr. Burghiba; we all know how he started bargaining over the Palestine problem, and calling for its liquidation. We had all agreed on one point—unified action on behalf of Palestine; then along came Burghiba and called for negotiations with Israel and peace with Israel. He was, of course, executing the plans of America, for it is America that protects Israel, America that defends Israel, and Burghiba, like the good imperialist agent that he is, said that he was acting courageously in coming out with these ideas. The Western press published what he said, so that he was assured of American support. It was then said that these were not Burghiba's views alone, but the views of certain other Arab leaders as well, who were not in a position to speak out. Thus the destruction of unified Arab action began with Burghiba. Then King Faysal started working for the Islamic Pact in the service of American and British interests, thinking that he could do his work under the protection of the Summit Conferences. Who destroyed the Summit Conferences? The same men who destroyed unified action on behalf of Palestine.

After that along came King Husayn and joined with King Faysal.

Who destroyed unified Arab action? It was destroyed by those who destroyed the Summit Conferences, and we could not accept that the Summit Conferences should be made a screen for the supporters of imperialism in the area. Nor could we accept that the Summit Conferences should prevent us from expressing our opinion while these men were engaged in intrigue and were investing money in conspiracies. We, on the other hand, relied on our words—the words we spoke, the words broadcast over our radio, the words published by our press. We were not supported by money or by conspiracies.

Last year in Suez I got up and spoke before we announced that we were leaving the Summit Conferences, and asked that they be suspended—I spoke of the Islamic Pact. And later I also spoke in Damanhur of the Islamic Pact and the activities of reaction in the Middle East.

I did not attack America on either occasion but the Americans were very angry. Why were they angry? Because we had attacked King Faysal. Because we had attacked King Husayn.

Because we had attacked Israel. We were expected to solve all these problems by "quiet diplomacy." There was no need for us to speak about them, it would seem.

Very well, don't they attack us in their press and their broadcasts? Why wasn't America angry at these attacks? If we attacked them, America was angry, but if they attacked us, America was pleased, What did this mean? It meant that they wanted to shut us up.

But of course we refused to shut up, so they threatened us. Of course we refused to be influenced by their threats, and continued on our course. Then America cut off all the aid we had been receiving, which consisted mainly of imports of wheat to the value of £E 60 million. I told you at the time that we could not submit to economic pressure or threats, because by refusing to submit we should be defending the Arab revolution, the Arab struggle, Arab sovereignty and Arab nationalism. I told you that if we kept our mouths shut so that America would give us £E 60 million worth of wheat, and let the supporters of imperialism in Tunisia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia talk when we were afraid to talk lest America should cut off the £E 60 million worth of wheat, the result would be that the Americans would have us by the throat, and would never let go until we were utterly subservient to them. Let me tell you that we are a hundred per cent independent country and we are ready to sacrifice £E 60 million. I knew that we should be in difficulties—we were bound to be in difficulties if we suddenly lost £E 60 million a year, especially as we had overstretched ourselves in the development plan. But I was sure that every inhabitant of this country, if he had to choose between submitting to the Americans and receiving no aid, would say: "We won't have the aid."

We said to the Americans: Very well, why are you angry? We didn't even mention you. We talked about Israel, we talked about the man with the beard, but we didn't say who he was—we didn't even mention his name. What we said was anonymous; I don't know why the Americans were so angry.

Of course it is perfectly easy to deduce that they are American agents—tools of America. The man who advocated the Islamic Pact but said that he was defending religion, the man

who met with the Shah of Iran, but claimed that this was a religious and not a political action, is obviously an American agent carrying out American plans. But if I speak about him, even anonymously, the Americans are very angry indeed.

So we are confronted with all the conspiracies and intrigues of reaction and imperialism. This is quite plain. We were patient until we could be sure, and we did make sure. Behind the Summit Conferences lay the call for the Islamic Pact. Behind the Summit Conferences lay the consolidation of American and British influence in certain Arab countries. Behind the Summit Conferences lay the liquidation of the Yemeni revolution. Then along comes Burghiba—they said that Burghiba was “crazy” and that no one should take any notice of what he said—sometimes he comes over queer, and then he will say anything. And I myself, after Burghiba had spoken, said wait a minute, every one knows that he is temperamental, and sometimes he’ll say anything. But Burghiba reaffirmed what he had said, again and again.

It was not we who abused him; it was the Syrians. But he did not reply to the Syrians, he replied to us, and abused us. The first time at the meeting I said that I did not want to speak about Burghiba, or to answer him on this matter, or to quarrel with the man—it was the Syrians who had abused him. It was as though he were saying he was determined to pick a quarrel, that the plan he was following required that he pick a quarrel, that after he had announced the liquidation of the Palestine problem, he had now reached the second stage—he is nothing but stages, that man; after announcing the liquidation of the Palestine problem he now had to quarrel with us. We said to him, right, if you want to quarrel with us, we’ll quarrel with you, and tell you frankly what we think of you. What we think is this: A man who speaks like this must have been chosen by the Jews or by the Americans. Either that, or he must have gone crazy. Then, of course, along came King Faysal with his plans for the Islamic Pact. When people talk to King Faysal about the Yemen he says: Never, I have nothing to do with the Yemen, I am no party to the dispute—but he is laughing at people. Then they mention the Islamic Pact, and he says: Who says there is

an Islamic Pact? I have never mentioned anything but the Islamic Conference and Islamic solidarity; we are working for religion. But it was well known that America had already tried to use Saudi Arabia against the revolutionary forces in 1957. Eisenhower said so. The Americans sometimes deny things, but every President, when he comes to the end of his term, publishes his memoirs and discloses whatever they have denied. In 1957 they said that they supported neither the Islamic Pact nor Islamic action, nor any confrontation with the revolutionary forces: but then we have Eisenhower’s memoirs. In fact in 1957 they wanted to occupy Syria, and told the Turks to occupy it. Later they decided that it would be better for Iraq to occupy Syria—we all remember what happened in 1957, when there were Egyptian paratroops in Syria before the union, and we announced that the Egyptian army would stand by the Syrian army. The fact is that in 1957 our intelligence services informed me that the Americans were plotting with Turkey and Iraq to invade Syria. I didn’t believe it; we discussed the matter, but there was no hundred per cent certain proof, although there was some information. Until after the union, I preferred not to believe it—how could America dare, how could America even dream of invading Syria in agreement with Turkey and Iraq? Then Eisenhower described the whole plan in his memoirs, telling how he had sent Loy Henderson to Turkey to come to an agreement with the Turks to attack Syria, and that afterwards they had gone to Iraq and come to an agreement with Nuri as-Sa’id to attack Syria, but changed their minds.

All this happened in 1957. Eisenhower’s memoirs also describe how they wanted to establish a force to oppose the revolutionary forces, which, at that time, were led by Egypt. So they proposed to King Sa’ud that he should do all he could on behalf of Islamic propaganda, an Islamic Pact and an Islamic Conference. Then they invited him to America, and Eisenhower said that although it had been decided that he should not normally go to the airport to meet anyone, for the sake of this scheme an exception had been made and he had gone to the airport to meet King Sa’ud. Then King Sa’ud returned from America, but the Islamic Pact operation was not carried out. We had a meeting here,

which was attended by King Sa'ud and Shukri al-Quwatli and myself, and there was some talk on this subject, but it was disregarded.

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So they are all working hand in hand—America, Britain, King Husayn, King Faysal, the Shah of Iran, the present government in the Occupied South, the government of stooges appointed by Britain after suppressing and driving out the nationalists, and the stooges in Bahrain and in the British Protectorates—they are all working together under one master and one planner, this planner being America and Britain; imperialism and neo-imperialism.

This is the relationship between imperialism and Arab reaction today.

Now we come to another simple question—What is the relationship between imperialism and Israel in view of the whole situation? Israel, the real enemy, Israel which has always been our enemy, and which makes a formula for unified action on behalf of Palestine and the Summit Conferences essential.

There is no need for a very profound analysis to discover the relationship between imperialism and Israel. America and Britain established Israel and protected her; imperialism strengthens Israel. The existence of Israel is due to America and Britain and the other Western powers under American influence. Israel's economy depends on what it can get from America, Germany and Britain. Israel's arms come from America. Formerly she used to get arms from France, but today it is America that is arming Israel, either for nothing or for a nominal price. All this so that Israel may be a base for imperialism in the heart of the Arab homeland, and a barrier to the achievement of Arab unity.

I have told you before how the Americans threatened us more than two years ago, and asked us to refrain from any nuclear activity, and to give them the right to inspect Egypt to make sure that we were not undertaking any nuclear activity. Then they told us to stop producing rockets, and let them inspect us. Then they told us not to make any increases in the Egyptian army. But we rejected all their demands. Then they told us that, as they were giving us wheat and letting us save hard currency, and since we

were receiving £E 60 million a year from them, they would find our refusal very difficult to explain to the Congress and to American public opinion. What they meant was that they would cooperate with us if we did what they told us but they were indirectly threatening to cut off the wheat supplies. But we told them that we could not possibly agree to their having the right to inspect us; we had refused to accept American arms at the beginning of the Revolution, for if we had accepted them we should have had to accept an American military mission too. For they have a law which says that if they provide American arms as aid, they must also provide a military mission to give training in how to use them.

In 1953 Ali Sabri went to Washington to negotiate for arms. They agreed to give us arms, but only on condition that they should send a mission to teach us how to use them. At the time we were just about to be rid of the British. We had developed a real complex about British missions. We absolutely refused an American one. So we told them so; we said that we would have the arms but not the mission. They replied that if we had the arms we must have the mission too, so we told them to keep both the arms and the mission.

That was in 1953. Then in 1965 they came and asked to be allowed to inspect us for rockets, bombs, nuclear activity and nuclear research, and wanted to insist that we should not enlarge our army beyond a certain size. Of course, they made the same request again. When we said we were sorry we could not accept this, they replied that they would do all they could to prevent the balance of armaments in the area being upset—meaning that they would give Israel arms, which they said they had not been doing before. But we said that this was not true—they had been exporting arms to Israel, without payment, through Germany. We told them that they had given Israel tanks, planes, helicopters and transport planes—they had given her whatever she had asked for gratis—through Germany. America told Germany to give Israel arms, and after Israel had received the arms, they came to us and said they were going to give her even more. We told the Americans that if they gave Israel arms we should buy arms, for we could not possibly accept that Israel should have more arms than we had.

It was obvious that America had aligned herself entirely with Israel, and had decided to arm her with tanks, rockets and all kinds of equipment.

So, you see, it was imperialism that established Israel and protected her and it is imperialism that is now protecting and strengthening Israel, in order to create an equilibrium between Israel and the Arab countries.

What, then? When we see that Faysal, Husayn and Burghiba are the friends of imperialism, which is the friend of Israel, everything becomes perfectly clear and consistent. We can understand everything—why Arab reaction turned against unified Arab action; because its hostility to the ultimate aims of the Arab struggle is always stronger than any motives it might have for going along with action directed towards those aims, a course it is sometimes obliged to follow. We can understand why imperialism incited Arab reactionary forces—Burghiba, Husayn and Faysal—and how it caused a breach with unified Arab action to appear so enticing to them by exploiting their interests and ambitions. We understand that imperialism is coordinating its activities on two fronts—Arab reaction and Israel. Imperialism does not want there to be a Palestinian entity, nor does it want the Palestine Liberation Front, nor the Palestine Liberation Army, nor the Unified Arab Command, nor unified action on behalf of Palestine, which assists the evolutionary development of the Arab masses along progressive lines. But imperialism did not oppose unified action, because it could relieve the pressure on the friends of imperialism, the Arab reactionaries, and give them a breathing space to regroup for a new attack. America and Britain thought that they could provide sufficient protection for themselves, their friends and their spheres of influence through economic and psychological warfare and pressure on the revolutionary and progressive countries.

It also becomes very easy for us to understand why imperialism is arming reaction. When it gives arms to King Husayn, does America really imagine that these arms will be used against Israel—America which created Israel, has protected Israel, and helps Israel and its economy? Is it conceivable that America should give arms to King Husayn for use against Israel?

Of course not; it is inconceivable. America

gives King Husayn arms to be used anywhere but against Israel.

America also sells arms to King Faysal. For use against Israel? Of course not; America gives King Faysal these arms for use elsewhere than Israel. In 1955 we asked America to sell us a few tanks and rockets for cash, not on instalments—in 1955 there was constant tension on the frontiers. But America refused. In 1955, before asking the U.S.S.R. for arms, we asked the Americans, we begged them, we did everything to get them to sell us tanks and planes. But they absolutely refused to sell us a single plane or tank. Why? Because it is inconceivable that America should give arms that might be used against Israel. So we gave up hope of the Americans, and asked for arms from the U.S.S.R. and the Czech arms deal was concluded in September 1955.

Everyone knows America's attitude to the Palestine problem; America makes no attempt to conceal it. America declares its attitude every day. It only remains for them to get up and say that they are one with Israel. They have said everything short of that. Only last week the American Secretary of State got up and said that America would support Israel's security, for which she felt herself responsible. He said this in reply to a senator who called for an international conference for the protection of Israel. The Secretary of State said in reply that there was no need for an international conference, but that America would support and be responsible for Israel's security.

And America is also responsible for the security of the stooge regime in Jordan—not that she is just interested in preserving it for its own sake, but because its continued existence ensures the continued existence of Israel. Israel herself confirms this—the Israel Foreign Minister gets up and says that any change in the present Jordanian regime would be unacceptable. That is to say, Israel entirely approves of the present regime in Jordan, and has every confidence in it. The Israeli Foreign Minister said this only three days ago in an interview with the *London Times*.

America arms Israel and arms Jordan, protects Israel and protects Jordan. This means that the Jordanian regime is regarded as an indirect protection for Israel. And, in the same

statement, the American Secretary of State went on to say that America did not approve of the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and was opposed to its objectives. This is also King Husayn's attitude to the Organisation, as is shown by both his words and his deeds. It is also the attitude of King Faysal to the Organisation, as is shown by his deeds though not, so far at any rate, by his words. King Faysal behaves deviously—he does not say anything, but he does not support the Organisation—indeed, he fights against it. He sends for Hajj Amin al-Husayni and gives him money, and tries to spend money on the Palestinians to make them a threat to the Organisation. But he doesn't say anything. King Husayn both speaks and implements the policy of his masters to the letter, while Faysal implements the policy of his masters sometimes openly, at other times secretly.

So we must conclude that imperialism supports and arms reaction, imperialism supports and arms Israel. And as imperialism is the sole source of the planning, the two sides that obtain its support and arms cannot possibly be in conflict with each other; they must be cooperating, though perhaps through a third party. And this third party plans for both Israel and reaction.

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King Husayn is both by his nature and his heritage disposed to go the same way. When the Jews and Israel say that if a finger is laid on King Husayn or the established regime in Jordan, Israel will intervene and attack and occupy the West Bank. In the days after the attack on As-Samu', and the demonstrations that took place on the West Bank, there was talk of this kind. We sent a message to the Syrians saying that we had decided that any attack on the West Bank would be the beginning of the battle between us and Israel. What attitude would Syria take?

The Syrian government replied that the Syrian army would immediately enter the battle. Our Chief of Staff General Fawzi went to Syria, and the Egyptian and Syrian armies coordinated their plans of action in case of any aggression against the West Bank.

This means that we aren't going to let the Jews do just as they want. They say that if there is any change in Jordan, they will take action;

they say this to protect their beloved protégé King Husayn. Any one familiar with Israel knows her objectives, and knows who are her friends and enemies in the area. Similarly, the objectives, friends and enemies of reaction and imperialism are equally well known, for reaction is following the same imperialist plan as Israel. This is the final conclusion we reach; this is what has destroyed all hope of unified Arab action; this is what has wrecked the Summit Conferences, and this is where a new stage in the Arab struggle begins.

I have spoken to you today about the first experiment in Arab unity. The first union was destroyed, but in spite of that it sowed the seeds of the idea of unity, the idea that there must be some simple form of unity, if only in the form of unified action within the framework of the Summit Conferences. But this too was destroyed by Arab reaction in collaboration with imperialism. It was destroyed by the same forces that destroyed the first union. But the current has not ceased to flow despite the sorrow, the pain, and the calamity of the rulers of the Arab nation, in cooperation with imperialism, selling the aspirations of the Arab nation and acting in collusion with the enemies of their Arab nation, through fear of the legitimate demands of the members of their nation.

The current has not stopped flowing, it has only taken a new form that the powers of reaction working in collaboration and collusion with imperialism can no longer continue to attack from within. From now on they will have to attack it from the outside, and be unmasked as following the same line as imperialism and Israel. This new form is the unity of the revolutionary forces.

This is the new stage; we are only at the beginning and there are still many obstacles ahead, but this is the only true formula and it is essential for the confrontation of imperialism and Israel. We are now embarking on this stage, meaning that we have ranged all Arab objectives, whether political, social or unionist, on one side, and that we have grouped all the objectives of the struggle on the opposite side. The revolutionary Arab forces have dedicated their energies and their future to political and social liberty and unity, in the form agreed on by the Arab

peoples, the form which suits their development and expresses their aspirations. This means that the forces on the other side, the hostile forces of imperialism and reaction and Israel, know that they are engaged in a decisive battle, and that if they lose it they will lose all the positions they hold, while if they win they will win all. This is the explanation of the desperate struggle in which the Arab masses are engaged at the present stage, the stage of action for the unity of the revolutionary forces. It is also the explanation of the desperate opposition to these forces of the hostile forces of imperialism, reaction and Israel. Thus when King Faysal pays £E 5 million to a news agency or a public relations company, we say that he is not paying too much, considering that he is paying to save his neck, and considering that if he loses the battle he will have lost everything, while if he wins it he will have won everything. The Arab masses are also fighting for their destiny; if they win, they will win everything; that is why the battle for the unity of the revolutionary forces is a desperate struggle. It is also a battle on many fronts—one on which the revolutionary forces are operating inside their countries to affirm their existence and their influence and another on which the revolutionary forces meet, coordinate their activities and define their objectives and the means to be used to attain them. And finally there is the struggle with the principal enemy of the Arab nation and the forces of the alliance made up of imperialism in the centre, Arab reaction on the right and Israeli racialism on the left.

294

Speech of Syrian Chief of State al-Atasi on the Fourth Anniversary of the 8 March Revolution.¹ [Excerpt]

Damascus, March 7, 1967

Brothers and fellow citizens;

The Arabs of Palestine, wearied of the

promises made by the reactionary rulers ever since the disaster of 1948 to work for the recovery of their usurped territories, have succeeded in overcoming the despair in which imperialism and its agents among the Arab rulers have tried to plunge them. There has arisen in their hearts the hope of liberating their country with their own hands, in the same way as the Arabs of Algeria liberated their country from French imperialism and as the rebels of Vietnam are liberating their land from the imperialism of America and her allies. The will of the people is irresistible; no one can stand up against legitimate aspirations, however great his material and technological strength.

In the past French imperialism followed the scorched-earth policy to overcome the Algerian rebels, but it was unsuccessful. So France surrounded Algeria with an electrified fence to prevent the people liberating their country. But in spite of this the Arab people in Algeria, who were determined to fight until victory was won, succeeded in gaining their full independence and driving the alien usurper from their land. This is because the will of the people is unconquerable; any one who disbelieves this should be living in another age. Similarly, American imperialism in Vietnam is following an abominable policy of annihilating villages and their inhabitants, burning crops, trees and forests and blowing up bridges and installations. But in spite of this the Vietnamese rebels have succeeded in teaching American imperialism a lesson it will never forget. They have succeeded in encircling the Americans in positions from which they cannot escape, in preparation for their final expulsion from the country. This is because the will of the people is unconquerable, and any one who doubts this is ignorant of history. The liberation of Palestine is both a national and popular necessity, a socialist and economic necessity, because every day the gangster state exists in the occupied territory is an obstacle in the way of Arab unity, delaying economic development, and impeding the achievement of Arab freedom and world freedom. It was a great achievement on the part of the Arabs of Palestine that they should conceive the hope of recovering their occupied territory, and the treachery of the subservient rulers was revealed in its full enormity when the Palestinian Arabs started to infiltrate into the occupied territories

¹ Syrian News Agency, 7/3/1967.

and spread terror in the ranks of the Zionists who occupy them. Then Arab reaction was revealed for what it really was; the mask fell from its face once more, and it could no longer avail itself of the political imposture in which it was so firmly rooted once it had revealed its evil face and set itself up as the protector of the frontiers of the gangster state against the raids of Palestinian commandos.

The commandos have spread terror in the ranks of the Zionist gangster state, their heroic actions have cut down the flood of Zionist immigration into the occupied territories. They have shaken Israeli society to its foundations and obliged large numbers to leave the occupied territories. These commandos, who are sacrificing their lives and their blood to recover their usurped homeland, now feel themselves reborn—not when they escape unharmed from the frontiers of the gangster state, but when they escape over the frontiers of the subservient state of Jordan. Arab reaction, in its subservience to Zionism and imperialism, has lowered the mask from its ugly face and shown itself in its true colours as the protector of the frontiers of the gangster state and the persecutor of every Arab commando and of any man who is related to any Arab through bonds of kinship, friendship or ancestry. The prisons of Jordan are full of those whom the subservient regime there believes might become Arab commandos at some time in the future. But, in spite of this, Arab commando activity in the occupied territories has not stopped, and the strong guard kept on Israel's frontiers by the subservient regime has in no way altered the character of the struggle. The day will surely come when the toilers in Jordan and the persecuted in Palestine say their last word on this subject. A great clamour is arising about the Revolution in the Syrian Region; starting with servile broadcasts and reports in the mercenary press, it reaches as far as the United Nations and the Security Council. Syria, it is claimed, is training the commandos and others, arming them and urging them to enter the occupied territories. Why is there all this concern? Why all this fear for the gangster state?

Why do the reactionary rulers always concentrate on Syria and the Revolution in Syria? We declare to the world that our army, which we have made ready to fight the decisive battle

with the gangster state, cannot be turned into a guard to protect the frontiers of that state from the commandos, sons of the occupied territories, who have a natural right to return to and liberate their homes.

295

Speech of Jordanian King Husayn on Martyrs' Day.¹ [Excerpts]

Jericho, March 12, 1967

The cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs, and calls for effort and sacrifice. The least that we can offer is our money, and shame on those who have been in the past and are still reluctant to work in the service of the cause of our usurped rights in Palestine. In the past it was commonly said amongst us Arabs that the Jews are notorious misers. But today, when we look at our enemies, we find them in the heart of our homeland and attacking us every day, with the support of all the Jews in the world, who are not sparing their aid and support and are working together closely to execute their designs.

A glance at the past shows us that more than 90 per cent of the population of Palestine were Arabs. But the Arab revolt came into collision with the schemes of the enemy, with their offers and temptations; we did not accept the partition resolutions, though many others did. Then the enemy crossed the partition frontiers and constantly attacked us until 1956, when they proceeded to open the Gulf of Aqaba and bring in United Nations forces, and then started planning to divert the waters of the River Jordan from their natural course, in violation of international law and custom. Meanwhile, the whole Arab nation, indignant at what had happened and was still happening, was asking its leaders and chiefs, who had filled the air with their talk, what preparations they had made for the battle.

It was under such pressure that a Summit Conference of Arab leaders was convened. We

¹ *Al-Jihad*, 13/3/1967.

said at the time that the Arabs had risen to their responsibilities, had risen to the Summit. We had wasted much of our potential in the previous years while the enemy was working and preparing. Then the Arab leaders met, and let me remind you of what I said to them:

"I welcome this occasion and this meeting. My country and my people have been exposed to many unjust attacks, and hope for your assistance and support, on this occasion when we are met to cope with aggression against Arab waters." I also said to them: "Jordan is ready to march in the van if you want war with the enemy. She will offer all her available resources, and the resolution of her sons, and we are all ready to sacrifice our lives on behalf of our goals. If you want to do the planning and organising, you can take the decisions and we will follow you. It is up to us to deal with everything here, and we want the Summit Conference to mark the start of a new era in unified Arab action, through cooperation, organisation and loyalty. For the Arab people are one people throughout the whole Arab homeland."

So we started to work on Arab projects, including the Unified Arab Command. Then we met again at Casablanca and reviewed what had been achieved. The experts at the Casablanca meeting said that if we wanted our nation to become strong enough to be secure from surprises from the enemy, we must make a military plan for the next three years, as all available information indicated that the enemy was preparing for war with new and lethal weapons. We also decided that it was essential to strengthen Arab solidarity by solving the problems of the Arab homeland, including the problem of the Yemen, so that the Arabs should recover their normal strength as before and that all should work together for stability.

At a time when all of us were trying to find solutions for the various problems in the shortest possible time, and particularly the problem of the Yemen, we suddenly found that the Summit Conferences and the unity of Arab ranks had been sabotaged. The Summit Conferences were an attempt to capitalise on Arab feelings at a time of transformation. They also put certain Arab countries, and Jordan in particular, in a critical situation they were unable to cope with. The enemy

took advantage of this opportunity to obtain arms, so that Jordan had to choose between its new military formations and reinforcements, and returning to the situation before the Summit Conferences. This was the situation that confronted Jordan, which is now trying to become self-sufficient and to execute her seven-year-plan projects.

Jordan needs many resources to enable her to man the longest stretch of the Armistice Line; the enemy's total common frontiers with the other Arab countries are shorter than Jordan's common frontier with the enemy, which stretches for 650 kilometres. Jordan is the shield which protects the Arab nation against the enemy, and is firm and resolute in the performance of her duty. Jordan will never allow any one to interfere in her affairs, nor will she accept conditional aid. Jordan needs unconditional aid, and will continue to follow her plans to make herself self-sufficient. If Jordan accepts such aid from foreign countries, it is entirely the fault of the Arab countries that have not aided her in her time of trial.

The enemy is constantly trying to destroy the self-confidence of the people of the Arab homeland; in this way the hopes to achieve his aims rapidly. The Arab homeland is being submitted to a variety of shocks which, far from being accidental, are skilfully contrived. Instead of advancing, it is revolving in a vortex. The armed forces of the Arab countries have been subjected to shocks, with the result that we have lost hundreds of officers who, had they not become involved, would have been a great source of strength against the enemy.

The arms we carry are Arab arms, wherever they may have come originally from—the East or the West. We hope to stop the genocidal war in the Yemen and to bring back Arab troops to the front they should be holding. We have never been able to explain the use of Arab arms by Arabs against the Yemen; we have never been able to explain how Arabs come to be using not only traditional weapons, but also poison gas and weapons that are internationally outlawed, at a time when international forces are safeguarding the enemy's freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

We hold meetings and boycott the companies that trade with the enemy, but in the Gulf of

Aqaba we give him every opportunity to transport his wares and manufactures to Asia and Africa. No one has answered our questions about the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force or the reason for the presence of Egyptian troops in the Yemen. All we want is that the Yemen should be allowed to decide her own future, to choose the regime or form of government that suits her, and that all Arab forces should help our brothers in the Yemen to catch up with the rest of the Arabs. It is painful to us that huge resources should be lost in this barbaric war; we should like these resources to be earmarked for the building up of the Yemen. Once more I say that the conspiracies that the Arab world is witnessing are no accident.

Every man of good will knows that the cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs. The Palestinians have a great duty to perform; they must be the vanguard, because our cause is one of right and justice, and right will surely triumph in the end. Our duty is to resist the falsehood of our enemy on every field and front throughout the world, and the duty of the Palestinians is to cooperate with all so that we may work together. The Palestinians must see to it that their cause should be the cause of all Arabs, and not be allowed to become a mere secondary problem after these long years since 1948. At that time our armies were incomplete and the situation was unfavourable to us, but now our situation is such that we cannot accept that the problem should be left to the Palestinians to solve for themselves. To do that would be to give away what is left; it would be a shirking of Arab responsibility. Therefore the [Palestinians] must be more zealous than others for their cause. The Arab revolt reached this conclusion long ago—that the cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs.

President Nasir called the first Summit Conference, then sabotaged the Summit Conferences. He is always talking about Arab problems; he makes speeches to the masses and interferes with many people in the Arab world. People sometimes ask why we do not reply to his attacks. The explanation is very simple: if we have any feelings in this regard, they are feelings of pain, because he had the required qualifications and circumstances were more favourable to him than to others for him to serve the aspirations and

aims of the Arab nation and to recover our rights. We regard it as natural that Egypt, with her population of thirty millions, should play the leading role. He could have united all the Arabs, and done great things. But many years have been lost.

We hope and pray, but, if there is any hope, President Nasir has not been the man to fulfill it, and if there has been sadness, he, and he alone, has been the cause.

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The problem of Palestine is a matter of life and death for us, and the road ahead of us is long and hard. Every one of us must do his duty with resolution and determination to surmount the difficulties that face us.

Our military situation is now excellent, and I will not allow the smallest of our military units to be dissolved or to lack a single piece of arms. Through our armed forces we shall be able to evict our enemies from the Holy Land, with the aid of our brothers in the Arab homeland on whose shoulders lies the duty of providing the necessary support. It is our duty to deal with problems in the right way.

As an example, let me mention our attitude to the Arab League. It is not an escapist attitude; on the contrary, it is one dictated to us by our feelings. If the Arab League had met its responsibilities, much of what has happened in the Arab world would never have happened. But the desire of some of us to be tolerant in this matter, and our failure to correct what went wrong, has resulted in the League becoming so weak that it can no longer perform its duties properly. It is essential that the League should be rescued so that it may execute its mission and perform its duty in the service of the Arabs. In the past we sacrificed our opinions and convictions in the hope of achieving full Arab unity. But now, since the Summit Conference has been sabotaged, it is our duty to follow a policy that is really in the national interest.

Our feelings for the enemy are unchanged, and the battle is that of a nation and its rights against the false claims of the enemy. Zionism is our enemy throughout the whole world, and we must confront it everywhere, we must resist it everywhere, and not withdraw anywhere and

leave it the field. There is an old friendship that can work miracles, and good feelings such as generally arise between worthy peoples. This is the case as regards us and the German people, regardless of certain things done by Germany that we do not approve of. And this, I believe, is why three Arab countries did not accept the principle of boycotting Germany. And we have decided that it is our duty, now that circumstances have changed, even in Germany itself, to reestablish relations in the service of our cause.

296

Resolutions Adopted by the Joint Arab Defence Council at Its Tenth Meeting.¹

Cairo, March 14, 1967

Inasmuch as the governments of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and Saudi Arabia were absent from the tenth meeting of the Joint Defence Council, and have failed to implement the decisions taken at its ninth meeting, the Council resolves:

1. That the Arab member states shall meet their financial obligations not later than 1 July 1967, and the Council shall keep a record of statements made by representatives of the member states to the effect that they undertake to do so before that date.

2. That the financial commitments due to any such state as does not fulfil its military commitments as fixed by a decision of this Council, shall be frozen. By virtue of this resolution:

(a) The sums received by the Unified Command shall be distributed to the beneficiaries, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Army but not to Jordan, in the proportions allotted at the Second Summit Conference;

(b) The Unified Command shall disburse the remainder of the amount earmarked for the erection of airports in Jordan as a temporary advance to the beneficiaries, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Army, to meet the deficit

of payments to them, and in the proportions allotted at the Second Summit Conference;

(c) Should the payments fixed at the Third Summit Conference become available, the Unified Command shall pay the sum necessary for the establishment of formations, as decided at that Conference, to the Command of the Palestine Liberation Army.

3. The Council commissions the Commander in Chief of the Unified Arab Command to submit an appraisal of the military situation, taking into account present conditions in the Arab world, but on the assumption that these conditions are temporary.

4. The Council shall refer to the Commander in Chief for study the proposals contained in the report of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

5. The Council recommends that the Arab Finance Ministers be invited to attend a meeting to be held at the Headquarters of the Arab League on 2 April 1967, to examine the report of the finance experts.

6. The Council resolves to set 4 July as the date for the Joint Defence Council to meet to consider the appraisal of the new situation, and once the financial commitments have been fulfilled.

297

Statement by the Jordanian Chief Delegate to the Arab League Jum'ah Announcing Jordan's Withdrawal from the League Council Meetings.²

Cairo, March 14, 1967

The Delegation of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan wishes to affirm the desire of its government, already expressed on many previous occasions since it had the honour of participating in the establishment of the League, to strengthen and support it so that it may fulfil the high hopes the Arab nation has placed in it by becoming a guiding light for all Arabs and a meeting place

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 15/3/1967.

² *Al-Jihad*, 16/3/1967.

for the effective advancement of their national interests and objectives. This is especially necessary in the present critical situation in which our great nation finds itself, for, had the League performed its role properly, the Arabs' national aspirations would not have been so rudely shattered and spurned, unified Arab action on behalf of our first and foremost cause—the cause of Palestine—would not have been impeded, and other calamities would not have befallen certain Arab countries. Certainly one of the reasons for this degeneration and collapse is that the League has become mere form without content and, most regrettably, has lost the courage and ability to uncover weak points so that they may be faced up to and remedied. This has encouraged certain quarters to persist in their negative attitudes to Arab circles not directly concerned with tackling the problems so as to avoid being exposed to slanderous attacks and unconcealed pressures.

Far from having fabricated this crisis, Jordan believes that it is essential that its causes should be eliminated. Jordan is extremely anxious that the League should be what all Arabs want it to be, but it appears that Mr. Ash-Shuqayri has other views and is following another course. Had he been really anxious to support the League and to follow the right course towards the liberation of our usurped territories, he would not have resorted to these methods—to odious vituperation which is of service only to the enemy who is lying in wait for us, and sterile argument whose only result is increased division and estrangement. Ash-Shuqayri is well known in the conference rooms of the League as a speaker inspired by the whim of the moment, who talks only nonsense, whose nature it is to exude insults which he generously and impartially distributes right and left, to the fervent applause of stooges, hirelings and self-interested persons. But all he is doing is to blow bubbles which, like all worthless things, soon vanish. The only result is that the Arab peoples, and first and foremost the Palestinian people, in whose name ash-Shuqayri claims to speak, have become weary of his stock in trade of words, jugglery and insults to the intelligence, and are no longer taken in by his methods. For he has caused divisions between brother and brother, and endeavoured through intrigues and stratagems to bring disunity to a united people and a united country. And it is our primary

cause that will have to pay the price.

Perhaps it was a pure coincidence that yesterday witnessed both ash-Shuqayri's speeches at the Joint Defence Council, which were published, distributed and broadcast, and Israel's treacherous attack on Jordanian territory. In any case, neither did Ash-Shuqayri get what he wanted, nor did the enemy succeed in penetrating the impregnable citadel of Jordan or shaking her victorious army under the command of King Husayn.

Jordan hopes and prays that her sister Arab countries will take the same stand in the service of the higher national interest, for she believes that all of them, or at least the great majority of them, have the same views and opinions as we have. Jordan reserves her right not to attend any meeting of the League at any level if it is attended by Ash-Shuqayri, for reasons disclosed by Jordan in her memorandum addressed to the Secretariat General of the League on 29. 1. 67. Since it has become known how he reveals important military secrets, outrages the truth and falsifies history, the mere presence of Ash-Shuqayri at any meeting makes it certain that he will deprave it, obstruct it and make it utterly worthless. It is essential, if intentions are good and if higher national interests are to prevail over sectarian passions, that this situation and any other situation that has weakened the League and impaired its powers should be remedied. Jordan does not take this attitude so as to shirk her responsibility or avoid the confrontation; she is strong for she is right and she has full confidence in herself. All she hopes is that other Arabs may be influenced by her just and correct attitude and be prevailed upon to assist the League by deeds, not words, to remedy the deplorable situation and make it what all Arabs wish it to be, for it is our only hope.

Mr. Chairman: The Jordanian delegation hereby declares its intention of withdrawing from the present sessions of the League, wishing you every success in the service of the true aims of all the Arabs.

Memorandum Submitted by Jordan to the Arab League on the Restoration of Its Diplomatic Relations with West Germany.¹

Amman, March 18, 1967

The Foreign Ministry of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan offers it sincerest greetings to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, and, in view of the questions that are being asked and the misrepresentations that have been circulated as a result of the restoration of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level between the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and the Federal German Republic as from 27.2.67, this Ministry has the honour to bring to the attention of the Secretariat-General the following observations and explanations, in the interests of truth and for the sake of history. The Ministry further requests that they be made known to the other Arab countries.

1. Jordan believes that the struggle with Zionism is a struggle between right and wrong, between good and evil, and that it is a struggle which is by no means restricted to Palestine. On the contrary, it is a battle that has to be fought throughout the whole world, for, were it not for the enemy's activities in all countries of the world, he would never have been able to establish himself in the heart of our homeland and maintain himself there to this day. Thus, as far as the Arabs are concerned, construction and preparation are not enough; they must take control of the struggle and carry it into every land and every awakened conscience, so that, with time and effort, they may win friends. For we firmly believe that, although wrong may win a battle, right must inevitably win the war. For this reason Jordan believes that the Arabs must everywhere confront the wrong which is Zionism with their own right, that they must make a point of passing through every door which the enemy has already opened for himself, and that they must compete in every field in which Israel is already active.

2. Jordan firmly believes that the Germans are a worthy people who have had in the past, and still have at present, strong links with the Arab people, links which should be retained and fostered. It was undoubtedly because they also

held this belief that certain other Arab countries refused to sever their relations with Federal Germany.

3. A rapid glance at the crisis and the events that led up to it will establish the following:

(a) On 25.11.1964 the King of Jordan paid an official visit to Federal Germany at the invitation of its President, and, in the course of his visit, had talks at the highest level. The joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit includes an expression of Germany's profound concern with Arab issues and the refugee problem. Both sides expressed the hope that all issues at stake would be settled by peaceful means and on a basis of freedom and justice.

(b) His Majesty King Husayn was the first to accept the invitation to an Arab meeting at Summit level, in the hope that the Arab nation might return to its previous dedicated and purposeful course, and that it might recover its prestige among the peoples and nations of the world. Since the first Summit Conference His Majesty has made the greatest efforts to maintain contacts with the other Arab leaders in the hope that such contacts might contribute to the good of all and lead towards the common goal. Before his visit to Germany he personally contacted President Gamal Abd an-Nasir to ask whether there were matters that might profitably be discussed in Germany, but the President had nothing new to suggest, apart from general action to strengthen the links of mutual understanding with Germany and to preserve the existing friendship.

(c) During his visit, King Husayn concentrated his efforts on preventing Germany from establishing diplomatic relations with the present regime in Occupied Palestine, which it then appeared to have the intention of doing in the near future.

(d) The German attitude tended to be in favour of the exchange of representations with the present regime in Occupied Palestine. This attitude arose from Germany's desire to put an end to the stage in its relations with that regime during which this had been accorded a special treatment, as a result of what the Jews had suffered in Germany during the Nazi era, and of the prevalent feeling that it was Germany's moral duty to atone for what had happened to them.

¹ *Ibid.*, 19/3/1967.

The decision to establish diplomatic relations with this regime, the Germans pointed out, was one that had been taken by the majority of the countries in the world, including certain recently independent ones, which were, nevertheless, the close friends of many Arab countries. King Husayn insisted that the German people had a moral duty to the Arabs too, for, he said, had it not been for what had happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany, tragedy might never have befallen Palestine. The fate of the Jews had aroused world-wide sympathy for them, which sympathy they had exploited to assist them in committing their own abominable crime. During the talks the Germans assured King Husayn that, although, the decision to exchange diplomatic representations might be taken at some time in the future, it would certainly not be taken immediately. The German officials expressed their surprise at King Husayn's insistence, especially as, when an important German personality, Herr Gerstenmaier, the President of the Bundestag, had informed President Nasir of the German point of view, the latter had made no comment. It came as a great surprise to King Husayn who, inspired by the spirit of the Summit Conferences, had gone to Germany prepared to act a spokesman for his fellow Arab Leaders, to hear while there of this meeting, for President Nasir had not referred to what had passed during his talks with the German envoy and in fact, had not even mentioned meeting him.

(e) During his visit to Germany, His Majesty did not bring up the question of the arms that had been supplied to Israel, and did not discuss it with the Germans, as it did not yet form part of the picture.

(f) When the crisis with Germany came to a head, King Husayn was surprised to hear that the Egyptian President had discussed the question of these arms with the German official, even before he, Husayn, had met Nasir, and before he had gone to Germany.

(g) It became clear that it was the previous German government that had concluded the arms deal as a result both of external pressure and of psychological pressures at home, looking for an outlet to atone for what the Nazis had done to the Jews, and that some Arab countries had long known of the deal, and concluded deals

of their own with Federal Germany.

(h) Jordan's official feeling, in spite of the pain and agitation caused by what had happened, was that the matter should be dealt with in such a manner that the Arabs would benefit from it. It was essential, Jordan believed, to adopt a unified Arab attitude and to emphasise that it was Germany's duty to realise that she had, to a great extent, been morally responsible for the disaster of 1948. It was also necessary to explain that the Arabs could not accept that Germany should give their enemies arms free of charge, in fact, regardless of cost or quantity, at a time when they themselves had to work so hard to buy arms to strengthen their defences against a planned aggression that was being implemented against them stage by stage. Jordan also learned that Germany had stopped arms shipments, and had no intention of resuming them at a later date, and that she was likely to make great efforts to restore her former friendship with the Arabs.

(i) Intent as she was on unified action, unity of ranks and adherence to an Arab policy drafted by all the Arab countries, Jordan was amazed to learn that the United Arab Republic, without the slightest regard for the wishes of the other Arab countries, had chosen to invite Herr Ulbricht to pay a visit to Egypt. The situation became more and more critical; the friendly German people, who love the Arabs regardless of any unfortunate measures that may have been taken under the pressure of specific circumstances, know that Herr Ulbricht is a fanatical Communist who played a large part in the attempts to bolshevise German prisoners of war in Russia during the War. They know that he entered German territory wearing a Russian officer's uniform. They know him, and they know what crimes the Russian troops had committed against them when he was serving with them as an officer. They know that he was responsible for erecting the wall of shame around Berlin, and for killing many Germans who loved liberty. They know that he is an inveterate opponent of their dearest aim, the unification of the German people. Mr. Ulbricht visited the United Arab Republic, whose President had known all about the arms deal and everything related to it from the very beginning. Moreover, the visit took place after His Majesty King Husayn had personally drawn the President's attention to

the effect that such a visit by Mr. Ulbricht would have on the German people. In fact, the German response to Ulbricht's visit was to recognise the present regime in the occupied part of Palestine.

(j) Then came the rupture of diplomatic relations, for which President Nasir must bear the greatest responsibility. This was an issue which constituted a threat to the unity of Arab ranks, a threat which Jordan proudly refused to bring to fulfilment, in spite of her views on the way in which the crisis should have been dealt with—it should have been possible, she was convinced, to turn the situation to the advantage of the Arabs. Three Arab countries did, indeed, refuse to break off relations, but Jordan went along with the majority, though she was aware that in so doing she was relinquishing her right to exercise her direct protection over more than 20,000 of her citizens who live in Germany. She was also aware that, in breaking off diplomatic relations, she was delaying the completion of numerous economic projects for which Germany was providing aid, and which were contributing to Jordan's advance towards self-sufficiency. Moreover, in taking this action, Jordan was also sacrificing the principle that the Arabs should stand firm in the field and combat the evil of the enemy in every sphere.

(k) As a result of a change of government, Germany started to make efforts to secure the resumption of relations with the Arabs. Ignoring the slap in the face administered to her by Ulbricht's visit to the United Arab Republic, she tried to restore the relations that had been broken off and to re-establish the traditional friendship between the Arab and German nations.

(l) In the meantime, the situation in the Arab world had deteriorated to an unprecedented extent; the Summit Conferences had been suspended, and unity of ranks and unified action undermined. In this way a valuable opportunity was lost, an opportunity for the Arabs to become strong enough to recover their usurped rights in Palestine which is not likely to recur for a long time. Instead there arose in the heart of the Arab homeland suspect coalitions which fabricated crises between Jordan and other countries. The first to do this was the United Arab Republic itself, and its President. These coalitions sought to bring about the downfall of Jordan by incapacitating her and

making her incapable of fulfilling her obligations to the countries that are supplying her with arms, obligations which she had incurred by virtue of the decisions of the Summit Conference. They attempted to ruin Jordan by destroying the unity of her inhabitants and casting doubts on her ability to stand fast as the bulwark of the Arab nation against the threats of the enemy along her extensive frontier with Israel. In doing this, these Arab circles were only aiding the enemy to achieve his well-known objectives. Attempts were even made to destroy the confidence of Jordanian officers and men in the arms they bear, and other attempts have actually succeeded in impeding work on Arab projects whose aim is to safeguard Arab rights to Arab waters. Some Arab countries have even gone so far as to forbid passage through their air space to arms imported for Arab soldiers on active service. All this is achieving the enemy's dearest wish—the arming of Jordan is not being completed, and other crises are being manufactured to distract attention from the real field of battle. These crises include the continued fratricidal slaughter of Arabs by Arabs, attempts at sabotage and destruction in all parts of the Arab world and efforts to destroy the Arab character, national heritage and religion. The unity of Arab ranks and of Arab objectives have been undermined by internationally outlawed armaments employed by Arabs against Arabs. Our unity has been destroyed because some of us have refused to haggle and bargain over certain issues. Our unity has been destroyed by those who have not hesitated to exploit all that is most dear to us in the hope that more evil may befall our nation, by those who have repeatedly attempted to dominate everything, even the Arab league itself, who have spared no effort to keep the Arabs in a vicious circle of disunity, confusion and stupefying dreams, so that they may be unable to face the truth, the bitter truth. And if the truth is not faced with honesty, courage and objectivity in every respect, the result is utter disaster.

4. Shortly before Ulbricht's visit, the government of Federal Germany had announced that it would definitely not supply Israel with arms, and it has kept this promise. We believe that there was no call to take such a definite decision as that of breaking off relations, and that the decision was an artificial one, taken as a result

of particular psychological circumstances, after long bargaining by certain Arab countries which tried to exploit these circumstances to their own material advantage. All this was to be disclosed to Arab public opinion at a later date.

At the time, however, Jordan was living in the atmosphere created by the Summit Conferences, an atmosphere of solidarity, unified action and common interests. The decision to break off relations was the first political problem Arab unanimity had to face within the framework of the Summit Conference. Jordan adopted the attitude that she did against her better judgement, and without believing that it would do any good. But she was determined to place Arab interests, and especially the cause of Palestine, above all else. However, inasmuch as Arab solidarity and unified action have been undermined, the Jordanian government is absolutely convinced that the measures that have led to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Jordan and Federal Germany as from 27.2.67, are of real service to Arab interests. Jordan wishes to place on record her grief and regret at the present deplorable situation in the Arab world, which she has done all in her power to prevent. Even through the act of resuming diplomatic relations with Federal Germany, Jordan is affirming her conviction that a radical remedy must be found for this situation. Such a remedy, she believes, lies in supporting and strengthening the Arab League, so that it may live up to the hopes that the Arabs have placed in it, and perform its proper task of uniting Arab ranks, coordinating Arab efforts and showing the Arabs the course they should follow. This is a task in which all Arabs can play their part, through the agency of their countries which are represented in the League.

But the situation being what it is at present, Jordan believes that the first essential for all Arabs is frankness, so that they may be prepared to meet the demands made on them by the situation. For, as things stand at present, the unity of ranks in which Jordan has always believed and which she has made such efforts to strengthen, is non-existent. The same applies to unified action and unified long-term planning. Jordan, for all her enthusiasm, devotion and steadfastness in confronting the enemy with whom she has a common frontier longer than all the other Arab frontiers

together, has been exposed to ingratitude and suffered rejection. Nay, more, she has been subjected to a variety of attempts to destroy her resolution and endurance. Certain Arab quarters have actually gone so far as to prevent the arrival in Jordan of arms intended to strengthen this bulwark of the Arabs against their enemy. This has been Jordan's fate, in spite of the fact that in the act of breaking-off diplomatic relations with Federal Germany she was sacrificing certain principles she believes should always be observed in dealing with other countries. She made this sacrifice in the service of higher Arab interests, in the service of Palestine, to preserve the unity of ranks, which was not even complete at that time for three Arab countries had decided not to adhere to the decision to sever relations. Jordan now, therefore, sees no alternative to returning to those principles that she had previously relinquished. In reversing her decision, Jordan is acting on behalf of higher Arab interests and of her own interests. She is taking this step at a time when, most regrettably, the unity of Arab ranks, which she has done so much to foster, has been sabotaged, Arab relations have deteriorated to an unprecedented degree, and the Arab advance has been impeded in a manner with which we are all too familiar. We have already referred to some of these facts in other memoranda submitted to the League. Thus, in taking this measure, Jordan is both serving national interests and confronting the other Arab countries with their responsibility for remedying the deplorable situation in which the Arab world now finds itself. The first thing that calls for a remedy, if any one is courageous and determined enough to face the regrettable fact, is the League itself, so that it may live up to the hopes reposed in it, and so that the Arabs may thereafter abide, with determination and good will, by all its decisions, because they know that such decisions are based on the principles they themselves adhere to and strive for.

In conclusion, the Ministry wishes to convey to the Secretary-General of the Arab League the thanks of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan for the efforts he has made on behalf of Arab-German relations.

Resolutions Adopted by the Arab League Council at Its Forty-Seventh Ordinary Meeting.¹ [Excerpt]

Cairo, March 18, 1967

Statement of the Jordanian Delegate

After hearing the statement of the Jordanian delegate, in which he attacked the head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the League Council resolves to reject all the allegations and calumnies made in the statement.

The Council therefore resolves to delete from the minutes the speech of the Jordanian delegate.

It also resolves to express its esteem and respect for, and full confidence in, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

(The Saudi delegate declared that he would abstain from voting on this decision for the reasons set out in the minutes of the League Council.)

(Resolution No. 2286/47th m./sess. 1, 14. 3. 1967)

Resumption by Jordan of Diplomatic Relations with Federal Germany

The Council approves the following decision of the political sub-committee:

"The sub-committee has been informed of the Jordanian government's decision to resume diplomatic relations with the Federal German Republic, and resolves to express its condemnation of the Jordanian government's decision as being inconsistent with the resolutions of the Arab League Council." (The heads of the Saudi, Libyan and Moroccan delegations abstained from expressing their opinions.)

(Resolution No. 2287/47th m./sess. 3, 18. 3. 1967)

West German Relations with Israel

The Council approves the following decision of the political sub-committee:

"The sub-committee has been apprised of the contents of the Secretary-General's report on the results of the contacts he made while performing the task allotted to him by the Council of Heads of Governments in March 1966 in connection with the relations between West Germany and Israel.

¹ Arab League, Cairo (mimeographed).

The sub-committee appreciates his efforts and calls on him to complete his task, inform the member states of the results of his efforts and call a meeting of the Council to consider the matter." (The head of the Saudi delegation expressed the views of his government in the minutes of the meeting and the heads of the Libyan and Moroccan delegations refrained from voting.)

(Resolution No. 2288/47th m./sess. 3, 18. 3. 1967)

United States Policy as Regards the Palestine Problem

The Council approves the following decision of the political sub-committee:

"The political sub-committee has heard the detailed report submitted by the head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation on United States policy as regards the Palestine problem, and in particular the statements of American politicians, the last of which was a statement by the Secretary of State attacking the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Palestine Liberation Army,

And resolves:

1. To condemn the hostile attitude adopted by the United States to the Palestine problem, and to condemn the hostile statements directed against the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Palestine Liberation Army, and in particular the statement of the American Secretary of State.

2. To affirm that the people of Palestine, like any other people, are entitled to decide their own future and to fight for the liberation of their homeland. The United States has no right to interfere in the affairs of the Palestinian people, nor to interfere with the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which represents the Palestinian people and is responsible for leading it and preparing it for the battle of liberation.

3. That Arab information media, both official and popular, should support the attitudes adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organisation and enlighten public opinion so that it may resist the smear campaign against the people of Palestine and its Organisation that is being carried on by imperialist and Zionist circles.

4. To reaffirm full support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation as it fulfills its national responsibilities for the moral and military preparation of the Palestinian people so that they may

become the vanguard of the Arab nation in the liberation of the usurped homeland."

(Resolution No. 2289/47th m./sess. 3, 18. 3. 1967)

300

Statement by a Syrian Military Spokesman on the Land and Air Clashes Between Syrian and Israeli Forces.¹

Damascus, April 7, 1967

At precisely 0945, for the third time in a week, an Israeli agricultural tractor entered the area in the Demilitarised Zone where rights to cultivate are a subject of dispute.

The local Syrian authorities called on the Israelis to withdraw the tractor, but they persisted in their aggression, so that our forces had to reply to them in language they could understand. Our forces then fired at the Israeli tractor and destroyed it, after which there was an exchange of firing between our advanced positions and the Israeli positions. Our forces destroyed two more Israeli tractors and two tanks, whereupon the gangster state lost control of itself, and at 1340 threw its planes into the battle and destroyed the houses of peaceable civilians. Our gallant pilots responded immediately, and engaged the enemy planes three times, bringing down five of them. While our gallant pilots were winning this honourable victory in the air, our artillery was pounding the bases of aggression inside the occupied territory, completely destroying the enemy's military positions on the other side, and dealing smashing blows to the colonies of Ka'ush Ein Gev, Beit Katsir and Ha'on, which are still burning while this statement is being drafted.

Enemy losses are estimated at not less than seventy dead; convoys of ambulances were seen entering and leaving the colonies.

Our losses were four dead, four planes lost, and a number of wounded, all of whom are in a satisfactory condition.

Today's treacherous aggression by the gang-

ster state and the resolute response of our army confirm two interconnected objective facts: firstly, that the Zionist gangster state is determined to continue its acts of aggression against the Arab people and the Arab nation; secondly, that the Revolutionary Government in Damascus was faithful to the obligations it undertook to the Arab masses, to the effect that any Israeli aggression would be nipped in the bud and that the bases of aggression inside occupied territory would also be attacked.

301

Speech of Syrian Chief of State al-Atasi on Evacuation Day.² [Excerpts]

Hama, April 17, 1967

During the last year of our nation's struggle the Summit Conferences, the Arab Solidarity Pact and reactionary Arab attempts to cause the miscarriage of the Arab liberation movements and paralyse their advance have all been exposed. The progressive Arab forces have therefore had to draw their inspiration from the wishes of the masses, the wishes of the overall Arab struggle. The progressive forces have thereby become the revolutionary alternative to these Conferences, through their encounter in the common struggle of destiny. It was thus inevitable that Syria, Algeria and the United Arab Republic should come together.

Brothers and fellows-citizens, heroic Arab masses; In view of the atmosphere in both the Arab world and the world in general, it was inevitable that Israel, that base of colonialism and world imperialism in Arab territory, should make a move. Such a move was the inevitable result of the anxiety and forebodings of impending doom that have beset Israel since the Arab masses have taken the initiative. Moreover, she has been gravely concerned since the first heroic Arab

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 8/4/1967.

² *Ath-Thawrah*, 18/4/1967.

commandos, threatening her very existence, have shown that they are not to be turned aside from their objective by a subservient regime, nor hindered in their activities by imaginary frontiers or by killing, arrest or torture. Israel, the guard-post of imperialism and Zionism, was bound to move when she realised that the floods of Western economic and financial aid she was receiving had failed to create an economically viable state. The result of this failure is that she is faced with inevitable bankruptcy; unemployment is widespread, and, in the hope of escaping disaster, more emigrants are leaving the country and the flow of immigration is at a standstill.

It was natural that this instrument of imperialism should move against our southern frontier, and recently, as has always been her custom, she has been engaging in acts of provocation towards Syria. But every action on her part has been met with a decisive response, either on the frontier itself, or beyond it in the colonies from which the aggression is launched. A telling example was the crushing blow dealt by our air force to the centres of aggression inside occupied territory in the battle of Tiberias.

With her very existence threatened by this new strategy and the strength and determination of our defence, the only means left to Israel in her attempt to shake the confidence of the Arab masses in this new revolutionary attitude, and to divert internal resentment and alarm, is collusion with the subservient reactionary regime in Jordan. This was illustrated by Israel's terror raid on as-Samu', the peaceable Arab village on the West Bank, when Israeli forces crossed the frontier unresisted, because the treacherous and subservient regime in Jordan had deprived the heroic Arab people of both Banks of their natural right to protect their territory and die defending their honour and their homeland.

Brothers and fellow-citizens; The object of this treacherous raid on as-Samu' was to destroy the morale of the population of the occupied territories by threatening the peaceable inhabitants of the West Bank and striking the growing commando activity which has become a threat to the very existence of Israel. It was also clear that the operation was coordinated with the plans of Arab reaction to destroy commando activity, for Jordan made the raid a pretext to cast com-

mandos in prison and inflict on them all kinds of torture. There can be no more convincing proof of the coordination of Israeli and Jordanian plans than the fact that the Arab army of Jordan was deprived of its right to defend its honour and the honour of the people by resisting the Israeli aggression. Instead of this army confronting the enemy in the execution of its sacred duty to liberate the usurped homeland, the reactionary Jordanian regime had concentrated it on the frontier with Syria. The object of this was to complement the imperialist conspiracy which is trying in vain to destroy the Revolution of the toiling Arab masses in this country.

Israel's criminal aggression against as-Samu' has been exploited but not to release the energies of the Arab people on both Banks of the Jordan, to train and arm them, and allow them to play their part in resistance to aggression and the liberation of the occupied territories. On the contrary, the as-Samu' incident has been made a new pretext to pursue the conspiracy against the honour of the Arab people and against the causes that involve their destiny. American arms of all kinds have poured in in an undisguised and dramatic manner by sea and air, not to be put in the hands of the Arab masses for use against the forces of evil and aggression, but to be used by foreign military experts to destroy the progressive Arab forces in Jordan and to threaten Syria. This has been confirmed by public statements of American officials in the Defence and State Departments, that the American arms sent to Jordan would never be used against Israel. McNamara stated that these arms that have been sent to the subservient regime in Jordan within the framework of arming Israel and Arab reaction to confront the tide of revolution in the area are, as far as Jordan is concerned, for the protection of the throne from destruction by the people, and on the clearly expressed condition that they will not be used against Israel.

Last week we were confronted with a new stage in this master plan, and, as usual, the first tasks were allotted to the Zionist presence in the occupied territories. Before this, however, the way had been prepared by raising the question of cultivation in the Demilitarised Zone. The intention was to make this problem a permanent source of provocation, so as to win over world

opinion and the international organisations before the main plan was put into effect. We were well aware of this plan, and informed the United Nations of it, asking it to insist on the implementation of its previous resolutions on the Demilitarised Zone. The attention of United Nations circles was also drawn to the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from the land she had illegally occupied in this Zone. Our frank attitude derived from our wish that the United Nations should not be exploited by the Zionist-imperialist plan, and our determination to frustrate Zionist attempts to mislead world opinion.

It was our duty to accompany words with deeds, and protect the Arab farmers who had entered the Demilitarised Zone to cultivate their land. So we adopted a resolute attitude to the forces of aggression in their attempt to gradually occupy what was left of the land in the Demilitarised Zone. We are determined to defend every inch of Arab soil, whatever the cost, and to pursue our primary objective, which is the liberation of our usurped territories from alien Zionism. This resolute attitude was something new to Israel and her supporters, for they had become accustomed to taking possession of land in the Zone by agreement with the reactionary governments. This is what actually happened in the past in the areas of Jerusalem, Latrun, and Jabal al-Mukabbar, and around Tulkarm, Jenin and elsewhere. But the revolutionary regime in Syria, which embodies the aspirations of the masses and struggles for the realisation of these aspirations, considers itself responsible for unveiling to the Arab masses and to all forces in the world, the plans of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. It also holds itself responsible for the struggle, along with progressive Arab forces, to frustrate these plans and liberate and unite the Arab homeland. We are now well aware that all the forces of conspiracy, and their pockets of supporters in reactionary circles and regimes in the Arab world, will continue to conspire and cooperate with imperialism. But we are wholly confident that the fusion of the struggle of our Party with that of the toiling masses and all other progressive and revolutionary forces in the Arab world will smash this new imperialist strategy and guide the revolutionary, socialist and unionist current in the Arab homeland to positions of decisive victory. Our people have won great

victories over the monopolistic oil companies. The masses have rallied round the slogan of a popular war of liberation, and the resources available to these masses have been placed at the disposal of the struggle through the meeting of the progressive forces. Irrelevant disputes on side issues between these forces have been checked, and all conspiracies at home against the Revolution and its ruling Party have been frustrated. All these mighty achievements have forced imperialism to take action as it did at the time of Suez. Imperialism is manipulating its base, Israel, against Syria, within the framework of a large-scale conspiracy aimed at the destruction of the revolutionary regime which Eshkol regards as the greatest threat to Israel. The overthrow of this regime, consequently, is the principal objective of both imperialism and Zionism. The latest Israeli aggression was the first step in this new plan drawn up by imperialism. For its execution imperialism has recruited Arab reaction as well as Israel; it has also secured the support and protection of the Sixth Fleet. The Arab people have confronted this aggressive design with the requisite determination and courage; our frontline artillery has shelled, destroyed and burnt the colonies which are being used as bases of aggression, spreading terror and despair inside the occupied territories. This was confirmed by the enemy cables intercepted during and after the fighting. Our brave pilots shattered the myth of Israeli air supremacy, which the enemy has emphasised so strongly, and destroyed five Israeli planes. They have thereby provided yet one more example of the efficiency, courage and heroism that has always characterised them. And throughout the battle we were in touch with the United Arab Republic, ready to take such joint measures as might prove necessary as the fighting developed.

Brothers and fellows-citizens, struggling masses of our people; The battle was very useful to us, not only because it was a demonstration of serious resistance and confrontation never previously experienced by imperialism and Zionism, nor because of the blows and losses inflicted on the enemy. It was also useful because it threw light on the imperialist master-plan. Only a few hours after the aggression was crushed, the forces privy to the conspiracy all started telling the same story. There were the statements of Zionist

authorities on the necessity for the Sixth Fleet to guarantee and protect them, and their repeated demands for more arms for Israel. On the other hand, there were the statements issued by State Department officials that the United States would make no diplomatic efforts, meaning that diplomatic efforts had already been made to incite Israel to attack.

Meanwhile, Arab reaction in Jordan has tried to exploit this aggressive move to complete the huge propaganda effort undertaken by the Zionist gangs. The aim of this propaganda is to inflate the losses suffered by the Syrian army and ignore its successes, deny that the enemy suffered any losses whatsoever and belittle the extreme importance of the Revolution's resolute method of confronting and crushing aggression. A further intention was to raise doubts as to the efficacy of the Joint Defence Agreement by the waging of psychological warfare on the Arab masses to make them lose their confidence in the slogan of the meeting of the progressive forces through struggle—the meeting which spells doom to reaction, Zionism and imperialism. The traitor King has tried to disguise his shameful attitude by visiting Syrian pilots in hospital; this was a great thing in the eyes of the members of the subservient regime in Jordan, for a traitor does not generally entertain his brother, but shoots him in the heart. The subservient traitor regime in Jordan generally kills Arab pilots and Palestinian commandos as they return from occupied territory, and allows Israeli planes to hunt them down inside Jordan and kill such of them as are still alive after performing their task in occupied territory. The same traitor regime has also tried to veil its treachery and its links with Israel by alerting the army. But the Arab people of Jordan, and the officers and men of the Jordanian army, know that the mobilisation is not taking place on Jordan's frontiers with Israel, the natural place for the real battle to be fought. No, Jordanian troops are being mobilised on the frontier with Syria, where the traitor regime is trying to fulfil the Zionist-imperialist plan to stab the Revolution in the back.

Certain Arab rulers have tried to make it appear that they support the attitude of the Revolution in confronting and repelling aggression. There are numerous examples of this sup-

port. But we hereby declare to the Arab masses that the only true support lies in the practical adoption of friendly attitudes, not in flowery statements issued only to turn aside the wrath of the masses. How is it possible that the government of a neighbouring Arab country should announce that it supports Syria's attitude while at the same time it allows press organisations linked with reaction, imperialism and Israel to decry the Revolution of the Arab people in Syria and the courage of its gallant troops? These organisations, in fact, have gone further than even reactionary and imperialistic circles in their shameless attempts to cast suspicion on the arming of the Syrian army and to belittle the importance of its successive victories over the enemy, victories that have won the admiration and support of the masses throughout the Arab world. Eshkol's repeated frank statements about the role of the Sixth Fleet in guaranteeing the protection of Israel should drive the government of this neighbouring Arab country to respond to the wishes of the masses and the progressive forces that have rejected with indignation visits of the Sixth Fleet to Arab waters.

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The disclosure of this plan, and of the roles played by the participants, will never induce us to shirk our responsibilities or cast them on the shoulders of others. The cause of the liberation of our usurped Arab homeland is the cause which involves our destiny, and the confrontation of imperialism and Zionism is, essentially, the justification of our existence. We shall never for a moment pause in the execution of our historic task, depending on ourselves and our integration with the toiling masses in every part of the great Arab homeland, and on our meeting with the progressive Arab forces.

The method we have chosen for the smashing of the threats of imperialism, reaction and Zionism, is that of a popular war of liberation. What arms we have are the property of all the Arab masses—they will be given to all who ask for them—and our training centres are open to every Arab citizen. We affirm that we cannot but be with the Arab guerrillas; we are ready to fight the battle however great the sacrifice. Sacrifice is our daily duty; without it we cannot continue to exist. We are confident that the toiling masses

of our people, the workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and all progressives, are aware of the magnitude of the struggle and support our Revolution here in Syria. And we are also confident that progressive forces throughout the world must stand by us in the battles we fight, for they are battles for liberation and justice, and because the struggle of our people and our toiling masses is part of the progressive socialist struggle throughout the world.

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302

Statement by a Lebanese Foreign Ministry Spokesman in Connexion with Israeli Premier Eshkol's Statements on the Role of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.¹

Beirut, April 17, 1967

At 11.30 a.m. on Monday, 17 April, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Dr. George Hakim, had a meeting with the ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Dwight Porter, and informed him of the concern felt by the Lebanese government at the statements by the Prime Minister of Israel to the effect that the Sixth Fleet would protect Israel.

Ambassador Porter's reply was that these statements are not an expression of United States policy, pointing out that they appeared in an interview published by an unofficial magazine. United States policy, he said, had been defined by the late President John Kennedy on 8 May 1963, and reaffirmed by the present government of the United States of America. It had remained unchanged since that date, and was based on resistance to aggression, the use of force or threats of force in the Middle East.

303

Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at a Syrian Students Conference.² [Excerpts]

Damascus, April 18, 1967

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The problem of Palestine, as seen by the Ba'th Party, is a problem of the liberation of a usurped territory and the return of a people dispersed by aggression to the homeland they have been robbed of.

We do not say that the Syrian Region alone will liberate Palestine; this Region is part of the Arab homeland and its people part of the greater Arab people, standing resolute and prepared for any sacrifice in the front-line against Zionism and the intrigues of imperialism and Zionism.

Palestine will be liberated by the masses of the Arab people from the Ocean to the Gulf, headed by the people of Palestine, who will be the first to struggle and make sacrifices for the recovery of their homeland.

So it is the Arab people who will liberate Palestine, when they advance to realise the slogan of the popular war of liberation. This is the course they are following already, with full knowledge of the meaning of that slogan.

Imperialism, brothers, is trying to rescue Israel from its inevitable doom, because it, too, knows that the popular war of liberation is the sure way of purging Palestine of Zionist usurpation. Imperialism knows, too, that all the aid and assistance it has lavished on its creature, Israel, has not availed to establish her firmly, for she is an artificial creation. Israel at present is suffering from internal collapse and a regime convulsed by violent passions. She is weakened by economic collapse, conflicting attitudes, attempts to dominate the political scene and racial discrimination, and all the lethal conflicts these give rise to.

The rulers of Israel, and the imperialist masters who support them, are trying to distract attention from this deplorable situation by repeating the old story of military superiority and by aggressive military adventures.

This alleged superiority is a myth which

¹ *Al-Jaridah*, Beirut, 18/4/1967. For Eshkol's statements, see *ante*, doc. 12.

² Syrian News Agency, Damascus, 18/4/1967.

cannot deceive us. Even supposing the combatant Jewish population of Israel was doubled, would that mean superiority? Even supposing imperialism goes so far, in its arming of Israel, as to provide non-conventional armaments, even nuclear weapons, would this mean that the Arab people would submit to the logic of imperialism and Zionism, and relinquish part of their beloved homeland? This is a stupid way of thinking, and one that is utterly rejected by the Arab masses. Therefore the only road open to the Arab people is that of a popular war of liberation, the road of sacrifice and dedication that will surely lead to victory. This has been confirmed by the struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, by the struggle of the Arab people of Algeria, by the struggle of the heroic peoples of Vietnam and Latin America. Peoples have ever proved that they are stronger than the imperialists, stronger than the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, than the Baghdad Pact and all the forces of colonialism and imperialism.

Our concept of the liberation of Palestine is another reason why imperialism and its stooges hate us. For they want the liberation of Palestine to remain a mere empty phrase. We reject this utterly, and have chosen the course of sacrifice and dedication.

We expect aggression at any moment, and are ready to repel it by revolutionary methods. We knew that the battle of Friday, 7 April, was bound to happen. Despite all the provocations of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction, and the coordination of their efforts to conspire against the cause of Palestine, the battle of 7 April was of great significance. It was an honourable engagement in which the Syrian army once more gave evidence of its faith, strength, good training and endurance. And our army will evince these same qualities every day and every moment until the usurped territory is liberated.

The existence of Israel depends, to a great extent, on the fragmentation of the Arab world. For this reason the struggle will be long and unremitting; we must make sacrifices and pay the price every day of the battle. And such sacrifices will leave no place for deceitful talk and sentiment.

Husayn has concentrated troops on our frontier; is this the act of one who wishes to make sacrifices and fight in Palestine? Or is the spoilt child dreaming dreams inspired by the imperialist policy our people have exposed? A policy which depends on playing the card of changing situations and overthrowing regimes?

The Arab people have exposed this game, and those who play it will come to a bad end. The Arab people will crush all who play fast and loose with the cause of Palestine. Since their game has been exposed, and the Arab people have shown that they have been playing fast and loose with Palestine, dozens of rulers and hundreds of professional politicians have fallen—Nuri as-Sa'id, Abd al-Ilah and Faruq—and the day will surely come when the Arab people will say the last word on all traitors and stooges of imperialism in every part of the Arab world.

304

Joint Communiqué on U.A.R. Premier Sidqi Sulayman's Talks in Syria on the Joint Defence Agreement.¹ [Excerpts]

Damascus, April 22, 1967

Events have confirmed the conclusions reached in the previous talks held in Cairo and published at the time in the joint communiqué issued on 7.11.1966, to the effect that it was historically inevitable that the masses and the progressive forces of the Arab nation should be utterly incompatible with reaction, which cooperates with imperialism and Zionism.

The statements of the American and Zionist authorities have disclosed that the arming of Arab reaction is directed principally against the revolution of the Arab masses. It is intended to stem the progressive tide in the Arab homeland and to protect the subservient reactionary regimes. The basic condition for such massive arming of reaction is that the arms should never be used against the common enemy, Israel. And the

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 23/4/1967.

operation is being carried out under the protection of the American Sixth Fleet.

The same motives lie behind the transformation of Jordan into an arsenal for imperialist arms and for the training of mercenary gangs to act as an advanced guard post for reaction and imperialism and to protect Israel. Similarly, it is clear that the task of the press and broadcasting services of reaction and imperialism is to arouse misgivings and to wage psychological warfare to cover up the vast conspiracy aimed at checking the advance of the Arab nation.

In the same way, the failure of the imperialist and Zionist conspiracies on the home front against the revolutionary regimes whose roots are now firmly implanted in the soil of popular sentiment, as a result of the profound social changes and the organisation of the resources of the people that have been brought about, has led to the employment of Israel, as happened in the days of the Suez War, as a spearhead of imperialist conspiracies against these progressive regimes.

Israel's latest move against the Syrian Region is no more than a manifestation of the overall imperialist and reactionary plan. The delegation of the United Arab Republic therefore salutes the resolute determination of the Syrian Arab Republic, which smashed the Israeli aggression.

The two sides declare to the masses of the Arab nation that they will remain united throughout the struggle and after it, and that they are ever ready to enforce the joint plans already devised in implementation of the Joint Defence Agreement between their two countries, and to crush Israeli aggression and the schemes of imperialism and reaction in the area.

The two sides also affirm that the battle for the liberation of Palestine is the first and foremost cause of the struggling masses throughout the Arab homeland, the cause for which, and through which, they must unite.

The two sides affirm their profound belief that the only way to frustrate all imperialist, Zionist and reactionary moves lies through closer association of the revolutionary and progressive forces and the sparking off of the unlimited energies of the masses in all parts of the Arab homeland. They also believe that it is essential to forge

the closest possible links between the masses and the revolutionary and progressive forces, in their historic advance towards the elimination of all manifestations of imperialism, fragmentation and backwardness in the Arab homeland.

305

Interview Statements by the Syrian Chief of Staff Major General Suwaydani on the Military Situation.¹

Damascus, April 1967

Q. The people, the army and the government in Syria are all shouldering a considerable part of the burden of the Palestine problem. The Arab people always take the keenest interest in what happens on the Syrian front, and it is the particular affection and pride we feel for Syria that prompts us to ask what is, perhaps, a rather delicate question. What we should like to know is to what extent has the military efficiency of the Syrian army been affected by the political changes which have taken place in Syria since the Palestine disaster, and by the fact that the army has played a fundamental role in these events, and has lost many of its officers?

A. This is a point that is always being raised. Imperialism, reaction and the fifth column are usually behind it, whether in Syria or in any other Arab region. The Jordanian radio has recently taken up this particular theme. In fact, raising this question may well have a depressing effect on Arab public opinion, which knows that the Arab people is surrounded with constant threats from Zionism and imperialism.

The facts are that the Syrian army's loss of a number of its officers in the last few years, when it is remembered who those officers were, neither has affected nor will, in our opinion, in any way affect the army's efficiency. If we look at the matter from the point of view of the present situation, we shall realise that the army has made steps towards being prepared for the struggle in all fields. This is due to one important and funda-

¹ *Al-Musawwar*, Cairo, 28/4/1967.

mental reason, namely, that there are no more divisions, no more conflicting currents in the army, so that it is now free to devote itself entirely to the operation of military build-up.

I can assure you, without revealing any secrets, that in the past, whenever it was faced with a problem of training, for example, or arming, or organisation, the army command used to be baffled by it for months on end before it could find the appropriate solution. The reason for this was the mutual suspicion and conflicting currents that existed between the different elements of the command. But now, any important decision as regards the perfection of organisation or training is implemented in no more time than is required by the command to study and understand the written memoranda, so as to ensure that the best possible solution is adopted.

For example, and this, again, is no secret, the number of those enrolled in the training course that started in 1966 was greater than ever before in the history of the army—indeed, four times as much as the highest previous average. The army now has a large number of officers who have completed a course which bears absolutely no resemblance to any other course followed by any officers in France or any other country in the world. It is quite unique as regards curriculum, length and standard. Now, moreover, training in the army is planned and carried out on the following basis: officers, non-commissioned officers and men, both on active service and on the reserve list, get equal shares of training. I should like very much to quote some figures to prove the truth of what I am saying, but they are military secrets.

The military programme is developing every year; in 1966 it was not what it had been in 1965. I can say with absolute confidence that the army has advanced for beyond the capacity of the officers who left it. The battle is now a matter of science. Arms are developing rapidly and military technology is advancing by leaps and bounds. The army is attaining higher standards every year. If we wanted to make use of the officers who have left the army, we should have to set up new courses for them.

The number of active officers, in particular, is considered sufficient to enable the army to take part in any defensive or offensive action the

situation may require.

To single out the air force for special mention, I can assure you that none of the air force officers who have left the force in the past could be of any use to it now, because the planes that our air force now uses are quite different and far superior to what they used to be. In the last two years the whole equipment of the air force at all levels has been replaced, and I am sure that if an officer who left the force in the past were to return to it now he would not know it.

Regarding the number of pilots—and this is the crux of the matter—the number of pilots who pass out every year nowadays is greater than the whole yearly output of officers in all the forces four years ago. I cannot, of course, give figures or details of equipment and preparation, but what I can say is that the army command has assimilated and achieved a full understanding of all the various kinds of planes and equipment that have been bought for the air force. It has also made ready for them, in advance, the requisite number of technicians and pilots, in accordance with a carefully timed plan that has been carried out with great precision.

Q. Is the stopping of the credit allotted to Syria by the Summit Conferences having any effect on the Syrian Army's acquiring an air force of the standard agreed on at these Conferences?

A. We have done all that was necessary both at home and abroad to eliminate the effects of the stopping of these credits, and we have, in fact, been successful to a great extent. But I should like to remind you that the Summit Conferences, which were based on an unnatural, indeed a bogus, solidarity between a variety of Arab mentalities and regimes, laid upon us much heavier financial burdens than we had in the past, especially in the field of armaments. They obliged us, in fact, at one of their rasher moments, to contract for large quantities of arms on the understanding that the Unified Arab Command would pay for them. But the only guarantee of this, unfortunately, was "the word of Kings," to use the expression of a certain leader at the third Summit Conference. And this "word of Kings" meant one thing only—that we should cooperate with Arab reaction, by keeping silent about the persecution of Arab progressives and liberals in the

reactionary countries, and by abandoning our political and social convictions. Naturally, this was repugnant to us and we refused everything so as to maintain our revolutionary and liberationist line. The price we had to pay, as is well known, was the stopping of the financial credits. So we were left alone in this country, crushed by the burden of debts we had incurred for the purchase of arms in the name of the Summit Conferences. We do not regret this; indeed, it was only natural that the rulers of Saudi Arabia and other reactionary countries should behave like this. As I have said, we have weighed all the possibilities and we have overcome all the difficulties, both at home and abroad, which stood in the way of the army receiving the arms that had been ordered and the provision of financial resources sufficient to meet our obligations.

Q. Revolutionary Syria has adopted the slogan of a popular war of liberation as the only way to recover Palestine, and there are two conspicuous historical examples of this—in Algeria and Vietnam. But conditions are not the same in Palestine as in Algeria and Vietnam; I mean from the point of view of there being a people in their own country struggling against external aggression, as is the case in the latter two countries. The result is that the slogan needs further clarification. Moreover, the strategy of a popular war of liberation requires that, once it reaches certain dimensions, it should be transformed into total war. What do you think should be the role of the Arab armies at that time?

A. We believe that Israel is a military base for the imperialist camp, not a state, so that, through this base, we shall come face to face, in armed conflict, with the forces of Western imperialism. The question then will be: "Have we any hope of overcoming those forces by land, sea and air?" The answer, obviously, is: No. Then there is another question: "Why, then, should we continue to arm our army?" When we ask this question we have to bear in mind the long series of arms deals we have concluded with various countries at the expense of our country's growth and development. At one time we used to buy Western arms, planes and tanks, and they became obsolete before they were ever used. Then we bought arms of all kinds from the East, and these too became obsolete before they were used, to be replaced by more modern varieties. If we keep on like this, we shall have to

replace them again in a few years time, and so on for ever! For we shall always find that it is impossible for us to fight a war that depends on our military supremacy, without which we shall never start such a war. And when are we going to achieve military superiority over the United States, Britain and West Germany?

So we have had to consider some alternative to the traditional warfare which depends on the traditional weapons used by all armies. This alternative is the popular war of liberation, which depends, first and foremost, on the human element and belief in the cause. It also depends on rifles, which will have a far more important role to play than heavy arms.

It would, indeed, be true to say that the situation in Palestine was different from that in Algeria and Vietnam, if we regarded occupied Palestine as a non-Arab land or a land that had previously belonged to a non-Arab people. But we regard it as what it is in fact—a province of the Arab homeland that imperialism has occupied, just as it might occupy some part of the territory of Vietnam. Thus we regard the situation in Palestine as being similar to the present situation in Vietnam, and the past situation in Algeria.

Supposing Israel takes action to confront the popular war of liberation, and launches a traditional war, the Arab armies that are led by progressive commands must be ready to join battle, defensively at least, and to ensure the protection of the bases of the guerrillas, who form the basis of the popular war of liberation.

Similarly, our absolute belief in the unity of the Arab nation makes it our duty to fight the battle of Palestine. Arab unity must come, not only as the result of a natural process, but also because unity is vitally necessary in a world in which the great powers are in conflict. For we live in the world of the great powers. Can unity come through diplomatic niceties and protocol? Of course not.

We believe that unity which comes through battle is the real unity we aspire to. The heat of the battle must be as high as possible; we believe that Palestine is the destined field, because it was the scene of a great Arab tragedy which has united the forces of the whole Arab nation from the Atlantic to the Gulf. He who liberates Pales-

tine will lead our nation to full unity, and he who sparks off the war of popular liberation will be able to cast all the reactionary regimes into the sea.

Therefore we believe that the war of popular liberation will lead not only to the liberation of Palestine, but to the liberation and unification of the whole Arab homeland. This is our firm belief. The immense energy latent in our Arab homeland can only be sparked off by a popular war of liberation on the territory of Palestine. So we are confident that those who are now children in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries that are ruled by reactionary regimes, will be able to overthrow the thrones of their subservient rulers, join in the advance towards liberation and play their part in establishing the united Arab homeland.

Q. Do you believe that the role of the Unified Arab Command is at an end?

A. The question should really be: "Is the role of Arab solidarity at an end?" I think that our final and official answer has already been given, both by the Party and the Government. As for the Unified Arab Command, as an organisation that arose from this solidarity, it has been paralysed from birth and, under present conditions in the Arab world, will never come to anything. Our policy is based on the military and political meeting of the progressive forces, and nothing else.

Q. The Joint Defence Agreement between Syria and the United Arab Republic was an important step on the road towards the liberation of Palestine. Is it expected that this agreement will develop into a unified command uniting the forces of the two countries and creating new conditions that will make it possible for the forces of the two countries to operate side by side on the same front and from the same bases?

A. Since the Agreement was signed we have said that it was only one step along the road to unity. Unity will ever remain our principal aim, and we shall be on the lookout for any possibility of taking further steps along that road. We have observed, too, that the United Arab Republic's command is also on the lookout for such possibilities. Constant efforts are being made to develop this first step into something resembling the normal situation, which is, of course, unity.

Q. Syria recently announced the establishment of a popular army. What is the role of this army, how was it established and where is it to operate?

A. The popular army is the reserve for the regular army, and is based on the same rationale as the slogan of the popular war of liberation. Our aim is to turn the whole country, from north to south and from east to west, into a single system of defence, in which the whole people will play its part. All the available light arms have been distributed to the people.

306

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir on Labour Day.¹ [Excerpts]

Shubra al-Khaimah, May 2, 1967

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Being threatened constantly, for fifteen years! Threatened by whom? Who is the source of the threat? Why, imperialism, which we have driven out of our land. Our ideas, principles and all we advocate constitute a menace to imperialism in every Arab land. We are the enemies of imperialism, and take part in the war against imperialism throughout the whole world, even though it be only through moral solidarity with people who rebel against it, who struggle to drive it out of their countries and to destroy its domination of them. Why are we being threatened? Because imperialism in this area will never forgive us for having opposed it and its alliances—we opposed the Baghdad Pact, and we opposed Mr. Eden, and Mr. Eden went. We have opposed all the plans for pacts in the area. We opposed the Eisenhower Doctrine that they thought up after the collapse of the Baghdad Pact. Imperialism will never forgive us for having opposed it, opposed its pacts, opposed its spheres of influence. Imperialism will never forgive us for having opposed its stooges—we opposed Nuri as-Sa'id, and we opposed the lackeys of imperialism in Iraq who joined the Baghdad Pact—Abd al-Ilah—and now we are opposing Husayn and Faysal.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 3/5/1967.

As for Burghiba, I don't want to speak about him; he's a sick man—may the Lord make him well—may the Lord heal his heart. I'm not going to speak about him; let's pray that the Lord will restore his wits. Imperialism will never forgive us for having called for social freedom or for linking it organically with political freedom, because this threatens its interests and its partners. Imperialism will never forgive us for having rallied to the call for non-alignment or for our efforts to save the colonised peoples, if only by the model we have provided of resistance and fighting. Neither imperialism nor its reactionary aides shall forgive us. And along with them is Israel, which is the direct consequence of the alliance of imperialism with reaction, the alliance of imperialism with King Abdullah and with the tide of Arab reaction in 1948. Israel, too, will never forgive us; they will never forgive us, particularly in view of the fact that the struggle has been going on for 15 years, and is ever growing fiercer and more violent. Well, the struggle continues and Arab development is taking its course. You can't imagine how dangerous they think we are—not only because of Arab action or because of South Arabia—they tell me of the danger we constitute in Latin America; I saw the Under Secretary of the American State Department, who came to tell me that we had been causing them trouble and that they were annoyed with us. Why was this? In the first place, they said that we had been attacking King Faysal and King Husayn whereas they liked to see things done through quiet diplomacy. Then they said that we were encouraging revolutionary elements in Latin America. I then pointed out that Latin America was a long way off. The first point, I understood very well—they want us to keep quiet while their stooges work unopposed. King Faysal and King Husayn turn up and attack us solidly for six months, and the Americans do nothing. Then after this has been going on for six months, we start to reply to them, and within 24 hours the Americans come along and tell us we are attacking King Faysal and King Husayn. What this means is that the Americans are only too glad that we should be attacked for six months, but if we attack them for 24 hours they are annoyed and tell us to stop. No, they say, their attacks don't count, they make no difference; yours do. Well! I must say! We waited patiently for six months.

If they're your friends why don't you go and talk to them? We are not your friends. Then, why do you come and say that you prefer us to practice quiet diplomacy?

The Americans and the British have put King Faysal and King Husayn to work. The British, of course and America too, decided at the beginning of the latest stage that they would not interfere with the Arab nation and the Arab revolution openly—they would interfere through their stooges. So they found a stooge in the Hashimite family and another in Saudi Arabia. The actions of these two were being directed by an American plan, based on the assumption that we should keep quiet and let them get on with their work. But this was too much! Did they really expect us to shut up and let them get on with their plan? How could we? Talk started about an Islamic Pact. Well, naturally, as it was in the name of Islam, certain Muslims agreed right away. There was the Shah of Iran, who was joined by King Husayn. Now, we have always opposed all pacts in the area; so how could we keep quiet and allow the Islamic Pact to go ahead? Of course we couldn't do that. How could we possibly look on at activities whose aim was to draw the whole Arab nation into the sphere of influence of America and Britain without protesting and resisting the Pact? And how do we resist, anyway? Through the Arab masses, who do not accept subservience, and do not accept to be in spheres of influence, or to be subject to either America, Britain or imperialism in any form whatsoever. It is the masses, in every Arab country, who resist. Anyway, when the Islamic Pact started to look shaky they said it wasn't a pact at all, only Islamic solidarity or an Islamic Conference, and they actually sent out letters of invitation. But I know for a fact that the replies they received from the heads of Islamic States were not at all encouraging, for most of the heads of the independent liberated Islamic States knew what was afoot. The Islamic Pact, or the Islamic Conference if you will, is a plan adopted by the forces of imperialism and reaction, by America and Britain who have been encouraging Faysal, and Husayn. Faysal started to talk about Islam, the Muslims, the Islamic Pact and Islamic solidarity, thinking he could pull the wool over the eyes of the whole Arab nation and of all Islam as well, but of course he can't. So he takes out his money and starts throw-

ing it around. He has been spending money in every country. So what? Those who accept his money, well, they take it, but that's as far as it goes. For when someone takes money to carry out an idea, does he believe in that idea, or in anything else, for that matter? Whoever accepts money in such a case neither believes in that idea nor in any other. Of course this makes him unreliable. Faysal doesn't care who he deals with. He even resorted to the Muslim brotherhood, which is a reactionary party in the Arab world which happened to need money at a time when Faysal wanted people to carry out his plans. So he gave money to the Muslim Brethren in every Arab country, and they saw no reason why they should not work for reaction or imperialism or the CENTO Pact, or the Baghdad Pact. For, as a political party they follow the course of imperialism and reaction. So what did the Muslim Brethren do? Faysal paid one of them, who had fled in 1964, and others who had been living abroad, and they went on the Pilgrimage, and they went into the mosques and the Ka'bah and they attacked Nasir and the Revolution in Egypt, and they distributed books printed at Faysal's expense, against the Revolution and against us. The Egyptian pilgrims tore up these books, and some of them answered the preachers back; of course there were many disputes and some of the pilgrims were arrested. This is what Faysal did in the name of Islam and the Muslims. Faysal only deceived himself; he didn't deceive the Arabs or the Muslims. And the Americans were disappointed in him, for they had thought that, as a result of what had been said at the Summit Conference, we should keep quiet about this conspiracy. But we couldn't possibly keep quiet, because we don't depend on money; we depend on the awareness of the Arab people, which is worth more than all the money in the world.

So they are working against us, making propaganda in the Arab world, saying that Nasir is against Islam and against religion. And along comes Faysal, talking about religion, of course, though in his heart there is neither religion nor anything else; it is all talk and play-acting. So they get hold of people and give them books on nice paper—I have read the books; I get copies of them—they are printed on beautiful paper, and

the print itself is beautiful. But such abuse! Not that this is anything new—we have been abused before and attacked before. We have been subjected to innumerable radio attacks. Along comes King Husayn's radio station, which works for the CIA—for if King Husayn himself works for the CIA, of course his broadcasting station does too. This broadcasting station starts saying such things, low dirty things. Of course I read everything it says; my comment is that it is mere childish talk, which should be ignored. Anyway, they come up with such nonsense as that Zakariya Muhyiddin had been arrested, and a newspaper in the Sudan also said that he has been arrested. Am I expected to reply to such nonsense every day, and say to them the next day that it was Salah Nasr who had been arrested, and the day after that that it was Husayn ash-Shafi'i who had been arrested? For heaven's sake!

No, of course I can't reply to all this childish nonsense. Every one knows what will happen to them—I do, they do themselves. There is plenty of time. We shan't keep quiet. In the days of the Israeli aggression against Syria, King Husayn's broadcasting service said that the Joint Defence Agreement with Syria had not been implemented, King Husayn was most upset; he and his mother were crying because the agreement had not been implemented. Tell me the worst! What happened? What is there for the Hashimite family to cry about? Well they say that Egypt had done nothing when Syria was attacked, and King Husayn and his family were very angry. They made propaganda of the affair, saying that Egypt—Egyptian planes—had not gone to the assistance of Syria. Of course every one knows that fighter planes have a limited range, and our planes wouldn't have reached the frontiers of Syria if they set out from Egypt, because they would have had to go there and come back. I am saying this for the information of the Arab nation, the Arab people and Arab youth, so that they may know everything. We made the Joint Defence Agreement with Syria, and said that we were ready to implement it and stand by Syria and the Syrian people. For the Syrian people is as dear to us as the Egyptian people—any Arab people is as dear to us as the Egyptian people—and it is quite impossible that we should neglect our duty in this matter. But we said that if there was an air engagement between Syria and Israel we should

not be able to take off from Egypt to help Syria. The only way we could help Syria was by having our planes in Syria. As soon as we had signed the Agreement we told the Syrians that we were ready to provide every assistance—if they needed planes we would supply them, if they needed pilots we would supply them—anything they wanted; there was absolutely no difference between Egypt and Syria in this matter. The Syrians said that they had enough, so we were reassured. Then Air Marshal Sidqi went to Syria after the recent fighting, and repeated what we had said. Naturally, the proposal is still open; if there is an Israeli attack Egyptian pilots will be ready, along with their Syrian colleagues to meet any air attack against Syria. The servile King of Jordan, whose broadcasting station said these things, in collaboration with imperialism, is the servant of imperialism and of Israel. And what did he do? When the fighting broke out between Syria and Israel, there was an air battle over Jordan, and Syrian planes went to meet the Israeli planes, and the Syrian armed forces went out to meet the Israeli forces; there was a big battle, and the Syrians inflicted heavy losses on the Israelis—they gave details of these later on.

Three planes came down in Jordan, three Syrian planes. And what did King Husayn do? What did the babies in Jordan do? They interrupted their broadcast. Israel had broadcast that she had brought down a number of Syrian planes; Syria had not broadcast. When Israel's planes are shot down in her territory she doesn't say anything about them; she says she hasn't lost a single plane, but King Husayn interrupted the broadcast to say that a number of Syrian planes had come down in Jordan, that they had found one of them and that they had heard that there were two others, and that they had started a search for them. Then King Husayn interrupted the broadcast again, he and the other babies, and said that they had found the two other planes and their pilots. They interrupted the broadcast once more to say that the pilots had been taken to hospital. They interrupted again to say that King Husayn had gone to visit the pilots in hospital. Is this the way a man talks? How could anyone talk like this?

If they were real Arabs and working for the aims of the Arab nation, would they have inter-

rupted the broadcast like that and made such an announcement? They should have got in touch with the Syrians secretly and told them what had happened, and returned their men to them. But they were obviously gloating. The interruption of the broadcast and the announcements showed this. But does any one expect to fight an air battle and emerge unscathed, as if he was protected by a charm? Every day the Americans fight air battles in Vietnam, and lose three aircraft, five, six, or even seven aircraft, up to now they have lost 1,200 aircraft altogether. What do you expect? Of course there are losses in war. You don't expect us to make war and say we don't want any one to die, we don't want any planes to be shot down. When people make war they expect to hit and be hit, to kill and be killed. But King Husayn was extremely happy at that time, and, of course, when he interrupted the broadcast he was carrying out the plans of the CIA, his masters, for the stooge King, whatever he does, can never be anything but a stooge King. He interrupted the broadcast and told Israel, he told the Jews, that three Syrian planes had come down in Jordan, thereby doing a service to Israel. And in interrupting the broadcast like that he showed clearly how pleased he was at the outcome of the battle and that three Syrian planes had been shot down. Then he said that the Joint Defence Pact had not been implemented. But what right has he to speak about Arab solidarity? There was Arab solidarity in 1948, but King Husayn's grandfather, King Abdullah, at a time when there was Arab solidarity, was negotiating with the Jews, with Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir. They used to go to Amman and stay with him. But today, how can we speak of Arab solidarity? How can there be solidarity between revolutionaries and the stooges of imperialism? There can be no possibility of solidarity between revolutionaries and the agents of imperialism. We have tried. But in spite of our experience we thought that they had some honour and conscience. But we were wrong, they have no honour and no conscience—every one of them wants to be a stooge because it is his heritage to be a stooge, because he has inherited treason. One who has inherited treason and been brought up in such surroundings and such atmosphere cannot possibly have any part in Arab solidarity. He regards us as his enemies and Israel as his friend, and Israel

says that it cannot agree to any change in the present regime in Jordan, which is the regime of King Husayn. The Arab revolutionaries with their revolutionary ideas insist that King Husayn must be got rid of; so, naturally, he is heart and soul with Israel.

He talks about Arab solidarity, but we tell him that he is not deceiving any one; all the Arabs know who are the stooges of imperialism, the servants of imperialism, who the traitors are, and who have inherited treason. He, too, talks about Islam like King Faysal, but every one in the Arab world knows that the object of this operation is to deceive the Arab masses and the Arab peoples.

The battle we are fighting is not an easy one; it is a battle in which we are fighting America, the greatest power in the world. The fact is that our battle is not with Faysal, nor with Husayn nor with the crazy Burghiba, nor with the Shah of Iran—all of them are tools in the hands of the Americans, and all these tools are worth nothing. It is America we have to deal with.

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The battle we are fighting is an immense one, not because we are fighting Husayn, Faysal, the Shah of Iran and Burghiba, and the stooges of imperialism in the area. We told them three months ago that we didn't want their aid—they waited a year without answering us, and no one who has any honour can accept that sort of treatment. We don't want their aid, and we withdraw our request for aid. We thank them, but we also say that we are people of honour, and we are not prepared to sell our independence for any price. Our freedom is above any price; it is dearer to us than anything else. America assisted in the establishment of Israel, and is protecting Israel. America made Germany pay Israel money as compensation—they got thousands of millions of dollars. America made Germany arm Israel, and now it is America that is arming Israel, and the Prime Minister of Israel says that they have promised that the Sixth Fleet will help Israel if she is attacked. Of course Germany is not an independent country; she is completely subject to America. Since 1965, when Germany recognised Israel, what we have thought is this: All right, so Germany has recognised Israel; very well

then, we shall recognise East Germany; they are against the recognition of East Germany, and we were against the recognition of Israel. And this is what we said at the Arab League; we proposed that the Arabs should sever relations with West Germany; we wanted to take an equivalent step. That step was the recognition of East Germany, but at the Arab League, of course, there was a difference of opinion. Some said that they did not want diplomatic relations with the communist countries—Saudi Arabia, for example—and that they preferred to sever relations only. So, to preserve unanimity, we adopted a resolution to sever relations. I say it was we who demanded that relations be severed with West Germany, and I was not in favour of the step the League took when it decided that Hassunah should go and negotiate with the West German Foreign Minister, where they attacked him—the newspapers attacked him and attacked the Arabs, saying insulting things about the Arab nation, and accusing us of sending Hassunah hat in hand to beg.

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It is an unremitting struggle, and we stand with the revolutionary forces against imperialism in every Arab country, against imperialism everywhere, for imperialism will not stop working against us. They won't stop plotting, for we are the real resistance to them; we represent our nation's power to endure, our nation's will to live, our nation's aspirations to freedom and to be rid of imperialism and its allies, the first of which is Zionist racialism in Israel.

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307

Government Policy Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah.¹ [Excerpt]**Amman, May 6, 1967**

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The Government announces its firm intention of making the most determined efforts to increase the strength and impregnability of Jordan in all fields, thereby strengthening the line of defence of our sanctities and our national aspirations against the usurping enemy. At the same time, it believes that the battle in Palestine requires joint Arab effort and unified Arab action based on true solidarity, sincerity and honesty. In this connection the Government declares its profound belief that our sacred cause can only be successfully served if the Arab states come together once more at Summit meetings. The Government therefore supports any Arab effort towards the resumption of meetings at Summit level, and is proud of the sincere and unselfish call for such meetings made by our great King. For it regards this as the only way of coordinating efforts, organising action and mobilising all resources in the Arab world to contain the peril of Zionist expansion and to strive for the recovery of the usurped Arab right to Palestine. The Government's policy in this field is a continuation of the policy of previous governments, which was based on the principles of the great Arab Revolt, whose leader was such a splendid embodiment of sacrifice on behalf of Palestine. For did not Husayn ibn-Ali willingly sacrifice his throne, his kingdom and his life rather than give up an inch of Palestinian territory? We who live in this embattled land are the heirs of the calamity that befell her; we share in her pains and tragedies every moment of our lives. It is a matter of life or death for us that right should be re-established, so that it is no hard task for us to make sacrifices or to shed our blood.

Therefore, both moral and material mobilisation will continue, so that this country, patiently awaiting the battle in the trenches and resolutely manning the lines of defence of all that is holy to Arabs and Muslims alike, may endure as the spearhead and vanguard of dedication, with the

¹ *Al-Quds*, Jerusalem, May 7, 1967.

aid and support of all honest and honourable men in the great Arab homeland. We hereby declare our resolution to meet our national responsibilities with courage, determination and faith, by persevering in the effort to keep our armed forces fit to fulfil the role they have always had to play—as the strong shield of our nation and a thorn in the side of our evil enemy. We also declare our unrelenting concern for home security and civil defence, so that we may maintain the level of stability and prosperity we now enjoy and make every citizen the assistant and helper of the soldier in his trench, encouraging him and protecting his rear in the battle that is being fought in the name of duty, truth, and dedication.

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308

Memorandum of the Syrian Ba'th Party Foreign Relations Bureau on the Likelihood of Israeli Aggression.² [Excerpt]**Damascus, May 11, 1967**

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Progressive Arabs;

Aware as it is of the necessity of maintaining contact with all progressive forces in the Arab homeland and in the whole world, and determined to disclose the aims of the aggression to which Syria was submitted on 7 April, 1967, the disappointment suffered by the aggressors on all sides, both directly and indirectly, and the means they have employed in an attempt to mislead Arab and world public opinion, and in view of the dimensions of the continuous aggression and of the possibility of its being renewed at any moment, the Foreign Relations Bureau of the Ba'th Party draws your attention to the following facts:

A. Reasons for the Latest Aggression:

The reasons for the aggression are now obvious to Arab and world public opinion, the most important being:

² *Al-Ba'th*, 12/5/1967. The Memorandum is addressed to "Friendly Arab Revolutionary and Progressive Parties."

1. The economic crisis and the lack of political stability from which Israel is suffering at present.

2. The decreasing rate of immigration to Israel and the rising rate of emigration from it as a result of world Jewry realising that Israel is not, as was claimed, the promised paradise, but a raging inferno of internal differences, unemployment, poverty and racial discrimination, even among the Jews in Israel. American and German Jews, for example, who used to come to Israel with dreams of stability, quiet, protection and a comfortable life, now find only danger, anarchy, lack of security and the determination of the Palestinian guerrillas to liberate their land from the Zionists. This was by no means what American and German Jews had been led to expect by Zionist propaganda, which had presented Israel as a paradise.

3. The consistently lenient attitude adopted in international circles to Israeli aggressions against the Demilitarised Zones and the frontiers of neighbouring Arab countries.

4. The support of American, British and other imperialists for the aggressive Zionist entity, which they employ to further their conspiracies against the liberated Arab countries that threaten their monopolies and their ability to plunder the resources of the peoples of the world. This is what happened in 1956, when imperialism used Israel as its spearhead in the Tripartite Aggression, after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

This is also what happened on Friday, 7 April, 1967, after Syria had obliged the Iraq Petroleum Company to pay in full the sums the Syrian people were entitled to, and after it had become clear that Syria was going to invite Tapline to review its system of accounting as regards the payment of dues for the transit of its oil across Syrian territory, and, in particular, after Syria had actually begun to exploit its oil on a national basis.

5. The support of Arab reaction for Israel in the planning and execution of its aggression against Syria, in view of the common interest that both Israel and Arab reaction have in toppling the revolutionary regime in Syria. It was because of this support that Israel was able to use Jordanian air space to penetrate into Syrian air space in an attempt to deliver a blow from the rear.

6. Israel's desire to avenge the last battle of Tiberias.

B. Aims of the Aggression

Israel carried out her latest aggression in the hope of achieving some or all of the following aims:

1. To smash the superior military and strategic strength of the Syrian Front.

2. To recover the prestige of the Israeli air force which had been dragged in the mud by the battle of Tiberias, and thus reaffirm her claim to air supremacy.

3. To retrieve the reputation of the Israeli government, which was being accused by its people of being afraid to start a fight on the Syrian front. The aim of the latest aggression was to rebut this accusation by actually engaging in a fight with Syria. Even if it was unsuccessful Israel could, by employing hireling propaganda writers in the Arab countries and misleading world public opinion by denying all losses, transform what was really a defeat into a fictitious victory, which she intended to exploit quite unscrupulously.

4. To smash the morale of the Arab people, especially in Syria, with the object of preventing them from responding to the Syrian revolutionary regime in seriously preparing for a war of popular liberation. Seeing how rapidly these preparations were advancing, Israel hoped to stop them before they were completed.

5. To destroy the Arab's people's confidence in the slogan of the meeting of the progressive forces through struggle, especially in the context of the efficacy of the Joint Defence Agreement with the United Arab Republic. The object of this was to cast doubts on the Agreement, and to suggest that the intentions of those party to it were not serious.

6. To punish Syria on behalf of the British and American imperialists for the victories she had already won in the field of oil and those she hoped to achieve in the future at the expense of the other monopoly companies.

7. To distract the Syrian Arab Republic from its revolutionary advance and impede the execution of the second Five Year Plan. It was also hoped to raise doubts as to Syria's ability to realise the slogans of the Ninth National Con-

ference of the Ba'th Party.

8. To cast doubts on the soundness of the Party and its ability, after the liquidation of rightist, hesitant and deviationist pockets from its ranks, to continue its socialist advance and confront the enemies of the nation. This would give rightists, reactionaries and capitalists an opportunity to gloat and to pounce upon the rising revolutionary regime and to cast suspicion on its principles and its strategy.

9. To relieve the pressure of the revolutionary attack—embodied in the meeting of progressive forces—on the reactionary regimes, and thereby save them from the fate that is inevitably in store for them, and to relieve the pressure of the revolutionary tide in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Aden, the Occupied South, Morocco and Tunisia.

These being the causes and objectives of the aggression, it is evident that:

1. The causes of the aggression are latent in the very fact of the Zionist presence in the occupied territory of Palestine and imperialist support for this artificial entity. This encourages it to commit aggression, for it was brought into existence to do just this, whenever imperialist interests in the Arab homeland should come into conflict with the determination of their legitimate masters, the struggling Arab masses, to recover control of them. The imperialists hope, by maintaining their interests, creating, strengthening and supporting Israel, and linking their destiny with that of the reactionary regimes in the area, to perpetuate the differences, fragmentation and exploitation now prevailing in Arab society, whereas the struggle of the Arab people, led by their revolutionary and progressive forces, aims at the construction of a unified socialist Arab society. However, in our opinion, this can only be achieved through a united class struggle against the interests of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, a struggle that knows no mercy, no retreat, no hesitation and no compromise. We are confident that the unity of the struggle against imperialism, backwardness and exploitation in the world will induce all honest and honourable men, and all forces of liberation, progress and socialism in the world, to assist us in our legitimate struggle. We are confident, too, that these forces will support us in our efforts to unveil the methods used by imperialism and its tools, Zionism which has usurped

Palestine, and reaction which exploits the masses.

2. The decisive response of our armed forces in general, and our air force in particular, to the latest Israeli aggression, has made it impossible for Israel to achieve the military, strategic and psychological aims for which this aggression was launched. Furthermore, the awareness of our people, and their confidence in their revolutionary and progressive leadership, have frustrated the rest of Israel's objectives—intrigue, propaganda and the stirring up of strife. Prominent factors in this field have been the resolution of the forces on the Syrian front and the efficiency of the Syrian air force, which has smashed the myth of Israeli air supremacy, and the validity of offensive strategy against the positions of imperialism, the bases of aggression and the conspiracies of Zionism and reaction. This constitutes the policy decided on by the Ninth National Congress of the Ba'th Party. The awareness of our people has also exposed Israel's claims for what they are and increased our people's determination to stand by the meeting of progressive and revolutionary forces and the Joint Defence Agreement between Syria and Egypt. Thus the hopes of imperialism to force us, through intimidation, to withdraw the Arab people's rightful claims against the monopoly companies have come to nothing. For immediately after the aggression we sent for representatives of Tapline and told them to account for the sums lost to our people as a result of the company's failure to implement the agreements properly.

Thus, it is not too much to say that the aggression has failed in all it set out to do.

In the light of these facts, we can see that the reasons for the aggression are still in existence. This applies both to causes integrally connected with Israel's being an aggressive entity, and other causes, such as imperialist support, the encouragement given to aggression, the indulgent attitude of the international organisations and the conspiracies of the reactionary regimes.

In view of all this, the Foreign Relations Bureau of the National Command of the Ba'th Party regards it as its duty to assure you that there is a growing possibility of further aggression. You should also be aware that the manifestations of, and preliminary preparations for, such further aggression are clearly apparent, as can be seen

from the following moves which have been made in accordance with the roles allotted to each of the parties concerned:

1. The Israeli authorities' public statements of their aggressive intentions on the pretext of "punishing Syria."

2. The statements of the Israeli authorities about support by the American Sixth Fleet for their aggressive plans, and the confirmation by American authorities, in many ways and on various occasions, that these statements are true.

3. The request submitted by the American authorities for permission for the Sixth Fleet to pay a visit and anchor in neighbouring Arab waters.

4. The scandalous way in which hiring journalists have been employed by newspapers known for their imperialist affiliations and complexion to attack our ideological army and the revolutionary regime in Syria, to cast suspicion on its ability to confront Israel, and to intrigue against our armed forces, their standards and armaments. Even the Israeli press is incapable of such excesses, for the Israelis know the falsehood of these assertions from their first-hand experience of Syrian resistance to their acts of aggression.

5. The moves by the mercenaries of the new imperialist pact who, using religion as a screen for their traffic in all that the people hold most sacred, have contracted an alliance with the enemies of the masses with the object of destroying their revolutionary gains and achievements.

6. The intensification of the imperialist and reactionary campaign against the revolutionary regime in Syria. The object of this campaign is to support Israeli aggression and make its task easier. The methods it employs include attacks on the Party and its slogans, the hatching of conspiracies against Syria by sending spies and spending money to spread confusion and effect acts of sabotage inside the country, and the training of mercenaries in Jordan, which is concentrating her forces on the Syrian frontiers instead of stationing them on the frontiers of Israel. All these moves are being made in preparation for an imperialist, Zionist and reactionary attack on Syria, aimed at restoring her to the fold of backwardness, exploitation, imperialist monopolies and nefarious military projects.

Progressive Arabs;

In submitting this memorandum to you, we hope that the leaders of your Party will make these facts known to the struggling masses in your country. We assure you that we shall not for a moment falter in our advance towards the achievement of our aims. We are determined to destroy the supporters of imperialism, the aggressive Zionist presence and all the various reactionary regimes in the Arab countries, and to achieve the construction of a unified socialist society. With these ends in view, we place all our material and moral resources at the disposal of the world struggle against imperialism, Zionism and racial discrimination and shall work hand in hand with the progressive Arab forces and the forces of liberation and progress in every part of the world.

309

Statement by an Official Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the "Repeated Threats by Israel."¹

Damascus, May 13, 1967

The representatives in Syria of the countries that are members of the Security Council were summoned to the Foreign Ministry, where it was disclosed to them that imperialist and Zionist circles are engaged in a conspiracy against Syria. They were also made aware, by reference to the repeated provocative statements issued by the authorities in the occupied territory, of the carefully prepared role of aggressor that Israel has been cast to play within the framework of this conspiracy. They were also apprised of the following facts:

1. The series of threats made by a number of Israelis—Eshkol, Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, the Israeli representative at the United Nations and certain military men—are intended specifically to prepare world public opinion. Their object is to cover up for the forthcoming Zionist aggression. They are

¹ *Ibid.*, 14/5/1967.

an act of provocation against the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. Israel's attempt to exploit international organisations to cover its forthcoming aggression is doomed to certain failure. For we have informed our ambassadors in all countries in the world, and the Secretary-General and the member states of the United Nations, of the true position of Israel as an instrument used by imperialism against the resurgence and progress of the Arab people. We have also made it clear that the Zionist presence is based on usurpation and aggression, and that, since 1948, it has disobeyed all the resolutions of international organisations, which have so far failed to secure the implementation of a single resolution on Israel. We have also pointed out that Israel must not be allowed to exploit international organisations, and that, on the contrary, it is their duty to disclose to world public opinion Israel's failure to comply with international law, the resolutions of the Security Council on the Demilitarised Zone, and other resolutions condemning constant Israeli aggression.

3. Israel's attempt to justify her actions by laying the blame on commando activity and holding Syria responsible for this activity is internationally unacceptable, because of the attitude of the Palestinian Arab people, more than half of whom live in such parts of the West Bank as are still not under Zionist occupation, in Gaza, and other Arab areas, in addition to about one million displaced persons, living in tents. These people, who are faced with annihilation, living as they do in the most inhuman conditions, and who have been awaiting since 1948 for justice to be done them by the United Nations, do not accept the tutelage of Syria, the United Arab Republic, or any other Arab Region, and do not ask anyone's permission to engage in their legitimate struggle to liberate their usurped homeland. This is a right guaranteed them by the principles of the United Nations and international law. It is thus not permissible to hold any Arab Region responsible for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people, and Israel's argument is thus invalid at all international levels.

4. Israel's use of the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people as a pretext for aggression

against Syria cannot conceal the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary conspiracy against this country. This conspiracy has been fully disclosed to the Arab people and to the whole world. It consists, basically, of a major aggression by Israel on a variety of trumped-up pretexts, to be followed by an aggression by mercenaries and intelligence service stooges in Jordan. These, it is intended, will use imperialist armaments which are now being concentrated on our frontier, and their aggression will be accompanied by moves on the part of reaction and stooges whose interests have been prejudiced by the Revolution, all under the protection of world imperialism, which has planned the whole operation.

This conspiracy, the implementation of which began with the abortive aggression of 7 April, is being continued today quite openly. The reason is that the organised Revolution of our toiling masses and their ruling Party, through their interaction with all Arab progressive forces and forces for freedom throughout the world, has come to represent a real danger to the interests of imperialism, Zionism and reaction in the area. The result is that the Revolution is now the object of an unconcealed conspiracy which is using Israel as its spearhead.

It is utterly impossible to conceal the criminal role played by Zionism from the Arab people or from international public opinion, for it is a repetition of what happened at the time of Suez.

5. The object of the Israeli aggression, in which imperialist and Zionist circles are playing their part, is the overthrow of the revolutionary regime in this region. This was made perfectly clear in the statements of Rabin, the Chief of Staff of the Zionist army of occupation, and it is now being repeated in the statements issued by Israeli sources, defining the aim of the aggression as the destruction of the revolutionary regime in Syria. Anything else they say is nothing but trumped-up pretexts designed to mislead world public opinion. But they will deceive no one, nor can they conceal the facts of the imperialist role that Israel is playing in the area against the interests of the Arab people.

The impudent threat to mount wide-scale military operations and wage war against the Syrian Arab Republic will frighten no one. The dreams of Israel and her imperialist masters of

overthrowing the revolutionary regime by a strike at Damascus or elsewhere with the support of all the forces of imperialism, will only increase the regime's popular support and rally the Arab masses everywhere more closely around the Revolution. Any attack on this Region will result in the destruction of the thrones of treachery and subservience in the Arab homeland, for the cause of Palestine is not the cause of the Syrian region only, but of the whole Arab people—their toiling masses and their progressive governments. Thus, aggression against Syria through the cause of Palestine will not overthrow the revolutionary regime, as imperialism, Zionism and reaction fondly imagine; such an aggression will only consolidate it and make it stronger and more impregnable. It will, however, overthrow the subservient reactionary regimes and stir up all the Arab masses in a revolution so violent that the imperialists can have no idea of the extent to which it will damage their interests and their presence in the area.

7. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that one aim of the aggressive actions directed against Syria is to distract attention from what is going on in Aden and South Arabia, and to relieve the pressure of the popular war against imperialism and reaction there. But we also emphasise that the imperialist Suez War did not stop the popular revolt in Algeria, nor did it bring down the progressive regime in Egypt. Similarly, the attacks on North Vietnam have not stopped the revolution in South Vietnam. By the same token, aggression against Syria will not stop the struggle of the toiling masses throughout the Arab world against imperialism, Zionism, reaction, fragmentation and backwardness, and for the establishment of a unified socialist Arab homeland.

8. In drawing the attention of the diplomatic missions and of world public opinion to the Zionist conspiracy that is being carried out against the Syrian Arab Republic, the Foreign Ministry holds Israel and its protectors responsible for everything that may happen in the area. The Foreign Ministry also affirms that the government and the people of Syria are ready to confront any aggression with all their strength and with a resolution that knows no hesitation and no surrender. The aggression that is being prepared by Zionist circles will be confronted not by Syria

alone, but by all the progressive Arab Regions. The Joint Defence Agreement will be put into action against this aggression, which will also have to reckon with a popular war of liberation waged by the masses throughout the Arab world.

310

Message from U.A.R. President Nasir to the Palestine Day Conference Held in London.¹
[Excerpts]

Cairo, May 14, 1967

It is also not possible, brothers, to distinguish between imperialism and Zionism or reaction and Zionism. These three members of a hostile alliance can only live by relying on and complementing each other; none of them can survive without the support of its two allies. This is why their activities directed against our nation are so closely coordinated, each attack being timed to follow the one before it and closely linked with the one that follows it.

You are far from your homes, brothers, but I am sure that you are aware of these activities and of their deliberate timing. You are aware that Israel and the government of Jordan have coordinated their plans to exert pressure on Syria and, through repeated provocations, to embroil Arab forces in a conflict for which they themselves have chosen neither the time nor the place.

I am sure, too, that you are aware of the constant pressure that is being exerted on Lebanon and her economy, to make her abandon the Arab line she has adopted.

I am also sure that you have seen through the conspiracy and the preparations that lie behind the consignments of Western arms that are piling up in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and accumulating in the south, on the frontiers of the Yemen, instead of in the north, on the frontiers of Israel. Naturally, it is perfectly obvious

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 15/5/1967. This Conference was organised by the Union of Arab Students and Workers in Britain.

to all of you for what purposes these arms will be used. You know perfectly well that America and Britain will never sell the Arabs arms for use in an attack on Israel or in defending themselves if Israel attacks them. America and Britain only give arms to reaction to enable it to resist the spirit of liberation and prepare for a new aggression against the Yemeni Republic.

I am sure that you have a clear picture in your minds of the war of nerves that is being waged against the forces of liberation in your nation, and of the economic pressure that is being exerted with the object of hindering these forces and subjecting them to the will of foreigners.

Our enemies are the enemies of liberation everywhere, the advocates of counter-revolution against all aspirations to liberty, progress and welfare, not only in our nation, but in the whole of the Third World. Our enemies want to bind the countries of the Third World with the shackles of backwardness, and thereby impose their domination and rob them of their wealth. In this way they hope to make the Third World into a market for their wares.

The time has come, brothers, for us to face the facts and expose the leaders of this counter-revolution, this conspiracy. The time has come for us to expose the role of America, which is planning the conspiracy, financing it, and buying agents to execute her plans.

Brothers, it is America that is seeking to become the heir of defunct British imperialism in this area. It is America that implanted Israel in our territory, that is supporting reaction and imposing backwardness upon us, and which is setting obstacles in the way of our progress and our welfare.

America is the leader of the counter-revolution, and our other enemies are no more than her satellites, following faithfully in her footsteps. Without her they are weak, without her leadership, they are powerless.

Britain could not stay a moment longer in Arab territory without American support, nor could Israel live for a day without American economic and military aid. And Faysal, Husayn, Burghiba and the other stooges could never

confront their people if they were deprived of the full American protection they now enjoy.

The cause is no longer the cause of Palestine only; it is the cause of the destiny of all Arabs, and victory depends on the extent of our awareness and preparation.

It is our duty brothers, to prepare for the decisive battle, in Palestine and elsewhere. We must consolidate our strength and increase our production; we must confront and overcome the pressure exerted on us, we must show up our enemies to the whole world, and disclose their fraud and deceit. We must support the Arab will to rise against the reactionary regimes and reject subservience to the imperialists, so that the Arab will alone may be paramount in all Arab territories from the Ocean to the Gulf.

311

Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the Alerting of the Armed Forces.¹

Amman, May 17, 1967

The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is watching with great concern and all vigilance the developments in the area following constant Israeli threats of aggression against the Arab countries, and has issued urgent orders for all the armed forces to be alerted in readiness for an emergency. The basic assumption of this country's policy is that the armistice lines between the enemy and the Arab countries are one single line, and that aggression against any part of it is an aggression against the whole line. Obedient to the dictates of national duty, Jordan will stand by the other Arab countries against the common danger, in all determination and resolution.

¹ *Al-Quds*, 18/5/1967.

312

Statement by Saudi Crown Prince Emir Khalid Ibn Abd al-'Aziz on Israeli Threats Against Syria.¹**Riyadh, May 18, 1967**

Our attitude to this is consistent with our general policy in Arab affairs and our firm belief that any Israeli aggression against any other Arab country is an aggression against us. Repeated statements of His Majesty on this subject have made the attitude of Saudi Arabia perfectly clear. For our religion, our Arabism and the brotherly links between our two countries make it inevitable that we should stand beside the Syrian people.

Israel would never have adopted its present provocative attitude, or threatened any Arab country, had the Arab countries been united in both views and action. We would have wished that Arab energies might not be dissipated in activities which can only result in the shattering of Arab unity and in the Arab peoples being subjected to a savage war of aggression that knows neither right, mercy nor conscience.

313

Statement by U.A.R. Deputy Supreme Commander Marshal Amir on the Political and Military Situation.²**Cairo, May 18, 1967**

During the last few days, the armed forces of the United Arab Republic have taken up positions from which they can repulse and deter enemy attacks.

I wish to say very plainly that no one, whether in the Arab East or elsewhere, is entitled to feel the slightest doubt that the United Arab Republic will resist any attempt at aggression with all its strength. The time has come to put an end once and for all to the policy of arrogant boasting that Israel is following.

This policy has recently reached its climax, and it is clear to anyone who tries to analyse the

situation that the enemy has relied on three factors which, he believes, enable him to make what moves he likes.

The first factor is the slackness of Arab reaction and its collusion, which has been carried to the extent of treachery, with imperialism, the creator and supporter of Israel.

The second factor is increasing American support, especially in the field of arms supplies.

The third factor is the idea that the presence of United Arab Republic troops in the Yemen limits, if it does not completely paralyse, Egypt's power to react.

Just recently the enemy has been exceeding all bounds in his threats to Syria and his plans to follow up these threats with armed aggression.

The enemy's threats to Syria in both the political and military fields have been supported, according to reliable information, by a military concentration of unprecedented strength against Syria.

For some time it has been apparent that Israel has been behaving as if she were always capable of aggression and imposing the consequences of such aggression as a *fait accompli*.

The movement of United Arab Republic forces to the front lines in great strength and in a state of full readiness for action will completely reverse the enemy's position.

The slackness of reaction and its collusion with imperialism, and American arms consignments to Israel will not save the enemy, for they cannot safeguard and protect him.

Similarly, the basic strength of the Egyptian armed forces is capable of dealing the enemy shattering blows, and at the same time the Egyptian army operating in the Yemen can play its heroic part there with the support of the forces of the revolution in South Arabia, which have succeeded in putting British imperialism on the defensive. They will also have the support of the national resistance forces inside Saudi Arabia, whose King was in London this week asking help and support from imperialism, whose few remaining forces are now in retreat.

I will not say more than this: that the armed forces now confronting the enemy will strike at any aggressive action in any field, and will strike hard.

¹ Saudi Embassy Press Release, Beirut, 19/5/1967.

² *Al-Ahram*, 19/5/1967.

314

Interview Statements by the Syrian Defence Minister General Asad.¹**Damascus, May 19, 1967**

Q. How serious, in your opinion, are the provocative statements that have been made by the Israeli authorities, and what are the motives behind them?

A. As a result of its analysis of the Arab situation, the Revolution in the Syrian Region has devised a strategy based on the assumption that imperialism, Zionism and reaction together form a coherent whole and are working within the framework of a single plan to thwart the aspirations of the Arab people.

The Revolution has opened fire on the interests and concessions of reaction, Zionism and imperialism, and has thereby become a threat to their whole alliance. The masses throughout the Arab world have also adopted this method of confrontation. The forces of reaction, Zionism and imperialism have therefore agreed to respond to the Arab revolutionary tide by conspiracy, the mobilisation of forces of mercenaries, the arming of reaction and the establishment of military bases in the reactionary Arab countries, in an overall plan to use all these factors against the Revolution and against the Arab masses.

Ever since it came to power, the Revolution in the Syrian Region has always defeated the countless conspiracies that have been directed against it. Thus imperialism now has only one weapon left—to set Israel in motion.

Thus Israel's first motive today derives from the fact that she is an imperialist base and a spearhead directed against the revolutionary aspirations of the Arab people and the objectives on whose realisation their destiny depends.

There is also another motive, deriving from the slogan of the popular war of liberation that the Revolution has adopted. This slogan has seized the initiative in the struggle from the hands of reaction, which has ruled and conspired against the Arab homeland for fifty years, and put it in the hands of the masses who, by adopting it, have made it a grave threat to imperialist interests and concessions in general and to the Zionist

occupation of Palestine in particular.

The third motive is the acute internal crisis that now besets occupied Palestine and bedevils the occupation authorities. This crisis has in no way been alleviated by material support from the capitals of world imperialism. On the contrary, the disintegration is increasing daily, and threatening the pastebord entity that is Israel with total collapse. In this connection it should be remembered that the capitals of imperialism have had to pay a very high price to establish Israel, and that this price is constantly growing as the crisis grows more acute. This is only natural in view of the fact that, inasmuch as she is merely an occupying power, Israel has none of the constituents of a genuine state.

The fourth motive is to be sought in the Revolution's strategy of striking at the bases of aggression, as happened in the Battle of Tiberias, that of 7 April, and all the other battles that have been fought recently.

The Revolution has abandoned its policy of complaining to the United Nations and decided to take action on its own behalf to punish the enemy. It now remorselessly counters any move by the enemy, and demolishes his positions. This abandonment of the policy of submitting complaints to the United Nations may be regarded as a fifth motive.

In view of all this, we regard the enemy's provocative statements as serious, and believe that expanded aggression or war is the only means left him of resolving the crisis. For he believes that, in collusion with the forces of imperialism, he can strike a blow at Syria and thereby stem the Arab revolutionary tide, curb the popular masses and impede their advance towards their goals.

We are acting on the assumption that these provocations are serious, and we have made all preparations for a suitable retort.

Q. Do you think that the international atmosphere is now favourable for Israel to embark on an adventure?

A. It would be out of the question for Israel to embark on an adventure were she not specifically instigated by America. This requires no proof; the statements of Eshkol and the threats of McNamara, not to mention the massive material aid provided by West Germany, for which

¹ *Al-Ba'ith*, 21/5/1967.

we hold America responsible, are sufficient evidence.

In spite of Israel's dependence on the Sixth Fleet and the forces of imperialism, it is impossible for her to foretell the outcome of her adventures. We, on the other hand, have confidence in ourselves, in our people and in their ability to smash aggression. We are also confident of the support of all peoples engaged in the struggle; the peoples of the Third World and the socialist countries are with us.

Q. Could you give Arab public opinion some idea of what form the air battle with the enemy is liable to take?

A. From a military point of view it is impossible to separate air attacks from other forms of attack; the whole operation has to be regarded as a single entity. All kinds of armaments will be used in the military operations we foresee.

However, it may be useful to recall certain facts about our air arm, especially in view of the misrepresentations spread by the enemy and by Arab reaction, which has done its best to minimise the capacity of our air force, as a service to Israel and imperialism.

1. Since the Revolution our air arm has developed greatly as regards size, character and training. There is no comparison between the force we had before the Revolution and that which we possess now.

(a) The number of our aircraft has increased greatly.

(b) The planes acquired by our air force since the Revolution are among the most modern and best armed in the world.

(c) We have many more pilots.

(d) The training facilities and methods that have been made available since the Revolution were non-existent before it.

2. Agents and sections of the subservient press are always saying that very large numbers of pilots have been discharged, and that this must inevitably weaken the Syrian air force and make it incapable of performing its duties. I should like to assure you that the number of pilots capable of fighting air actions who have left the service could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

3. In all the actions it has fought, our air

force has proved the superiority of its planes and the efficiency of its pilots, not to mention their high morale and their loyalty to the people and the Revolution.

4. In pursuance of the Revolution's strategy, our air force has struck at the bases of aggression inside occupied territory.

In other words, our air force has attained a standard which enables it to perform its duties to perfection; it has specific tasks laid down for it in accordance with the plan, and it will perform these tasks. I can assure you that we shall inflict on the enemy much heavier losses than his air force will be able to inflict on us; we proved this in the battles of Tiberias and of 7 April, in spite of the fact that the latter was prepared by the enemy and coordinated with reaction, which allowed him the free use of its air space in an attempt to stab us in the back.

In fact, according to military custom, in this area at least, it was not to be expected, in such a surprise attack, that our air force should have been given the chance of joining in the battle and effectively and decisively counter-attacking as it did.

In this connection, great play has been made of the fact that an enemy plane was seen over Damascus. But it is an obvious fact, which must surely be known to every citizen, that surprise air raids are possible however strong the opposing air force. There have been numerous cases of this kind in the major countries. Moreover, our own air force has entered the air space of the occupied territory dozens of times since 23 February, for reconnaissance and other purposes. The last occasion was at about noon on 15 May, when our aircraft penetrated dozens of miles into enemy air space. M.T. anti-aircraft guns and Hawk rockets were fired at our aircraft, but they completed their tasks and returned safely to their bases.

It may happen that people see an enemy plane over Damascus, but they can rest assured that we can and shall reply, not only in our own air space, but in the air space and over the towns of the occupied territories.

Q. In case of aggression, what will our reply be?

A. Our preparations to confront any aggression are now completed, and we have taken into

consideration the possibility of the Sixth Fleet's intervening. From my knowledge of our potential, I can assure you that any operation the enemy engages in will be an adventure doomed to failure.

Our forces are ready and prepared not only to repel aggression but to start on the actual operation of liberation and the blasting of the Zionist presence out of the Arab homeland.

Our army, which has long waited in readiness, hand on trigger, is unanimous in its desire for an early conflict. We are only awaiting the sign from the political leadership.

As a soldier, I believe that the time has come for the battle of liberation. In my opinion, minimum measures at least must be taken to ensure that punishment be inflicted on Israel. Only thus can we restore her to her senses and bring her to her knees, so that she may live in an atmosphere of fear that will make her think twice before she commits further acts of aggression.

I believe that our brothers in the United Arab Republic feel the same as we do, and that our feelings are also shared by the toiling masses in all parts of the Arab homeland.

315

Resolution Adopted by the Arab League Council on Aggression Against Arab Territories.¹

Cairo, May 20, 1967

Support for the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic against Israeli aggression.

Having reviewed with the gravest concern the question of the undisguised Israeli threat to the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and the large Israeli concentrations on the armistice line, and the urgent measures taken by the United Arab Republic to confront the Israeli threat of aggression, the action it took to end the task of the United Nations Emergency Force, the soli-

darity of the Arab countries which have declared their support for the Syrian Arab Republic, and foreign hostility to the Arab attitude;

The Council declares:

1. Its full support for the attitudes of the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic and its solidarity with them in all fields.

2. That in pursuance of the obligations of the member states of the Joint Defence Agreement and the Charter of the Arab League, these states all regard any aggression against any Arab territory as an aggression against all of them, which they will cooperate to repel.

3. Its condemnation of all imperialist moves, whether as regards encouraging Israel to attack in conformity with a joint imperialist-Zionist plan, or as regards casting doubt on the genuineness of the Arab attitude of confronting Israeli threats of aggression and of the Arab countries' common stand against these threats.

316

Speech of Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Premier Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir at the Opening of a New Factory Unit.² [Excerpt]

Kuwait, May 20, 1967

Quarrels and disagreements between the Arab countries can only benefit the enemy, and, first and foremost, Israel, which has found in our differences an excellent opportunity to violate our frontiers and repeatedly threaten us with aggression. For nineteen years we have been demanding the return of Palestine; how much longer shall we continue to do so? Why, with Israel heading for aggression, can we not throw all our weight into a decisive battle in which we make use of all our armaments and resources to wipe away the blemish that adheres to us, and will continue to adhere to us as long as we do not suit our actions to our words? Israel today is concentrating her forces on our Arab frontiers with the greatest unconcern, in her

¹ Arab League, *Report of the Secretary General to the Council of the Arab League*, 48th Meeting, 11/9/1967, p. 3.

² *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, 21/5/1967.

belief that our all too obvious differences will ensure her victory. But Israel's hopes will be disappointed, for there are signs of solidarity in the ranks of the Arab nation. And Kuwait, which has always been in the vanguard of those who believe in the efficacy of armed struggle against the Zionist gangs for the liberation of the usurped homeland, has the honour to offer all her resources on behalf of the realisation of this, our dearest hope, and to play her part in repelling any aggression against any part of the great Arab homeland.

With this end in view, His Highness the Ruler, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and his government, gave orders last Thursday for our army, which is among our dearest possessions, to be in a state of absolute readiness for joint collective action at a sign from the Unified Arab Command. The Minister of Defence has also been entrusted with the task of contacting his colleague, the Iraqi Minister of Defence, to reach an understanding with him on the passage of Kuwaiti armed forces through Iraqi territory, should this be necessary.

We in Kuwait accord our absolute support to the honourable decision taken by the United Arab Republic to demand the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from its frontier areas in Gaza and Sinai. The object of this is that this force may not constitute an obstacle to the provision of effective military aid to the Arab countries which have common frontiers with Israel, should they be attacked by the Zionist gangs.

We hope that this collective Arab initiative, which has attracted the attention of the world, and which will undoubtedly enable us to repel any attack by those who have designs on us, will prove to be the beginning of a new era in which the Arab countries forget their differences over side issues and advance, firmly united, towards the achievement of our great objectives.

317

Letter from the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri to U.A.R. President Nasir.¹

Cairo, May 21, 1967

I have today returned from the Gaza Strip, where I met with the Palestine Liberation Army, stationed in advanced positions, ready for battle, and saw the Palestinian people straining for the fight. I therefore feel it my duty to the revolution and the liberation to express to the United Arab Republic, under the leadership of its President, who with his bravery and courage embodies all the aspirations of the Arab nation, my profound appreciation of and admiration for the national initiative you have taken to defend Syria, to protect Palestine and to guard the whole Arab nation.

Since the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Aqaba in the south and Gaza in the north—that Force which was the last vestige of the heritage of the Tripartite Aggression—the army of Egypt, the gallant army of Arabism, now stands face to face with the gangs of Israel. This has aroused revolutionary feelings in the Arab nation, intent as it is on the liberation of the usurped homeland. In view of this the Palestine Liberation Organisation has decided to place at the disposal of the United Arab Republic all the forces of the Palestine Liberation Army now stationed in the Gaza Strip, to act as vanguard to the gallant Egyptian army. It also places all the moral and material resources of the people of Gaza at the service of the battle for victory and liberation.

The Palestine Liberation Organisation, which, since it was established, has received from Your Excellency so much revolutionary support and popular backing in Egypt, renews its undertaking to march alongside you in the revolutionary advance towards liberation and victory.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 22/5/1967.

318

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir Announcing the Closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli Shipping.¹**May 22, 1967**

The entire country looks up to you today. The entire Arab nation supports you. It is evident that the entire people supports you completely in these circumstances and considers the armed forces as its hope today. It is also certain that the entire Arab nation supports our armed forces in these circumstances through which it is passing.

What I want to say is this: We are now in 1967, not in 1956. A great deal was said after the Tripartite Aggression while many things were still a dark secret. Israel, her commanders and rulers, boasted a great deal after 1956. I have read every word that was written about 1956, but I also know what happened in 1956.

On the night of 29th October 1956, the Israeli aggression against us began, and fighting began on 30 October. We received the Anglo-French ultimatum which called on us to withdraw several miles to the west of the Suez Canal. On 31 October the Anglo-French attack on us began. The air raids began at sunset. At the same time all our forces were withdrawn completely from Sinai to inside Egypt.

Thus in 1956 we had absolutely no opportunity to fight Israel. We decided to withdraw before the real fighting with Israel began. But in spite of our decision to withdraw, Israel was not able to occupy any of our positions except after we had withdrawn from them. But they made a great uproar after that, talking and boasting, and said a great deal about the "Sinai campaign" and the "Sinai battle." Every one of you knows what was said. It may be that they themselves believed it.

But today, more than ten years later, all the secrets have been disclosed, the most important thing being how they brought Ben Gurion to France, to employ him as imperialism's dog, to begin the operation. Ben Gurion refused to do anything unless he was given a written guarantee that they would protect him from Egyptian

bombers and the Egyptian air force. All this is no longer a secret today; all the world knows it. It was on this basis that France sent him fighter planes, and it was on this basis that Britain undertook to Ben Gurion to bomb Egyptian airfields within 24 hours from the beginning of the aggression. This shows how seriously they took the Egyptian air force.

Ben Gurion himself said that he had to think about the Haifa-Jerusalem-Tel Aviv triangle, which contains one third of Israel's population. He did not dare to attack Egypt for fear of Egypt's air force and bombers. At that time we had Ilyushin bombers, but only a few; we had only a few; we had only just acquired them to arm ourselves. But today we have many; there is a big difference between yesterday and today, between 1956 and 1967. Why do I say all this? I say it because we are in confrontation with Israel. Israel today does not have the support of Britain and France, as she did in 1956. She has the United States supporting her and supplying her with arms, but what happened in 1956, the conspiracy that took place in 1956, the world will not accept that it should be repeated.

Israel has been boasting since 1956. They speak of Israel's efficiency and excellent training. The West and the western press are always on about this, talking about the "Sinai campaign"—which was not a battle at all, because we withdrew at the time to confront Britain and France. Today we have a chance to bring the truth to light. We really have a chance to make the world see things as they really are. We are face to face with Israel, which has recently been threatening aggression and boasting.

On 12 May the first statement was made, a very impertinent one. Anyone who reads this statement must agree that these people are so boastful and arrogant that it is impossible to remain silent. The statement said that the Israeli leaders had announced that they would undertake military operations against Syria to occupy Damascus and bring down the Syrian regime. And on the same day, 12 May, the Prime Minister of Israel, Eshkol, made a very threatening statement against Syria. At the same time the commentators said that Israel thought that Egypt could not make a move because she was tied up in the Yemen.

Of course they say that we are tied up in

¹ *Ibid.*, 23/5/1967. Made to officers and men of an advanced air force base in Sinai.

the Yemen and have problems there. We are in the Yemen, but it seems that the Israelis have believed all the nonsense and lies they have been telling about our situation in the Yemen for years. We are capable of performing our duty in the Yemen and at the same time performing our national duty here in Egypt, both in defending our frontiers and attacking, if Israel attacks any Arab country.

On 13 May we received definite information to the effect that Israel was concentrating huge armed forces of about 11 to 13 brigades on the Syrian frontier, and that these forces were divided into two fronts, one to the south and one to the north of Lake Tiberias. We also learned that the Israeli decision taken at this time was to carry out an attack on Syria starting on 17 May. On 14 May we took action, and discussed the matter and contacted our Syrians brothers. The Syrians also had this information. In the light of this, General Fawzi went to Syria to coordinate things. We told them that we had decided that if Syria was attacked we should enter the battle immediately. This was the situation on 14 May; forces started to move towards Sinai to take up their natural positions.

News agencies reported yesterday that these movements must have been the result of a previously well thought-out plan. I say that it was the course of events that determined the plan. We had no plan before 13 May, because we did not believe that Israel would dare to make such an impertinent statement, or to take action against any Arab country.

Then on 16 May we requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, in a letter from General Fawzi. We then requested the complete withdrawal of the Emergency Force. This was the signal for the launching of a major world-wide campaign, led by America, Britain and Canada, opposing the withdrawal of the Emergency Force from Egypt. We understood that attempts were being made to turn the United Nations Emergency Force into a force serving neo-imperialism. It is perfectly clear that when these forces entered Egypt it was with our approval, and that therefore they could only stay in Egypt with our continued approval.

Until yesterday there was a great deal of talk about the Emergency Force. There is also

a campaign against the Secretary-General of the United Nations because he made an honest and sincere decision and did not submit to the pressure exerted on him by America, Britain and Canada to make the Emergency Force an instrument for the implementation of the plans of imperialism.

Quite naturally, and I say this today quite frankly, if the Emergency Force had been turned aside from its proper task and worked for the aims of imperialism, we should have regarded it as a hostile force and forcibly disarmed it. We are certainly capable of doing that. I say this now not to disparage the Emergency Force, but to let those that have neo-imperialist ideas and who want the United Nations to achieve their imperialist aims know that there is not a single self-respecting country, or one that enjoys full independence that could possibly accept these methods. At the same time I say that the Emergency Force has performed its duties honourably and faithfully, and that the Secretary-General has refused to submit to pressure, issuing immediate orders for the Emergency Force to withdraw. We therefore praise the Emergency Force, which has stayed for ten years in our country in the service of peace. When it found that the forces of neo-imperialism wanted to divert it from its proper task it refused to do so. We salute it as it leaves our country and bid it an honourable farewell.

Our forces are now in Sinai, and we are fully mobilised both in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai. We notice that there is a great deal of talk about peace these days. Peace, peace, international peace, international security, United Nations intervention, and so on, is appearing daily in the press. But why did no one talk about peace, the United Nations or security when, on 12 May, the Israeli Prime Minister and the Israeli leaders made their statements that they would occupy Damascus, overthrow the Syrian regime, strike vigorously at Syria and occupy part of Syrian territory? It is clear that they approved of what was said by the Israeli Prime Minister and leaders.

There is talk about peace now. What sort of peace? They talk about peace, but of course we say that we too are working for peace. But does peace mean that we should ignore the rights of the people of Palestine because a long time has passed? Does peace mean that we should relin-

quish our own rights because a long time has passed? Nowadays they talk about a United Nations presence in the area for the sake of peace, but does a United Nations presence in the area for the sake of peace mean that it closes its eyes to everything? The United Nations has adopted many resolutions in favour of the people of Palestine. Israel has not implemented a single one of these resolutions. Of course, that did not give rise to a hue and cry in the United States; in fact, no one ever talked about that.

But today American Senators, members of Congress, the press, and every last man there, is speaking in favour of Israel, of the Jews. But nobody is concerned over what happens to the Arabs. The United Nations resolutions in favour of the Arabs have not been implemented. What does this mean? No one talks at all. Where is the United Nations, that the people of Palestine might turn to it? Just how concerned is it with respect to the rights of the people of Palestine, to the tragedies that have befallen them since 1948? There is always talk of peace when Israel is in danger. But when the rights of the Arabs and of the people of Palestine are lost, no one talks about peace, rights, or anything of the kind.

So it is clear that there is an alliance between the major Western powers, represented by America and Britain, and Israel, a political alliance which prompts the Western powers to provide Israel with military equipment.

Yesterday and the day before yesterday the whole world was talking about Sharm ash-Shaykh, navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Port of Eilat. This morning I heard the BBC saying that Abd an-Nasir had undertaken to open the Gulf of Aqaba in 1956. Of course, this is not true; it was taken from a newspaper called the *Daily Mail*; such a thing never happened. Abd an-Nasir could never give away a grain of sand of the soil of our country.

You have now taken a responsibility upon yourselves. Yesterday the armed forces occupied Sharm ash-Shaykh. What does this mean? It is an affirmation of our rights, of our sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba, which constitutes Egyptian territorial waters. Under no circumstances can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jews threaten war. We say they are welcome to war, we are ready for

war, our armed forces, our people, all of us are ready for war, but under no circumstances shall we abandon any of our rights. These are our waters. Perhaps war will be an opportunity for the Jews, for Israel, for Rabin, to try out their forces against ours, and find out that all they wrote about the battle of 1956 and the occupation of Sinai was a lot of nonsense.

Of course, there is imperialism, Israel and reaction. Reaction in our countries casts doubt on everything, and so does the Islamic alliance. We all know that the Islamic alliance is now mainly represented by three states: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran. They say that the object of the Islamic alliance is to unite the Muslims against Israel. But I should like the Islamic alliance to serve the cause of Palestine in one way only—by preventing Israel being supplied with oil. The oil that now reaches Israel, that reaches Eilat, comes from one of the Islamic alliance countries. It comes from Iran to Eilat. Who, then, is supplying Israel with oil today? It is the Islamic alliance, one of the members of the Islamic alliance, Iran. This is what the Islamic alliance really is, an imperialist alliance, and it is therefore on the side of Zionism, because Zionism is the main ally of imperialism.

The Arab world, which is now mobilised to the highest degree, knows all this. It knows how to deal with the agents of imperialism, with the allies of Zionism, with the fifth column.

They say they want to coordinate their plans with ours. We can never coordinate our plans with members of the Islamic alliance, because if we did we should be giving our plans to the Jews, to Israel. Today we are engaged in a vitally important battle. When we said that we were ready to enter the battle, we meant that we should really do so if Syria, or any other Arab country, was attacked.

Today the armed forces are everywhere. The army is mobilised; so are all the armed forces and the people. The people are all behind you, praying for you day and night, and feeling that you, their sons, are the pride of their nation, of the Arab nation. This is what the Arab people in Egypt and outside Egypt feel about you. We are confident that you will honour the trust. Every one of us is ready to die rather than allow a grain of his country's soil to be surrendered. This is

the greatest honour for us; it is the greatest honour for us to defend our country. So we shall not be frightened by imperialist, Zionist or reactionary campaigns. We have won our independence and tasted freedom. We have built a strong national army and achieved our aims, and we are building our country. There is at present a propaganda campaign against us, a psychological campaign, a campaign to implant doubts, but we can leave all that behind and follow the course of duty, the course of victory. God be with you.

319

News Conference Statements by King Faysal of Saudi Arabia During His Visit to Britain, 8-29 May.¹

London, May 23, 1967

Q. What is Saudi Arabia's attitude to the present confrontation between Syria and the United Arab Republic on the one hand and Israel on the other?

A. Obviously, Saudi Arabia has always been in the lead of the Arab countries in confronting the Israeli peril. We believe that an Arab who is remiss in his support for his brother Arabs in the struggle with Israel does not deserve to be called an Arab. It may appear to some people that there are differences between the Arab countries, but it must be remembered that differences between brothers do not prevent their cooperating against their common enemy. Saudi Arabia supports the stand of the other Arab countries against Israel and her aggressions against the Arab countries, and we have ordered the government to alert all the armed forces so that they may rise to their responsibilities and fight Israel. In our opinion, all the disturbances in the area have come about since the illegal creation of Israel.

Q. What will be the attitude of your government if hostilities are renewed between Israel and Syria and Egypt?

¹ Saudi Embassy Press Release, Beirut, 24/5/1967. King Faysal paid a state visit to Britain from 8 to 17 May, after which he stayed on in Britain in his private capacity until 29 May.

A. I think that I have already answered this in my answer to your first question, so that I need not repeat it.

Q. What view does your Majesty take of the events that have taken place in the Middle East since the withdrawal of the U.N. Forces?

A. Does the questioner mean our attitude to these events? If so I have already answered him.

Q. The question means the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Sinai.

A. We support the withdrawal of U.N. forces from there.

320

Statement Issued by the National Command of the Syrian Ba'th Party on the "Battle of Destiny."²

Damascus, May 23, 1967

Arab masses;

This morning the National Command of the Ba'th Party held a joint meeting with the Syrian Regional Command, and studied the latest developments in the battle of destiny which the Arab people are fighting against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, and took all necessary decisions so as to be prepared for all contingencies.

The Command addresses the following statement to the toiling Arab masses and their progressive forces:

The struggle between the toiling Arab masses and their progressive and revolutionary forces on the one hand, and imperialism, Zionism and reaction on the other is inevitable. This is today being clearly demonstrated through the swelling of the revolutionary tide of the masses of the Arab nation and the coherence of the pioneer revolutionary forces on the field of battle. It is also being made evident through the frustration of all imperialist and reactionary conspiracies against Arab revolutionary regimes and the growing threat these regimes constitute to imperialism's oil

² *Al-Ba'th*, 24/5/1967.

interests, its Zionist bases and reactionary façades in the Arab homeland. All this means that the battle has now reached the stage of head-on collision between the Arab people and "Israel" the principal tool of imperialism in the area and the guardian of its interests and monopolies.

The Arab masses have taken note of "Israel's" latest challenge, which took the form of impudent and provocative threats to the Syrian Region and its revolutionary regime, the massive concentration of troops on the Syrian frontier, and boasts of protection by the American Sixth Fleet and by the reactionary regimes in Amman and Riyadh. World public opinion, too, is aware of "Israel's" impudent and provocative threats. In view of this the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic have hastened to shoulder their historic responsibilities to the Arab nation and to resist all Zionist and imperialist threats. To this end they have mobilised all their military and popular resources to fight the battle of the liberation of Arab territory from all forms of Zionist and imperialist occupation.

It was inevitable that this revolutionary confrontation, around which the masses of the Arab people have rallied in support, should assume its full dimensions once the United Arab Republic had taken its historic decision to demand the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and recover its legitimate right to control the Gulf of Aqaba and close it to Israeli navigation. This conclusive and revolutionary decision has revealed the true scope of the battle and established that the Arab nation is both worthy and capable of controlling its own destiny and smashing all the intrigues of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

We hereby declare, on behalf of the Party's Commands, its bases and toiling masses in all Regions of the Arab homeland, our absolute support for this courageous revolutionary attitude and for the right of the United Arab Republic to full control of the Gulf of Aqaba, as being Arab territorial waters. We offer all the resources of the Revolution in the Syrian Region for the support and protection of this right and for the frustration of all attempts to impair it or intrigue against it.

Arab masses;

The Ba'th Party is aware of the gravity of

the stage the Arab people are now passing through and which will have such a decisive effect on their destiny, and is keeping track of all developments liable to arise from Israel's aggressive preparations and imperialist support for them. It therefore calls on the Arab people in all Arab Regions to muster all their resources and efforts to fight the battle of destiny with imperialism, Zionism and reaction until victory is won.

The Ba'th Party warns the imperialists who dream of imposing by threats of war specific solutions of the Palestine problem and other Arab problems, whether in South Yemen or anywhere else in the Arab homeland, that their dreams will never come true, and that the struggling Arab masses will strangle at birth all attempts of this kind.

The Ba'th Party affirms the right of the Palestinian Arab people to fight for the liberation of their homeland and the recovery of their territory by all available means. It rejects any control by other parties over the exercise of this legitimate right, which is guaranteed by the principles of the United Nations and all human laws.

Comrades in the struggle throughout the great Arab homeland; Today it is your duty to shoulder your responsibilities in the struggle and to unite sincerely with all progressive forces and the toiling masses in fighting the battle for unity, freedom and socialism.

The Ba'th Party calls on all progressives and popular organisations in the Arab homeland to order their ranks and pool their resources for the elimination of all pockets of reaction and imperialism. It calls on them to destroy imperialism's bases, oil monopolies, and lines of communications and supply, and to liquidate all who foster doubt, spies, spokesmen of the criminal imperialist war of nerves and members of the fifth column, wherever they may be.

321

Statement by Lebanese Premier Karami Before the Chamber of Deputies.¹ [Excerpts]**Beirut, May 23, 1967**

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With this end in view the government has very seriously studied the situation and taken all necessary measures it demands, for Lebanon is aware that Israel is as great a danger to Lebanon herself as to the other Arab countries. Lebanon feels that it is her sacred duty to the Arab homeland to define her attitude and state it clearly and with all frankness. . . . There are two aspects to our attitude, the Lebanese and the Arab, and they are inseparable.

As regards Lebanon, the government has studied the situation in conjunction with the army, in which we have the fullest confidence and on which we depend for the defence of our frontiers. According to plan, the army has taken all necessary military measures on the frontier and made all preparations to be on the alert. For we all know that no one can be sure of what may happen under such circumstances, especially as Israel is built on fraud and deception.

In addition to military measures, we must make plans for the mobilisation of the people, for we know and believe in this people, which does not waver in the face of sacrifice. Therefore, in our study of the situation, we have emphasised these two points: an army in readiness and a people prepared for the day which we hope will witness the decisive victory of truth over falsehood.

At the Arab level, we are well aware of our duty, for the present situation means that the cause is a common one, and demands that we should cooperate and coordinate our plans with the other Arab countries. The government has lost no time in establishing contact with all quarters concerned with a view to coordinating our plans and efforts, for we know that only through cooperation can we hope to realise our aims.

The government appreciates the gravity of the situation and the weight of its responsibilities. It also appreciates the attitude of this Cham-

ber and its readiness to play its part in deciding what measures must be taken and in providing all support required by the present situation. For it is from this Chamber, with which we cooperate on an equal footing, that we derive our support and strength, for it represents the will of the people. Therefore, with God's will and your support, we shall follow our appointed course towards our great aims. For none of us can accept that Palestine, the birthplace of Christ and the source of the noble message of peace, should remain the victim of aggression. We have no choice as we confront the dangers, and all of us know the importance of the duties we are called on to perform. We are ready to accept all suggestions likely to lead to the adoption of a united stand and the mobilisation of efforts on behalf of our sacred cause, and of the protection of the honour of Lebanon and the sovereignty of her people.

322

Resolution Adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies Authorising the Government To Take All Necessary Military Measures.²**Beirut, May 23, 1967**

The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies,

Having heard the government's statements on the situation that has arisen on the frontiers of Syria and the United Arab Republic as a result of the threats of aggression voiced by the enemy, who has usurped the occupied territory of Arab Palestine;

And having approved the preliminary measures taken by the Lebanese government to meet the requirements of the present situation, believing in the justice of the Palestinian cause, and in performance of its sacred national duty;

And on the assumption that today's battle with the common enemy is a battle for the destiny of the Arab countries, and first and foremost Lebanon;

1. Calls on the government to mobilise all

¹ *Al-Muharrir*, Beirut, 24/5/1967.

² *Ibid.*

governmental and popular resources to enable the Lebanese army to play its role fully and effectively in accordance with the dictates of national duty and of Lebanon's belief in the justice of the cause of Palestine.

2. Supports unconditionally the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic in their stand against the common enemy, declaring its resolution to perform its duty which is to fight the enemy with all its strength and resources. It also supports all other Arab countries which may be subjected to aggression.

3. Reaffirms that the presence of this enemy on the territory of Palestine, in addition to being a flagrant aggression against the Palestinian people and an usurpation that must be terminated, is a permanent threat to security in the area and to world peace.

4. Charges the government to take all military measures necessary to ensure a strong and coherent Arab front against any aggression, as the circumstances of war may demand.

In this the Chamber of Deputies is expressing the opinion of the Lebanese people, who support their army and stand resolutely behind it, prepared, like it, to make every effort and sacrifice to defend the homeland and to ensure the triumph of right in the land of Palestine.

323

Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah in Support of the U.A.R.¹

Amman, May 24, 1967

The Jordanian government fully supports the stand taken by the United Arab Republic in reasserting its sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba and the prohibition of Israeli navigation therein. The Jordanian government regards this as the natural exercise of the national rights of the United Arab Republic and the Arab nation.

The Jordanian government has mobilised all its resources and all its strength to confront the situation and support Arab rights and sover-

eignty. It has also instructed our delegate to the United Nations to cooperate fully with all the other Arab countries in defending this Arab stand in the debates of the United Nations. It wishes to assert that the question of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba is not an isolated problem, but part of the problem of the Israeli threat to the safety of the whole Arab nation.

324

Statement by an Official Syrian Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Views Expressed to All Heads of Diplomatic Missions.²

Damascus, May 25, 1967

On 23, 24 and 25 May, 1967, the Foreign Ministry summoned the heads of all foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Damascus in connection with the situation that has arisen as a result of Zionist and imperialist threats, and explained to them the following points:

1. Full responsibility for the present tension in the area, which is causing world public opinion such concern, must be laid at the door of Israel. For, since her creation in 1948, Israel has been an imperialist base in the area, a threat to peace and security and an obstacle to the development and growth of the Arab people. The history of Israeli aggression is only too clear; it reached its climax in the Tripartite Aggression in particular, and in the repeated acts of treacherous aggression against Syria in the course of the last year. These included attacks on civilian projects in the front-line area and on children and old people with napalm bombs. Another example was the aggression organised on 7 April, not to mention thousands of other aggressive acts, and the wrongful occupation of the Demilitarised Zone. All these acts of aggression have gone unpunished by international organisations, and in the majority of cases the United States and the great imperialist powers have refused to allow the Security Council to condemn them. Moreover, the encouragement and protection provided by these powers have induced Israel to make impudent statements

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, Amman, 25/5/1967.

² *Al-Ba'th*, 26/5/1967.

against the Syrian region during the last two weeks, threatening to occupy Damascus and overthrow the revolutionary regime. In this Israel has depended on the protection of the American Sixth Fleet, as Eshkol himself has confirmed—an event unprecedented in history. all these facts make it impossible that world public opinion should have any doubt that the present tension in the area and the threat to peace are entirely the responsibility of the Israeli gangsters and the imperialist forces that support them. It is to this that the Foreign Ministry wishes to draw the attention of the Diplomatic Corps, as it has done in the past on the occasion of Israeli aggressions or provocations.

2. The full popular and military mobilisation that has been carried out in both the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic, in conformity with the Joint Defence Agreement, and to meet the obligations of the common national destiny of the two countries, was quite inevitable. Only thus was it possible to meet the requirements of defence if we were to confront the threat of aggression represented by Israel's massive troop concentrations on the frontier of the Syrian region, which would never have occurred but for the encouragement of world imperialism. This popular mobilisation in the two Regions, which has been enthusiastically supported by the masses throughout the Arab world, along with their progressive governments and popular organisations, was the result of the resolute determination of the Arab people to resist and crush aggression whenever Israel tries to attack any Arab country. These defensive measures are a legitimate right that is guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations and international law and practised by all self-respecting countries to protect their peoples from danger.

3. In requesting the withdrawal of the United Nations forces, with which request the Secretary-General of the United Nations has so wisely concurred, the United Arab Republic was indisputably exercising an absolute and natural sovereign right. The Foreign Ministry calls attention to the shameless manoeuvres of imperialist circles in their attempt to exploit the United Nations flag and once more impose an international police force. This would be regarded as an act of occupation, and resisted with force.

4. The recovery by the United Arab Republic of the exercise of its legitimate right to full sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba and to prohibit Israeli navigation therein is a legal and natural act. Moreover, it is nothing new, and calls for no specific new measures, as Israel and the imperialist circles that protect her are trying to suggest. Although the criminal Tripartite Aggression resulted in freedom for Israeli navigation in the Gulf as a *fait accompli* based on the presence of the international police, absolutely no resolution has been issued, either by international organisations or any other bodies, affirming Israel's right to such navigation and, consequently, restricting the absolute right of the United Arab Republic to control the Gulf as constituting Arab territorial waters. What has happened now is a return to the situation that existed before 1956, whereby the last consequences of the Tripartite Aggression, which was condemned by the United Nations, have been wiped out. Therefore, the international clamour that Israel and the imperialist countries are trying to stir up over the measures taken by the United Arab Republic with regard to the Gulf is entirely unjustified, and should be received with nothing but ridicule by enlightened world opinion and by all countries in the world that love freedom and peace.

The Syrian Arab Republic warns against the efforts that are now being made to exploit international organisations to impose freedom of navigation for Israel and to regard the Gulf as an international waterway. Such attempts have been expressed in statements by American and British authorities in particular. Syria frankly declares her intention of supporting with all her strength the United Arab Republic in its resistance, including armed resistance, to any attempt by Israel to impose freedom of navigation for her by force.

5. The repeated attempts to make the Syrian Region or other Arab Regions responsible for the Palestinian struggle with the object of justifying aggression and threats of invasion, are once and for all rejected. For the Palestinian people were an independently existing entity before the Israeli occupation of 1948, when part of their territory was occupied by the Israeli gangsters, while the remainder was handed over to the subservient royalist regime in Jordan as a reward for its trea-

chery to the cause of Palestine. This people is facing slow death in tents, dispersion, imprisonment, and killing in the dungeons of the Jordanian intelligence services, which are in the service of imperialism. For 19 years it has awaited the awakening of the conscience of the world and the enforcement of the many resolutions passed in its favour by international organisations. But it has met with nothing but neglect and attempts to disintegrate it. It has every right to fight by all available means for its right of self-determination and the liberation of its homeland, a right guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and enshrined in the principles of the United Nations. Thus responsibility for the legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people cannot, from a legal or international point of view, be laid at the door of any other Region. Nor will the Palestinian people accept that any other party whatsoever should be responsible for its actions. It is therefore the duty of all peace-loving countries which believe in freedom and human dignity to support the just struggle of this people to recover its usurped rights, like other struggling peoples in the world. It should be remembered, moreover, that the Palestinian people still regards itself as being in a state of war with the enemy who is in occupation of its territory; it is not party to the Armistice Agreements, and cannot be called to account on this basis.

6. The attempts by the United States and Britain to impose their tutelage on the area and on the struggle of peoples through the so-called statement of President Kennedy on the Middle East situation, or the statements of Johnson or Wilson, are rejected as a whole and in detail, in form and in substance. For no country in the world that has been subjected to aggression and occupation can be expected to accept control over its legitimate and heroic struggle to resist aggression and terminate occupation. Nor can either the conscience of the world or truly objective reasoning accept a comparison or equating between the Arab people, who are the victims of aggression in most parts of their homeland, and their aggressors, who practise direct occupation and constant monopolistic plundering.

7. The reliance of the imperialist countries and Israel on the time factor to liquidate the Palestine problem through cooperation with the

traitor reactionary regimes in the Arab homeland can have no hope of success. The present situation, and the alertness of the Arab nation from the Ocean to the Gulf and its absolute readiness to fight the battle of destiny, prove that the cause of Palestine is still the most important and sacred cause of the Arabs, and that it is still an open wound in the conscience of every Arab. It is the duty of all peace-loving countries in the world to review this important problem, for, until it is solved in a right and just manner, there can be no peace. It is also the duty of these countries to re-define their attitude to the aggressive imperialist base called Israel. For it has now been clearly demonstrated to all the peoples of the world, through the bitter experience of Israel's existence, that she is nothing more nor less than an advanced garrison to protect imperialist interests in the area and a bridgehead for the penetration of neo-imperialism into the countries of Asia and Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic therefore calls on all countries to make a radical reappraisal of the existence of Israel. The creation of Israel in 1948 did, indeed, deceive certain peace-loving countries. This was because the majority of the Regions of the Arab homeland were at that time groaning under the yoke of direct foreign occupation, because the small part of the Arab world that had recently become independent was dominated by a subservient bourgeoisie, and because appalling pressures were exerted by the United States to impose this artificial entity. But the liberation of the Arab homeland, the awakening of the toiling masses and the control of the government by progressive and revolutionary forces in a large number of Arab regions have disclosed to world opinion the truth about the imperialist Israeli presence. It is now clear to all that world imperialism is trying to exploit this presence to maintain fragmentation and backwardness and to protect the corrupt reactionary regimes in certain Arab countries. A further object is to retain the oil monopolies and continue the voracious plundering of the territory of the great Arab homeland. Moreover, the independence of a large number of struggling peoples in the three continents, and the increased influence of socialist and progressive forces on international politics, have brought about a favourable situation for a reappraisal of what the Arab people are suffering at the hands of Israel and world imperialism,

which supplies Israel with strength, arms and protection.

The time has come for the world to think profoundly and seriously, on a basis of principles and morality, of this problem which is unique of its kind in the whole of history. The time has come for those who have been deceived by the huge world Zionist organisations, and the imperialist monopolies and trusts linked to them, to see the truth.

The Arab people in their great homeland are fighting the battle of truth and justice, and all they ask of their friends in the world is that they, too, should be on the side of truth and justice.

325

Cable from Tunisian Foreign Secretary Burghiba Jr. to Arab League Secretary-General Hassunah.¹

Tunis, May 25, 1967

To His Excellency the Secretary General of the Arab League;

I have the honour to inform you that His Excellency the President of the Republic is following with the greatest concern the unfolding of events in the Arab East.

His Excellency has asked me to assure you once more of Tunisia's devotion to the cause of the people of Palestine and her support for their struggle for the liberation of their occupied homeland and the recovery of their usurped rights. His Excellency has already expressed this attitude very clearly at various Arab, African and international gatherings.

As regards the present situation, may I remind you that the Tunisian Republic still regards itself as committed to the undertakings it entered into at the First and Second Summit Conferences and at the First Conference of Heads of Arab Governments, as regards the cause of Palestine and the possibility of Israeli aggression against any Arab country. This attitude I have already stated to you in an official document dated May 22, 1965.

¹ *Al-'Amal*, 26/5/1967.

326

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir to a Delegation of the Damascus Arab Workers Conference.² [Excerpt]

Cairo, May 26, 1967

We have at last felt that we are strong enough, and that in any battle with Israel we shall, with God's help, be victorious. We have therefore decided to take definite action.

As for what has been said in the last few years, there used to be a United Nations Emergency Force in our territory and many people have reproached us for this. But if we were not fully prepared, was it not better that we should say nothing, and continue building up and training our army, with the United Nations Emergency Force still there, until we had built up our army and prepared ourselves. For one day we should certainly be prepared. I once said that we could get rid of the Emergency Force in a half-hour, that as soon as we were prepared we could get rid of the Emergency Force in a half-hour, and this is what has now happened.

We have also been attacked by certain Arab quarters in connection with Sharm ash-Shaykh. But we could do nothing else; if we had it would have meant a real confrontation with Israel. I mean that to take this step we had to be prepared to fight a full-scale war with Israel. Sharm ash-Shaykh could not be treated in isolation. We had to work on the assumption that one day we should be ready, and that then we should go to Sharm ash-Shaykh and establish our rights. It was on this basis that these operations have been carried out. In fact, I was charged by the Higher Executive Committee to do this when a favourable opportunity arose, and such a favourable opportunity came with the threats of aggression against Syria.

We carried out reconnaissance operations, sending our planes inside Israeli territory, and did not spot a single brigade on our frontier—they were all ranged against Syria. Today they are all ranged against Egypt, with the exception of four

² *Al-Ahram*, 27/5/1967. This delegation went to Cairo to meet President Nasir and inform him of the resolutions of the Arab Workers Conference held in Damascus on 22-24 May.

Israeli brigades which are ranged against Syria. But we are confident that, with God's help, if we go to war we can win.

As regards our military plans, there is full coordination for military action between us and Syria, so that our two armies will fight as one in a single battle for a single aim—the aim of the Arab nation.

The problem today is not only Israel, but those who are behind Israel. If Israel starts any aggressive action against Syria and Egypt, the fight against Israel will be total war. It will not be an engagement restricted to a particular area on the frontiers of Syria or the frontiers of Egypt. It will be total war with the basic object of destroying Israel, which we can do.

I should perhaps not have been able to talk like this five years ago, or even three years ago. If I had been unprepared and talked like this, what I said would have been meaningless.

Today, eleven years after 1956, I do speak like this because I am confident and know what we have here in Egypt and what they have in Syria. And I also know what the other countries are doing—Iraq has sent forces into Syria; Algeria will send us forces, and so will Kuwait; they will send us armoured and infantry forces. These are Arab forces, and their being sent is a real sign of the revival of the Arab nation, which may be said to have been in despair some time ago.

Today it must be revealed to the Arab world, to the whole world, what Israel is. Today Israel is America. Today America is the chief advocate of Israel. What about Britain? I think that Britain talks because she is just America's follower; she has no independent policy, and Mr. Wilson does as Mr. Johnson says—he follows behind him and says what Johnson wants him to say.

All the Western powers have adopted Israel's point of view. The Gulf of Aqaba was closed before 1956, and we used to search British, American and French ships. All ships were searched. After the Tripartite Aggression—we all know about the conspiracy of the Tripartite Aggression—the United Nations Emergency Force came, and we let them come to the area because they had come in accordance with a United Nations resolution to supervise the withdrawal of Britain, France and Israel. The Jews say that they opened

the Gulf to navigation; I say that they believe their own lies, for we withdrew because the British and French attacked us; it was never a straight fight between us and Israel.

In the last few days I have been with the armed forces; they are all waiting for the battle of direct confrontation between the Arabs and Israel, without any outside interference.

So we come to the question: Who is behind Israel? This is something we must know; we must learn this very important lesson today. We must realise the hypocrisy of America, and that when she says that she is with the Arabs she is adopting the point of view of Israel one-hundred-per-cent, and is one-hundred-per-cent aligned with Israel; Britain also is one-hundred-per-cent aligned with Israel; the whole of the West is with Israel.

Because of General de Gaulle's personal views, France has not aligned herself. She has not followed the American line nor the British line; she has not aligned herself with Israel.

The attitude of the U.S.S.R. has also been a splendid one; she has supported the Arabs and the Arab nation, and even said that she will resist, with the Arabs and the Arab nation, any interference and any aggression.

Today every Arab must know who is his enemy and who his friend. If we do not recognise our enemies as enemies and treat our friends as friends, Israel will always be able to turn our conduct to advantage.

Clearly America is the enemy of the Arabs, for she is completely aligned with Israel, and the same applies to Britain.

This is how we must treat our enemies, or those who take sides with our enemies—on the assumption that they really are our enemies, and we can treat them like this because we are not countries with no weight, worthless countries. On the contrary, we are countries of importance, located in an important part of the world, with a civilisation that is thousands of years old, with 7,000 years of history. We can do a lot; we can disclose the hypocrisy of our enemies when they try to talk to us under the pretence that they are concerned for our interests. America is only interested in the interests of Israel, and so is Britain; international law does not come into it.

Why all this fuss over the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba? When Eshkol and Rabin threatened Syria, no one spoke of peace or the threat to peace, for in fact they hate the progressive regime in Syria. America doesn't like it, nor does Britain, nor does Arab reaction, which is the friend of America and Britain. And of course the same applies to Israel, the ally of America and Britain.

When Israel threatens Syria they say nothing. But when we exercise a legitimate right, which we used to exercise in the past, the world is turned upside down and they say that peace is threatened and talk about a crisis in the Middle East and threaten us with war.

We shall not relinquish our rights in the Gulf of Aqaba. Today we are ready, and the Egyptian and Syrian armies form a single front. And we hope that all the fronts around Israel will be united to form a single front.

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327

Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the American Attitude to the Crisis.¹

Amman, May 27, 1967

In present circumstances, when the whole Arab nation is mobilising all its forces to protect Arab rights in a decisive confrontation of the Zionist peril, the United States has adopted an attitude which, if it is maintained, bodes much ill for the future of American relations with the Arab world.

Arab rights in Palestine are clear and unambiguous; there is no question but that the Arabs are right and Israel is wrong.

The Arabs, in whatever Arab country they live, call on America in this critical situation not to adopt an attitude of support for baseless Israeli claims and of hostility to the whole Arab nation.

The Arab countries, united in their support for the cause of Palestine, will never forgive such an attitude of support for Israel on the part of the United States or of any other country.

¹ *Al-Quds*, 28/5/1967.

Any country which supports the falsehood of Zionism today is falling into the trap set for it by Israel, and is playing its part in sparking off the explosive situation in the area, with consequences impossible to foresee. Such a country is also supporting Israel in the aggressive designs for which she has planned with such precision and which she is about to implement after a long series of constant provocations and aggressions. It is to be hoped that this fact will be grasped by all leaders and men in responsible positions throughout the world.

328

News Conference Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir to the Arab and World Press on the Crisis.²

Cairo, May 28, 1967

I am happy to meet today with the representatives of the Arab and world press who are engaged in such diligent efforts to follow the important events that are of such deep concern to us all.

As you all know, the press does not only follow events; it also, to a certain extent, plays a part in shaping them. The part it plays is of considerable importance, for if the facts relative to a certain incident are important, the form in which the press presents them to the public is no less important.

In other words, the subject matter is one thing and the form in which the subject matter appears or is presented is another.

I have decided that it is my duty to place before you a picture of the truth as we see it. This is part of the responsibility that we bear, especially in a situation like the present one, which may well mean either peace or war for the whole Arab nation, not to mention the consequences to which it may lead and the reaction which it may give rise to even outside the Arab world.

I also believe it to be your right—for all of

² *Al-Ahram*, 29/5/1967.

you here are engaged in a task which may be said to be sacred inasmuch as it is connected with the freedom of news coverage, and is certainly extremely important from the point of view of influencing world appreciation of problems—that I should meet with you and speak to you myself about the things you want to ask me.

Let me tell you frankly that we have nothing to ask of you or to conceal from you.

We want to tell you the truth and give you all the details you want to know about events as we see them.

This, as I have already said, is our duty, especially in a situation where it is a case of war or peace.

The rest is no concern of ours, and can be left to your professional conscience and your sense of responsibility to the masses whom you serve in all the countries of the world.

If I am to add anything to this introduction before proceeding to answer your questions, it is that I should like to draw your attention to one important point.

The problem we are all facing at present, and which is of concern to politicians, journalists and the masses alike, is not the problem of the Straits of Tiran, or of the withdrawal of the Emergency Force. These are all contingent aspects of a much greater and more important problem, the problem of the aggression which has been perpetrated and is still being perpetrated upon the soil of a certain part of the Arab homeland—Palestine—and the consequent threat involved therein to all our countries.

This is the basic problem.

Those who imagine that the problems involving the destiny of peoples can wither away and die with the passage of time are making a great mistake. Individuals may grow old and forget, but peoples are a living entity that perpetually renews itself and is eternally young.

This is especially the case in that we are not concerned with an aggression that once took place and has run its course, but an aggression that, having taken place, is continuing and actually growing and expanding in scope. In fact, the enemy wants to expand the scope of his aggression so as to expand his sphere of domination.

We absolutely refuse to restrict the problem to the Straits of Tiran or the withdrawal of the Emergency Force, both of which, in our opinion, are questions about which there can be no argument whatsoever. The Straits of Tiran are Egyptian territorial waters, where we have enforced Egyptian sovereign rights. And no power, however mighty—I say this plainly so that all parties may know where they stand—can impair or get round Egyptian sovereign rights. Any attempt of this kind will be an aggression against the Egyptian people and the whole Arab nation, and will do the aggressors greater harm than they can possibly conceive.

The withdrawal of the Emergency Force is the other matter about which there can be no argument. This force came to Egyptian territory under circumstances resulting from the tripartite conspiracy, the disgraceful collusion which shattered the moral reputation of all those involved. This collusion has now been disclosed in every detail, to convict those who engaged in conspiracy and collusion, and condemn them to that worst of fates—universal contempt.

The Emergency Force, as I said, came to Egyptian territory with our approval, and on condition that its staying here depended on our approval. We have now withdrawn our approval, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations has honestly, impartially and honourably acceded to our request. The question of the Emergency Force is closed; the matter is no longer open to discussion.

The conditions under which we requested the withdrawal of the Emergency Force are also well known to you all. There was a threat to Syria; there was a plan to invade her; certain measures had been decided upon; these measures were meant to be implemented; a specific time had been fixed for their implementation and authoritative voices were being raised in Israel frankly demanding an advance on Damascus.

We could not remain silent in the face of threats to Syria or any aggression against her. We could not accept this, whether it was Syria or any other Arab country that was involved.

So the armed forces of the United Arab Republic had to advance to positions from which they could effectively repel aggression. After that there was a series of natural developments,

which were surprising only to those who had made spurious and tendentious propaganda against the Arab nation, and then fallen into the trap they had set for others.

They lied and lied and went on lying, until they even believed themselves; it was for this reason only that the truth came as a shock to them.

We do not believe that any just man could interpret our conduct during the last two weeks as aggression or anything like aggression.

Our troops have gone to Sinai to repel aggression, and we have enforced our rights of sovereignty over the Straits of Tiran. Any infringement of these rights will in itself be an aggression. This brings us to the heart of the matter, its very core.

Israel was created by imperialism and the forces that desired to control the homeland of the Arab nation. It is not only we who say this, but others, too, who are today protecting Israeli aggression. They say, practically in so many words, on every possible occasion, that they created Israel and that they will bear the responsibility for her security. They handed over to Israel the greater part of the territory of Palestine, and since that first and greatest aggression they have been supporting the continuous aggression that has followed it.

Here we must ask ourselves a number of questions.

What did Israel do about the United Nations resolutions of 1947, 1948 and 1949? The answer: She treated them all with utter contempt.

What did Israel do about the Security Council resolutions imposing the armistice? The answer: She went on to occupy large areas of Palestinian territory after those resolutions had been adopted. The best example is the case of Eilat, which the Israelis built on the site of the Arab village of Umm ar-Rashraash. The armistice agreements had barely been signed in February 1949, when, in the following month, March, Israel occupied that position and thereby trampled underfoot all the Security Council resolutions and the armistice agreements, on which the ink was scarcely dry.

What has Israel done about the rights of the Arab refugees and the United Nations resolutions with respect to them? The answer: They are still dispersed outside their usurped homeland.

What has Israel done about the armistice commissions, whose members, in their mission, represented the United Nations? The answer: When Israel wanted to occupy the demilitarised area of al-Aujah in 1955, she did not hesitate to arrest the truce observers and drive them out of the area. This is not surprising, for Israeli aggression actually went so far as to assassinate the international mediator, Count Bernadotte, because it found that his report opposed its ambitions.

What did Israel do in 1956? What is the meaning of what Israel did in 1956? The answer: Israel played the role allotted to her as a tool of imperialism. That was a truly ignominious role, as is now clear as a result of the publication of all the secrets of the Suez incident. What is more, Israel claimed to have won a victory, and intended—this is certain—to annex a piece of Egyptian territory, Sinai. Indeed, Ben Gurion actually went ahead and announced its annexation.

Since Suez the record of aggression has been continuous, up to the latest threat to Syria, which sparked off the present crisis.

This is the heart of the matter, and it cannot be ignored or avoided.

This is the issue before the Arab nation, which is prepared to see the matter to the end, if such be the desire of Israeli aggression and of the United States, which has supplied it with political, economic and military support, and still continues to do so.

The heart of the matter is a question of war or peace; peace or war for the entire Arab nation, whatever attempts at aggression, and however great the forces of aggression.

Now I am ready to answer your questions.

Q. [Winston Burdett, of Columbia Broadcasting Corporation.] Mr. President, you said that "If Israel wants to threaten us with war, we are ready, and we say that she is welcome to it." Is this confidence of yours based on your reading of the political situation, or on your belief in the military superiority of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic?

A. In reply to this question we say that Israel has exceeded all bounds with her threats over all these years, the latest example being the Israeli Prime Minister's threat to attack Syria, threatening to go to war, a threat which is constantly

being made by Israel. On 12 May she went too far. It became the duty of every Arab to respond to that threat.

This is why I said that if Israel threatens to go to war—as she has done—she is welcome to go ahead.

Israel, in my opinion, has fallen a victim to the bogus victory of 1956. In 1956 we did not fight Israel; we fought Anglo-French aggression. We withdrew our forces from Sinai to confront Britain and France, yet we left a small force to block Israel's advance for one day, and during that one day Israel did not succeed in penetrating a single Egyptian position. But, in spite of this, I have read articles in the American press glorifying the army of Israel, the strength of Israel, and other such nonsense; we have read books about the 1956 campaign, even books of poetry.

But today we and Israel are alone, and if they want to try war, I tell them they are welcome.

Today is not like 1956, when we withdrew our forces from Sinai to confront Britain. In the Suez war, Israel was in collusion with Britain and France.

Today our army has once again returned to Sinai, to its natural positions. Today we are in 1967.

Naturally, in doing this we choose the place and the time to speak, the place and the time in which we say "Welcome."

The timing, in fact, has been decided by the Prime Minister of Israel, but we were ready for this timing.

So much for your first question. As regards military superiority, of course we think that our armed forces are capable of performing their duty honourably, forcefully and loyally.

Q. [Same questioner.] It has been widely reported that the United States has, through its ambassador in Cairo, warned the United Arab Republic that it will regard any interference with freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba as an aggressive act which it will oppose with all possible means. Is this report true?

A. Firstly, this report is not true. Secondly, the Gulf of Aqaba is Egyptian territory. The whole Gulf, which is less than three miles wide, lies between the coast of Sinai and the Island of Tiran, and the island of Tiran is Egyptian and

the coast of Sinai is Egyptian. If it is accepted that territorial waters stretch for three miles, then the whole Gulf is Egyptian territorial water; if six miles, it is Egyptian territorial water; and if twelve miles, it is still Egyptian territorial water. In fact, the passage through which shipping passes is less than one mile away from the Egyptian coast of Sinai.

It was on this basis that, in the past, before 1956, we did not allow Israeli shipping to use the Tiran Strait, and we never allowed it to use the Gulf of Aqaba. We used to search all ships that passed through the Strait, and had opened a customs post. We searched American ships; we searched British ships; we searched French ships; and all this went on until 1956.

Then, in 1956, there was the Suez War, and on 31 October orders were given for the evacuation of Sinai and the withdrawal from Sinai to confront the Anglo-French aggression. It was on this basis that we withdrew all our forces from Sinai. But our forces returned last week. They are there now. How, then, can we fail to resume the exercise of our rights? How can we overlook our own territorial waters, and not resume the exercise of our sovereignty over them?

We are back, and we shall once more exercise our rights, our sovereign rights over our territorial waters.

I think that what is being said is an act of aggression, and that passage in the Gulf of Aqaba through our territorial waters is an infringement of our sovereignty, and an act of aggression directed against us, an act of aggression which we shall resist with all our strength.

I also think that if the United States interferes with our sovereignty we shall resist such interference with all our strength.

Q. [Ali Ismat Khalifah, correspondent of the Kuwaiti Akhbar al-Kuwait and of Al-Yaman al-Jadid.] What are the possibilities of Arab oil being used as a weapon in the struggle, and how could it be so used? Have contacts been made with the Arab oil-producing countries on this matter?

A. The use of Arab oil as a weapon will be left to the oil-producing countries, and to the Arab peoples. The only contact that has been made was with the Foreign Minister of Kuwait. He contacted me on his arrival in Cairo and said

that if war broke out, Kuwait would stop oil production completely on her own initiative, by government order. There have been no other contacts. I believe that all weapons must be used in this struggle—used by the peoples concerned as well as their governments.

Q. [Eva Fournier, correspondent of the Paris France Soir.] In view of the fact that the great powers will not permit the destruction of Israel, what does Your Excellency regard to be a practical and final solution for the Middle East problem? That is to say, what sort of situation would you accept as a basis for co-existence with Israel?

A. We are in the right, and when it is a case of our rights, the great powers don't concern us. Let the great powers take all the decisions they want in their own countries; we are not under the control of either great or small powers. The rights of the people of Palestine must be restored. We accept no basis for co-existence with Israel.

The people of Palestine must recover their rights; what happened in 1948 was an aggression, an aggression against the people of Palestine. Israel drove the Palestinians out of their country and robbed them of their possessions. There are today a million Palestinians dispersed in many countries; their possessions have been stolen by Israel. Yet in spite of this we find America and certain other great powers—Britain, for example—saying that they are ready to protect Israel, and this week they have turned the world upside down just because we have restored the situation to what it was before 1956.

What about the rights of the Arabs? No one today talks about the rights of the Arabs. Before coming here I read a statement by the American Vice President, Mr. Humphrey, saying that Israel is a beacon, and flattering Israel in a most embarrassing manner. I don't understand. We Arabs must understand who are our enemies and who are our friends. Whoever stands by Israel shall be our enemy and whoever stands by us shall be our friend. We shall recover our rights.

We Arabs are an ancient people, we have an ancient civilisation—seven thousand years of civilisation. We know how to be patient and we don't easily forget; when a child is born his mother tells him what it is all about, so that he

knows who is his friend and who is his enemy. The Crusaders occupied our country for seventy years, but where are they now? They are gone, and today all that is left of them are crusader castles, just relics among other relics. No, no Arab is ever going to renounce the rights of the people of Palestine.

Q. [Stephen Harper, of the London Daily Express.] A personal question: You, as a man, went through a period of great pressure in the 1956 crisis, which closely resembled the present crisis. Do you find it any easier to bear the burdens of this crisis as a man who is eleven years older, or more difficult? And how do you relax from your problems?

A. As regards the *Daily Express*—speaking as a man, I read the *Daily Express* every day—it ruins my whole day when you fail to abuse me. You have been abusing me since 1956 and before 1956; as a man I accept it, I find excuses for you. As for my age, I don't think I've become feeble yet; I am not yet 50, and I'm not worn out like Mr. Eden, not by any means.

You ought to understand this. Also, please reassure them in Britain that I'm not yet 50 and I expect to be here for a long time—in this country, in this part of the world.

You attack me, you make up stories about me; full of lies, nothing but lies. I read what you have to say and so long as you are abusing me I feel reassured, for I know for certain that I must be on the right track. I'm used to you now, I've grown accustomed to your attacks and to your lies.

As a man, I have been reading the English papers for 15 years, and the *Daily Express* in particular—I like its cartoons, and I read its articles; they have not affected me as a man. I read them at night, but they have no effect; I still get up early these days, my health is still good, even in the middle of this crisis; in fact my health gets better in the middle of the crisis; I sleep well, and I think you can see that my health is good, and I can endure this struggle and other struggles as well. It is not at all more difficult than in 1956—we regard what is happening today as a continuation of what happened in 1956—we are putting things to rights, restoring them to normal.

Q. [Khayri al-Ka'ki, correspondent of the Beirut

ash-Sharq.] *Lebanon has responded unanimously to the steps taken by the United Arab Republic to confront Israel—the government, the Chamber of Deputies and the whole nation have been unanimous. Could Your Excellency tell ash-Sharq what impression this has made on the great Arab President?*

A. Of course Lebanon is our sister, and is with us in the struggle. We have the greatest esteem for Lebanon, the Lebanese people, the Lebanese President, the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. I have read what was said in the Chamber of Deputies—it was what the Arab nation has always expected from any Arab country. We are hand in hand with Lebanon in this struggle, and through this solidarity we shall be victorious, God willing.

Q. [Matthias Heft, correspondent of the West German DPA.] *Your Excellency, the recent political decisions taken by the government of the United Arab Republic, which have been implemented in the military field during the last week, and the similar measures that have been taken by Israel, have made it certain that the danger of a military conflict in the Middle East has increased even if these decisions are regarded as a reaction to Israeli threats to Syria. Is the policy of the United Arab Republic to take the final decision as regards the existence of Israel at the present time? If not, what does Your Excellency think should be done to keep peace in the area?*

A. We have taken these measures to restore the situation to normal, and we are now waiting to see what Israel will do.

If Israel provokes us, Syria, or any other Arab country, we are all of us ready to confront Israel. If Israel wants war, as I said before, she is welcome to war. What has happened up to now is that there has been a great uproar throughout the world, stirred up by America, which created Israel and protects Israel. America is trying to manufacture a crisis, to make things seem worse than they are. What has in fact happened is that the Emergency Force came to Egypt in 1956 as a result of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against us, and we have now told this force to leave—the Gulf of Aqaba was closed in 1956, and we have been preparing ourselves for a real confrontation with Israel ever since.

When Israel grew more and more boastful

and her threats to Arab countries mounted we decided that we must take the reins of the situation in hand. So we went back to the Gulf of Aqaba and restored the pre-1956 situation. So far, absolutely nothing has happened; we do not regard ourselves as aggressors. What we do know is that there was an aggression against us in 1956, and that we have now eliminated the consequences of that aggression.

America is creating an uproar, all the western powers are creating an uproar. Mr. Wilson is issuing statements and the Israelis are creating an uproar, and the western countries and their press are mostly taking the side of Israel. In view of this I say that all that has happened is that we have restored the situation to normal—we have recovered the gains achieved by Israel as a result of the 1956 aggression. If there is an aggression, as I said before, we shall not regard the aggression as restricted to any specific place—it will be all-out war between us and Israel.

Q. [Same questioner.] *Some countries think that the Gulf of Aqaba should be free to international navigation, basing their point of view on international agreements. What is the legal basis of the United Arab Republic's decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and to so-called strategic materials carried on non-Israeli ships? And what is the criterion for deciding whether or not materials are strategic?*

A. You say that some countries think that the Gulf of Aqaba should be free to international shipping, basing their point of view on international agreements. But I say that there are no international agreements. How can there be international agreements on our territorial waters? The Gulf of Aqaba, the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—the Tiran Straits—are Egyptian territorial waters; there is no international agreement that says that the Gulf of Aqaba is a waterway. Some people say the opposite, but I say that such people are aligned with Israel and protectors of Israel. You ask what is the legal basis of our decision to close the Gulf. This Gulf was closed until 1956, it was always closed to Israeli shipping up to the Suez War. And, as I told you before, all ships used to be searched, and were not allowed to carry strategic materials. Therefore, so far as our territorial waters are concerned, we base our argument on two points.

The first point is that the Armistice Agreement concluded between us and Israel in 1949 stipulates that neither party shall use the territorial waters of the other—we are not to use Israeli territorial waters, and Israel is not to use our territorial waters.

It was known at the time that the Gulf constituted Egyptian territorial waters. Thus Israel has no right to use Egyptian territorial waters, and if she does, and an Israeli ship is found in these waters, we shall confiscate it. It has happened before that we have confiscated Israeli ships that have entered Egyptian territorial waters.

The principle of strategic materials was also applied before 1956. There are Egyptian laws that give full details of what constitutes strategic materials. Naturally, I cannot at the moment recite the whole list of strategic materials and goods.

Q. [*Jan Dziedic, Polish Press Agency, Cairo.*] Do you think that, if war breaks out between Israel and the Arab countries, it might be restricted to the countries of this area?

A. Naturally, I can't foretell the future, but if war breaks out between Israel alone and us alone, I think that it will be restricted to this area.

Q. [*Donald McGillivray, correspondent of Southam Newspapers of Canada.*] Have you any comment to make on the role of Canada in the present Middle East crisis? And do you consider that Canada has adopted a hostile attitude to the United Arab Republic?

A. Naturally I have a comment to make on the role of Canada. We are all much depressed by the attitude of Canada, and that of the Prime Minister of Canada, who is a Nobel Peace Prize-winner. What he has done in the past week is quite different from any action on behalf of peace.

The first thing is that he has expressed doubts as to our right to call for the withdrawal of the Emergency Force, and insisted that it should remain in our country. That, in our view, would have been an act of aggression, a form of new imperialism, because the United Nations Emergency Force came to our country with our approval, and cannot stay when our approval is withdrawn.

This was the first hostile act, and showed

complete alignment with Israel and collusion with the United States of America.

Of course, in view of all that I have said about the Gulf of Aqaba, this constitutes an alignment with Israel on the part of Canada and her Prime Minister, and an act of hostility to the United Arab Republic and the Arabs in general. Mr. Pearson knows that the Gulf of Aqaba was closed before 1956. And now Mr. Pearson, who won the Nobel Peace Prize, emerges as Israel's attorney and as her apologist. Who made him do this? America, of course, the United States. This is why we are surprised by the attitude of Canada and the attitude of Mr. Pearson, and consider that Canada's attitude in the last ten days has been hostile to the Arabs and the United Arab Republic, and an attitude of close alignment with Israel—an attitude of collusion with the United States.

Q. [*Noel Hudson, correspondent of Reuter's.*] Mr. President, would you kindly tell us why Egypt chose this moment to request the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. I did not choose the timing; it was Mr. Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel, who did so.

Of course, we had it in mind, but we did not choose the time. As I said before, when Eshkol threatened to advance on Damascus and to occupy Syria, when Eshkol threatened to bring down the nationalist regime in Syria—it was our duty to hasten to the aid of our brother Arabs. And it was our duty to request the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force. And as soon as these forces had gone, it was our duty to go to the Gulf of Aqaba ourselves and restore the situation that had prevailed when we were there in 1956.

Q. [*Rolf Gunther, of the East German Neues Deutschland.*] Mr. President, the East German government has issued a statement declaring its full support for the attitude of the United Arab Republic and the Arab peoples. The same course has been followed by other socialist countries, in particular the U.S.S.R., and a large number of peace-loving countries. The last few days have thus clearly shown the character of the forces that are struggling against imperialism both in the Near East and in a wider sphere. What is Your Excellency's

view of this measure? What effect will this display of loyalty have on the United Arab Republic's future foreign policy?

A. As I said before, the coming days will show us who are our friends and who are our enemies. They will not show me only, they will show the Arab people in every Arab country. They will show the Arab man, the Arab citizen, the Arab masses. The socialist countries have adopted a sound attitude, an attitude of support, just as they did in 1956.

The U.S.S.R. has supported us and issued a statement saying that the Arab countries will not be alone, and that the U.S.S.R. will resist any interference. The many peace-loving countries in Asia and Africa have also stood by us. India has stood by us and supported us, Pakistan has stood by us and supported us, Malaysia has stood by us and supported us. The same applies to the African countries. Afghanistan has stood by us and supported us, so has Cyprus, and many African countries. Guinea has stood by us and supported us. We shall know who are our friends and who are our enemies. America has stood against us, and aligned herself completely with Israel, and announced that she is Israel's protector. And Britain has stood against us; not having learned the lesson of 1956, she has aligned herself entirely with Israel. We had been on the way to improving our relations with Britain, but what can we do in the face of Britain's open support of Israel, her protection of Israel, added to the fact that Britain is responsible for the situation we are in and for the misfortunes of the people of Palestine?

Britain is responsible for what happened to the people of Palestine; it was Britain's duty to make amends for what she had done in the past, in 1948 and 1956. But she did not do so, choosing instead to follow America's lead and align herself with Israel. In this connection I should like to mention the attitude of General de Gaulle. I think it is a sincere and noble attitude, one that is well appreciated by the Arab nation, for it is a non-aligned attitude—he has chosen neither the side of Israel nor that of the Arabs. He has not aligned himself. In this he has provided the great powers with a model for action in the field of international politics.

What we want of the great powers is that

they should not be aligned. At the very beginning of the Revolution, we thought that America would be the country that would support the liberty and independence of other countries, the country that would help people, not the country that would seek domination and alignment. America is the strongest country in the world, the richest country in the world; what is the attitude of the world to be when America is always aligned? What is the attitude of the world to be when it sees America, in the present situation, for which we are in no way responsible—all we have done is to go back to where we were before 1956—aligning herself with Israel and making all this fuss? The American Vice President gets up and says that Israel is a beacon to the world, and so on and so forth. The whole world and the conscience of the world is losing its confidence in the United States, just as we have already done. In these coming days the Arab world will learn who are its friends and its enemies, and its future conduct will be based on the conduct of its enemies and friends.

Q. [Manfred von Juterczenka, correspondent of Radio Cologne, West Germany.] The attitude of the German government in Bonn is essentially neutral, especially as regards the present crisis in the Middle East. Does Your Excellency think that this attitude will help the restoration of better relations?

A. Of course all the German papers are supporting Israel; clearly, there is alignment with Israel. The second point is that it is not easy for us Arabs to forget that the Germans—West Germany—have given Israel tanks, planes, guns and other armaments secretly, behind our backs. Today, of course, should there be a clash between us and Israel, what will be the result of these German gifts to Israel? The result will be that the blood of our sons will be shed. Guns in the hands of the Jews, in the hands of Israel, arms in the hands of Israel, tanks and planes pointed at the breasts of our sons. How can we forget that?

No, we shan't easily forget it. What Germany is doing in the way of supporting Israel, making gifts of arms and money to Israel, are actions directed against the whole Arab world.

You say that today the German government's attitude is neutral. That's what you say. But I see the German press every day, I see what is written in it. In the whole German press there is

no one with any sense of justice; they are all on the side of Israel, aligned with Israel. What about the Arabs, the Palestine refugees, the Palestinian people, the Palestine problem? The Arabs, of course, have no one to write on their behalf in Germany; their rights are ignored. All this has its effect on us, the Arab people.

Q. [H.A. Call, correspondent of the London Independent Television News.] Under what conditions would Your Excellency be prepared to discuss the return of some of the United Nations peace-keeping forces to the frontier between Egypt and Israel?

A. I have already answered this question. The peace-keeping forces are finished, gone for good: they won't come back again. It was a situation that came into existence in 1956 for reasons I have mentioned, and it won't occur again.

Q. [Same questioner.] Under what circumstances would Your Excellency consider raising the blockade on Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. Under no circumstances. Israeli shipping will not pass through Egyptian territorial waters. This is a position I will not retreat from a single inch.

Q. [William Rademaekers, correspondent of Time magazine.] Would you explain the nature of the relations between the United Arab Republic and America?

A. Excellent! Obviously excellent relations! From what is being said it can undoubtedly be seen that relations between us and America are very bad. There are no contacts between us and America at present. We regard America as being aligned and one-hundred-per-cent on the side of Israel. Naturally this affects our relations with America. We don't want anything from America, we don't want anything at all. And we have always offered our friendship to the American people—there is nothing between us and the American people—no problems, I mean. What is at issue between us and America in the present situation? The problem is between us and Israel; what has it to do with America? There is no direct problem between us and America. For longstanding reasons which are well known to us—because of the Jewish vote and historical reasons known to every one—America has aligned herself totally

with Israel, and totally ignored the legitimate rights of the Arabs. America, as the greatest, strongest, and richest nation should be just in her dealings with the world, so that the world may have confidence in her and respect her.

Q. [Same questioner.] Would you comment on what may happen to the Suez Canal if war is declared?

A. What war? Naturally, if there is war with Israel, nothing need happen to the Canal; in case another country intervenes, there will be no Suez Canal—I say this perfectly frankly.

Q. [Arminio Sarioli, correspondent of the Rome L'Unità.] Mr. President, as regards the rights of the United Arab Republic in the Straits of Tiran, what are the limits of Egyptian territorial waters? Has the United Arab Republic imposed a total blockade there? And has Egypt adhered to international obligations as regards navigation in this Strait?

A. I have already answered this question too. Egyptian territorial waters stretch for 12 kilometres from the shore, but the Tiran Strait is less than three miles wide. So even if we said that our territorial waters were only three miles wide, that would cover the whole Gulf.

Of course, in addition to this, the whole of the Strait is not navigable; only a very small part is. This part runs about a mile away from the coast of Sinai; the rest of the Strait is not navigable. Total blockade has been imposed, as we have announced. I should like to say that we are not bound by any international obligations or agreements as regards navigation in this Strait.

Q. [Al-Bukhari Hamamah, correspondent of the Algerian News Agency.] Mr. President, the United States is issuing statements on the present crisis in the Middle East containing almost open threats of armed intervention on behalf of Israel and against the Arab nation which may lead to a second Vietnam in the Middle East. What would the attitude of the United Arab Republic be in such circumstances? And what does Your Excellency see as resulting from such intervention?

A. We shall not relinquish or renounce our sovereignty. If the United States intends armed intervention in favour of Israel and against the Arab nation, then I say that we shall defend our sovereignty and defend our country as we did in

1956 and before 1956. This is the United Arab Republic's attitude, and I believe it is the attitude of the Arab nation throughout the whole Arab world.

As for the possible consequences of such intervention, they are very grave; I cannot at present foresee what they are likely to be.

Q. [Ania Francos, correspondent of Le Monde and Jeune Afrique.] As it is not humanly possible to prevent the Palestinians from fighting to recover their homeland, how is it possible to prevent the war of liberation from developing into a full-scale conflict in the Middle East?

A. The Palestinians were driven out of their country in 1948; they were robbed of their lands, their homes and their fortunes in 1948. The United Nations has passed resolutions stipulating that they should return to their country, and that their possessions should be restored to them or that they should receive compensation for them. But Israel has not complied with a single word or recommendation of the United Nations—on the contrary, she has treated them with contempt. So I think that the Palestinians have every right to undertake, on their own behalf, a war of liberation to recover their rights in their country.

If things develop into a full-scale conflict in the Middle East, we shall be ready for it.

Q. [Same questioner.] What are the reactions of the African nations to the present conflict?

A. We get an idea of the reactions of the African nations from the Afro-Asian conferences being held at the United Nations, from the letters that have reached me, and from the replies I have received to my letters. All free African countries are in complete sympathy with our present attitude.

Q. [Flora Lewis, correspondent of the U.S. Newsday.] Does the President see any chance of reaching a settlement that would ensure permanent peace between the Arab countries and Israel, on the basis of the present situation?

A. The question today is not of a settlement or a permanent peace between the Arab countries and Israel; the question today is that Israel has committed aggression. The question is, what about the rights of the people of Palestine? These

rights must be restored. We cannot reach a settlement on the basis of the present situation. We shall wait patiently for a year, ten years, or even more, for the Palestinian people to recover their rights. As I said before, the Arab people are not a people who easily forget; they are a people with a long history and an ancient civilisation; they will achieve their aims.

Q. [Same questioner.] Does the President believe that the United Nations can play any other useful role in the Middle East, and if so, what is that role?

A. Yes, of course, if the Charter is implemented. When we talk of peace, we must not talk of peace based on usurpation and aggression. We must talk of peace based on justice. Peace based on justice would certainly restore the rights of the people of Palestine. If the Charter, which stipulates peace, justice and the freedom of peoples, is enforced as far as the Palestine problem is concerned, it would mean that the people of Palestine would return to their country and recover their sovereignty over it.

The peace that is on everybody's tongue today ignores all that has happened in the last twenty years. Peace should mean peace based on justice, not peace based on usurpation, gangsterism and aggression.

Q. [Abd ar-Rahman al-Badri, Cairo correspondent of the Iraqi News Agency.] How can the Arabs accept a demand from any country to regard the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba as international, not, in fact, in the interest of international society, but only to consolidate the existence of Israel, the tool imperialism uses against the Arab nation, that illegal entity which has come into existence in a land with which it has absolutely no connection, and which it seized through usurpation and terrorism so that the existence of a government called Israel has not been legally established to this day? How, I say, can the Arabs accept this when it is historically and legally established that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba are entirely Arab territorial waters, which have never been international, and there has never to this day been any international agreement about them?

A. Of course the Arabs can never accept a demand from any country to regard the Gulf of Aqaba as international as though this were in fact in the interest of international society, whereas it only serves to press the demands of Israel. It is

quite clear that the Western powers in general are aligned with Israel and that they helped to establish Israel and helped her to usurp the rights of the people of Palestine. The Arabs can never under any circumstances accept such a situation.

Q. [Pierre Mauvais and Rizo Français, representatives of Radio Canada (CBC) and of Canadian Radio and Television.] Mr. President, Canada has been criticised in the United Arab Republic for its attitude to the crisis. Have relations between the two countries deteriorated, and what might be the results of that?

A. Actually, I have already mentioned our criticism of Canada. Canada is a very long way away from us. There are no problems between us and Canada. We weren't even going to take part in the present Expo 67 in Canada. It was only because I received a letter from Mr. Pearson that we decided to take part in the exhibition knowing that it was going to cost us more than \$2 million. We have friendly feelings towards the Canadian people, so that we were really surprised by the way Canada and Mr. Pearson aligned themselves with Israel, and we presumed that he was acting under American influence. Certainly, the relations between us and Canada today cannot be considered as friendly as they were, and I cannot say what the results may be.

Q. [Same questioners.] Your Excellency has been invited to visit Canada to attend the celebrations for Canada's centenary, and the National Day celebrations at the Montreal Expo 67 on 11 September. Will you accept this invitation and, if not, do you intend to delegate one of your ministers or senior officials to represent you?

A. Of course I should have liked to visit Canada, but my programme for this summer leaves me no time for visits. That is why, before the crisis, I delegated our ambassador to represent us.

Q. [Fumio Kitamura, correspondent of Yomiuri Newspapers, Hideo Murase, correspondent of Chunichi Newspapers and Takaharu Yoshiazawa, correspondent of Mainichi Newspapers.] According to some reports, the United States government is preparing to send naval units under the command of the Sixth Fleet to Israel. If American military intervention of this kind takes place, will you regard it as an act of aggression against Arab territory? And does your government intend to call on

the U.S.S.R. and other friendly countries to intervene in this part of the world?

A. Naturally, the sending of American naval units to Israel to protect her in case she attacks us will be regarded as a hostile act against us and the Arab nation. If American military intervention of this kind takes place, naturally we shall regard it as a hostile act directed against the whole Arab nation. However, we shall not ask any of the friendly countries to intervene; we shall leave it to these countries to make their own decisions.

Q. [Joe Alex Morris, correspondent of the Los Angeles Times.] You have stated that the United States is totally aligned with Israel in the present crisis. You have also said that the Arabs will struggle to protect their rights, even if this leads to an open clash. This statement means that the Arabs want to go to war with the United States. How can this be achieved without direct military aid from the U.S.S.R.?

A. We have never said that we want to fight the United States; there are no direct problems between us and the United States. But of course we shall protect our sovereignty. If the United States attacks us and our sovereignty, what are we to do? Are we to surrender, to put our hands up and tell the United States that we surrender? Or are we to defend our rights and our sovereignty? If we are attacked we are bound to defend our freedom and our sovereignty. We never said that we wanted to fight the United States or the American people. There is no direct problem between us and the United States or between us and the American people. But we see that the United States has totally aligned herself with Israel, taken Israel's side and ignored the rights of the Arabs.

In my opinion, as I said before, it is the duty of the United States, as the greatest country in the world, to ensure that her actions are based on justice, to be non-aligned, for all the world looks to the greatest country in the world and expects great things of it. But, most regrettably, the United States has taken Israel's side and entirely ignored the Arabs.

What have the Arabs done to the United States? They have always wanted to be friends with the United States, they have always offered the United States the hand of friendship, they have always cooperated with the United States

in the economic field. I said that there is no direct problem between us and the United States. The basic issue between us is that of Israel. They have taken Israel's side and ignored 100 million Arabs, ignored all the good will offered by the Arab nation to the United States and the American people.

Q. [Vanna Beckman, correspondent of the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation.] The President has said more than once that it is the Arabs who will choose the time and place of the war against Israel. Does Your Excellency regard the present moment as well chosen, in view of the fact that some people are saying that relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are neither as friendly as they were a few weeks ago, nor are they at the stage of direct confrontation, which situation might be favourable to Egypt, inasmuch as her object is to keep the great powers out of the conflict?

A. What has happened so far is that we have been threatened by Israel. Israel has said, the Israeli Prime Minister has said, that he wants to occupy Syria, to occupy Damascus, and change the nationalist regime in Syria. Were we ready for such a situation? Yes, we were ready. Our armed forces are ready to cope with this situation, so are our people. We have no intention of causing a confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We don't in the least want there to be a confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. for such a confrontation would mean a world war, which would affect the whole world, for it would be a nuclear war.

We have never had such an idea, and we don't want it, but, on the other hand we cannot accept that the Prime Minister of Israel should threaten us and say that he is going to advance on us and occupy us. To all these threats there has been no reaction whatsoever in the United States; not a single person in the United States has condemned them, not a single paper or journal. As regards time and place, we are at the present time fully prepared for a confrontation, and as I said before, if Israel attacks any Arab country, we shall not allow her to confine the operation to a limited area: it will be total war.

Q. [Charles P. Arnot, correspondent of ABC.] In the 1956 Tripartite Aggression against Egypt, the United States opposed two of her foremost allies—Britain and France; she also opposed Israel. Do you think, as,

apparently some of your compatriots think, that the United States has changed so greatly in the course of the last eleven years that she now wishes to injure you and your country?

A. Of course we appreciate the attitude of the United States during the 1956 Tripartite Aggression; we have never denied it, in fact, we expressed our appreciation openly. In 1956 President Eisenhower behaved as the United States ought to behave. But the situation is entirely different today. The United States has changed. The United States today is totally aligned with Israel and, secondly, the United States also wants to dominate us; she wants us to do exactly what she tells us.

They say that the Gulf of Aqaba is international. We say that it is not an international gulf, and we believe what we say. We have always said that the waters of the Gulf were territorial waters. What has happened in the last ten days is perfectly obvious—the United States has totally aligned itself with Israel. Not that we have attacked Israel during these ten days; all we have done has been to resume the exercise of our rights. We therefore believe that, in virtue of her present policy and her total alignment with Israel, America intends to injure the whole Arab nation.

Q. [Delegation of the Brazilian Press, Broadcasting and Television Services.] What does Your Excellency think of Brazil's immediate support for U Thant's decision to respond to the United Arab Republic's request for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force?

A. Naturally, we fully appreciate Brazil's attitude. The Arab people, too, fully appreciate Brazil's support for U Thant's decision.

This attitude is totally different from that of Canada, which did not support the decision. Canada's attitude implies that she has doubts as regards our sovereignty over our territory. Canada's attitude implies that foreign soldiers have the right to be in our country against our will. Brazil's attitude, on the other hand, implies that it is not permissible for the United Nations to impose a military presence, to support or to assist neo-imperialism.

Q. [Same questioner.] Is Egypt's decision to prohibit the passage of Israel shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba irreversible?

A. Of course. I have already answered that question. The decision is irreversible.

Q. [G. Higgins, correspondent of Associated Press.] *Would Your Excellency accept the Joint Armistice Commission, if Israel agreed to its revival?*

A. We accept the Armistice Agreement, in its original form, and we are ready to accept the Joint Armistice Commission if Israel agrees to its revival. But every one knows that Ben Gurion said in 1956 that the Armistice Commission was dead and could never be revived. Obviously, for the Joint Armistice Commission to perform its task, al-Aujah would have to be returned to the United Nations. According to the Armistice Agreement, al-Aujah was under United Nations control. There were United Nations forces there. Then Israel disarmed the United Nations forces, tied their hands and threw them out of al-Aujah. If we want to enforce the Armistice and revive the Armistice Commission, the Armistice Agreement will have to be reinstated, Israel will have to evacuate al-Aujah and the United Nations will have to return there. On this basis only could the Armistice Commission be revived.

Q. [Same questioner.] *Does Your Excellency think that your country is in a position to bear the pressure of war, in view of the present state of the Egyptian economy and the shortage of hard currency?*

A. The present state of the Egyptian economy is a story that has been made up, and you have believed it. You have written about it and believed what you wrote. In fact we are living and eating; while you are here in Egypt you are eating too—there's bread, salad and meat. There's chicken. This is the Egyptian economy. The myth about the Egyptian economy being in a bad shape is something told by you and believed by you.

Of course we have problems; we are a developing country, we are trying to build quickly. Our plan for this year includes investments of £E. 400 million. We are building an iron and steel works; investments in that alone are £E. 400 million. The first stage will be completed in 1971; it will give us 1.5 million tons of steel. We shall not start benefiting from it for some time. We have built the High Dam; we have put £E. 400 million

into it; it will provide us with 10,000 kwh of electricity as of this year. This electricity has yet to be put to use. It has also provided us with water, which also has yet to be put to use.

Of course we have to face the consequences, the consequences of the fact that we are building our country, developing our country. We need loans, we need hard currency to build our country, especially as our population increases by about a million every year. We have reserves of gold and reserves of hard currency, though not very large ones. But the economic situation is not at all as you describe it in your papers, or as the embassy reports describe it. Of course, we have had to tighten our belts a little; there are no luxuries; we are trying to have only Egyptian products on the market. But we can make sacrifices in order to keep our self-respect, our sovereignty and our rights. I believe that the Egyptian people are ready to make sacrifices, and that the Arab people everywhere are ready to make sacrifices.

Q. [Thomas Thomson, correspondent of Life magazine.] *Is the Middle East situation today any better than it was a week ago, before U Thant's visit?*

A. I haven't noticed any improvement. We have recovered our rights, we have got rid of the United Nations Emergency Force and returned to the Gulf of Aqaba—we have reasserted our sovereign rights in the Gulf of Aqaba. People are threatening us with war, people are threatening us with aggression; we sit and wait, leaving the initiative to them. Those who want to make war on us are welcome to come and do so—we are ready for them. There is a great deal of fuss, principally manufactured by the United States, because she wants to support Israel, because she wants to grant Israel rights that are really ours. The United States has armed Israel, has given arms to Israel, given aid to Israel, given tanks to Israel, given planes to Israel. Somebody asked me just now if the situation had changed in the last eleven years. Yes, it has indeed changed. Israel now has arms. The United States first told Germany to make a gift of arms to Israel, and that is what the United States is now doing herself. She is giving Israel planes, tanks and rockets. I can't possibly say that the situation has improved.

Q. [Ole Sippel, correspondent of Danish Broadcast-

ing Corporation, the Danish Demokraten and the Norwegian Arbeiderbladet.] Does the President expect an attack by Israel, the United States, or both of them in collusion, in the near future?

A. I expect all sorts of things. As regards an attack by Israel, we expect it daily. In 1956 we expected an attack by France and Britain—we never imagined that Britain would be operating in collusion with Israel. But what we had never imagined did happen—Britain did act in collusion with Israel and Israel attacked us when we thought the attack was going to come from Britain. Today we are on the alert for anything.

Q. [*John K. Cooley, Middle East correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor.*] *Mr. President, now that the last of the territorial gains made by Israel in the 1956 Suez War have been eliminated, does Your Excellency see any hope of negotiations for a general settlement of the Palestine problem? And what conditions would the United Arab Republic make for such negotiations?*

A. As I said before, the mere existence of Israel is an aggression. Yes, it is true that the last of Israel's territorial gains in the 1956 Suez War have been liquidated, but I can see no hope of negotiations for a general settlement of the Palestine problem, because none of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations during the war of 1948-1949 have been implemented, and all the Western countries today—America, Britain—are all talking of the rights of Israel and are aligned with Israel. Not one of them mentions the Arabs or the rights of the Arabs or the rights of the people of Palestine to their country, their homes and their possessions. How can there be any talk of a general settlement of the Palestine problem? I think that the Palestinian people will have to recover their rights for themselves.

Q. [*Same questioner.*] *What does Your Excellency think should be done to restore good relations with the United States? Do you think that the United States has a role to play in the Middle East? If so, what role?*

A. I have already spoken on this subject. I say that the United States, as the greatest and strongest country in the world, should behave justly, and not be aligned. Of course the United States can play a major role in the Middle East—the role of a friend of the Arabs, not the friend of

Israel and the enemy of the Arabs. It shouldn't be aligned with Israel and totally ignore the Arabs—it shouldn't provide Israel with all sorts of arms and completely ignore the Arabs.

America's reputation in the world today is not what it was after the Second World War. After the Second World War the whole world regarded America as a free country which had tasted imperialism and wanted to be rid of imperialism, that had rid itself of imperialism and tasted freedom. The whole world regarded America as standing against imperialism and domination. But today America wants to rule, to give orders, to make conditions. We are ready to be extremely friendly with America, but only on condition that we are not expected to obey her orders and accede to her demands and bow to her terms and accept her alignment with Israel and her total neglect of the rights of the Palestinian people.

Q. [*Michael Dranigan, correspondent of United Press International.*] *Reports have appeared on the possibility of the United States using force, as a last resort, to open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli navigation, if this end cannot be achieved by peaceful means. Would Your Excellency care to comment on the reaction of the United Arab Republic if this were to happen?*

A. The United States is the greatest and strongest country in the world, but we shall not relinquish our sovereignty or our rights. We shall resist any aggression against our sovereignty or against our rights; we shall resist it bitterly. And I think that the whole Arab people, and all free peoples, all struggling peoples, will resist such aggression.

Q. [*Same questioner.*] *Would Your Excellency comment on the reports that there are ready plans for stopping Middle East oil supplies to the West in the event of an outbreak of hostilities? If this is so, would not this be injurious to the Arab economy in the long run, or has this been taken into account?*

A. I have no completed plans, and I know nothing about reports to the effect that there are plans made to cut off supplies to the West. I consider this to be the responsibility of the Arab governments and the Arab peoples. The Arab economy might be affected, but Arab independence is very important, Arab self-respect is very

important and so are the rights of the people of Palestine.

Q. [Peter Worthington, correspondent of the Toronto Telegram.] Do you regard war with Israel as inevitable now? And do you, from you experience, imagine that Israel will not respond with force to the closing of the Straits of Tiran?

A. We have been at war with Israel since 1948; we have been expecting Israeli aggression since 1948. We have recovered the rights we lost in 1956. As I told you before, we are leaving the initiative to Israel; if she wants to respond, with or without force, to our exercise of our rights, we are ready, our sons are ready.

Q. [Same questioner.] Do you object to the presence of any kind of force representing the United Nations on Egyptian territory, to help keep the peace?

A. I have already spoken of this. The United Nations Emergency Force was present for a specific reason. Its task is now completed and we shall not accept any foreign forces.

Q. [Riyadh Taha, Editor-in-Chief of the Beirut Al-Kifah.] The mobilisation of Arab forces and the destruction of Western interests and installations in the Arab countries would cut the arteries of America and its allies in the Middle East. Are we not entitled to do that in self-defence, when America and the Western powers intervene to protect Israel?

A. I cannot approve of the destruction of Western interests and installations in the Arab countries, for they are ours, our own resources, not America's. I warmly welcomed the proposal of the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister—he said that the Kuwaiti government had decided that, in case of any aggression against us, or if America or the West intervened, Kuwait would stop oil exports completely; we are still awaiting Saudi Arabia's views, and the views of the other Arab countries. But we shall not destroy Western interests and installations; I think that would not be a sound course of action. But of course, if the Arab governments hesitate to take the necessary steps, it will be up to the Arab peoples to do their duty.

Q. [Hisham Abu Dhahr, Chief Editor of the Beirut Al-Muharrir.] Has the United Arab Republic

considered the possibility of armed American intervention in favour of Israel?

A. In fact I have not taken America into account, for if I took America and the Sixth and Seventh Fleets and the American generals into account we shouldn't be able to move. No, we haven't taken America into account in this matter. If America intervenes we shall certainly defend ourselves and our rights. But if I started considering how strong America is and how strong I am, even before I started my calculations I should come to the conclusion that America has air, land and sea superiority over us. I leave this out of my calculations. If America intervenes, that's another matter; we shall have to defend ourselves, and no country, however strong, can defeat a people determined to defend themselves and their right to live and to sovereignty over their country.

Q. [Rosemary Sayigh, correspondent of The Economist.] Every year the United Nations issues resolutions on the return of the Arab refugees, and every time the United States and Britain have voted in favour of these resolutions. Has the President proposed to the United States and Britain that they exert pressure on Israel to make her accept these resolutions, instead of exerting pressure on the United Arab Republic to make it open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping?

A. I should like to thank the questioner for asking this question. I am glad that there is somebody here who thinks of the rights of the Arab refugees.

It is true that every year America and Britain vote in favour of the return of Palestinian people to their country. But things go no further than voting. Israel does not implement the resolutions. Indeed, Ben Gurion himself has said that he would not agree to any Arab returning to Israel and that he wanted three million Jews from the U.S.S.R. Of course we have spoken with the United States and Britain about the return of the refugees and the resolutions. But I think it's a question of hypocrisy. They agree at the United Nations for reasons of hypocrisy—in the hope of deceiving the Arab countries, and laughing at the Arab countries. But they never intend that the resolutions should be implemented, because Ben Gurion does not want it so, and they are aligned with Ben Gurion and always take sides with Israel.

Of course, when we resumed the exercise of our rights, as the lady said in her question, pressure was brought to bear on us, and a great deal of fuss was made. Has there ever been one millionth of the present fuss because Israel has refused to implement the United Nations resolutions adopted every year, on the return of the people of Palestine to their homes? No, there hasn't been a murmur. Has a single article been written about it? Not one, not a single article in the western press.

As I said before, the Arab world regards the United States as a great power, and expects it to take a just view of things, so that the peoples of the world may have confidence in it.

That was the last question. Thank you all very much for giving me your time. Good night.

329

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir to Members of the National Assembly.¹ [Excerpt]

Cairo, May 29, 1967

As for our present situation, it is a difficult one, if solely because we are not facing Israel only; we are facing Israel and those who created Israel and those who are behind Israel. We are facing Israel and we are facing the West as well. We are facing the West which created Israel and has despised and ignored us Arabs since 1948 and even before 1948. It has shown no consideration whatsoever for us, for our feelings, our aspirations in life or our rights. The West has ignored us completely, and the Arab nation has not been able to do anything about it. Even worse happened in 1956; we all know what happened during the Suez War in 1956, when we demanded our rights and Britain, France and Israel opposed us and confronted us with the Tripartite Aggression. But we resisted them, and said that we would fight to the last drop of our blood. And God granted us victory, and the victory was a mighty one.

After that we got to our feet again and have been able to build. Today, eleven years after 1956, we have restored things to what they were before 1956. So much for the material aspect; in my opinion, the material aspect is a minor one. The moral aspect is much more important. The Arab nation has been resurrected, the cause of Palestine has been resurrected. The confidence of every Arab has been restored, the confidence of every Palestinian has been restored, for, just as we have been able to restore the pre-1956 situation, we shall certainly, with God's help, be able to restore the pre-1948 situation.

Brothers; The Arab Revolution, the Arab uprising, the upsurge of the masses which we are today witnessing throughout the Arab world, is not only the result of our having returned to the Gulf of Aqaba and got rid of the Emergency Force; it exists for the recovery of Arab honour, of Arab aspirations. Israel has always been boastful, and has become even more boastful, and the Western countries, headed by America and Britain, have ignored and despised us, and thought us worthless. But when the time comes, as I have said before we shall decide the time and the place; we shall not let them decide. We must be prepared this time, so that we may win. There must be no repetition of the farces of 1948. With God's aid and support we shall win.

Our preparations are complete, and we are ready to face Israel. They can say what they like about the war of 1956, but no one will believe them now that the collusion of 1956 has been disclosed, the base collusion in which Israel was involved. Today we are ready for a confrontation, we are ready to raise the whole question of Palestine. Today it is not a question of the Gulf of Aqaba, nor of the Straits of Tiran, nor of the Emergency Force. It is a question of the rights of the people of Palestine, of the attack on Palestine in 1948, carried out with the aid of Britain and America. It is a question of the Arabs having been driven from Palestine and robbed of their rights and their possessions. It is a question of the neglect of all United Nations resolutions in favour of the people of Palestine. The question today is bigger than they say. They want to restrict it to the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran and the Emergency Force, to right of passage. But we say that we want the full and undiminished rights of the

¹ *Ibid.*, 30/5/1967.

people of Palestine. We say this because we believe it is impossible that Arab rights should go by default; because every Arab in every Arab country demands these Arab rights.

We are not frightened by America and her threats, nor by Britain and her threats, nor by the whole Western world and its alignment with Israel. America and Britain are aligned with Israel and leave the Arabs entirely out of account. They think nothing of the whole Arab nation—one hundred million Arabs. Why? Because we have accustomed them to believe that we do not know who are our friends and who are our enemies. It is our duty to know who is our enemy and treat him as an enemy, and who is our friend, and treat him as a friend. If America and Britain are aligned with Israel, we say that our enemy is not only Israel, but that Israel, America and Britain are all our enemies, and we shall treat them as such.

If the Western powers ignore us, deride us and despise us, it is up to us Arabs to teach them to respect us and take us into account. If not, all our talk about Palestine, the people of Palestine and the rights of the people of Palestine will be so much hot air. We must treat our enemies as enemies and treat our friends as friends.

Yesterday I said that the countries that are for peace and freedom are supporting us. I spoke yesterday of the support of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, of Yugoslavia, Malaysia, People's China and the Afro-Asian countries. And after saying that yesterday, I saw the Minister for War, Mr. Shams Badran, and heard from him what had happened in Moscow.

I want to tell you today that the Soviet Union is friendly to us. In our relations with the Soviet Union—and I have been dealing with them since 1955—they have never asked us for anything. I have never received a single request from them. They have never interfered in our affairs or our ideology; under no circumstances do they try to interfere in our internal affairs. This is how we have always found the Soviet Union, while we, on the other hand, have asked for much, and asked for it to be granted quickly. Last year we asked them for wheat and they sent it. And when I went to them last year I asked them for all the arms we needed, and they granted my request.

When I met Shams Badran yesterday, he gave me a letter from the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, in which he says that the Soviet Union supports us in this conflict, and will allow no country to interfere until the situation returns to what it was before 1956.

We must know who is our friend and who is our enemy, who is a hypocrite, who wants something, who threatens, who is exerting economic pressure on us, and who is offering us his friendship simply because he loves freedom and peace.

In the name of the people of the United Arab Republic I thank the peoples of the U.S.S.R. for their magnificent attitude and true friendship. This is the attitude we want, and, as I said yesterday, we have not asked the Soviet Union or any other country to intervene, because we do not want a confrontation that might lead to a world war, because we are working for peace and advocate peace. When we advocated the policy of non-alignment it was mainly on behalf of world peace. We shall work for world peace with all our strength, and we shall cling to our rights with all our strength.

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330

Reply of Syrian Foreign Minister Makhus to a Verbal Message of the U.S. Ambassador in Damascus on the Crisis.¹

Damascus, May 29, 1967

1. The government of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that the government of the United States is, according to the Charter of the United Nations, in no way different from other member states, and has no right to interfere in the affairs of this part of the world or to impose its tutelage on it.

2. The American verbal memorandum stated that "tension has again risen on the armistice lines between the Arab countries and Israel during the last few days," but, in fact, this tension

¹ *Al-Ba'ith*, 30/5/1967.

has risen not only in the last few days, but has prevailed in the area since the imposition of Israeli occupation, which was the result of the forcible invasion of part of the Arab homeland and the dispersal of its Palestinian Arab citizens. This occupation is a permanent source of threats, tension and direct danger to security and peace in this important part of the world.

The Foreign Ministry of the Syrian Arab Republic hereby affirms that Israel has aggressive intentions. The attitudes she has adopted ever since the Zionist occupation in 1948 have constituted a series of aggressive acts which the Security Council has repeatedly condemned, regarding them as a grave threat to international peace and security. The claim that Israel has no aggressive intentions and that her troop concentrations are for defensive purposes is refuted by the impudently aggressive statements made by the authorities in the occupied territory and by all the accompanying objective circumstances.

The serious acts of aggression against the Arab countries which Israel has committed are known to the whole world, and cannot be disguised. The Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956, of which Israel was the subservient criminal instrument, might well have drawn the world into a third war. Further definite proof of Israel's continued aggressive intentions is provided by the perfidious acts of aggression against Syria committed by her during the last three years in particular, in the course of which she has made extensive use of aircraft and dropped napalm bombs on civilians and civilian development projects. The latest of these acts of aggression were the incident of 7 April last and the abusive threats of Zionist spokesmen to occupy Damascus and overthrow its revolutionary government.

The government of the Syrian Arab Republic has on more than one occasion appealed to the Security Council and requested it to put a stop to this aggressive policy and to condemn Israel. But the persistently pro-Israel attitude of the United States has justified and protected Israeli aggression, and this has encouraged Israel to continue in this dangerous policy. Eshkol's recent repeated statements on the placing of the Sixth Fleet at the disposal of the occupying authorities in Israel to protect their aggression, which statements have not been denied by the American

authorities, are conclusive evidence that Israel is entirely confident of the American government's support for her aggressive policy.

The total popular and military mobilisation that has been carried out in both the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic, in conformity with the Joint Defence Agreement and with the commitment of both countries to a common national destiny, was inevitable. It was a response to defence requirements for the confrontation of the threats of aggression which have been manifested in the massive Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian frontier. These concentrations, of course, would not have been made but for the encouragement of international imperialism. This popular mobilisation in the two regions, which has rallied round itself the masses of the Arab people throughout the Arab world, along with their progressive governments and popular organisations, derives from the resolute determination of the Arab people to repel and crush aggression whenever Israel tries to attack any Arab Region. These defensive measures are a legitimate right sponsored by the Charter of the United Nations and international law, a right exercised by all self-respecting countries to protect their peoples from danger.

3. The verbal memorandum also mentions what it describes as "constant acts of terrorism against Israel." The government of the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms what it has more than once declared, that it is not responsible for the actions of the exiled Palestinian people in their struggle to recover their rights and decide their own future, as stipulated by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations. They have waited 19 years since the disaster befell them, during which time certain great powers, in particular America, have, at the United Nations, opposed their attempts to recover their rights.

The fact is that the Palestinian people are still the victims of constant flagrant aggression. Thus their actions are perfectly legal, in view of their right to a free and decent life in their own land, like other peoples in the world, and of their aspirations to deliver themselves from the tragedy, unparalleled in the whole of history, that has befallen them.

We emphatically insist on the great difference

between the struggle of this people for liberation and self-determination, which cannot possibly be called aggression or terrorism, and the conduct of the usurping enemy who has occupied their country and driven them from their homeland. But voices are being raised in America and certain other Western countries in an attempt to obscure the issue and suggest that aggressor and victims of aggression should be judged by the same standards. Efforts are also being made to create permanent justifications for the aggressor to continue his aggression, whereas every step taken by the persecuted Palestinian Arab people is made a pretext for denunciation, intimidation and threats of invasion.

This people has always been a separate individual entity, both before and since the Zionist occupation; it is still in a state of war with the enemy who is occupying its country. It is not a party to the Armistice Agreements and does not accept tutelage from any quarter whatsoever. Consequently, the provisions of these Agreements are not applicable to it, and are of no benefit to it.

In this connection, we should like to ask what would be the attitude of any of the United States of America if, for example, its people were suddenly driven from their homes and forced to become refugees, to make way for an alien people. Would their efforts to return to their homeland be regarded as terrorism and aggression against the alien people who had occupied it? And why does the United States not display its generosity and sympathy for the Jews by giving them the State of New York, for example, instead of supporting the Zionist occupation of Palestine at the expense of the Arab people who have been expelled from their homeland?

4. The memorandum also mentioned the United States government's anxiety lest "the withdrawal of the Emergency Force make it more difficult to keep the peace." The government of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that the United Arab Republic had an absolute right to withdraw its approval of the continued presence of this Force whenever it wished, and that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was acting in keeping with this clear legal right in his wise response to the request of the United Arab Republic. It also affirms that this action was

consistent with the interests of the Arab people, who have warmly welcomed it, and who will resist all attempts to bring back these forces in any form. Their reason for this is that any such attempt would be a violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic and would mean that in performing their task these forces would be occupying the country. This is something we emphatically reject.

5. The government of the United Arab Republic has exercised its legitimate right to reestablish its sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba, which from both the historical and international points of view is a closed gulf, and its waters Arab territorial waters. Thus to describe this exercise by the United Arab Republic of its sovereignty over this gulf as interference with international navigation is an undisguised attempt to create justification for aggression and to mislead international opinion as to the facts of the case. For this exercise of sovereignty amounts to no more than the elimination of one of the consequences of the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, which was condemned by the United Nations, and the restoration of the situation that had prevailed before that aggression. Any attempt to give this Tripartite Aggression the quality of permanence, or the character of *fait accompli*, or to claim that it conferred international navigation rights, is utterly unacceptable as re-affirming and condoning the aggression. Any such attempt will be strongly opposed by us and by the masses throughout the Arab world.

6. The peace that we desire and are struggling for is a peace based on justice and the recovery by the Arab people of their rights in their land. It is a peace based on absolute freedom for the Arabs to rid themselves of all the consequences to the Arab homeland of fragmentation, backwardness and imperialism, both old and new.

For the Arab people, peace is the natural atmosphere for the building of a new life, but it cannot be achieved as long as there is constant aggression against the Arab homeland. If the United States seriously wants peace, it must abandon its permanent undisguised alignment with the Israeli occupation and the aggression to which the Arab people are being subjected by Israel. The United States must also refrain from protecting this base and providing it with

arms and other items calculated to strengthen it and thus increase its capacity for aggression and for constituting a threat to peace and security in the area.

In conclusion, we repeat what the Syrian authorities have declared on many occasions: we reject the tutelage of the United States or any other country over the Arab homeland and the struggle of peoples for liberation, and affirm their absolute right to decide their own future and build up their society as they wish. Respect for this fundamental principle of international relations is the natural way to protect peace and security in the world.

331

Statement by the General Director of the Israel Boycott Bureau of the Arab League Mahjub on Passage Through the Gulf of Aqaba.¹

Damascus, May 29, 1967

Now that the United Arab Republic is once more exercising its indisputably legitimate right to prohibit Israeli and other foreign ships from carrying strategic materials in its territorial waters in the Gulf of Aqaba, the Head Office of the Israel Boycott considers it to be its duty, in the interests of foreign shipping companies, and especially of such of them as own oil tankers, to draw their attention to the fact that the provisions imposed by the Arab countries are not applicable to the company as a whole if one of its ships infringes these provisions, but only to the offending ship itself.

There is, however, an exception that shipping companies may not be aware of. This is a decision issued by the Council of the Arab League prohibiting dealings with any shipping company any of whose ships or tankers shall, in agreement with any body in Israel, engage in activities calculated to create an international crisis for any Arab country. This prohibition means that all ships and tankers belonging to such a company, and

not only the offending ship, will be put on the black list.

Thus any ship or tanker carrying strategic materials, especially oil, to the Gulf of Aqaba, by agreement with Israel, whether under charter to Israel or under any other form of agreement, will be regarded as doing so with the intention of creating an international crisis for a member state of the Arab League, and the decision mentioned above will be enforced against it; that is, all its ships or tankers will be put on the list of ships not allowed to anchor in any Arab port or to enter any Arab territorial waters.

332

Text of the Joint Defence Agreement Between the United Arab Republic and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.²

Cairo, May 30, 1967

The Governments of the United Arab Republic and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, in response to the desire of the Arab people in both countries, and proceeding from their absolute belief in the common destiny and the unity of the Arab nation, and in order to unify their efforts to ensure and protect the safety and the national ideals of their countries, have hereby agreed to sign a Joint Defence Agreement in order to achieve these aims, as follows:

Article 1. The two Contracting States consider any armed aggression against either of them or their forces as an aggression against both countries. Therefore, acting on the legitimate individual and collective right to defend their entity, each of them is obliged to go to the aid of the State against which the aggression is committed and immediately take all measures and employ all means at their disposal, including the use of armed forces, to repel the aggression.

Article 2. The two Contracting States shall consult each other, at the request of either of them, on important international issues which affect the safety or independence of either of them. In

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Al-Ahram*, 31/6/1967.

the event of impending war or of an emergency liable to prove dangerous, the two Contracting States shall immediately adopt preventive and defensive measures required by the situation.

Article 3. In the event of sudden aggression against either of the two Contracting States, the two States shall, in addition to the military measures necessary to confront this aggression, immediately decide on the other measures which will put into operation the plans comprised in this Agreement.

Article 4. In implementation of the aims of this Agreement, the two Contracting States have decided to set up the following main bodies: (1) A Defence Council. (2) A Joint Command which shall consist of: (a) a Council of Chiefs of Staff, (b) a Joint Staff Committee.

Article 5. (1) The Defence Council shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence or War in the two countries. It shall be the highest authority for the Council of the Chiefs of Staff. (2) The jurisdiction of the Defence Council shall include the following: (a) to lay down the general bases and principles of a policy of cooperation between the two countries at all levels to repel aggression against them; (b) to make the necessary recommendations for the direction and coordination of the activities of the two States in the service of the joint war effort; (c) to ratify the decisions of the Council of Chiefs of Staff in all matters related to the planning of operations and the preparation of the armed forces of the two States; (d) to form special committees, either permanent or temporary, when necessary; (e) the Council shall meet regularly once every six months, in Cairo or Amman alternately, or when the need arises, by request from either Party.

Article 6. The Council of the Chiefs of Staff:

(1) The Council shall consist of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in each of the two countries.

(2) The Council of the Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following: (a) approving the plans and studies drawn up by the Joint Staff Committee and, when necessary, submitting them to the Defence Council for approval; (b) issuing decisions connected with the formation, organisation and duties of the Joint Staff Committee.

(3) The Council shall meet regularly once

every three months, or when requested by either of the Chiefs of Staff.

Article 7. In the event of military operations starting, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic shall assume command of operations in both States.

Article 8. Each of the two States shall bear the expenses of the military installations required for operations in its territory.

Article 9. This Agreement shall remain in force for five years, automatically renewable for a further period of five years, and so forth. Either of the two Contracting States is entitled to withdraw from it after informing the other State in writing of its desire to do so at least one year before the date of expiry of any of the aforementioned periods.

Article 10. The provisions of this Agreement in no way prejudice the rights and commitments of the two States arising from, or which may arise from, any special agreements, the Arab League Charter or the United Nations Charter.

Article 11. This Agreement shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures in each of the Contracting States. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at the Foreign Ministry of the United Arab Republic. This Agreement shall become effective as from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

In confirmation of which this Agreement has been signed and sealed with the seals of the two States.

Done in Cairo on 20 Safar 1387 A.H., 30 May 1967, A.D., in two originals.

Gamal Abd an-Nasir

President of the United Arab Republic

Husayn ibn-Talal

King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

333

Interview Granted by Saudi King Faysal to a Correspondent of American Television.¹

Q. Your Majesty, will Saudi Arabia enter the war as a reprisal against Israel if she breaks the blockade imposed by Egypt on the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. Saudi Arabia will be in the vanguard of any action undertaken by the other Arab countries.

Q. In recent years your government has been regarded by many in the West as a factor of tranquillity and moderation in the Middle East. Does Your Majesty feel that there is still any possibility of negotiating an agreement on the present crisis?

A. Would you first define what you mean by the crisis—the situation with Israel, or something else?

Q. I mean the situation that has changed in the last few days between Egypt and Israel to relative or radical war—to what may now be practically total war?

A. We hope that the day will come when our problem with Israel will be ended and Israel will cease to exist.

Q. In 1956 all the Arab countries undertook to aid Egypt—by that I mean military aid—but they did not do so. Will they do so this time if there is a war?

A. In 1956 Egypt herself asked the Arab countries to refrain from military intervention, which they were all ready to provide. This time of course all the Arab countries are just as ready to aid Egypt or any other country that is the object of aggression by Israel.

Q. Does Your Majesty think that war between Israel and her neighbours is inevitable?

A. If Israel rashly tries to make any move against the Arabs, that of course will be the result.

Q. But if she does not do so, why should there not be peace? Peace is surely in the interest of the welfare of all the Arab countries in the area?

A. We believe that there can be no peace in the area as long as Israel continues to exist.

¹ *Al-Bilad*, 31/5/1967.

334

News Conference Statements by the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri.²

Amman, June 1, 1967

Q. Do you think that the present tension will lead to war between the Arab countries and Israel?

A. It seems to me that war is quite inevitable.

Q. And will the Palestine Liberation Organisation take part in this war?

A. The Palestine Liberation Army has been placed at the disposal of the Arab countries so that it may fight beside them—it will, indeed, be in the forefront of the fighting.

Q. What is your objective, if you win the war?

A. Our objective is the liberation of the homeland from Israeli occupation. Like all liberation movements throughout the world, we are fighting for national freedom and sovereignty.

Q. What will happen to the Israelis? Will you throw them into the sea?

A. We do not want to throw the Jews into the sea. This is an old accusation, which was first made by the Zionists against the Palestinian leaders in 1929, during the revolt that broke out as a result of the incidents at the Wailing Wall. The future of the Israelis is a matter to be decided by the United Nations.

Q. Would you give us some details?

A. In 1957 I submitted a proposal to the United Nations for the formation of a "Return

² Letter from Mr. Ahmad ash-Shuqayri to the Institute for Palestine Studies. Mr. Shuqayri attached the following note to the above text: "These are the questions and answers which appeared in the statement which Zionist propaganda has misrepresented throughout the world, alleging that I said that we should throw the Jews into the sea. This allegation they have incorporated in their films and books and the press which they control, and even certain Arabs have inadvertently been taken in by it. I have refuted the Zionist lie in press conferences in Khartum, Beirut, Baghdad, Kuwait and Algiers, but the Zionist-controlled press has maintained that my refutation is untrue."

Agency" to facilitate the return of the Israelis to their countries of origin. To this I should now like to add that the Arab countries, as members of the United Nations, are ready to contribute to the budget of this Agency to facilitate the return of the Israelis to their former countries.

Q. Does that mean that you want to expel the Jews from Palestine?

A. That is not true. We are against Israel as a State, not against the Jews as Jews. We resist the Zionist Movement and all Zionists, in Palestine and elsewhere. The Palestinian Jews can stay in Palestine, and the same applies to the Jews who came from the Arab countries. We impose one condition only—that they should not be loyal to Zionism or to the State of Israel.

Q. And the other Jews?

A. They will go back the way they came; they came by sea, and they will go back by sea. We are ready join with the United Nations in facilitating their return to their original countries.

335

Interview Granted by Syrian Foreign Minister Makhos to the French Daily "L'Humanité" During His Visit to France, 31 May-2 June.¹

Paris, June 1, 1967

Q. Les dirigeants syriens sont présentés par la presse occidentale comme les responsables de la tension actuelle au Moyen-Orient. A en croire certains commentateurs, Damas, comme le Caire, voudraient la guerre? Qu'en est-il en réalité? D'où viennent les dangers d'un conflit?

R. La vérité sur ce qu'on appelle maintenant la crise du Moyen-Orient, c'est que les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne sont conscients du danger que représente le mouvement populaire progressiste dans les pays arabes pour les intérêts de leurs monopoles pétroliers et pour les féodaux arabes. C'est pour cela que l'impérialisme a provoqué la

tension, fomenté des complots et poussé le sionisme entre le mouvement progressiste arabe afin de conserver ses intérêts au Moyen-Orient et de maintenir les pays arabes dans le sous-développement. Cette tension nous est imposée par la force. Nous sommes contraints de nous défendre contre une menace d'aggression qui pèse constamment sur nous.

Q. Quelles preuves étaient en possession de votre gouvernement sur les préparatifs d'une agression israélienne?

R. La raison de la tension actuelle remonte à l'occupation sioniste de la Palestine arabe en 1948. Elle persiste toujours et prend de l'ampleur chaque fois que les intérêts impérialistes sont menacés par les masses laborieuses du peuple arabe. Les préparatifs de l'agression israélienne du 17 mai 1967 n'étaient un secret pour personne.

Celle-ci n'est pas sortie de notre imagination, mais elle a été exposée par les plus importants responsables israéliens, à commencer par Eshkol en passant par Eban et Rabin. Il n'y a pas, à notre connaissance, dans l'histoire des peuples, de cas de dirigeants d'un pays se dressant pour annoncer ouvertement d'une façon provocatrice et constante qu'ils veulent occuper un autre pays pour y renverser le régime.

C'est pourtant ce qui est arrivé, il y a deux semaines. Les dirigeants israéliens l'ont fait au grand jour. Leurs déclarations se trouvent dans tous les journaux du monde et tous les hommes honnêtes et objectifs en Occident peuvent les lire, en prendre connaissance.

Il ne s'agit pas d'une question de frontières ou de zones démilitarisées. L'opération agressive qu'on préparait contre la Syrie n'est pas semblable à celle de Samoa, qui eut lieu en Jordanie, ou à une autre qui eut lieu au Liban.

C'est donc une opération nouvelle en son genre, car elle vise à occuper la ville de Damas et à renverser le régime révolutionnaire et progressiste de Syrie. Que les hommes de votre pays jugent ces menaces en toute conscience.

Elles n'étaient pas de simples paroles en l'air car elles furent secondées par des concentrations de troupes sur les lignes de démarcation syriennes. Ces concentrations ont atteint 15 divisions.

Elles ont été complétées par deux déclarations

¹ *L'Humanité*, Paris, 2/6/1967.

d'Eskhol en une semaine, disant que le gouvernement américain enverrait la 6^e Flotte afin de protéger Israël. Cette flotte, qui représente l'arrogance impérialiste en Méditerranée, faisait des démonstrations de force près de nos côtes. Aucun démenti n'est venu du côté du gouvernement américain, malgré nos questions à l'ambassade des Etats-Unis, malgré la protestation des masses arabes et les grandes manifestations qui ont eu lieu au Liban contre la visite de la 6^e Flotte.

Tout ceci ne fait que confirmer les plans menaçant la Syrie.

Il faut y ajouter la longue histoire de l'agression israélienne dans la région qui a atteint son apogée avec l'opération tripartite contre l'Egypte en 1956. Elle a continué, par la suite, avec des bombes au napalm contre les installations civiles, contre les enfants et les vieillards, l'année passée en Syrie. Il faut y ajouter celle du 7 avril dernier lorsque les avions israéliens ont lancé des bombes de 500 kilos sur les enfants et les civils et où l'aviation a été employée d'une façon intense et traître, pénétrant jusque dans le ciel de Damas.

Tout ceci prouve qu'Israël a toujours été un instrument aux mains de l'impérialisme mondial afin de mettre en échec les régimes progressistes dans le monde arabe.

Le congrès des diplomates américains qui s'est tenu à Beyrouth avant l'agression du 7 avril n'était pas en réalité une réunion de diplomates mais une réunion d'agents de la CIA qui a planifié et préparé l'agression, après avoir constaté l'échec de toutes ses tentatives passées pour renverser le régime de Damas. Ainsi donc tout ce que nous avons fait, l'Egypte et nous, n'était que des mesures défensives pour protéger l'honneur de notre peuple et la sécurité de notre patrie d'une éventuelle agression. Si les hommes honnêtes et de bonne volonté dans le monde désirent effectivement voir la paix régner dans cette région, ils doivent déployer tous leurs efforts pour faire entendre leur désapprobation à ceux qui commettent l'agression et non pas s'adresser à ceux qui sont menacés par celle-ci.

Q. Le conflit au Moyen-Orient est souvent présenté comme une querelle entre Arabes et Juifs. Les Arabes mèneraient une guerre sainte contre Israël. Des accusations d'antisémitisme sont portées contre votre gouvernement. Qu'en est-il en réalité?

R. Poser le problème de cette manière est simplement ridicule. Nous sommes nous mêmes des Sémites, et l'accusation d'antisémitisme que le sionisme s'efforce de lancer actuellement contre les peuples arabes ne tient vraiment pas.

Il n'y a pas non plus de problèmes entre Arabes et Juifs et le sionisme entretient ici volontairement la confusion. Le judaïsme est une religion et non une nationalité, un Etat ne peut pas être construit à partir de bases religieuses ou raciales, si-non on n'aurait plus que des Etats islamiques, chrétiens, juifs, bouddhistes, etc. Le judaïsme est une chose et le sionisme, phénomène colonialiste, en est une autre.

Nous avons des Arabes, musulmans, chrétiens et juifs qui ont vécu ensemble pendant de longs siècles comme en France vivent les catholiques, les protestants, les juifs...

Lorsque, au Moyen-Age, les Juifs ont été persécutés, ils ont émigré d'Espagne avec les Arabes; lorsque les Arméniens ont été persécutés en Turquie, ils ont émigré chez nous et ils ont vécu avec nous. Et lorsque les Tcherkesses ont été persécutés en Russie tsariste ils sont venus chez nous et y ont vécu comme toutes les autres minorités.

Nous n'avons jamais fait de distinction entre nos citoyens sur une base raciste ou religieuse et nous n'avons pas d'experts nazis qui examinent le sang de nos citoyens pour en déterminer l'origine raciale.

Ce n'est pas à nous de payer les conséquences de l'antisémitisme, et il est scandaleux qu'on oblige un million et demi d'Arabes à vivre en exil, dans les conditions les plus inhumaines. Pourquoi ne rappelle-t-on pas que les peuples arabes, au cours des deux guerres mondiales, ont eux aussi souffert de la persécution impérialiste. On les a récompensés pour le soutien qu'ils ont donné aux Alliés par la division de leurs pays en zones d'influence et par leur condamnation au sous-développement et au pillage par les impérialistes.

Les juifs des pays arabes qui ont vécu ici avant l'occupation sioniste n'ont jamais eu de difficultés avec les chrétiens et les musulmans. Mais ces mêmes juifs souffrent aujourd'hui de discriminations en Israël.

Les pays arabes ont été le berceau de trois grandes religions: le judaïsme, le christianisme et l'islam. Peuvent-ils réunir aujourd'hui tous

ceux qui appartiennent à ces religions? Peut-on rassembler tous les juifs de la Terre à Jérusalem, tous les chrétiens à Bethléem et tous les musulmans à La Mecque?

Q. Le Conseil de sécurité est actuellement réuni. Croyez-vous qu'une quelconque solution puisse en sortir?

R. Nous avons eu recours au Conseil de Sécurité et aux organisations internationales chaque fois que nous avons été victimes d'une agression israélienne.

Plus de 6.000 plaintes ont ainsi été déposées. Les Nations Unies ont pris beaucoup de décisions dans l'intérêt des réfugiés arabes, et en ce qui concerne les zones démilitarisées occupées par Israël.

Les décisions du Conseil de Sécurité sont très claires. On les retrouve dans le rapport présenté par M. Thant à la dernière session de l'Assemblée générale, qui demande la destruction des installations militaires et para-militaires dans la zone démilitarisée, et la réinstallation de ses habitants arabes dans leurs terres.

Eilat est en réalité le village arabe de Oum Sharshar, qui a été occupé par les forces sionistes deux mois après la signature des accords d'armistice.

Tout cela montre que les Etats-Unis utilisent leur influence pour empêcher l'exécution des décisions de l'ONU. Ces décisions ont pourri dans les tiroirs des Nations Unies, tandis que les réfugiés arabes attendent depuis 19 ans le réveil de la conscience internationale.

A la suite de chaque agression, nous avons pris contact avec tous les ambassadeurs accrédités à Damas, pour demander à leurs gouvernements de condamner à l'O.N.U. ces actes de guerre, afin qu'Israël ne soit pas continuellement encouragé, et afin de soustraire la région au danger d'une conflagration.

Mais l'attitude des Etats-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne a fait obstacle à nos demandes.

Pour que nous ayons confiance dans les possibilités de l'O.N.U. de faire quelque chose en faveur de la paix, il faudrait d'abord mettre à exécution les innombrables décisions qui dorment dans ses tiroirs.

Nous pourrions alors espérer que les décisions nouvelles qu'elle pourrait prendre aujourd'hui

seraient effectivement appliquées, et que l'O.N.U. aurait les moyens d'en obtenir le respect par Israël.

Q. Quel est l'objet de votre voyage en France?

R. Les peuples opprimés guettent avec la sensibilité d'un radar les démarches des hommes honnêtes qui cherchent à comprendre la vérité sur leurs justes luttes. C'est pourquoi nous suivons de près la politique du général de Gaulle qui se distingue de l'attitude agressive des Etats-Unis. Nous croyons que la France pourrait être un élément d'apaisement de la tension mondiale, ce qui permettrait de briser la féroce attaque impérialiste américaine.

La France gagnerait ainsi l'amitié du peuple arabe et des peuples du Tiers Monde. J'apporte un message verbal en ce sens du chef de l'Etat syrien à M. le président de la République.

336

Letter from U.A.R. President Nasir to U.S. President Johnson.¹

Cairo, June 2, 1967

I welcome your initiative in writing to me about the present situation in the Arab World, because I believe that, however unlikely it seems that we shall agree at the present stage, any joint attempt on our part to establish a direct dialogue may at least do something towards dissipating the atmosphere that has been fabricated in an attempt to suggest that the exercise of legitimate rights is unlawful, and that the right of self-defence is an act of aggression. I also believe that it may be useful, for purposes of passing judgment on the events of the moment, to see them in their full temporal and logical context. In this way we may perhaps avoid misunderstanding and arrive at a sound, reasonable and just appraisal of the present situation.

With this end in view I intend to refer to a number of facts which I should like to describe as basic:

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 23/6/1967. President Nasir sent this letter in reply to a letter on the critical situation in the Middle East he had received from President Johnson on 23 May. See *ante*, doc. 20.

Firstly, we should cast our minds back over the last few days to the measures recently taken by the United Arab Republic, and recall the dangerously aggressive attitude adopted by the Israeli authorities vis-à-vis the Syrian Arab Republic. We should recall the threats of aggression uttered by a number of Israeli officials, and the conjoint concentration of massive forces on the Syrian frontiers, which has certainly been carried out in preparation for an attack on Syria. In view of this it was natural that the United Arab Republic should rise to its responsibilities and take all measures required for action in defence of the Arab homeland against organised aggression.

Secondly, the defensive measures taken by the United Arab Republic required that our armed forces should proceed to their advanced positions on the frontiers, so as to be able to cope with developments in the situation, and, by being in these positions, to intervene against the invasion prepared by Israel. Moreover to ensure the security of the United Nations Emergency Force, we decided that it should be withdrawn, and its withdrawal has now been completed.

Thirdly, after the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, it was logical that the Egyptian armed forces should advance to occupy their positions from which the Emergency Force had withdrawn. This is what the Egyptian forces did, among the positions occupied being Sharm ash-Shaykh, which commands the Tiran Straits. It was also logical that we should exercise our established sovereign rights over the Straits and our territorial waters in the Gulf.

Here, also, I should like to go back with you some years to the Tripartite Aggression against the United Arab Republic, your country's just attitude to which we still remember with such appreciation.

Before that aggression, the United Arab Republic exercised its established legal rights as regards Israeli navigation in the Straits and the Gulf—rights which are quite indisputable. Now that the Emergency Force has departed from the area, to be replaced by Egyptian forces, no one could imagine that Israeli shipping or strategic materials on their way to Israel could be allowed to pass through these waters. Our attitude on this point, apart from being legally unshakeable,

is aimed at the elimination of the last consequences of the Tripartite Aggression, in conformity with the moral principle that the aggressor must not be rewarded for his aggression.

In all the measures we have taken in defence of our country and our rights, we have made two things perfectly clear: firstly, that we shall resist any aggression against us with all the resources we possess, and, secondly, that we shall continue to allow the innocent passage of foreign shipping in our territorial waters. These facts relate to the position declared by the United Arab Republic, a position in which we can see nothing to justify certain quarters' creating an atmosphere of crisis or launching the present war of nerves against us.

While this war of nerves is expanding and assuming a variety of forms, there is a total and regrettable neglect of a number of other facts which I should like to describe as basic. I use this word because it is these facts that are actually influencing the present course of events, and will continue to do so in the future until there is full understanding of them, their implications and their origins. Here I shall refer to only two of them:

The first is the question of the rights of the people of Palestine which, in our opinion, is the most important fact to be recognised. Aggressive armed force has succeeded in expelling this people from their homeland and making them refugees on its frontiers, and the forces of domination and aggression are now depriving them of their unshakeable right to return to it and live in it, in spite of the resolutions of the United Nations, the last of which was adopted as recently as last year.

The second fact is the attitude of Israel to the Armistice Agreements, an attitude which involves not only constant violation of the provisions of these Agreements, but goes so far as to actually deny their existence or the necessity of abiding by them, and even as far as the occupation of the demilitarised zones and the expulsion from them of the United Nations observers, contempt for the international Organisation and attacks on its flag. These are two basic facts whose influence on the recent course and development of events must not be underestimated.

In your letter you referred to two points:

Firstly, you suggested that we should set aside the past and do all we can to save the Middle East and the whole world by avoiding military action. As regards this point, I should like to point out that the policy of the United Arab Republic not only makes world peace its aim, but that in our attempts to realise that aim we are playing a positive role, which I will not expatiate upon, for fear of falling into the snare of self-glorification. As for avoiding military action, all that is necessary here is for me to repeat what I have said before—all we have done is to take such measures as have been imposed on us by the forces of aggression. Our forces have never started any aggression, but we shall certainly resist any aggression against us or against any Arab country with all our might.

Secondly, you stated that the problems of our time cannot be solved through the violation, by men and arms, of international frontiers. In this I agree with you, but it is necessary to examine the manner in which this principle should be enforced in every case. If you are referring to the crossing of the armistice lines by individual Palestinians, I should like to request you to consider the matter in the context of a comprehensive view of the problem of the people of Palestine. I should also like to ask to what extent is any government able to control the feelings of more than one million Palestinians who have lived nearly twenty years without the international community—whose responsibility here is unavoidable—talking the trouble to ensure that they return to their homeland. All that has happened is that at every session the General Assembly has reaffirmed their right to return. The action of certain individual Palestinians in crossing the armistice lines is no more than a manifestation of the anger rightly felt by this people at the complete neglect of their rights by the international community and by the powers which stand by Israel and give her their material and moral support.

In fact, however hard we try to distinguish between different aspects of the problem, in the end we inevitably return to its origin, which lies in the right of the people of Palestine to return to their homeland, and the responsibility of the international community for ensuring that they are in a position to exercise that right.

In conclusion, may I say that in this letter, although it is rather long, I have tried to summarise certain fundamental features of the situation that confronts us in the Arab world, today.

Finally, I should like to assure you that we shall be glad to listen to Vice President Hubert Humphrey whenever he cares to visit the United Arab Republic, and that we shall try to give him a picture of the situation as we see it against the background of the crucial events the Arab nation is now experiencing. I am also ready to send Mr. Zakariya Muhyiddin, Vice President of the Republic, to Washington immediately, to meet with you and explain our point of view to you.

337

Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan.¹
[Excerpts]

Sidi Bil'abbas, June 3, 1967

It is not a question of race or religion; there is no resentment between Jews as Jews and Arabs as Arabs. It is a case of imperialism pure and simple. The American and British imperialists and their allies have strategic, military and economic interests in the area. For this is an oil area: sixty per cent of the oil used in Western industry comes from this area. This is why it was essential that imperialism should establish a base in the area, and create other military and nuclear bases; all the British and American military bases are in this area.

This is the true nature of the conflict. Today, when we talk of the Palestinians' return to their homeland, when we talk of finding a just solution for this grievous problem, which is the problem of the Arabs and of all humanity, when we ask for this we are not asking others to relinquish their rights in our favour, we are asking only for our own rights. We are demanding that the Palestinian people should be allowed to return to their country, Arab Palestine. We are demanding that Arab resources be restored to the Arabs,

¹ *Al-Mujahid*, Algiers, 4/6/1967.

that Arab oil be restored to the Arabs, and that the Americans and British leave our lands—leave the Arab West and the Arab East for their own countries, and go to hell. We do not need their civilisation; in the past they used to boast to our peoples that they had come to teach them civilisation, to teach them how to live, that they had come to help these peoples. But in fact all the Arab peoples, and the Algerian people better than any, know that they came to rob and plunder our resources, to enslave us and destroy our identity, our language, our religion and our history.

This is the truth, and this accounts for the presence of French imperialism here in the recent past, and the presence of Anglo-American imperialism in Aden and many other Arab areas today.

The *raison d'être* of imperialism is to keep us for ever under its sway so that it can enjoy the resources of our lands.

Today there are still millions of people in the Arab world who go barefoot and unclad, millions groaning under the yoke of ignorance, in spite of the fact that the Arab world is the land of gold, the land of oil. But, at the same time, millions of pounds worth of the riches of the Arab homeland are finding their way to American, British, Swiss and other Western banks. In our view, the struggle is not a struggle between Jews and Arabs.

All we demand is our rights. We demand them today, we shall demand them tomorrow, we shall continue to demand them as long as there is an Arab homeland and an Arab nation. You know that these rights can never pass away; in this country we waited patiently for 125 years, and our people were subjected to campaigns of annihilation and genocide; to crusading wars and the forcible christianisation of their country. But, in spite of all that, because we believed in our rights, in the end we were victorious.

The problem of Palestine, which is the problem of all Arabs, the problem of the whole Arab nation, must be solved, and must be solved in the right way, whether the Zionists, the British, and the West as a whole like it or not. The fight, as I said before, is against colonialism and imperialism, against the allies and supporters of imperialism in the Arab world, and it is on this basis that it must be fought. This, too, is the basis on

which the problem must be solved, for Israel came into existence with the absolute support of the Americans, the British and others. It also came into existence as the result of the treachery of many Arab governments at the time, and these reasons for the existence of Israel must be eliminated.

Algeria, with her revolutionary leadership, speaks on behalf of all of you when she says that the struggle is the struggle of all of us, not only of the Palestinians. Geographically, indeed, we are far away, but we have a role to play, and we must play it. It is not a religious struggle, for fourteen centuries have proved that the Arab nation, which believes in Islam, is a stranger to racialism, persecution and enslavement. It is a struggle to establish our rights and the rights of the Palestinians; it is a struggle against imperialism and its allies, because the struggle against Israel cannot be separated from the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Similarly, the struggle against the Zionist state cannot be separated from the struggle against those who, by their treachery in 1948, helped to implant this dagger in the heart of the Arab nation. This, then, is how we should see the struggle—as a struggle against foreign interests.

It is insufferable that the Arab nation, from the Ocean to the Gulf, should live in poverty at a time when hundreds and thousands of millions—and I am not exaggerating—are being sent to America, to make America, Britain and the West in general even richer than they are already. This is the essence of the struggle. It is not the case, as the Western press suggests, and even some progressive people in the West, most regrettably, imagine, that Israel is oppressed by the Arabs. It is not, as they imagine, a religious or racial struggle. . . .

I insist that the only true freedom for the whole Arab world must be based on the expulsion of the British from the area, and the Zionist state along with them. The Americans, too, must be driven out, along with their bases, and sent far away from our land, so that Arab resources may be restored to whom they belong. This is our appraisal of the struggle; it must be regarded on this basis.

On this occasion, from this city of Bil'abbas, in the name of the people of Algeria, we address every Arab from the Ocean to the Gulf, and say to him that this is the nature of the struggle. We say that the struggle is not only against the Sixth Fleet, nor for a gulf called the Gulf of Aqaba, since the Gulf of Aqaba has been known as an Arab Gulf for fourteen centuries and more; it is a matter on which there is no place for discussion. But today we must enter the battle making no distinction between the struggle against Zionism and the struggle against imperialism and its influence and interests in the Arab world.

With this appraisal in mind, we are bound to win the battle, but we must accept as the price of fighting this battle the impossibility of our being friends of the Americans at the same time as we are enemies of the Zionists. This is impossible, for it is Zionism that controls America. Nor can we be friends of the British and at the same time say that we are the opponents of Zionism. If we really want to oppose Zionism, we must oppose America and Britain, and their enslavement, exploitation and arrogant domination of the Arab peoples.

This is our appraisal of the struggle, and if we use this weapon we shall be sure of final victory, because we have rights and we insist on those rights. This is our view of this important problem; this is Algeria's view of this cruel struggle, which is not only the struggle for the Gulf of Aqaba and for Palestine, but total war.

As I said before, our country has a great store of credit in the Arab nation. Having imbibed imperialism with its mother's milk, it decided to rise up, with the best of its sons, and fight the battle of destiny. And our people are now fully prepared to play their part with all means at their disposal in this sacred struggle on behalf of the destiny of the Arabs and independence of the Arab nation.

We are convinced that history is working for us, that the Arab peoples today are fully awakened, that the will of the peoples of the world is the will of God, and that the will of God is unconquerable.

338

Text of the Protocol on Iraq's Accession to the Joint Defence Agreement Between Jordan and the U.A.R.¹

Cairo, June 4, 1967

The Governments of the United Arab Republic, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and the Iraqi Republic, in response to the wish of the Arab peoples of their three countries to support and consolidate the joint defence of the existence of the Arab nation, and in their absolute belief in the common destiny and unity of the Arab nation, and in their desire to unify their efforts for the coordination of defence measures to ensure and protect their security and their national traditions, have agreed to draw up the present Protocol declaring the adherence of the Iraqi Republic to the Joint Defence Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan signed in Cairo on 30 May 1967.

This Protocol shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedure in force in each of the Contracting States, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in the Foreign Ministry of the United Arab Republic.

In confirmation of the above, this Protocol has been signed.

Done in Cairo on 25 Safar 1387 A.H., 4 June 1967 A.D., in three originals.

339

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir After Iraq's Accession to the Joint Defence Agreement Between Jordan and the U.A.R.²

Cairo, June 4, 1967

Dear Brothers;

I will start by thanking President Abd ar-Rahman Arif for his admirable initiative in bringing Iraq into the Joint Defence Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Kingdom of Jordan.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 5/6/1967.

² *Ibid.*

This step, I am sure, will fill the whole Arab nation with self confidence. The Arabs are one nation, and in times of struggle and stress there is no difference between Iraqi, Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese Arabs; we face our common enemy as one man. I should like to say to the Arab nation that Iraq did not wait until this Agreement was signed to take action; in its loyalty to the Arab nation, the national leadership of Iraq took action before the Agreement was signed.

The Agreement is thus no more than an official ratification of a situation that already existed, for the armed forces, army and people of Iraq, and the whole of the Arab nation are on the move.

In these critical days, the Arab nation is faced with a challenge, the challenge of Israel and those who are behind Israel. What happened nearly ten days ago was that we recovered our rights in the Gulf of Aqaba. In 1956 the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba was what it is today, but as a result of Anglo-French aggression we withdrew our forces from Sinai and their place was taken by the United Nations Emergency Force. It was therefore our duty to prepare ourselves for a decisive battle with the enemy, and when we felt that we were prepared, we recovered our rights. The United Nations Emergency Force left, and we returned to the Gulf of Aqaba, and then proceeded to close it.

Today there is talk of the United Nations Emergency Force returning; Mr. Wilson, the British Prime Minister, spoke only yesterday of its return. But I tell him that he is living in an age that came to an end two weeks ago. The United Nations Emergency Force is finished; it has left the country never to return.

I also wish to speak about our rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, and say that some people advocate a statement by the maritime nations. But we shall not recognise any statement by the maritime nations, and shall regard any such statement as an act of aggression against our sovereignty and our legitimate rights. We shall regard such an action as the prelude to hostilities, and we shall resist all aggression.

I am confident that the whole Arab nation will resist and defeat aggression.

Arab unity has brought us respect and dignity, and the forces that support Israel should

realise that their interests lie with the Arabs, not with Israel. The Arab governments and peoples are today united in the face of repeated Israeli aggression. Israeli aggression against us has been constantly repeated during the last ten years, and they have laughed in our faces.

But today we are united against aggression, and if any foreigner dares to attack us we shall be ready for him.

We say to the United States that all American statements have been pro-Israeli, and that the Arabs now know who are their friends and who are their enemies. There have been United Nations resolutions in favour of the people of Palestine, but Israel has refused to implement them. A resolution is adopted every year on the return of the people of Palestine to their country, but Israel refuses with all its force to implement this resolution. There are Security Council resolutions, and neither the United States nor Britain nor any of the Western powers have opposed Israel. But they know that they were being hypocritical; they approve the resolution, but it is never implemented.

Today we say that there must be recognition of the rights of the people of Palestine if there is to be peace and stability in the Middle East.

As for the talk about freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, we say that we have recovered our rights in the Gulf of Aqaba, and that no power on earth can deprive us of them.

In 1956 Israel attacked us, confident that Britain and France were with her in the battle. Since then they have talked about their victories in the war in Sinai. Today we tell them: "We are face to face with you, and burning with enthusiasm for the fight, so that we may avenge the perfidy of 1956, and show the world who are the Arabs and who is Israel; so that we may show the world that the Arab soldier is a brave fighter, and that the Arab people are a brave, gallant and dedicated people."

Finally, I want to say that at five o'clock today I got in touch with King Husayn by telephone, and told him of Iraq's proposal to sign this Agreement. King Husayn welcomed this move with all his heart. He later got in touch with me again, at about seven o'clock, to tell me that he had contacted President Abd ar-Rahman Arif, and that Jordan felt full of confidence,

power and pride as a result of this step.

We are, with God's help, advancing along the road towards our rights and the rights of the people of Palestine, and God willing, we shall be victorious. The Arab nation will be victorious; "if God grants you victory, none can conquer you."

Thank you brothers, and may God grant us success.

340

Communiqués Issued by the U.A.R. Foreign Ministry Following the Initiation of Hostilities by Israel.¹

Cairo, June 5, 1967

Communiqué No. 1

Early this morning Israel launched an aggression against the United Arab Republic by raiding United Arab Republic airfields in Cairo and the Canal Zone. Our forces resisted this aggression.

Communiqué No. 2

The United Arab Republic has informed the President of the Security Council that Israel today launched an aggression against the United Arab Republic by raiding United Arab Republic airfields in Cairo and the Canal Zone, and that the armed forces of the United Arab Republic resisted this aggression.

Communiqué No. 3

The details of the Israeli conspiracy are beginning to become clear. While Israel was beginning her aggression against the United Arab Republic and attacking Egyptian airfields in Cairo and the Canal Zone, the Israeli delegate at the United Nations was claiming that the United Arab Republic had started the aggression. In this manner Israel is trying to deceive the world by misrepresenting events to give the impression that Israel is on the defensive. A few hours later, however, Israel's conspiracies of aggression began to become clearer, when Israeli planes attacked

a French oil tanker passing through the Canal. Our forces offered resistance to the raiding planes and forced them to withdraw.

It is clear that Israel has two objects: the first is to impede navigation in the Suez Canal, and the second to involve a third party in the Israeli aggression.

The United Arab Republic draws the attention of the whole world to this Israeli conspiracy and to Israel's aggressive intentions against the Suez Canal and her wish to involve other countries in the armed struggle started by her.

Communiqué No. 4

Ambassador Mahmud Riyadh, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, today received M. Jacques Roux, French Ambassador in Cairo, and informed him that Israel has today launched an aggression against the United Arab Republic, Israeli planes having raided Egyptian airfields in Cairo and the Canal Zone. He also informed the Ambassador that Israeli planes have attacked a French oil tanker which was passing through the Canal.

The Foreign Minister also explained to the French Ambassador that Israel is thereby trying to throw the responsibility for starting hostilities on to the United Arab Republic, to impede navigation in the Canal, and to involve a third party in the present armed struggle.

341

Statement by Sudanese President al-Azhari to the People.² [Excerpt]

Khartum, June 5, 1967

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Sudan is an inseparable part of the Arab nation, and a vital, active and integrated sector of the Arab people. We hereby declare, at the very beginning of the treacherous Israeli attack, that we are at war with Israel, and that the Sovereignty Council has approved the declaration of a state of emergency in the Sudanese Re-

¹ *Ibid.*, 6/6/1967.

² *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Khartum, 6/6/1967.

public, and the declaration of general mobilisation at both popular and official levels.

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342

Speech of Tunisian President Bourghiba on the "Battle of Palestine."* [Excerpt]

Carthage, June 5, 1967

Fellow citizens;

Now that the fighting has started, and the struggle for truth, justice and peace has really begun, the government and people of Tunisia stand beside the other Arab countries in their effort to liberate Palestine, whose territory was usurped and whose population was expelled nineteen years ago. On this occasion we must remind the people, and our brothers and friends in every country in the world, our Jewish fellow-citizens and our friends in the leftist parties in France who supported us during our struggle for emancipation and liberation from imperialism, that our stand against Israel is by no means the result of religious or racial fanaticism or hatred for the Jews. On the contrary, it is on behalf of the principles and values for which these leftist parties, the French people and all peace-loving peoples supported us when our freedom was trampled under foot and we resisted French imperialism.

What really distresses us is that large numbers of our friends in France seem to have forgotten how Israel came into existence. Their attitude now seems to be that Israel is an established state that has been attacked by the Arabs, and it must live.

How did this Jewish state come into existence? It was established in a land that had been in the possession of its owners for two thousand years, when the Jews started gradually taking possession of it. In this they were like the imperialists in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; they, too,

employed the methods of colonialism by settlement. The establishment of the Jewish state was supported by aid from Britain, which had the mandate over Palestine, and was carried out in implementation of the Balfour Declaration. Then all the Allies joined forces against the Palestinian people—the same Allies who had resisted the tyranny and violence of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, to establish the principles of democracy and freedom—and imposed their protection on every part of the Middle East.

After the second World War we were shocked to see Palestine, which, like the rest of the Middle East, was under British control, being taken from the Arabs. British politicians were doing all they could to colonise the country by encouraging Jews to immigrate and settle there, arming them and strengthening their gangs until the Arabs of Palestine realised that their country had passed from their hands.

This is something that can never be forgotten, for all men of principle must hold the same views on similar situations. But some of those who supported the cause of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, out of their hatred of settlement colonialism, object to the Arabs fighting against Israel, although in fact Israel practises exactly the same form of colonialism. It is therefore amazing that they should now be claiming that the war is a racial one between Jews and Muslims, and that the poor Jews deserve to be pitied because of what they suffered in Europe.

What, I wonder, would the European countries have done if some other country than Palestine—say part of France, Britain, Sweden, Germany, Tunisia or Algeria, had been chosen for the Jews to settle in?

Our attitude today is the same as it would have been if part of Tunisian territory—Sfax or Gabes, for example—had been set aside for gradual settlement by Jews, and then, a state called Israel had been resurrected, and the population of this territory expelled by force of arms.

The Arab peoples whose countries verge on Israel did not possess the proficiency in the arts of war that the Jews had acquired in the Second World War. The result was that, in spite of their numerical superiority, the Arabs were defeated in 1948, and the performance was repeated in 1956, when Britain, France and Israel joined

¹ *The Battle of Palestine*, official publication of the State Secretariat for Cultural Affairs and Information, Tunis, 19/6/1967. The President spoke at the end of a meeting of the Council of the Republic.

forces against them after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. At that time of trial, too, we stood by the Arabs in support of what was right and out of respect for the principle that all peoples are entitled to do what they wish with their own homelands.

I have only dealt with these details to dispel confusion, and to show that it is not possible to disregard or ignore the problem as long as the Arabs continue to exist, and as long as some of them, expelled from their country, continue to live on its frontiers in the most deplorable conditions. And all this is happening in an age when all peoples have been liberated, the colonialist empires have collapsed, and the peoples of Central, West and East Africa, and even the countries which were formerly the victims of settlement colonialism, have been liberated. It is an age, too, in which all the countries of the Middle East have won their independence, with the end of foreign tutelage, except for the unfortunate people of Palestine, whose liberation was prevented by the Balfour Declaration and the Allies' signature of the Treaty of Versailles and had to make way for the persecuted Jews, whose persecution by peoples who, we used to think, had reached a higher standard than the peoples of the Middle East we ourselves deplored. We cannot allow liberties to be taken with the rights of the people of Palestine because the Jews suffered at the hands of the Nazis, for one injustice does not justify another.

This is what I am constantly repeating; it is what I said to the Americans themselves in New York and Washington. I reminded them that it is not fitting that a great republic like America, which claims to carry the banner of democracy and freedom, advocates the principles we hold sacred and lays so much emphasis on what is right, should support such an injustice. It is not fitting that America should do her best to strengthen and defend this injustice—this is something entirely illogical and extremely difficult to understand—and then try to set her conscience at rest by sending food to the refugees and approving the United Nations budget for aid to them.

But the Arabs have their honour, which is far more important than supplies of wheat or rice sent as aid, and this honour was injured by the expulsion of a people from their homes, to be

replaced by an alien people. This is something that cannot be tolerated by any man whose attitude is dictated by his principles, regardless of all other considerations.

I said that when the time came, Tunisia would be ready to fight with all her resources, however limited these may be, for she has not the resources of other countries. These resources are also affected by the facts of geography; were we Palestine's neighbours, we could do much more. This was proved during the war in Algeria, to which we gave our full support, thus incurring the vengeance of the enemy. But it must not be forgotten, either by us or by the Arab peoples who live in the line of fire, that we in the Arab Maghrib are thousands of kilometres away from the field of battle. Thus our contribution will not be the same as if we verged on Palestine. Similarly, the aid provided by the peoples of the Middle East to Algeria was different, for geographical reasons, from the aid it received from Tunisia and Morocco. But, in spite of the distance, we are ready, to the extent of our powers, to make our contribution, for this we regard as our duty. We also regard it as our duty to do all we can to raise the morale of the Arab peoples by supporting the rights of a people to whom a great injustice has been done.

It is to this that I wanted to call the attention of the Tunisian people and other peoples who love liberty and justice, that they may all realise that Tunisia's attitude is not the result of fanaticism, racialism or hatred of the Jews. They should realise that our attitude derives from lofty principles, and that when we defend these principles we think neither of the colour, race nor geographical situation of those we are helping, Nor do we care whether they be Algerians, Angolans or any other people who are struggling for freedom and independence. Tunisia will always support the cause of justice, truth and freedom.

The position is perfectly clear, although propaganda has represented the Palestinians as aggressors, in spite of the fact that they were evicted from their homes and their country by force of arms, to make way for people who had come from Europe, on the pretext that there was a Jewish state in Palestine four thousand years ago.

This has been our attitude for twenty-one

years, and we have never confused Zionism with the question of the Jews here in Tunisia. For it is a mistake to think that all Jews are Zionists, or that they all support Israel. And it would be a disaster for the Palestine problem if we made it a racial one; then all the other races would join forces against us.

We were the first to remove this problem from its racial context and regard it as a problem of colonialism. This is of particular importance in present circumstances, when all free peoples are taking their stand against imperialism—even France herself, which was one of the greatest colonial powers, has thrown off the infection of colonialism and now respects the rights of peoples. Her attitude today is quite different from what it was in 1956. If we regard the problem as a war for freedom, honour and emancipation, we shall get much more support.

We have told our friends that Burghiba is grateful to the great powers like America and Britain that helped Tunisia at a critical period, when France was still a colonial power and was trying to annihilate us. That was at a time when our independence was threatened, and those countries stood up for Tunisia's rights—our people appreciate this, and will never forget it. But this does not oblige us to keep silent when the rights of another persecuted people are violated. Every man with a conscience must condemn what has happened to Palestine, and I have observed that many Americans have been embarrassed and grieved whenever this problem has been mentioned.

You must always remember that this is a question of principle. At a time when colonialism has passed away and the colonialist empires are no more, it is intolerable that the wretched people of Palestine should be condemned to perpetual dispersion.

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343

Communiqué Issued by Iraq Announcing Its Declaration of War on Israel.¹

Baghdad, June 5, 1967

The government of the Iraqi Republic announces to all countries in the world that it is at war with the Israeli gangs and that it will regard any country that aids or abets Israel as committing an act of aggression against the Iraqi Republic, which will therefore feel itself free to take any such measures against any such state or states as may be sanctioned by international law and custom.

General Abd ar-Rahman Arif
President of the Republic and Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces

344

Statement by the Libyan Government Announcing a State of Defensive War Against Israel.²

Al-Bayda', June 5, 1967

Fellow-citizens;

Now that the aggression has shown its true face and that the Israeli gangs have disclosed their perfidious intentions by attacking our Arab brothers, Libya declares that she is in a state of defensive war with the Israeli gangs. She places all her resources at the disposal of the struggle and will make every possible effort to meet her responsibilities and perform her duty, in obedience to the commands of our Commander in Chief, His Majesty the King, and as an expression of the unity of the Arab struggle. Orders have been issued to units of our young army to move up to advanced positions to perform their sacred duty and to be ready to lay down their lives in defence of the Arabs and of their indisputable right in that Arab region.

The government is determined to support with all its strength the efforts of the other Arab

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 6/6/1967.

² *Tarablus al-Gharb*, Tripoli, 6/6/1967.

countries to crush aggression and ensure that they recover their lost territory. With this end in view it calls on all citizens to appreciate the gravity of the present situation, in which the strength and endurance of the Arab nation are being put to the test.

The government is well aware that this situation demands the mobilisation of all resources for the confrontation of aggression in every part of the great Arab homeland, and that the battle which is now being fought for the destiny of the Arab nation is a battle which every true Muslim who believes in his religion and every true Arab who believes in his Arabism is eager to join. It therefore hopes to give expression to your noble and patriotic attitude by implementing the orders of His Majesty the King for the mobilisation of all our resources for the battle and the direction of all our forces into the course of support, sacrifice and dedication.

At this decisive moment the Arabs are fighting shoulder to shoulder to repulse aggression and defend the eternal verities of their nation. The government, strengthened by the confidence felt by all citizens of this country in its conduct of affairs and its unwavering attitude, urges them to be calm and to practise self-restraint. In this way they can assist the authorities in maintaining security and order and enable them to give expression to the people's national will by the prompt performance of their duties. Confident in the response of all citizens to the gravity of the present situation and in their understanding that the infringement of law and order can neither be of service to the objectives of the battle nor realise our great aspirations, the government undertakes to join the vanguard of the Arab forces as they advance towards victory and liberation.

345

Decree Issued by the Ruler of Kuwait Announcing a State of War Against Israel.¹

Kuwait, June 5, 1967

Article 1. We announce and declare that,

¹ *Al-Hayat*, 6/6/1967

since this morning, Kuwait, has been in a state of defensive war with the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine.

Article 2. The Prime Minister shall communicate this decree to the National Assembly, and the Foreign Minister shall communicate it to those concerned.

346

Cable Message of Solidarity from Saudi King Faysal to U.A.R. President Nasir.²

Riyadh, June 5, 1967

To His Excellency President Gamal Abd an-Nasir.

We stand beside you with all our strength and resources in this battle of destiny and offer you our full support in this decisive battle in the history of the Arab nation. Our forces have entered Jordan to stand beside the other Arab countries. We pray that God will support us all.

347

Speech of Moroccan King Hasan II to the Army Contingent Headed for the Middle East.³ [Excerpt]

Rabat, June 5, 1967

My beloved people;

You know that the Arab nation and the whole of Islam are passing through one of the gravest and most critical periods in their history. You also know that another Arab country, the United Arab Republic, was today the object of an iniquitous and perfidious attack by the enemies of Islam.

You likewise know that, as soon as the Arab countries heard this grievous news, they rose as

² *Al-Bilad*, 6/6/1967.

³ *The Kingdom of Morocco in the Battle for Palestine*, Moroccan Embassy, Beirut, n.d., p. 11.

one, in unparalleled enthusiasm, to the support of their sister Egypt.

In 1947, when Morocco, far from expecting independence, was still groaning under the yoke of imperialism, its King and Liberator, Muhammad V, said that he regarded his country as a member of the Arab family of nations and of the Arab League, and that it was ready to sacrifice all that was most precious for the glory of the Arabs and the honour of the Muslims.

For the last eight days we have been closely and constantly following the situation in the Middle East, and at the appropriate moment we officially declared our attitude and stated that we were ready to go and fight beside our brother Arabs. The time has now come, and today our Royal Armed Forces are ready to depart for the Middle East, where they will fight side by side with Arab armed forces from every Arab country.

348

Resolutions Adopted by the Conference of Arab Petroleum Ministers.¹

Baghdad, June 5, 1967

In response to the invitation of the government of the Iraqi Republic, representatives of all the Arab oil-producing countries and those of other Arab countries participating with them in their Conference held in Baghdad on 24 and 25 Safar 1387 A.H., 4 and 5 June 1967, met and studied the subject of the treacherous Israeli aggression against the Arab nation. They condemned in the strongest terms this aggression and any support for it, in whatever form, and unanimously resolved the following:

Firstly, to cut off the flow of Arab oil and to prevent its delivery, either directly or indirectly, to countries which commit or take part in any aggression against the sovereignty, territory, or territorial waters of any Arab country, with particular reference to the Gulf of Aqaba.

By aggression which would lead to the interruption of oil supplies, the Conference means:

1. Direct armed aggression by any country in support of Israel.
2. Provision of military aid to the enemy in any form whatsoever.
3. Attempts by merchant shipping to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba under military protection of any form whatsoever.

The Conference recommends the formation of a permanent committee composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab countries, to meet within forty-eight hours of any of its members calling for a meeting, with a view to determining what stands have been adopted which might be regarded as constituting aggression.

Secondly, this Conference resolved:

1. That the undertaking by any state of direct or indirect armed aggression against the Arab countries would subject the funds of companies and nationals belonging to such a state in the Arab countries, including the funds invested by the oil companies, to the laws of war.
2. This Conference recommends that all the Arab countries should convene an emergency meeting to enforce the same decision with regard to all other funds invested by companies or nationals of such aggressor states and warns all foreign oil companies operating in Arab countries of the consequences of their conveying oil to the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine irrespective of the source or point of origin of this oil, be it directly or indirectly, or in cooperation with other parties; it also reaffirms the liability of these companies to the Unified Boycott of Israel Law.

This Conference considers that the signing of any declaration infringing the sovereignty of the Arab countries over the Gulf of Aqaba would constitute an act which would justify the prohibition of tankers of the signatory state from carrying Arab oil.

A committee composed of the Oil Ministers of the Arab oil-producing countries shall be formed to take the necessary measures in this connection.

This Conference calls on all Islamic and friendly oil-producing countries, in particular Iran, to take all necessary measures to prevent the delivery of oil to the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine in any form whatsoever.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 6/6/1967,

Signed:

Abd as-Sattar Ali Husayn, Head of the Iraqi Delegation

Engineer Hasan Amir, Head of the U.A.R. Delegation

Fawzi Bardawil, Head of the Lebanese Delegation

Mahmud Alawi, Head of the Bahraini Delegation

Dr. Nadim Pachachi, Head of the Abu Dhabi Delegation

Daud Akruf, Head of the Algerian Delegation

Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Head of the Saudi Delegation

Abd ar-Rahman Atiqi, Head of the Kuwaiti Delegation

Khalifah Musa, Head of the Libyan Delegation

Dr. Hasan Kamil, Head of the Qatari Delegation

349

Military Communiqués Issued by the U.A.R. on the Progress of Hostilities.¹

Cairo, June 5, 1967

Communiqué No. 1 0950 hours

A military source stated that Israel started its aggression at 0900 hours this morning with air raids on Cairo and other parts of the United Arab Republic. The attacks were resisted by our planes and anti-aircraft units.

Communiqué No. 5 1155 hours

At 0900 hours this morning the enemy launched a large-scale air and land attack on the United Arab Republic. In the air Israeli planes raided a number of military airfields in Sinai and the Canal Zone and an air base near Cairo. On land the enemy launched several attacks on all fronts, and at present attacks along the whole front on the Egyptian frontier are in progress, and air attacks are being made on Sharm as-Shaykh. There can now be no doubt that Israel has started a full-scale aggression on all fronts, and in spite of all the attempts she is now making

to suggest that it was the United Arab Republic that attacked first, the sequence of events makes the truth perfectly clear. In resisting and repelling the attack, the United Arab Republic is performing its sacred duty, and declares that Israel and those who have given Israel their full support in the past, and are doing so now, will have to bear the inevitable consequences of aggression.

Communiqué No. 7

1230 hours

The first of the enemy pilots whose planes were brought down during the aggressive operations undertaken by the Israelis this morning has been interrogated. He is Captain Lavo Mordechai, number 9968744, number of unit 135. In the course of his interrogation he said that he and his unit received orders to attack the United Arab Republic at 6 a.m. this morning. His unit's specific task was to attack Al-Malig airfield in the United Arab Republic, and it took off from Hatur military airfield in Israel to carry out its orders.

The interrogation of this first enemy pilot to be taken prisoner provides conclusive evidence that, in spite of official statements designed to conceal her attitude from world public opinion, it was Israel that started the attack on the Arab front. The United Arab Republic High Command is now sending a televised recording of the evidence of the first of the Israeli pilots to the Security Council so that the whole world may know who started the aggression. The other enemy pilots who have been taken prisoner are now being interrogated.

Communiqué No. 9

1345 hours

Enemy air raids on airfields are still continuing, and so far 70 enemy planes have been brought down.

Communiqué No. 14

1656 hours

The enemy has been forced to withdraw from Khan Yunis after violent fighting. The enemy was resisted by Palestinian forces and civilians inside the town itself, and large numbers of enemy tanks were destroyed before the withdrawal.

Supreme Command Communiqué

1730 hours

At noon today the enemy launched three main attacks towards Kuntilla, Abu Ageila and

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 6/6/1967.

Khan Yunis. All attacks have been smashed. The attack on Kuntilla was made with armoured forces; 30 tanks were involved, most of which the enemy lost when the attack was smashed and he was forced to retreat. In the Abu Ageila area our forces counter-attacked and forced the enemy to retire with heavy losses. The enemy tried to advance on Khan Yunis in a concentrated attack, but the forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian National Resistance resisted the attack and successfully pursued the defeated enemy troops as they retreated.

350

Cable from Joint Arab Command Chief of Staff General Riyadh to U.A.R. President Nasir.¹

Amman, June 6, 1967

1200 hours

The situation on the West Bank is deteriorating rapidly. Concentrated attacks on all fronts, with violent bombing from the air day and night. Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air forces in (3 H) and bombers practically destroyed. After consultation with King Husayn he has asked me to inform you that there are three possible solutions:

1. An effective political decision for a cease-fire today to be imposed from outside. (America-Russia-Security Council).

2. Evacuation of the West Bank tonight.

3. Staying one day longer will mean that the Jordanian army will be completely cut off and destroyed.

King Husayn has asked me to submit the matter to you for your urgent reply.

¹ Sa'd Jum'ah, *The Conspiracy and the Battle of Destiny* (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1968), p. 236.

351

Communiqué by the High Command of the U.A.R. Armed Forces Announcing the Interruption of Navigation in the Suez Canal.²

Cairo, June 6, 1967

1210 hours

There is now definite proof of intervention by the governments of the United States of America and Britain in the present military aggression by Israel. This intervention is at its ugliest on the Jordanian front, where the combined Jordanian and Iraqi forces are fighting side by side; it is also apparent in the enemy's air operations on the Egyptian front and the protective air cover which, taking off from American and British carriers, is protecting Israeli air space. It has therefore been officially decided to stop navigation in the Suez Canal.

Furthermore, Israeli aircraft have carried out repeated raids on ships passing through the Canal. To ensure the security of this vital waterway it is therefore essential to clear it completely of shipping, so that it may not be exposed to enemy raids which might put it out of action for a long period.

352

Cable from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. President Nasir on the Military Situation in the West Bank.³

Amman, June 6, 1967

1230 hours

To His Excellency President Gamal Abd an-Nasir:

The situation is extremely deteriorated; in Jerusalem it is very bad indeed. We are losing tanks at the rate of one every ten minutes, in addition to heavy losses of life and equipment everywhere. The enemy is concentrating all his forces against the Arab troops in this country,

² *Al-Ahram*, 7/6/1967.

³ Jum'ah, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

which is your country. We are indeed proud of the resistance put up by these Arab troops, both Jordanian and Iraqi, whose blood is flowing on the sacred soil of Jordan as they fight with the desperate courage and endurance that will be the talk of future generations. We are holding out, but it is clear that the enemy's main objective is the West Bank of Jordan—which we have pledged ourselves to keep in Arab hands ever since the disaster—once he has destroyed and annihilated these Arab troops and destroyed us all. This is happening because we have no air support, because we have endured the enemy's attacks with all our forces since the operations began without effective military support from our right wing.

If this state of affairs continues, there can be but one result—that you and the Arab nation will lose this citadel and all its forces after the most appalling carnage in our history. This means a reverse to the Arab war effort amounting to an overwhelming calamity.

Let me tell you the details of the situation, so that you may share with me in the greatest responsibility I have been faced with in all my life.

I hear that General Abd al-Mun'im Riyadh has already sent your Excellency a cable describing the situation, and I hope you will lose no time in appraising it, in the light of what I have told you. And may God guide us aright.

The United States Ambassador has contacted us, bringing a definite assurance that they had no foreknowledge of the enemy's intentions, that they have no carriers in the area, and that not a single American plane has taken part, or will take part, in the fighting. I have decided that I had better tell you this, with full details of the situation, to have your opinion. Until it reaches me, we here are engaged in a suicidal battle; what grieves me more than anything else is that every moment of it I see the fruits of the years of effort we have spent in building up the forces of this country, which are the forces of the whole Arab nation, being destroyed as they gallantly and honourably resist to their last breath. Beside them and with them are the forces of Iraq, which have throughout fought beside us in the field of battle with all their strength.

I beg you to reply immediately.

Husayn

353

Cable from the Deputy Supreme Commander of U.A.R. Armed Forces Marshal Amir to Jordanian King Husayn.¹

Cairo, June 6, 1967

1430 hours

From Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amir to His Majesty King Husayn

We shall make every effort to obtain a cease-fire, and agree to the withdrawal of the regular army. Try to arm the people for popular resistance.

354

Cable from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. Marshal Amir.²

Amman, June 6, 1967

From Husayn to Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amir

With reference to your cable in reply to the cable of General Abd al-Mun'im Riyadh, agreeing to the withdrawal of the regular army and mentioning your efforts to secure a cease-fire, I hereby inform you that the situation of the forces here is as follows:

They are being subjected to constant concentrated shelling; we are trying to keep them in the field as long as possible in the hope of securing a cease-fire while they are still in the field. It goes without saying that we shall resist desperately and only retreat if it is clear that continued resistance will result in their annihilation. Arms have been in the hands of the people from the beginning.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, p. 244.

355

Letter from U.A.R. President Nasir to the Arab Heads of State on the Need for a Unified Stand.¹

Cairo, June 6, 1967

Office of the President,

Cairo, 6 June 1967.

To _____

Greetings. The present situation, in my estimate, demands a unified, definite and resolute Arab attitude. Such an attitude, I believe, can have a great effect on the sacred struggle in which our peoples and our armed forces are today engaged.

I propose that the enclosed draft be issued as an expression of such a unified Arab attitude:

1. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries believe that there is at present no alternative to a united and determined stand against Israeli aggression supported by the forces of imperialism.

2. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries are entirely convinced that Israel could not have done what she has done without constant and concentrated military support from the United States of America, Britain and other countries that make common cause with her.

3. Determined as they are to take this decisive stand against Israeli aggression the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries affirm that this attitude can only be fully effective if the same attitude is adopted toward the foreign imperialist forces that support this aggression. They affirm, too, that there must be a practical and positive appraisal of the forces which have condemned the aggression, or which have shown that they are capable of taking an objective and independent view of the situation.

4. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries are determined that none of the countries supporting the Israeli aggression shall be allowed the smallest foothold in any Arab country, in any field, unless they immediately change their attitude.

5. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries believe that the heroic stand of the

peoples of the Arab nation has finally and permanently resolved all differences between the Arabs.

6. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries are convinced that a new system should be established in the whole Arab homeland, based on the common destiny that has been sealed with blood on the field of battle. They believe that an Arab Summit Conference should meet as soon as possible after the end of this battle of destiny, to draft the outlines of this proposed system, on a basis of sincere cooperation, mutual confidence, self-denial, and the eternal aspirations of the Arab peoples, which will outlive all individuals and are above the highest offices of state.

7. In the knowledge that they are faced with an extremely grave situation and immense responsibilities, the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries declare that all Arab resources and potentials will be unconditionally and unrestrictedly placed at the service of the battle of destiny, and they believe that the powers that have declared themselves the enemies of the Arab nation and facilitated the Israeli aggression should bear the cost of it.

8. So that their point of view may be perfectly clear to all concerned, the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries hereby resolve that King Husayn should, as soon as his responsibilities permit, act as the spokesman of all of them and meet the President of the United States, and that President Hawari Bumadyan should, as soon as possible, meet the head of the Soviet government on their behalf to explain to them the present situation and the possible consequences to world peace of continued Israeli aggression supported by the forces of imperialism.

9. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries hereby call on all free and friendly peoples who believe in peace based on justice to raise their voices in support of Arab rights and to give all possible support to the gallant efforts of the Arabs.

10. The Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries have instructed their ambassadors in the capitals of the world to call on the heads of states or governments to which they are accredited and to submit to them the unanimous Arab view of the situation and scope of the struggle. They

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 5/1/1968.

do not ask anyone to choose between them and any other party, but they sincerely believe that the choice lies between freedom and domination by foreigners and their bases of aggression.

356

Statement by Sudanese President al-Azhari to the People.¹

Khartum, June 6, 1967

My dear fellow-citizens;

Greetings. This morning the decisive battle between the Arab nation and the Israeli forces of injustice and aggression entered its second day. In the Council of Ministers, the Defence Council and all the other security organisations, we have been holding non-stop meetings to coordinate efforts with the Arab countries and meet our obligations. Our forces are now in full readiness to fight, and, as you know, we have declared a state of emergency and taken all necessary steps to safeguard the home front while standing by our Arab brothers on the field of battle. The whole world has seen how our people have risen to the situation and shown how ready they are for self-sacrifice. While praising this honourable stand taken by our people, I should like to remind them that the most important weapons we depend on for the achievement of victory are patience and self-control.

Cairo, Amman and Damascus have all reported today that it has now been confirmed that Britain and the United States are helping the enemy and providing Israel with aid. We are in constant contact with the other Arab countries so that we may coordinate our operations to confront this situation and adopt a common attitude to it. Today I sent for the ambassadors of America and Britain, who brought me denials by their governments of what has been confirmed by the Arab capitals—that they are aiding Israel. I told them that we in the Sudan stand firmly by our brother Arabs and shall not hesitate to adopt the attitude dictated to us by the interests of our country and the honour of the battle we are

fighting. I assured them that we, like the other Arab countries, are determined to sever diplomatic and economic relations with both America and Britain, and asked them to inform their governments of this. We are in contact with the other Arab countries with a view to coordination in this matter. What I ask of you is that you should be confident that your government is aware of how much trust and courage is expected of it, that you close ranks in support of it, and that you do nothing to impede the efforts we are making to secure victory. I also ask you to refrain from demonstrations in these critical hours, and hope that all you do will be marked by the wisdom and self-control for which our people have been renowned throughout the centuries. May God grant victory to the Arabs!

357

Statement by Algerian Finance Minister Ahmad on the Enforcement of General Mobilisation.² [Excerpt]

Algiers, June 6, 1967

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For some weeks, Anglo-American imperialism has been disguising its planes and equipment for a surprise attack on the Arab peoples in the Middle East, in the belief that it could thereby mislead world public opinion and deceive the peoples of the world.

World Zionism, which is the agent of imperialism, has mobilised all the material and financial means at its disposal to provide massive aid to the so-called State of Israel. This has been done under the supervision of certain Western powers and with the aid of organisations which claim to be progressive and which, through their treachery to the weak and persecuted, and their ignorance of the course of history, have encouraged the ugliest manifestations of racialism and religious persecution. In this they are, in fact, resuscitating Hitler and his fascist ideology.

In view of the present situation, in which the Arab countries are involved in a battle of life and

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Khartum, 7/6/1967.

² *Ash-Sha'b*, Algiers, 7/6/1967.

death, the Revolutionary Council, in a decision adopted on 27 May, 1967, decreed the full and unrestricted mobilisation of all citizens.

Following this decision the government, at its meeting on 5 June, 1967, made a number of important decisions, which it is determined to enforce. Algeria is directly concerned with this struggle, and is now at war.

This will call for material and moral sacrifices, and for sacrifice of lives. It also means that all citizens, both men and women, must place themselves and their resources at the disposal of their country.

Our armed forces are now on their way to the front.

To fulfil our military obligations, the government has decided to mobilise all necessary material resources by voting an emergency budget. This budget is an expression of Algeria's active involvement in the present struggle of the Arab nation with all the means at her disposal, and will provide the necessary financial support for our men who are about to fight under the red, green and white of the Algerian flag. From now on the duty of every citizen is clear—it consists of sacrifices in war, full war effort, and the appropriate mobilisation of men, resources and material.

At the behest of the Revolutionary Council and the government, I am here to inform you of the first urgent measures that are to be taken:

1. It has been decided to impose an extraordinary levy on all citizens proportional to their resources, to be collected in the course of the coming week. Details of how this levy is to be expended will be published from time to time.

2. All occupied in economic activities are called on to make every effort to raise the level of production and, at the same time, to reduce unprofitable consumption expenses.

3. All who are in arrears in the payment of taxes are called on to discharge their financial obligations rapidly, and to pay taxes before they are due, if possible.

4. A solidarity campaign will be organised to allow all citizens, male and female, to have a personal share in the war effort of the Arab nation which is the victim of the latest conspiracy of cowardly imperialist aggression.

5. Instructions have been given to the

responsible departments, which have been working day and night, to permit all citizens to carry out their urgent obligations.

There are certain historical circumstances in which, to protect his honour, every man must be prepared to forget his possessions and all that is most dear to him.

Men and women of Algeria;

The history of our country has been a continuous historical struggle in which the Algerian people have acted as one man and proved that they are capable of fighting every battle however great its scope. Now once more our martyrs of the past call on us over the centuries to make a mighty effort for the effective enforcement of all decisions.

In the battle that has been forced upon us there is no place for hesitation or counting the cost; there is no place for sterile analysis.

The battle may well be long, and all Arabs worthy of the name must face the situation on the assumption that it will be long.

In the cities, on the shores, in the mountains and in the streets, around the oil wells and the centres of production, in all social groups, there must be unlimited resolution, involvement and vigilance; complaints and regrets must be eliminated for good.

A time of crisis is a time for acts of courage.

The Arabs should assume that the war will be a long one, a war which must inevitably be fought by armed popular forces in a guerrilla war, alongside the regular forces, with all the consequences attendant on this.

Coming generations will never forgive any procrastination on the part of this generation, for it is a question of defending the very foundations of Arab society.

What matters the occupation or temporary invasion of this or that piece of Arab territory under the weight of the coordinated forces of imperialism? That is of no importance. What is important is to choose an integrated strategy within the framework of an over-all struggle for our life.

History will never forgive us if we hesitate in our choice between death and a life of humiliation.

358

Statement Issued by the Syrian Embassy in Algiers on the "Participation of the American and British Air Forces in the Battle."¹

Algiers, June 6, 1967

The truth has been disclosed about the Zionist-imperialist conspiracy hatched by world imperialism against the Arab homeland. The object of this conspiracy is to strengthen the stranglehold of imperialist monopolies, so that they may be better able to devour the Arabs' oil resources and keep the Arab people in a state of backwardness and poverty.

The density of the air attacks launched by the gangster state against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria proves that American and British air forces are taking part in the fighting.

The four Zionist pilots taken prisoner by the Syrian army have confessed that American and British aircraft have been stationed in various Israeli airfields for fifteen days, and that they have taken part, along with the planes of the gangster state, in all the raids on the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic.

The Syrian Arab Republic intends to send the Security Council a tape-recording of the confession of the Zionist pilot Gadan which confirms that British aircraft took part in the attacks.

The Arab masses, under the command of their revolutionary vanguards, will continue the struggle against the forces of evil and the treacherous Zionist gangs, and resist Anglo-American imperialist aggression until victory is won. All free men in the world, and their revolutionary and progressive forces, will stand by us in our efforts to overthrow imperialism and its foster-child, Israel.

359

Military Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. on U.S. British Intervention.²

Cairo, June 6, 1967

Communiqué No. 3

1800 hours

Wide-scale air intervention in favour of Israel by the United States of America and Britain has brought about important developments in the course of the hostilities. Our forces are now fighting desperately in Egyptian territory and resisting with exemplary courage the attacks of the enemy on al-Arish, Abu Ageilah and al-Qasimah. The enemy is now employing huge forces in the fighting, and in spite of heavy losses in planes and tanks, these losses are being made up by reinforcements from those who are supporting Israel.

360

Cable from U.A.R. President Nasir to Jordanian King Husayn.³

Cairo, June 6, 1967

1523 hours

To King Husayn

I have received your cable. In my estimate we are facing one of those moments in the history of our nation that require super-human courage. At such a moment it is our duty to meet the requirements of the situation whatever the cost. We are aware of your situation. We, too, on our front, are faced with a gravely deteriorated situation as a result of yesterday's crushing air attacks. This means that our forces are facing superior forces on all fronts, without air cover. When history comes to be written it will certainly record your courage and bravery, and place on record how the gallant people of Jordan joined this battle immediately it was forced on them, without hesitation and regardless of anything but their duty and their honour. The aggression was forced on us, and it was our duty to resist it, in all its strength, perfidy and collusion. I

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Al-Ahram*, 7/6/1967.

³ *Jum'ah*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

think that the best decision is to choose the second of the alternatives you and General Abd al-Mun'im Riyadh mentioned—the evacuation of the West Bank tonight—though we should bear in mind your first idea—Security Council intervention to bring about a cease-fire. The history of nations consists of giving and taking, advance and retreat, so let us be sure that whatever choice we make at this decisive moment, though the choice may be a crucial one for us, will place us in a position from which we can advance. This is the will of God; let us pray that His will may be for our good.

We believe in God, and it is impossible that he should abandon us; let us hope that in the next few days He will grant us victory. Familiar as I am with all aspects of the situation we are now in, it remains for me to tell you how greatly I appreciate your courageous attitude, your unshakeable will and the heroism displayed by every member of the Jordanian people. May we be guided by God's will.

Your brother, Gamal Abd an-Nasir.

361

Cable from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. President Nasir.¹

Amman, June 7, 1967

From Husayn

To President Gamal Abd an-Nasir

I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your cable, and wish to inform you that we have given orders to all our troops on the West Bank and along the whole front to stand firm in their positions. May God help us and you.

Husayn

362

Military Communiqués Issued by the U.A.R. on the Progress of Hostilities.²

Cairo, June 7, 1967

Communiqué No. 1

1330 hours

Our forces are now fighting violent battles in second-line positions in Sinai.

Some positions on the first line have been evacuated in a regrouping operation made necessary by enemy activity on the front supported by foreign forces.

Enemy planes have carried out a series of raids on our positions in Sinai, and our forces brought down eight of them this morning.

Communiqué No. 5

1735 hours

Our troops in Sharm ash-Shaykh have joined our main forces stationed in defensive positions in Sinai.

Communiqué No. 6

1830 hours

After our troops in Sharm ash-Shaykh had been ordered to join the second line in a regrouping operation, the enemy tried to drop airborne troops in Sharm ash-Shaykh, from troop carriers with fighter protection. Our fighters resisted them and brought down five "Mirage" and two "Noratlas" planes. The enemy also tried to drop groups of airborne troops in areas on the second line in Sinai; these groups were wiped out.

363

Cable from U.A.R. President Nasir to Jordanian King Husayn on the Progress of Hostilities.³

Cairo, June 7, 1967

From President Gamal Abd an-Nasir

To His Majesty King Husayn

I wish to inform you of developments in the fighting on the Egyptian-Israeli front. The aggres-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

² *Al-Ahram*, 8/6/1967.

³ *Jum'ah*, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

sion began suddenly and unexpectedly, and from the first moment its target was our air force. The enemy attacked all our airfields at once with planes in far greater numbers than allowed for by our estimate of his air strength. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has established beyond all doubt that America and Britain are acting in collusion with Israel. This is indicated by the fact that the attack has been in continuous waves, with the result that our airfields and air force have been dealt a blow which has prevented them from providing air cover for our forces at the front. In spite of the heavy losses in planes inflicted by us on the enemy it is clear that he has a reserve of planes in addition to the Anglo-American air cover over Israel, which has enabled him to provide air cover for his forces at a time when our forces have had no such cover. Nevertheless, our forces are now engaged in heavy fighting in Sinai, and losses are heavy on both sides.

Your brother,

Gamal Abd an-Nasir

364

Cable from U.A.R. President Nasir to Joint Arab Command Chief of Staff General Riyadh.¹

Cairo, June 7, 1967

King Husayn should exert pressure on Britain and America to make Israel observe the cease-fire. This is the only way. There is no need for Jordan to sever relations with America and Britain.

365

Cable from U.A.R. Deputy Commander in Chief Marshal Amir to General Riyadh on the Cease-Fire.²

Cairo, June 8, 1967

The U.S.S.R. has submitted to us a proposal for a cease-fire on the basis of the parties' withdrawing to the armistice line and the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba. We have accepted a cease-fire on this basis on condition that hostilities should cease at dawn today at the latest, under a U.S.S.R. guarantee. Awaiting your reply. Greetings and best wishes.

366

Cable Message from Jordanian King Husayn to the Arab Heads of State Calling for an Urgent Meeting.³

Amman, June 8, 1967

In this struggle which will decide the destiny of our nation, and in which the Arab forces have honourably fought the fiercest of battles on the whole length of the front, we realise, as we feel our wounds, that we are all now confronted with an international plan in which the principal role, a highly suspicious one, is being played by the great powers, both Western and Eastern.

Practically no Arab leader can avoid responsibility for the measures taken to prepare for this struggle, and our nation, which has fought the battle with courage and heroism, is now faced with a choice which will decide its whole future: either it must rise to its responsibilities, or accept the inevitable result, which would be—God forbid—the irrevocable end of Arab and Islamic civilisation.

We urgently need to reappraise our past attitudes and join in a general plan embracing the whole Arab nation, to build a sound Arab structure on sound foundations.

We must expect all sorts of political and

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

imperialist manoeuvres, not only on the field of battle, but affecting all international meetings and gatherings.

All of us owe it to our soldiers, whose heroic deaths have done such honour to our nation, we owe it to our future and our self-respect, that we should no longer confront facts with superficial and merely emotional reactions.

The round that started a few days ago will be followed by many others in both the near and more distant future. We here in Jordan thank God that we have always advocated unity of ranks, unity of aims and unity of sound effort, on behalf of a nation that cannot live without honour and self-respect; we have also advocated planning, coordination, common effort and silent work towards a specific end.

We swear by God that we shall fight the battle to the end. Those who have fallen so far were but the pioneers of this Arab bastion—the first wave in the battle of destiny. But in a short time we and our nation will be able to send after them wave after wave from here and from the whole Arab nation; to that end we are working with resolution, determination and faith.

This, then, is the situation we have lived through, the situation we have confronted at the cost of so much sacrifice, and I hope that the experiences and tragedies of the last few days will induce the leaders of the Arab nation to hold an urgent meeting to discuss the problem from all aspects and to confront the situation with all its material, political and military implications.

The fighting has proved how urgent is our need here in Jordan for the building of a network of airfields and air defences, the reconstruction of the Jordanian air force and the replacing of the heavy losses we have suffered in arms and equipment. We have the men—and not only men, but heroes—and we have every confidence that, with material support from our Arab brothers we shall be able to build up our forces in the best possible manner and in the shortest possible time.

Husayn

367

Cable Message from U.A.R. President Nasir Replying to Jordanian King Husayn's Call to a Summit Meeting.¹

Cairo, June 8, 1967

From President Gamal Abd an-Nasir
To His Majesty King Husayn

All of us here in the United Arab Republic highly appreciate the role played in the fighting by you yourself, the Jordanian people and their heroic army. You have made a great and glorious contribution to the battle of destiny which the Arab nation is fighting and will continue to fight until the overthrow of Israeli aggression supported by the forces of imperialism.

I should like you to understand how profoundly we are all aware of and appreciate your attitude and how unreservedly we support you.

As the battle rages, I am confident that God will grant us victory. I have every confidence in the masses of the Arab nation; I have every confidence that the right will prevail; I have every confidence in the value of peace based on justice.

My sincerest greetings to you; Long live the great Arab nation; Long live our heroic armed forces.

Gamal Abd an-Nasir

368

Broadcast Message of Jordanian King Husayn to the People.² [Excerpt]

Amman, June 8, 1967

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Yesterday, when the Security Council adopted the cease-fire resolution, those who were left of our men were desperately hard pressed. But not one of them turned his back to the enemy. They stood firm and immovable as a rock. When the cease-fire resolution was adopted we thought that, as far as the enemy was concerned, honour

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

² *Ad-Dustur*, 9/6/1967.

and decency would prevail over vileness, treachery and baseness, so we decided from that moment to submit to the voice of the world's conscience, in the hope that all peace-loving countries would hasten to deal with the situation in a spirit of justice and equity, and put a stop to threats and aggression. We therefore at once announced that we had no objection to a cease-fire, and immediately communicated our decision to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the four great Powers. But, as it later became clear, the scope of the conspiracy was too vast for considerations of moral conduct to be taken into account, and the enemy continued shelling what remained of our troops with all his strength, in the hope of completely annihilating them. Air cover was the cause of the enemy's superiority. Had it been merely a question of courage and heroism, the world would have learned that the soldiers of the Great Arab Revolt, the soldiers of embattled Jordan, side by side with those of Iraq, were born, and have lived, worked, and fought to provide the whole world with a splendid example of courage and heroism, as they challenged fate.

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Brothers; For fifteen whole years of my young life I have been building this gallant army with my blood, my resolution and my youth. Nothing has been dearer to me than that it should grow and develop until it reached the highest possible degree of readiness, equipment, courage and initiative. And all that time, God knows, I was jealously holding it in reserve for the battle of honour and sacrifice, for the day of revenge. All that time I called on my people to give me their help and support, telling them with the deepest emotion that this army of theirs would be the vanguard of dedicated action. I exhorted them, morning, noon and night, to co-operation and solidarity, to coordinated mobilisation and sound planning, so that, if we had to fight, we might be in a position to fight in our own time, not in the enemy's. My first joy was the Summit Meetings, which I welcomed with all my heart, because I saw in them the only ray of hope. But scarcely had the ranks been ordered than fate dealt them a bitter blow; their unity was shattered and we were back where we were before—all was procrastination, disunion and evasion. But the only

role I played in all this, either in public or in private, was that of a man jealous of his people's honour and loyal to the forces of his nation.

The atmosphere in this area became more and more threatening as the enemy revealed his aggressive intentions in a manner that left no possible doubt that he had in mind further expansion and extension, further threats and aggression, against us and the other Arab countries. I decided that, under the circumstances, what was most desirable was solidarity and coordination with our Arab brothers before it was too late. As you know, too, a few days ago I again saw a ray of hope; I met with true and faithful brothers, and agreed on a common goal. Once more I dreamed my happy dreams, once more I allowed myself to hope for great things. Duty dictated that I should deploy all the forces I had prepared for this day over the long years; I was confident, I believed, that the time had come when we could take our revenge and wipe out the stain on our honour. I found that these strong young forces themselves desired what I and the whole nation desired for them; as the believer yearns for his Lord, his nation and his cause, so I yearned for the battle for which we had so long lived and prepared. What happened I have already described—the tragedy that has torn me asunder, and filled my heart with grief, when I think of the loss of those who were part of my heart, dearer to me, indeed than my own self.

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Brothers; I come from a family which, God has willed, shall suffer for its nation and religion, and shall offer sacrifices to the cause of Arab dignity and Islamic honour. God has taught us to be patient in tribulation, and to have confidence in His will and a faith that knows no discouragement and no despair.

Though the setback we have suffered borders on the intolerable...we in this country have a mission we shall not abandon for as long as we live. No matter how great the setback, it will infuse in our spirits an unbending determination, and we shall build again and build high. With our sweat, our tears and our efforts we shall achieve the miracle once again, so as to prove to the world that misfortune is the test of courage, and that God's will is best.

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369

Military Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. on the Progress of Hostilities.¹

Cairo, June 8, 1967

Communiqué No. 1.

0955 hours

An enemy armoured force, which had penetrated behind the al-Arish position in an attempt to advance along the coast road in northern Sinai, was resisted by our air forces, which checked its advance and then destroyed it completely.

Our gallant forces are continuing to resist with unexampled heroism in al-Arish itself, and a number of enemy tanks are trapped between the town of al-Arish and the coast. At 0703 hours three American planes with the insignia of the American Air Force were seen flying over the Suez Canal from north to south. They were identified by our forces all along the Canal. They were on a reconnaissance flight, searching for the Israeli armoured forces destroyed by our forces on the north road.

370

Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. Armed Forces Supreme Command on the Withdrawal of Its Troops to the Western Bank of the Suez Canal.²

Cairo, June 9, 1967

1155 hours

Yesterday our forces completed their withdrawal to the western bank of the Suez Canal. In spite of the cease-fire, which the United Arab Republic has been observing since yesterday, as it has informed the Security Council, enemy forces, supported by the forces of imperialism, are still attacking our forces west of the Suez Canal.

Furthermore, continuous air raids on the Canal Zone are still being carried out, while our armed forces are performing their sacred duty of defending the homeland.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 9/6/1967.² *Ibid.*, 10/6/1967.

371

Communiqué Issued by the U.A.R. Armed Forces Supreme Command on the Cessation of All Hostilities.³

Cairo, June 9, 1967

1430 hours

The front is now quiet. All operations have ceased in observance of the cease-fire resolution.

372

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir Announcing His Resignation.⁴

Cairo, June 9, 1967

Brothers;

In times of victory and times of tribulation, in the sweet moments and the bitter moments, we have become used to sit down together and talk from open hearts, and to speak the truth frankly to each other, in our belief that only in this way can we decide on the right course to follow, however critical the circumstances, however dim the light.

We cannot hide from ourselves the fact that we have suffered a severe setback in the last few days. But I am confident that all of us will be able, in a short time, to surmount this difficult situation, even though this will require much patience, wisdom, moral courage and capacity for self-sacrifice.

But before that, brothers, we must take a look at what has happened, so that we may follow the course of events that led to the present situation.

We all know how the Middle East crisis started in the first half of May. The enemy had a plan to invade Syria; this was frankly admitted in all the statements of enemy politicians and military commanders, and there was ample evidence of premeditation to that effect.

Syrian sources were quite definite on this point, and we ourselves had reliable information confirming it—our friends in the Soviet Union

³ *Ibid.*⁴ *Ibid.*

even warned the parliamentary delegation that visited Moscow at the beginning of last month that there was a plot against Syria.

We considered it our duty not to remain silent in the face of this. This was a duty imposed not only by our brotherly feelings for another Arab country, but also by the requirements of national security, for whoever began with Syria would follow-up with Egypt.

Our forces therefore moved up to our frontiers with an efficiency acknowledged by our enemies even before our friends. This was followed by a series of moves, including the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and the return of our forces to the Sharm ash-Shaikh post commanding the Strait of Tiran, which the enemy had been using, this being one of the consequences of the 1956 Tripartite Aggression against us. The passage of ships flying the enemy flag through the Strait within sight of our forces could not be tolerated, and there were other considerations connected with the dearest aspirations of the Arab nation.

A careful appraisal of the strength of the enemy had convinced us that, given the standard of the equipment that they possessed and the training they had received, our armed forces were capable of resisting and repelling him. We knew that there was a real possibility of armed conflict, and accepted the risk.

We had to consider many factors, national, Arab and international, including a letter from the American President Lyndon Johnson, which was handed to our Ambassador in Washington on 26 May, calling on us to show self-restraint and not fire the first shot, if we wished to avoid serious consequences.

The same night the Soviet Ambassador asked for an urgent meeting with me at 3.30 a.m., and communicated to me the urgent request of his government that we should not fire the first shot.

In the morning of last Monday, 5 June, the enemy struck. Even as we admit now that the blow was much heavier than we had expected, we cannot but add, with full confidence, that the attack came in far greater force than the strength of the enemy would allow. This proved from the very first moment that there were other forces behind Israel engaged in settling their account

with the Arab nationalist movement.

Indeed, there were some remarkable surprises:

The first was that the enemy, whom we had expected from the east and the north, came from the west, which conclusively proves that matters had been facilitated for him in a manner beyond his own capacity and beyond the extent of the strength he had been credited with.

Secondly, the enemy covered all military and civilian airfields in the United Arab Republic at one and the same time. This means that he was depending on some force other than his normal strength to protect his air space from any retaliatory action on our part, and that he was leaving other Arab fronts to be dealt with by such other assistance as he had been able to procure.

Thirdly, there are clear indications of imperialist collusion with the enemy, which attempted to put the lesson of the previous undisguised collusion of 1956 to use, by resorting this time to nefarious practices. It is now established that American and British aircraft carriers were off the enemy's coast and assisting his war effort; also that British planes raided positions on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts in broad daylight, while a number of American planes engaged in reconnaissance operations over some of our positions.

The result achieved by this was that our land forces, which were fighting the most violent battles with great gallantry in the open desert, found themselves in an extremely difficult situation, because the air cover above them was insufficient in the face of the decisive superiority of enemy air strength. It is no exaggeration to say that the enemy was operating with an air force three times its normal strength.

The same situation confronted the troops of the Jordanian army, which fought with great courage under the command of King Husayn, whose stand in all fairness and honesty was magnificent. One must give credit where credit is due. I confess that my heart bled as I followed the battles fought by his gallant Arab army in Jerusalem and other places on the West Bank during the night when the enemy, and the forces acting in collusion with the enemy, concentrated not

less than four hundred planes over the Jordanian front.

There were other honourable and splendid efforts.

The people of Algeria, under their great leader Hawari Bumadyan, gave to the battle without reservation and without counting the cost.

The people of Iraq, under their great leader Abd ar-Rahman Arif, gave to the battle without reservation and without counting the cost.

The Syrian army fought gallantly, reinforced by the great Syrian people and under the command of its national government.

The peoples and governments of Sudan, Kuwait, the Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco also adopted truly honourable attitudes.

Indeed, the stand taken by Arab peoples, throughout the length and breadth of the Arab homeland, without a single exception, was one of manliness and honour, of resolution and determination that Arab rights should not be infringed or flouted, and that the war to defend them should continue to be fought, whatever the sacrifices and setbacks, until the inevitable victory was won.

There were also certain great nations, outside the Arab world, which gave us invaluable moral support.

But the conspiracy—we must admit it courageously, like men—was greater and fiercer.

The enemy concentrated mainly on the Egyptian front, which he attacked with all his main forces of armour and infantry, supported by the air supremacy I have already described to you.

The nature of the desert terrain did not permit full defence, especially in face of the enemy's air supremacy.

I realised that the armed conflict might not go in our favour, and I, along with others, tried to make use of all sources of Arab strength. Arab oil came to play its role, and so did the Suez Canal.

There is still a great part to be played by general Arab action, and I have every confidence that it will measure up to its task.

Our armed forces in Sinai were forced to evacuate the first line of defence, and fought fierce battles with tanks and aircraft on the second line.

Then we responded to the cease-fire resolution, in view of assurances contained in the last Soviet draft resolution submitted to the Security Council, and of French statements that no one should achieve any territorial expansion from the latest aggression, and in view of international public opinion, especially in Asia and Africa, which saw our position and fully appreciated the ugliness of the forces of world domination that had pounced on us.

Many urgent tasks now lie ahead of us, The first is to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, and stand firmly and resolutely with the rest of the Arab nation. In spite of the setback, the Arab nation, with all its potential and resources, is in a position to insist that the consequences of the aggression be eliminated.

Our second task is to learn the lesson of the setback. In this connection, three vital facts must be mentioned:

1. The elimination of imperialism in the Arab world will leave Israel with her own forces only, and, whatever the circumstances, and however long the conflict lasts, the Arabs' own forces are larger and more effective.

2. It is of primary importance that Arab utilities should be redirected to the service of Arab rights. The American Sixth Fleet was running on Arab oil, and there are Arab bases which are being forced, against the wishes of the peoples, into the service of aggression.

3. The present situation demands complete unanimity on the part of the Arab nation; there is no substitute for this.

We now come to an important point in this heart-searching self-criticism. We must ask ourselves:

Does this mean that we bear no responsibility for the consequences of this setback?

I tell you frankly, and in spite of any factors on which I may have based my attitude during the crisis, that I am ready to bear the whole responsibility.

I have taken a decision which I hope all of you will help me to carry out.

I have decided to retire from all official positions and all political roles and return to the ranks of the people and perform my duty with them like any other citizen.

The forces of imperialism see Gamal Abd an-Nasir as their enemy, and I want it to be quite clear to them that their enemy is the whole Arab nation and not only Gamal Abd an-Nasir.

The forces hostile to the Arab nationalist movement always try to represent it as Gamal Abd an-Nasir's empire. This is not true, because aspirations for Arab unity manifested themselves before Gamal Abd an-Nasir, and will continue to exist after Gamal Abd an-Nasir is gone.

I have always told you that it is the nation that lasts, and that the individual, whatever his role and however great his share in national affairs, is no more than the instrument of popular will, and not its creator.

In conformity with Article 110 of the Provisional Constitution of March 1964, I have instructed my friend and colleague Zakariya Muhyiddin to assume the office of President of the Republic and to perform the duties of that office in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Having made this decision, I place myself entirely at his disposal and at the service of the grave situation through which our people are passing.

In doing this I am not liquidating the Revolution; indeed the Revolution is not the monopoly of one generation of revolutionaries. I am proud to belong to this present generation of revolutionaries, which has achieved the evacuation of British imperialism and the independence of Egypt, established her Arab identity, combated the subjection of the Arab World to the policy of spheres of influence, led the social revolution and wrought a profound transformation in the Egyptian reality. It has established the control by the people over the sources of their wealth and the fruits of national endeavour, recovered the Suez Canal, laid the foundations of an industrial revolution in Egypt, built the High Dam to make the arid desert blossom like the rose, constructed an electric power network over the whole of the northern Nile valley, and made our oil flow after so long a period of waiting. And, even more important than all this, it has placed the leadership of political activity in the hands of an alliance of the working forces of the people, which is the permanent source of constantly renewed leadership that carries the banner of Egyptian and Arab struggle ever further forward, building

socialism, succeeding and conquering.

I have unlimited confidence in this alliance of the peasants, the workers, the soldiers, the intellectuals and national capital as the leadership of national action. Its unity and cohesion and creative interaction within the framework of this unity is capable—through work, real work, hard work, as I have said more than once—of working miracles in this country, so that it may become a strength for itself, for the Arab nation to which it belongs, for the national revolutionary movement and for world peace based on justice.

The sacrifices made by our people, their fervent spirit during the crisis, and the heroic deeds which the officers and men of our armed forces have recorded with their blood, will remain as a ray of light that will never be extinguished through all our history, and a mighty inspiration to the future and its great aspirations. Our people were magnificent, as is their custom, steadfast, noble as is their nature, faithful, true and loyal. And the members of our armed forces were an honourable example to the Arabs at all times and in all places. They defended the sands of the desert to the last drop of their blood, and in the air, in spite of the enemy's supremacy, they will become legendary as examples of sacrifice, dedication, intrepidity and enthusiasm in the performance of the noblest of duties.

This is the time for action, not for grief; it is the place for ideals, not for selfishness or individual feelings.

All my heart is with you, and I hope that all your hearts are with me.

May God be with us all, to fill our hearts with hope, light and guidance.

God bless you and grant you peace.

373

Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan to the People.¹ [Excerpt]**Algiers, June 10, 1967**

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The field of battle must not be restricted to the Canal nor to Sinai; it is the whole Arab world; it is a comprehensive operation that is not yet ended and will only end with our victory over imperialism and Zionism.

Fellow citizens; We have embarked on a long war that is on a much wider scale than before, on a wider scale than the aggressors who forced it on us expected. The peoples of the Arab nation have entered this war to confront, with their own resources, the forces of Anglo-American imperialism which basely conceals itself behind the mask of the Zionist gangster state. They have entered this war ready to fight to the death to protect their honour and self-respect, and to defend the cause of freedom which is indivisible and is the concern of every human being.

The trials through which the Arab nation is now passing demand that all its members should stand together as one man and mobilise all their human and material resources, not only to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine, not only for Aqaba, but also to destroy imperialism, Zionism and all other forms of racialism.

Although we have been dealt a severe blow in the Arab East, in Egypt, Syria and Palestine, and although the fortune of arms has betrayed us in a battle in which we were unevenly matched, this will not sap our strength, nor turn us aside from our resolution to destroy the citadels of evil and aggression and to crush imperialism and Zionism in every part of our great homeland.

If the Security Council has not supported right, nor been fair to the wronged, but treated aggressor and victim on the same footing, this is nothing new. How can a Council which has shown itself utterly incapable of defending liberty and peace in Vietnam be expected to have sufficient courage to deal fairly with us in our struggle against imperialism, whose influence on and undisguised control of international organisations

is known to all? We must, however, warn the Security Council of the consequences of its bias in favour of aggression, and remind it of the fate of other international organisations which failed to support right and proved effective only in support of aggressors.

We are today faced with a critical situation that may well be decisive in our history as a nation; we are at a definite turning point in the history of our national life. This situation demands of us, wherever we may be, that we should mobilise all our resources. The situation is extremely grave, and history will set down these days and the events they witness in its record which neither forgets nor forgives. Every one of us must do his duty in accordance with the dictates of the battle of destiny.

We must be frank with ourselves and with our friends—and even with our enemies. Whatever setbacks and trials they suffer, whatever disappointment they may feel as a result of the aggression by their enemies, the hesitations of their friends and the indifference of onlookers, the Arab people will ever remain resolute in the face of events and stand firm as a rock in the face of every kind of danger and disaster.

This frankness requires that we say that, in the future, it will not be permissible for any of us to use neutrality as a pretext, for there can be no neutrality between right and wrong, between self-defence and aggression, between freedom and slavery, between racialism and toleration.

To be neutral means to avoid taking a stand; it means passivity and collusion with the perfidious enemy. To accept the *fait accompli* imposed by force is pure cowardice, the greatest possible treachery to the cause of humanity, and the betrayal of all the highest values.

The war must go on. We must not lay down our arms until justice has been reinstated, the abnormal situation righted, aggression smashed and its results wiped out. The Arab nation is as one man, and behind it is a huge human and material force embodied in all the peoples of the world who support right in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In the socialist countries, too, there are vital forces that will now have clearly to choose their course, assess the situation with all courage and objectivity and meet their responsibilities fully without subterfuge or evasion.

¹ *Al-Mujahid*, 11/6/1967.

The Arab nation has learned from its bitter experience who are its enemies and who are its genuine friends. Our people have fought for their honour and self-respect, and the history of oppressed peoples who have been the victims of aggression will record this chapter in letters that can never be erased.

374

Communiqué Issued by Syrian Defence Minister General Asad on Syrian-Israeli Hostilities.¹

Damascus, June 11, 1967

In the course of the fighting between our gallant troops and the forces of the tripartite Zionist-imperialist aggression launched by America, Britain and Israel, the enemy tried repeatedly to pierce our first line of defence all along the front with all his various armaments, including tanks, artillery and aircraft in vast numbers.

Our brave forces resisted and crushed these attacks, and destroyed enemy troop concentrations and bases, and all the colonies in the occupied area opposite our first line of defensive positions. Our heroic officers and men fought with exemplary courage and stood firm against the enemy's vastly superior numbers and continuous air raids of such density as to prove conclusively that the planes used belonged not only to Israel but also to the other countries engaged in the tripartite aggression.

Our army has defended every inch of Syrian soil in the furious battles that have raged continuously since the aggression began, but the inequality of forces between us and the three enemy countries, and especially the massive use of aircraft, enabled the enemy to pierce our first line of defence in the northern sector in an attempt to surround the other sectors. These sectors, however, resisted with unexampled vigilance and heroism, and defended every inch of land under

the most difficult conditions, so that the enemy was unable to carry out his plan.

Our officers and men fought the superior forces of the tripartite aggression with unprecedented gallantry, and fell in the defence of every particle of Syrian soil. They are now concentrated on the second line of defence, resolute in their boundless faith in the honour of their country and of the Arab nation, and preparing to recover every inch of Syrian territory and to resist all Anglo-American-Israeli schemes whose sole aim is to protect the interests of imperialism in the Arab homeland.

375

Letter from Moroccan King Hasan II to the Arab Heads of State and the Arab League on the Proposed Summit Conference.²

Rabat, June 13, 1967

At this moment, when the rulers and peoples of the Arab countries can think of nothing but how the consequences of the treacherous Israeli aggression can be eliminated, we consider it our duty to inform Your Excellency that the urgent convening of a conference at summit level cannot, in our view, achieve the desired results.

In the past we have been in favour of the convening of the Arab Summit Conference when we considered the circumstances propitious and favourable, from our conviction that such conferences were likely to clear the air, bring about a rapprochement of divergent points of view and coordinate political plans between countries linked by bonds of brotherhood and a common destiny. But the problems which now confront the Arab countries cannot be realistically and effectively dealt with by the convening of Summit Conferences in the usual form. For it is most undesirable that a meeting of the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries should be held in an atmosphere of emotional self-criticism and excitement.

For our meeting to lead to a new start and to precise and useful planning, we think that it

¹ *An-Nida'*, Beirut, 12/6/1967.

² *The Kingdom of Morocco in the Battle for Palestine*, issued by the Moroccan Embassy, Beirut, n.d., p. 32.

would be better, as an urgent preliminary step, to convene a meeting in Kuwait at the level of Foreign Ministers. Such a meeting as well as preparing for a Summit Conference, could take the most urgent measures to ensure the elimination of the consequences of the aggression and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories they occupy, and coordinate the policies of the Arab countries as regards the great powers with this end in view.

When this stage is completed, it will be possible to hold a Summit Conference capable of confronting the problems of building the future on a unified and coordinated basis.

With my sincerest greetings and highest esteem.

376

Statement Issued by the Saudi Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources on the Resumption of Oil Exports.¹

Riyadh, June 13, 1967

To ensure the strict enforcement of the decision of the Council of Ministers forbidding exports of oil to the countries which are helping the Zionist gangster state, the pumping of oil was stopped entirely from the moment that decision was published. Measures were then taken to ensure that no consignments reached any country to which it had been decided to deny Saudi oil supplies. His Majesty's government has therefore issued an order permitting Aramco to resume the pumping of oil as from midnight on Tuesday, on condition that the necessary measures are taken. These measures include the signing by the company, the purchaser and the captain of the tanker, of undertakings that no Saudi oil shall reach the territory of such states as His Majesty's government has decided shall be denied it. The Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources has appointed a senior official as controller to supervise the enforcement of these measures, and exports will proceed in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers and with the full cooperation of Aramco.

¹ *Al-Bilad*, 14/6/1967.

377

Statement by the National Command of the Syrian Ba'th Party on the War.² [Excerpt]

Damascus, June 14, 1967

The Arab armies that took part in the fighting had to defend the honour of the homeland against the forces of the tripartite aggression in an unequal battle imposed on them by the alliance of imperialism with Zionism. These forces occupied the West Bank after bitter fighting in which the Jordanian army and the forward ranks of Iraqi forces displayed exemplary courage. There was also a tripartite air attack on the victorious Egyptian army in Sinai, where our brothers fought honourably and heroically. The Syrian army, also, destroyed enemy colonies and carried out an attack inside occupied territory, while part of our forces entered Jordan to fight the invaders side by side with Jordanian and Iraqi troops. However, in view of the superiority of the forces of the tripartite aggression, and of the huge sacrifices made by the Jordanian army, which fought furiously to defend every house and every inch of soil, Jordan decided to respond to the Security Council's cease-fire order. Under the same harsh conditions a cease-fire was also imposed in Sinai. In view of this, it was only natural that we, too, should respond to the Security Council resolution on the Syrian front. The enemy, however, deceived the United Nations and world public opinion. We had predicted that despite his declared acceptance of the cease-fire, he would continue the aggression and concentrate further forces on the Syrian front. We were convinced that he would pay no attention to any United Nations decision, and that the imperialist conspiracy would continue to work for the objectives it had set itself.

On 9 June the enemy renewed his attack with greater concentration along the whole front, supported by continuous aerial bombardment. Our forces resisted and repelled and destroyed his tank convoys, while our artillery shelled his concentrations and inflicted severe losses on his heavy artillery. The following day the enemy returned to the attack after bringing up extensive

² *Al-Ba'th*, 15/6/1967.

reinforcements of troops, tanks and heavy artillery. There followed heavy and continuous attacks, in which internationally outlawed napalm bombs were used; American and British planes were also directly involved. After several attempts to pierce our lines had been repelled, and four waves of advancing tanks had been destroyed, the enemy succeeded in piercing our lines in the northern sector and, after a battle in which our officers and men displayed unprecedented courage, he occupied al-Qunaytrah.

Our forces fighting in the central and southern sectors frustrated the enemy's plan to encircle them and took up battle positions on the second line of defence.

Brothers and fellow-citizens;

The military victory claimed today by the Israelis is not due to their own unaided efforts, but is the consequence of a huge tripartite American-British-Israeli conspiracy. In this conspiracy, world imperialism, in its hatred for the independent peoples of the world, is supporting world Zionism with all its political influence and scientific resources, along with the full weight of its capital, its monopolistic oil companies, and its modern armaments.

The Arab nation today is faced with a cruel and bitter setback, with a decisive moment in its history. For it is confronted with an insolent Zionist-imperialist invasion which has occupied new areas of the territory of the Arab homeland in addition to the already occupied part of Palestine.

This tripartite conspiracy is the culmination of the conflict between the will of the Arab nation to build a modern, independent and efficient Arab state, and the vast interests of imperialism in the Arab homeland. It is a link in the chain of the historical struggle between the desire of our people for progress and independence and the challenge of the vast imperialist interests. This has been a continuous struggle in which imperialism has employed the most despicable means to impede and frustrate the advance of the Arabs. But the will of the people has always been victorious, despite many setbacks, and has triumphed over its bitter trials. This long and continuous struggle has had positive results for the Arab people, and imperialism, now that all other methods of conspiracy have proved ineffective,

is confronted with the advancing forces of the masses, which now occupy forward positions that threaten its vast oil interests, its influence and its very existence in the Arab homeland. It has thus been forced to resort to direct military action and to the traditional weapon of old imperialism—invasion—in an attempt to subdue our homeland, occupy new areas of our territory and bring us back into its spheres of influence. It hopes, in this way, to destroy all the national and social progress achieved by our people through their long years of bitter struggle. Because of its alliance with world Zionism, Anglo-American imperialism has been able to carry out its attack through its advanced base, Israel. In this way it hopes to conceal from international public opinion and the conscience of the world the truly criminal nature of this attack.

The Arab people, and all the struggling peoples in the world, know for sure that it was Anglo-American imperialism that both planned and carried out all the stages of the aggression, that Israel was its tool, and that there has been an imperialist aggression every time imperialist interests have been threatened. This was the case with the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956, and again after the 14 July Revolution in Iraq. It is thus clear that the tripartite conspiracy hopes to achieve the following objectives:

(1) To stem the popular progressive tide and destroy the will of the mass struggle to build the modern Arab state.

(2) To bring back the Arab homeland into the spheres of direct imperialist influence and ensure the protection of its oil interests.

(3) To smash the Arab armies built by the people with their effort and sacrifice, the enemy having realised the increasing threat they constitute to his very existence.

(4) To realise the dreams of Zionism to expand, to consolidate its imposed presence in the area and to liquidate the Palestine problem.

Brothers and fellow-citizens, members of the great Arab people; If we are to face the full extent and dangers of the setback, and of the military occupation of new areas of our homeland, we must ever bear in mind the magnitude of the historic struggle between us and the forces of perfidy and tyranny. We must not for a moment forget the great and positive implications

of this struggle which make inevitable the final victory of the people over all the forces of the conspiracy.

In the second World War, the Nazis overran most of the countries of Europe, and in the course of history there have been many barbarian invasions, but rapid military invasion of this kind has never in history achieved a real and definite victory over any people. In the most cruel circumstances the conquered peoples have always continued and intensified their struggle until they have eventually crushed their invaders. These historical facts will not be forgotten by our people as, guided by their example, they pursue their stubborn and determined struggle. From the first moments of the battle, however bitter and painful the situation, it has been easy to discern the splendid and positive qualities that have been manifested in the full unity of the Arab masses. This unity has proved itself in the struggle and in the determined efforts of the masses to smash the interests of imperialism and to uproot its political and economic presence from the Arab homeland.

In particular, the direct participation of Algeria with all the moral and material resources at her disposal, has endowed the struggle of the Arab people with new and positive qualities which will certainly have an effective and decisive influence on the historic advance of the Arabs and hasten their inevitable victory.

The war has also shown that the Arab nation possesses great resources and effective weapons which, if placed at the disposal of the national cause, can decide the battle in favour of the people. The most important of these weapons is oil, which is already showing its strength by upsetting and paralysing the economy and the military and industrial machine in the countries which are supporting aggression.

Another effective weapon which must immediately be employed in the battle is the bank deposits of the oil producing countries, on which the economy of Britain, in particular, depends so greatly.

The endurance of the Arab people in the face of tyranny is profoundly appreciated and respected by the freedom-loving peoples of the world. These are the friendly peoples who have condemned the criminal aggression and regard

the struggle of our people in the front-line trenches as a real contribution to their struggle to eliminate colonialism and imperialism throughout the world. This moral support has been shown in the attitudes adopted by friendly countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and in the countries of the socialist camp, whose leaders met in the Soviet Union and issued a communiqué¹ in which they expressed their support for the Arab people, condemned Israel and severed diplomatic relations with her.

We thank all the countries, peoples and international popular organisations that have extended the hand of friendship to the Arab people in its present time of trial, and offered any kind of moral or material support. We hereby declare that, in performing their historical role of confronting the malevolent forces of imperialism and Zionism in this most important area of the world, the Arab people hope for further and more effective aid and support from all the freedom-loving peoples of the world. The Arab people also reject out of hand the despicable smear campaigns undertaken by the agents of America, Britain and Israel, with the object of destroying friendly relations and cooperation between the Arab people and the socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular.

The setback that faces us today threatens the very existence of our people. It stirs the Arab soul to its very depths. This setback demands of every Arab a reappraisal of his whole life and conduct, so that he may confront this bitter situation by mobilising all his resources and placing them at the disposal of resistance and endurance and of the battle for their destiny and existence.

In confronting our trials and tribulations we must hold on to all our revolutionary vigilance, our endurance and faith, and the will of our people to fight for the direct confrontation which depends, fundamentally, on the following points:

(1) The elimination, by all means at our disposal, of the consequences of the aggression, and the firm rejection of all attempts to impose solutions based on the new situation, however strong the forces supporting the aggression, and whatever sacrifices this may demand of us. The

¹ See *ante*, doc. 89.

historic stage through which this country and the whole Arab homeland are passing, a stage in which their destiny will be decided, demands that every citizen should make all his resources freely available for the defence of the homeland and the recovery of our usurped rights.

(2) The circumstances attending our confrontation with the forces of aggression require a reappraisal of our defensive capacity in the light of the facts that came to light during the recent conflict, and we must do everything in our power to ensure that such a reappraisal is made.

(3) The dangers which threaten the very existence of the Arabs demand a reappraisal of the economic and social situations in the Arab countries, with a view to ensuring protection against Zionist-imperialist attack.

(4) The Ba'th Party has, since its foundation, fought to achieve Arab unity and to build up a modern Arab state that will be capable of confronting the threats of Zionism and imperialism and enriching human civilisation. In view of the tripartite conspiracy against the very existence of the Arab nation, the Ba'th Party hereby affirms the urgent necessity of finding a progressive and practical formula that will ensure the realisation of this slogan.

(5) We must confront and frustrate all attempts by imperialism and Zionism to liquidate the Palestine problem and make comprehensive plans for the great operation of liberation.

Imperialism and its agents are now trying to achieve, through the cruel trial they have inflicted on us, what they have so far failed to achieve through military invasion or their previous conspiracies. They are trying, by exploiting isolated and subservient individuals, to introduce humiliating solutions, based on surrender to imperialism and acceptance of its existence, so that the Arab world may be once more drawn into their spheres of influence.

What imperialism wants now is to sap the will and endurance of the Arab nation and replace them by a spirit of submissiveness, surrender and resignation. In this way it hopes to crush the revolutionary generation which is the expression of this will and endurance in all parts of the Arab homeland. It also hopes to represent all Arabs who oppose the interests of imperialism, all who try to express the aims and aspirations of the Arab

masses for the building of a new society, and dare take part in such a confrontation, as the source of all our people's miseries and calamities. In this it is insulting our whole people, all who say No to imperialism, all who employ slogans which express the interests of the masses, and all who try to assume the responsibility for the realisation of these interests. To further its ends, imperialism is waging a malevolent war of nerves against all the revolutionary leaderships and all who, rejecting submissiveness and surrender, refuse to allow the honour and the glorious history of our nation to be tarnished.

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378

Appeal by the Leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri Calling on Palestinians To Remain in the West Bank.¹

In the setback that has befallen our homeland and our people, the Palestine Liberation Organisation calls on you to stand fast in your land, your homes and your farms, to be calm and patient and not leave your towns, villages and camps however cruel the situation. In these harsh and bitter circumstances, the homeland requires of you that you should cling more firmly to your land, remain at your work, your commerce and your husbandry, and not succumb to anxiety and despair. Adversity must be met with faith and patience.

To stand firm is the present test of our attachment to our land, the land of our fathers and the resting place of our ancestors. The eyes of the whole Arab nation are upon you today, and it is sure that you will faithfully stay on your land, whatever the conditions surrounding you. Remember that our cause will never die, our rights will never pass away, and our will can never be broken.

¹ *An-Nahar*, Beirut, 14/6/1967.

Message from Jordanian King Husayn to the Arab Heads of State Appealing for a Summit Conference.¹

Amman, June 17, 1967

Greetings; We have already suggested that it is essential to convene a Summit Conference as early as possible to discuss the situation in the area following the Israeli aggression. The conference should also work out a unified Arab policy to confront the political struggle and to prepare for future conflicts on a basis of completely new thinking appropriate to the magnitude of the setback which has recently befallen the Arab nation.

I regret to say that my appeal, and similar appeals from other Arab Kings, have met with neglect and procrastination in the Arab capitals, or have been countered with proposals for conferences and meetings at lower levels, which I am absolutely convinced are useless under present circumstances, especially in view of the fact that the General Assembly of the United Nations is to meet next Monday at the invitation of the Soviet Union. Thus, had the Arab Summit Conference met a few days ago, as we hoped it would, it could have been ready for this meeting with a carefully thought out and unified policy.

In God's name I implore you, on behalf of past generations of Arabs and of the coming battles of destiny, to declare without delay that you approve the convening of an Arab Summit Conference which, I propose, should be held in Khartum, as being the capital of the first Arab country to propose a conference, and whose proposal was approved by the other Arab states. Alternatively, the meeting could be held in any other country agreed on by the Arab states, on condition that it should start on Saturday, 24 June, at the latest.

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 19/6/1967.

News Conference Statements by Jordanian King Husayn.² [Excerpts]

Amman, June 19, 1967

Q. Can Jordan live and prosper without the West Bank?

A. The West Bank is an important part of Jordan, part of our homeland, part of the Arab world. The question is not only one of living; it is also a question of rights. As far as we are concerned, Jordan has always been, and still is, a single unit.

Q. Does Your Majesty accept the proposal for an Israeli-Arab federation in Palestine?

A. It is not a question of accepting or refusing. We here in this country, and in the Arab world, have received a cruel blow. What we are trying to do now is to make what has happened a turning point in the life of the Arab world. As I have said, the problem is not that of a specific group of people only; it is a problem that affects a whole nation. We are now making the most strenuous efforts for a meeting at the highest level to draft a unified Arab policy and adopt a new Arab attitude. This is essential under present circumstances if we are to find a way out of the tragic situation in which we find ourselves. Once there is a new plan and a new policy, the Arab nation will be able to live and to demand the world's acknowledgement once more.

Q. What are the numbers of those who have left the West Bank, and what do you think Israel's policy will be as regards the population of that area?

A. There are no exact figures, but the number of refugees is estimated at 100,000. As for Israel's policy towards the population, it will doubtless become clear in coming days. Israel is trying to make it appear that she is not forcing the inhabitants to leave, but giving them the chance to live there and return to their homes. But, as far as I know, this is not really the case; what has really happened is that the inhabitants have been forced to leave and prevented from returning to their homes.

² Official publication (pamphlet).

Q. During the war it was said that British and American planes took part in the fighting. What is your view of this charge?

A. To answer this question we must go back a little, to the time of the fighting. An extremely important factor which decided the outcome of the fighting was the enemy's numerical superiority in the air. There was also the evidence recorded by Jordanian radar before it was destroyed. All this convinced us that we were not confronting Israel alone, but that there were other forces heavily involved.

Full copies of the Jordanian radar records for the period from 18 May 1967 to the day of the aggression have been sent to our delegation at the United Nations, so that they may be ready to hand should they be required.

Since that time there have been numerous explanations of the point. The result is that we are not now in a position to affirm the nationality of the planes or the ships they took off from. Our radar was concentrating on the activities of planes over the Mediterranean near the enemy coast and the coast of the United Arab Republic.

One explanation is that these planes showed up on the radar screen after they had ascended from sea level before attacking. I must however state that radar cannot definitely prove that they had taken off from the sea. It did detect certain positions and planes that looked as if they had taken off from the sea, but they may have been planes at a low level which climbed higher on their way back to their bases.

We have no definite proof that these planes took off from carriers; all we saw we have sent to our delegation at the United Nations for use if required. We do not accuse any specific country, nor can we definitely state that there was no intervention; it is also possible that there was. What we want is to know the truth—was it Israel alone, or was there foreign aid? We want to be sure of this fact, so that it may be a turning point in our life, thinking, and planning to confront our problems, not only in Jordan but in the whole Arab world. We want to know the truth, and until we know it, all we can do is to tell what we do know and what we have established, and leave the rest to others, for them to tell us their deductions.

Q. What are your views on the prohibition of napalm bombs in warfare?

A. I think that the world would welcome such a prohibition. What is certain is that we did not use them; they were used against us. They are certainly a lethal and destructive weapon; if there were any means of prohibiting them it should be employed.

Q. Should Israel refuse to withdraw, would you ask the United Nations to intervene to oblige Israel to leave by force, including the employment of Soviet troops?

A. So far, I do not think that that is probable. But since the problem is one which affects the present and future of the whole Arab world, if we fail to meet at a high level to discuss the matter, which is most unlikely, it will be up to Jordan, or any other country, to decide on its own what must be done. We are doing all we can to bring about such a meeting, and hope that it will take place soon, so that we may make a thorough study of the subject. In this way we shall be able to adopt a unified policy to cope with what has happened and what may happen in the future, in all fields, and in all areas. Then we shall be in a position to answer your question, and the various other questions connected with it.

Q. What is your view of the idea that the conflict should be turned into a conflict between East and West?

A. That is not my policy; I think it is an absurd one. I do not want the problem to be turned into a conflict between East and West. The Arab nation has experienced a setback, and it will face the blow, decide its policy on its own and try to get help wherever it can find it. The result will be a unified Arab policy, but, as long as we live, we shall never relinquish our rights.

Q. Does Your Majesty think that it will be possible to hold direct negotiations with Israel?

A. I answered this question to your colleague just now.

Q. It seems that Israeli planes bombed this palace and your private house. Do you think there was any personal intention in these attacks?

A. My life is part of Jordan; this hall, and the meeting hall were bombed, just as other places and other citizens were bombed. I belong to my people and my nation; I am part of their heritage.

Q. What does Your Majesty think of Algerian and Syrian statements on the necessity for guerrilla warfare to liberate Palestine?

A. I think that the Summit Conference will take a decision on this if it meets, and discuss the whole situation, and the causes of what has happened, and what may happen in the future. Before that point is reached it is useless to discuss what may happen.

381

Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan on the Anniversary of the "Rising of 19 June."¹ [Excerpt]

Algiers, June 19, 1967

As you know, brothers, the Arab area is rich in oil resources which form the basis of Europe's present prosperity and of the armaments industry that produces planes, tanks and guns. Oil provides the power to operate the factories which produced the instruments of death and destruction used in the battles of the present and of the past—they were used against the Arabs in 1948, when the Arabs suffered a defeat, and again in 1956, and once more today, when the Arabs have been defeated for the third time.

This is why Algeria believes that the conflict cannot be restricted; it cannot be restricted to Suez only, to Sinai only, to one inch of soil only.

On the contrary, we have always thought that if the conflict was not established on its proper basis, with the whole of the Arab homeland as its base of operations, and if it did not continue to be fought on this basis, it was inevitable that our humiliation should continue and that a

large part of the Arab homeland should remain in subjection to American imperialism and the forces of tyranny, aggression and evil.

As you know, before the fighting began on the borders of Sinai, in Jerusalem and on the Syrian frontier, the American Sixth Fleet was on station throughout the whole of the Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Red Sea. The Sixth Fleet, to use a popular expression "wasn't on a fishing expedition"; it was there for reasons of world strategy, part of a plan embracing the whole Arab world from Tangiers to the Arab Gulf. This was an Anglo-American imperialist plan, for, as we have said in the past and say now and shall repeat in the future, the conflict must embrace the whole of the Arab world. The Arab plan must be on this basis; the conflict must not be restricted to armies; we must fight our battle against Anglo-American imperialism on the basis of the popular masses. Every member of the Arab nation must realise this fact, remove his dark glasses and see the naked truth as it really is. Only thus can he face up to his responsibilities, if the Arab nation really wants a life of self-respect, honour and glory.

You saw and heard, both during and before the fighting, how the whole of Europe, including, unfortunately, its progressives, its moderates and also its extreme and fanatical rightists, the members of the secret terrorist organisations, and capitalists like the Rothschilds, all adopted the same attitude, with no difference whatever between right and left.

This is something we must take note of here in Algeria, something every member of our people, of the whole Arab people, must be aware of. We have seen how America and Britain, with their full military, economic and propaganda strength and with the whole of Europe behind them, have mobilised their forces to crush everything Arab. This is a fact we ourselves have experience of; we also have experience of their age-old hatred for us. They decided that the opportunity was favourable then to drag the honour of the Arabs through the mud. You have seen, too, how all European and American radio and television broadcasts, and the entire European press, have mobilised all the means at their disposal, even the most insignificant, to smear the honour of the Arabs. This is a fact we must be aware of.

¹ *Al-Mujahid*, 25/6/1967.

We have become accustomed to being frank with one another, and there is all the more reason for us to be frank with ourselves, under present circumstances, at this historic stage; there is only one way that can profit us, the way of frankness and telling the plain truth to the masses. For we know that telling the truth and seeing things as they really are, not as we should like them to be, will teach us to rely on ourselves and strengthen our will. It will double our strength and make us ready for coming conflicts, and, as I said before, the Arabs have suffered a setback, they have suffered a military defeat in the first battle.

But the question today—we have already stated it in an official communiqué, and we repeat it today—is this: Has the Arab nation made use of all the immense human and material resources it possesses today? Has the Arab nation made use of all the weapons at its disposal? Until we know this we cannot say whether it has lost the war, or only lost a battle. The answer to this question is a simple one. It is an answer prompted by your ever-flowing emotion, by the growing enthusiasm of the Algerian people and their steely determination. The answer, as we said yesterday, is: No, we have not lost the war, for we have not used all our resources or all our weapons. We say to the Arabs that they have one extremely powerful weapon in their hands. Let them cut off oil supplies for one year only. We say to the Arab peoples, the Arab nation and the Arab governments: let them cut off oil supplies for one year only, for the sake of Arab honour. Is not Arab honour entitled to expect that we should tighten our belts, and give orders for the stopping of our oil exports, so that the factories of Europe may be brought to a standstill? For Europe and America have mobilised all their infernal forces to humiliate and enslave us and exploit our resources. Does not this require of us that we should make use of oil as a weapon?

Algeria has raised this question before, and raises it again today in the name of all of you, for Algeria does not, and never will, accept defeat.

We have not accepted defeat. Your ancestors fought for 17 years without accepting defeat. Unit after unit fell, soldier after soldier, officer after officer, until there remained only a small group with the Amir Abd al-Qadir that had not surren-

dered. They were colonised, but still they did not accept defeat. Our people have experienced other long conflicts; our recent history is replete with tales of heroism, and we have never admitted defeat although huge and infernal forces have been mobilised against our people. You have lived through all this, you know how all our people were in prison, how at one time the Casba was a prison, how the whole of Algiers, Oran and Constantine were so many great prisons. You remember how the whole of Algeria was surrounded by electrified wires guarded by tanks, planes, guns, submarines and so on. But for all this our people never admitted defeat and never surrendered, although they lost a million and a quarter dead, and although they had to fight unarmed against the most fiendish weapons. You who live in the capital certainly remember the historic demonstrations that took place, when our young men and women, carrying banners, went out to face these infernal weapons unarmed. But they did not accept defeat. This we say, too, to Europe, and to the Jewish and Zionist spokesmen who say that the Arabs are cowards.

We thought that the West would not remind us of this, we thought that they would leave our wounds to heal in peace. But today they have again inserted the dagger in the wound to redouble our pain; they have brought all their hatred to bear on us. They have today exploited their failure against the Arabs in the past. It is true that the Arabs' wound is deep, and that those whose faith in Arabism was weak in the past must today make their faith stronger than ever before, for, in any case, Arabism is not to be found only in Cairo, Jerusalem or Damascus; Arabism, Arab honour and Arab gallantry are to be found throughout the whole Arab homeland in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, in all Arab countries. It is true that the wound is deep and that Arab honour has been dealt a blow, and that the Arabs have lost a battle. But if we accept this setback, this defeat, history will condemn us as traitors and defeatists, and convict us of dereliction of our duty.

This, in fact, is what is really felt by our Algerian people—peasants, workers and young people. What we say is that we shall never accept this setback, nor shall we accept that Sinai, parts of Syria and Jerusalem should remain under

Zionist occupation. These are not the words of men suffering from the emotional shock of the setback; they are the words of responsible men aware of their duties and responsibilities to their people. For we have seen how the Algerian people prepared themselves from the first day, how young and old, men and women, all enlisted for battle and sacrifice. This is why our answer was what it was at this historic stage.

Our answer, in view of these momentous events, was that it was inconceivable that we should ever accept a policy based on the *fait accompli*, on an unconditional cease-fire, that it was inconceivable that we should ever surrender. We can see that there is an imperialist campaign afoot that has succeeded in Latin America, a campaign of imperialism, led by America, that has also won many victories in Africa. Imperialism today is crushing the people of Vietnam without the conscience of the world raising a finger in their defence, without Europe raising a finger, or all its vociferous spokesmen saying a word.

All these battles are linked, for, when Cairo and Damascus fall, whose turn will it be next? Who will be involved in the next stage? The objective of the next stage will be Algeria, for Algeria has a courageous people, who rose up on 1 November 1945 and destroyed the bases of imperialism. This former bulwark of imperialism has been smashed and broken, and its place has been taken by another bulwark, the citadel of the socialist revolution. Imperialism, its agents and its foster-child, Israel, have tried to strike and smash Cairo and Damascus; Israel is trying to expand in the heart of the Arab homeland. But this is only one of many battles. I tell you all, for you are used to me being frank with you, that if Cairo and Damascus fall, it will certainly be the turn of Algiers, and I will not conceal from you the fact that, during the tripartite aggression against the Arab homeland, there were units of the Sixth Fleet near to Algerian territorial waters.

It is this that leads me to say that the war must be unrestricted, and that we must use all our resources in it. If our armies are defeated, our peoples must rise up as one man to defend our honour, self-respect, liberty and sovereignty, and the wealth of the Arab countries, which is still finding its way into the pockets of those who enslaved us in the past. This is our view of the

war, for we have many weapons, and we must use them to the full. We have only one choice: it lies between the way of enslavement, surrender and submission to the *fait accompli* and the exploitation of our country's interests by foreigners, and the way of struggle, conflict, fighting and continued war.

The only choice open to Algeria is to continue the struggle and the defence of her honour; this is the way our people have chosen ever since invaders first set foot on our sacred soil. This has been our choice since the outbreak of the Revolution of 1 November, since our people took their first steps towards socialism. This has been their choice since they decided to recover their land, their factories and their mines—all their country's resources—from the hands of the foreigner. We can never be turned aside from this choice in the present struggle between the Arab peoples and world imperialism.

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382

Statement by Lebanese Premier Karami on the Occasion of the Prophet's Birthday.¹ [Excerpts]

Beirut, June 20, 1967

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I will therefore start by saying that our cause is establishing itself more and more firmly in the conscience of the world, and is daily acquiring more supporters.

This is an indication that truth will triumph in the end. For the role of the aggressor, the usurper and the conspirator will surely be disclosed, so that they will be vanquished by those who have a legitimate right to defend their sovereignty. These are the principles that must inevitably triumph throughout the world. If they do not, the law of the jungle will prevail, and this is inconceivable—it would herald a calamitous end for humanity.

¹ *Al-Jaridah*, 21/6/1967.

At the international level we have unavoidable duties to perform and a great role to play in the defence of our future, our cause and our rights. In this field Lebanon is playing her role with all honesty, courage and determination. This is why we are employing all our resources and relying on the standing we enjoy in international circles and on our friendship with various countries in the world. We are confident that, through cooperation and solidarity with all the Arab countries and other friendly countries, we shall succeed in achieving our aspirations on the international level.

I will now go on to speak of the second front—I mean the Arab front. Here I feel I must say that it is the solidarity and cohesion that exist on behalf of forceful, honest and sincere action between the Arab countries that makes us believe that final victory will be ours. For our conflict is long and continuous, and none of us can avoid his duty in any round. This makes us all the more resolute and determined to follow our appointed course towards our mighty goals. We have learned lessons from the setback that can help us to reappraise our situation, so that in the light of all that has happened, we may decide on our policy and our plans for the present and the future. In doing this we shall use all means at our disposal to rally and consolidate Arab ranks around the aims and principles we all believe in, so that we may advance together towards the victory of our cause, our countries and our peoples.

In this connection, moreover, I feel that I must say that Lebanon has declared her readiness to attend any conference the Arab countries may decide to convene in any place and at any time. We have accepted the invitation to attend the Conference of Kings and Presidents, and are ready to make a positive contribution to its deliberations, activities and decisions.

I now wish to talk about the third front—the home front. This is the pivot on which all the other fronts turn, for if our home front is not coherent, strong and united there is no need for me to tell you that we shall not be able to endure in the conflict or win final victory. I therefore draw the attention of all citizens to the responsibilities that they must shoulder and to the sense

of duty that should urge them on to serious work and great sacrifices. For, through work alone can we build our strength and ensure our country's progress. It is therefore essential that we should stand united and resolutely set our faces against all defeatism and procrastination intended to divide our ranks, dissipate our forces and prevent us from following our appointed course. But this will never happen, because the Lebanese people, with their awareness, their patriotism and their loyalty, will ever remain the immovable rock that shatters those waves of rumour, falsehood and misrepresentation that rage around us whenever this country is beset by an ephemeral crisis.

383

Letter from U.A.R. President Nasir to Jordanian King Husayn on Unified Arab Action.¹

Cairo, June 22, 1967

To King Husayn Ibn Talal

I have decided to write to you at this time of trial through which the Arab nation is now passing, as a result of the Israeli aggression which was prepared and made possible by world imperialism, without whose assistance it would never have been able to achieve so much. What pierces my heart more than anything at this time is the thought of the material and mental sufferings to which, because of your peculiar circumstances, both you yourself and the whole Jordanian people have been subjected. God knows with what heartfelt grief I share in your sufferings, day and night.

I feel for your sincere grief as you observe what we cannot but regard as hesitancy and slackness on the part of certain elements in the Arab nation. Although it would be premature for us to give vent to our wounded feelings, it is certainly more important than anything else under present circumstances that we should spare no efforts to marshal our resources for unified Arab

¹ Jum'ah, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

action capable of playing its role vis-à-vis the terrible danger that threatens the whole Arab nation, the future of our peoples, and even our leaders, however much their views may differ.

But there is one question that I should like you to be aware of at this critical moment, and that I should like you always to bear in mind. I refer to the fact that the United Arab Republic is ready to link its destiny fully and finally with the cause of the heroic Jordanian people under your patriotic leadership, which has proved how loyal you are to your people under the most difficult and dangerous circumstances.

In all fields—economic, political and military—we are ready to place all we possess at the service of the common destiny of our peoples. And I have not the slightest doubt that, whatever troubles lie ahead of us, God will grant us victory soon, as long as we work, have faith, are loyal to our principles, arm ourselves with patience and insist on the just rights of our nation.

With my sincerest greetings and admiration,

Gamal Abd an-Nasir

pany our advance with solidarity, cooperation and unity.

I, too, have been deeply grieved to observe, like you, that hesitancy in meeting their responsibilities and performing their duty which has been displayed by certain of our Arab brothers. But I am happy to share in your belief in the need to marshal our resources for unified Arab action, not only to obliterate the traces of the despicable aggression, but also to draft a comprehensive Arab plan to ward off the danger that encompasses our existence and our future. Your Excellency, your people and your country will find that I, my people and my country, are with you heart and soul until, God willing, all the hopes and aspirations of ourselves and our nation are realised.

In conclusion, I pray that God may keep Your Excellency, watch over you always and grant you success in all you do in the service of your country and your nation.

With my sincerest greetings and my heartfelt admiration and affection,

Husayn

384

Letter of Reply from Jordanian King Husayn to U.A.R. President Nasir.¹

Amman, June 22, 1967

To His Excellency President Gamal Abd an-Nasir

I am unable to express how proud your last letter has made me. I was profoundly moved by your sympathy for me and my country, and God knows that I reciprocate your feelings and harbour the same sentiments for you and your country. Our two peoples and, indeed, the whole Arab nation, are now passing through a time of trial as a result of Zionist aggression supported and made possible by the forces of world imperialism. But we are also at a decisive turning point in the destiny of our nation that will lead us towards a better future if we support our efforts with resolution and determination and accom-

385

Interview Granted by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir to French Television.² [Excerpt]

Kuwait, June 28, 1967

Q. When Kuwait joined the other Arab countries in their war against Israel, precisely what action did she take in the military, political and economic fields?

A. Kuwait placed all her military, political and economic resources at the disposal of the requirements of the conflict.

Q. Kuwait has always tried to play the role of mediator between the Arab countries, as she succeeded in doing between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia in connection with the Yemeni problem. This being so, what role does Your Highness think Kuwait can play in this new situation?

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

² *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 29/6/1967.

A. Kuwait has always been strongly in favour of joint Arab action and of efforts to achieve Arab unanimity. Now that the whole Arab nation is united in its determination to stem the perfidious Israeli aggression, the initiative taken by Kuwait in calling for a conference of Arab Foreign Ministers aims at laying the foundation for holding an Arab Summit Conference and coordinating the efforts that are being made at the international level.

Q. Many proposals have been made in connection with direct negotiations with Israel. What precisely is Kuwait's attitude to this matter?

A. There is no question of negotiations direct or indirect. The establishment of Israel was in itself an aggression against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and an open violation of justice and peace.

Q. Does the Kuwaiti government think that a period of cessation of hostilities between Israel and the Arab countries is necessary or desirable?

A. Kuwait will never agree to a cessation of hostilities. In our opinion a cessation of hostilities is a purely formal matter, the essential fact is that there has been an aggression against the whole Arab nation.

Q. Some of the Arab countries have so far rejected the idea of a Summit Conference of Arab leaders. What does Kuwait think of this refusal?

A. We have not heard that any country has so far rejected the idea of a Summit Conference. On the contrary, the call to hold a Summit Conference has met with the approval of the Arab states. All that has happened is that there has been some discussion about the measures that should be taken to prepare for this conference.

Q. Should the Summit Conference take a majority decision to prohibit oil shipments to Israel's allies, what would be Kuwait's attitude to such a decision?

A. Kuwait will implement all resolutions adopted by the Summit Conference in connection with measures intended to repel Zionist aggression and to eliminate its consequences. She has, in fact, already stopped oil shipments to countries that supported the Israeli aggression.

386

Interview Granted by Iraqi President Arif to a Correspondent of Agence France-Presse.¹

Baghdad, June 29, 1967

Q. What solution might Iraq accept in any attempt to settle the current problem?

A. Fundamentally, the problem is that the very existence of Israel is an aggression against the Arab countries, and that this aggression must be repulsed so that the situation may return to normal.

Q. What body does Your Excellency think should be responsible for finding a solution?

A. The United Nations.

Q. Which subjects would Iraq agree to discuss, and which would it refuse to discuss?

A. Iraq will accept anything that safeguards the natural rights of the lawful inhabitants of Palestine. The State of Israel was imposed forcibly, and the Balfour Declaration was made at the expense of the original inhabitants of Palestine, as it involved their expulsion and the formation of a Zionist state.

Q. Does Iraq agree to the internationalisation of the Holy Places of the three religions—that is to say, the internationalisation of Jerusalem?

A. Certainly not! Iraq does not agree to the internationalisation of Jerusalem. This holy spot has been in Muslim hands for centuries, and adherents of all religions have been free to practise their observances there.

Any change in this situation can only sow a harvest of hatred in the hearts of coming generations, and provoke vengeance and renewed tragedies.

Q. Does Iraq agree that the Gulf of Aqaba should remain open to all shipping?

A. Eilat came into existence after the Armistice, so that its very existence is illegal. The Gulf of Aqaba is only used for a small proportion of Israel's imports and exports, and Israel has no

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 30/6/1967.

right to use it. As for its being open to all shipping, passage in territorial waters is regulated by international law.

Q. The Minister of State for Presidency Affairs has said that Iraq intends to submit extremely important proposals to the Summit Conference. Could you throw some light on the nature of these proposals?

A. These proposals have to do with clearing the atmosphere in the Arab world, and strengthening unity of ranks and the awareness of the common Arab destiny as regards the Palestine problem.

Q. What is Iraq's attitude to the Arab countries that have not severed relations with Britain and the United States?

A. Iraq thinks that the Arabs should adopt a common attitude, but she appreciates the special circumstances of each of them in the present situation. This does not affect our unity of aims.

Q. Would Your Excellency explain the reasons why Iraq has stopped all pumping of oil, in opposition to the resolutions of the Arab oil-exporting countries to restrict the boycott to such countries as the Foreign Ministers may declare to have adopted a pro-Israeli attitude?

A. We have decided to export oil to friendly countries on receipt of guarantees that such oil will not reach the countries that are supporting Israel.

Q. What are the possibilities of Iraqi policy as regards the oil agreements between Iraq and the British oil companies?

A. There are none. As regards measures to make up for any deficit that may result from the interruption of oil exports to certain countries, we shall depend upon our other sources, and adopt a policy of retrenchment and dependence on essential materials.

Q. Would you welcome mediation by General de Gaulle in the present situation?

A. The Arab nation is grateful for General de Gaulle's honourable stand by the side of the Arabs, which it supports and regards as strengthening the friendly relations between the French and Arab peoples. We think that France can play a constructive role at the United Nations.

Q. Would Iraq agree to proposals made by the Soviet Union?

A. The Soviet Union has submitted proposals to the United Nations and we support them.

387

Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on Israeli Measures To Annex the Arab Sector of Jerusalem.¹

Amman, June 29, 1967

The Jordanian government is following with the greatest concern and in close cooperation with the governments of the other Arab countries the developments in the situation on the West Bank of Jordan and in the other Arab areas now occupied by Israeli forces following the latest aggression. It condemns in the strongest terms the measures taken by the enemy authorities to usurp the holy Arab city in an evil attempt to establish Israeli control over it.

The taking of such measures at a time when the Middle East crisis in all its aspects is being discussed by the General Assembly of the United Nations is one more indication of the flouting by the Israeli authorities of world public opinion, and a new and insolent aggression committed by them against the Christian and Islamic Holy Places which are so dear to the hearts of millions of people in all parts of the world.

Jerusalem was and will remain an Arab city, and the custody and protection of the Holy Places provided by the Arab regime of Jordan has always been regarded as a model, due to the manner in which it has promoted the freedom, confidence and love of all who believe in God. If there is anyone who is not aware of the racialist creed which dominates Israeli thinking and the fanaticism and abominable tyranny that characterise life in Israel, the whole world knows and remembers His Holiness Pope Paul VI's testimony to the Jordanian regime and his profound appreciation of the kindness, love and tolerance displayed by King Husayn in exercising his custody over the Holy Places.

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 30/6/1967.

In drawing the attention of all who believe in God to this vitally important matter, the Government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan calls on them, on behalf of the Holy Places, both Christian and Muslim, to declare their resolute rejection of the aggressive measures taken by Israel with regard to the Holy City. It affirms that this country, along with the whole Arab nation, insists on the Arab character of the Holy City and on the withdrawal of enemy forces from all the Arab areas they have occupied, and is ready to sacrifice the last drop of its sons' blood to that end.

388

Statement of Policy by the New Libyan Cabinet of Mr. Abd al-Qadir al-Badri.¹ [Excerpt]

Al-Baida', July 2, 1967

As far as Arab affairs are concerned, government policy is based on a full grasp of the importance of the stage through which the Arab nation is now passing. It is also based on an appreciation of the gravity of the setback that has befallen the Arab nation as a result of the Israeli aggression, and of the disastrous consequences of this aggression, which have disclosed Israel's expansionist ambitions in the Arab world.

Our policy is also based on the responsibility we feel as part of the great Arab homeland and our conviction that it is essential to unite Arab efforts to repulse the aggression and eliminate its consequences with all the means at our disposal and at all levels, military, political and diplomatic.

The government will do all in its power to unify its efforts with those of the other Arab countries, and will adhere to any unified Arab plan agreed on by Arab meetings, at whatever level.

The government will also continue its efforts at diplomatic and personal levels, and within the framework of general Arab endeavour, both to present and defend the Arab point of view, and to maintain the attitude required by Arab unanimity.

It hereby expresses the hope that the setback that has befallen the Arab nation will provide it with an incentive to review its political methods and plans, and its relations, such as to guarantee closer cooperation, truer brotherhood and greater unanimity in the interests of the Arab nation.

It is in the light of this attitude that the government will define the course it will follow within the framework of Arab action, in obedience to the instructions of His Majesty the King, who has always championed Arab and Islamic causes and worked for their victory and success. The attitudes he has adopted have always won the appreciation and respect of the Arab and Islamic peoples.

The government is completely in accord with the other Arab countries in their appreciation of the importance of oil as a weapon, and will abide by the resolutions of the Conference of Arab Oil Ministers or any other unanimous resolutions of the Arab oil-producing countries. Libya's attitude in this connection is absolutely clear and unambiguous, for it has completely stopped the pumping and export of oil. It was the only Arab country to do this, in response to the call of Arab duty. Every citizen of Libya is aware of how grave a loss this represents to the Libyan treasury, and knows what its effect will be on the national economy and on development projects.

In conformity with the general Arab attitude, it has been decided to export oil to the countries to which the resolution of the Conference of Arab Oil Ministers is not applicable, including France, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece and other friendly countries, and to maintain the prohibition of exports to Britain, the United States and any other country to which the Arabs agree that oil should not be exported.

¹ *Tarabulus al-Gharb*, 3/7/1967.

389

**Address by Jordanian Prime Minister
Jum'ah on the War and the Arab Situation.¹
[Excerpts]**

Amman, July 5, 1967

Jordan's attitude has always been, and will remain, that of a country that believes in its cause, and that does not hesitate to pour all its resources on to the field of battle if it is forced to fight. His Majesty King Husayn has repeatedly warned the other Arab leaders that the only way to confront our enemies lies through Arab solidarity and unity of ranks. But unity of Arab ranks, most regrettably, had been shattered, and the Arab nation had been cut to pieces and fragmented.

It became clear in the course of the fighting that Israel was four times as strong as we had estimated. I do not wish, in this review, to lay the blame on any specific quarter, but it is essential that we should face the facts—whether Israel fought by herself or with the help of others in no way alters the situation.

The Arabs should have studied their situation. They should have known the intentions of their enemy, and what external forces were supporting him. They should have made plans and mobilised their forces on that basis.

The fault was ours. From the very first moment, as I said before, Jordan threw all her forces into the battle, although we knew that the enemy had succeeded, through his craft and perfidy, in destroying the air striking force of our Egyptian brothers in the early hours of the morning of 5 June—the force we were relying on to provide our forces with air cover, because God had not granted us sufficient material resources to ensure this cover ourselves.

It was clear, as soon as we realised the extent of the enemy's craft and treachery, that the out-

come of the battle was already decided. But in spite of this, we in this country resisted with all our might and, as you know, our men fought with a heroism greater than that of the early Islamic heroes, whose glorious deed we celebrate to this day.

Today, gentlemen, after the disaster, after this new tragedy, where are we going? Jordan's policy has always been and will always be based on the following principles:

1. The cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs, and no Arab state can do anything on its own towards solving this problem of Palestine. As a Jordanian the cause of Palestine is my affair, just as it is the affair of Iraqis, Syrians, Egyptians—all Arabs, in fact.

2. Our cause, the Palestinian cause, has no particular international complexion; it is not the cause of Russia, America or Britain. It is my cause and yours, our cause as Arabs, and the whole Arab nation must start from this assumption. If we leave the Palestinian cause to be haggled over in the market of international bargaining, we shall never achieve anything for the Arab nation. Our cause must be holier than that; our cause is the cause of the Arabs, the cause of the martyrs who have fallen in the past and in the present. We lost six thousand men; Jordan lost them in the recent fighting, and their blood calls on us day and night for vengeance, calls on us to open our eyes and face up to ourselves, measure up the facts, appraise the situation, discover the causes of the disaster, and plan scientifically on a sound basis, as the enemy does. But if our ranks remain disunited, our mobilisation wrongly directed, our attention distracted by internecine strife and attacks on one another, then whether we are hopeful or hopeless, we shall never be able to help our nation. We must build as our enemy builds, on scientific foundations. For the battle is one of technological knowledge, a battle of right tactics based on profound understanding, intelligence and grasp, not one of chaos and pure caprice.

3. The Jordanian entity on both Banks of the River is something sacred that we believe in as firmly as we believe in God and in our religion. We cannot allow ourselves for a moment to relinquish this sacred unity. The West Bank is

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 6/7/1967. Mr. Jum'ah delivered this address at a meeting held in the hall of the National Assembly and attended by former Prime Ministers, the Presidents and Members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, Under Secretaries, Heads of Departments, Provincial Governors, Christian and Muslim religious leaders, and others.

the beloved twin of the East Bank, and the two cannot live unless they are locked in an indissoluble embrace that provides an example and a pattern for all subsequent Arab unity. This, as I said before, is something we believe in as strongly as we do in our religion; we shall never relinquish an inch of our soil. This is a right that is sacred to us, and I am glad to say that although our people on the West Bank realise the extent of the tragedy, for they are living today under the insolent tyranny and cruel occupation of the Jews, they will never abandon their belief in the unity of the two Banks.

This morning I received messages from some of our people in the occupied West Bank. I am glad to say that their morale is high, and all enemy attempts to coerce them, through compulsion and intimidation, into adopting a policy inconsistent with the unity of the Jordanian entity have failed, apart from a small number of people with sick minds, who do not deserve to belong to us. These, I am happy to say, are so few that they can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

The hearts of our brothers on the West Bank are with us as our hearts are with them. They are only awaiting the hour when they can rid themselves of the enemy yoke and return to their homeland.

In the messages I received this morning they told me how the enemy is making every effort to persuade or force a number of landlords in Jerusalem to sell their property. But our young men are on the alert for such moves; some of them have been in touch with all these landlords and warned them that anyone who sells so much as an inch of the soil of Jerusalem will be killed, although the killer knows that he himself will certainly be killed.

The West Bank, I am happy to say, is undaunted. Our brothers there are blessed with many valuable qualities. They are aware and intelligent, they think and they have foresight, and they know that their future is inextricably bound to this Bank by the closest and most sacred of links, links which, under the banner of Husayn, can never be dissolved.

390

Press Statement on the Cairo Meeting of Presidents Bumadyan, al-Atasi, Arif, al-Azhari and Nasir.¹

Cairo, July 16, 1967

In the course of their meeting in Cairo, President Hawari Bumadyan of the Algerian Democratic Popular Republic, President Nur ad-Din al-Atasi, Syrian Head of State, President Abd ar-Rahman Arif of the Iraqi Republic, President Isma'il al-Azhari of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council and President Gamal Abd an-Nasir, of the United Arab Republic, reviewed the present situation and the unified action necessary at the present stage of the Arab struggle against the aggression committed by Israel, in partnership with American and British imperialism, against the Arab people.

In the light of the fateful experience to which the Arab nation has been subjected as a result of this aggression, the Presidents declared their absolute confidence that the immense resources of the Arab people and their creative abilities were capable of making of this setback a point of departure towards the just and honourable national objectives for which the Arab nation has striven throughout all the stages of its struggle, and which it is determined to achieve, however great the challenges and difficulties that confront it.

The Arab Presidents agreed to take effective measures to ensure the elimination of the consequences of the Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland.

The Presidents also unanimously agreed that the relations of the Arab countries and peoples with other countries should be determined in the light of the latter's attitude to the aggression and its consequences.

Mr. Ismail Al-Azhari proposed that a meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers should be held in Khartoum. The Presidents approved this proposal and agreed that the Arab Foreign Ministers should attend this meeting at an early date.

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 17/7/1967.

391

Statement by the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party on the Crisis.¹
[Excerpts]

Damascus, July 1967

One of the main objectives that imperialism and its protégé, Israel, had set for this treacherous aggression was to strike a blow at Arab-Soviet friendship, a friendship which has taken shape and developed in the course of years of joint struggle against imperialism and Zionism. The objective was to isolate the Arab countries and to weaken them, in the hope of compelling them to surrender their territory and their resources to imperialism. Another objective of the aggression was to increase the territories of the criminal state of Israel and to augment its capacity for aggression, so that it may continue its battle against the Arab national liberation movement while playing the contemptible role of policeman of American imperialism. The criminal aggression has, indeed, realised some of its objectives. Israel has occupied Arab territory in Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Furthermore, she has issued a declaration annexing the old city of Jerusalem, in defiance of the almost unanimous decisions of the United Nations and in defiance of world public opinion in its entirety. Meanwhile, in their treatment of Arab citizens in the occupied territories, her armed forces are employing the methods employed by the criminal Nazis during the second World War.

But the political objectives which imperialism had set for the Israeli aggression have not been realised. The aggression has not succeeded in overthrowing the progressive nationalist regimes in either Syria or Egypt, nor has it succeeded in crushing the Arab national liberation movement.

Israel's vicious imperialist aggression, with all its concomitants and its consequences, has served to confirm the existence of two opposed, conflicting attitudes in the world. The first is the attitude of the imperialist great powers, headed by the United States, Britain and West Germany.

This attitude is manifested in the arming of the aggressor, encouraging him, prompting him to perpetrate aggression and then seeking to protect him, to prevent any punitive action from being taken against him and to make it possible for him to enjoy the fruits of his criminal aggression. The second is the noble, honourable attitude adopted by all the progressive forces of socialism, at the forefront of which stands the glorious Soviet Union, and which include the majority of developing countries, the revolutionary labour movements in capitalist countries and all the forces of liberation in the world. Their attitude is manifested in the way they condemn aggression, defend countries that are attacked and provide them with all the material and moral assistance they require.

Every patriotic Arab knows that the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states have made immense efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Arab countries to defend themselves and to supply these countries with all they need to be able to do so. The Soviet Union also made immense efforts in the political field to prevent the aggression from taking place. When it did take place, the Soviet Union, along with six other socialist states, severed diplomatic relations with Israel. The U.S.S.R. sent Israel a strongly worded ultimatum and played a decisive role in checking the aggression and bringing it to a halt, and in defending the rights of the Arabs. Today, the U.S.S.R., acting in complete agreement with the other socialist states, and in full cooperation with them, is making colossal efforts to compel the aggressor to withdraw from all the Arab territories he has occupied, and to supply the Arab countries with all that they require to recoup their strength and complete their defensive capacity. All this is in addition to the varied assistance that the Soviet Union provides in the form of food, medical supplies, etc.

Our country is passing through a critical stage. The difficulties that face us are by no means inconsiderable. However, we possess all that is necessary to transform the temporary setback that has befallen us into a new source of strength for the just course of our liberation. The example of other peoples struggling for liberation, the victories won all over the world, have strengthened

¹ *An-Nida'*, 5/8/1967. This communiqué was reportedly adopted at an enlarged session of the Central Committee held in Damascus in mid-July.

our confidence in ourselves and in the certainty of victory.

What we need to do now is to analyse, objectively, the weak points and the breaches in our ranks which the enemy has exploited. What we need is to study, in a critical and constructive manner, the factors which contributed to the present situation. What we need is urgent action in all fields so that we may be ready as soon as possible to confront all new acts of aggression, repel them and repulse those who perpetrate them, to liberate all Arab territories occupied by the enemy without renouncing our claims to a single inch of them.

To be successful in this, it is essential for us to unify the forces of the people and mobilise their abundant resources, and to bring about a change in the present political climate, a change for the better. Only thus shall we be able to foil the designs of imperialism and Zionism and their reactionary lackeys. We must create a new atmosphere appropriate to the demands and the urgent, pressing exigencies of the situation.

In order to achieve all this, we must first consolidate the line of progressive nationalism in one country. For this to come about, a larger measure of trust must be invested in the people, in the great masses of the people. The people's progressive nationalist forces must be allowed the full exercise of their democratic liberties. We must take action in this historic situation that is laden with responsibility, to ensure that a unified effort results from all these forces, a unified struggle based on cooperation and mutual trust. Acting with the greatest possible speed, we must utilise all available means to raise the level of combat readiness of the army and to reorganise the popular army and make it ready and fit to participate in the defence of every inch of the homeland and of every house in it. Such a course will strengthen our faith and improve morale. It will mobilise the progressive capacity and ability of the nation to the full and press them into service in the harsh battle against our vicious enemy. It is only natural that this course of action should find an echo in the government as well as in the labour

union movement and in all other popular organisations.

In the second place, we must be fully on the alert for the traps laid by imperialism and Zionism, which are seeking to sow the seeds of dissension among the progressive forces in every country in the Arab world. We must act with courage and with full determination to consolidate the bonds of cohesion and brotherhood which were displayed by the progressive Arab nations during the war. The efforts of these countries must be synchronised and united in the fields of defence, politics and economics. We must endeavour to induce all Arab countries to take part in the struggle in every way, so as to bring about a withdrawal of the forces of the aggressor and to eliminate all consequences of the aggression.

In the third place we must consolidate the united front of the Arab and socialist countries in the struggle against the common enemy, international imperialism with American imperialism at its head. In particular, unwavering action is needed to tighten the bonds of friendship and to increase cohesion between our country and the mighty U.S.S.R., which is the truest friend the Arabs have. One of the most important tasks before us is to make use, without reservation, of every opportunity that the Soviet Union or any other socialist state offers us to fortify and buttress our economic potential and our military preparedness.

In the fourth place, we must follow a wise and farseeing foreign policy that shuns both adventurism and flashy slogans, and unrealistic overbidding. If we pursue such a policy we may hope to succeed in isolating Israel more and more in the international field and in disclosing her true aggressive character; in this way we shall refute the false claim that she has always made that she desires to establish peace in the area. In this way we shall refute her claim that she waged this aggressive war for her very existence and survival, not for expansionist and imperialist objectives linked with the plans of Anglo-American imperialism and the oil monopolies, which in fact is the case. Such a wise and farseeing policy would both consolidate the climate of international opinion favourable to the Arab peoples in their cardinal struggle to liquidate the traces of the aggression, and foil the aggressive projects of imperialism

that are channeled through Israel.

In the fifth place, we must follow an economic policy appropriate to the coming struggle. We must concentrate more attention on agriculture, we must persevere in our efforts to execute development projects, particularly those projects relating to our military preparedness and to the development of national resources, to raising the level of production and supplies. We must concern ourselves seriously with the standard of living of the toiling masses.

In the sixth place, we must hold on to the gains achieved for the people, we must preserve the economic and social changes that have come about. We must consolidate all these. In particular, we must pursue a resolute course of agrarian reform, we must distribute confiscated lands among poor farmers, we must improve the running of nationalised factories and organise the processes of import and export so as to bring them in line with the general defence effort and with the need for increased production. We must provide for the needs of the great popular masses. The implementation of such a policy is one of the greatest historical responsibilities that rest upon the shoulders of all citizens and all enemies of imperialism, whether or not they are in government service.

392

Letter from the Jerusalem Municipal Council to the Israeli Assistant Military Governor.¹

Jerusalem, July 21, 1967

With reference to your written invitation of 20.7.1967 addressed to us and signed by Mr. Antoine Safiah, to meet with you individually on Sunday morning, 23.7.1967, and with reference to our telephone conversation with Mr. Safiah, in which we asked him to acquaint us with the subject to be discussed at these meetings, upon which he informed us that each of us was to be

asked whether he wished to become a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council after the amalgamation of the two parts, we wish to inform you that any discussion of this subject requires prior consultation amongst ourselves as members of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, inasmuch as we are duly and legally elected by the people of the City of Jerusalem. In fact, a number of us, including Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, have met, and after discussing the matter we have reached the following conclusions:

1. Inasmuch as the mere fact of discussing the possibility of joining the Jerusalem Municipal Council under Israeli rule, in the form in which it was announced by the Israeli authorities, would, from our point of view as Arabs, constitute an official recognition on our part of the principle of the attachment of Jerusalem to the sector of Jerusalem occupied by Israel, which we neither accept as a *fait accompli* nor acknowledge, regarding it as an infringement of the United Nations Charter and of the Resolutions adopted at its last extraordinary session, a violation of international law and an illegal measure, and demanding the restoration of the *status quo* that existed before 5.6.1967;

2. We find ourselves regretfully unable to accept your invitation to discuss this matter.

Signed: Ruhi al-Khatib, Nihad Abu Gharbiyah, Dr. Ibrahim Talil, Fayiq Barakat, Ali at-Taziz, Dr. Rashid an-Nashashibi, Musa al-Bitar, Abd al-Ghani an-Natshah.

393

Speech of U.A.R. President Nasir on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the 23 July Revolution.² [Excerpts]

Cairo, July 23, 1967

The crisis confronting us, if not the gravest and most difficult we have ever had to face, is certainly the most evil and malignant. Imperialism has not come out empty-handed—as we

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 27/7/1967.

² *Al-Ahram*, 24/7/1967.

must admit—in his confrontations with us and with the other peoples who have so frequently come under its attack. This time imperialism did not confront us openly, as it did in 1956, but made every effort, with, admittedly, great skill, to disguise its role and cover up its collusion—indeed it left almost no evidence at all, apart from its fingerprints. The situation is quite different now from 1956, when we managed to catch him red-handed.

It is for this reason, also, that we are for the first time celebrating the anniversary of the Revolution at a time when our homeland is still involved in a voracious conspiracy. In spite of our people's courage and their resolute determination to confront this conspiracy, there can be no doubt that they are experiencing great sorrow and pain. It may be that Almighty God wanted to test us, to see whether we are worthy of what we have achieved, if we are capable of protecting our achievements, if we have sufficient courage, patience and determination for this time of trial. It may be, brothers, that He intended it to be a lesson to us, to teach us what we had not yet learned, remind us of what we may have forgotten, and purge us of the blemishes and defects we should have avoided in building up our country.

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I do not wish to go back with you over the circumstances that led up to and created this crisis. I explained some of them to you in my speech of 9 June, directly after the setback. Also, I am well aware, and we must all be aware, that what is done is done, and that it is useless to dwell on it and to cry over spilt milk. What we must do today is to learn the lesson the setback teaches us, surmount that setback, rise above it, and continue triumphantly on the road that leads to the realisation of our hopes.

However, I do think that we should examine certain important points, so that everything may be as clear as possible to all of us.

The first point that must be clear to us all is that it was not we who sparked off the crisis in the Middle East. We all know that the crisis began with an attempt by Israel to attack Syria. We are all certain that, in making this attempt, Israel was not acting on her own behalf only, but also on behalf of the forces which were at the

end of their tether because of the Arab revolutionary movement. The information we received about the attack on Syria came from many sources. Some came from the Syrians themselves, who told us that Israel had mobilised 18 brigades against them. We made a point of checking this information and confirmed that Israel had mobilised at least 13 brigades against Syria.

Then there was our parliamentary mission, headed by Anwar as-Sadat, which was on a visit to Moscow, where our Soviet friends informed Mr. as-Sadat that Israel was on the point of attacking Syria.

What could we have done? We could have kept silence and waited; we could have contented ourselves with issuing finely worded communiqués and sending telegrams of support.

But had we done this we should have been relinquishing the mission, the true role of this country. We should have been denying its personality.

We had a joint defence agreement with Syria, and we do not regard the agreements we make with Arab or other peoples as so many scraps of paper. We regard them as sacred, as honourable obligations. There is between us and Syria, as there has been and will always be between us and all Arab peoples, something greater and more lasting than agreements and treaties.

There was, and always will be, faith in our common struggle and common destiny. It was therefore inevitable that we should take action to confront the threat to Syria. For the statements of Israeli leaders, politicians and military men, and their open threats against Syria which had been reported in the press and mentioned at the United Nations made it impossible to doubt that the information we had received was true. They also made it impossible for us to wait or hesitate.

The second point is that, when we decided to take action, this decision had practical consequences. In the first place, we asked for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, and then reasserted our sovereign rights over the Gulf of Aqaba. This was something our Arab brothers have always insisted on and asked us to do.

Naturally, this had important consequences

in the Middle East and throughout the world.

The third point is that, even as we took these active measures and took the initiative in warding off the threat to Syria, we knew, particularly in view of the international situation, that we absolutely had to keep from firing the first shot.

Had we done that we should have exposed ourselves to disastrous consequences, which it was beyond our power to endure. The first thing we should have had to face was direct American military action against us, on the pretext that it was we who had fired the first shot.

In this connection I want to draw your attention to the following important points. The first point concerns the American warnings, which you may have read of. What happened was that President Johnson's adviser sent for our Ambassador in Washington late at night, and told him that Israel had information that we were going to attack. He said that this would place us in a grave situation, and called on us to practise self-restraint, adding that they had recommended that Israel do the same. Then there were the messages that reached us from President Johnson, talking about the United Nations, and calling on us to practise self-restraint.

The second point, which I may also have mentioned to you before, is that the next day the Russian Ambassador asked for a meeting with me, and gave me a message from the Soviet Prime Minister, asking us to practise self-restraint, and informing me of a message he had sent to the Prime Minister of Israel, to the effect that any action on her part would expose the world to grave dangers.

The third point is that the whole international community was opposed to a war being started. De Gaulle, the French President, said very plainly that France's attitude would be determined on the basis of who fired the first shot.

The fourth point is that we were the victims of a piece of diplomatic fraud, of an operation of political deceit so grave that we could never have imagined that a great power could condescend to practise it. The political deceit was on the part of America—the letters of the American President and the appeals of the American President. They asked us to co-operate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The

President said that he was ready to send the Vice President to discuss with us ways and means by which we could get the whole world out of the crisis. The Secretary-General of the United Nations came. We cooperated to the fullest extent with the Secretary-General of the United Nations; he asked us for a breathing space, and we agreed, as far as the Gulf of Aqaba was concerned. He said that he wanted this breathing space for everyone, so that they might have a chance to take a deep breath and put things in order, the first point of agreement being that no Israeli ships should pass through the Canal, and no Israeli strategic cargoes either; at the same time we should not search ships. We accepted this regarding it as a solution by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that would give every one time to discuss the matter.

After that an envoy of the American President arrived here and suggested that one of our Vice President should go to America. I agreed to this, on the understanding that he would meet President Johnson and explain matters to him. I then sent a message to the American President, saying that we would welcome the American Vice President's visit. I also said that I was ready to send Vice President Zakariya Muhyiddin to Washington to meet President Johnson and explain to him the Arab point of view. The next day the reply came: they would welcome Zakariya Muhyiddin's visit to Washington to meet the President, and asked us to propose a date. We suggested Tuesday, 6 June. But, as we all know, the aggression began on 5 June. What does this mean? It means that there was wide-scale political and diplomatic activity which entitled us to believe that the explosion was not close at hand.

The fifth point: in spite of all this, we were not entirely happy. We knew that something was being cooked up, and that it would not be long in coming to light. It was clear that something was being cooked up against us. For two years I had had the feeling that something was being cooked up against us, from the time U.S. aid was cut off, and America started warning us not to arm or expand our army, and not to go on with technical or military development.

When we mobilised our forces there was, in my estimation, a 20 per cent possibility of war.

Before closing the Gulf of Aqaba we had a meeting of the Higher Executive Committee. This meeting was held in my house, and we discussed the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba. That was on 22 May. I said at the meeting that there was a 50 per cent chance of war, and at another meeting I said that the likelihood of war was 80 per cent. At these meetings of the Higher Executive Committee it was clear to all of us that our role would be purely defensive; we should not attack unless there was an aggression against Syria; we merely had to be in a state of preparadness. At that meeting no one spoke of attacking Israel; there was absolutely no intention of taking offensive action against Israel. As I have said before, it was clear from all our analyses that any offensive action on our part against Israel would expose us to grave dangers, the first being that America would attack us, in view of American statements to the effect that they would guarantee the frontiers of all countries in this area. It was clear to us that when America said she would guarantee the frontiers of all countries in this area, and would not allow any changes to be made, she did not mean the Arab countries but she meant Israel. She meant that in the case of any aggression against Israel, she would implement the statement of President Kennedy that America would guarantee the frontiers of all countries in this area.

Thus, there was absolutely no discussion of offensive action against Israel; the activities of the Joint Command were restricted to defensive operations. The mobilisation was, in our opinion, merely a deterrent operation to prevent Israel from attacking Syria.

On 23 May we announced the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Then came the political changes in Israel at the beginning of June, after which there was a 100 per cent chance of war.

What does this mean? It means that we were not at all happy about all the diplomatic and political activities that America was engaged in. We were sure, too, that something was being cooked up against us, and that it would not be long in coming to light. On Friday, 2 June, I myself went to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and attended a meeting at which all the senior officers of the armed forces were

present, and told them my views before hearing their analysis of the situation.

At that meeting on Friday 2 June I said that we should expect the enemy to strike within 48 to 72 hours, and that all the events and developments that had taken place indicated that the blow would be struck no later than that.

At the same meeting I also said that I expected the aggression to take place on Monday 5 June, and that the first blow would be struck at our air force.

The Commander of the Air Force was present at the meeting.

What did that mean? It meant that, in spite of all the diplomatic activity that was going on and all the contacts that were being made, in spite of the fact that the Secretary-General of the United Nations had been sent to us and despite Johnson's approval of Zakariya Muhyiddin's visit, we had not been misled into underrating the situation. It was perfectly clear to any political group that Israel would have to take military action, especially after the Iraqi troop movements and after Jordan had joined the Joint Defence Agreement.

We now come to the sixth point. After what has happened, honesty and simple self-respect dictate that we admit that the war did not go as we had expected and hoped. What happened to us, in effect, is a witness to the fact that one cannot guard against fate. I do not want at this juncture to talk about the causes, nor do I agree that either I myself or the Egyptian people should start apportioning the blame while the conflict is still in progress; this must be left to history and the struggle of our people. But I can say, of my own free will and with a conscience ready to be brought to book at any time, that for whatever has happened and may happen, the responsibility, first and last, must fall on my shoulders. I said this in my speech to the nation on 9 June, I say it now and I shall continue to say it. I accept all the consequences and consent to any judgement that may ensue. This, indeed, was what prompted me to take my decision on 9 June to resign.

I wanted to assume the responsibility and go. I wanted the enemies of the Egyptian people and the Arab nation to know that it was not merely a matter of Abd an-Nasir and his ambitions, as they said, but that the struggle of the Egyptian

people had begun before Abd an-Nasir and would continue after he was gone.

The Arab people, too, had striven for unity before Abd an-Nasir. I have always said, and I still say, that I am not the leader of this people; the greatest honour I aspire to is that I should be the expression of this people at a certain stage of their struggle, which will go on, regardless of individuals.

The seventh point concerns the role played by America. Much of this is still obscure; only a little of it is known to us as yet. The secrets of the 1956 war did not become known until last year, ten years after the events took place. It is impossible that we should know all the secrets of the 1967 war at present; it will be some years before we know them. But America certainly played a role in this aggression. Much of this role is still obscure, but we do know something. What can we say about the political and diplomatic role played by the United States of America before fighting broke out; the letters, the request that we should practise self-restraint, the warning to us that any action on our part would expose the whole area to danger, then the offer to send the American Vice President to talk to us about the subject, and their consent to have Zakariya Muhyiddin visit Washington to meet Johnson to discuss the question and try to find a solution? All this happened before the aggression, before war broke out. It was a fraud, and we must ask ourselves in whose interests the fraud was practised. Of course, it was on behalf of the Israeli imperialist aggression, on behalf of an American plan organised against us with the object—as I have been saying for two years—of destroying the free revolutionary regimes which were not prepared to obey the orders of the great powers or to be drawn into their spheres of influence. What was the meaning of the role played by the Sixth Fleet in the few days before the war, as it was sailing off our shores and near our frontiers? What arms were shipped to Israel between the beginning of the crisis and the moment of aggression? Exactly how many planes were brought down? How many volunteer pilots were there? How can one explain the huge strength of the air force the enemy operated with on all the Arab fronts?

They attacked us here in Egypt and attacked

Jordan at the same time. They attacked Syria and at the same time sent planes to attack Iraqi airfields. On 7 June King Husayn telephoned me in the morning, at dawn, and said that 400 planes were attacking on the Jordanian front; his radar had picked up this large number of planes. Where did these planes come from? How to explain the role played by the American spy ship "Liberty"? You have all read in the papers how there was an American ship called "Liberty" near our territorial waters, or actually in our territorial waters, and how the Israelis thought it was Egyptian and sent torpedo boats to sink it, with the result that 34 American sailors were killed. On whose behalf was this ship working, with all its scientific instruments? It is said that the ship was deciphering messages concerning military operations. It was said that it was sending messages to America, and later to Israel—of course it takes very little time to send messages by radio—or that it was perhaps sending messages to American embassies in the area. But what would have happened if the "Liberty" had been attacked by our destroyers? What would the Americans have done then? When the Israelis hit the ship the Americans covered everything up and sailed off to Malta for repairs. If we had attacked the ship the Americans would have sent us an ultimatum because we are neither an American colony nor a bridgehead for imperialism, nor do we lie within the American sphere of influence. Another question: Why were there American planes flying over our front? On Wednesday 7 June two planes with American insignia were seen over our lines. I did not believe it at first, but the information was confirmed, and later on we broadcast a statement saying that American planes had flown over our lines and over the front. We said that this had led us to believe that the Americans were taking part in the attack. We also mentioned the planes that were attacking Jordan, saying that non-Israeli planes were attacking Jordan. We broadcast a communiqué giving details of the two planes, which had been sighted twice. That night I received a message from President Johnson; he had got in touch with the Soviet Premier and asked them to send us a message, because by then we had no relations with America. In his message he said that there actually had been two American planes flying over our

lines, but that they had been going to the rescue of the "Liberty," the spy ship "Liberty."

The question that arises is: Were there other American planes? Another question is: Would they have ever admitted the existence of those two planes had we not broadcast our statement to that effect? One really ought to ask oneself these questions, in view of what one knows. How are we to understand the American attitude at the United Nations on the termination of hostilities? Exactly what did it mean? How are we to understand the fact that the American attitude at the United Nations, the termination of hostilities, was based entirely on the Israeli point of view? This American attitude meant unconditional surrender for the Arabs. That's what it meant. There is thus a terrible difference between the two American attitudes—that of 1956, when America was surprised by the Tripartite Aggression, and that of 1967, when America was not surprised at all. In 1956 America was taken by surprise by the Tripartite Aggression against us, but in 1967, in spite of all the messages, and in spite of agreeing that Zakariya Muhyiddin should go to Washington, America was not surprised by the Israeli aggression against us. When America was surprised, she adopted a firm attitude to the aggression, demanded that it be stopped, and that the enemy forces be withdrawn. But when America was not surprised, she stood by the aggression and exerted pressure on every country over which she had any influence of any kind, with the consequent failure of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Certainly America was not surprised. Stories have started to be told, the American press these days is full of news items saying that the matter was the subject of high-level discussions in America—the American press has said, and *Life* magazine has said that Israel proposed to the American President that she should attack, saying that she was sure she had supremacy. It has also been said in the American press that the President sought the opinion of his Chief of Staff and Head of Intelligence, and that they agreed to the proposal. Israel was then given the green light. She could go ahead and attack, she could commit aggression. At the same time Israel received guarantees from America that if the Arabs entered Israel they would be opposed by the Sixth Fleet—if Israel

went to war, America would support her. All this has been published in the press. Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister, had thanked the American President for telling him that the Sixth Fleet was there "for your sake, to help you." Eshkol, growing coy, had then told the American President that he was afraid that when they were in danger he may be busy with Vietnam, or away for the weekend on his ranch in Texas. But the American President had assured him that the Sixth Fleet would protect them if the Arabs crossed the Israeli frontiers. All this has appeared in the press.

Thus American was not surprised by the aggression; there was collusion between America and Israel. All this is true. Naturally one tends to ask oneself if it could really have happened. But of course the only answer is that America acted in collusion with Israel. Before the war broke out America announced that she would abide by Kennedy's statement guaranteeing the frontiers in the whole of this area. But of course she only meant the frontiers of Israel, not Arab frontiers. America reassured Israel about her frontiers, but allowed her to violate Arab territory. America asked us to practise self-restraint, and allow a breathing space; at the same time she permitted Israel to commit the aggression. As I said before the fighting started—we don't want war with America. Perhaps some people were annoyed with me for what I said at my press conference before the outbreak of hostilities—I repeated more than once that America is the strongest and richest country in the world. This is true, and it is no good denying it. Political attitudes cannot be built on fancies or on self-deception; they must be built on facts. When I say that we neither desire nor are able to fight a war with America, I do not regard this as anything shameful or injurious: it is perfectly true, we neither wish to nor are capable of fighting America. But that cannot deprive us of our determination to retain our freedom; it cannot deprive us of our will for revolution or our hope for a future that we shall build for ourselves in accordance with our desires and the interests of our people, whatever the circumstances, however great the pressures exerted against us and however far America goes in her attempts to suppress the national liberation movement and the national revolution.

Two years ago the American Under-Secretary of State came to meet me with a message from Johnson and said that, as we had not agreed to their demand for inspection rights—I have told you about this before: they had asked for the right of inspection as regards nuclear activities and rockets, and wanted to restrict the Egyptian army to a specific number, but we had refused this, saying that America had no right to inspect us—as I said, Talbot, the American Under-Secretary of State, came to me, and said that, as we had refused this request, they would be obliged to give Israel all the arms she asked for. He added that if we denounced them for giving arms to Israel, they would give her even more arms. I replied that if they gave Israel arms, we would buy arms; it was the only thing we could do. They then decided to give Israel a number of tanks and planes, and it may well be that there was a difference between the numbers they published and the number they actually gave Israel.

This was an open threat from the Americans that they would give Israel arms, and help her and cooperate with her if we did not allow them the right to inspect us and accept their demand that the Egyptian army should be restricted to specific numbers and specific arms.

This is part of the background to what has happened. Much more will come to light as time goes by. But the important thing, as I said before, is that what is done is done, and we cannot ignore it; we cannot remain paralysed by shock. The important thing, as I said before, is that we should learn our lesson from what has happened, that we should rise above the setback and continue our triumphant course towards the realisation of our hopes.

This the real significance of the attitude of our people in the evening of 9 June and the morning of 10 June.

Brothers; I did not think for a moment that, in the evening of 9 June, the people came out into the streets to do honour to me personally, in spite of the blackout and the enemy raids. I was sure that it was a sign of their determination to continue the struggle. I have said many times that this people has given me more than I ever dreamed of. I have more than once raised my voice in warning against dependence on an individual, for every individual has a part to play, after

which he must leave the scene; it is the people who go on for ever. From this point of view I have nothing to say. The attitude of the people on 9 and 10 June was something more than I, or any individual, deserve, but, as far as I am concerned, it had another meaning—it meant the continuation of the struggle, the popular struggle, it meant that the people were prepared for the heaviest burdens, the greatest sacrifices; it meant determined resistance and endurance. In adopting this attitude the people were answering the most important question posed by recent events, by the setback itself: What was to be done? The people replied, as I have said, with determination to resist, with readiness for sacrifice, with endurance. But this is not all there is to it; it is only the beginning, for we are confronted by another urgent question: Where are we to begin?

As I stand before you here, within hearing of the whole Egyptian people and the whole Arab nation, I know that every one of you has questions in his heart which he has come to hear answered. I know that in your homes, everywhere, you want to know, you want me to tell you where we are to begin. But I tell you plainly and frankly there is no short and easy course to what we want. Nor is there one single course that will lead us to our aims. The course is long and hard, there are many courses we must follow at the same time, no matter how great the difficulties or the obstacles. The setback that has befallen us was greater than we had expected, so that we cannot without due consideration immediately follow the first course that presents itself. We must come to realise that what is essential is the popular and military reconstruction of the forces of the Egyptian homeland.

Moreover, the enemy we had to face was not Israel alone.

That is why we say that there are many courses that we must follow, Arab courses, political and economic courses, the courses of international politics and propaganda as well as the international military path.

The courses of struggle open to us are momentous indeed. Of the two courses open to us—either to surrender unconditionally, or to continue the struggle—the character of our people, our character and our regime, for which we are known

throughout the world, demands that we should choose the course of struggle. I said that there were two courses open to us, but in fact there is only one; it is only when we treat the matter purely objectively that we can say two courses are open to us—either to surrender or to continue the struggle. But in fact there is only one solution. We have never surrendered, we have always struggled. Even in the days of the British occupation we struggled, in the days of the Ottoman occupation we struggled—we have struggled throughout our history. So we can ignore the solution of surrender, and there then remains only one course open to us, the course of struggle. Struggle at this stage means real struggle, hard and cruel. But it is a struggle for our principles and our aims, for our liberty, our land and our country, for the social revolution we have brought about, and for the whole Arab homeland.

As I told you, there are many courses that this struggle can take. There is political struggle. We shall never close the door to a political solution, nor to political contacts, absolutely never. Even when Dr. Fawzi went to America, to the United Nations in New York, I told him that I had no objection to his meeting the Americans, so he met the American Secretary of State twice. Struggle can be through political action.

Then there is economic struggle. They said that if the Suez Canal was closed we should lose about 10 million pounds every month—110 million pounds in hard currency every year. And today our enemies are saying that if this goes on for five or six months we shall not have the money to buy wheat, and the Egyptian people will starve. We say that we shall carry on the economic struggle. What do we mean by that? We mean that we shall get wheat and that we shall not starve; we shall go without other things that are less necessary than wheat. I should like to remind you that 110 million pounds didn't use to come to us before 1956; the British and French—the Suez Canal Company—used to get them. Before the Canal was nationalised we used to get only one million, but this year we expected to get 110 million. We shall not get them, but it doesn't matter. Economic struggle means that we shall have to make certain economic sacrifices; we shall not be the first country to do this. In Britain during the war people got only one egg a week.

When we think of the Second World War we can all remember how the British continued the struggle after their defeat at Dunkirk. War is not just one battle, and then surrender; it is much more than that. Victory comes to those who stand firm and endure. We have fought harsh and violent battles in the past; this was not the first. The violent battles we fought had no effect on the determination of the Egyptian people to defend their liberty; they did not surrender.

Political struggle is one course; economic struggle is another and a long one, that will ensure that imperialism does not gain its ends. Then there is military struggle, which means that we must rebuild our armed forces to make them efficient. There must be popular resistance and popular mobilisation everywhere, so that we may resist aggression from village to village in defence of the freedom of our country. We read every day about the people of Vietnam, and how with only small arms they resist tanks and planes. They themselves have no tanks or planes, but they inflict heavy losses on the Americans. We are no less than the people of Vietnam; we are a people that has always struggled. When there were air raids on Suez that first day, of course people were afraid; but I tell you that by the second day they had got used to them; and on the third, fourth and fifth days they had—this is something well known to military experts—they had become immunised. People become immunised at times of war. When you hear shooting for the first time, you may well be frightened, but later on you can hear a machine gun without turning a hair. Military struggle does not involve the armed forces only, but the whole people as well.

There must be popular resistance everywhere. I have heard people saying about popular resistance that we haven't given people arms, and asking why not, and things of that kind. Never mind; we don't have to be critical of everything, we don't need to ask that everything should be perfect. Egypt isn't America.

The sort of popular resistance we want is that people should have arms of some kind—knives, staves, sticks, anything—popular resistance in accordance with our ability and capacity. In this way we can get large numbers of people joining the popular resistance.

I hope that our young men will not be disappointed when they find that there are not arms available for everyone. We shall gradually make them available. In any case, a small amount of arms is sufficient for training a large number of men.

Popular resistance of this kind employs many methods, and when we talk of military struggle, we mean both our armed forces and popular resistance, which will include both men and women in every village and town; there must be complete popular mobilisation.

As I said before, it is essential that we should undertake the popular and military reconstruction of the forces of the Egyptian homeland.

Let me start by saying something about Egyptian reconstruction, which, we must all admit, is the principal base of resistance, the battlefield of endurance, the vanguard of progress.

The first thing I talked about today was the military aspect. I hope that you will appreciate that I cannot give full details about it. All I can say is that we are reorganising our armed forces, and reinforcing their potential and effectiveness. Here I should like to mention a number of points which are extremely important as far as our struggle is concerned.

The first point is that our armed forces must be the vanguard of our people in every battle. This is, and will remain, the role of the armed forces. Therefore the strength of the armed forces is the strength of the homeland, and their honour its honour.

Secondly, the members of our armed forces have shown unparalleled courage and made unheard of sacrifices. They fought without air cover, whereas the enemy not only had planes, but supremacy in the air. The conditions attending the setback did not permit the heroism of our soldiers to come to light as it deserves but I can say with absolute certainty that many of them wrote with their blood glorious pages in the history of this country.

Thirdly, our armed forces cannot perform their role properly unless there is complete cohesion between the army and the people, and such cohesion has never been more necessary than it is today.

Let me now talk of the popular aspect:

I accepted the job of Secretary-General of the Socialist Union with all its attendant responsibilities because I knew that the field of popular political organisation would play a decisive role in the battle. I knew that it was essential that, even in the middle of the battle, we should renew the strength and activity of popular organisation. It was decided before the crisis that the central committee of the Arab Socialist Union should be formed before the fifteenth anniversary of the Revolution. I cannot see any reason why the crisis should postpone the implementation of this decision; on the contrary, I think it makes it even more urgent. It is more necessary than ever that we should expand the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union. If the Union is the organisation that represents the alliance of all the forces of the people, its leadership must not be the monopoly of a handful of individuals. I therefore hope that the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union will be formed within a few days, and that it will include the cream of this country's leaders. I also hope that the committee will fulfil its role of leadership in the best manner possible, which is to release the vitality and energies of the working forces of the people and to bring out the role of the people in the leadership. In this way it can lead the working forces of our people to a wider and more profound democracy, so that, as soon as the consequences of the aggression are eliminated, the Revolution may achieve a complete and genuine advance to sound democracy.

We have always aimed at establishing sound democratic life, and I have always said that political democracy cannot exist without social democracy, nor political liberty without social liberty. I have always said that the way to sound democratic life lies through the socialist solution, which consists of dissolving class divisions. It is the socialist solution that makes the people sovereign over its own affairs and offers equal opportunities to everyone in the country. It has always been and will always be my opinion that the greatest success the Revolution of 23 July can achieve is to be affirmed in the life of the Egyptian people, and to remain when the revolutionary vanguards pass away, when the revolutionary vanguards which came into existence on 23 July,

and have since borne the responsibility for the Revolution, become absorbed into a wider civil life—that would be the greatest success the July Revolution could achieve.

Our generation has provided leaders for the great period of change. Other generations must come and lead, and, more important still, there must be a democratic regime that ensures the renewal of the leaderships that permanently express the demands and aspirations of the working forces of the people and that are capable of appreciating and solving the problems that make their appearance at every stage. If our generation thinks that it is to be in command for life, it is making two grave mistakes. Firstly, it is taking on itself more than it can justly and honestly fulfil, and secondly it is hindering and impeding growth and standing in the way of the healthy renewal of the forces of the people and their leadership.

From another point of view, popular reconstruction is also essential for the achievement of victory. If we ask ourselves what was the object, the real object, of the organised aggression to which we were subjected, the answer can be that it was to destroy the socialist revolution in Egypt. Thus, for us to be able to confront the aggression, it is essential that we should strengthen the social revolution in Egypt. This involves, first and foremost, the mobilising of the forces of the masses, to whom we must disclose the object of the aggression, of the whole operation.

What, in fact, was the object of the collusion? It was to destroy the social revolution which they have opposed with all the means at their disposal. They have opposed us with attempted assassination, through the Muslim Brethren, through conspiracies and the cutting off of aid—but we have endured. All their attempts failed, so that there was only one solution left to them—Israel. They hoped that after Israel's attack cracks would appear in the regime. Of course, the setback did cause some cracks to appear, it did have some effect. Now is the time for them to concentrate on economic pressure and on political pressure. They may even resort to military pressure to bring down the Revolution which they have not been able to touch for 15 years. They have not been able to subdue it or to draw it into their spheres of influence. The occupation of territory was not the fundamental objective of

the imperialist-Zionist aggression; it was only a partial objective, intended to aid in the realisation of the fundamental objective, which was the liquidation of the Arab Revolution as a whole. The aggression realised its partial objective, but it has not succeeded in realising its fundamental objective. The enemy guns trained on us, the great powers that are still standing against us, have not realised their fundamental objective. Therefore, the aggression is still trying to realise its fundamental objective. This means that when we reflect on and define our aims, we can decide where we should make a start. Our direct objective, therefore, must not only be the elimination of the effects of the aggression, it must also be the protection of our revolutionary regime, the reinforcement of its foundations and the strengthening of the Arab revolution. But does this mean that we should close our eyes to the Zionist occupation of our country? That we should forget the military setback? Certainly not; it means that the main line of our activities must be revolutionary action, the strengthening of the home front, revolutionary mobilisation of the masses, the expansion of the links that unite the different branches of the Arab revolutionary movement in the common struggle and the strengthening of our military forces.

If we succeed in achieving this, in preventing the enemy from achieving his fundamental aim, if we succeed in protecting the social revolution in Egypt and strengthening the comprehensive Arab revolution, we shall succeed in liberating the occupied territories. Now why do they want to destroy the revolutionary regime? Because they know that it is a regime of struggle, not surrender. What they want, of course, is a regime of surrender; but how is the enemy going to secure a regime of surrender? All of you know the objects of the enemy's attack. It was directed in the first place against our armed forces, but this was only a small part of the overall attack, which was directed against the working forces of our people, as being the source of all our strength. This was the main body of the attack. Thus by repelling this attack, by defeating it, we shall be able to liberate ourselves and eliminate the consequences of the military aggression. The military aggression is over; what we are experiencing now is the attack on the masses, on you, on

every single individual in this country. We can see the psychological attack in the foreign press and foreign broadcasts, the comprehensive attack on the whole Arab nation to reduce it to despair, to make it lose hope, forget its objectives and surrender. The enemy is trying to undermine the confidence of the Arab masses in everything, in their sacred objectives and their huge achievements, in the results of their sacrifices, in the stability of what they have built, to sap their self-confidence and their confidence in each other. This is the real struggle that faces us today. The enemy has not achieved his objective by occupying our territory; he hopes to do so by destroying first the Arab revolution, then Arab hopes, and later drawing our country into his sphere of influence. The enemy has occupied Sinai, but the Revolution still exists. We have said that we shall struggle and liberate our country, liberate Arab territory. But our enemies say they have caused cracks to appear, that they have struck us a heavy blow. We are not the first people to be beaten. France and Britain were beaten, as was America at Pearl Harbour, and had to withdraw; Russia too—the Germans came to within ten kilometres of Moscow. We are not the first people to lose a battle. Where, then, does the difference lie? Not in military conflict, but in whether to surrender or to continue the struggle.

The fact of the matter is that they now want us to surrender. What do they mean, surrender? They want us to despair; they are spreading talk amongst us that they hope will make us despair, and without realising their aims we hear their broadcasts and pass on what they say and say that it is useless, Israel is too strong, America is too strong, and so on. And they know that people, and especially the Egyptian people, will get hold of almost anything and turn it into a joke. You all know the spate of jokes that has been going around recently. I know our people. That sort of thing is a part of our nature. I have not taken the matter seriously; I know the Egyptian people very well—I am one of them. I was brought up among them. Whenever anyone meets anyone else he asks him if he has heard the latest joke and then goes on and tells it to him. This is how we are, after all, and of course they know it, and they may well try to exploit this characteristic by spreading jokes that affect our honour, our

honour as a people whose vanguards fought and died; yes, people did die.

We are not the first people to lose a battle. The Americans were defeated at Pearl Harbour, and fled. The British lost everything before they left Dunkirk—they had to sail in fishing boats. France fell in ten days. And the people who are opposing us now—Holland fell in a day, Belgium fell in a day, the whole of Western Europe went. We all of us remember the speeches—the speech of Churchill after Dunkirk, when he said that the British were like an oyster that had lost its shell so that they must go carefully for a bit until they could grow a new shell to protect them. Then they endured the Battle of Britain, and the bombing of London, and food was not reaching them, and so on and so forth, but they continued the struggle until they were victorious. Every day they used to hear a man called Lord Haw-Haw, an Englishman, broadcasting, and telling them that they were defeated, that they had been put to shame and that Germany had smashed Britain with air raids, and smashed London and Canada too—he ridiculed them, but it was useless.

In 1956, didn't we have eleven secret radio stations broadcasting against us? We should like to ask the West why it keeps on attacking us to make us despair of our life. We have not despaired and we have not surrendered. The "Voice of Britain" station that opened up in 1956 used to say that the British were going to strike here and to strike there, but people everywhere said that they would fight. Then economic pressure was exerted against us, our sterling balances were frozen in 1956, and we had no hard currency. But we resisted and managed to win the economic struggle, the political struggle and the military struggle.

Today, the enemy has not achieved his aim. His aim was not territorial gains—not Sinai, nor the West Bank nor the Golan Heights. It was all directed at you. His aim was to make us despair, and give up hopes, to bring down the principles we believed in, to bring down our social revolution—they used all means in their power to bring it down. What are our enemies the Americans saying today? "We have done all we need to do, and now we can leave them alone, in another six months they will collapse on their own; the cracks have begun to appear, so we can leave

them to collapse. The cracks have begun to appear—they are giving up hope—they will certainly fall. The whole Arab nation will despair.” They thought that this would really happen, they thought that we should give up hope, that we should lose confidence in our aims, in everything.

Whenever anyone meets anyone else he asks him: “Have you heard the latest?” There are heavy duties imposed on us. It is required of every individual, not only in Egypt, but in the whole Arab nation, that he should be alert to, and cautious of, the methods of imperialism and Zionism, which want to make us despair, and lose our faith in our values. We are not going to despair or lose our faith in our values or our aims.

When is it that we shall succeed? When every individual promises himself that he will work against the objectives of the enemy—don’t come and tell me it is the political organisations alone that are responsible. I say no; every man is responsible, every Arab individual in every Arab country is responsible, and he cannot shift this responsibility on to anyone else. If everyone rises to his responsibilities we shall defeat the aims of imperialism and Zionism, and succeed in our popular, political and military struggle, and liberate the occupied territories. But if imperialism succeeds in making the individual lose his confidence, and has even a 50 per cent effect on him, it will have achieved a 50 per cent success. Every individual is responsible and can play his part in this cruel and bitter struggle against imperialism and Zionism. This applies to every man, every woman, every house and every family in the Arab homeland, at the present stage. They must all come to realise that the struggle was not over once the fighting stopped. They must realise that the struggle is going on, and that the struggle that faces us today is even more bitter than the actual fighting was: We must continue the struggle everywhere so that we may mobilise the forces of the Arab masses, so that we may not lose confidence in ourselves, not despair, not lose hope in our aims. I repeat, we are not the first to lose a battle or to be defeated in a battle; to put it bluntly all the great countries in the world have been defeated in battles. But through planning and struggle, the countries that have succeeded in mobilising themselves and in knowing where

they were going have been victorious. We also intend to be victorious. We shall never give the enemy the chance of achieving his aims. So much for the individual, and every individual has a part to play. But if every one of us palms off his responsibility on to someone else, we shall remain a nation of shirkers, we shall suffer again, once, twice, three times, four times. Every man has his duty, every citizen has his duty.

What I want to say is that we have been carried away by the spate of jokes going around; we haven’t understood what effect they have. In fact the jokes that were going around were injurious to the honour of men who are our sons and brothers. I myself have heard these jokes, people would ask me if I had heard the latest one, just as you ask each other the same question. Such is the Egyptian character I myself did not take any notice of these jokes, but I know the Egyptian people. They are a people 7,000 years old; they have conquered all their invaders, they have broken everyone who came to Egypt, from Cambyses to Napoleon, and sat back and made jokes about them. They are a people with their own philosophy and their own character. No one has been able to divide them, for they have national unity. They are a strong and stubborn people, but they love jokes. I regard this as an excellent characteristic; it is a good thing to be able to philosophise about things. If our enemies come to exploit this characteristic to further their aims, we must all be sincere in our intentions. I can’t give you any specific political instructions; what I say is that any responsible individual must ask himself what is behind this or that. If the aim is to consolidate the defeat, to make us lose our confidence in the armed forces, to make the armed forces lose hope, what will the result be if we join in? We shall be helping the enemy to achieve his aims. The way of struggle lies before us; it is a hard road, but every man can do much.

Political organisation, too, must be in the field with the masses; it must lead, really lead, and not only seem to do so. It must not be arrogant or conceited, it must operate from within the popular base. We all know how the political parties in the past used to dominate and behave arrogantly. If the popular leaderships are going to dominate and behave arrogantly now, they will immediately fall in the estimation of the

masses.

Crises more than anything else reveal people's true mettle. The present crisis has revealed the true mettle of our people, and shown that they are a people with a long and uninterrupted civilisation. Afterwards, of course, there was a spate of criticism; every one has criticised everything about the setback with the greatest frankness. Every one has been talking and theorising; the setback has resulted in a great deal of talk, criticism and theorising. I have heard a lot of this talk; and many people have sent me letters—sincerely patriotic people, who want to make sacrifices, to take part in the struggle, to die. To tell the truth, I agreed with a great deal of what people were saying. They were asking for a decisive and serious start in keeping with the gravity of the situation that confronts us, and there I agree with them.

We must do everything to meet the requirements of the situation that confronts us. We are facing a war situation, and we must act accordingly. Every one of us, within the framework of his responsibility, must come to realise that, in wartime, extravagant expenditure on appearances must be cut down. Every man must do his work, and as far as the work is concerned there must be standards for the meting out of rewards and punishments.

Brothers; The new budget will come out tomorrow, or in a few days time. In the new budget we have been obliged to curtail the development plan, and postpone the iron and steel complex for a year. But work will continue in industries, new lands and electricity, and this will be the last budget for the High Dam. All this was so that economic pressures would have no effect on us, and so that the money we used to spend on such things could be spent on purchasing wheat and other necessities.

I now want to say something about Arab action. We began on this immediately after the setback; we kept in constant touch with each other and with others in an attempt to obtain a true picture of the situation in its full scope, both Arab and international. There have been meetings in Cairo, but, they weren't organised meetings. President Bumadyan sent me a message one day

to say he was coming to Cairo in the morning; because of his true Arab feelings he realised that he ought to come and see us at such a critical time, and we welcomed him. When he came he said that all Algeria's resources were at our disposal, that all Algeria's forces were at our disposal, that everything we asked for Algeria would give us, and that the battle was Algeria's battle. King Husayn also sent a message, saying that he wanted to come to Cairo, and we told him that he was most welcome, that this was his own country. He came, and we met with him and President Bumadyan; then they left. President Abd ar-Rahman Arif also considered it his duty to come and see us at this juncture. I did not know he was coming until an hour before he arrived. We were not even aware that he had left Baghdad. Then President al-Atasi came from Syria and President al-Azhari from the Sudan; it was an impromptu meeting without previous organisation or planning, and we talked of possibilities of cooperation to eliminate the consequences of the aggression. But do these conferences preclude further Arab action? I say No! We would be only too glad for unified Arab action at this stage. The people of the whole Arab nation have been shaken by this collusion and aggression, the peoples of the whole Arab nation have demonstrated and shown their feelings. Many people have sacrificed themselves; some have been imprisoned, others have gone on strike or refused to take their salaries. The whole Arab nation—men, workers, everyone—have shown their true nature, and shown that the rulers of every Arab country must bow to the opinion of its people. Differences of social system are not a reason for not holding meetings; our situation is too serious for us to allow that—we must rise above it. The battle requires the mobilisation of every Arab rifle, every Arab financial resource, every Arab individual, every Arab effort. Therefore I say that we must go to the Summit Conference so that every one may face up to his responsibilities. Some people seem to think that their responsibility goes no further than sending telegrams of support or sympathy; everyone comes and says "When we go to the Summit Conference..." Formerly we rejected the Summit Conference; some people might have thought this was because it would be injurious to our self-esteem to attend. Not in the least. In the past we have never allowed

considerations of self-esteem to stand in the way of the interests of the Arab homeland. Perhaps there are people who say that if we go certain people will gloat over our misfortunes; never mind, we have done our duty. We have done our duty; we have built up an army—we spent ten years building up an army for an Arab cause. We have never fallen short of our duty—when Syria was threatened we did not hold back. We acted like men and said that we would stand by Syria. Such is the character of our people. We did not leave others to fight on their own, we stood by them in the battle. We were defeated in the battle, but, as I said before, other people have lost battles, even great powers. Now great powers have plotted against us; as I have explained, there has been obvious collusion. We have acted honourably; in spite of the setback and the occupation of our territory in Sinai we have acted honourably. We have prepared our army and prepared ourselves, we have spent money on our army; we have not neglected our duty, but acted like men. Such is the character of our people today.

Since the setback took place they have been criticising us; Saudi Arabia has been criticising us, the press and the radio have been criticising us every day. After I said on 9 June that I had received a message from Kosygin and one from Johnson, the Saudi papers—King Faysal's paper, that is, came out to ask why we hadn't attacked first. King Faysal who is in Riyadh, five thousand kilometres away, and didn't send a single soldier, asks why we didn't attack first, why we listened to the orders of Johnson and Kosygin. In our case, it wasn't a question of listening to their orders. What happened was that these countries got in touch with us. It is well known what sort of relations exist between different countries. It was a time of crisis. Yet King Faysal's press and radio ask why didn't we attack first. But how many soldiers did he send during the crisis? Not one. We don't want to start quarrelling again, though we could easily answer them. The unfortunate thing is that no one reads their papers or knows what they say, whereas as soon as we publish anything not only do all Arabs read it, but the whole world reads it and says that we are attacking Saudi Arabia—it occurs to no one that Saudi Arabia has been attacking us ever since the aggression, in its press and radio. But if we started

attacking Saudi Arabia tomorrow, the whole world would say that Abd an-Nasir had started the quarrel and was attacking King Faysal. As I say, for a month and a half, since the aggression, the Saudi press and radio have been attacking us and gloating over our misfortunes. But I say that we did our duty like men; we did not run away from the battle. If we lost the battle, it is nothing shameful—it would certainly have been shameful, however, if we had run away from it; it would have meant that we had lost hope in our objectives, that we had despaired, that our slogans were meaningless, it would mean that what I say here and the slogans you repeat are meaningless, that all we say about Egyptian and Arab problems is meaningless. As I told you before, peoples must take action if they are to progress; they must take risks if they are to get anywhere and be victorious. Otherwise, they will stagnate.

In spite of all this I say that we are prepared to go to the Summit Conference. Let those who want to take part in the struggle do so, those who do not, let them not do so. Let those who want to play only a small part play a small part. But we are the ones who are today here, who are mobilising for the struggle, who are facing up to our responsibilities. Faysal's newspapers are not contributing anything; they only criticise us—of course they did send a brigade to Jordan after the fighting was over. We are not against any Arab country, we do not want to change the social system in any Arab country, we are not against the influence of any Arab country. What we are against is imperialism and the inroads of imperialism. We do expect an Arab country to be really Arab, genuinely Arab, Arab nationalist. When the President of Sudan proposed a Summit Conference we agreed, but we want guarantees that it is going to succeed. We also agreed to the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Khartoum. There must be an Arab front to oppose our enemies—Israel and her supporters. This front must be able to decide who are our enemies and who is helping Israel. We don't ask any one to do more than he is capable of, but we cannot accept that he should do less than he is capable of. While we are still fighting the enemy we are not prepared to start a quarrel, this is not the time for it. We are not going to reply to Saudi Arabia or to the Saudi press. I only mention this because I know that no one

listens to Saudi broadcasts or reads the Saudi press to tell the whole Arab world that ever since the war the Saudi press and radio have been attacking us.

In the international field we must decide who are our friends and who are our enemies; this will determine our attitude in the international field.

I say that the Arab nation and the peoples of the Arab nation, whatever setback has befallen them, distinguish between their friends and their enemies, and will bring their enemies to account.

As for the great powers, France alone of the Western countries adopted a moral attitude. The others, America and Britain, supported Israel. The U.S.S.R. stood by us and gave us political and economic support, and strengthened our armed forces. The Soviet President, Podgorny, came here and talked to us, and told us frankly that the U.S.S.R. was standing by us. I told him quite frankly that we didn't want the Red Army to come and fight for us. We can fight by ourselves, I said. We may have lost a battle but don't forget that when you were attacked by Hitler, you too lost many battles. Don't ever think that the Egyptian people or the Arab people want the Red Army to come and fight instead of us. We have men who know how to die, how to act like heroes. We have had men who died in the past, and we have men who are prepared to die now.

Of course I said this because the West had been attacking Russia, saying that the Arabs were angry because the U.S.S.R. had not sent any troops. But I don't imagine that we ever thought Soviet troops would come and fight our wars for us.

Many friendly countries stood by us—we all know which powers are friendly to us. India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, the Congo, and all the socialist countries stood by us. Outside the United Nations, China, North Korea, North Vietnam stood by us. Turkey, Cyprus—many countries stood by us. Greece and Spain stood by us; we have many friends who stood by us. But there are also some we thought were our friends who did not stand by us. Our relations with these will depend on the attitude they took.

As for America's attitude at the United Nations—you have all read the papers—I don't

need to repeat how America exerted pressure, threatened and offered foreign aid as a bribe to secure Israel's aims. If the United Nations has been unable to adopt a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israel's forces, the main reason is American pressure.

Brothers; There is no short and easy road. The road ahead of us is a long one. There is no one road, the roads are many, we must travel them all to reach our single aim. I am confident that, with God's help, we shall be able to reach the end of the road, for all its difficulties. I am confident that, with God's help, we shall pursue every course open to us, and we shall arrive at our destination.

Brothers; When they talk of peace, I say that no power on earth can impose peace. To accept an imposed peace means to accept surrender. They want us to surrender in the name of peace.

Brothers and fellow-countrymen; The only course open to us, despite the setback, despite everything, is to hold on to the rights of the people of Palestine. We shall never relinquish these rights.

Brothers and fellow-countrymen; This is the heart of the matter: we cannot accept peace if it means surrender, and, in spite of the setback, in spite of the occupation of Sinai, we cannot relinquish the rights of the people of Palestine. It is impossible that we should despair or betray our objectives; it is impossible that we should lose confidence in ourselves, in the Arab nation or in the Arab people.

Brothers; I am confident that coming generations will look at this era and say: that was one of the cruellest hours of their struggle, but they rose to their responsibilities and were loyal to their trust. May God grant you success. God bless you and grant you peace.

394

Statement by Prime Minister Jum'ah Affirming that Jordan Will Take No Separate Action on the Palestine Problem.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, July 27, 1967

I am anxious to affirm that Jordan, under the leadership of His Majesty King Husayn, has believed from the first that the cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs. She has believed that she could never adopt any attitude or take any measure in connection with this sacred cause unilaterally and that she should make every effort to preserve the unity of the Arab nation in everything she does in connection with this cause. She will continue to hold this belief as long as there is an ounce of effort left to be expended in achieving a united Arab attitude and a unified Arab policy capable of coping with the situation and the responsibilities it involves.

395

Statement of Policy by the New Iraqi Premier Yahya.² [Excerpts]

Baghdad, July 28, 1967

Fellow citizens; The Arab nation is passing through a critical stage in its history, a stage vital to its destiny, in which its present and future are being decided. World imperialism, along with its evil instrument, Zionism, is planning for the Arabs a future of humiliation and oppression which will destroy their nation's independence and draw it back into imperialist spheres of influence, exploitation and subservience. Imperialism is also making every effort to destroy the liberationist regimes and all the gains they have achieved for the Arab people.

Aware of this, we shall continue to confront the imperialist challenge through national planning that will mobilise all our resources for a joint struggle to safeguard the independence of the

homeland, maintain all gains achieved by the people, and consolidate the achievements of the July Revolution. We shall also make preparations to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to recover, with God's help, the Holy Land.

With these ends in view, our government will work in conformity with the following programme:

Firstly—The Armed Forces:

We shall take action as soon as possible to fully prepare the Iraqi Army to perform its duty in the battle of honour. We shall provide the financial resources necessary to build a modern army, to arm it with the most modern weapons, to improve its officer corps and to raise its standards as regards technical proficiency, administration and mobilisation to enable it to perform its duties both to Iraq and to the whole Arab nation, and to protect the aims of the Revolution. We shall also make an immediate start on reorganising the police and providing it with modern arms and equipment to enable it to perform its national duties in the best possible manner.

Ninthly—Arab and Foreign Policy:

1. We shall make every effort to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to mobilise all resources to recover Arab rights in Palestine.

2. We shall adhere to the Unified Political Command Agreement and take resolute and determined action to achieve union with the United Arab Republic, in accordance with Article I of the Provisional Constitution. In this we shall work with genuine dedication and revolutionary action aimed at the achievement of a unified economic and social regime on a socialist basis, unified political action on a popular democratic basis, and the taking of all effective measures in the military, political and cultural fields to achieve constitutional unity.

3. We shall oppose imperialism in its old and new forms, support the struggle of the Arab people in the Occupied South [Aden] and assist all peoples struggling for liberty and progress.

4. We shall cooperate more closely with the liberated countries in Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

5. We shall cooperate more closely and extensively with the friendly countries of the socialist camp.

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 28/7/1967.

² *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 29/7/1967.

6. We shall cooperate more closely with Islamic countries and peoples, friendly countries and all countries and peoples that support Arab rights in Palestine.

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396

Manifesto of the Arab Nationalist Movement on "The Struggle of Destiny Between the Arab Revolutionary Movement and Neo-Imperialism."¹ [Excerpt]

July 1967

It is impossible to grasp the import of the military setback that the Arabs have suffered as a result of the last war with Israel, and to deduce the meaning of the setback or to delineate its consequences, unless the issue is clearly seen within the context of the struggle of destiny which has been in progress for many years between the Arab revolutionary movement and neo-imperialism. Never before have we so much needed to be aware of the simple fact that the Zionist state, Israel, despite its individual and distinctive character, despite the specific way in which it came into existence and the theories concocted to justify its creation, is, fundamentally, an extension of the camp of international capitalism and of imperialism into this part of the Arab world.

The latest Arab-Israeli war was the climax of the conflict, which had been escalating for more than five years, between the Arab revolutionary movement and neo-imperialism, which is under the direction of the United States of America. This should serve as a point of orientation for revolutionary Arab thought, which is trying to sound the ground upon which it stands, if it is to arrive at definitive answers to the questions which haunt the mind and the heart of every Arab, namely, "Why the military setback?" "How can we eliminate the consequences of the aggression?" "What is the nature of the war for

which we must now prepare?"

Between the early fifties and the start of the sixties, the Arab liberation movement registered outstanding triumphs over the old form of imperialism and its empires, namely, the British Empire in the Arab East and the French Empire in Arab North Africa. These victories formed the general historical background for the basic developments that took place within the social and ideological sphere of the Arab national liberation movement, and for the by-products of these victories, which impelled the national revolution in significant parts of the Arab world along the path of non-capitalist development towards socialism.

This did not end the era of confrontation between the Arab nation and imperialism; it only moved the confrontation to the threshold of a more advanced stage, that of a collision with neo-imperialism, which, in recent years, had begun to adopt a thoroughly aggressive attitude.

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The United States, in its relations with the revolutionary movement, was moving from the era of sporadic clashes, which lasted from the beginning of the fifties to the start of the sixties, to the era of decisive collision which followed. The United States had several "local" forces in the heart of the Arab world which it could manipulate against the Arab revolution, without having to intervene directly, as in other parts of the world.

In addition to the vestiges of the old British imperialism, which were now mere pockets in the domain of American neo-imperialism, and beside the reactionary regimes, which represent the coalition of the upper bourgeois classes and feudalism in the Arab world and which, by their very nature, constituted bases for neo-imperialism, the United States also had a constant military reserve at its disposal. Israel, from the very start, was this reserve, which could be used to check or to strike at the Arab revolt whenever needed.

The presence of Israel at the centre of the Arab world provided the forces of neo-imperialism with a constant opportunity for direct military intervention against the Arab revolt, because the Zionist state, by its very nature, is part and parcel of world imperialism and, in particular, of American imperialism. Impelled by her own desire for territorial expansion, Israel is ever ready to

¹ *Al-Hurriyah*, Beirut, Nos. 377, 378 and 379 of 4, 11 and 18/9/1967. This manifesto was issued after the enlarged meeting held by the National Executive Committee towards the end of July.

act as the striking force of imperialism in this part of the world.

In the past five years, the United States, by virtue of the forces it controls and the opportunities open to it in the Arab world, has advanced to the stage of planning the downfall of the principal strongholds of Arab revolt, so that it might even be able to strike at the very roots of the national liberation movement. Since then, the Arab world has witnessed America adopting an ever more aggressive approach to the Arab revolutionary movement. This approach did not, indeed, assume the aspect of military aggression from the start, but Washington has made use of all the weapons at its disposal, short of direct military intervention, in preparing for such an intervention.

American policy has been well aware of the fact that the United Arab Republic is the centre of gravity of the entire Arab revolutionary movement. It has also been aware that very significant historical events and developments have placed Abd an-Nasir at the head of this movement to act as a rallying point for the Arab masses, which fact ultimately threatened decisively to change the face of this area of the world. American provocations, directed at Egypt, under the leadership of Gamal Abd an-Nasir, began to take the form of intensified pressures applied at a number of points. This was meant to drag Cairo to the point where it would gradually lose sight of its goals and lose its links with the Arab revolutionary movement and its ability to be affected by it and to affect it. It became evident that America wanted to contain Cairo within Egypt, to surround it, to isolate it and then to intensify her war against the progressive regime in Cairo. This would easily enable her to liquidate the Egyptian revolution from within, and by that time she would have liquidated it outside Egypt.

The foregoing makes it clear that the basis of United States relations with this part of the world is the permanent strategy of involving the Arab revolutionary movement in a decisive collision. It would also seem that at one point, while planning this collision, Washington had based its calculations on the expectation of the total collapse of the front of Arab resistance and

on a speedy surrender. However, the Arab response to these designs revealed several errors in their calculations. At that point, America abandoned the attempt to lay siege to the Arab revolutionary movement and exert overwhelming pressure designed to undermine it, and started making preparations for direct military intervention, which was to achieve the same end. It was quite natural that, in doing this, America should mobilise the bases it had on Arab soil, and press them into the service of the war for which it had begun to prepare. The most outstanding among these bases, and the one best prepared for action, was Israel. In fact, the Zionist state is better described, in its true nature, as a member state of the United States of America implanted in this region of the Arab East to implement American policy and to realise the objectives of America in the area.

It was thus that Israel, which enjoyed American support and the benefit of American planning, initiated the measures which were to lead up to the war, from whose aftereffects the Middle East is still smouldering.

We have paused, in the course of our analysis of the recent Arab-Israeli war, to look back at these events, events which had been building up for years on end, for without a knowledge of these events it would have been impossible to shed light on the historical introduction which is essential if we are to understand this war that was thrust upon the Arabs in the course of events by ever-mounting degrees.

The course of events in the last war furnishes us with decisive, detailed, and practical proof which allows us to assert categorically that our war was not with Israel. We were fighting America, which was behind Israel. A glance back at the fierce battle which has been in progress with American imperialism on Arab soil during the past five years is all that is needed to confirm our conviction that America is the real enemy, and that the Israeli campaign was only a manifestation of the real war, and a by-product of Washington's strategy of bringing about a decisive and final collision with the Arab revolutionary movement, a strategy that has been put into action specially since Johnson assumed the reins of government in the White House.

Only if we rediscover and fully appreciate

this fact can we understand the full significance of the military setback that the Arabs have suffered, the real nature of the present situation, and the prospects for the future.

In the light of what has been said, we can now go back to the important questions that await definite answers. Why the military setback? How can we eliminate the consequences of the aggression? What is the nature of the war for which we must now prepare?

Among the attempts to analyse the causes of our defeat, several voices have been raised, since the setback, to criticise and to analyse. These voices have pointed out scores of errors committed by the Arab revolutionary movement which have sapped its power to resist.

The process of criticism and of self-criticism in which revolutionary Arab thought is now engaged should, indeed, be allowed to proceed with complete freedom, but, in order that the Arab people may not be dazed by all these critical discourses, it is necessary to differentiate between the primary error and the related but derivative and secondary errors.

It is our opinion that the principal error lies, first and foremost, in the fact that the Arab revolutionary movement has not, from the very beginning, countered the offensive strategy that neo-imperialism brought to bear upon it with a stable and fully formulated strategy of its own, based on the principle of incessant and total confrontation with neo-imperialism throughout the Arab world. For it was incessant confrontation which constituted the proper historical domain for Arab revolutionary struggle during the new era that it embarked upon with the advent of the ambitions of the sixties, an era which was still, essentially, an era of national liberation—but liberation from neo-imperialism this time. The Arab revolutionary movement did not fully grasp the true nature of the new era upon which it embarked after its victories over the old form of imperialism. It did not fully grasp the developments which had come about in its social and theoretical ideology, nor did it fully grasp the nature of its achievement in undergoing a transition from a national revolution to a social revolution. Several sections of the Arab revolutionary movement thought that these victories, developments and achievements had fulfilled the process

of national liberation from imperialism and that the historical field of its struggle was now restricted to the process of internal development in the Arab countries which were under the leadership of progressive regimes, and to the sparking off of social struggle in non-progressive Arab countries. This way of thinking was in itself a wrong evaluation of the battle with neo-imperialism which is being waged both within the Arab world and outside it, a battle which first began to appear on the scene more than five years ago.

The Arab revolutionary movement's failure to appreciate the nature of the new era of national liberation upon which it had embarked at the end of the nineteen-fifties was the prime error. The other significant errors which played a large part in setting the stage for the military setback were all derived from this.

The consequence of this principal error was that the confrontation with the designs of neo-imperialism and with its acts of aggression became discontinuous. Neo-imperialism confronted the Arab revolutionary movement, in this new era, with a stable and well-formulated strategy which was designed to engage the movement in a decisive collision as a prelude to the act of killing and uprooting it, but the Arab revolutionary movement countered this strategy with fluctuating tactics which, in their scope, methods and battles, were merely a continuation of the previous era during which discontinuous conflict governed the relations of the Arab revolutionary movement with neo-imperialism under the leadership of the United States of America. These fluctuating tactics also formed the basic method of the movement in its confrontation with the reactionary regimes in the Arab world which were, in reality, political and social bases for neo-imperialism on Arab soil.

The confrontation of the Arab revolutionary movement with neo-imperialism and with the reactionary classes and regimes allied with it went on in this sporadic fashion at a time when it was clear that Israel was drawing closer day by day to the stage where she could perform the role assigned to her, as a tool of neo-imperialism and a striking force for its aggressive designs. Her role, of course, was to curb the Arab revolutionary movement. In recent years, as Israel's role grew more and more prominent, a number

of slogans have become current, slogans connected with the liberation of Palestine and the confrontation of the Zionist state. These slogans, theoretically, or shall we say verbally, linked Israel and imperialism with the reactionary Arab regimes. But they were not effectively linked to a permanent strategy based on an analysis of the problem on the lines that our slow but sure advance towards the decisive moment when we shall succeed in liquidating the Zionist presence depends on the extent of our achievements in liquidating the imperialist and reactionary presence in the Arab homeland.

It was because this fact played no effective and decisive role in the policy of the Arab revolutionary movement towards Israel that no true appraisal of the nature of our battle with Israel was made. Our whole understanding of the battle and our preparations for it made it seem that we were fighting an isolated battle with an enemy that has no roots elsewhere, an enemy called "Zionism in Palestine." We should have realised, instead, that the battle with Israel loses all its significance and all hope of victory unless it is planned on the basis of total and unceasing warfare throughout the Arab world against neo-imperialism, represented by the United States of America, and against its allies, the reactionary classes and regimes, which, in the final analysis, are hostile to any Arab endeavour to curb Israel or to liberate Palestine.

With the outbreak of the last war with Israel, we suddenly and effectively rediscovered the nature of the fundamental and organic ties, derived from their common destiny, that bind Israel and neo-imperialism to the local reactionary elements which are at its service. The rediscovery of this basic fact demanded that, in order to stand a real chance of winning the war with Israel, we should immediately rechannel it into an all-embracing war with neo-imperialism and with all the bases and forces that neo-imperialism controls in the Arab world and that it both supports and relies upon. Unfortunately, the Arab revolutionary movement was not in a position to spark off such a long drawn-out war, for neither its ideological content, its strategy, the nature of its organisation nor its tactics were equal to such a war. This is the true significance of the military setback. . . . The signi-

ficant fact of the setback was not only that the Israeli army proved to be superior to the Arab armies, nor that it was able to occupy Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The significant fact was first and foremost that the Arab revolutionary movement was forced to restrict the war with Israel within the limits of the "Six-Day Round" and did not transform it into an all-embracing war against imperialism and its bases and interests, and the forces allied to it. Had it been possible to do this, the war would have taken on its true historical significance as a war of national liberation throughout the Arab homeland, and ceased to be a mere clash of armed forces exclusively between us and Israel.

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We thus entered the last war against American-Zionist collusion under the influence of factors and circumstances the majority of which were ultimately not favourable to us.

The defeat which the Arab armies suffered and the paralysis which afflicted the progressive regimes and the popular movements in the Arab world made it clear that the horizons of the movement of Arab revolt, while under the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie, were not wide enough for this long drawn out war against neo-imperialism with all the bases it has on Arab soil, the most important of which is Israel.

In registering this fact, which we arrived at in the course of our analysis of the recent military setback, we are not advocating extreme leftist positions, such as dropping the petty bourgeoisie from the list of forces and classes that are enemies of imperialism in all its forms, including neo-imperialism.

The petty bourgeoisie has, in the past, been antagonistic to imperialism. It can remain so. It is essential that it should be incorporated in the Arab revolutionary movement at this stage, along with all nationalist and progressive elements. The question, rather, is just how qualified this class is to lead such a movement. The economic, political, ideological and military horizons of the war against neo-imperialism, and the domestic and foreign repercussions of such a war, require that the reins be handed over to the toiling classes and to the groups within society which, by virtue of their interests and their ideology, are more

deeply rooted in the fight against imperialism and its local allies. Under the guidance of such a leadership, the petty bourgeoisie, along with all nationalist and progressive elements, will be required to play its proper role in the battle for national liberation.

However, such a basic evolution in the structure of the Arab revolutionary movement cannot take place in a vacuum. We can only visualise such a transition within the context of a clear grasp of the current situation in the Arab world, which has to cope with the consequences of the imperialist Zionist aggression and their possible implications.

The last Arab-Israeli war, which had such far-reaching effects and consequences has, once and for all, carried the battle between the Arab revolutionary movement and neo-imperialism from the stage of sporadic conflict to that of decisive and final collision. This can only lead to one of two alternatives:

— Either the Arab revolutionary movement will submit to the imperialist invasion for which Israel provided the striking force and thereby make it possible for neo-imperialism, under the leadership of the United States of America, to bring the Arab nation fully under its sway, to decisively liquidate the main bases of Arab revolt, and physically liquidate all progressive elements.

— Or the Arab revolutionary movement will rise to the challenge and bring about a fundamental change that will deepen its rootedness in scientific thinking and give a more profoundly proletarian character to its social structure and consolidate its organisational structure and strengthen the strategy and the method of its struggle. Such a reform must issue from a comprehensive grasp of the current designs of imperialism, which is trying to exploit the situation resulting from the military setback which has had the most extreme consequences on the Arab World.

It is evident from the actions of imperialism at this stage that it wants the Arab revolutionary movement to believe that the problem it now faces is confined to the issue of the Israeli occupation of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. If the issue were thus confined to the geographic level, then the battle for the final liberation of these territories would be a battle to be fought strictly between regular armies,

with Israel as the only enemy. Imperialism is well aware that the military setback, which the Arab armies that took part in the war have suffered, has made it fantastically difficult for the battle to be fought between regular armies, both now and for some time to come. Imperialism hopes to turn the element of time to its own advantage and has therefore resumed its attempts to exhaust the Arab masses morally and materially, using all means at its disposal and exploiting Israel to the full, in order to set the stage for talks on a settlement of the issue, something that the Arab revolutionary movement has consistently refused.

It has become clear that, aware as it is of the difficulty of directly advocating peace with Israel, imperialism is prepared, instead of pleading the cause of peace with Israel, to support those who plead the cause of peace with imperialism in the Arab world, for they both lead to the same end. Already, the first notes of the call for peace with imperialism have been sounded and are growing louder, in an attempt to test the reaction of the Arab masses to such a call and their resistance to it. Moreover, the attempt is being made to pass off certain forms of this call as part of the endeavour to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and as an endeavour to prevent a clash with imperialism, particularly with the United States of America, which could lead to total disaster, and make it impossible to rescue the Arab positions that are now threatened as a consequence of the Israeli aggression.

The fraudulent nature of these calls is unmistakable. It is not true that peace with Israel and peace with imperialism are two separate issues. The war with Israel is, fundamentally, a war against imperialism. To make peace with imperialism is to make peace with Israel. The call to step down the war with America, her bases and her agents, for the sake of the threatened Arab territories, will only lead to the final entanglement of the Arab revolutionary movement in consequence of which it would lose all. In the light of this outstanding fact, we must reappraise all hopes for the elimination of the consequences of the aggression by means of a political settlement with imperialism; in other words, with Israel. Are we to imagine that America has spent all these years executing its aggressive policy against

the Arab world only to see all its efforts end in a peaceful political settlement that safeguards the interests and the rights of the Arab revolutionary movement? Are we to imagine that Israel undertook to carry out this invasion, with neo-imperialism spurring her on and supporting her with all its forces, in order to be rewarded for her adventure with a peaceful settlement that hands back to the Arabs the lands she took from them and does not allow her to harvest the fruits of her adventure or to acquire any essential gains at the expense of Arab interests and Arab rights?

In the light of the above, and in the light of the present course of the battle of destiny that is being fought on Arab soil, there can be no doubt that any formula for a peaceful settlement with imperialism or with Israel would contain within itself the seeds of either the total or the partial collapse of the Arab revolutionary movement. For this reason, "to eliminate the consequences of the aggression" can only mean "to finally regain the occupied lands by means of war and by resuming the blockade of the Zionist state." However, our success in eliminating the consequences of the aggression by regaining the occupied Arab territories will not depend solely on engaging Israel in a rapid war fought between regular armies. Our success in this endeavour will hang upon our awareness of the basic truth that "the elimination of the consequences of the aggression" is an incomplete slogan and that, to acquire its true meaning, it needs to be complemented with "confrontation of imperialism everywhere."

Imperialism wants to contain us within the confines of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, to make these territories into a trap for us and for the Arab revolutionary movement and to ensnare the movement within these confines, where it can be bled of its material and moral resources. Our only alternative is to draw imperialism into an extensive collision with the Arab revolutionary movement throughout the Arab world. If the battle were to take on these extended dimensions, then victory would be possible for us and defeat would be possible for imperialism and Israel. Neo-imperialism used Israel to deliver us a blow, and so won the first round. We, in turn, can only retaliate for the setback by waging total war against neo-imperialism. Moreover, this total warfare ought not to

be confined to one field, that of war with Israel. It must be expanded to encompass the entire Arab world. The way to confront American neo-imperialism is by forming a united front for Arab struggle. Furthermore, it should not be left to America to decide where the battle is to be fought or to confine it to Israel, behind which she can veil herself and hide. America must be drawn on to a large, open battlefield of such dimensions as will shake up her imperialist system and directly affect her extensive economic interests throughout the Arab world. It is now clear that it is not possible to stand up to Israel without embarking upon an all-embracing collision with imperialism. The battlefront of the war with imperialism must extend beyond Israeli manoeuvres on the frontier. Preparations for the next round with Israel, which is to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, must be immediately, directly and organically linked to the act of extending the battlefront with American imperialism and its British lackey in Arab territory.

If we are to rise to the level of this decisive confrontation, a real change at the level of the roots of the Arab revolutionary movement must take place. This cannot be accomplished through theoretical arguments alone, or through organisational measures taken haphazardly by the official progressive regimes or the popular political movements. It is demanded of both the leadership and the rank and file of the Arab revolutionary movement who possess the necessary positive potential to open up an immediate horizon of action for the battle against imperialism which will set the stage for these changes within the sphere of revolutionary Arab action. This horizon of action must be opened up by rapid confrontations with imperialism on the model of organised revolutionary violence, in various shapes and forms. This will inevitably escalate and finally crystallise into armed struggle, which is the highest and most decisive form of revolutionary violence.

There is but one path for us to take if we are to rise to the challenge constituted by international imperialism—the path of armed struggle. The task of Arab revolutionaries in this historic era is to protect the revolution by creating an aware and organised armed populace. This is where the road begins; this is where the Arab revolutionary movement will be reborn and take

its true course. But this does not require lengthy theoretical discussions. Such discussions, if carried to excess, can only lead to intellectual over-indulgence and to escapism in the face of the difficulties and hardships of armed struggle. Arab revolutionary thinking today must rapidly assimilate the simple fact that the only way to destroy imperialism is to engage it in armed struggle of this kind.

Organised revolutionary violence is now the true and contemporary expression of the strategy of total and decisive confrontation with imperialism. Insofar as the Arab revolution is true to this, it is responding to a global force which is spreading wider each day among the ranks of national liberation movements throughout the third world. By responding to this force, the Arab revolution will be taking its place in the vanguard of an integrated global revolution, for which the third world is both the venue and the main striking force.

It is the duty of the Arab national liberation movement, directly engaged though it is in its struggle to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, to join the other movements of national liberation in the third world in formulating clear theoretical answers and in taking decisive action for the cause of the global revolution in its fight against the capitalist camp led by the United States of America.

In allying itself with this global revolution, the Arab national liberation movement will not be taking a step away from its main field of battle, either in theory or in fact. Rather, this alliance forms the natural extension abroad of the Arab confrontation with neo-imperialism at home.

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397

Press Statement by the Arab Foreign Ministers Conference.¹

Khartum, August 5, 1967

In response to an invitation from the Sudanese government, the Foreign Ministers of the

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 6/8/1967.

Arab countries met in Khartum from 1 to 5 August 1967. They discussed all aspects of the present situation and agreed to concert their efforts to eliminate all consequences of the Zionist-imperialist aggression against Arab territory.

With this end in view, in the course of their Conference they made the necessary recommendations to clear the air in the Arab world and to take the political, military and economic measures required to confront the crisis through which the Arab countries are passing. These recommendations will be submitted to the Conference of Arab Kings and Presidents for their decision.

The Conference agreed that the Arab Economy, Finance and Oil Ministers should meet in Baghdad on 15 August to appraise and determine the role of the Arab economy at the present stage.

It was agreed that the Arab Foreign Ministers should meet in Khartum on 26 August to study the recommendations of the Arab Finance, Economy and Oil Ministers, and to complete the agenda for the Summit Conference, which the Conference recommends should be held in Khartum.

398

Interview Statements by Sudanese Prime Minister Mahjub.² [Excerpts]

Q. What is the extent of the aid provided by the Sudan in support of the war effort?

A. When the government of the Sudan declared war on Israel, it was not content with a mere declaration. Far from it; this country lost no time in sending two brigades of troops to the field of battle as a vanguard for further forces which were to follow as soon as they were ready. The declaration of war also made necessary the declaration of a state of emergency to safeguard the war effort, protect the home front, and defend its safety and security from spies, saboteurs, agents and defeatists, with the object of covering the rear of the fighting forces.

The government of the Sudan broke the arms

² *Ibid.*, (special supplement on the Sudan), 5/8/1967.

monopoly to equip the army with weapons with which to defend our frontiers and protect the most sacred principles of our country. The Council of Ministers, moreover, gave its approval for meat and other foodstuffs to be sent as a contribution to our brothers at the front, and for the removal of all restrictions on the export of consumer goods to the United Arab Republic and Syria. The government also contributed one hundred thousand pounds sterling to our brothers on the West Bank of Jordan. Furthermore, the government for the first time established a Department of Civil Defence to protect the people against the dangers of war, and a Department of Popular Resistance to train, prepare and arm them to defend their homeland. When it was established that Britain and America had joined Israel in her treacherous attack on all Arab fronts Sudan severed her relations with them, in accordance with the declared policy which she had previously adopted and made known to all countries, to the effect that Sudan was the enemy of all enemies of the Arabs and the friend of their friends.

Q. What economic and other practical measures has your government taken to cope with the consequences of the aggression?

A. We have carried out economic studies, and we are beginning to find appropriate solutions that will enable us to surmount this critical situation in a manner consistent with our unavoidable obligation to meet our commitments and fulfil our undertakings. Our deposits in the Bank of England have been transferred to the Swiss Central Bank, and the government is now taking the necessary measures to cut down expenditure and control all aspects of economic activity. It is also asking friendly countries to cooperate. In the course of the next few days it will announce what measures must be taken to cope with the economic situation in the light of present circumstances.

Q. What do you think is the effect of the setback, and what lessons can we learn from our appraisal of the war or of the next round?

A. Our attitude is unchanged towards resistance to Zionist aggression supported by the

forces of evil and imperialism. The fact that we have lost a round will not diminish our resolution or weaken our determination. On the contrary, this only provides us with a stronger incentive to endure and to start from a new turning point on the road to victory. Neither in heart nor in mind can we accept defeat. The glories of our nation have been built in the past, and will be built in the future, on the bitterness of defeat and the sweetness of victory. There is no place in our ranks for defeatists, rebels, or advocates of disunion and disintegration, who permit themselves to rejoice in the misfortunes of other Arabs or their leaders at this critical stage in the history of the Arab nation.

Q. What about the attitude of the United States, Britain, and their allies, to the Israeli aggression?

A. In spite of the ample evidence of the expansionist intentions of the Israeli aggression, the United States and Britain insist that we should accept this Israeli usurpation. They have tried to justify Israel's aggression and the consequences of their share in the planning or the carrying out of the aggression. They told us that it was Israel alone that carried out the aggression, and that their fleets and aircraft carriers were anchored hundreds of miles away from the theatre of these criminal operations. Britain claimed that its aircraft carrier was stationary, and did not move at all, and was thus incapable of having taken any action. We heard the same bogus claims of innocence in 1956, when Britain denied collusion with the aggressors. But now this collusion has been established, those who committed it have acknowledged it, and it has become part of history.

As for the United States, it is quite clear that it undertook to protect Israel. President Johnson, indeed, mentioned this undertaking in his speech on 19 June, when he referred to it as one of the five bases of permanent peace in the Middle East. But the actions of the United States are not consistent with its words. Had the United States observed the territorial integrity of all the nations in the area, its delegate would have found no difficulty in voting for the draft resolution submitted by the U.S.S.R. delegate, condemning Israel and calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces

from the occupied territories. Far from doing this, however, the President of the United States himself condemned the Soviet proposal condemning the aggression and calling for the withdrawal of the aggressor troops, and described it as a "call to aggression." . . .

399

Interview Statements by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Premier Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir on the Continued Stoppage of Oil Exports to Certain Countries.¹

Kuwait, August 6, 1967

Q. There have been rumours, and reports have been carried by foreign newspapers and news agencies, to the effect that the Kuwaiti government intends to terminate the prohibition of oil exports to the countries that supported the Israeli aggression, and to which the government had decided not to export oil. Would Your Highness give us some idea of how true these reports are?

A. The government's decision to stop oil exports to countries that supported the Israeli aggression is perfectly clear and unambiguous. It is regrettable that there should be such rumours at a time when the Arab nation urgently requires united ranks and genuine constructive action.

We affirm that the government has not and will not change its attitude on oil exports, and that it considers itself completely committed to unanimous Arab resolutions.

Q. Your Highness, certain papers and news agencies have reported, quoting radio broadcasts, that Kuwait will lose \$ 145 million per year as a result of stopping oil exports to America and Britain. Is this true? And if it is, what measures will be taken to cover this loss?

A. The sacrifice that Kuwait is making in response to the call of her sacred duty cannot be described as a loss. The government cannot be expected to publish details of the sacrifices it is making or the burdens it is carrying as a result of a decision it took in firm faith on behalf of a sacred aim and in defence of a legitimate right.

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Am*, Kuwait, 7/8/1968.

The financial obligations which Kuwait has undertaken are inconsiderable when compared with the terrible setback that has befallen the Arab nation. We reaffirm that we shall do our duty to the full without hesitation, whatever the sacrifices involved, to ensure that our cause may triumph and to recover the imperishable rights of our nation.

Q. One last question, if your Highness does not mind: Will the financial losses arising out of the stopping of oil exports affect the activities of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development? Will any new loans be granted under present circumstances?

A. Naturally the Fund will be affected by the present situation, but it will continue to grant loans as far as possible.

400

Press Statement on the Talks Held by Iraqi President Arif During His Visit to Syria, 10-12 August.² [Excerpt]

Damascus, August 12, 1967

Furthermore, both sides reviewed the world situation and the situation in the Arab world in the light of the prevailing circumstances and of the imperialist-Zionist aggression to which the Arab nation is at present being subjected. They also reviewed methods of mobilising all efforts and energies in both Iraq and Syria, and throughout the Arab nation, to check the aggression and to eliminate all its consequences.

Both sides affirmed their profound faith in the abilities, vitality and creative powers of the Arab nation, which, if mobilised and channelled into one stream with the all-embracing current of the struggle of the Arab nation, could easily repulse the vicious imperialist Zionist aggressors, repel their aggression and thwart all hostile plans to impose a humiliating peaceful settlement which would allow the enemy to enjoy the fruits of his aggression.

² *Al-Ba'th*, 13/8/1967.

401

Statement by Prominent West Bank Personalities to Residents There Calling for National Unity.¹

Statement to the Arab People

Our Arab homeland has been the victim of a military aggression which has led to the military occupation of many parts of it. The occupation authorities have taken a number of arbitrary measures, including the following:

1. The annexation of the Arab City of Jerusalem, and its subjection to the laws in force in Israel, on the pretext of administrative unification and the maintenance of freedom of worship.

2. The subjection of the West Bank to laws which the occupation authorities are not entitled to impose. These laws include those covering currency, taxes, customs and school curricula.

3. Open interference in the religious affairs of citizens. For example, Moslems have been forbidden to enter certain mosques, which have been thrown open to Jews whose conduct has been incompatible with decency and good morals. There has been encroachment on Islamic Holy Places and Waqfs, and excavation for antiquities in religious and historical locations in a way which is both illegal and infringes international custom.

4. Various means have been used in attempts to induce the inhabitants to leave the country and to prevent them from returning to their homes.

5. The destruction of the greater part of the town of Qalqilyah, the blowing up of the villages of Yalu, Amwas, Bait Nuba, Bait Awwa and Surif, and the razing of the Maghribi Quarter of Jerusalem.

6. The seizure of certain articles from the Palestine Museum.

7. Restriction of the freedom of the inhabitants, who have been subjected to annoyance and insulted because of their political beliefs.

8. There have been attempts to infiltrate the ranks of the citizens using every available means and inducement, in order to divide the unity of the Jordanian entity.

9. All available means have been employed to tighten the economic stranglehold on the inhabitants, so as to create an atmosphere favourable to the execution of the political and economic plans of the occupation authorities.

There can be no doubt that these measures constitute a clear violation of the principles of international law and agreements, which clearly define the obligations and rights of occupying authorities, forbidding them to interfere in the religious, judicial and cultural affairs of the occupied region, or to encroach on the freedoms, beliefs or possessions of the inhabitants. None of these provisions have been observed by the occupation authorities.

Conscious of the historic responsibility which has been laid upon us, and aware of the gravity of the situation that confronts the Arab nation at this critical stage of its history and of the need to define the attitude which our people should adopt, we address this statement to our brothers and fellow-citizens, and affirm the following:

1. The City of Jerusalem is an Arab city and an integral part of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, which in turn is part of the great Arab homeland. We do not acknowledge or accept any measure prejudicial to this historical fact.

2. The decision to annex the Arab City of Jerusalem and the surrounding area is one of the acts of territorial expansion which clearly reveal Israel's policy and her deliberate expansionist designs, which she has always tried to conceal and disavow in international circles.

3. We hereby declare, resolutely and emphatically, our condemnation of all attempts to establish a Palestinian entity under whatever name or in whatever form. We also declare that the elimination of the consequences of the aggression demands comprehensive Arab responsibility, a united Arab attitude and full solidarity with no unilateral action on the part of any quarter.

In view of the above, we call on our brothers in the West Bank to hold fast to their national unity and to strengthen it as being the only way to win the battle of endurance and the only safeguard of our cohesion and our ability to overcome the trial we are passing through. We also call on them to ignore attempts to arouse misgivings and doubts and to sap their determination, for coming generations and the Arab

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 16/8/1967. Date and place of issuance unspecified.

nation expect us to be firm and resolute. Our history, both past and present, is full of examples of our people's resolution in the face of currents that threaten to sweep them away and change their destiny. In the glorious Arab nation and in our friends in every part of the world we have powerful supporters of our legitimate rights, and, if God wills, the resolution and determination of our people will lead our cause to certain victory.

(Some hundred signatures follow)

402

Joint Communiqué on the Talks Between Sudanese President al-Azhari and Jordanian King Husayn, 18-19 August.¹ [Excerpt]

Khartum, August 19, 1967

There was complete agreement between both sides on all points that were discussed.

It was clear to both the Jordanian and the Sudanese sides that the only way to arrive at a fundamental solution to the problem that would eliminate the consequence of the aggression, enable the Arabs to regain the territory that had been seized from them and recover their usurped rights was for them to join ranks and to coordinate their efforts, in thought and in deed, and to agree on a unified programme.

Both the Sudanese and the Jordanian sides also affirmed the urgent necessity of convening a Summit Conference to unify the efforts of the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries in harmonising all Arab efforts and in devoting all Arab resources and potential to the formulation of a unified Arab policy that would enable them to take a stand as one man in the face of the battle that is being fought for their destiny.

403

Interview Granted by Libyan Prime Minister al-Badri to the Beirut Daily "Al-Hayat."

Al-Baida', August 1967

Q. In your opinion, is it not time for the Arab and Islamic worlds to join forces in the face of the Zionist threat?

A. Solidarity between the Islamic world and the Arab world has already made itself felt. It is reflected in the awareness of the Islamic world that the aggression to which the Arab world was subjected is, at the same time, an aggression against the Islamic world and against the sanctuaries of Islam. There has been definite political action at Islamic level in the cooperation between Islamic peoples and governments in the face of the treacherous aggression to which the Arab nation was exposed. This solidarity has made itself clearly felt through the attitudes adopted by certain Islamic governments at the United Nations. We believe that the issue is an Arab-Islamic issue and that we must join forces in order to intensify this solidarity which will acquire support for Arab Islamic rights to the occupied territories.

Q. What difficulties has Libya had to face so far as a consequence of the suspension of oil shipments to non-friendly nations? What effect has this had on the development projects which the Libyan government is now undertaking? Will Libya maintain the embargo on oil shipments to America and Britain?

A. Libya will adhere to the heroic stand dictated to her by her sacred duty, under the inspiration of her steadfast Arab conscience and the guidance of her leader, King Idris. Libya had declared that she would be bound by any decision taken at the Conference of Arab Oil Ministers even before the Conference was held in Baghdad. Although the Conference only recommended an embargo on the shipment of oil to all countries who either took part in or supported the aggression, Libya stopped oil production altogether. This was a major sacrifice and has involved the Libyan treasury in considerable losses, as a result of the total cessation of oil revenues during this period. This cost the Libyan treasury one and

¹ *Ibid.*, 20/8/1967.

² *Al-Hayat*, 20/8/1967.

a half million dollars a day. The embargo lasted for one month. The total loss during this period amounted to forty-five million dollars. Since the pumping of oil has been resumed, within the limits set by the Arab oil Conference, exports have returned to their level prior to the aggression. This deprives the Libyan treasury of a certain percentage of its income, which will affect the general budget and, consequently that section of it which covers development. Libya has consequently suspended all new development projects because of this large drop in her revenues.

It should be remembered that Libya is completely dependent on oil, which constitutes 80 percent of her gross national income.

Q. Do you foresee the evacuation of American and British military bases in Libya in the near future?

A. Discussions for the evacuation of these bases have met with great success so far. Talks with the British and Americans officially started on the 1st and 10th of this month, August, respectively. These talks are proceeding according to the schedule of the Libyan government, which was formulated in accordance with its declared policy. Talks with the Americans will be resumed on Thursday, and cover certain important points relating to the evacuation of the American base. The evacuation of the British bases will be completed within six months, as was agreed with Great Britain.

Q. What is Libya's position with respect to the holding of a Summit Conference? Do you consider this possible in the near future?

A. Libya announced that she would welcome such a Conference when King Husayn called for it. He was informed at the time of the King of Libya's consent. Libya again expressed her agreement to the holding of such a conference when the Sudanese government extended its invitation. Libya has not shifted from this position. She welcomes any Arab meeting at any level and anywhere. Moreover, she welcomes any unified Arab plan. She hopes that these meetings will achieve their desired objective, which is to serve the cause of the Arab nation, to further Arab solidarity and to devise adequate plans for eliminating the consequences of the aggression to which the Arab nation has been subjected.

Q. Arab public opinion has received news of the generous financial and moral support the Kingdom of Libya has offered the Arab states which bore the brunt of the Israeli aggression. Could you give us a detailed account of this support?

A. Official financial support has amounted to 20 million pounds. The objective of this support is to assist the Arab war effort to repel the iniquitous Israeli aggression. Ten million pounds of it went to the U.A.R., six million to Jordan four million to Syria, 250,000 to Lebanon and 250,000 to the Palestinian war effort. Furthermore, public contributions, which the Libyan people have eagerly joined in, totalled fifteen million dollars. In the past Libya took a similar attitude by extending support to the Algerian revolution.

Libya will loyally and zealously maintain this attitude. The Palestinian cause is our cause and we shall allow no one to desecrate our religious sanctuaries so long as there is a spark of life left in us.

404

Interview Granted by Jordanian King Husayn to the Paris Weekly "L'Express."¹

Amman, August 1967

Q. Majesté, vous êtes le seul leader arabe à être allé sur le front. Quelles sont, selon vous, les causes essentielles de la défaite arabe?

R. Elles sont aujourd'hui faciles à discerner. De 1948 à nos jours, et sans oublier 1956, la nation arabe n'a pas cessé de reculer. Au cours de la dernière rencontre arabe "au sommet", qui s'est tenue au Maroc, en septembre 1965, des études extrêmement sérieuses et poussées avaient montré que le monde arabe ne pouvait pas livrer bataille, ni même se défendre, avant trois ans. Le conflit du 5 juin a éclaté un an et deux mois avant cette échéance minimum. C'est là la première raison.

D'autre part, dès cette époque, nous avions demandé que des rencontres "au sommet" pério-

¹ *L'Express*, Paris, 21-27/8/1967, pp. 20-22.

diques aient lieu, que l'atmosphère interarabe soit assainie, que des moyens militaires et financiers soient trouvés. Cela n'a pas été fait.

Les résultats ont été ce qu'ils devaient être: désastreux.

Il y a enfin des raisons purement militaires. En ce qui concerne les Israéliens: la qualité de leurs services de renseignements et leur supériorité aérienne.

Q. Quelle a été l'étendue des pertes de la Jordanie, sur le plan militaire?

R. Elles ont été extrêmement sévères. Sur le seul plan financier, elles se situent autour de 70 millions de livres.

Q. La Jordanie aurait-elle pu éviter d'être entraînée dans cette catastrophe que vous aviez—à plusieurs reprises et publiquement—prévue?

R. Il y a des circonstances où vous avez le choix. C n'était pas le cas. Voyant la guerre arriver, nous avons fait notre possible—vraiment tout notre possible—pour l'empêcher d'éclater. Sans résultat.

Nous ne regrettons pas d'avoir fait tout ce qui était en notre pouvoir pour défendre nos droits et notre pays. Nous regrettons simplement de n'avoir pu le faire plus efficacement.

Q. Vous avez été le premier dirigeant arabe à parler d'une politique nouvelle des Etats arabes à l'égard d'Israël. Dans vos entretiens avec le Pape, vous avez employé le terme "politique réaliste". Qu'entendez-vous par là?

R. Je pense que le prochain "sommet" arabe—qu'il sera encore possible, je l'espère, de réunir, et qui devrait rassembler tous les leaders arabes ou, au moins, la majorité d'entre eux—je pense que ce "sommet" arabe devrait se livrer à une analyse sérieuse et profonde de ce qui s'est passé jusqu'à présent et de ce qui devrait être fait dans l'avenir—j'ai des idées sur la question—pour faire face à nos responsabilités.

Nous avons commis un nombre incalculable d'erreurs. La plus tragique d'entre elles est cette coupure de l'univers arabe vis-à-vis du reste du monde. Nous avons été incapables de présenter à l'opinion publique mondiale un certain nombre de faits évidents, ne serait-ce que celui-ci: depuis 1948, nous avons été sans cesse refoulés de nos

territoires. L'affaire de Palestine a été une tragédie humaine. Mais le monde a tout le temps eu l'impression que nous, nous étions ceux qui jouaient perpétuellement avec la paix de cette région, et avec la paix du monde.

Résultat: Israël a toujours rencontré un appui massif pour sa cause. Cet isolement volontaire dans lequel nous nous sommes complu, isolement auquel sont venues s'ajouter les déclarations totalement irresponsables de tant de gens dans le monde arabe, ont donné aux Israéliens une formidable panoplie d'arguments de propagande, dont ils se sont servis efficacement, et ce, à l'échelle mondiale. Maintenant, il y a une situation nouvelle dont nous devons tenir compte, sur le plan local, comme à l'échelle mondiale.

Q. Vous venez de parler de vos propres idées en la matière. Quelles sont-elles?

R. La première consiste à sauver l'unité arabe en essayant de mettre en commun nos ressources et nos énergies. Ensuite, réviser la position arabe tout entière, et adopter une ligne et une politique qui soit acceptable pour le reste du monde. Enfin, présenter au monde notre dossier de l'affaire, afin d'établir nos relations sur de meilleures bases, et obtenir appui et soutien pour notre cause, qui est juste.

Les principaux dirigeants du monde discutent de notre destin, de notre avenir, de nos problèmes. Nous devons y apporter notre propre contribution en élaborant une politique que nous pourrions défendre. En même temps, nous devons aller plus loin dans nos contacts avec le reste du monde.

Q. Qu'attendez-vous du "sommet" arabe, dont vous êtes l'un des plus solides partisans?

R. L'affaire est claire: il y a une situation donnée et peu de solutions possibles. L'une d'entre elles consiste à suivre une voie que beaucoup d'entre nous ont suivie dans le passé: irresponsabilité, analyses superficielles, toutes choses qui font le jeu de nos adversaires. L'autre demande une étude lucide de la situation et des moyens adéquats pour en sortir.

Q. Vous êtes le seul leader arabe à avoir vu le président Johnson, M. Harold Wilson et, à Paris, le général de Gaulle. Vous avez également rencontré le président Nasser. Vous êtes donc l'un des hommes qui

connaissent le mieux tout le dossier de la crise. Quelles conclusions en tirez-vous?

R. Je suis optimiste. Je pense qu'il y a une chance d'arriver à une solution de la crise, probablement au niveau global, que ce soit dans un très proche avenir ou plus tard. En ce qui concerne la rive occidentale du Jourdain et les territoires occupés après le 5 juin, je crois qu'il y a de très fortes chances pour que nous les récupérions.

Q. Quelles sont les exigences minimums de la Jordanie? Incluent-elles expressément la vieille ville de Jérusalem?

R. Je dois expliquer notre position sur Jérusalem, sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain, sur tous les territoires qui ont été occupés après le 5 juin. Cela est une exigence fondamentale. Le retour de ces territoires—qu'il s'agisse de la rive occidentale du Jourdain ou de Jérusalem en particulier—est le premier pas vers un règlement général de toute la tragédie palestinienne. Jérusalem, pour nous, n'est pas quelque chose qui appartient à la Jordanie seulement ou au monde arabe. Jérusalem appartient à l'Islam, et aux croyants. Nous assumions une tradition qui a plus de mille ans. Ainsi, pour tout ce qui concerne Jérusalem, il n'y a pas de place pour un compromis sur nos droits de souveraineté et sur notre mission de gardiens des Lieux saints. L'accès aux Lieux saints de Jérusalem n'aurait jamais été un problème, s'il y avait eu auparavant une juste et honorable solution à toute la tragédie palestinienne. Je pense que le retrait des positions occupées depuis le 5 juin est une obligation.

Q. Quelle serait l'attitude de la Jordanie si Israël se refusait à tout compromis?

R. Alors, Israël portera seul la responsabilité de tout ce qui pourrait suivre. Nous n'aurions pas d'autre choix que de faire tout ce qui serait en notre pouvoir pour récupérer notre rive occidentale du Jourdain et Jérusalem. En clair, cela implique probablement de nouveaux conflits. Mais, dans ce cas, nous ne serions pas responsables, et Israël seul serait à blâmer.

Q. Vous avez dit, à Londres, au début du mois de juillet, au cours d'une conférence de presse: "Le vrai problème, ce n'est pas le droit d'Israël à l'existence, c'est le drame palestinien." Pourriez-vous préciser votre pensée?

R. Le problème est tellement complexe. Il ne s'agit pas de la survie ou de l'existence d'Israël—Israël a suffisamment prouvé sa capacité à exister et à continuer d'exister—le problème est la tragédie, restée sans solution, de la Palestine, tragédie qui demande à être résolue dans son ensemble, et par le monde entier.

Q. Que pensez-vous de l'intention prônée à Tel-Aviv de créer un Etat palestinien confédéré avec Israël?

R. Je ne crois pas qu'une telle chose existe, ou puisse exister. Nous sommes extrêmement près de ce que fait notre peuple là-bas, sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain. Il montre qu'il est jordanien, et qu'il entend le rester.

Je suis fier de nos concitoyens de la rive occidentale du Jourdain, qui ont attiré l'attention du monde sur ce qu'ils veulent, sur ce qu'ils jugent être leurs droits. Ce mouvement est spontané. Il n'a pas été organisé d'ici. Nous l'appuyons et nous en sommes fiers.

Q. Quelles solutions envisagez-vous au problème des réfugiés?

R. Maintenant, les réfugiés devraient pouvoir retourner chez eux, dans leurs propriétés, dans leur pays. Mais la solution du problème des réfugiés ne peut être qu'une partie d'une solution globale de toute la question.

Q. Cent ou deux cents personnes, peut-être, par jour, continuent à franchir le pont Allenby pour fuir le territoire sous contrôle israélien. N'est-ce pas contraire aux accords du 7 août?

R. Certainement. Mais vous savez les obstacles que nous avons rencontrés du côté israélien. En dépit de leur politique officielle, ils ont multiplié les difficultés pour empêcher le retour des réfugiés. Et je ne parle même pas de ces réfugiés qui ne retrouveront rien à leur retour. Des villages entiers ont été rasés.

Q. Bien avant la guerre, vous avez dit qu'Israël nourrissait des vues expansionnistes au détriment de la Jordanie. Sur quoi vous fondiez-vous?

R. Le territoire israélien est extrêmement étroit, et Israël n'a de sens que comme tête de pont, amenée à s'étendre. D'autre part, un certain nombre de leurs actions ne visaient pas autre chose qu'à nous pousser dans nos retranchements.

Malheureusement, nous avons réagi, sans réellement comprendre ce qui se passait.

Prenons un exemple: la fermeture du détroit de Tiran a été présentée au monde entier comme un acte d'agression. Mais personne n'a pensé que, pendant dix-neuf ans, nous avons été privés de nos droits d'accès à la Méditerranée. Il était sûr qu'Israël attaquerait avant que le monde arabe soit suffisamment fort pour dissuader effectivement sa volonté expansionniste. Je crois que les Israéliens avaient des idées expansionnistes et qu'ils en ont encore plus.

Même s'ils s'arrangeraient pour rester sur la rive ouest du Jourdain, ce ne serait qu'une étape, et ils auraient bientôt d'autres ambitions.

Q. Lesquelles, selon vous?

R. Contrôler les territoires du Nil à l'Euphrate. Je sais que cela peut paraître exagéré. Mais chacune de leurs actions, le fait que nous ayons été continuellement refoulés, tout cela montre qu'ils ont une politique et un plan expansionniste qu'ils réalisent graduellement.

Q. Considérez-vous que votre vie est en danger?

R. Ce n'est pas cela l'important.

405

Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organisation Rejecting "Any Project Aimed at the Liquidation of the Palestine Question."¹

Beirut, August 22, 1967

One of the primary objectives of the imperialist Zionist aggression against the Arab countries at the beginning of June was to place the Arab nation in a position where it would be forced to bargain for a settlement calculated to liquidate the Palestine problem. The objective was to compel the Arab nation to accept any form of settlement which Israel might put forward, a settlement which would enable Israel to sink in

her roots more deeply and to consolidate her existence. For this reason, the topics of co-existence, negotiations, peace and recognition began to make their appearance in certain news items, as well as other kindred projects, all of which would lead to the liquidation of the Palestine problem and put an end to Arab rights to Palestine. The Palestine Liberation Organisation therefore announces that it rejects any project whose object is to liquidate the Palestine problem, as to which there can be no question of settlements or bargaining. It is a matter of liberation, a matter of destiny. Any undertaking that ignores this fact or attempts to veil it will meet with failure, for the Palestinian Arab people and the whole Arab nation will accept no substitute for the liberation of Palestine, and are determined to achieve that end by all available means. The Palestinian Arab people are fully awake to this fact, no matter how oppressive the conditions to which they are exposed under the imperialist-Zionist occupation. Furthermore, by virtue of their steadfastness, their struggle, their faith and their resolution, they are fully able to bring to naught all imperialist-Zionist undertakings, in any shape or form. The Palestinian Arab people, along with all members of the Arab nation everywhere in the Arab world, will pursue their destined historic path, with the support of friendly peoples, until victory is attained and Palestine is liberated.

406

Telecast Interview Statements by Jordanian King Husayn.² [Excerpt]

Q. Do you think there is a possibility of permanent peace between the Arabs and Israel?

A. I have repeatedly said that peace is quite possible, if there is justice. But, so long as Israel holds on to the Arab territories she has occupied since the 5th of June, then peace is

¹ *Al-Muharrir*, 23/8/1967.

² *An-Nahar*, 26/8/1967. The interview was telecast by the Columbia Broadcasting Corporation in New York.

unlikely. Nevertheless, if the issue as a whole is handled well, then the probability of war will decline rapidly.

Q. Will Jordan adopt an independent attitude on the issue if the other Arab countries fail to adopt a unified attitude toward Israel?

A. Jordan is still working towards the formulation of a unified attitude with the other Arab countries. We have not been able to arrive at this, because, up to this moment we have not held a high-level conference. Nevertheless, I hope that such a conference will be held in the near future. If this fails, then I shall attempt the following:

— I shall call upon the Jordanian people, who accepted the challenge of the crisis, who made great sacrifices and who, to this very moment, are suffering from the shock of recent events, to adopt a unified attitude come what may. At the same time, I shall get in touch with all Arab countries, and try to convince them of the necessity of our holding a meeting.

— If these attempts fail, I shall get in touch with each Arab country separately, I shall get in touch with each Islamic country and with each of the world powers and shall try to explain our position and to elicit their understanding and their support for our position, in the hope of an outcome that will open up a better future for us.

Q. Is Your Majesty optimistic as to the possibility of establishing a stable peace?

A. I am optimistic that we in the Arab world are capable of taking a unified stand. Perhaps, after taking a closer look at the precise nature of the events that have taken place and at their causes, we may adopt a different line from the policy to which we have adhered up to the present. As far as peace is concerned, that does not depend upon us alone. There are others involved as well. On the one hand, there is Israel; on the other, there is the entire world and what it may do. We hope that if the world does intervene it will propose a just and honourable solution to the problem as a whole, thereby putting an end to the calamity that has befallen this part of the world.

407

Statement by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the Israeli Attitude to the Return of Refugees from the West Bank.¹

Amman, August 28, 1967

The government of Jordan has constantly affirmed that the grave human problem created by the exodus of about a quarter of a million refugees and displaced persons as a result of the recent aggression against the West Bank of the Jordan is, and will continue to be, a matter of grave concern to world public opinion. The government of Jordan hereby calls the attention of all peoples, of all international organisations and all humanitarian institutions to this problem.

The agreement concluded on 6 August, 1967, which provides for the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and the implementation of which has already begun, was not meant to serve the interest of Jordan alone, but those of humanity as a whole, for it involves the exercise of a sacred and natural right that belongs to every human being, a right recognised by the whole world and enshrined in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on Refugees.

The government of Jordan hereby declares, with the deepest regret, that despite all efforts on its part to make the operation as successful as possible, particularly in view of the challenge constituted by the approach of the cruel winter season, it finds that the methods on which the occupation authorities insist for the implementation of the agreement are definitely prejudicial to the success of the operation, insofar as a time limit has been imposed, which will in turn reduce the number of refugees and displaced persons who will be able to return to their homes within that time limit to a small percentage of their total number.

Thus, of a total of 40,000 applications submitted to the International Red Cross, on behalf of about 170,000 refugees, the occupation authorities returned, during the period between the 13th and the 28th of August, no more than 4,763 approved applications, which are valid for only 26,266 displaced persons. Furthermore, there is only a brief period—a maximum of twelve

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 29/8/1967.

hours—allowed between the receipt of a permit by the Jordanian government and the time limit set for its utilisation. This has greatly restricted the successful implementation of the operation. Moreover, such practices on the part of the occupation authorities as granting permits to certain members of a family while refusing them to other members of the same family, the distribution of those who are granted permits over several localities, and the exclusion of refugees who are now living in emergency camps on the East Bank but who are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and the specific exclusion of displaced persons coming from Jerusalem, Jericho and Bethlehem, have created hindrances to the success of the operation and rendered it abortive. They have provided a psychological deterrent to the refugees' return to their lands and camps.

However, in spite of these obstacles designed to paralyse the operation, up to the present 3,140 families, or 13,707 individuals, have returned to the West Bank as a result of the unflagging efforts of the Jordanian authorities concerned, in cooperation with the International Red Cross.

The Jordanian government is firmly convinced that, were these grave obstacles removed, it would be possible to increase the number of those going back each day (excepting Saturdays) from the present daily average of less than 2,000 to 10,000 refugees and displaced persons a day.

The Jordanian government also wishes to express its profound gratitude for the statement made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 25 August 1967, requesting the occupation authorities to extend the present deadline of 31 August 1967, as the last day for the return of the refugees and displaced persons, until such date as would make it possible for all those who want to return to their homes to do so. The Jordanian government will persevere in its earnest efforts on all planes and by all possible means to ensure the return of all displaced persons and all scattered fragments of families in a rapid, practical and effective manner consistent with the requirements of this humanitarian operation.

The Jordanian government hereby appeals to the conscience of all peoples of the world to come to its aid in carrying out this humane endeavour to save the refugees and displaced

persons from ever-growing hardships and to avoid a catastrophe that will be grave indeed.

The Jordanian government also wishes to call the attention of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and all other parties concerned, to paragraph 8 of the 4 July 1967 General Assembly resolution on humane assistance, in which the General Assembly of the United Nations requires all its members to ensure the transport of emergency supplies to any region that stands in need of them and states that any hindrance thereof will be regarded as a violation of the resolution.

408

Statement by U.A.R. President Nasir Upon His Arrival in Khartum to Attend the Arab Summit Conference.¹ [Excerpt]

Khartum, August 29, 1967

I have come today, as you know, in response to the initiative of the Sudanese government, an initiative undertaken because of that government's realisation that the crisis necessitates an Arab Summit Conference that will attempt to mobilise an all-out Arab effort to confront an enemy who is aided and abetted by huge and devastating forces, in the face of which all the potential of the whole Arab nation must be set in motion so that it may play its role in the battle of Arab destiny.

This initiative of the Sudanese government has not only allowed me the privilege of meeting the Sudanese people in their homeland once again; it is also a test of Egypt's unrestricted and unconditional readiness to take part in any endeavour that holds a promise for the forces of the Arab nation to attain the necessary level of effectiveness, which is their true level.

There is nowhere that we will not go for the sake of this endeavour; there is nothing we would hesitate to do for it; there are no considerations which we would place before the aspirations of

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 30/8/1967.

the whole Arab nation, if only the opportunity be given.

Even if the preliminary meetings that were held in preparation for this Summit level conference have not fulfilled all our expectations, this does not exempt us from persevering in the endeavour to its very end, because the challenge that faces the Arab nation is far more important than all presidencies and thrones.

The imperialist tempest which swept across the entire Arab nation on 5 June has inevitably shaken the very foundations of the situation that prevailed before it arose. Consequently, there have been new turning points in Arab affairs.

We have come to take part in this endeavour though we know that some of our close friends have condemned it in advance as useless. However, regardless of all other considerations, we chose to come.

We hope with all our heart that what even some of our friends consider to be unlikely will come to pass. We shall try, honourably and steadfastly, for we trust the solidarity of the Arab struggle and we believe in the unassailable unity of the Arab destiny. But the real guarantee of success is that the Arab masses should, in all awareness, be determined that it should be achieved.

It is fortunate that such an endeavour should take place in the homeland of the great Sudanese people, who have under all circumstances shown an unlimited capacity and a self-sacrificing loyalty for the cause of the Arab revolt. There is no need for me to call on you to invest the full power of your will and your determination and your true awareness in this conference, for it is you who issued the invitations to attend it, you who are responsible for it and you who are the great and living symbol of the whole Arab nation and of its steadfast determination. I now bid you farewell and may God be with you and sustain you in the historic role you are playing in an enterprise on which depend so many crucial developments in the Arab nation, which now faces one of the most critical moments in its history.

409

Message from King Hasan II of Morocco to the Arab Summit Conference.¹

August 29, 1967

Your Majesties, Your Excellencies:

We had sincerely hoped to be able to attend in person this Conference which opens today for the leaders of the Arab countries to study the affairs of our nation, devoting themselves to the issues and problems arising from the Zionist aggression, in an endeavour to arrive at results satisfactory to us all and to supply us with positive, constructive solutions that will allow us to eliminate all consequences of that ugly aggression. We can only express our regret at not being able to take part in the proceedings of this conference, but circumstance do not permit us to do so. Nevertheless, our government is present among you, in the person of our Prime Minister, who will take part in your discussions.

Our government is ready to take upon itself its own share of the responsibilities involved and is resolved to implement any and all such effective decisions as you may take on behalf of our desired objectives. There is no need for me to mention the efforts we have made in the past to ensure that Arab solidarity should be established on firm foundations that would enable our nation to pursue the path of growth and development in all fields and to confront any threat to its destiny or any obstacle to its progress and development. We have on all occasions endeavoured to clear the air in the Arab world of any differences and of anything that impaired its purity. In particular, before the Israeli aggression, we tried to convene an Arab Summit Conference as early as possible to review the rapid developments that had taken place in the Middle East situation as a consequence of the Israeli threat. Our intention was that the Conference should decide on unified military and political measures that would have enabled us to gain control of the situation and to come to grips with events in a spirit of unanimity. Unfortunately, the rapidity with which events including the Israeli aggression took place, prevented the Conference from meeting.

We did not, however, restrict the expression

¹ Embassy of Morocco, Beirut.

of our solidarity with the other Arab nations, either during the crisis or after the iniquitous aggression, to despatching delegations and corresponding with the other Arab leaders. On the contrary we prepared and alerted public opinion in our country so that it might follow the course of events and be ready to face any emergency. We also sent battalions of our armed forces, from the first day of the outbreak of hostilities, to take up their positions near the front lines. Moreover, after the setback which befell the Arab nations as the aftermath of the iniquitous Israeli aggression, our country spared no efforts in its attempts to remedy the severe damage which certain Arab countries had suffered and to eliminate the consequences of the aggression.

Thus we were in the very heart of the battle, both in sentiment and in action. We took upon ourselves our own share of the ensuing difficulties. We shall continue on this course, undismayed either by the shock of the setback or its critical consequences for all Arab countries, particularly those that were the direct object of the treacherous aggression. Let us learn the lesson taught by this cruel setback, let us change the way in which we do things, let us change our attitude towards things. Let us hope that the spirit of true solidarity may govern whatever we say and do, that it may induce us to settle all differences between us so that our hearts may be as one and our ranks united in all future battles, and that, inspired by the idea of unity, we may be firmly resolved that the members of the family of Arab nations should rally to each other's support. Let us also hope that this most significant Arab meeting will result in effective resolutions and constructive results that will light the way for us in our future battles—and let us not forget the political aspect of these battles, which, under present circumstances, is most important. Nor can there be any doubt, if we are in concord and unity, that our just cause will have a better chance of success in the sphere of international diplomacy as well as on the actual field of battle, a success to which this concord and this unity will pave the way, just as they will aid us in the task of liquidating the consequences of the aggression and in liberating our territories from occupation, God willing.

Finally, we take the opportunity provided by this Conference to send you our fraternal greetings

and to convey to your peoples the salutations which we bear from our people to them. In particular, we wish to express our gratitude to Sudan and our appreciation for the efforts of the President of its Sovereignty Council, the members of its government, and its people to bring about this meeting of the Kings and Presidents of the Arab countries.

410

Speech of Algerian President Bumadyan at the End of a Student Military Training Course.¹ [Excerpt]

Zeralda, August 30, 1967

As I said before, the issues facing the Arab world, together with recent events in the Middle East, leave us but one of two alternatives. There is no room for a third: either we accept the *fait accompli* and submit irrevocably to the defeat we have suffered and thereby liquidate the Palestine problem, once and for all, or we commit ourselves with full determination to go on fighting.

Our answer, the answer of the entire Algerian people, and particularly of its progressive elite, is that we cannot but carry on the struggle. It is unthinkable that we should liquidate the Palestine problem. No one, and no Arab government has the right to do that, for it is the cause of an entire people, a people that has been dispersed, whose rights have been usurped. Let whoever chooses to go to Tel Aviv do so alone, let him not ask other governments to go along with him, to negotiate with Israel or to acknowledge the *fait accompli*, to acknowledge the defeat.

The choice of the entire Algerian people is in fact the same as the choice of the Arab nation. Were there no restrictions on liberties in the Arab world and were a plebiscite to be held throughout the Arab homeland, as to whether to submit or to do battle, I believe that, if not 100 per cent, certainly 99 per cent of the Arab people would declare their commitment to the inevitabil-

¹ *Al-Mujahid*, 3/9/1967.

ity of the struggle. No just cause is won through prayer alone nor is an enemy driven out of the lands he has occupied by political measures.

The Israelis have occupied large areas of land. They still retain possession of them to this day. Yet there are still some who say that we must employ political methods. The employment of political methods means that the enemy has won a military victory.

The Zionist state was established by force and aggression. It is now expanding by the use of force. In spite of this, certain parties say that political means exist and that we should follow the course of political settlement. But what lies behind a political solution is the recognition of the Zionist state and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, for the condition of the enemy, an enemy who is in a position of power, is that we grant it diplomatic recognition and accept the modification of the old frontiers.

For this reason, we choose now what we have chosen in the past and what we shall always continue to choose in the future: of the two courses only one is open to us, to go on fighting, not to give up the struggle, but to make use of all means available to us, the most significant of these being the elimination of imperialist interests in the Arab world. Nor is this merely the choice of some official, a member of the Revolutionary Council or of the government. It is the course chosen by the Algerian people. For it is the United States, Britain and their allies in the Arab world that are responsible for consolidating and strengthening the Zionist presence. Moreover, there are those who work hand in hand with these powers.

If we do indeed mean to pay the enemy back for the blow that we received, if we are looking for the real solution, then we shall have to pay the price for the true solution and for the triumph of our just cause, the price which is sacrifice and willingness to shed our blood. Such is the straight and narrow path. Any other course will lead to submission, to an escape from responsibilities, and will bring about the final and irrevocable liquidation of the Palestine question.

I bear witness to you this day, in the name of both the Revolutionary Council and the government, that Algeria, which has had its own revolution, the Algerian Revolution, with its own particular methods, its ideology and its ways of think-

ing, and has seen those methods lead it to a glorious conclusion—I bear witness that we shall have no part in any settlement that might consolidate the defeat which the Arab nation has suffered. We shall have no part, either directly or indirectly, in any settlement which might liquidate the Palestinian cause. We shall forever remain advocates of the true, the real, the revolutionary solution, a solution that will lead us to the goal towards which we strive, namely, to put an end to all forms of exploitation by colonialism, imperialism and their allies in the Arab World.

These are a few thoughts on an issue that is critical and of direct concern to us because it is the issue of the destiny of a whole people.

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411

Joint Communiqué Issued at the End of the Arab Summit Conference Held at Khartum.¹

Khartum, September 1, 1967

In response to the call of the government of Sudan for the convening of a Conference of the Arab Kings and Presidents from 29 August to 1 September 1967, to review the current Arab situation and to consider the formulation of a joint Arab plan for the elimination of the consequences of the aggression, the following Heads of State and representatives of Heads of State met in Khartum:

His Majesty King Husayn Ibn Talal, of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan; His Excellency Isma'il al-Azhari, President of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan; His Excellency General Abd ar-Rahman Arif, President of the Iraqi Republic; His Majesty King Faysal Ibn Abd al-Aziz, of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; His Excellency Gamal Abd an-Nasir, President of the United Arab Republic; His Excellency Abdullah as-Sallal, President of the Yemeni Arab Republic; His Highness Sabah as-Salim as-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait; His Excellency Charles Hilu, President

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 2/9/1967.

of the Lebanese Republic, His Highness Hasan ar-Rida, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Libya; His Excellency al-Bahi al-Adgham, Presidential Secretary of State, representing His Excellency al-Habib Burghiba, President of the Tunisian Republic; His Excellency Abd al-Aziz Butafliga, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Revolutionary Council, representing His Excellency Hawari Bumadyan, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Popular Democratic Republic of Algeria, and His Excellency Dr. Muhammad Ibn Hima, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco, representing His Majesty King Hasan II of the Kingdom of Morocco.

The Conference was dominated by a common awareness of the grave historic responsibility facing the Arab people at this critical and decisive phase of their battle. The delegates reaffirmed their determination to stand as one man in the face of the challenge of destiny and of the resulting responsibilities of the Arab people. The Arab Heads of State and the representatives of Arab Heads of State at the Conference discussed the ramifications of the June 5 aggression against the Arab countries. They decided that the elimination of the consequences of the aggression was the responsibility of all the Arab countries, a responsibility that dictated the mobilisation of all Arab resources. They also expressed their profound conviction that these resources were equal to the task and that the setback which the Arab people have suffered must act as a powerful incentive for them to close ranks and to stand solidly behind the united Arab endeavour.

In view of this appraisal of the situation, the Arab Heads of State and the representatives of Arab Heads of State at the Conference agreed upon the means which would effectively ensure the elimination of the consequences of the aggression. Among these was the decision to offer aid to the Arab countries whose revenues had been directly affected as a consequence of the aggression, to enable them to withstand economic pressures.

The Arab Heads of State and the representatives of Arab Heads of State at the Conference expressed their firm belief in the necessity for continued joint Arab action to safeguard the sacred right of the people of Palestine to their

land. Moreover, the Arab leaders at the Conference call on the peoples and governments of the countries of the world to support the just right of the people of Palestine and to adopt a positive attitude against the countries that favour Zionist imperialism and stand in the way of the Palestinian people's exercise of that right.

The Arab Heads of State and the representatives of Arab Heads of State at the Conference reviewed all aspects of the relations between their countries and agreed to take steps to consolidate relations between them and support the Arab solidarity pact, with the object of realising the aspirations of the Arab people to progress and prosperity.

The Arab Heads of State and the representatives of Arab heads of State at the Conference expressed their sincere appreciation for the initiative of the Sudanese government in calling this historic Conference and for the warm welcome they had received from the Sudanese people.

412

Text of the Published Resolutions and Recommendations Adopted by the Arab Summit Conference.¹

Khartum, September 1, 1967

1. The Conference affirmed the unity of Arab ranks and the unity of collective Arab action which has been cleared of all differences. The Arab Heads of States, either personally or through their representatives, affirmed their countries' adherence to the Arab Solidarity Pact which was issued by the third Arab Summit Conference held in Casablanca, and undertook to implement it.

2. The Conference resolved that it was essential that all Arab efforts should be unified to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, in view of the fact that the occupied territories are Arab territories, so that the responsibility for their recovery must be borne by all the Arab countries.

3. The Arab Heads of State agreed to unify

¹ *Ibid.*

their efforts in political action at the international diplomatic level to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied during the June War, provided that it be consistent with the principles to which all Arab nations adhere: that there shall be no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and that the Arab nations shall take action to safeguard the right of the people of Palestine to their homeland.

4. The Conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil had recommended that an embargo on the flow of oil be used as a weapon in the war; the Summit Conference, after a careful study of the issue, decided that the oil flow could be used as a positive weapon, in view of the fact that oil is one of the resources of the Arab World, which could serve to support the economies of Arab nations which have been directly affected by the aggression and enable these nations to stand firm in the battle.

The Conference therefore resolved that oil pumping should be resumed, in view of the fact that oil is a positive Arab resource that can be exploited in the service of Arab objectives and play its part in enabling the Arab countries which were the victims of aggression, and had thereby lost part of their revenues, to stand fast in the battle for the elimination of the consequences of the aggression.

Moreover, the oil-producing countries have in fact played their part in enabling the nations which were the victims of the aggression to withstand economic pressures.

5. The delegates to the Conference endorsed the proposal submitted by Kuwait for the establishment of an Arab economic and social development fund as recommended by the Conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.

6. The delegates to the Conference resolved that it was essential that all requisite steps should be taken to ensure the provision of military supplies to meet all eventualities.

7. The Conference resolved to bring about the early liquidation of foreign bases in Arab countries.

The Conference also issued the following separate resolution:

Each of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Libya undertake to pay the following annual sums, in quarterly installments in advance, as from the middle of October, until such time as all consequences of the aggression shall be eliminated:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	— £ 50 million
The State of Kuwait	— £ 55 million
The Kingdom of Libya	— £ 30 million

On the basis of which the Arab nation is certain of being able to continue the battle until the elimination of the consequences of the aggression is completed.

413

Interview Statement by Kuwaiti Minister of Guidance and Information Shaikh Jabir al-Ali on Kuwait's Attitude to the Palestine Question.¹ [Excerpt]

Kuwait, September 3, 1967

... the directives we received from our Ruler, of which he had informed us long ago, and had reaffirmed in his statements before, during and after the aggression, [were] that Kuwait had placed herself in the midstream of Arab action of her own free will and choice and that it was her duty to follow this course wherever it led and to employ all her resources to convince the whole world that, although she is a state whose independence is internationally recognised, she is still part of the Arab nation.

I am sure that this patriotic line alone has determined the attitude of the Kuwaiti delegation, led by the Ruler, and that it was this line alone that inspired Kuwait to raise the banner of sacrifice on behalf of Arab freedom, Arab honour, Arab territory and the unity of Arab soil.

Kuwait will cling to this course of patriotic action with love, awareness and faith until the Arabs' glory is recovered and Palestine is restored to her people and they return to their usurped homeland.

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 4/9/1967.

414

Cable from Catholic Palestinian Refugees to Pope Paul VI.¹

We Catholic refugees, natives of Bethlehem, the City of the Nativity, are still prevented from returning to our homes and our families, and this is shaking our faith and confidence in our religious beliefs.

We call on Your Holiness and the conscience of the world to ensure that we may be allowed to return as soon as possible, like other refugees.

415

Interview Granted by King Husayn to the Jordanian News Agency.² [Excerpt]

Amman, September 4, 1967

Q. What are Your Majesty's views on the subject of Arab oil?

A. First, I should like to remind you that Jordan is not an Arab oil-producing country. But this does not relieve us of responsibility as regards Arab oil. In our opinion, the resolutions adopted by the Summit Conference on oil are sound. In the first place, they will lead to the positive employment of Arab resources in the service of our cause and of the effective support of Arab endurance. On the other hand, the Arabs are not the only people in the world who produce oil, and the stopping of exports of Arab oil could only have an effect until such time as it was decided to resume them, and by then the importing countries might well have found other producers whom they could depend on to supply them with oil uninterruptedly. Moreover, in our struggle with the enemy, the effect on the states whose oil supplies we cut off will be less than the effect on their peoples, and this will be in the interest of the enemy, who is always making all possible efforts to win over these peoples and to incite them against us, thereby frustrating our attempts

to build bridges throughout the world so that we can make our just and righteous cause known to the conscience of all men.

Q. What are Your Majesty's views on the commandos being sent into the occupied territory to add their activities to the passive resistance of our brothers there?

A. I have already made my views on this matter perfectly clear to the other Arab leaders. We here in the East Bank are in a position of responsibility for everything that happens in the West Bank. As regards commando activities in the past, it is now obvious that not only were their positive results extremely limited, but they also provided the enemy with an extremely important weapon with which to force us to fight at a time of his own choice for all the world to see. Before the aggression these activities were being carried on against the orders of the Unified Arab Command and in opposition to the Arab plan for the building up of Arab strength, the lack of which, when the first Summit Conference met after the enemy had started diverting the Jordan waters, led to the Arabs' failing to adopt a military stand which could, at that time, be justified.

But now, proud as I am of the patriotic attitude adopted by all our brothers in the West Bank in resistance to the enemy, and of their refusal to cooperate with him within certain limits, I regard it as a crime that any quarter should send so-called commandos to engage in activities which provide the enemy with a pretext to take repressive action against the population and practise greater violence and intimidation as long as he is in control of the occupied territories.

In my opinion, activities of this kind can only assist the enemy in his attempts to break the spirit of resistance to the temporary occupation which is now known to the whole world. Inasmuch as I am opposed to such methods, it is my duty—and the duty of every citizen and every Arab—to resist them with all my power, for as long as the adoption of such methods remains inopportune and does not form part of a general and agreed Arab plan, to be executed once fighting becomes our only means to retrieve the usurped land.

Q. What does Your Majesty think of the Arabs' military situation at present?

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 3/9/1967.

² *Ibid.*, 5/9/1967.

A. Certainly the present stage requires a thorough organisation of the whole Arab military situation. I think that the way to do this is to call a meeting of the Arab Defence Council, so that the Unified Arab Command may once more play its part in controlling and directing Arab efforts, after a study of ways in which they can be made strong enough to meet all the requirements of the new situation. If this is done, unified collective action can take the place of the unilateral action that is being taken in all the Arab countries, or the bilateral action that is being taken by some of them. The cause of Palestine is the cause of all Arabs.

416

News Conference Held by Jordanian Prime Minister Jum'ah on the Return of West Bank Refugees to Their Homes.¹ [Excerpts]

Amman, September 10, 1967

My purpose in holding this conference is to make available to you the true facts and figures regarding the return of the refugees. The Israeli authorities have spread many rumours and lies about this question and have publicised their own version of the story. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities have, without any justification, unilaterally imposed upon us a time limit. This is what prompts me to speak to you at this time. You may ask any questions you like at the end of my address.

You are all acquainted with the details of the return of the refugees. Nevertheless, I am sure that you will permit me to refer you to Security Council resolution No. 237, dated the 14th of June, 1967. The text runs as follows, word for word:

"The Security Council calls on the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the area where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled

the area since the outbreak of hostilities."

As you can see, the text is binding and stipulates neither a time limit nor other conditions. This is how we understand it, and this is how the whole world understands it. The text leaves no room for interpretation. Consequently, the restriction set by the Israelis on the return of the refugees has no legal basis. While meetings were in progress at the United Nations, Israel announced that she would allow the refugees to return. However, it later became evident that this was only a political manoeuvre designed to win the support of public opinion, and a reaction to the pressures that were being brought to bear on Israel. Israel's declaration was not prompted by any humanitarian or moral considerations. The statement made by the Israeli Foreign Minister on his return from the United Nations, to the effect that this pledge had proved to be beneficial to Israel in international circles, for it had kept the United Nations from condemning Israel's political designs, serves to confirm our conclusion on this matter.

Both the Jordanian government and the International Red Cross encountered all sorts of difficulties in initiating proceedings for the return of the refugees. In the period between 2 July and 13 August, the Jordanian Government conducted a detailed census to determine the exact number of refugees, to classify them in terms of the families they belong to and in relation to the place to which they had emigrated, in order to facilitate the operation. On 13 August, the Red Cross succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Israeli authorities on this issue, and the process of filling out forms was begun. Within six days, the Jordanian government was able to hand in 400,000 application forms, covering 175,000 thousand refugees, to the Red Cross for forwarding to the Israeli authorities.

On 16 August, the Red Cross informed us that the Israeli authorities would start receiving refugees as from 7 a.m. on 18 August until the end of that month, in other words, Israel only allowed a few days in which to hand back the applications and to complete the operation.

Despite the shortage of time, the Jordanian government made preparations for the return of between six and ten thousand refugees per day across the King Abdullah and Umm ash-Shart bridges. However, we discovered at the very

¹ *Ibid.*, 11/9/1967.

start that the enemy had set obstacles in the way of the operation, which was an added indication that his acceptance of the return of the refugees was for propaganda purposes only, and was intended to ease international pressures upon him during the U.N. sessions.

Among these obstacles were:

1. Israel announced, through the Red Cross, that she would not be able to receive more than three thousand refugees a day, whereas the permits received each day did not even approach this figure.

2. In most cases, the Israeli authorities limited the period that was allowed to elapse between the receipt of a processed application and the actual return of the refugees concerned to twelve hours.

3. Israel resorted to the practice of dividing each family into two or more parties and refused to accept young male members of a family, which in effect kept these families out.

4. Israel refused all refugees living in emergency camps.

5. Israel also refused all those who had previously been refugees and whose names were on UNRWA lists, thereby preventing all refugees who are registered with UNRWA and who had fled to the East Bank from returning to the West Bank.

6. Israel furthermore refused all refugees coming from Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jericho, nor did she allow refugees to bring in their cars or other belongings with which they had left the West Bank.

7. Most important of all, Israel restricted the time allowed for the completion of the operation to the period between 18 and 31 August. On top of that, throughout this whole period, we received no more than 5,102 permits, which were valid for only 17,749 refugees. Nevertheless, despite all these obstacles, the Jordanian government succeeded in using up 3,824 permits, which were valid for 14,027 refugees. The Jordanian government still has in its possession 1,362 permits, valid for 3,722 persons.

While Jordan was working to facilitate the return of the refugees to the West Bank, last month 10,226 people crossed from the West to the East Bank in addition to 4,512 people who

came from Gaza. Their combined number actually exceeds the total of refugees returned to the West Bank. This only made the problem we faced more difficult and confronted us with a very heavy responsibility, as it confirmed our fears that we should expect a large number of new refugees.

These figures should silence Israel's claims that the Jordanian authorities showed negligence in the matter of the return of the refugees, an accusation concocted by Israel to justify her violation of the Security Council decision and of the codes of humanity.

We are faced with the dilemma of a quarter of a million of our brothers and fellow-citizens who are refugees from the West Bank. We are ready to share our homes with them and we are ready to share our food, for they are part of us and part of our nation. But our resources are limited and we cannot adequately cope with the needs of such a large number of human beings, whether in terms of medical or social welfare or in terms of all the other obligations they put us under. Therefore I repeat what I said on Lebanese television two days ago: we call on the conscience of the world, we call on every human being on this earth to acquaint himself with this dilemma and, insofar as there is a measure of humanity or honour in him, to exert pressure on his government to put an end to the obdurate stand of Israel over the question of the refugees. The refugees now face the prospect of the coming winter season; they are faced with the threat of wholesale annihilation. Let us turn, then, to look at Israel, which is placing obstacles in the way of the return of the refugees, and in so doing is flouting all principles of humanity, the resolutions of the Security Council, and the United Nations itself. Moreover, in view of the attitude taken by Israel, I appeal most urgently to all our brothers in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip not to leave their homes but to stay where they are. This will spare them such a fate and it will, moreover, thwart the designs of the enemy, who is actually encouraging them to leave.

That our lands should be restored to us, this we cannot doubt, and toward this end we strive, full of confidence that our hope will be realised, particularly in view of the results of the last Arab Summit Conference. Our nation will be

one again, and for this unity we are ready to lay down our lives. We have faith in the loyalty of our citizens in the West Bank to their nation and we trust in their Arab character which dictates that they shall not move until victory is achieved—and victory is not far off, God willing. I do not say this in order to incite our citizens in the West Bank, but to help them to endure and to retain their cohesiveness. The Israeli authorities have put words in our mouths, words which we have not used. They would have the world believe that the Jordanian broadcasting service and the Jordanian Government want to exploit the return of the refugees for the sake of terrorist action. This is a pure fabrication and is no part of our intention. For us, the return of the refugees remains nothing more than the exercise of the unreserved, unrestricted natural right of a citizen.

Q. Does His Majesty intend to visit the U.S.S.R.?

A. The purpose of His Majesty's visit to the U.S.S.R. is to clarify the Jordanian and Arab position on the Israeli aggression and to make known the injustices that citizens of the West Bank are suffering at the hands of the Israelis. We consider this first visit of His Majesty to the Soviet Union to be politically beneficial and should serve to gain support for the Jordanian and Arab position.

I cannot, however, tell you what will be the scope of His Majesty's discussions in the Soviet Union, or whether they will touch upon the establishment of economic or military cooperation between Jordan and the Soviet Union.

Q. What is your opinion of the plan proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia for handling the Middle East crisis?

A. The proposal of the Yugoslav President is an attempt on the part of certain Eastern Bloc countries to put forward viable suggestions which could serve as the basis for a speedy solution of the crisis. All proposals put forward so far have been unrealistic with the exception of the plan of the Yugoslav president, which is the most adequate plan for an honourable peaceful settlement based on sound reasoning.

As regards the attitude of the various Arab countries to this plan, that has been left to Arab

political leaders to expound, should the question be raised before the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Q. What, to your knowledge, are the methods employed by Israel to entice certain residents of the West Bank into negotiating for a settlement of the Palestinian question?

A. We have a great deal of information at our disposal relating to the attempts on the part of the enemy to induce, through intimidation or temptation, certain persons who have sold their conscience and who are traitors to the cause of their nation to cooperate in the establishment of a buffer state. I need not stress that any such cooperation is a betrayal of Arabism, of our religion and of our homeland.

Israel is trying to reach a solution to the problem that will be in keeping with her own wishes, whereas the issue concerns every Arab; it is part of our very lives. We shall never desert the cause. It is fortunate, however, that Israel has not met with any success worth mentioning.

I must caution our citizens in the West Bank against the temptations the Israelis are offering and the spurious leniency they are affecting at present. I would like to remind them of the fate of those who remained in the occupied territories in 1948 and of the relentless persecution which this minority has encountered at the hands of the Israeli authorities. Such will be the fate of those who cooperate with the enemy, should his attempts succeed, which God forbid.

The people of the West Bank are not the only ones who have been subjected to such attempts. Israel has also sent delegations to many parts of the world in search of refugees prepared to cooperate with her. All such attempts have met with failure. We are confident, moreover, that our citizens in the West Bank will never waver in the defence of the cornerstones of their nationalism, of their religion and of their lives.

We have recently heard that a few people have broadcast statements over Israeli radio which are a form of propaganda for the enemy. I do not wish to make charges which I cannot substantiate, but let me remind everyone that cooperation with the enemy is treason, that it is Israeli practice to fabricate statements and to attribute them to our fellow citizens, and that we

can never be sure of the truth of what the Israeli broadcasting service says. Nevertheless, I must warn our fellow citizens in the West Bank of the sick people who let no opportunity pass for personal gain, in spite of the fact that the overwhelming majority will never betray their allegiance to their country.

Q. What comments do you have to make on Israel's attitude towards Jerusalem?

A. The question of Jerusalem does not concern Jordan or the Arabs alone; it is the concern of all Muslims and Christians. His Majesty has already expressed our attitude on the question of Jerusalem quite clearly. I shall not be giving away a secret if I say that His Majesty will be visiting certain Islamic countries soon, with the express purpose of discussing this matter. Jerusalem is one of our religious sanctuaries, and we shall forsake none of our sanctuaries so long as there is a spark of life in us. I explained this fact to the British parliamentary delegation that visited me this morning, and I would like to add that we are not trying to stir up trouble, but that we insist on justice, and justice dictates that Jerusalem be restored to us. Just an hour ago I received a letter from Jerusalem, sent by a religious dignitary, informing me that the Israeli authorities had forcibly seized the key to the Bab al-Magharibah from the Awqaf Department, and that the Israeli occupation authorities had defaced the inner side of the Bab al-Asbat, which has enraged the inhabitants of the city.

417

**Speech of the Chief U.A.R. Delegate to the African Summit Conference in Kinshasa
Mr. Muhammad Fayiq.¹ [Excerpt]**

Kinshasa, September 12, 1967

It is a fact that Africa has displayed an interest in this matter; this is evident from the unques-

tionable support we have received from a great many of the member states of this organisation. This interest is also evident from the attempts made by other African countries to find a solution to the problem in the light of evidence available to them. Moreover, the statements read before the Security Council and before the General Assembly of the United Nations on behalf of the African countries express the profound regret of all these nations for the military occupation of part of the territory of another African nation. This regret is also expressed in their demand for the withdrawal of the occupation forces. However, it would also appear that certain other African countries have been beguiled by Zionist propaganda, which has wrongly portrayed Israel as a tiny nation fighting for its life and its security. Israel has succeeded, through her propaganda machine, and the propaganda machines of certain world powers which stand behind her, in disguising the truth and in veiling her aggressive and expansionist policy while presenting a false front which makes it appear that she is defending her security and her very survival.

The fact is that the security of Israel is guaranteed by the cease-fire agreements between Israel and the Arab nations signed in 1949, which provide for demilitarised zones, and for the establishment of international organisations to deal with problems that arise, and which clearly specify the means for preventing either side from committing acts of aggression.

The truth of the matter is that it is Israel that has not respected these agreements. It is she who has constantly violated them, to the extent of declaring, finally, that she considers these agreements to be non-existent. All this has been part of a series of attempts at expansion and domination.

In 1947, the United Nations defined the territory of Israel. Israel exceeded these limits by first occupying, in 1948, part of the territory earmarked for the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state, thereby preventing the establishment of such a state. Since then she has exceeded these limits on several occasions to occupy other regions which the United Nations resolution had declared to be demilitarised zones. Finally, in June, she occupied all the territory set aside by the United Nations resolution for the establish-

¹ *Al-Amal*, 16/9/1967. This conference was held in the Congo between the 11th and the 15th of September.

ment of a Palestinian Arab state, and even parts of the territory of neighbouring Arab countries, including the United Arab Republic.

The land area set aside by the United Nations for the establishment of Israel, whether justly or unjustly—this is not the time to go into that—was 14.000 square kilometres. Israel exceeded this total, and occupied 20.000 square kilometres, and then occupied even more. In June, as a result of her latest aggression, she acquired over 60.000 square kilometres, including the whole of Palestine, which was to be divided between her and the Arab countries, and Jerusalem, which all nations of the world, including all African nations, have demanded should not be annexed to Israel. In addition she acquired parts of the territory of the other Arab nations, over which she has no claim except that of flagrant aggression.

Israel is a state that is constantly expanding at the expense of the other peoples of the area, and she persists in her expansionist policy. Consequently, the fears of the Middle East countries that this expansion will continue are firmly founded on an ugly reality, particularly in view of the extensive foreign aid that Israel receives in the economic, military and propaganda fields.

The foregoing makes clear the necessity of curbing the expansionist ambitions of the Israeli authorities and of preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their aggression, lest they be encouraged to commit further acts of aggression. The policy of Israel, which was quite clearly revealed in 1956 and 1967, is based on ceaseless aggression. Israel has occupied the entire territory of the Arab state of Palestine, not to mention parts of the territory of other Arab nations, and she refuses to withdraw. She has announced the annexation of Jerusalem and is now trying to double her population by bringing in two-and-a-half million European and American immigrants to replace the Arab inhabitants who have been expelled from their land. And doubtless this new massive immigration will drive her to expand even further.

Our attitude is, and has always been, one of self-defence. Israel, by failing to respect her commitments, and through her repeated acts of aggression, has impaired the possibility of peace. We have not turned our backs upon the possibility of a peaceful settlement, but we do not think that such a settlement can really come about while

the enemy remains in occupation of our lands and is left to enjoy the fruits of his aggression.

We know that imperialist powers are supplying Israel with arms, with technological equipment and with volunteers. We even have proof now that establishes the involvement of South Africa, from which Israel obtained a number of racist mercenaries in the June war. At the moment when I left Cairo, the Israeli Prime Minister was declaring that Israel would not withdraw from the Arab territories she had occupied unless the Arab nations came to her humbly to discuss terms of surrender. Last week, the Israeli naval forces tried once more to cross the Suez Canal, the Israeli air force violated our air space yet once again, they bombed our cities again and they killed yet more civilians, thereby adding to our roll of civilian martyrs, which already included thousands.

Mr. President, Excellencies;

African unity is not only one of the objectives of our Charter; it is, in fact, a necessity if Africa is to be free. Our commitment to solidarity requires of us that we should acquaint you with our position, which can be summarized in the following three points:

1. Our goal is to achieve peace in the Middle East and in the rest of the world, so that we may be at liberty to devote ourselves to the task of development, secure from acts of aggression and expansionism.

2. No acceptable peaceful settlement can ever come about while part of our territory remains under military occupation, nor can it come about under pressure from the threat of further military action against us. Therefore, as a first step towards such a solution, there can be no alternative to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces to behind the lines which they crossed when they committed their aggression on 5 June 1967. Any demand made upon us to accept such conditions as the forces of aggression may impose upon us while we are under military occupation is an unjust demand and might establish a precedent constituting a serious threat to our way of life, for it would give international sanction to the use of force as a means to acquire gains. Such a demand would take the world back to where it was before there were any international conventions, conventions which came about after the

world had experienced devastating wars, conventions which now form the basis of the United Nations and of our organisation. Such a demand would incapacitate both of these organisations and render them ineffective.

3. If it is clear to us that no peace can last if it is not based on justice, then it must also be clear that any solution of the problem must respect the rights of the people of Palestine, both Muslim and Christian, rights which have been upheld in repeated sessions of the United Nations, and which have also been supported by all the nations taking part in this Conference.

Now, as we face one of the most crucial moments in our history, the Government in Cairo has taken pains to clarify its position to you, here, at this, the highest level of responsibility in our nations. Our citizens, who lost thousands of martyrs during the aggression, are confident, in their millions, that their African brothers are with them in these decisive, historic moments. We believe that the crisis we face constitutes a threat not to our country alone but to the entire continent of Africa, and exposes the entire region to danger. This is the reason which led my government to clarify its position so painstakingly to you; there was no intention of asking this Conference to take any decisions or to make any recommendations. We found it to be our duty to the heads of state, of governments, and of delegations, who have met together in this illustrious city, to acquaint them with our position truthfully and quite simply. It only remains for me, as I conclude this exposition, to express my deep gratitude to you all. I thank you, Mr. President, and I thank all those who have been so kind as to listen to me.

418

Resolutions Adopted by the Arab League Council at Its 48th Ordinary Session, 11-13 September.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, September 13, 1967

On the Pressures Applied by Israel on Arabs in the Occupied Territories to Drive them to Emigrate to Canada and Australia:

The Council approves the following recommendations of the Political Affairs Committee:

"The Political Affairs Committee, having studied the pressures exerted by Israel on Arabs in the occupied territories to drive them to emigrate to Canada and Australia, and having reviewed the League Council's resolutions No. 2029 of 30 September 1964 and No. 2243 of 12 September 1966, makes the following recommendations:

1. That the Council should reaffirm the content of both resolutions and that it should include Canada among the nations concerned.

2. That the information media of the member States of the League should devote greater efforts to emphasising to the Arabs in the occupied territories the necessity of holding on to their nationality and of not leaving their homes.

(Resolution 2351/48th m./Sess. 3—13.9.1967)

On the Attempt to Alter the Legal Status of the City of Jerusalem and Its Annexation to Israel, and Other Measures Taken by Israel in the Territories at Present under Its Occupation, in Connection with Aviation and Telephone and Wireless Communications:

The Council approves the following recommendations made by the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee for Economic Affairs and Communications:

"The Committee, after studying and discussing the Secretariat General's communiqué on this subject, recommends that the Arab countries reject and denounce these measures to all inter-

¹ Arab League, Cairo (mimeographed).

national bodies and organisations concerned and that they demand that these measures be annulled as violating both United Nations resolutions and international conventions. The Committee has also taken note of the letter received by the Secretariat General from the United Arab Aviation Institute to the effect that IATA considers the change in the status of Jerusalem null and void.

(Resolution 2355/48th m./sess. 3—13.9.1967)

419

Statement by an Official Jordanian Spokesman on the Israeli Decision To Permit the Return of Some Refugees.¹

Amman, September 14, 1967

1. Israel is permitting the return only of those who failed to do so between 18 and 31 August—these number only 3,722 and not 6,000 as the occupation authorities claim—and not of the 170,000 other refugees who submitted forms requesting permission to return. In this she is infringing the Security Council resolution on the return of the refugees to their homes, which resolution did not specify numbers and set no specific deadline, but covered all the refugees and insisted that they should all be allowed to return.

2. By granting permits in such a manner that families were divided into two or more parts, so that it was impossible for one part to return without the rest, the occupation authorities created a situation in which it was difficult for these refugees who had failed to do so before to return for the reasons set out above and for other reasons mentioned in detail by the Prime Minister at his press conference on 11 September 1967.²

3. This being the case, the Jordanian government cannot but reaffirm the right of all refugees to return to their homes, while reserving their full rights involved in such return, in accordance with the Security Council resolution, no group or groups being excepted.

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 15/9/1967.

² See *ante*, doc. 416.

420

Statement of the National Command of the Syrian Ba'th Party on the Proceedings of the Ninth Extraordinary National Conference.³ [Excerpts]

Damascus, September 17, 1967

The Zionist-imperialist Attack on the Arab Homeland and its Objectives:

The latest Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab people was but one aspect of the comprehensive imperialist strategy aimed at crushing the national will of peoples so as to keep them, directly or indirectly, within its sphere.

This aggression was the climax of the conflict which has been going on between the Arab liberation movement and imperialism. Even before the discovery of the huge economic resources of the Arab nation, imperialism had long been aware of the strategic importance of the Arab world as regards both Asia and Africa, and of the possibility of utilising this to rob both continents of their riches and of using the Arab world as a link in its global network of military and commercial communications.

After the discovery of oil, the designs of imperialism on the Arab world grew more vicious. While the national liberation movement was engaged in demolishing the citadels of the old form of imperialism, neo-imperialism, under the leadership of the United States of America, tried to exploit this struggle for its own benefit. Its intention was to take the place of the old imperialism, or at least to join it in robbing the Arab world of its riches. Imperialism considered these huge resources, especially oil, as indispensable for the maintenance of its industry and its war machine.

Moreover, imperialism became aware of the human role of Arab nationalism, and realised that it could be an important factor in the possible victory of the entire national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Imperialism also became aware of the threat that the establishment of a united socialist Arab state in this significant part of the world might well become a

³ *Al-Ba'th*, 18/9/1967.

stronghold of freedom which would protect the people of Asia and Africa from imperialism.

This realisation of the importance of the Arab world and of the historic role of the Arab nation led imperialism to draw up plans to tear the Arab nation apart and to ensure that the Arab world should remain divided, under-developed and exploited, and to establish military bases in various regions of the Arab world.

Yet all this did not satisfy imperialism. Its violent cupidity drove it to think up more drastic means for protecting its interests and better guarantees for its continued domination. It therefore cooperated with world Zionism, which is the most dangerous form of imperialism, in the establishment of Israel, which was to become an embodiment of the Zionist movement and an organic extension of the body of imperialism. Israel was the outcome of a movement of colonisation and invasion intended to scatter the struggling Arab masses and to liquidate the Arabs as a people.

The progressive and revolutionary forces of the Arab masses and the various different movements that have arisen among these masses have come to constitute, at the present stage, a new threat to the imperialist presence, to its interests and to its supporters in the Arab world. The progressive regimes in Syria, the United Arab Republic and Algeria have brought about far-reaching socialist changes and have adopted an undisguisedly liberationist policy. The first steps have been taken towards a merger between the progressive forces among the Arab people through sharing in the same battles, escalating the battle waged by the masses and the progressive forces in Arab countries governed by reactionary elements, revealing the true nature of these reactionary elements, exposing their methods and shedding light on the ties that link their destiny to that of imperialism and Zionism, and extending the scope of the armed popular struggle to wipe out the bases of direct occupation, as is taking place in South Yemen. The revolutionary path of the battle of the masses in the Arab world, which embodies the will of the Arab nation and its firm resolution to bring about a united socialist society, has reached a stage where it must inevitably come into collision with imperialism and its supporters. So far, it has had to cope with the

vicious designs of imperialism in all its various forms aimed at causing the revolutionary movement to miscarry.

In the stage previous to this, imperialism had recourse to all forms of intrigue and pressure in order to destroy the forces of Arab revolution. It exerted economic pressures on the progressive Arab countries; it practised intrigues within Arab countries, it set its *agents provocateurs* in motion; it pressed reactionary regimes into its service, and made use of the threat constituted by its fleets and military bases. When all these failed, it resorted to barefaced military intervention. This military intervention was either directly carried out by imperialist powers, like the intervention in Iraq during the July 14th revolution, or in open cooperation with Israel, which is the base of imperialism, as in the Tripartite Aggression of 1956, or by inciting Israel to commit aggression and providing her with arms and the necessary means of destruction, thereby using her as a pawn, as in the aggression of 5 June 1967.

The latest Zionist-imperialist conspiracy against the Arab nation has more clearly than ever disclosed to the eyes of the peoples of the world the artificial nature of Israel and her true *raison d'être*.

Large sections of world public opinion have become aware of the fact that this pocket of imperialism implanted in the heart of the Arab world can only maintain itself by performing the role for which it was created, which is to commit repeated acts of aggression against the Arab nation and the nations of Asia and Africa, to invade, to occupy territories and to wage wars of annihilation and liquidation to serve the interests of imperialism and Zionism.

The latest Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab nation was committed in order to realise the following objectives:

1. The aim of imperialism was to check the course of the Arab revolution, and to bring down the progressive regimes which are the bases of this revolution, in order to destroy the will of the Arab people to do battle, to scatter its hopes of establishing a unified modern state, to cause the Arab nation to despair and to give up the struggle, to paralyse it, to force it to surrender, accept the *fait accompli* and relinquish its human role in the struggle for civilised values. If this objective

is attained, imperialism will have destroyed all the gains of the Arab people, political, social or economic, gains acquired after long and bitter struggle, for which our forefathers laid down their lives. Imperialism will have thereby reduced the Arab world to a sphere of influence or subjected it to direct occupation, and will also have protected its own interests, its monopolies, and the reactionary regimes allied to it, and at the same time retaining its military bases.

2. Furthermore, the aim of imperialism is to strengthen Israel as its base at the centre of its international communications network and to realise yet another stage in the expansionist designs of world Zionism. This is the stage of obtaining control of further Arab territories, settling in them more invaders, and preparing the way for repeated waves of aggression in the future, in order to create a Zionist state extending from the Euphrates to the Nile.

3. The scope of the aims of the aggression extends beyond the Arab world. The goal of imperialist circles is to use this aggression to terrorise other peoples, and to avenge itself for the successive defeats it has suffered at the hands of the victorious popular revolutions, as a consequence of the steadfast endurance of the heroic Vietnamese people, and as a consequence of the widening scope of the revolution in South Yemen.

4. The forces of imperialism attach the profoundest significance to the fulfilment of the principal aims of the aggression, which are to gain mastery over the Arab world and the Arab revolutionary movement, which constitutes one of the main fields of resistance. If they succeed in this, then the task of carrying out their far-reaching designs to gain control of the world will be made easier. It is the dream of international imperialist circles, by implementing these plans, to achieve final victory with the downfall of all socialist regimes. They hope to turn the entire world into fertile soil for their rapacious exploitation and for their monopolistic interests.

The Factors Involved in the Setback and Its Causes :

The Ninth Extraordinary National Conference has attempted to evaluate the causes of the setback and the effects of the aggression of 5 June.

One of the main features of the psychological warfare which has followed the military aggression

has been the exaggeration of the significance of the causes of the setback in a calculated and untiring attempt to drive the masses to despair and confusion, seeking thereby to gain complete control of the frame of mind of the Arab people and to undermine its will to resist.

It is therefore necessary to emphasise a basic fact whose relevance and importance have been repeatedly affirmed throughout the course of history.

This basic fact is the capacity of the Arab, as a human being, to stand fast, to resist, and to confound the stratagems of the imperialist fifth column and the manoeuvres of the psychological warfare waged by imperialism itself.

We also find it necessary to affirm that the military victory won by the alliance of imperialism and world Zionism is not the first of its kind in the world. This alliance had at its disposal all the material resources of imperialism, its propaganda machines and its military bases inside and outside the Arab world, as well as its imperialist fleets in the area, both when the aggression was being planned and when it was being carried out. Their victory was not the first of its kind, nor was it due to the inability of the Arab nation to resist and stand fast, nor to the inferiority of its culture to that of the invading armies. Nor does the defeat detract from the courage or the loyalty of the regular Arab armies, despite the many deficiencies and shortcomings in our social structure and in our military apparatus. Several such sudden wars of aggression have taken place in many parts of the world throughout history. The invading barbarians and the Nazi and Fascist regimes also won lightning military victories against European nations which were at the same level of civilisation and at the same cultural and technological levels of development as themselves, yet the judgement of history did not go against these nations for their lack of ability or steadfastness or courage, for they resisted the setback and fought against occupation, so that with steadfastness, patience and sacrifice they were able to inflict a final and decisive defeat on the aggressors.

Arab masses; The causes of the setback are many-faceted and deep-rooted. Fundamentally these causes are related to indigenous factors which concern the true situation of the Arab nation and the state of the Arab revolution.

Furthermore, they are related to factors in the international sphere which concern the nature of the struggle which is in progress between the world-wide revolutionary movement and the forces of colonialism, Zionism, and imperialism.

However important the international factors, our major concern must ever be to bring to light the elements of deficiency on our part which helped to bring about the setback, and which facilitated the task of the Zionist-imperialist collusion in achieving one stage of its objectives.

In the opinion of the Ba'th Party, it is the responsibility of the progressive Arab forces and of the toiling Arab masses to arrive at a common understanding and a common vision of the indigenous factors which helped to bring about the setback. A true knowledge of these factors, and an appreciation of the role they played in the last round, and of the place they occupy in the consequences of the setback is essential if the bases of the Arab revolution are to become more deeply entrenched, and the revolution is to acquire a comprehensive sweep in the future, and become more capable of responding to future challenges.

1. The basic factor responsible for the setback and for all the fateful disasters which have befallen the Arab nation is our dismemberment.

The forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction have both planned and taken action to ensure that this division should continue, in order to keep the Arab world under-developed, and so that they might continue to exploit it, manipulate it, bleed its resources, paralyse its capacities and prevent it from adopting a united Arab strategy. For they know that such a strategy is capable of confronting the successive waves of intrigue and invasion, and devoting the huge resources of the Arab nation, human, military and economic, to the service of the battle.

Our internal division has had dangerous repercussions on all aspects of Arab life and on its ability to stand up to the enemy, to endure and to achieve victory. All other factors are secondary; they are by-products of this internal division—whether it be the lack of an industrially based economy to provide the necessary potential of the nation, or the absence of a unified military command to lead our armies in accordance with the demands and requirements of the war. Neither economic nor military coordination are

a substitute for this, as was in fact proved during the last phase of the battle.

From this we conclude that, in order to make a decisive response to the imperialist, Zionist, reactionary presence in the Arab world, to keep it from attaining both its short- and long-term objectives, and to liquidate its interests and its supports, it is essential first and foremost that steps be taken in a new and unified direction which will provide a material, economic, human and military basis that will constitute a nucleus capable of channeling the Arab revolution towards the realisation of its major objective, which is the establishment of a unified socialist Arab society.

2. Moreover, up to now, the stand taken by the masses in the face of the circumstances arising from the setback and its aftermath has not been equal to the challenges facing the Arab revolution, in spite of the sacrifices made by the masses and their heroic endurance and spontaneous rallying to the cause throughout the Arab world, as we saw at the time of the aggression and afterwards. This deficiency was due to the fact that the revolutionary forces were not adhering to a unified joint strategy which could provide a basis for the organised masses in their battle and their all-out attack on the bases, supports and interests of imperialism in the Arab world.

It must be pointed out, and stressed, that one of the major factors responsible for the after-effects of the setback was the absence of such a strategy and the restriction of the war to a battle between regular armies within a restricted span of time, which did not permit of its taking on its proper dimensions, which are the dimensions of a popular struggle to be fought throughout the Arab world. It must also be stressed, however, that the Ba'th Party was aware of the importance of such a strategy and of the need to put it into practice by merging the forces of progress and forming an extended united front throughout the Arab world, which would include the largest possible numbers of people and assume the character of a war of popular liberation in its stand against the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

3. Another aspect of the situation is that the secondary battles which the progressive forces in the Arab world were fighting among themselves in the previous phase led to negative and danger-

ous consequences. The most outstanding of these was that the energies of the masses in the Arab world were squandered and the unity of their ranks shattered rather than their energies and efforts being mobilised and pressed into the service of the struggle for union and socialism.

This caused large sections of the masses to succumb to despair and confusion, and it delayed the progress of revolutionary construction. Because of the repercussions of this conflict and because the forces of progress drew apart from each other, it was not possible to arrive at a unified revolutionary strategy for popular struggle throughout the Arab world.

As a result of this disagreement, the lines of battle were blurred in the war between the masses and their enemies; a truce was declared with reactionary regimes; there was cooperation with these regimes as a form of reaction or of being drawn in the train of impromptu tactics at the expense of the strategy of revolution.

4. We must also stress the significance of the crucial role played by the military bases of imperialism which are implanted in certain countries of the Arab world, and the large part they had to play in the aggression. The necessity of engaging in armed combat to liquidate the bases of imperialism must also be stressed.

5. Furthermore, it must be recorded that we fall far short of being able to present our just cause clearly to world public opinion, for this requires factual planning, objectivity, the ability to convince, and perseverance. This was one of the factors that took the initiative out of our hands and made it appear that our human struggle for liberation from the aggressive and Fascist forces of Zionism and its imperialist backers was a form of chauvinism or anti-Semitism, whereas the Jews had lived among us in the past, like all other citizens, in the atmosphere of toleration which has always characterised Arab history, and which they would still have been enjoying had Zionism and imperialism not exploited them in an attempt to justify the new imperialist invasion.

Alongside these erroneous methods and the grave shortcomings in our foreign public relations policy, there were severe shortcomings in the preparedness of our citizens and their knowledge of the real nature of the forces which support the Zionist aggression. It is essential that these be

remedied, in order that our preparedness may be equal to the challenges we face, and so as to involve these forces in a total confrontation, wherever they may be found on Arab soil, instead of limiting the confrontation to the regular military fronts.

6. The continued backwardness of Arab society is something that is imposed by factors outside the control of the will of the Arab people, and is due primarily to the continuation of the reactionary-imperialist-Zionist presence. The reason for the backwardness of the Arab world cannot lie with the Arab individual, who lacks neither adequate capabilities nor the willingness to take the path of progress and development, nor can it lie in the shortage of material resources, for the Arab world abounds in these. If our nation were allowed a free hand in making use of these resources, and if there were unified methodical planning, it could give birth to a centre of civilisation capable of effectively serving the struggle and of working toward the progress of civilisation throughout the world.

Throughout its past phases, imperialism has plotted in all sorts of ways to keep the Arab world split and underdeveloped, in order to ensure that imperialism may be able to continue plundering its riches and its economic resources, and Arab reactionary forces have acted as the watchman for the interests of imperialism and as a tool with which to execute its plans. Meanwhile the reactionary regimes have carried out their task of frustrating the masses and maintaining them in a state of backwardness, and thwarting any revolutionary movement on the part of the masses.

Moreover, imperialism has plotted to overthrow the progressive Arab regimes which, despite the limited material resources available to their countries, have been able to build a socialist economic base which serves the interests of the masses and works unceasingly to bring about a union of Arab states.

The progressive regimes were kept busy by these constant intrigues against them and by the attempts to overthrow them, which diverted them from the task of internal development, and their resources were diminished, as was their potential to stand up to the Zionist-imperialist aggression.

Furthermore, the dangerous conspiratorial

role played by the forces of reaction did not stop at that, for they went so far as to refrain from joining in the fight against the aggression, an aggression which was directed against the very existence of the Arab nation. The forces of reaction devised means to dull the ensuing rancour of the masses, to sap their resistance and to bring them to capitulate and to accept concessions within the framework of a peaceful settlement.

7. The international factors responsible for the setback are related to the condition of the forces of progress in the world. The most important of these is that the progressive tide of the Third World has been checked for the moment, and that the role played by the non-aligned nations and other regional bodies has been inadequate, for there has been no unanimous adherence on the part of its members to a unified battle position in the face of the attacks of imperialism upon these countries. Moreover, there has been an absence of unity among the forces of socialism, and a lack of effective synchronisation and cooperation between the progressive movements in the Third World and the forces of socialism in the face of the forces of colonialism and imperialism.

As for the factors responsible for the setback which have to do with the role played by the forces of imperialism and Zionism, these spring primarily from the organic bonds which link the imperialist nations, particularly the United States of America, Great Britain, and West Germany to world Zionism, which is an inseparable part of the imperialist presence. These links were manifested in many events related to the recent aggression against the Arab nation. The most prominent among these was the supplying of Israel with technical resources, volunteers and vast material and military aid, which transformed her into a military barracks bristling with arms. Furthermore, all the military bases of imperialism in the Arab world and in neighbouring regions, not to mention its fleets, were placed at the disposal of the aggression, whether directly or indirectly. The intelligence services of the United States of America and other imperialist countries, with their excellent espionage facilities, participated in the execution of the designs of this aggressive collusion. By making use of their control over the means of communication, pro-

paganda and the centres of capitalist economy in the world, the imperialist countries and world Zionism turned world public opinion outside socialist countries against the Arab cause. This misleading imperialist Zionist propaganda tried to deceive world public opinion into believing that Israel was threatened with an imminent Arab military invasion, in order to veil its own criminal surprise attack.

On the other hand, the Arab nation paid for its respect for peace-loving world public opinion with its own security and the future of its coming generations. Yet all this did nothing to prevent the planned and treacherous aggression.

Struggling masses of our people; The Ninth Extraordinary National Conference of the Ba'th Party has reviewed the activities and developments which have taken place since the Zionist-imperialist aggression, at both Arab and international levels, in the report presented by the National Command of the Party. This Conference has reviewed developments since the General Assembly of the United Nations met and failed to take any measures to condemn the aggressors, being exploited by the United States of America and other imperialist powers.

The Conference has also reviewed the real support which we received from the socialist countries, at the forefront of which stands the Soviet Union. The Conference has also reviewed the attitudes of the friendly countries and peoples which stood by us in the face of the aggression.

The Conference has also reviewed the outcome of the contacts which were made with progressive Arab countries, with the purpose of coordinating our efforts and the use of our joint resources, and of unifying these efforts and resources to confront the aggression.

The Conference has also reviewed the results of the conferences held within the Arab world at ministerial level, between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economy and Oil, and the unceasing efforts exerted by the revolutionary government of the Syrian Arab Republic to unify the resources and the potential of the Arab world and to make use of all weapons available to remove the traces of the aggression.

It has become clear to the delegates attending the Conference that these numerous and lengthy meetings have not succeeded in producing a

unified programme to ensure the use of Arab resources in waging the common war for our destiny. Such a programme should include the boycotting of the imperialist states which took part in the aggression and contributed to it economically and politically, and the liquidation of the bases and interests of such countries in the Arab world; it should advocate the use of effective Arab economic weapons in the impartial service both of the battle and of development. But such a programme has not been produced by these meetings. It has become clear, since the failure of all these efforts, that the proposed Summit Conference could only be a continuation of these meetings and could not possibly bring about the required new confrontation with the invasion, and that the old methods have not changed, despite the graveness of the setback and the danger it constitutes to Arab existence. Nevertheless, the Summit Conference was held despite the lack of common ground. The outcome of the Conference confirmed to the Arab people its inability to achieve the objectives which the masses throughout the Arab world demanded and considered to be the effective way of confronting the aggression. This way, of course, lies in armed struggle, steadfastness, and the mobilisation of the entire military and economic resources of the Arab world, including oil, capital and everything else, in the service of the total war for the liberation of the occupied territories and the liquidation of the imperialist presence in the Arab world.

Having reviewed the developments which have taken place, the Conference, in the light of the new conditions arising out of the aggression, has endorsed a plan of action for the future, and has outlined the principal tasks which must be undertaken if we are to stand up to the aggression and to repulse the Zionist-imperialist invasion.

The Conference has also emphasised that such a plan of action must be based upon the clear, fundamental strategy laid down in the decisions of the Party Conferences, particularly the decisions of the Ninth National Conference. Insistence on the revolutionary line is the proper way of sparking off the will of the masses throughout the great Arab nation to do battle, for it is the struggle of the masses which constitutes the firm basis and the sure means of guaranteeing

the triumph of the Arab people over the aggression and over the conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism, and of guaranteeing that exploitation, underdevelopment and factionalism shall be overcome. For the decisive movements in a people's history must not be met with compromise solutions, bargaining, acceptance of the *fait accompli*, or docile compliance, subjection, and capitulation to the orders of covetous imperialist countries.

The question before the Arab masses is whether to go on with the revolution or not. It is precisely this issue which will decide the fate of the Arab nation in the future. Moreover, it is this issue which forms the foundation for, and the broad context within which a comprehensive and workable strategy can be drawn up with which to face the future.

History has no mercy on weak-willed peoples who forsake the struggle and submit and surrender to the invasions of imperialism. The logic of history and the law of life decree that a people that is determined to realise its objectives and to achieve the goals to which it aspires must pursue the path of struggle to the very end.

Throughout the long cycles of history, the Arab people has manifested an unlimited capacity to withstand challenges and conspiracies and an unflagging energy for incessant struggle and untiring sacrifice. It is this that has enabled it to shatter consecutive waves of invasion and occupation.

Today, under these cruel and fateful circumstances, further sacrifice and effort is demanded of the Arab people for the sake of its survival and for the preservation of its liberty and integrity. The way to bring about a change in the world situation and to gain positive support for the just cause of our people is for the Arab masses to persevere in their adherence to the path of struggle and sacrifice. In fact, this perseverance, which has to be transformed into an indefatigable revolutionary struggle, is the only way to gain further ground in the march towards total liberation.

Throughout the world, peoples who come under attack from imperialism are rallying with courage and honour to the defence of their survival, their liberty and their right of self-determination. It is the right, or rather the prime

responsibility, of the Arab people, which is now under attack and faced with a war of annihilation, to do battle on all fronts and to resort to both political and armed struggle, for these are the weapons to be used by a people in liberating its homeland from occupation, and these are the true expression of the most widespread reaction of nationalism to the phenomena of invasion, occupation and wars of annihilation.

No matter how talented the Zionist-imperialist propaganda machine may prove to be in its distortion of the struggle of the freedom-loving Arab people to drive the usurpers from its land, it will not long succeed in the deception it practises upon the peoples of the world. The very act of misrepresenting this just struggle for liberation is an insult to the struggle of all those peoples who have combated the different waves of occupation and all those who are still struggling on the road to freedom and progress.

The Arab people have carried the banner of national struggle side by side with all the peoples of the Third World and all freedom-loving forces in the world. They insistently refuse to allow their homeland to become a base for aggressive military pacts directed against other peoples of the world.

The Arab people is still engaged in a bitter struggle for national unification, for the establishment of a socialist society and for the development of its economic resources in the interests of national development and progress. In engaging in a just and legitimate struggle, the Arab people is, in fact, extending the hand of friendship to all freedom-loving and peace-loving peoples, is acting in cooperation with them and is engaged in fighting for a common cause which is to bring about a world free from all forms of exploitation and imperialism.

All the factors in the Arab situation, as in the general world situation, make it crystal-clear that, no matter how significant the role of the political battle in discrediting Israel and her backers, in isolating the aggressors and in gaining the sympathy of world public opinion and winning the friendship of peoples of the world, such a battle is no substitute for the armed struggle in which the Arab people must engage throughout the Arab homeland for the liberation of their occupied territories and the complete liquidation

of the imperialist presence. Our people has had bitter experience of international organisations, and of the disdain of Israel and her backers for all international law, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Israel has refused to implement any of the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialised agencies, decisions which have piled up over the years and are now gathering dust in drawers. But in spite of all this we have not lost our respect for the United Nations; on the contrary, we took full part in the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly which was held to discuss the aggression.

Despite the importance attached to this Session; despite the enormity of the crime, the like of which has not been committed against any people since the Nazi wars; despite, moreover, the unsparing efforts of the socialist states and the progressive and friendly nations, the United States, through its control over this international organisation, and after leaving no form of economic or political pressure untried, succeeded in preventing the United Nations from taking the stand dictated by this imperialist outrage.

Nevertheless, the political battle fought in the United Nations did achieve certain results in that it unmasked the designs of imperialism. Moreover, it was a good beginning for the attempt to win world public opinion to the side of our just struggle, which at least assures us of support for our armed battle, the United Nations having failed to punish the aggressors or to eliminate the consequences of the aggression.

We need not remind the Arab people that the acceptance of any compromise or of any settlement that involves any form of concession, or that allows the aggressors to harvest the fruits of their criminal aggression, would entail a capitulation to the designs of American imperialism, whose purpose it is to enforce surrender by means of war. Such an attitude is not only an insult to the Arab people who were the victims of the aggression; it also sets a dangerous precedent in international affairs and establishes a new principle in the struggle of mankind—the principle of resorting to military force to subjugate peoples and to force settlements on them.

To all steadfast warriors throughout the lands of the Arab nation, we bear this message:

The Ninth Extraordinary National Conference of the Ba'th Party, having sought inspiration from the will of the Arab masses and from the exigencies of the revolution, has formulated the strategy of the future, which will be based on endurance, the continuation of the battle, adherence to the fundamental line and the adoption of means suited to the realisation of our aims.

The principle of our confrontation with the enemy will be armed struggle, which is the means to eliminate all consequences of the aggression and to gain further ground along the path of liberation. The Conference has decided that the use of other methods, whether economic or political, and of information media, should be subsidiary to the one principal method, which is armed struggle.

On the basis of the foregoing, and of the long and incessant battle that is being waged, the Conference has laid down the general principles to be followed in fighting this battle, taking as its point of departure, first and foremost, the principle of self-reliance. In so doing, the Conference is sustained by its trust in the potentialities of the Arab masses, in their limitless resources, their unwavering faith and their firm determination to play an effective and decisive role in the battle for our destiny.

We should make the following our points of departure in the internal, Arab and international fields respectively:

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In the sphere of Arab affairs:

The Ninth Extraordinary National Conference of the Ba'th Party . . . resolves the following:

1. The Arab nation is divided and underdeveloped, its potential and its energies are being dissipated and wasted. The factor responsible for this is the division of the Arab world. We are faced with the threats of imperialism and of Zionism, to which we must respond. Therefore, Arab unity, within the limits open to it, is an urgent strategic necessity and a defensive necessity as well, besides being a national goal. This is the proper domain for progressive Arab regimes; this is where they must take the lead with unified action.

The creation of a unified Arab nation that binds the progressive Arab states together would

mean the establishment of a human and economic base of operations equipped to face the challenges of imperialism and Zionism and equipped to feed the march of the Arab revolution and to direct it toward the attainment of its final goals.

The Ninth Extraordinary National Conference, having reviewed the activities of the National Command of the Party in furthering unified progressive action and in providing the initiative for it, requests the new National Command, in full awareness of the historic calling of the Party in this field, to continue in its efforts at unification and to persevere in the endeavour to realise the aspirations of the Arab masses by creating a united socialist base to support the endurance of the Arab people in their war of liberation.

2. The need to confront the aggression to which we are being subjected in a responsible manner, the need to counter the perennial conspiracy of imperialism and Zionism against the Arab nation, as well as the necessity for an effective unified strategy, dictate that immediate steps be taken to ensure that the military and economic resources of Syria, the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Iraq be united and enlisted in the service of the common battle.

3. In view of the incessant attacks of colonialism on progressive Arab regimes, on the forces for progress in the Arab world and against the advance of the Arab people, it is the duty of all progressive forces, movements and organisations of the Arab nation to take up the banner of unity for the forces of progress and to turn the incessant war that is being waged into an occasion for effective and decisive action towards that end. Moreover, in view of the importance of this objective, the Ninth Extraordinary National Conference requests that the new National Command of the Party should call for a popular convention of all popular and professional organisations, parties and movements in the Arab world to unify their efforts and mobilise all their resources and join the ranks of popular resistance throughout the great Arab nation and transform it into armed resistance, and bring about total confrontation with any support that colonialism may have in the Arab world, whether political, economic or social.

4. On the basis of a scientific analysis of the on-going battle between the toiling masses and

the forces of progress on the one hand, and the alliance of imperialism, Zionism and the forces of reaction on the other, the Ninth Extraordinary National Conference of the Ba'th Party is of the opinion that Summit Conferences are inadequate to deal with the issue of the destiny of the Arab world, if we wish to keep the outlines and objectives of the struggle clearly defined and if we are to save the Arab masses from a vortex of disarray and dispersal. Experience has shown that this method cannot satisfy the least of the expectations of the Arab people in their desire for liberty and for progress. This Conference therefore endorses the decision of the Ninth Ordinary National Conference not to attend the Summit Conferences.

5. The cause of Palestine is the cause of the entire Arab nation. It and the issue of the future of the Arab revolution are one. Neither any Arab state nor any other body has the right to take a stand on this issue of destiny if such a stand involves any form of compromise or capitulation that might constitute a first step towards the liquidation of the Palestine problem. The Arab people, which lacks neither endurance nor determination, is quite fit to continue the war and to thwart all attempts at compromise or at liquidating their cause. For this reason, this Conference condemns any initiative liable to lead to compromise or capitulation at the expense of the existence of the Arab nation or of its future generations.

This Conference proudly acknowledges its admiration for the steadfast stand of the Palestinian Arab people in the West Bank and in Gaza. In so doing, the Conference is only reaffirming its unshakeable faith in the determination of this people to remain in the vanguard of the armed confrontation with the Zionist-imperialist aggression.

8. A serious and all-embracing confrontation with the Zionist-imperialist aggression against the Arab nation demands that we mobilise all means at our disposal and press them into the service of the battle. Furthermore, the Conference reaffirms the necessity of responding to the demand of the Arab masses for a total political, economic and cultural boycott of the imperialist powers that took part in the aggression.

9. The aggression has proved the significance of Arab oil as a potential weapon, for it is the main fuel for the industrial and war machines of the imperialist powers. In spite of this, oil has not been pressed into service in the war.

The Conference calls on the Arab masses and all their progressive forces to strive unceasingly for an embargo on oil shipments to all countries that took part in the aggression and for its use as a weapon in the continuing battle.

10. The latest Zionist-imperialist war has revealed the extent of the danger constituted by the presence of imperialist bases and of direct imperialist influence in certain regions of the Arab homeland, for these are permanent bases for aggression against the Arab people and for hatching conspiracies against them.

In the opinion of this Conference, it is the fundamental and urgent responsibility of the Arab masses and of all revolutionary Arab forces to steadfastly engage the enemy in armed combat and to use all other means available to liberate the occupied territories and to eliminate all foreign military bases from all parts of the Arab homeland.

11. The Conference recommends that due attention be given to Arab communities and Arab students in foreign countries. All possible means should be used and organisations established to bind them to the Arab nation in a vital and effective manner. They should be kept in constant touch and made fully aware of all issues that bear on the destiny of the Arab people. Their effective cooperation in the struggle that their nation is undergoing must be ensured.

In the sphere of international affairs:

1. The circumstances attending the recent aggression against the Arab people have disclosed the villainy of the attacks of colonialist imperialism on the struggling peoples of the world. On the other hand, the socialist countries have made great efforts in support of the just cause of the Arab nation in its confrontation with the aggression and in its attempt to eliminate its consequences. This, in addition to various other forms of support provided by these countries serves to confirm the validity of the point of departure of the Ba'th Party, which postulates the necessity of creating a unified stand for the forces of progress and socialism in the world in the face of

the designs of imperialism.

In view of the above, this Conference recommends that we develop our existing ties with the socialist countries and that we cooperate with them more fully in all fields in the service of our mutual interests.

2. Throughout the current crisis and various international circumstances, and in view of the significant role that the non-aligned nations can play in the battle against colonialism and in contributing to the endeavour to thwart the designs of imperialism against the world liberation movement, the validity of the stand taken by the Party is confirmed, namely, acting hand in hand with the non-aligned nations and joining in the efforts to increase their effectiveness, fortify their endurance and coordinate their efforts, so as to unmask the deals, inducements and subterfuges of imperialism and to resist the economic and political invasion to which developing nations are subjected at its hands.

3. This Conference stresses the importance of strengthening the ties binding us to all nations that supported the just cause of the Arabs in their battle against imperialism and Zionism. We need to increase cooperation and mutual understanding. Moreover, this Conference stresses the need for us to act in unison with all popular movements and all forces of progress in the third world and in all other parts of the world. We must make them aware of the justice of our cause and we must work towards the creation of a unified stand for all such forces and movements. We must support them in their battle against colonialism, imperialism and Zionism, in which we all share.

4. The United States of America, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany are all to be considered directly responsible for Israel's being supplied with arms, for instigating her to commit aggression and for lending her political and economic support. This Conference stresses the necessity of maintaining the suspension of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with these imperialist nations. This Conference stresses the need to mobilise both Arab and world public opinion in the endeavour to thwart the aggressive imperialist designs of these nations. Furthermore, we must make no allowance for defeatist attempts that advocate retreat and the resort to dialogue and persuasion between us and the imperialist

powers.

As for the nations that stood by Israel, we must shape our future relations with them according to the extent of their support of Israel and their compliance with imperialist policies.

5. Imperialist military bases of all kinds are considered to be a means for the continuation of the domination of imperialism over the destiny of peoples, and a constant threat to the independence of peoples and their struggle for liberation. This Conference stresses the necessity of engaging in a total battle in which all forces of liberation and progress throughout the world join ranks to liquidate these bases.

421

Statement by Greek Catholic Archbishop Assaf on Behalf of the Leaders of Christian Communities at the Islamic-Christian Conference.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, September 18, 1967

We the representatives of the Christian sects in Jordan welcome you and hope that, God willing and with the support of your countries and governments, we shall be able to welcome you not only in Amman but also in Jerusalem and the holy places which belong both to you and to us.

We assembled here are the heads of the Orthodox, Catholic Latin, Armenian and Syrian Communities, and in our hearts and feelings we represent all the sects both here in Amman and in the West Bank. Also with us is the head of the Protestant Community, who is our brother and yours, for we regard ourselves as the brothers of all of you and citizens of all your countries.

Also present are a number of Deputies, Senators, and members of the government, not to mention leading members of our communities, and we

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 20/9/1967. This conference was held on the occasion of the convening of the extraordinary session of the Conference of the Islamic World in Amman from 17 to 21 September.

all of us, too, represent our children, our men, our youths and our women. Here in this country we do not regard ourselves only as Christians, but also as citizens and Arabs. We have lived for countless generations with our Muslim brothers of all races and from all the Islamic countries in the world and we welcome you and all the countries you represent. In the name of Jordan I welcome you, in the name of Jordan I salute your countries, one and all. We are linked together in both weal and woe and, God willing, we shall be linked together in good days and in joy and happiness when we return to our Christian and Muslim homelands, which are all God's abodes. For, whether in churches or in mosques, we all raise our hands in worship of the One Most High. We are your brothers and we offer you the hand of brotherly love in God's sight. Long live both the Islamic and the Christian peoples.

422

Reply of Saudi King Faysal to a Speech of Welcome by Somali President Shermarke.¹
[Excerpt]

Mogadishu, September 21, 1967

As regards the tribulations brought upon us by Israel, Your Excellency, it is not only today that the Arabs are complaining of aggression—they have been complaining of such aggression for nearly twenty years. They regard Israel's usurpation of part of our Arab territories and the eviction of its population as a flagrant aggression which was assisted by a particular state of mind prevailing in the past, some twenty years ago, and supported by the great powers and the efforts of world Zionism. When we complain today of what happened at the beginning of last June, we are complaining of the expansion of the aggression, rather than of the ways and means through which it was carried out, because the aggression has been going on for twenty years.

In this connection I should like to call attention to the fact that, if the United Nations relinquished its responsibility for repelling the aggressor and for ensuring that he gains nothing from his aggression, if the conscience of the world is blind to its duties, and if justice is not done and the aggressor is not repulsed, the Muslims—not only Arabs, but all Muslims—will reconsider their attitude and resolve their problems in their own way. We have waited patiently for nearly twenty years in the hope that the comity of nations and the conscience of the world might become aware of the errors they have committed, but, most regrettably, we find ourselves today the victims of a greater calamity, a more grievous aggression, as a result of Israel's disdain for all principles and all humane considerations. In spite of this there are, today, those who help and support Israel and find completely unwarranted justifications for her actions. Is it reasonable, when the Arab countries have been attacked in this flagrant manner, to say that the Arabs are to blame because of the way in which they provoked Israel? Was it not Israel that attacked the Arabs, and said that she would attack them in their own country, so that the Arabs were obliged to make preparations to defend themselves? Then came the Israeli aggression which, most regrettably, the comity of nations has refused to recognise, although Israel herself has admitted that it was she that started the aggression. After this admission, can there be any doubt that Israel was the aggressor? Why do the comity of nations and the conscience of the world not face up to their responsibilities? What hope is there henceforward of solving the problems that beset us if people are going to distort them and refuse to face them and try to make others follow the same course? What redress will countries have if, God forbid, they are attacked? The only course now open to us is to stand shoulder to shoulder and turn ourselves into a deterrent force to repel aggression and ensure us a secure and stable life which will enable us to concentrate on building up our countries and our peoples so that we may attain the level of other countries and nations of the world.

We pray that Almighty God may lead us to our goals. We Muslims not only have a right to strive for solidarity, brotherhood and cooperation so that we may set our affairs, both religious and

¹ *Al-Bilad*, 22/9/1967. During King Faysal's state visit to Somalia from 20 to 22 September. For the joint Communiqué see *ante*, doc. 175.

temporal, to rights; to do so is a duty imposed upon us by our religion, our interests, our security and our firm stand in the face of external trends, deviations and aggressions.

423

Cable Message from the Islamic-Christian Conference to Some World Leaders.¹

Amman, September 21, 1967

The Islamic World Conference on Palestine, which met in emergency session in Amman, has convened a joint Islamic-Christian Conference together with the leaders of all the Christian denominations in Jordan.

The Joint Conference voices the condemnation by both Islam and Christianity of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and of other Arab territories, and for Israel's attempt to annex Jerusalem. The Joint Conference also voices a strong protest against Israel's aggressions against the holy places and her violation of the sanctity of these sites. The Conference deplores the violation of the *status quo* by Israel, the destruction of churches, mosques and Islamic Waqf property in Jerusalem, the grave Israeli threat to the safety of Al-Aqsa Mosque and of all other holy places, and Israel's maltreatment of both Muslim and Christian divines.

The Conference hereby declares that it is unthinkable that Jerusalem should be given up and that neither its annexation to Israel nor its internationalisation are acceptable. It calls upon the United Nations to take measures during its present session to compel Israel to observe the United Nations resolution on Jerusalem adopted during its last emergency session. It calls upon the heads of all Christian churches in the world, the leaders of the Islamic world and of Islamic

Nations and all peace- and justice-loving countries in the world to intervene directly to put and end to the Israeli aggression against the West Bank and Jerusalem and to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Furthermore, the Conference deems it unjust that the holy places of both Muslims and Christians, who form half of the total population of the globe, should fall into the hands of the Jews, whose total numbers do not exceed fourteen million and who, moreover, cannot be trusted with them. It remains true that Judaism neither recognises nor has any respect for the prophets of Islam or Christianity.

The Joint Islamic-Christian Conference demands that the West Bank, including Jerusalem, be restored to its previous political and constitutional status as an inseparable part of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, which was the status it enjoyed before the 5 June aggression.

The Conference expresses its profound conviction of the necessity for the conscience of the world to be stirred into action, as rapidly as possible, to find a way to alleviate the wretched situation of the Palestinian refugees, particularly the new ones, who face the threat of certain death with the approach of the winter season. The Conference demands that the refugees be allowed to go back to their homes with all possible speed, which is no more than their natural right and which would be no more than the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

The Conference believes that the only way in which peace can once again be restored in the land of peace, and the only way to safeguard the peace of the world, is for the above just demands to be met.

Signed:

His Eminence the Mufti Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, President of the Islamic World Conference, on behalf of that Conference, Archbishop Theodoros of the Greek Orthodox Community, Archbishop Mikhail Assaf of the Greek Catholic Community, Archbishop Ni'mah Sim'an of the Latin Community and the Reverend Shafiq Farah, Head of the Evangelical Church.

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 22/9/1967. Sent to the President of the General Assembly and Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Heads of Islamic States, Pope Paul VI, Patriarch Athenagoras and the Archbishop of Canterbury.

424

**Views of the Lebanese Communists on
"Ways and Means of Carrying On the Struggle
Against the Israeli-Imperialist Conspiracy."¹ [Excerpt]**

The fact that world imperialism has resorted to direct military intervention is the result of its failure to achieve its strategic objective, in the period that has just passed, through political and economic pressure, sabotage and the organising of coups d'état. In spite of all impediments the liberation movement in the Arab world has grown and developed and this has been especially apparent in the great achievements of the progressive Arab countries in the economic, social and political fields, in the expansion and growth of the popular movement that is opposed to imperialism and local reaction, in the increasing influence of progressive forces, organisations and parties, and in the increased and closer cooperation between them.

In the light of all this it is clear that we are faced with an all-embracing battle which has been going on for a long time and will continue into the future. Our principal enemies in this battle are: American imperialism and its allies, the British and West German imperialists. Israel has been employed in the past, and will continue to be employed in the future—inasmuch as she is a colonialist base which has organic links with imperialism—as the instrument for the implementation of the conspiracies of her masters in Washington, London and Bonn against the Arab peoples and their aspirations to build a free and progressive life. Only if we set the matter in this framework can we define the strategy that must be adopted and the course of action that must be followed by the nationalist, revolutionary and progressive movement in the Arab world. The aims of this movement are:

- to maintain the progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria and ensure that they continue to follow the course chosen by their peoples: the course of social progress and socialism;

- to destroy the bases of imperialist domi-

nation—political, economic and military—in the Arab world, and to liquidate the imperialist monopolies in the Arab countries.

In the light of this it is clear that there is a fundamental weakness in the position of those who advocate "persuading" the United States to relinquish its total alignment with Israel. Such a trend, with its implicit justification of American imperialism, is an attempt to mislead the Arab peoples and conceal from them the identity of their principal enemy, and to restrict the problem to the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. What is really required is the decisive confrontation of American imperialism by nationalist and progressive forces, on all fronts.

In the economic field, for example, it is more than ever essential to take measures to achieve economic independence and liberate Arab resources from domination by imperialist monopolies, and to make every effort to expand economic relations with the socialist countries and the countries of Asia and Africa. Everyone knows that the weight of the imperialist attack on the economic front has been directed against the independent line which the liberated Arab countries have been following. In this operation, of course, these countries have been the objective in themselves, but over and above this there is the fact that these countries have achieved conspicuous successes in the field of economic growth and development on a non-capitalist basis dependent on the development of the state sector. This is a situation the imperialists cannot tolerate, for fear that it should provide an example to be followed by other countries. It is thus essential for the interests of the Arab peoples to strengthen and consolidate this trend rather than to abandon it on the pretext of "protecting the national entity" before achieving social changes.

In view of world conditions and the situation in the Arab countries, the fact that must be emphasised is that the question of protecting the national entity is organically linked with advance along the course of social change. Just how dangerous is the call to abandon the course of social change becomes obvious when we consider the efforts of the imperialists and their agents to represent the military setback as the total collapse of everything that has been achieved by the progressive regimes, and to suggest that no serious

¹ *Al-Akhbar*, Beirut, 24/9/1967.

advance has been made in this field. This, in fact, is an attempt by the imperialists to hold the progressive regimes responsible for what has happened and to isolate them from the masses. But the awareness of the masses became apparent, in spite of the bitterness of the setback, on 9 and 10 June, when they announced their determined adherence to the progressive regime in Egypt and their readiness to support any sacrifice to that end, which is the only way to freedom, progress and a better life. Any other course can only lead them back anew to a life of slavery and deprivation.

Again, the method of defining the scope of the conflict and its comprehensive character, and of pinpointing the principal enemy, shows that to advocate a rapid military solution as the only way of confronting the situation is a foolhardy course fraught with perils, which may well lead to another setback. It also clearly shows that the recent Israeli aggressions in the Canal Zone were an attempt to draw the Arab countries into a new encounter, in the hope of acquiring new gains for Israel. The most urgent task in the military field is to take action as early as possible to reconstitute the military strength of the Arab countries, to purge the armed forces of lax elements and representatives of the reactionary classes, and to strengthen military cooperation between the Arab countries, so as to confront and stem any new aggression and repulse the aggressors by force.

This is the realistic course. To advocate immediate war under these conditions is to provide fuel for the Israeli propaganda machine in its efforts to influence world opinion and represent Israel as a victim obliged to defend herself against aggression.

Failure to take this into account can only create an atmosphere in which Israel will be able to conceal the truth about the situation in the Middle East. Such a trend in Arab propaganda will also embarrass our friends, the representatives of the progressive forces, and limit their capacity to expound the justice of our national causes.

425

Resolutions Adopted at an Extraordinary Session of the Council of Arab Information Ministers, 27-30 September.¹ [Excerpts]

Bizerte, September 30, 1967

First: Principles and Objectives

At Home:

1. To adhere to, and implement, the Arab Solidarity Pact in accordance with the resolutions of the Khartum Conference of Arab Kings and Presidents.

2. To concentrate on unity of aims and destiny, on strengthening belief in Arab unity and on making the Arab masses aware of the Arab entity; to explain the stages through which the Arab cause has passed since the beginning of the struggle for liberation; to emphasise the deadly peril constituted by the forces of Zionism and imperialism, and the importance of achieving Arab unanimity on effective, unified action on behalf of the liberation of Palestine and the other occupied parts of the Arab homeland, and of forming a united Arab front against any aggression directed against any Arab country.

4. To spread awareness of the true significance of the concepts of Arab nationalism, deriving from the heritage of Arab civilisation, which has tended towards the scientific building of the future of the Arab nation and the way this heritage has developed towards growth, progress and prosperity; to emphasise the fact that Zionism is using all ways and means to build up its strength, consolidate its position and lay down its programmes of aggression and expansion.

5. To strengthen the Arab citizen's belief in things sacred and spiritual values.

6. To make the Arab masses aware of the scope of the battle and mobilise them against imperialist-Zionist aggression; to strengthen the Arab citizen's belief in the justice of his cause and in his eventual victory and convince him that the battle he has joined can only be won by the avoidance of all factors that led to the setback, by following a really effective course and by

¹ Arab League, Cairo (mimeographed).

employing the most advantageous methods of resisting Zionism in the international field; to strengthen the Arab citizen's confidence in the resources of the Arab nation on a realistic basis so as to provide him with an incentive to perform his national duty in all spheres.

7. To promote further two-way contacts with human civilisation and to strengthen the spirit of human brotherhood as a foundation for peace established on justice, in conformity with essential Arab values, and guided by the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights.

8. To oppose all trends and principles inconsistent with the aspirations and convictions of the Arab people and their national heritage.

9. To mobilise the forces of the Arab people to resist fascist and racist trends throughout the world, and to emphasise the true nature of Israel as an aggressive fascist base.

10. To concentrate on the Khartoum Conference's resolutions as regards no peace or negotiations with or recognition of Israel, and to insist on the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland.

11. To mobilise the Arab masses to carry on the struggle at all levels and in all fields until Arab rights are recovered.

12. To support the struggle of the people of Occupied South Arabia and encourage the nationalist forces there to consolidate their unity so as to enable the people of South Arabia to achieve their aspirations and objectives in full freedom unaffected by external influences.

Abroad:

13. To affirm the fact that the Arab nation, which believes in the right of peoples to a life secure from fear and confident in both present and future, offers to cooperate freely with all peoples of the world, regardless of differences of religion, creed, race or way of life, to ensure freedom, progress and peace.

14. To spread awareness of the fact that the Arab renaissance is rooted in the Arab national civilisation of the past, and that it advocates human brotherhood on a basis of justice between human beings, condemns fanaticism, opposes racial discrimination in whatever form, whether imperialist or sectarian, and endeavours to increase

cooperation with peace-loving peoples.

15. To explain the justice of Arab causes, particularly the cause of the liberation of Palestine and the other occupied parts of the Arab world; to expose the imperialist character of the Zionist occupation and reveal the true nature of the Arab struggle against it as a movement for liberation, justice, peace and the recovery of territories usurped by aggressive war, and of the rights of the people of Palestine which have been invalidated in spite of international resolutions, and the elimination of all consequences of the original and subsequent aggressions, so as to preserve peace, avoid the repetition of similar tragedies and defend human rights; to insist on the Arab character of Jerusalem and to prevent Israel from proceeding with the illegal measures she has initiated and from continuing to violate the sanctity of the holy places in defiance of United Nations resolutions.

16. To publicise the fact that the Arab homeland was the cradle of civilisation and the revealed religions, as well as the role played by the Arabs in guiding mankind, spreading the message of human brotherhood, freedom, love and tolerance, and the part they have played in the promotion of civilisation and the protection of religious sanctities.

17. To expose Israel's plan to extirpate the Arab people from their homeland and destroy their national personality.

18. To expose the destructive terrorist activity of Zionism throughout the world, which activity includes acts of assassination, kidnapping and torture, and the massacres and atrocities which Israel has committed and is still committing both in Palestine and elsewhere.

19. To disclose the racist and religious fanaticism on which Israel is based, her persecution of the Arabs and discrimination even against the Oriental Jews, her branding as atheists all Jews who do not believe in immigrating to Israel, and her perversion of scriptural texts.

20. The facts of the aggression have established that:

(a) Israel is a racist, aggressive and expansionist entity.

(b) That Israel is fascist in character, as is proved by her employment of Nazi methods,

her glorification of aggressive force and her intention to annihilate the people of Arab Palestine.

(c) That she will never abandon her aggressive and expansionist aims, as is proved by her continued calls for immigration since the aggression.

21. It is not permissible that aggression should achieve territorial gains:

(a) It is therefore essential that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories she has occupied.

(b) Jerusalem is an Arab city.

22. Refusal to make peace with Israel, recognise her or negotiate with her means insistence on the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland and refusal to recognise the aggression.

(a) The conscience of the world cannot approve of settlement colonialism which consists in expelling a people from its homeland and replacing it by another.

(b) It is not permissible to resolve the Jewish problem at the expense of the Arabs. The Jews have always lived amongst Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, without discrimination.

(c) Being Semites, the Arabs are not anti-Semitic, but they do reject and oppose racial fanaticism in Israel, in South Africa, in the Portuguese colonies or anywhere else in the world. Just as in the past they condemned Nazism, so today they condemn Zionism as a racist and aggressive movement.

23. The Arabs do not reject political action to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive forces of Israel, believing that delay to take such action can only consolidate the aggression and lead to an explosion of the crisis which will endanger world peace. But the Arabs cannot be blamed if they are driven to recover their rights by force.

24. To make known the problem of the Palestinian refugees whose numbers increase with each successive wave of Israeli aggression, and to disclose the persecution they are being submitted to as a result of the usurpation of their homeland, and how essential it is for them to return to their homes in implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

25. To condemn aggressive wars.

26. To express appreciation for the attitudes of the countries and peoples who have supported the Arab cause, especially the Islamic countries which stood beside the Arabs in the recent crisis, and to make efforts to obtain further support.

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426

Political Statement Issued by the Palestinian Liberation Movement "Fateh."¹

Masses of our steadfast Arab nation;

In the cruel circumstances through which the Arab nation is now passing, we feel profoundly that the setback has laid increased historical responsibilities on the shoulders of the Palestinian people, all nationalist groups, and the revolutionary vanguards of the Palestinian people.

Providing, as it did, evidence of failure, slackness and conspiracy, the setback was a new proof of the error of keeping the Palestinian people in particular, and the Arab people in general, remote from the field of battle and of preventing them from playing their proper heroic role in confronting the enemy usurpers, despite what is being said about the simplicity of the popular arm and popular methods of struggle; the only way for a revolutionary to learn about war is to wage war and experience its hardships.

Anglo-American and German imperialism will never abandon the occupying Zionist state, but will continue to supply it with arms and money so as to keep it in existence as an aggressive entity. Is it, then, reasonable that we should depend in the struggle on regular armies alone, without the masses playing their essential role in the battle? If we do this we are allowing the enemy to impose on us his own methods and weapons, and he is clearly more capable than we are of obtaining these lethal weapons and employing the most ugly methods of aggression.

Continued Zionist-imperialist aggression in the Arab East is a moral crime against humanity in this part of the world, and this crime can only be expunged and annulled, and its perpetrators

¹ *Al-Hurriyah*, Beirut, 2/10/1967.

can only be destroyed, by the Arab masses engaging in popular armed struggle on all fronts over a long period.

When the forces of "Al-Asifah" started to sound the alarm in the Arab East, the official Arab attitude was to arrest our men and cast them into prison. Regrettably, too, such methods of repression have continued to be employed even after the West Bank was surrendered without a fight, just as Lydda, Ramleh and the Arab Triangle were surrendered in the past.

The counter-revolutionary forces in the East Bank are still opposing, hunting down and arresting the commandos. We, who are engaged in this vast struggle with the Zionist enemy, should like to ask in whose interest are these actions and the statements made by senior officials in the East Bank, attacking commando activity in the West Bank, and describing it as treason? Arab masses;

Acceptance of the *fait accompli*, misrepresentation and fraud are no longer acceptable to us now that we have become aware of the conspiracy in which certain subservient forces are now engaged to liquidate the Palestine problem through purely political action and further territorial concessions. The statement of the Algerian leader Hawari Bumadyan during the last Summit Conference is a proof that what we are saying is true.

In the light of these contradictory Arab attitudes and of the present situation, with its elements of both strength and weakness, courage, enterprise and feebleness, the Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" and its military wing "Al-Asifah" hereby declare their intention of continuing and escalating their holy revolutionary war against Zionist occupation with obstinate determination and the utmost vigour. The land is ours, the people are ours, the cause is ours, so we ourselves are best suited to defend our cause desperately. We call on all nationalist forces to rally round the movement of armed popular resistance which our people has initiated in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Galilee and the Negeb, and may the slogan of all of us be "martyrdom on behalf of victory."

Long live free Arab Palestine and the Arab struggle for its liberation.

High Command of "Al-Asifah" Forces.

National Charter of the Arabs of the West Bank for the Current Phase.*

October 4, 1967

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

National Charter of the Arabs of the West Bank for the Current Phase

The aims of imperialism coinciding with the aims and plans of the world Zionist movement, they established an alien entity in the Arab homeland built on untruth, injustice and aggression, as a result of a continuous series of acts of conspiracy, terrorism and oppression. These acts were planned, prepared and carried out by world Zionism and imperialism so that the Jews might have a state which would both realise their dreams of usurping extensive areas of Arab territory and act as an imperialist base to separate the different regions of the Arab homeland and delay the progress and upsurge of the Arab nation, so that its resources might remain the prey of imperialism and foreign domination, and also pave the way for the penetration of the markets of the Afro-Asian world. This base would enable them to swoop down on the Arab countries, threaten their security and assail their resources.

The latest aggression which began with the war of 5 June 1967 was the climax of the conspiracy between imperialism and Zionism. The forces of aggression took action to realise their double ambition of destroying the Arab revolution and extinguishing the flames of nationalism, and of expanding by usurping new areas of Arab territory and imposing a final settlement of the Palestine problem.

The Arab people of the West Bank are aware that, having failed to achieve its primary object, which was to destroy the Arab revolution, stem the nationalist tide and overthrow the regimes in a number of Arab countries, the conspiracy of aggression will try to impose a permanent peace in Israel's favour, based on the recognition of Israel and the guaranteeing of new frontiers for

¹ Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut (Archives). This Charter was drafted at a meeting of a number of prominent personalities and representatives of Palestinian organisations held in the West Bank.

her, now that she has acquired further spoils over and above what she seized during her first aggression at the time of her establishment. Now that the chances of achieving such a peace by drawing the Arabs into negotiations or peace with Israel are slight, or even non-existent, Israel and her partners in the conspiracy will try to achieve their aim by employing all kinds of pressure, intimidation and coercion against the Arabs of Palestine, so as to weaken their morale and undermine their resolution by sowing doubts as to the ability of their nation to eliminate the results of the aggression, in an attempt to destroy their determination to insist on their full rights in their homeland.

The Arab people of the West Bank fell a prey to the calamity of 1948 and they are now sinking under the weight of the setback of 1967. Dispersed by disaster and overwhelmed by calamity, they are well aware that these afflictions have been visited on them only because they constitute an outpost of Arabism and a front line in its defence in the Arab nation's battle of destiny against imperialism and Zionism.

The Arab people of the West Bank believe in the unity of the Arab nation, the unity of its history, its aims, its struggle and its destiny. They believe in their nation's ability to pursue the course of liberation. They are confidently determined to recover their rights and liberate Palestine and all other parts of the Arab homeland and to resist imperialism and Zionism. They are convinced that their nation will overcome all obstacles, surmount all difficulties and establish a free homeland.

In the light of this belief, and of our appreciation of our basic responsibilities and our essential role in all efforts to eliminate the results of the aggression, we have undertaken to draft this Charter and to abide loyally by its provisions, regarding it a guideline for action in the current phase. We therefore declare:

1. That Palestine is an essential part of the Arab homeland; that the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation; and that the Palestinian cause is the cause of all Arabs, which it is the duty of the whole Arab nation to defend. This is imposed by a common national sentiment and the danger that threatens the whole Arab homeland. In view of this, neither the Palestinian people

nor any Arab state is entitled to deal with the problem unilaterally.

2. Collective Arab action, which at the present stage aims at the elimination of the consequences of the latest aggression, will never permit the policy of force to achieve any gains at the expense of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland.

3. We affirm our determination to stand fast in the face of all Zionist attempts to sap our self-confidence and impair our stubborn resistance, and we renew our undertaking to remain loyal to our homeland and our nationality, whatever the cost in sacrifice.

4. Jerusalem is an Arab city which is regarded as holy by Muslim and Christian Arabs. We absolutely reject all measures taken by the Jews with the object of judaising it, and we similarly reject attempts to internationalise it. Jerusalem is part of the West Bank, which is united with the East Bank by the Jordanian entity. We insist on this unity being maintained, our attachment to it deriving from our belief in the over-all unity of our whole nation, which we are striving to achieve.

5. In affirming our insistence that the unity of the two Banks be restored, we wish to place on record our distress that the prevailing attitude of the machinery of government in Jordan has had a regrettable effect on the minds of the citizens.

But we know that the people of Jordan in both Banks, shaken as they are by the setback, are fully aware of the errors which played their part in bringing it about. We know that they are determined to correct these errors and are capable of rebuilding their life on a basis of sound nationalism, which will create the free citizen in a liberated homeland. This land will follow an independent foreign policy based on positive neutrality and non-alignment, under the aegis of a democratic and constitutional regime which will safeguard the freedoms and ensure to all equal opportunities in a decent life. It will establish the army on a basis of service to the flag and once more allow the people as a whole the duty and honour of defending the homeland in coordination and full integration with all the members of the Arab nation.

To achieve this the government must concentrate on obtaining the full confidence and

support of the people, and follow a policy in domestic, Arab and foreign affairs that is demanded by the upsurge of the Arab nation towards its great aspirations—unity, liberation and social progress. It must be a strong force of attraction for our people in the West Bank and must inspire them to greater resistance, endurance and concern for the unity of the two Banks.

6. We resolutely reject the pernicious proposal for the establishment of a Palestinian state intended to form a buffer between the Arabs and Israel, but to be closely linked with the alien Zionist presence. This proposal is an attempt to remove the Palestine problem from its Arab context and divest it of its national significance, and to isolate the Palestinian Arab people from the Arab nation. The establishment of such a state could only result in the final liquidation of the Palestine problem, the dissolution of the Palestinian people and the dealing of the death-blow to the Arab liberation movement.

The setback which resulted from the aggression will certainly create awareness in the Arabs and bring about a radical revolution in Arab thinking. The fruit of this will be a scientific and constructive welfare society. Our belief in victory is based on our confidence in God and our nation and in our knowledge of its unlimited human and material resources. Our just struggle to recover our rights enjoys the support of the forces of right, peace and freedom, and is supported by the majority of the peoples of the world and by the friendly countries, so that it is bound to attain its goal.

The Arab people, who have carried the torch of civilisation throughout the centuries, and who, throughout history, have lost so many martyrs, is still capable of fulfilling its civilising mission and is resolved to offer yet more martyrs to provide fuel for the fire of liberation whose light will disperse the darkness of aggression and usurpation and illuminate the Arab nation with the beacon of imperishable glory.

Signatures

Nablus:

1. Hamdi Kan'an, mayor
2. Hikmat al-Misri, senator and former president of the Chamber of Deputies

3. Qadri Tuqan, President of Najah College and former Foreign Minister
4. Dr. Ahmad as-Saruri, physician and former mayor
5. Abd ar-Rauf al-Faris, deputy
6. Abdullah al-Khatib, deputy
7. Ibrahim Snaubar, president of the West Bank Examinations Supervision Committee and former senator
8. Dr. Salah ad-Din Anabtawi, physician
9. Walid ash-Shak'ah, merchant and former deputy
10. Dr. Abd al-Majid Abu Hajalah, physician
11. Musa al-Jayyusi, lawyer and member of the Bar Association
12. Husayn al-Ja'uni, lawyer
13. Abdullah Hamid, lawyer and member of the Bar Association
14. Farid Ghannam, lawyer
15. Dr. Adli Dallal, physician
16. Kazim al-Misri, president of the Board of Trade
17. Shaukat Kamal, president of the Pharmacists Association
18. Andalib al-Amad, president of the Arab Women's Federation
19. Isam Abd al-Hadi, vice president of the Arab Women's Federation
20. Rushdi Shahin, farmer
21. Bassam ash-Shak'ah, merchant
22. Adnan al-Bakri, lawyer
23. Walid Stetieh, member of the Municipality and chamber of commerce
24. Ibrahim al-Alul, merchant
25. Harun Rashid, merchant
26. Mustafa Audah, lawyer
27. Muhammad Rashed Abu Ghazalah, pharmacist, member of the Pharmacists Association
28. Nuhad Kamal, merchant, president of the Sporting Club
29. Hasan Hilmi Abd al-Hadi, merchant, member of the Municipality
30. Wasfi al-Misri, lawyer, former judge

Jenine:

31. Najib Mustafa al-Ahmad, landowner, former deputy
32. Dr. Khalil Tuqan, physician
33. Muhammad Taufiq Mahmud al-Hajj Hasan, deputy mayor

34. Zuhair Jarrar, lawyer
35. Dr. Adnan Abu Bakr, physician
36. Dr. Hashim Abd al-Hadi, physician
37. Ahmad Rabba', merchant

Tulkarm:

38. Hafez al-Hamdallah, deputy, farmer
39. Adnan Yasin, merchant
40. Dr. Khalid ad-Durzi, physician
41. Mahmud ash-Shaikh Yasin, lawyer, member of the Municipality
42. Wasif al-Jayyusi, landowner

Ramallah:

43. Nadim az-Zaru, mayor
44. Dr. Musa Abu Ghaush, physician
45. Dr. Alfred Tubasi, physician
46. Rev. Elia Khuri, Minister of the Arab Evangelical Church
47. Isa Qassis, landowner
48. Aidah Audah, hotel proprietor
49. Rima Tarazi, secretary of a charitable association
50. Samiha Salamah Khalil, president of the Family Welfare Society
51. Ahmad Salih Abd al-Hamid, lawyer
52. Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Hajj Ahmad, physician
53. Fallah al-Mudi, lawyer
54. Kamal Nasir, former deputy
55. Fayiq Warrad, former deputy
56. Emile Tubasi, pharmacist
57. Ali as-Safarini, lawyer
58. Abd ar-Rahman Hammad, lawyer
59. Ghayyath al-Khayri, lawyer
60. Ibrahim Bakr, lawyer
61. Rizq Khuri, engineer
62. Abd ar-Razzaq Audah, engineer, member of the Municipality
63. Dr. Antun Tarazi, surgeon
64. Mitri Aziz Khuri, landowner
65. Sharif Sha'ban, lawyer
66. Samih Amir, physician
67. Wadi' Butrus Tamir, landowner
68. Adil Qassis, landowner
69. Karim Khalaf, lawyer

Al-Birah:

70. Abd al-Jawad Salih, mayor
71. Abdullah Jaudah Khalaf, senator
72. Arif al-Arif, former Minister of Works and Mayor of Jerusalem

73. Abdullah Ismail, landowner
74. Dr. Tawfiq al-Barghuthi, physician
75. Ayyub al-Abidi, landowner
76. Ahmad Ma'ruf, landowner
77. Shafiq Sufan, engineer
78. Said Sha'ban, landowner
79. Dr. Kamal al-Amad, physician
80. Izz ad-Din al-Aryan, pharmacist

Hebron:

81. Sidqi Sadiq Al-Ja'bari, deputy
82. Dr. Hafiz Abd an-Nabi, deputy, physician
83. Dr. Abd al-Hamid az-Zair, physician
84. Dr. Ahmad Abu Sarah, physician
85. Hikmat al-Hammuri, pharmacist
86. Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Yahya Shawir, physician
87. Mrs. Ayishah Afifi Hammuri, housewife
88. Ali Ibrahim al-Qawasimi, landowner
89. Shukri Abu Rajab at-Tamimi, preacher in the Hebron district
90. Jihad al-Huri, pharmacist
91. Muhammad Shakir as-Suwaiti, farmer
92. Dr. Mustafa Mahim, physician
93. Jamil Muhammad al-Mu'ti, pharmacist
94. Dr. Zakariya al-Hammuri, physician

Bethlehem:

95. Dr. Bannurah, physician
96. Jaudat Shahwan, lawyer
97. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Qarra, physician
98. Nadir as-Saqqa, engineer
99. Nasrallah Yusef Sahuri, merchant
100. Husni Haddad, engineer
101. Jawad Yunis, lawyer
102. Edouard Khamis, deputy
103. Jalal Aql, landowner
104. Hanna Khuri al-Atrash, landowner
105. Abdullah Abu Id, lawyer
106. Dr. Kamal Shahadah, physician

Jerusalem:

107. Ruhi al-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem
108. Shaykh Hilmi al-Muhtasib, acting Chief Qadi and President of the Islamic Board
109. Bishop Najib Qub'ain, Bishop of the Arab Evangelical Church
110. Bishop Hilarion Kabbush, Bishop of the Greek Catholic Church
111. Antun Atallah, Director General of Bank al-Iqari, senator and former minister

112. Shaykh Sa'd ad-Din al-Alami, Mufti of Jerusalem
113. Shaykh Said Sabri, Qadi of Jerusalem
114. Kamal ad-Din ad-Dajani, lawyer, President of the Court of Appeal and former Minister of Interior
115. Sa'id Ala ad-Din, lawyer, senator, former Minister of Economy
116. Taysir Kan'an, president of the Central Court
117. Dr. Ibrahim Talil, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, director of a hospital
118. Dr. Rashid an-Nashashibi, surgeon, member of the Municipality
119. Nuhad Abu Gharbiyah, head of the Ibrahimiya College and member of the Municipality
120. Fayiq Barakat, president of the Chamber of Commerce, and member of the Municipality
121. Muhammad Ishaq Darwish, landowner and member of the Arab Higher Committee
122. Al-Hajj Omar al-Wa'ri, landowner and former president of the Municipality
123. Antun Safiyah, assistant to the Mayor of Jerusalem
124. Georges As'ad Khalaf, chartered accountant and member of the Chamber of Commerce
125. Dr. Nabih Mu'amar, surgeon and director of a hospital
126. Yusuf Hanna, journalist
127. Yusuf Khuri, engineer
128. Hasan Tahbub, Director General of the Awqaf
129. Michel Sandahah, delegate in Jerusalem of the Arab Trade Unions.

428

Statement by the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri on Solutions to the Palestine Problem.¹

Beirut, October 13, 1967

1. In addition to territories belonging to Arab countries, the Israeli aggression covered the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Al-Ham-

mah area, all of which are integral parts of Palestine, and no one is entitled to renounce them. The people of Palestine refuse to permit of any international bargaining over them, insisting on their Arab character and their unconditional return to the Arab fold.

2. The people of Palestine are following with the deepest concern the news of proposed solutions to eliminate the consequences of the aggression, and utterly reject any proposal which would, either directly or indirectly, link the evacuation of the Israeli forces with the Palestine problem. They also announce their rejection of any solution adopted by the General Assembly or the Security Council which is not officially approved by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as the representative of the people of Palestine, who alone have rights in their homeland and are entitled to determine its future.

3. The armed struggle in which the people of Palestine are engaged in the occupied territories constitutes the first stage in the Palestinian popular war, and the nationalist attitude which has made its appearance in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, along with the peaceful resistance and the armed struggle which Palestinians are carrying on with such courage and heroism, are no more than the first steps towards not only escalating commando activity, but also transforming it into a popular war which will become increasingly forceful and extensive as time goes on, and will attract to itself the support of the Arab nation and the aid of all peoples who love freedom and right.

4. In general, it may be said that the course of the debates at the United Nations and America's declared intention of continuing to support Israel corroborates the Organisation's view that the United Nations cannot be expected to take any effective step towards the elimination of the consequences of the aggression, and that, in spite of the great efforts being made by the Arab delegations and the good offices of the delegations of friendly peoples, the only possible political solution of the present situation lies in surrender to aggression and acceptance of the terms of the aggressor.

5. Both the Extraordinary and the Ordinary Sessions of the United Nations have shown more clearly than ever before that the World Organisa-

¹ *Al-Muharrir*, 14/10/1967.

tion is no more than a propaganda platform, that international relations are governed by force of arms, and that international support at the United Nations is given not to those who make fine speeches based on the principles of right and justice, but to those who are best at using napalm bombs and violating the laws of warfare and moral and humane principles, as Israel has done ever since she was established.

6. The Organisation therefore reaffirms what it expressed at the Khartum Conference—that the elimination of the consequences of the aggression must be achieved in the homeland, not at the United Nations, and by Arab, not by international, means. It reaffirms that the one and only way of eliminating both past and future consequences of the aggression is to lose no time in establishing a united Arab state, starting with those Arab countries whose present circumstances and conditions are similar, so that a single Arab army, directed by a single Minister of Defence, may perform its duty of fighting for a single aim.

7. The disasters that have befallen Palestine and the Arab nation since 1938 have proved that the Arab League, the Joint Defence Council, the Unified Arab Command and the Unified Defence Agreements have not achieved the objects for which they were established, and that the only course open to the Arab nation is that of true unity. The Organisation will therefore undertake the task of contacting the Arab states whose present conditions are similar with a view to their forming a federal state.

8. To ensure that the stage of implementation is reached in this matter of unity, the Organisation undertakes to draft a detailed project for the federation of the Arab states providing for the subjection of political, military, economic, cultural and information affairs to the authority of the federal state.

9. In view of its belief in unity, the Palestine Liberation Organisation announces that it is ready to make the Palestine Liberation Army, which fought with such courage and heroism during the aggression, part of the single Arab army. Furthermore, the Palestinian people, both in Jordan and elsewhere, will mobilise all their moral, intellectual and material resources on behalf of this sacred cause with the object of attaining our two most precious objectives: the

elimination of the consequences of the aggression and the liberation of Palestine.

10. The Organisation will shortly send delegations to the Arab states to draft the necessary plan as regards the Palestine problem, in the light of the present situation, so that it may be implemented at both official and popular levels.

429

Interview Statements by U.A.R. President Nasir to French Journalist d'Astier de la Vigerie.¹ [Excerpt]

Cairo, October 21, 1967

D'Astier: Qu'avez-vous ressenti pendant les jours de juin? Pensiez-vous à l'incompétence. ou à la trahison?

Nasser: Je suis un militaire. J'ai lu l'histoire militaire de tant de pays. J'ai vu partout des trahisons et des défaites.

D'Astier: Quels sont vos sentiments à l'égard d'Israël? Sentiments politiques, sentiments humains?

Nasser: Politiquement, c'est l'ennemi. Humainement: je pense aux sentiments que je porte aux Palestiniens jetés hors de chez eux; je garde mes sentiments pour eux.

D'Astier: Pensez-vous toujours que le peuple d'Israël doit être jeté hors de Palestine, ou croyez-vous qu'une confédération soit encore possible à long terme?

Nasser: Les Juifs sont nos cousins. Nous avons cohabité des siècles durant. Le sionisme a posé le problème et rien n'a été possible entre Juifs, Arabes et Chrétiens. Nous pouvons vivre ensemble dans une maison mais personne ne peut prendre la maison tout entière et en chasser les autres.

D'Astier: Vous négociez avec l'Angleterre, qu'attendez-vous? Qu'en est-il de la réouverture du canal du Suez?

Nasser: L'Angleterre prend maintenant une position modérée. Mais la réouverture du canal sans le retrait du Sinai, c'est non. Attendre:

¹ *L'Orient*, Beirut, 11/11/1967.

nous attendons d'abord tout de nous-mêmes. Vous avez attendu trois ans sous l'occupation allemande. Nous sommes trente millions: nous pouvons mobiliser un ou deux millions et nous pouvons attendre.

D'Astier: Ne croyez-vous pas qu'il soit temps de séculariser les Etats, votre Etat? Beaucoup d'entre nous ont été choqués par le fanatisme religieux, fanatisme des mosquées et des synagogues... Dans un de vos discours de mai vous avez dit: "Si Israël nous attaque, nous le détruirons"; cela signifie-t-il "et les Juifs avec?"

Nasser: Ah! Vous confondez l'Etat d'Israël et les Juifs?

D'Astier: Nous pouvons difficilement oublier les excès verbaux, mais pour ma part, je comprends mal pourquoi vous avez exigé le retrait des casques bleus.

Nasser: Nous avons accepté ces casques bleus, après 1956, pour une mission très précise. Quand nous avons cru que nous pouvions affronter seuls Israël, au cas d'une attaque contre la Syrie, leur présence ne signifiait plus rien. Selon nos calculs, nous pouvions faire face seuls à Israël. Nous nous attendions en fait à un affrontement de dix ans.

D'Astier: Eet voilà la catastrophe!...

Nasser: Oui, une dure défaite, mais nous en avons tiré beaucoup de leçons, de précieuses leçons...

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430

Interview Granted by Iraqi Acting Foreign Minister Khayrallah to the Cairo Daily "Al-Jumhuriyah."¹ [Excerpts]

Beirut, October 27, 1967

Q. Is Iraq's attitude to the export of oil to the aggressor countries unchanged?

A. We are still prohibiting the export of oil to America, Britain and West Germany, and our

economic boycott of these three countries is still in force.

Q. Does that mean that there is still no oil being pumped?

A. Yes. The Council of Ministers has not so far issued an order permitting the pumping of oil for the aggressor countries.

Q. Some people say that the stopping of exports is due to opposition from the Syrian government to the passage of oil to the aggressor countries over Syrian territory.

A. Iraqi oil is transiting Syrian territory, but only to friendly countries.

Q. Does that mean that the Syrian government has not completely prohibited the passage of Iraqi oil?

A. Yes. We have no problem with the Syrian government as regards this matter.

Q. Supposing Iraq decides to resume oil exports, as other Arab countries have done, in accordance with the resolution of the last Summit Conference, would the Syrian government agree to its transiting Syrian territory?

A. There can be no doubt that the Syrian government has a proper appreciation of Arab interests.

Q. What, then, is the reason for your repeated visits to Syria? Western news agencies have all agreed that the only reason has been to discuss the question of Iraqi oil transiting Syrian territory.

A. I can assure you that this matter has never been discussed with the Syrian government. Our discussions with our colleagues in Syria were on various forms of cooperation in a variety of fields.

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Q. Do you think the Arab position has improved since the last Summit Conference?

A. Certainly the Arab position has improved. The achievement of Arab unanimity, the resolution of Arab differences and the clearing of the Arab atmosphere, not to mention the realisation of Arab cooperation and solidarity, have all helped to improve the Arab situation. But what we hope is that this improvement will be wider and more profound, and will include all aspects, military political and economic.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Cairo, 3/11/1967.

Q. Do you think that this improvement is reflected in Arab action in foreign affairs?

A. Certainly, ever since we agreed at the Summit Conference that the Arabs should have a single attitude as regards foreign affairs. Thus among the principles we agreed on was the refusal to accept any proposal that was prejudicial to the honour and the rights of the Arab nation, within the framework of the basic principles approved by the Summit Conference, which were: no recognition of Israel, no peace or negotiation with her, no unilateral action on behalf of the cause of Palestine by any Arab country and no infringement of the rights of the people of Palestine.

Q. What is Iraq's view of the various suggestions and proposals that have been made as solutions of the Middle East problem?

A. Any proposal or suggestion inconsistent with what I have mentioned and with what was agreed on at the Summit Conference is rejected by us.

Q. What do you think, for example, of the proposals of the Yugoslav President Tito?

A. They might form a basis for discussion.

Q. And what do you think of the proposals made in the speech of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, to the General Assembly of the United Nations?

A. The principles and points mentioned in Gromyko's speech could form a basis for discussion, on condition that one point is made clear, so that there may be nothing inconsistent with the basic principles we agreed on at the Summit Conference. The point I mean is the safeguarding of the safety and security of the Middle East countries; this expression must not be interpreted in a manner incompatible with the basic principles agreed on at the Summit Conference, which I have already mentioned.

431

Address by Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Foreign Minister Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Opening a New Session of the National Assembly.¹ [Excerpt]

Kuwait, October 28, 1967

Kuwait's attitude to this series of events is perfectly clear. When Israel mobilised her forces and threatened to invade Syria, and the United Arab Republic called for the withdrawal of the Emergency Force from Sinai and Gaza so that it might confront the expected attack on a sister Arab country, we declared that we would stand firm against any aggression directed at any Arab country, and would not hesitate to use all means available to us to defend the Arab homeland. So when Israel launched her treacherous attack on the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, on the morning of 5 June, we immediately announced that we were at war with the Zionist gangsters in defence of these sister countries. The first units of our troops had already arrived in the United Arab Republic to be ready for the battle which the enemy had long been silently and artfully preparing and planning, exploiting our preoccupation with differences over side issues and mutual abuse. These had sapped our confidence in each other, sown hatred and rancour in our ranks, made us miss the opportunity of completing our joint defence plans at the proper time, and weakened our capacity to resist aggression. As a result of all this the enemy won a military victory in a short, sharp war. This has meant that the Palestine problem has entered a new phase, which is only just beginning, and the danger constituted by the Zionist presence in the heart of the Arab homeland has been disclosed more clearly than ever before.

Our attitude at all the conferences and meetings that have been held since these events took place has always been one of readiness for sacrifice to the utmost extent required by higher Arab interests. We declared this at the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers held here in our capital, at the invitation of our government, to discuss the situation that had arisen as a result of the

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 29/10/1967.

aggression. And we confirmed this attitude of ours when we stopped exports of oil to certain Western countries in accordance with the recommendations of the Conference of Arab Finance and Oil Ministers held in Baghdad just before the War.

432

Statement by the Head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation ash-Shuqayri Addressed to the Jews of Israel.¹ [Excerpt]

Beirut, October 30, 1967

Jews of Israel;

Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian people. It is part of the greater Arab homeland, and neither the people of Palestine nor the Arab nation as a whole will relinquish Palestine, either today or at any time.

Zionism, Israel and world imperialism have deluded you by leading you to believe that the Arabs will accept the *fait accompli*, make peace with Israel and live with her in peace as good neighbours. All this is absolutely false.

There can be no peace between the robber and the robbed, the usurper and the usurped, however long a time passes, and however great the sacrifices. We shall fight the state of Israel until it ceases to exist. This is a holy war of liberation; if the present generation loses it, it will be continued by future generations of our sons and grandsons until the state of Israel ceases to exist.

We do not want to annihilate the Jews, nor to cast them into the sea, as Israeli propaganda has falsely claimed. A Jewish community lived in Palestine in full peace and security long before Zionism came into existence, and the Jewish communities in other Arab countries still live in full peace and security.

Thousands of you are emigrating to America,

Canada and your original countries. This is the beginning of the sound peaceful solution: return to your original countries, emigrate to where you will find a quiet life. For Palestine will not be a land of quiet and stability until its original people return to it.

Do not be deceived by the victory of the Israeli army. This victory will only make the Arabs more stubborn and the people of Palestine more determined, and it must make you more fearful and anxious.

The commandos are neither murderers nor saboteurs; they are heroes who will shed their blood to liberate their country. And every Palestinian and every Arab will become a commando ready to die for Palestine.

You are surrounded by a hundred million Arabs, who will never let Israel alone. The weak points in the Arab nation, which facilitated the establishment and survival of Israel, will certainly pass away, and Israel will pass away with them.

Before your time, in the Middle Ages, the Franks established principalities in Palestine and Syria, built fortresses and castles, and founded farms and villages peopled with emigrants. But in the end they passed away after a terrible struggle, leaving behind them ruined fortresses and demolished castles.

Jews of Israel;

Zionism has gathered you in Palestine to live through bitter times, to suffer the miseries of war. And no sooner is one battle over than it will be followed by another even more terrible and destructive.

They tell you that the Arabs have been thrice defeated in war, but has this meant peace? Far from it. There will be no truce with aggression or with falsehood, so consider your future and the future of your descendants. The Arabs do not advocate war; they are a people of peace. The Arabs welcomed the Jewish refugees when all Europe was persecuting them. But the Arabs will never surrender Palestine, which must be returned to them whatever the cost in sacrifice.

Jews of Israel;

We have no religious, ideological or even personal quarrel with you; we are human beings like you. But your leaders have deceived and

¹ *Sawt al-ʿUrubah*, Beirut, 31/10/1967.

misled you, and driven you to a land that is ours. Liberate yourselves from this great lie, and seek security and well-being elsewhere. Emigrate to where Jewish communities live in comfort and stability, to where you can enjoy peace. This is the only solution, the only hope for peace. The Balfour Declaration, which is the cause of all this misery, started the immigration to Palestine, and this misery can only end with emigration from Palestine. Emigrate from Palestine, emigrate.

433

Speech from the Throne Delivered on Behalf of Jordanian King Husayn by Crown Prince Hasan Opening a New Session of Parliament.¹ [Excerpt]

Amman, November 1, 1967

Honourable Senators and Deputies; The cause of Palestine is the cornerstone of Jordan's domestic, Arab and foreign policy. It is, of course, the first and most sacred cause of the whole Arab nation, but for us here in this country it is a matter of life and death. This is why we responded to the present crisis, which was imposed on us and on the whole Arab nation by Zionist aggression, with all our strength and resources. This is why my government's policy is devoted to the elimination of the consequences of the aggression in the stricken West Bank, and especially the eternal Arab City of Jerusalem, and from all Arab territories that have been the victims of aggression. We have resolutely refused to accept the principle of allowing the aggressor to impose his own terms from the position he won as the result of his aggression. When we succeeded with God's blessings in convening the last Arab Summit Conference in Khartum, that Conference, with God's help, became a turning point in the lives of all Arabs. So it is now our duty to make our new departure a turning point in the whole international situation by striving to win more

friends and supporters for our rightful position, which has been obscured by the determined efforts of our enemies. The Conference joined us in proclaiming that we were, and should ever be, seekers after right and peace. But the rights we seek are sacred rights, and we shall never allow that they be diminished by one whit. The peace we seek is a peace that is based on justice, the only true and unambiguous peace. The present immediate aim of our efforts in all fields is the elimination of the consequences of the aggression, but our policy as regards the problem as a whole is aimed at finding an honourable solution for it, a solution that will preserve every atom of the rights of the people of Palestine and maintain Arab honour unimpaired. My government's efforts will be directed towards this end, in agreement and coordination with the other Arab countries and in a manner consistent with the protection of Arab rights and Arab higher interests.

Honourable Senators and Deputies; Jordan's policy as regards Arab affairs has always been, is still and will continue to be a reflection of our profound belief in Jordan as an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and that in Jordan we are leading an Arab renaissance, an Arab revolt which is a natural extension of the great revolt led by the late King Husayn Ibn Ali at the beginning of the century. Our revolution is inspired by the slogan of unity, freedom and a better life, and finds its expression in the brotherhood at arms during the latest aggression, when the blood shed by our heroic soldiers mingled with that of brother Arabs, when hearts and minds were welded together in pursuit of our common Arab aim, and when our energies and resources were coordinated in all fields. Jordan, too, has played her part in mending the breaches and eliminating all factors for dissension and difference which the imperialists foster and our enemies promote, and my government will work with all resolution and determination to strengthen this complete Arab unanimity and consolidate its foundations, so that it may become the solid basis for the construction of an impregnable and highly developed Arab nation which will be a joy to its friends and a thorn in the side of its enemies and those who have designs on it.

¹ *Ad-Dustur*, 2/11/1967.

As regards foreign affairs, my government's

policy is based on a determination to consolidate our relations with the Islamic countries, to regard as our friends those who befriend us and the Arab nation and as our enemies those who are our enemies and the enemies of our nation. Our relations with the countries of the world can only be established within the framework of mutual respect and a true desire for constructive cooperation in support of the aspirations of all peoples striving to secure a better life for themselves, on a basis of their struggle to determine their own future and to attain their legitimate aims. With this as our inspiration, we offer the hand of friendship to all who are ready to accept it, so that we may work together to build a world governed by peace, justice and well-being for us and for all humanity.

Honourable Senators and Deputies; Our country today is passing through a critical period in its history. It is determined to eliminate the consequences of the tragedy so that, by virtue of the lessons we have learned, we may build a firm new structure on the most solid and firmly laid foundations. With this end in view we must mobilise all our material and moral resources and direct them on the right and proper course. We must also ensure that all groups and classes of the people are fused with their government in the crucible of unflagging endeavour to establish a "government of the people, by the people, for the people." The responsibility of government is, indeed, a sacred trust of the authorities, but it is also a responsibility incumbent on every citizen. For we live in an age when the government is no more than a spearhead of comprehensive popular effort, which is the true and abounding strength of the whole country. In view of this, it is the duty of every citizen to be a conscript in the service of his country and his nation. There must be no limits to his faith in his Lord, his homeland and his mission, no limits to the sacrifices he is prepared to make to achieve his ends and realise his aspirations. For this reason my government intends to draft a law for compulsory military service, so that the people of Jordan may be given the honour of defending their flag and their homeland, with their habitual heroism and pride. But although we regard our military, economic, and other strength as one of the mainstays of our existence, we regard the power of thought and intelligence as the only way of enrich-

ing this existence with the noblest ideals and values. We therefore call on every citizen to join that army under whose banner all the forces of the human spirit are active, and under whose colours all forces for good felt by every human being carry on their work, so that we may all labour together, hand in hand, and raise the well-built edifice to lofty heights.

Honourable Senators and Deputies; The first and foremost task that my government is determined to perform is to rebuild the Jordanian armed forces in the light of recent experiences, so that we may perform the national duties which this country is called on to fulfil. These forces will be provided with the most modern arms and the most powerful equipment so that they may once more become, as they were in the past, our pride and joy and the bright hope of this country and of the Arab nation as a whole. The government will also build up the security services in such a manner as to ensure that they are able and qualified to watch over and protect internal security.

Jordan was advancing with firm steps towards the exploitation of its material and human resources in the fields of economic and social progress, and had, indeed, progressed to the extent that she was in the front rank of developing countries. The average annual increase in national income was ten per cent—one of the highest figures in the world for developing countries. The recent setback has certainly had a gravely adverse effect on this advance, but the government will resume it unflaggingly until we achieve the objectives of our comprehensive economic and social renaissance. In all this our watchword will be the provision of incentives for individual initiative, the encouragement of national investment, the combating of exploitation and monopolies and the achievement of welfare, social justice and opportunities to work for all. The projects for the West Bank will be included in the general budget so that it will be possible to start on them without delay as soon as our afflictions have passed away, as they will, God willing, very soon.

Honourable Senators and Deputies; In opening this session of your honourable Assembly, we call on you to exert even greater efforts within the framework of cooperation with the executive authority. We wish you every success in the service

of our beloved country and of our glorious nation and pray that God Almighty may guide our steps and grant us success in the achievement of our aims and aspirations in our life on earth.

434

Address by Jordanian King Husayn at Georgetown University During a Visit to the United States, 2-10 November.¹ [Excerpt]

Washington, November 7, 1967

Before I proceed to discuss the situation that we face at present and the hope and opportunity for a just and peaceful settlement, I should like to review briefly the events leading up to the war in June. My American friends tell me that before, during and after the war, the Arabs had a "bad press" in the United States—that if our side of the story was told at all, it was told inadequately. It is late, I know, to remedy this situation, but I would like to present the case as we know it to be.

I think I am not betraying military secrets if I tell you that on the day that Israel struck, the Arab states were one year and two months away from reaching any sort of military balance with Israel. That may indicate how eager we were for the war that we lost in a few days. Jordan fought a battle that we knew we would lose, solely because it was our duty to Jordan and to our allies.

Today—five months later—an uneasy truce still prevails between victor and victim. From our standpoint, we believe we have an obligation to the world not to accept the situation that presents itself to us, and thus set a world precedent—of allowing an aggressor to dictate his terms from a position of strength and expanded territory that he gained as a result of his aggression.

This is the moment for Israel to prove that she is interested in genuine, lasting peace in the area—not by right of conquest but by the demands of justice. If there is goodwill in Israel, now is the time for it to be shown.

Besides the loss of land, there is the greater loss that has come to 200,000 new refugees that were created by the war. Here the facts should not be blurred. There are 200,000 homeless people who want to go back to their homes. Against the expressed wish of the United Nations—which created Israel—Israel refuses to permit them to return. Her purpose is clear—to colonize the new territory with foreigners.

Just a few days ago, Mr. Eshkol issued a worldwide call for Jews from abroad—Americans, Europeans and Asians—to come to Israel and live on the land from which the refugees have been driven out.

All that I have said is past, and all that I shall say from now on is future.

Ever since the Khartoum conference of Arab heads of state in September of this year, a new kind of unity among our people has been emerging. It is not a negative unity born simply of antagonism toward Israel, but a unity of confidence in the future of the Arab world based on realism.

Although no resolutions were passed defining the positive attitude that resulted from our discussions, there is no doubt that the Khartoum meeting marked a turning point in our relations with ourselves, with our neighbors and with the rest of the world.

We are embarking on this challenging task of mobilizing our resources to advance along the whole broad front of human endeavor—social, economic and scientific, incorporating into the Arab society ethical values of the old and the liberality of the new.

Important in these plans for the future is the dominant question: What about Israel? Is there a place for the Jews in this future society of ours? We believe there is. It is based on our common heritage and our cultural convictions. Israel is the product of frustration and despair, which the Jews experienced in the West. When the structure of our future society has been completed, we are confident that the Jews themselves will decide to renounce their present separatism and their unrealistic political position.

We now ask Israel: How do you intend to exist and thrive in the midst of the Arab world? What formula for peace and justice do you offer

¹ *New York Times*, 6/11/1967.

us to make us want to accept you in our midst? What policy do you intend to follow to soften our rightful position? More than that, we say: What have you been doing so far to make us change our opinion of you? What kind of image have you painted of the Arabs in the circles of your influence, particularly in Europe and America? Who has engineered the aggressions and the large-scale wars that have been marring the map of the Arab world since your presence? Who is responsible for disturbing the peace in this part of the world?

We are asked to recognize the state of Israel. We believe that this question is wrongly posed. The world may rightly ask Israel: Does she recognize the right of the Arabs to exist? As for us, there has always been and will always be a place for the Jews in the Arab world. We have always recognized the legitimate rights of the Jews as a free people. We believe that it is in the interest of the Jews to communicate with us on the level of culture and civility, and not on the level of warplanes and tanks.

The Jews of Israel have a choice: the choice of living with us peacefully and eternally as they have lived in the past, or of remaining an isolated outpost in the Arab world. If for the time being, and under the influence of Zionist leadership, they want to insist on maintaining an outpost, they must then bear all the consequences resulting from this status.

The road to real peace in the Middle East is indeed a long one, but there is a path to follow that will set us on the right track. First, there must be the admission on the part of the Arabs that Israel is a present fact of life. We may not like it, and we may choose not to recognize it, just as we choose not to recognize Red China.

However, if Israel is a fact, what is its size and shape; which one does the world recognize? The Israel that the United Nations created? The Israel of its '48 expansion? Or the Israel of its recent aggression?

Israel must not only define itself geographically, but it must define itself ethnically. If it intends to live within itself, no matter what its borders, its life is likely to be as short as, or shorter than, the Crusaders who came to worship but who stayed to plunder. There was no more justice in adventurers plundering the Middle East under

a religious banner 900 years ago than there is in militant politicians today invading the Arab world under the Star of David. The first held Jerusalem for less than a hundred years, and things move swifter now.

In conclusion, let me say that perhaps the developments in the Arab world would one day lead to the de-Zionisation of Israel.

And a permanent peace will come when Arab and Jew can live together, as they have in the past, in peace, friendship and religious liberty. Whether this will actually happen depends on Israel and what it does in the very near future.

435

Statement by the Palestinian Liberation Movement "Fateh."¹

November 8, 1967

On Sunday, 6.11.1967, the Israelis submitted a complaint to the Security Council giving details of incidents that had taken place inside the occupied territories of Palestine, and accusing members of "Fateh." The submission of this complaint comes at a time when the authorities of the gangster state are uttering threats right and left.

The Palestine National Liberation Movement "Fateh" and its military wing "Al-Asifah" regard it as their duty to inform world opinion and all people struggling for their freedom and honour of the following facts:

1. The revolt that is in progress in the occupied territory is a genuine revolt of the Palestinian people led by their revolutionary vanguards represented by the forces of "Al-Asifah" and all the nationalist forces that have rallied round its standard.

2. When a people's territory is invaded, and its very existence is threatened by a conspiracy of colonialism, imperialism and Zionism, the outbreak of such a revolt is the inevitable, logical and natural consequence.

3. After twenty years of bitter experience with the United Nations, which has failed to

¹ "Fateh" circular.

establish the right, and has become a pliant instrument in the hands of imperialism, led by the United States of America, the Palestinian people hereby reaffirm that no force on earth can prevent them from exercising their natural right to engage in armed struggle to recover their usurped territory, Palestine, in such manner as they may wish, in their refusal to accept the Zionist imperialist presence with all the force and determination at their disposal.

436

Memorandum Addressed by the "Fateh" Movement to United Nations Secretary-General U Thant.¹

November 8, 1967

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fateh" greets the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, further to its former memorandum dated 12.6.1967 on "Al-Asifah" 's first prisoner, Mahmud Hijazi, wishes to bring to his notice the following facts:

The establishment of "Al-Asifah" at the beginning of January 1965, and the revolutionary war it has since waged against the Zionist occupation forces in occupied Palestine, are an embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of the Palestinian people to recover their land and their honour. As a result of the violent battles that have been fought by the forces of "Al-Asifah" against the Fascist occupation forces, a number of our men have been taken prisoner.

The Zionist occupation forces have maltreated and tortured our men to extract confessions from them under duress, before sending them to trial by bogus military courts, which have passed unjust and savage sentences on them.

In view of the brutal treatment to which our men are being subjected at the hands of the Zionist occupation forces, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fateh" calls on you to intervene immediately to ensure the enforcement

of the provisions of the 1922 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, to ensure that our men receive full medical care and proper humane treatment. "Fateh" also calls on you to condemn the Zionist occupation authorities who have violated international provisions and customs as regards the treatment of prisoners of war, and to impose the appropriate sanctions for such infringements.

As long as the Zionist occupation authorities continue to employ such savage and barbarous methods against prisoners of war, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fateh" will be obliged to take retaliatory measures.

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fateh" requests that copies of this memorandum be distributed to member states and takes this opportunity of expressing its profoundest esteem.

437

Joint Communiqué on Lebanese President Hilu's Visit to Saudi Arabia, 12-16 November.² [Excerpt]

Riyadh, November 16, 1967

In the course of this visit, the two sides held several meetings characterised by a spirit of complete frankness and mutual understanding, during which they made a profound study of the implications of the critical stage through which the Arab countries are passing, reviewing, in particular, developments in the Palestine problem and the consequences of the latest Israel aggression of 5 June and its effect on the security and future of the Middle East. They also reviewed the political measures that the Arab countries are taking for the implementation of the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference held in Khartum. There was full agreement on the necessity to mobilise resources, redouble efforts and coordinate action with friendly countries to confront the perils implicit in the Zionist

¹ *Palestinian Revolution*, Damascus, No. 2, Vol. 1, 2/12/1967, p. 5.

² *Al-Bilad*, 17/11/1967.

design, which is a threat to the existence and the future of the Arab countries, and to take action to recover the usurped territories and the holy places. The two sides also agreed on the necessity of supporting the Arab League to enable it to fully achieve the objects for which it was established. The two sides regard brotherly meetings at the highest level as likely to promote cooperation between the Arab countries and peoples, and affirmed their adherence to the Arab Solidarity Pact which resulted from the Third Arab Summit Conference held in Casablanca in 1965.

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438

Speech of Iraqi President Arif on the Fifth Anniversary of the 18 November Revolution.¹ [Excerpt]

Baghdad, November 17, 1967

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Brothers; In these decisive moments in the history of our nation I must not fail to speak to you of the consequences of the treacherous and barbarous Israeli aggression against the Arab nation and the Islamic holy places. It was a treacherous and cunning aggression that was disguised by misleading Zionist propaganda, while its execution was aided by criminal imperialist capitalism.

The Zionists are planning to bring about a greater calamity. It is their ambition to establish a Zionist state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, and to achieve their criminal purposes they do not shrink from genocide.

You have heard and read of the proposals of various countries for political solutions of the disaster that has befallen our countries. But these solutions are still being bandied to and fro between the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and imperialism is still supporting this gang—indeed, it is interfering in every part of our homeland and employing agents to incite unrest and disturbances to prevent

these countries from performing their national duty of solving the problem.

Israel would never have been heard of but for the support and intervention of imperialism. Are we then to be patient in the face of this provocation? Are we to comply with Israel's defiance? This is the question that must be answered.

I say to this generation and to the coming generations that we shall never accept the usurpation of a single inch of our territory, nor shall we accept that Israel should remain as a source of anxiety and disturbance in the area, which stands so greatly in need of quiet and stability to be able to play its proper part in the world and become a powerful instrument for the establishment of world peace.

The Arab homeland, with all its wealth and resources, could have become a rich source of foodstuffs and raw materials, and thus helped the increasing population of the world to live a life of ease and creativity. But it is still in a state of constant disturbance because of Israel, which imperialism has established as a base for espionage and the stirring up of revolutions in the heart of our homeland. We shall never be at peace until the United Nations realises the situation and reestablishes right.

I say to this generation and to coming generations that we shall vanquish and recover our usurped rights with our own hands if we depend on ourselves and arm ourselves with faith and knowledge, coordinate our plans, close our ranks and strike down those who seek to divide us.

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439

Statement of Policy by the New Jordanian Government of Mr. Bahjat at-Talhuni.² [Excerpts]

Amman, November 18, 1967

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Thus the government's domestic policy, like its Arab policy, is based on the belief in the

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 19/11/1967.

² *Ad-Dustur*, 19/11/1967.

unity of the East and West Banks of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, the belief that Jordan is an indivisible part of the greater Arab homeland, and that the Jordanian people are a part of the greater Arab nation. The government's policy in both these fields also stems from our firm belief that Jordan constitutes the natural extension of the great Arab revolt sparked off by the late King Husayn Ibn Ali, and has now become the field for a continuous revolt, an auspicious renaissance, whose slogan is: unity, freedom, and a better life.

The cause of Palestine has always been the cornerstone of Jordan's domestic, Arab and foreign policy, and it will remain so until truth triumphs, and falsehood is swept away. There is no substitute for it, and nothing can be allowed to detract from its sanctity, no matter how harsh the struggle or how cruel the reverses we suffer in the battle.

The consequences to our country and to the Arab nation of the black 5th of June have been far other than what we hoped for and aspired to. But our people and our brothers in the stricken West Bank have succeeded, in spite of the pain and grief of the tragedy, in providing us with a splendid example of endurance which does honour to the record of contemporary Arab struggle, a magnificent example of pride worthy of the history of Arab gallantry since ancient times. The policy of this government, which glories in this endurance, this stubborn insistence on the unity of the two Banks, is based on constant endeavour and unflagging effort to eliminate the consequences of the Zionist aggression in the West Bank and in all other Arab territories that were the victims of that aggression. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories they have occupied since that black day, and especially from Jerusalem, is the first object this government will strive for, in close cooperation and full understanding with the other Arab countries, working on the basis of the resolutions adopted by the Arab Kings and Presidents at the last Summit Conference held in Khartum some months ago.

With this end in view, His Majesty King Husayn left his country and visited many nations and capitals to put forward the case of the Arab nation, emphasising, wherever he stopped and whenever he spoke, that Jordan will never agree

that sacred Arab rights be disregarded to the smallest extent, and that we in this country are ready one and all to lay down our lives before we accept surrender or anything resembling surrender, before we resign ourselves to the aggression or to any trace of it remaining in our land or in any other Arab territory.

This government's policy, then, as regards the latest aggression, is perfectly clear and unambiguous. It is based on the resolutions of the Khartum Conference, on our belief that these resolutions are useful and that they are capable of serving the cause of Palestine in both the short and the long runs. If it proves possible to reach a just and honourable solution of this tragic problem, Jordan's attitude to such a solution will be at one with that of all the other Arab countries. If not, our rights will endure as long as there is life on earth, and our determination to recover them, our determination that they shall triumph, will last as long as the breath of life remains in our bodies.

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Inasmuch as Jordan's armed forces are the bulwark of the homeland and the shield of the nation, this government will grudge no effort to ensure that they are reorganised and armed with the most modern and powerful weapons, from whatever source, so that they may be able to perform their sacred duty of defending the soil of Jordan and of the whole Arab world.

In the face of the challenge that threatens the destiny of this country and the very existence of all Arabs, the government has decided to draft a compulsory military service law, and to submit it to this honourable Assembly. Our motive in this is our belief that the duty of defending the homeland and the nation against the perils with which the enemy threatens them is an honour that must be granted to every Jordanian.

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440

Memorandum from the "Fateh" Movement to the International Red Cross Asking for Its Intervention.¹

November 18, 1967

The Palestinian Liberation Movement "Fateh" offers its greetings and wishes to submit the following matter to your Organisation:

Doubtless your Organisation is in receipt of information about the just struggle in which the Palestinian forces known as "Al-Asifah" are engaged against the fascist forces of the Zionist occupation in occupied Palestine, in the course of which many of our men have been taken prisoner by the enemy.

The Zionist authorities have not hesitated in employing the cruellest methods in their inhuman treatment of our men whom they have captured; these men are subjected to savage and barbarous tortures with the object of extracting confessions from them, before they are sent to trial by bogus military courts which deliver unjust verdicts against them.

The above measures are totally inconsistent with the provisions of international law, and it is recognised by many international courts, in particular those which specialise in war crimes, that the torture, humiliation, maltreatment or trial of prisoners of war is in itself a war crime.

The Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fateh" hereby requests your Organisation to intervene with the Zionist authorities in the name of law and humanity to induce them to put a stop to such crimes against their prisoners of war and to insist on the enforcement of the provisions of the 1922 Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. "Fateh" also requests that your Organisation take the necessary measures to ensure that such prisoners of war are well treated and provided with medical attention, and to supervise this enforcement. "Fateh" is ready to meet all expenses involved.

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation "Fateh" takes this opportunity of expressing its great respect and esteem for the International Red Cross.

441

Speech from the Throne by Libyan Premier al-Bakkush at the Opening of a New Session of the General Assembly.² [Excerpts]

Tripoli, November 20, 1967

Senators and Deputies; In the field of international relations my government's policy will be based on understanding and moderation, and will aim at consolidating world peace and security by strengthening the bonds of friendship and cooperation with all countries that are striving for the good of humanity, respect the principles of sovereignty and independence, reject the use of force in the settlement of disputes and believe that all peoples are entitled to freedom.

On the basis of these lofty principles, and in view of the difficult circumstances which have beset the Arab world as a result of Israel's aggression, my government has not hesitated to devote all its resources to opposing the aggression and frustrating its expansionist aims. It has given all the support and aid in its power to the Arab countries which were attacked. It stopped the production of oil and prohibited its exportation altogether, in spite of the deleterious effect the adoption of this policy has had on our country's economy and development projects. Exports were later resumed, but only in accordance with the resolutions of the Kuwait Conference of Arab Oil Ministers, being restricted to such friendly countries as adopted a neutral attitude to the armed conflict, and under guarantees to ensure that the oil did not reach other countries. My government has also played a positive part in all the Arab conferences that have been held to draft a unified plan for the confrontation of the aggression and the elimination of its expansionist consequences. It has also loyally adhered to all the resolutions adopted by these conferences, zealously implementing all obligations arising therefrom. However great the sacrifices we are called on to make, we regard this as a sacred duty to our Arabism and to our brother Arabs who were the victims of the aggression.

My government is making the most strenuous

¹ *Palestinian Revolution*, No. 2 Vol. 1, 2/12/1967, p. 5.

² Ministry of Information and Guidance publication (No. 62), Tripoli, November 1967.

political efforts on the widest possible scale, both in several friendly countries and in international gatherings, to demonstrate the dangers of the situation to world peace and security, and the threat it constitutes to the United Nations Organisation, in which the peoples of the world repose such hopes, and which has failed to condemn the perpetrator of the aggression or to prevent him from enjoying the fruits of his aggression or from violating the holy places of the revealed religions.

Furthermore, my government is still striving to increase the efforts of the other Arab countries to remove the consequences of the aggression and to recover usurped Arab territories. That they will some day be recovered is our firm belief, however long this may take and however great the sacrifices involved.

In the field of other Arab relations, my government believes that the bonds of brotherhood which link the Arab countries will be a factor in uniting their ranks and an element in increasing their efforts which will enable this nation, through adherence to the Arab League Charter, to ensure the success of its just causes and to be united without dispute, to succour one another without conflict and to advance firmly along the road to dignity, prosperity and well-being.

Senators and Deputies; Inasmuch as our young army is the shield that guards our country, the effective arm that protects its sacred soil, my government believes in paying special attention to ensure that its forces are developed, strengthened and supplied with the most modern armaments. With this end in view, over and above the measures now being taken to provide the army with equipment, my government has drafted a five-point programme which has already been put into operation and which, when it is completed, will ensure, God willing, that we have a deterrent force which will provide us with such protection as will inspire us with complete confidence. My government is also at present taking the necessary measures for the enforcement of the conscription law so that our young men may be granted the honour of performing the sacred duty of military service. My government will also continue to send missions abroad for specialisation and training in all military fields, and will continue to give

constant support to the Royal Military College.

My government will, with God's help, continue negotiations for the elimination of foreign military bases, and it can assure this honourable Assembly that it will succeed. It also hopes to build up, as rapidly as possible, the military deterrent force which it believes to be necessary and which will replace non-Libyan forces. Moreover, at a time when my government is making every effort to develop the armed forces, it is not forgetful of those who made every possible sacrifice to ensure the liberation of the Libyan nation, and it takes pleasure in affirming its esteem for old combatants and in ensuring their welfare, so that they may live the life they dreamed of when they bore arms to purge the soil of our homeland of foreign usurpation.

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442

Interview Granted by Saudi King Faysal to West German Television.¹ [Excerpts]

Riyadh, November 21, 1967

Q. Your Majesty, the most important foreign problem facing the Arab countries is the existence of Israel. Do you believe that it is possible to find a peaceful settlement for the Middle East without recognising the existence of Israel? Or do you think that it will not long be possible to avoid the outbreak of another war?

A. As far as we Arabs are concerned, we expressed our views at the Khartum Conference. The matter is now being considered by the United Nations, and it is up to the United Nations to deal with the matter with the attention it deserves on a basis of truth and justice.

Q. Your Majesty, do you share Egypt's attitude to the effect that the Suez Canal will not be reopened until Israel withdraws from the occupied territories in the Sinai Peninsula?

A. In any case, Israel's withdrawal from the occupied parts of Arab territories is an indispu-

¹ *Al-Bilad*, 22/11/1967.

table right. For it is not just that any aggressor should gain from his aggression.

Q. The closing of the Suez Canal is a matter which concerns your country, and at the Khartum Summit Conference it was resolved to establish a fund to aid the Arab countries who suffered from the war—Egypt has received more than eight million pounds sterling from Saudi Arabia as a first instalment of Saudi aid. What do you expect of President Abd an-Nasir in return?

A. When we do our duty to our brother Arabs we do not expect anything in return.

Q. One of President Abd an-Nasir's political aims used to be the elimination of the royalist regime in Saudi Arabia. Do you think that he has relinquished this aim, or that he will do so in the future?

A. In the first place we never believed that this was ever one of President Abd an-Nasir's aims, so the question does not arise.

Q. Has the Middle East war had any effect on Saudi cooperation with the Western countries, and is Your Majesty thinking, for example, of altering the situation of the oil companies in your country?

A. Nothing has been changed in our economy or our treatment of the oil companies.

Q. My last question is this, Your Majesty: When do you think diplomatic relations will be reestablished between Saudi Arabia and West Germany?

A. When West Germany comes to an understanding with the Arabs, Saudi Arabia will be prepared to reestablish relations.

Message of Lebanese President Hilu to the People on Independence Day.¹ [Excerpt]

Beirut, November 21, 1967

Inasmuch as the attitudes we adopt at the United Nations, in solidarity with the other Arab countries, are those dictated by Arab interests in conformity with our joint decisions, the last of which were taken at the Khartum Summit Conference, we declare that we here in the Arab East are stationed on the front line of resistance to a domination that history will record as one of the strangest and most significant phenomena of the 20th century, a phenomenon which affects the whole of the human race throughout the world, even those, wherever they may live, who are in favour of it or indifferent to it.

It is the racist domination of a noble land by men who long suffered from racialism, and who told the world how they suffered from its terrors. Pretending to seek a secure asylum, they seized this asylum by violence, with the reactions and convulsions that violence brings in its train. They made their alleged need for a refuge a pretext to establish a state which boasts that it has supporters in all states, that it possesses a state within every state, thereby challenging the laws and customs of the international community. It is, in fact, an attempt at the racist domination of the whole world from a base implanted in the heart of the Arab world, which has expanded stage by stage, unobserved, taking advantage of regional and world conditions. It is an attempt, unique of its kind, to obtain possession of the holiest land in the world, and to dominate the thoughts and wills of individuals and peoples alike.

This is why, in defending our rights, we are defending the future of right and freedom, and the mind and conscience of man, which the powers of injustice are trying to dominate, as if they were territory to be occupied. The result of this attempt is that true vision has been darkened and sound thinking vitiated, to the extent that an erupting volcano is represented as a safe refuge, the eviction of a whole people as justice, a land

¹ *An-Nahar*, 22/11/1967.

that has been seized by force as a land of peace, and defeat and humiliation as approval and acquiescence.

From this point of view, the occupation of the land is only one manifestation of an attempt which threatens, at both political and moral levels, to undermine the foundations of truth and peace throughout the world, the foundations of human progress. This racist domination, in fact, now that the clouds with which it sought to disguise itself have been scattered, can now be seen in its true light, as something contrary to the course of history and God's purpose, something which is, consequently, foredoomed to failure, despite its deceptive appearance and the transient gains it has achieved.

The boundless power of truth and right will, if neglected, always avenge itself for such neglect, and error and tyranny inevitably lead to a chain of reactions and to terrors whose consequences are incalculable.

To replace right by force, to allow the aggressor the right to subject the loser to the wishes of the winner, is to call on the loser to use force himself, so that he, in his turn, may eventually be the winner.

When relations between nations and peoples are governed by force rather than justice, what guarantee has any country, however strong, that it will not one day become another Palestine?

Lebanon, the land of brotherhood and tolerance, resists all attempts to perpetuate a policy of force and racism, with all its available resources and in cooperation with the other Arab countries.

It was essential that we should meet our brother Arabs to unify our will and order our ranks. All of us, as we oppose Israel's ambitions, are defending not only our own territory and the places we regard as holy, but right as well, which is the mainstay of all civilisation, security and safety.

444

Address by U.A.R. President Nasir at the Opening of a New Session of the National Assembly.¹ [Excerpts]

Cairo, November 23, 1967

As this Assembly is about to resume its duties on the occasion of the inauguration of its fifth session, after a long and difficult summer, I feel that it is my duty to present you with a faithful account of the developments that have taken place since the great storm of popular enthusiasm of 9 and 10 June, which I rightly considered at the time as marking the renaissance of the revolution. At the time, you kindly delegated me to deal with the situation and with its consequent developments. My duty obliges me now to give due recognition to the unparalleled endurance of the Egyptian people in the face of the pressures of one of the most serious threats that have ever confronted us. The Egyptian people have withstood these pressures honourably, forcefully and magnanimously. I feel that we can now say that during the past five months there has been a profound and far-reaching change which will impose its character more and more upon the future. The credit for this goes to the people, and to the people alone, no matter how we look at it. We can say this despite the uncertainty we all feel about the future, despite the questions that trouble us and despite the dangers which we have yet to face and whose challenge we must accept.

Nevertheless, all must admit that, despite everything, we have travelled along a road that our enemies would have liked to see blocked to us; we have successfully passed through an extremely difficult phase and we have succeeded in widening the scope of action open to us, which will allow us to regain our mobility and acquire the material potential with which to put up an effective resistance.

Were it not for the absolute faith of the people in the fundamental principles of the cause for which they are doing battle, and in their own ability to withstand and endure, and were it not for their unwavering faith in the future, which, God willing, belongs to them, it would have been

¹ *Al-Ahram*, 24/11/1967.

manifestly impossible for us to have travelled along the road that seemed to be blocked or to have survived the cruelly difficult phase we have been through, or to have emerged out of all that into the possibilities of a wider horizon.

The fact which we must fully realise and be profoundly aware of is that it is not easy for any people, no matter how deeply rooted and authentic their heritage of struggle to go through what we have been through and not to lose their cohesiveness and faith and, what is more, to find themselves, only a few months after suffering a far-reaching setback, strong and able, and with their strength growing day by day.

No day passes without our nation drawing closer, step by step, to the acquisition of the potential with which to repair the damage done by the setback and with which to overcome all negative aspects of the defeat.

In the annals of history, both ancient and modern, we find the record of what can befall a nation that suffers a military defeat, and of what has in fact befallen nations bigger and stronger than ourselves. We thank God that we have been spared the fate of many others. We are left to draw our own conclusions from this.

The one and only reason why we have been spared, as I have already said, was the faith and obduracy of our people, the soundness of their struggle and their faith in their own principles and in God.

The stand which our people took on 9 and 10 June was the noble manifestation of this very faith in themselves and in the soundness of their struggle, in their principles and in God.

This stand was the turning point of the crisis.

The stand our people took was the determining factor that dispelled the darkness which surrounded us, and made room for the rays of sunshine which we eagerly grasped and out of which we won a brighter and more promising day.

By taking this stand, our people proved that although a part of their land may fall under enemy occupation, no part of their determination shall ever succumb to the enemy.

It is not up to a piece of land to decide whether we accept defeat or whether we resolve to fight. Only the will of the people can do this and can bring back the occupied land and reclaim

the unachieved victory.

Moreover, should a piece of land fall into the hands of an enemy whose power and resources exceed ours, this constitutes neither a true defeat for us nor a true victory for the enemy. But, should the will of the people fall into the hands of the enemy and be held as hostage, then we should be truly defeated and the enemy truly victorious. To have been surprised by an enemy stronger than we had anticipated and whom we did not know how to confront is not defeat.

Even as we speak of all this, of arms, of occupied territory and of the determination of our people which the enemy could not defeat, we must not forget the aftermath of the six days of war in June. Immediately after the Six Day War of June, the situation was ominous. Our material losses were severe. Part of our territory had been occupied. We all felt the shock; each and every one of us felt the shock. The blow took every one of us by surprise; each one of us was taken aback by the outcome of the war. I too was taken by surprise, but not on the 8th or the 9th. I could already sense it by the 6th; I knew that disaster was coming. On the 8th I decided to resign for a very obvious reason; it was my responsibility. I believed, I was certain, that my speech of resignation would not cause repercussions. I could still feel the shock and I felt with each and every one of you, I felt with each and every one of our countrymen who had experienced the blow.

Someone had to assume the responsibility for all the promises that had been made and for all the hopes and aspirations that had been raised and that belonged to us all.

I thought that the people would lose faith in our ability to endure and to resist after our armed forces had suffered such a rapid military defeat.

I thought that because of this our people would be ready to accept a peaceful settlement whether with the United States of America or with the other Western countries that were hostile to us.

I thought that the people would see Gamal Abd an-Nasir as an obstacle to such a settlement. Therefore, on the evening of the 8th I took my decision and on the 9th I announced it in my speech to you.

We had all lost faith in almost everything.

As I told you, I had not expected the reaction that took place, nor less than it, for I thought that the shock and the defeat had brought us all to the brink of collapse.

I believe I was wrong in this. I think, however, that all our enemies expected us to collapse from the effect of the sudden blow.

At the time, while our enemies believed we should collapse from the effects of the sudden blow, our people came forward to manifest the power of their determination and to show that their will is indomitable and that neither material losses nor casualties could vanquish them. I want you to know that on the 9th and the 10th, when the people poured out into the streets in their thousands—no, in their millions—we had no means of defending the west bank of the Suez Canal. Today things have changed, and I am in a position to say so. The enemy had reached the east bank of the Canal and there wasn't a single soldier on the road leading from the Suez Canal to Cairo. The road to Cairo was open. We could not have put up the least resistance. Our armed forces at Port Fuad were completely paralysed; it was the popular resistance that occupied Port Fuad. Again, it was the popular resistance that occupied Port Said.

I also want to tell you that it was Zakaria Muhyiddin who, in his capacity as Commander of the popular resistance took charge on the 8th, at about ten o'clock in the evening. This was in view of the condition of our armed forces after the battles that had started on the 5th. Nevertheless, despite these circumstances, despite the condition we were all in—and I believe that our people knew our situation, for our communiqués had been quite clear; in fact, the communiqué that was issued on the morning of the 9th concerning the movements of the enemy, and the fact that he had crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal at certain points, made it quite clear what position we were in on that day, and the truth is, anyone who cared to take a look at the situation we were in would have found no difficulty in sensing that we had arrived at the point of total collapse—nevertheless, the people came forward to manifest the power of their determination, and to show that their will was indomitable, and that neither the loss of a military battle, nor the heavy material

losses, nor the loss of part of our territory, could ever vanquish such a will. The people came forward to reaffirm this fact, and it was the manifestation of the will of the people that caused the situation to change.

The situation changed entirely. It changed entirely without the intrusion of any new material factors. With the manifestation of the will of the people, the extremely bad situation changed immediately; I say this without the least exaggeration. As the obdurate determination of the people withstood the trials to which it was subjected daily, a change for the better was made possible, and it became possible to alter the situation. We can feel this change now, five months after the setback. After five months, the cumulative effect has been to bring about a comprehensive change which we can measure and take into account.

The change wrought by the determination of the people started at a time when the purely material factors in the military situation, that is, when the apparent manifestations of the armed conflict, made it obvious that we had lost nearly 80 per cent of our military equipment during the Six Day War, and that our armed forces were scattered and almost stunned from the sudden blow they had suffered. This meant, at the time, that we were no longer capable either of attacking or of defending ourselves. However, if we were, for the sake of comparison, to measure the facts by the same scale today, we could confidently assert that our armed forces have regained a significant portion of their military capabilities. I do not want to enter into details at this point, for this would only serve the enemy and not us.

Suffice it to say, however, that the actual military capabilities of our armed forces now exceed what they were before the war.

This is a huge, a staggering change which we had not even dreamed of achieving in such a short time.

What brought about this enormous change, or rather, what made it possible for this change to come about, was the will of the people, whose heroic, unwavering endurance on the political front absolutely refused to submit or yield.

It was this that allowed the steps of national reconstruction to be taken, and allowed them to

advance and to bring about the necessary material changes.

The changes that came about followed so fast in each other's footsteps that it was impossible to distinguish between them.

However, as we review these events, we can take them within the sweep of a comprehensive glance, and we can discern the different steps which were taken and relate them to one another. Let us review the events together:

First: the first change that came upon us after the defeat, after the setback, was that we were able to face the reality of the setback; we were able to absorb that fact and yet to retain our self-control and not lose faith in our ability to get over it.

It was we who called it a 'setback.' Before I wrote down the main points I wanted to bring up in this speech I had been reading letters that I had received. I received a letter from a man who wanted to know why we called what had happened a 'setback'? Didn't Britain suffer a defeat in Dunkirk during the second world war? Didn't Britain withdraw from Dunkirk? Why didn't Britain call that a 'setback'? Why did she take it as an opportunity to uplift her morale? Why did the leaders in Britain resolve to go on fighting, why did they say they had nothing to give but sweat and tears? They didn't call that defeat a 'setback' for their nation. How then is it that we called our defeat a 'setback'?

I must say that the man who wrote the letter was right. Why did we call it a 'setback'? My reply to him is that we called it a 'setback,' and perhaps I was the first to use that term, because of the way we felt at the time, on 8 and 9 June. The fact is, I too felt that we had suffered a major disaster. We were like a man who on stepping into the street had been run down by a car, by a tram, a man who had fallen to the ground, who couldn't move and who didn't know what to do. In fact, that is how we felt on 8 and 9 June. But a great and powerful change has come about since those days.

The factor responsible for this change is endurance. Were it not for the steadfast stand taken by our people and by the people throughout the Arab nation, we should not have been able to get on our feet; we should not have been able to declare, before the whole world, that although

we had lost some of our territory, although we had lost a military battle, yet we had not lost our determination; our will had not bowed down. The steps of change then followed in quick succession. The most important thing was that our people, with their long history of struggle, were able to face the facts. From the very first day they faced the facts and were able to absorb them. The people did not collapse, they took a grip on themselves. The people called on all their trust, and they believed that they could get over the defeat, that they could get over the setback.

What did it mean for us to lose 80 per cent of our military equipment, when we were still confronted with the enemy, and the enemy was in possession of our territory? What did it mean for us to lose so many dead, 10,000 soldiers dead, 1,500 officers dead in the battles that lasted from 5 to 8 June? That, on top of the prisoners that were taken, 5,000 soldiers taken prisoner, 500 officers? We have lost a great many of those enlisted in our armed forces. We have lost a great many of our sons, both officers and men, who died on the field of battle. After that, on the 8th, we had no cover to protect us from the enemy, as I have told you. The front had no cover, the cities had no cover either. It was exactly as I have told you. The front was unprotected, we had no lines of defence west of the Canal, we had no cover for our cities, we had absolutely no planes left to face the air force of the enemy should he decide to attack our cities. Despite the calamity that had befallen our air force on the 5th, despite the enemy's air superiority, our pilots went up to fight a suicidal battle. They met the planes of the enemy and they brought some of them down. We lost 40 air force officers, dead and wounded.

They did their duty, insofar as it lay in their hands. Their command, the command of the air force, evaluated the situation wrongly. It was responsible for the disaster that befell the air force on the morning of the 5th, and, consequently it was responsible for the outcome of the war. But we are capable of facing the truth, in spite of all that has happened to us. We were able to face the truth after those few days. It was clear from the first day that we had begun to pull ourselves together again and to reorganise our defences. We resolved to fight inch by inch. When the enemy decided to advance to Port

Fuad towards the end of June, we did not end the engagement at Ras al-Ish; we clashed with him, our armed forces stood up to him. Why did we take the risk, before our air force was back to normal and while the enemy had the chance to win a victory? But we did take the risk, and therein lay the difference, precisely in that we now realised what we were doing, with no self-deception. Self-deception at that time could have led to total disaster, a disaster that would have killed the possibility of any future hope. We did not, we did not deceive ourselves, we did not deceive our people. We were not deceived. We had to realise all this, we had to absorb all the side issues of what I have been telling you, we had to recover from our state of shock, to wake up from mental exhaustion, from the mental stress that it involved. We had to come to ourselves, for each of us had come to feel that he was living in a nightmare; none of us could believe what had happened.

We were awake to the change. We were able to determine the precise nature of the facts of our new situation. That was no easy matter. The most difficult is over, but I know that the traces that these matters have left will be with us for some time. Of course, this means that our trust was perhaps considerably shaken. For some, it was a heart-rending experience. This is specially true of the younger generation, who saw Israel occupy part of our land and who saw her armed forces reach the east bank of the Suez Canal. I saw a number of young people myself who were torn apart, who couldn't take it, who couldn't put up with the thought that Israel was there. How did she ever get to the east bank of the Canal? I say that some of the more difficult things will be with us for some time, yet I know that at times it disturbs some people to come across a critical attitude or an attitude that is not full of confidence that we shall overcome. The tension that people feel is only natural after what has happened, and in face of the question of how to be rid of Israel, how are we to get over what happened and to be rid of the tension we are under. There is mental stress upon all our people, upon the leadership, upon the masses, upon the youth. We should be careful at all times, I believe, to evaluate the psychological effect that the reaction of the people has upon its leadership, specially when the people are uneasy, when the people

display the stress they are under, when they display mental tension.

Personally, I think it is a miracle that people are able to trust in anything, after what happened in those six days.

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If we are carried away by our emotions we shall never be able to take the right decision. Just like anyone else among my countrymen, I, who am telling you this, have also gone through a phase when I was susceptible to my emotions. My speech to you on the 9th was a form of emotional reaction, as was my speech on the 10th, as were the events of the 11th. However, after that, we began to act, we began to move. Every one of us has to try to gain control of himself, to overcome his excitability. If we are to successfully pass through the stage that we are in, we have to get a hold on ourselves and to pass from the phase of reaction to the phase of action. This relates to our thinking, to our planning and to the execution of our plans. It calls for constant reexamination of every step we are about to take, for we are at a stage, at a point in time, when circumstances will not tolerate an accumulation of errors. This ends the first part of our review.

Second: we had to begin with the armed forces. As you all know, I took a decision to change all the commands of the armed forces. Thus I took on a task that could not have been any more difficult, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. It wasn't just a matter of a change in command; the change that was necessary in our armed forces was much deeper and wider in scope. There were certain elements that had taken advantage of the political situation of the armed forces. There were certain elements that wanted to exploit the political situation of the armed forces to gain positions of power. There were certain elements that had set themselves up as an exclusive class over the armed forces. Certain circumstances had allowed this to happen. Nevertheless, we must view these circumstances in their proper historical context. We must not forget that the armed forces were the means whereby the popular revolution was realised. That was not an easy task. Among the simplest by-products of such a situation, however, was that just such a class might appear. Naturally,

even as I say these things, you are asking yourselves questions and saying: "Well then, Gamal Abd an-Nasir, how is it that you did nothing about this?" Before the setback, people in this country thought that all Gamal Abd an-Nasir had to do to have whatever he wanted was to give an order and it would be carried out immediately, that in fact it would have to be carried out. Generally, the public does not know the insides of things, they do not know what goes on behind the scenes—this applies not only to us, but to all countries in the world. Struggle and competition are always there, the attraction of seats of power is always strong. There are different seats of power and different tendencies in this regime as in any other. Naturally, this was already the case in 1962. We tried to overcome it by instituting a Presidential Council and by changing the system. However, we could not overcome the problem. Quite often it was the compromise solution that proved to be workable and safe if we were to avoid clashes that could have serious consequences.

The 9th and the 10th saw the beginning of a problem for me. To tell the truth, perhaps in saying what I did on the 9th about wanting to step down I was being selfish. Had I stepped down on the 9th, had I gone my own way, in addition to the considerations I then mentioned, I, as a man, would have been greatly relieved. However, ever since the 10th, ever since I made up my mind to stay on, I have resolved not to accept compromise solutions. I resolved to come to terms with all issues in the way I believe to be right and proper, in the way I believe I have to come to terms with them if we are to avoid a repetition of certain tragedies which we suffered, tragedies whose consequences we saw on the 9th.

However, that allowed me no rest either. Since the 10th it has caused me endless problems. The first problem I ran into right after the 10th was on the 11th. You do not know what took place on the 11th. On the 11th there was trouble within the armed forces after I had issued—or rather as a consequence of my issuing—an order for the appointment of a new Commander in Chief for the armed forces and for the replacement of all the chiefs of staff at that time. I was convinced that I could not accept any compromise solution in this matter, for any compromise

solution would have led to a repetition of the tragedies. It was imperative for us, from that day on, to keep clear of any compromise solutions in our dealings with the armed forces. Our armed forces had to take on the true character of armed forces. It was not simply a matter of a change in command; the change had to be much more far-reaching. We had to get rid of those elements that had taken advantage of the political status of the armed forces and were using the armed forces as a means of access to seats of power. We also had to get rid of those elements that had set themselves up as an exclusive class over the armed forces.

We got rid of those elements which, when our readiness was put to the test, had proved to be incompetent. We got rid of those elements which, when tried under fire on the field of battle, had fallen short of the level of responsibility demanded on the field of battle.

In the light of what we learned from the setback, even while the battle was in full swing, we had already started rebuilding our armed forces.

To give credit where it is due, I must say that the task of rebuilding the armed forces was not difficult in itself, if we set aside the difficulties that were due purely to the circumstances we were in, for it was possible to carry out this task only because of the trust, because of the understanding and the awareness of the members of the armed forces, officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

The courage of those men could not overcome the consequences of the mismanagement of the battle. Nevertheless they defied death, they gave of themselves, they gave freely and generously. They gave us our heroes and our martyrs.

True, there were individuals who were not up to their responsibilities. But there was not one unit of our armed forces that left its post without orders. It was clear that the command organisation of the armed forces was thrown into disarray from the very start of the battle and from the moment they felt the shock of the initial blow that was delivered to our air force. God knows it was no real surprise, and we could have dealt with it. But let us not talk about that any more, let us not talk about it except where it is necessary to extract the lesson it has to teach us

and where it is necessary to call those responsible to account, as is being done now. What is relevant is that our men did fight when they got a chance to fight, and they fought like men. The response we met in the task of rebuilding the armed forces was a further indication of the willingness of our men. The response came at once and made it possible for us to immediately strengthen our lines of resistance. We learned, from experience, that men count more than arms. The issue then, is not an issue of laying up stores of arms; it is the ability to use those arms. The effort that is now being put into the armed forces, the training effort, the effort at preparedness, deserves to be recognised by the nation; it deserves the admiration of the nation. God willing, when tested, it will have a chance to prove its true worth. It is truly an unbelievable effort, a superhuman effort.

I assure you that our soldiers, our officers, the junior officers, the senior officers, the high command of our armed forces, are all working ceaselessly on training in the use of arms.

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Fourth: as I present you with this review, as I talk about the attempt to gain control over the leadership of the army, I want this honourable Assembly to be aware that for me this topic is charged with emotions over which I have no control. In the final analysis, when all is said and done, man is man. Over this issue I have lost the closest person to me, closest of all. Nevertheless, the situation was creating a split in the army. I had to take a drastic decision. I had refused categorically to make a choice. I had even refused to talk to any of you, although I knew that you had heard about it and were wondering, although I knew that a great many of you were wondering. I had absolutely refused to discuss it. However, when this situation began to affect the army, when it began to affect the armed forces and it looked as if we were heading for civil war and there was danger of a serious split, I had to take a decision. There were certain adventurers who, caring for nothing but their own interests and the privileges they had acquired, were out to protect these interests and privileges at any cost. Others had been beguiled by them.

I believe that the task of defeating the attempt to create a split in the army and in the armed

forces of the nation was all-important under these circumstances, for it purged the national effort of elements that were undermining it and that threatened to bring about an explosion of incalculable impact. I had to take a decision to that effect in spite of the conflict within me. I took that decision on 25 August when I learned of the situation. Certain officers from the army came and told me that the General Intelligence Service was to be liquidated, because it had deviated. Different people came and told me about the operation that was being planned, people from the army, people from the air force. I had to take a decision and I had to act on the basis of that decision regardless of emotional considerations. The nation had to be saved. Regardless of the consequences, I thank God that we were able to keep this nation from disaster.

Fifth: as for Arab action and our achievements in that sphere, the battle dictated the mobilisation of the sum total of all the forces of the Arab world. As you all know, from the beginning, contacts had been made with those nations and forces that took an active part in the battle. Still, we hoped that all would join in the battle according to the full capacity of the means at their disposal.

This objective was realised to a large extent at Khartum. In Khartum, moreover, we agreed upon the principles of no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, and no recognition of Israel. There would be no unilateral action in the case of the issue of Palestine.

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In Khartum, we reached an agreement on financial support, by which we received 95 million pounds sterling. Unfortunately, this sum has decreased by 14 per cent in the last few days with the devaluation of sterling. All the Arab nations concerned have risen to the level of their responsibilities. The agreement we reached in Khartum was not in terms of sterling, nor was it in terms of dollars. We shall talk about the dollar later on. The enemy had pinned his hopes on imposing an economic blockade on us. They predicted that by December or January, as a result of the closing of the Suez Canal, the drop in our oil revenues and the loss of the oil in Sinai, we should not be able to buy wheat, and would have

to go hungry. However, we, on our part, perhaps because of our fear of precisely such a thing happening, had been careful and had spared no effort to ensure that we would have wheat for as long as possible. We had felt that our enemies would try to starve us into surrendering. For that reason, we had wheat to last us a long time, and the agreement for financial support that was concluded in Khartum was a great help.

Sixth: increasing our production capacity naturally required effort in production, an effort that was made under battle conditions.

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We are now transforming our economy into a wartime economy that can withstand a long war. We have taken this as a basis for our economic policy. If we are to stand fast, our economy must be a wartime economy that is able to withstand a long-drawn-out war, for the enemy will leave no weapon at his disposal unused, including economic pressure.

Seventh: as for our role in the international sphere, there were those who thought that we should be isolated from the other nations of the world. This did not come about. We worked day in and day out to enlarge the circle of our friends and diminish that of our enemies, and we drew closer to this goal every day. I believe that such freedom of action at the international level is imperative; we cannot deal with the crisis which we face if we are paralysed and if this paralysis extends to the international level. There remains nothing to prevent us from acting as much as we can.

Our old friendship with the Soviet Union proved to be invaluable to us in facing this crisis. The Soviet Union, from the first day of the war, showed itself to be a worthy ally. After the war, they helped us to replace the equipment we had lost, and they gave us economic support and political support. When Ali Sabri visited Moscow, he had a long meeting with Brezhnev, in the course of which Brezhnev told him that the Soviet Union supported the Arabs and the United Arab Republic. They promised us political and economic support; they promised to help us build up our armed forces.

India stood by us in all ways throughout the crisis. She stood by us in the United Nations

despite the American pressure to which she was subjected.

Yugoslavia stood by us in the crisis. President Tito visited us here and went on to visit Syria and Iraq. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, also visited us.

As for the Afro-Asian nations, there was the Afro-Asian proposal presented at the United Nations. I mention Mali and Nigeria in particular, and the support of Ethiopia. Then there were the Islamic countries, especially Pakistan, and the stand they took on the issue of Jerusalem. These resolutions were adopted with a clear majority in the United Nations.

Then there was the stand of France, under President de Gaulle. De Gaulle took a stand against the aggressor and he banned the shipment of arms to the aggressor. De Gaulle well knows that the entire Arab nation, that the entire Arab world, in fact the entire world, will not forget the role he played in the second World War when France was subjected to aggression. The whole world knows that he is a man of principle. He was truly so in this crisis and under these circumstances. Despite the pressures to which he was subjected, he stood by us.

As for the United Nations, we had to take action in the United Nations to keep Israel from deluding the world into believing that she is a peace-loving state, whereas in fact she was the aggressor. Israel presents herself to the world as a tiny nation of two and a half million people surrounded by one hundred million Arabs who are out to annihilate her and to kill every last Israeli. Israel is always saying that the Arabs are getting ready to attack. Before 5 June, she had the whole world believing that she was a small defenceless country that was threatened with aggression. If we were to leave the field clear for Israel in the United Nations to talk about peace without being interrupted, she would really play the role to the hilt. Israel says that we are guilty of guile and deceit when we talk about peace, that we are telling lies. The idea behind this is to show the world that Israel is a peaceable country, that the Arabs do not want peace, that they want war for the sake of war.

We had to take action in the United Nations not to let Israel get away with this. I believe we have been successful. This is evident from the

international Western press. The Western press has begun to grasp the true character of Israel, particularly since Eshkol and the other leaders of Israel made those statements about Greater Israel.

We even went half way to meet Britain. We had severed relations with Britain, and then one day I received a letter from George Brown, saying: How long are we going to go on without diplomatic representation? We must talk about reestablishing relations. The speeches he had delivered at the United Nations had, in fact, been encouraging and had been on the side of justice. Furthermore, seeing that the outcome of the war in South Arabia had become clear, seeing that the British had withdrawn from the southern part of the Arabian peninsula, leaving a nationalist regime behind, and considering the stand that Britain had taken on the issue of Jerusalem, we felt that we had to respond. This we did, to the point of reestablishing political and diplomatic relations. We closed no avenues that were open to us, we did not sever our ties with the world. Furthermore, we only reestablished relations with Britain after we had consulted the Arab and African states which had gone along with us in severing relations with Britain. We acted for we had to act, for our battle is an all-embracing war, a war that encompasses the whole world. We could not allow ourselves to be surrounded, we had to turn the tables and work towards isolating the enemy, rather than let ourselves be isolated.

Even in the case of the United States, despite the bitterness that we feel towards the attitude of the United States, towards the fact that it invariably supports Israel at the United Nations, that it supplies her with arms, gives her financial aid, in fact, her alliance with Israel, which the Israeli leaders themselves avow—the Israeli leaders say that their chief ally is the United States—nevertheless, despite all that, despite the attitude of the United States towards us, we are, after all, fighting for our destiny. We cannot fight the battle with anger alone. We were angry for all these reasons, yet, even though we felt as we did, Riyadh was meeting with Rusk, their Secretary of State, and he was also meeting with Goldberg, their representative at the United Nations.

Then they lifted the restriction banning U.S. citizens from visiting the U.A.R. We, in turn, welcomed this decision.

It is no easy war that we have to fight in the world. We cannot afford to stand idle. We cannot accept any restrictions upon our freedom of action, except where we are bound by our own principles. We cannot be lax in observing our principles, no matter what the cost. Were we to be lax in this, were our principles flexible, what cause would there be for this war or for any other war, for that matter?

Where, then, do we stand now?

There is no field in which we are not active. Moreover, there is one significant field which is, at present, more open to change than any other. I speak of the political field. But let me make my meaning clear to you and to the entire Arab nation.

There is a principle, a basic principle, in which I believe and in which my faith is unshakable:

Whatever is taken by force can only be regained by force.

This is a law.

Your applause just now reminds me of a letter I read three days ago. One of our fellow-citizens had sent me a letter to tell me that I seemed to be afraid, that the people had noticed that my tone had changed, that I no longer spoke as I used to. What I want to tell him is that the issue is not an issue of fear or courage. The issue is not whether Gamal Abd an-Nasir is afraid or not. Had it been a personal issue, the solution would have been simple. No, the issue is far more complex than that. We must all come to realise that force can be manifested at many levels. Force begins, at the simplest level, with the power of political action, and then escalates until it reaches the level of military action.

Political action is the use of a certain kind of power. It is an exercise of force at a particular level. When it is escalated to its most violent degree, military action results.

What I have to tell you is that neither can replace the other. There is no absolute line of separation between the two, one does not preclude the other. There is nothing to prevent us, while awaiting the result of political action, from prepar-

ing for military action, should this prove to be the road which we must take.

Regarding political and military action, let me define our position to you, briefly but clearly. I hope that I shall not be forced to go into great detail.

First and foremost, we need time to complete our military preparations.

I shall not be letting out a secret if I tell you that we have now acquired the potential with which to defend ourselves. It would have been highly irresponsible for us, as it would have been in vain, to talk about taking military action before we were ready to defend ourselves. Indeed, there was a time, following the setback, when our lines could not have borne the brunt of an attack. Our skies were undefended, our factories, our cities, our villages were all defenceless before the enemy. Had I stood before you then, as I do now, and talked of military action, I would have been selling you a line of goods or I would have been deceiving you, and this I cannot do.

Furthermore, we are resolved, should the time come to take military action, not to find ourselves in a defensive position. In other words, we must be prepared to take on the responsibility for attack.

We are prepared to attack to cleanse our land of military occupation, which is no more than our legitimate right. However, we shall have to be able to do it. To undertake such a thing before we are capable of it would be a grievous error, in fact, it would be a crime. We cannot afford another military setback. For suffering a setback is not like catching a cold or the flu, which a person may catch every now and then, every six months, or every four, three or even every two months. The setback was an event in the history of Egypt that must never be repeated.

The crux of the matter is that having already suffered a setback, if we ever decide on the necessity of military action, we can allow for no alternative but victory. In such a case, there can be no alternative to victory. The outcome would be no simple defeat. No victory would mean death.

It takes time and effort to move from the stage of defensive military readiness to the stage where we shall be ready to take the offensive.

Even as we move towards the completion of

our military preparations, however, we do not hesitate to try political action. In fact, we welcome it. War is not an end in itself, our objective is the same as the principle for which we stand: it is the liberation of our land, the restitution of our usurped rights.

Let the whole world know that we are no advocates of war. But should war prove to be inevitable we shall show that we are warriors, we are making preparations for war and for all the eventualities of war. Nevertheless, even as we prepare for war, should political action prove to be capable of liberating our territories, of restoring to us our usurped rights and of sustaining us in our principles, how could we then refuse? Were we to refuse, we should not be true to our international responsibilities. Were that to happen, we should find ourselves very much alone. Our friends have taken a stand by our side, not for the love of war itself, but on principle, for the sake of the land, in the name of justice.

If, however, political action should prove incapable of sustaining, of defending, of preserving these principles, then our friends, or rather, the entire world, will appreciate our position in having recourse to war. Moreover, they will not only take an appreciative stand, they will lend us support. All will stand by us without hesitation, knowing full well that we fight not for our principles alone, but for every principle, not for the sake of our territories alone, but in the name of every usurped territory, not for our cause alone, but for every just cause.

Furthermore, should political measures prove incapable of attaining the objectives of our struggle, we shall have lost nothing thereby. We shall have gained the necessary means of power, we shall then be confident of their effectiveness, and we shall have gained the greatest possible support for our legitimate war.

That, in brief but with no ambiguity, is the situation as I see it. I hope that this honourable Assembly will share my view.

As far as I am concerned, I shall not take a single step unless I am certain of the results. We must learn from experience.

Let me say, nevertheless, that we are not prepared to listen to those who advocate immediate war. These people have never been in a war

in their lives, and they have no intention of being in one.

The political endeavour that is in progress started while the fighting was still going on. At the time, the United Nations issued a cease-fire ultimatum. However, under the influence of barefaced American pressure, the United Nations, for the first time in its history, failed to follow up its cease-fire resolution with a demand for the withdrawal of the troops involved in combat to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

We all know what happened. After that, the U.S.S.R. called for an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, attended the session, as did a number of prime ministers and heads of state.

To tell the truth, neither we nor our friends attached any great hopes to the session, as far as the elimination of the consequences of the aggression was concerned. The main thing about the session was to awaken world public opinion and to goad the international community into action. The wide-ranging discussions that took place achieved a great deal of progress in this respect. The world came to see Israel in quite a different light than that in which she attempts to present herself. The world came to see her as a tool in the hands of the forces of imperialism, as being first and foremost an instrument for aggression and for intimidation.

Why did we not hang any great hopes, hopes that could be materialised, on the outcome of this session? For a very good reason, namely, that political measures are only worth anything insofar as one backs them up with force or with the promise of force, and insofar as one is willing to run the risk involved in so doing. At the time we had not regained any significant portion of our forces.

Then came the ordinary session of the United Nations. To tell the truth, we did not wait with bated breath for a decision from the United Nations, whether from the Security Council or from the General Assembly. At the same time, we were not out to create obstacles either, or to shelve the issue.

The most important thing for us was that the advance made in our capacity for military action should continue, for that constitutes the

true measure in all things: our capacity to resist is what determines the amount of pressure that will have to be brought to bear upon us as well as the effectiveness of that pressure.

During the ordinary session of the United Nations we neither waited with bated breath, nor did we place obstacles in the way. We cooperated with all in the political effort that was being made, we cooperated with those who were our friends. When the discussions of the General Assembly were over, we requested that the Middle East crisis be placed on the agenda of the Security Council in order to draw the attention of the world to the aggression which had not yet come to an end.

In the course of the contacts that were made, it was suggested that the non-permanent members of the Security Council should put forward a proposal. India then put forward an Afro-Asian proposal that enjoyed the warm and frank support of both Nigeria and Mali. In our opinion, had that proposal been adopted, it would have provided certain basic guarantees.

However, let me repeat what I have said yet once more. I want the people of the Arab nation to know that there can be no adequate guarantee except our readiness to take up arms at any time in defence of our principles, of our land and of justice.

Afterwards, Denmark put forward a proposal which we immediately rejected. The United States also put forward a proposal which we immediately rejected as well. Then Britain came forward with a proposal which was an attempt to reconcile certain central points of the Afro-Asian proposal with those of the proposals of the Western powers. In our opinion, the British proposal is not adequate for a sound solution to the crisis. After that came the last Soviet proposal which was both reasonable and balanced. It became obvious that the U.S.S.R. had done well to put it forward, for it at least succeeded in bringing pressure to bear which caused a certain interpretation to be given to a number of points in the British proposal which was adopted by the Security Council.

Nevertheless, in spite of the interpretations given to the proposal during the Security Council session—India did so before agreeing to the British proposal, as did the U.S.S.R. and France—on

which basis the proposal was put to the vote, and then adopted by the Security Council, yet despite the fact that these interpretations did clarify certain points in the proposal where it was necessary, the British proposal remains inadequate in our view.

In any case, I repeat—and this I shall never tire of repeating—we can have no guarantee except that which we can provide by virtue of the power we possess and by virtue of our readiness to take up arms. It has been proved that written phrases have no value, and that all turns of phrase tend to melt and flow under the heat of the guns.

Can we acquire effective potential for military action or not? That is the question. Nothing else will serve.

What are we to do with the United Nations resolution? For our part, we are studying it in consultation with our friends. However, as far as we are concerned, there are two definite points which are not open to discussion and over which there can be no give-and-take. The first of these is that there must be a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories, from every inch of territory that was occupied during the June war, whether in the United Arab Republic, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan or in the Syrian Arab Republic. As far as we are concerned, this is one point over which there can be no give-and-take. The second point is the fact that we shall never allow Israel the right of passage through the Suez Canal, regardless of what this may cost us. Passage through the Suez Canal is part and parcel of the original issue of Palestine and is not part of the issue of the elimination of the consequences of the aggression.

Beyond these two points, we are bound by the four points of the Arab Summit Conference at Khartum: no recognition of Israel, no peace with Israel, no negotiations and no unilateral action on the Palestine cause, for that cause belongs to the people of Palestine.

Brothers; In view of this, we believe that the turn of events makes it imperative that we now start thinking about holding an Arab Conference at the summit level.

The United Nations resolution constitutes a development which we must discuss together. We must study it as we must study what is to come afterwards, for which we must prepare and

be on the alert.

We believe that unified Arab action, whose effectiveness was brought out at Khartum, must continue to be possible. It must continue in the role it has to play to the very end of the crisis. Even after the crisis passes, it must be allowed full scope. Should we succeed, we believe that a new Arab order may be born which will give a powerful impulse to the world in this age of large economic communities, with its demands for technology, abundant resources and free markets.

The Arab nations cannot develop as they should or at the rate that they should while each remains separate and isolated from the others. Questions have been asked as to how two and a half million Israelis could defeat one hundred million Arabs? The truth of the matter is that the two and a half million Israelis mobilised the potential that they have as well as that of those who stand behind them. The one hundred million Arabs, on the other hand, failed to mobilise their potential, whether military or economic. What I am saying now requires, first and foremost, that the Arab League should be developed on a large scale and that it should receive support on a scale enough to enable it to fulfil its role as an organisation: to bring about effective economic, political and cultural unity. This issue deserves our attention.

Nevertheless, the immediate issue, the elimination of the traces of the aggression, ought to be the first item on the agenda of the proposed conference. What are we to do with the Security Council resolution? In our opinion, the subject should be brought up for general discussion, despite the fact that in itself it is not very significant. No resolution that issues from the Security Council means anything in itself. The case would not be different even if it were the Afro-Asian proposal that had been adopted or even if it were the Soviet proposal. There is a vast difference between a resolution and a solution. In our opinion, what matters is not the intricately woven and vague expressions out of which the United Nations resolutions are formulated. What matters is what actually takes place—will Israel in fact withdraw from all territories she occupied in the June war or not? This is the hard and fast line that separates words from deeds. As far as we

are concerned, we believe that time is on our side. If we are not given enough time, we shall ask for it, because time is needed for the sole sufficient guarantee of any political measure having effective force: I refer to the extent of our readiness for offensive military action.

What I want to say to you—and I am prepared to accept full responsibility for all that I say—is that Israel is not an unconquerable adversary. That is a superstition for which there is no place. I say this in full view of all the lessons that the setback had to teach us, and I say it after a detailed study of all the circumstances attending the setback. It was our faulty grasp of the situation that was responsible for the defeat, rather than any overwhelming superiority on the part of the enemy.

We shall have to fight a different kind of war. We have to overcome all our shortcomings, to mobilise all our potential and our resources; these are sufficient, and quite effective.

Despite all the negotiations that have gone on at the United Nations concerning political solutions and the prospects for these, we agreed, in the cabinet, to go ahead and transform our entire economy into a wartime economy. For, as I said, no resolution of a political nature is worth anything. The decisive factor is what takes place in fact. There were many resolutions passed by the United Nations, in 1947, 1948 and in 1949. None of these resolutions was implemented. A political resolution has value in one case only: depending on the measure of force we can exert in support of our rights. We even believe that the attainment of a certain degree of power might be a substitute for its actual exercise.

As far as we are concerned, the battle to eliminate the consequences of the aggression will not be over until the consequences of the aggression are actually eliminated.

Time is on our side, not on the side of the enemy. As I have said, we are growing stronger every day. In my opinion, the true challenge that we face is to abstain from the use of power until we have all the power we need. The enemy must not be allowed to incite us, until such time as is suitable, such time as we deem suitable. Last time, the enemy struck at the time and place of his choosing. We are determined to reserve the same right for ourselves—whenever circumstances

demand such action.

Experience has shown that we are indeed suited for military action. The naval engagement that took place within our territorial waters, off Port Said, is proof of this. The enemy fancied that he could do whatever he pleased, and sent the destroyer *Eilat* to parade in front of Port Said. Our light torpedo boats went out to meet it; and the result of the engagement was that the tiny crews of our boats managed to sink the large destroyer that was equipped with the most modern electronic equipment. Our men went into battle and they left no room for doubt concerning their competence. What did the enemy do? The enemy shelled our refineries in Suez.

Certain people have written to me, asking why I was afraid to strike back at Israel. They said that our forces had struck at Israel in Suez, and that Madkour Abul-Izz had wanted to strike at Israel herself but that I was not willing and that was why I had him replaced. None of this is true.

We have plans for retaliation; we have to have plans for retaliation—if they hit us we hit them. But when do we escalate? In my opinion, to have escalated at that time would not have been to our benefit. It would have been a mistake. That is why we decided to leave it at the level of artillery exchanges; we defined the scope of our retaliation. The enemy suffered heavy casualties. It was the exchange of artillery fire that restricted the damages we suffered in the refineries. It was said that we suffered 80 per cent damages, that they amounted to 100 million pounds. That is not true. We remained silent at the time, we did not expose the lie. What was said was not true. I shall not give the true figures, for I have no intention of giving the enemy free information. Suffice it to say however, that the damages we suffered at Suez were limited, and that was due to the intervention of our artillery against the enemy's artillery positions.

This gives us some idea of the difference between the kind of war we are fighting and the kind of war that the enemy is fighting. We fought a military battle, whereas the enemy is fighting what is primarily a war of terrorism. We have evacuated large numbers of the inhabitants of Suez and Ismailia, because we know that the enemy has us by the throat in Suez and Ismailia.

Should an exchange break out between our forces and his, the enemy can direct his artillery fire at civilians, killing many people. This factor had us constantly under pressure. That is why we decided to evacuate a large number of people, and did so.

I believe that battles have to be fought according to sound military principles alone. We cannot allow our battles to be run according to strategies concocted in clubs, at parties and in newspaper editorials. We simply cannot. I have restricted the scope of the battle. That was the sound thing to do. When we do decide to escalate our operations, we must not accept to do so on the enemy's terms. We shall escalate on our own terms, and in those situations that best suit our plans. Moreover, as I told you, time is on our side. Our forces grow stronger every day. That is a significant point.

The territories that the enemy has occupied are larger than his capacity to control them. Furthermore, the Palestinian resistance movement is growing more intense. This is a positive factor that now has its own contribution to make to the overall battle. The Jews tell us in their communiqués that they are hunting down the members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the members of Fateh. They say that they have captured members of Fateh and some of its commanders, that they have captured Palestinian commandos. This means that the Palestinian resistance movement is growing more intense.

Such resistance is the right of every one whose country is under occupation. We must realise that the enemy is waging psychological warfare against us on a very wide scale, and in accordance with the most modern methods. We must be well aware, however, that despite all such campaigns, Israel will never succeed in imposing her will on the entire Arab nation. Furthermore, Israel will never succeed in imposing her will upon the Arab people in Egypt. The Arab people in Egypt, with all the human, economic, political and military resources at their command, are resolute, and they will carry this resolution with them to the field of battle and make its effect felt, God willing; they will grasp victory with their own hands, regardless of the danger or the difficulties involved. If the Arab nation succeeds in

persevering in the exercise of unified action along the same lines as those on which it started at Karthum—and we believe that it will succeed in this—then the final result, in our opinion, will be unlimited in its scope and its effects.

We are witnessing the end of the age of imperialism in the Arab part of the world, the age of British imperialism in the Arab world. This is a miracle that revolutionary endeavour has achieved in our generation. When our generation was born, the British imperial presence had a tight grip on the Arab world. That strong hold has been broken. The people have been liberated, all the bases of imperialism have fallen, and we hope, we strive, we shall do battle to ensure that every last trace of both the old form of imperialism and of neo-imperialism is erased from the Arab homeland. The remaining foreign military bases must go. Neo-imperialism must not be allowed to replace traditional imperialism. Our struggle against this is incessant; nothing can turn us aside from it, whether it be the psychological warfare waged by our imperialist enemies and Israel to cause us to lose faith in ourselves or our leaders, to sow the seeds of dissension between the army and the leadership or between the people and the leaders or to undermine our power to endure. I am confident that, with God's help, we shall win this war, and we shall win it. But if we are to win the military battle we must first win the psychological war.

I hear that they are writing articles intended to cause the people to lose faith in our armed forces and to cause the armed forces to lose faith in the people, to cause a breakdown between the people and the armed forces. This kind of psychological warfare is nothing new to us. We have been submitted to psychological warfare for fifteen years. It did not affect us in 1956 and it did not affect us in 1957 either. Even the act of secession did not affect us.

Fellow-citizens, members of the National Assembly, we have spoken of what has taken place and of what is taking place now. We must also take a swift glance at the future. As we speak of military preparations and of the probability of the outbreak of a war in which we may be called upon to take part in the defence of our principles, of our territories and of right, we must be aware that the strength of the home front

is the foundation on which everything rests. It is the basis of all endurance, of every battle, of every victory. The decisive factor that prevented a limited military defeat in the field from turning into an overwhelming defeat for the entire nation was the strength of the home front on 9 and 10 June. The enemy is concentrating his most vicious attacks upon the home front, and is supported in these attacks by huge and arrogant powers whose resources and whose capacity to wage psychological warfare are far greater than we can imagine. They want to make the people doubt their political leadership, doubt their national armed forces, doubt their own revolutionary achievements. They want to make revolutionary forces doubt each other, and make them doubt other Arab forces. Their object is to create doubt about everything.

Fellow citizens, members of the National Assembly; Setbacks are transient occurrences in the life of peoples, but peoples are always stronger than setbacks in their faith, their steadfastness, their work, their struggle and their determination to advance regardless of the obstacles in their way.

This Arab nation—and our people is one of its peoples—is capable and is stronger than all passing occurrences and more lasting. Its decisive and honourable victory is, with God's will and support, inevitable.

May He guide your steps and peace be with you.

445

Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organisation Rejecting the British Solution Embodied in the U.N. 22 November Resolution.¹

Cairo, November 23, 1967

Having studied the British resolution adopted by the Security Council on the Israeli aggression

against Arab territories of June 1967, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, in behalf of the Palestinian people, hereby defines its attitude to the said resolution as follows:

1. The resolution as a whole is in the nature of a political declaration of general principles, and is more like an expression of international intentions than the resolution of an executive power. Its treatment of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli forces is superficial, rather than being a decisive demand. It leaves Israel many loopholes to justify her continued occupation of Arab territories, and may be interpreted as permitting her to withdraw from such territories as she chooses to withdraw from and to retain such areas as she wishes to retain.

2. The resolution more than once refers to Israel's right to exist and to establish permanent, recognised frontiers. It also refers to Israel's safety and security and to her being freed from all threats, and, in general to the termination of the state of belligerency with her. All this imposes on the Arab countries undertakings and a political and actual situation which are fundamentally and gravely inconsistent with the Arab character of Palestine, the essence of the Palestine cause and the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland. This resolution completely undermines the foundations of the principles announced by the Khartoum Summit Conference held after the aggression.

3. The resolution ignores the right of the refugees to return to their homes, dealing with this problem in an obscure manner which leaves the door wide open to efforts to settle them in the Arab countries and to deprive them of the exercise of their right to return, thereby annulling the resolutions adopted by the United Nations over the past twenty years.

4. The resolution recognises the right of passage through international waterways, by which it means the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Granted that the Canal is an international waterway, this right cannot be exercised by a state which has engaged in usurpation and aggression, especially inasmuch as this usurpation and aggression were directed against an Arab country. The Gulf of Aqaba constitutes Arab internal waters, and its shores include a coastal area belonging to Palestine occupied by Israel through

¹ *Al-Alam*, Rabat, 13/12/1967. For the text of the resolution, see *ante*, doc. 268.

an act of usurpation and aggression. The principle of freedom of innocent passage is not applicable to the Gulf of Aqaba, especially as regards Israel.

5. The resolution includes provisions for the sending on a mission of a personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This is no more than a repetition of unsuccessful attempts in the past, beginning with the dispatch of Count Bernadotte and ending with the formation of the International Conciliation Commission. All these attempts provided Israel with repeated opportunities to impose the *fait accompli* and to engage in further aggression and expansion.

6. The resolution as a whole validates Israel's attitude and her demands and disappoints the hopes of the Arab nation and ignores its national aspirations. The conflicting interpretations of the resolution made by members of the Security Council have weakened it even further, and it is not too much to say that the resolution is a political setback at the international level following the military setback which has befallen the Arab homeland.

For these reasons, the most important of which is that the Security Council ignores the existence of the Palestinian people and their right of self-determination, the Palestine Liberation Organisation hereby declares its rejection of the Security Council resolution as a whole and in detail. In so doing it is not only confirming a theoretical attitude, but also declaring the determination of the Palestinian people to continue their revolutionary struggle to liberate their homeland. The Palestine Liberation Organisation is fully confident that to achieve this sacred aim the Arab nation will meet its national responsibilities to mobilise all its resources for this battle of destiny, with the support of all forces of liberation throughout the world.

446

Comment by an Official Syrian Government Spokesman on the 22 November Resolution of the U.N. Security Council.¹

Damascus, November 23, 1967

The British proposal adopted by the Security Council amounts to a dangerous international confirmation of the principle of solving problems by armed force. It is also a piece of undisguised bargaining over the essential problem of Palestine in return for a vague promise of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from certain recently occupied Arab territories. As such it is absolutely and resolutely rejected by the Syrian Arab Republic, nor is it in any way conceivable that the Arab people should accept it. Britain, which was the first and principal cause of all the disasters and tribulations that have befallen the Palestinian people since the Balfour Declaration is, in drafting this resolution, continuing to perform her historic imperialist task of perpetuating and consolidating aggression and expansion and giving them a form of international legality. At the Special Extraordinary Session the Arabs unanimously rejected proposals less important than the British one that was adopted yesterday, and it is inconceivable that they should today accept this one, which makes Arab territory the object of bargaining, imposes the *fait accompli* of Zionist occupation and tries to compel the Arab nation to recognise this *fait accompli*, to guarantee Israel's new frontiers and to prevent the evicted Arab people of Palestine from exercising their legitimate right to struggle for self-determination, a right guaranteed by the principles of the United Nations and all international law. The British proposal also nullifies the Truce and all previous Security Council and United Nations resolutions on the Palestine problem and the old demilitarised zones, even calling for new demilitarised zones and demanding freedom of navigation in Arab waterways. What it amounts to, in fact, is that the Security Council and the United Nations are rewarding Israel's treacherous aggression and encouraging her to further acts of aggression and continued expansion. It thus constitutes a dangerous precedent in international relations, whose

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 24/11/1967.

consequences will be felt by all the peoples of the world.

The Syrian Arab Republic is unshakable in its refusal to make any concessions in the interest of the aggressors. Its attitude is consistent with the United Nations Charter, and with the principles of international law. The Syrian Arab Republic calls on the Arab people to depend on themselves, first and foremost, and to prepare themselves for endurance, sacrifice and long struggle to recover their usurped homeland.

447

Speech of Kuwaiti Ruler Shaikh Sabah as-Salim as-Sabah at the Opening of the Third Conference of Arab Labour Ministers.¹
[Excerpt]

Kuwait, November 25, 1967

Brothers; However frequent and varied, Arab meetings do in fact support that Arab solidarity for which we are so profoundly concerned. We believe that studied collective action will realise many of our aims and aspirations, and the events that we have recently experienced provide us all with an incentive to rise to our great responsibilities. We are today more aware, and have a better understanding of, the magnitude of the perils that threaten our existence and our future as an ancient nation with a glorious past, which has played a civilising role since ancient times, faithfully handing on to the world its heritage of ancient civilisation, after developing this civilisation to such an extent that all the peoples of the world have benefited from it. Today, too, we believe more strongly in the need for Arab solidarity as the basis of positive united action to meet the challenges and confront the situations that face us. The more firmly united our ranks the greater will be our strength and faith to surmount the difficulties that beset our path as we perform our civilising mission. We shall work with all our might to restore security and stability to the

Middle East, so that our peoples may recover their natural station and play their role as the vanguard in the establishment of right, justice, security and peace in international society.

We here in Kuwait are giving this trend much of our attention and care, especially in view of the fact that we are confronted with a question of destiny that requires that all of us dedicate our efforts and resources to convincing all men of true understanding that right is permanent and that wrong passes away, and that imperishable glory belongs to those peoples who defend their honour and their rights.

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448

Interview Statements by U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riyadh on the Current Situation.²
[Excerpts]

Cairo, November 28, 1967

Q. Are we now on firm ground? Is our situation clear to us?

A. Yes, certainly, our position in the international sphere has greatly improved.

Q. Are you referring to the Security Council's adoption of the British proposal?

A. Before we talk about any Security Council resolution, let us agree on a clear and definite answer to a clear and definite question, a question which every citizen would do well to ask himself. How are we to think of the United Nations and of the resolutions passed by the United Nations? Are we to direct our political and diplomatic efforts merely to having a resolution passed by the Security Council or by the General Assembly of the United Nations? What I want every Arab citizen to be aware of is that whether a resolution is passed or not is not the point. The passage of a resolution does not mean that the problem in question has been solved, nor does the contrary mean that the problem will be left unsolved,

¹ *Ar-Ra'ayul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 26/11/1967.

² *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 29/11/1967.

for how many resolutions passed by the United Nations have been worth more than the paper they were written on? Our own problem is very much a case in point. Has not the General Assembly of the United Nations passed more than twenty resolutions on the solution of the refugee problem? I can no longer recall the exact number; there are so many of them. Every year the General Assembly has passed a resolution on the repatriation and compensation of the refugees.

What result has this had? Of what real consequence has it all been? The refugees are still in their camps, they live on relief supplied by international organisations and on the opium of hopes and dreams. The United Nations is an international rostrum from which we can present the peoples of the world with a true picture of where we stand. Through it we can dispel the false claims of the enemy and the slanderous lies which he has disseminated, finding a ready market for them in world public opinion which he has duped into sympathising with his cause. Who would have thought that the American people, and the peoples of Britain and other European countries, would cheer and acclaim the armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against the Arab countries? Does not everything good in man condemn aggression? Nor can we brand these people of the West, who rejoiced in the aggression and in its aftermath as evil—despite our political disagreements with certain of their governments—we cannot call the people evil. They are civilised peoples who, in the past, were well-disposed to the Arab people, and had cultural and economic links with them. Certain Arab governments did not even have political differences with the West. Why, then, did these people acclaim the aggression perpetrated by Israel? Why did they give it their blessing? Why did they rejoice in its results? We must ask ourselves this basic question. Or, to put it differently, why did we lose the sympathy of these peoples after the June War? The clear and simple answer is the unquestionable fact that we have failed to present our just cause to these peoples while the enemy has succeeded in deluding them into believing his lies. In fact we unwittingly helped Israel to present herself to the world as a weak and helpless nation, surrounded by beasts of prey who know neither mercy nor compassion, with one sole aim in life: to eradicate Israel from

the face of the earth, to massacre her women and children and quench their thirst with their blood. Israel mounted an active, organised and calculated propaganda campaign to persuade the peoples of Europe and America into believing that Israel's only wish was for peace, and her only objective the protection of her women and children from the blood-thirsty, ravenous enemies of Israel. Were not thousands of letters sent from Israel before the aggression to thousands of European and American families, as part of this propaganda campaign, imploring, beseeching these families to look after their children should they survive the massacre which the Arabs intended to carry out in every household in Israel?

Q. Why did these peoples sympathise with Israel but not with the tragic fate of the refugees who were expelled from their homes by acts of terrorism and bloodshed?

A. It is we who encouraged sympathy for Israel. We get carried away when we come to express ourselves. Perhaps it is part of our nature. Perhaps it is the richness of the Arabic language in emotional expressions that incites us to do so. When we expressed our anger over the presence of Israel as a base for expansion and aggression, we did more than merely express our anger. The expression we used all the time was "the annihilation of Israel." When the peoples of America and Europe read this phrase in our press or heard it spoken by Arabs on foreign broadcasting services they came to believe the lamentations of Israel, her attempts to pass herself off as helpless, her propaganda and her calls for help against blood-thirsty beasts.

Q. Does the Foreign Minister believe that we have made the best use of the United Nations to present our case properly and to free the minds of these peoples from Israeli lies?

A. I believe that the situation has improved greatly. I do not wish to exaggerate the results, but I do believe that we have gained many friends. This is apparent from the stand which a number of nations have taken by our side, and from the tone of a large section of the Western press. In the past, Israeli propaganda used to play on the fact that we Arabs rejected proposals submitted to the Security Council, without actually having to say that we rejected any step towards peace,

or that we were warmongers, or to repeat the old theme of "the annihilation of Israel." In this way Israeli propaganda gave a completely false impression of the situation—Israel, which is an expansionist, aggressive state, and in favour of war, was made to appear a peace-loving nation, while we, who really desire peace, were made to appear eager for war. This is no longer the case. Perhaps the best proof of that lies in the attitude of President de Gaulle and the statements he made at his last press conference in which he branded Israel as "an aggressive, expansionist state," thereby exposing her true nature in the clearest of terms.

Moreover, the attitude of the Latin American countries and of certain African countries has changed; so they are now demanding that Israel withdraw. In fact, need we look so far away? What of the British attitude, which has altered remarkably? Are not the opening phrases of the British proposal an irrefutable condemnation of Israel: "The Security Council emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war..."?

What is the meaning of this passage, which is an integral part of the resolution? It not only mentions but actually *emphasizes* the inadmissibility of Israel's acquisition of territory.

Q. I would like to ask you to say more about the British proposal. But first, may I ask you about the repeated statements of Abba Eban and of all the Tel Aviv authorities in defiance of the United Nations, rejecting any United Nations resolution that does not provide for direct negotiations. Did not these statements make a bad impression on the member states of the United Nations?

A. I assure you that they made a very great impression, and one which was in our favour. These statements laid bare Israel's aggressive character to the United Nations and the peoples of the world which had been taken in by mendacious Israeli propaganda. Meanwhile, we ourselves have followed a policy of positive and serious action, avoiding angry words which only serve to arouse distaste for us in our friends and engender sympathy for our enemy. I shall not be revealing a secret if I say that the United States did not put its own proposal to the vote in the Security Council because it would not have obtained the necessary

number of votes for it to be adopted as a resolution. The estimate, which was quite clear, was that it could not obtain more than six votes, precisely because it made no reference to the principle that war was an illegitimate means for the acquisition of territory and because the paragraph relating to the withdrawal of troops was vague.

Q. What was Israel's attitude to the British proposal?

A. Israel was against it. Israel had already rejected the British proposal when the British delegate, Lord Caradon, submitted it to the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs. In fact, Israel tried, in vain, to suppress the preamble which insists on the illegitimacy of the use of war as a means to territorial gain. The way Israel has interpreted the British proposal since it was adopted as a resolution is an indication of her attitude to it.

Q. Are we in agreement with the British proposal?

A. We are not a member of the Security Council. We therefore do not have the right to vote either for it or against it. However, we have announced our interpretation of the proposal, which is consistent with the text. Let me point out, moreover, that the British proposal provides for two essential points: it provides for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories they occupied during the recent war, and for a speedy settlement of the refugee problem. These two points are in harmony with our own objectives. Let me also point out that Israel had banked on our rejecting the British proposal.

At any rate, allow me to repeat what I have already said: neither the United Nations nor the Security Council are synonymous with the resolutions that they pass. A resolution, moreover, may prove to be worth no more than the paper it is written on.

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Q. Let us hope that the coming Arab Summit Conference will provide the point of departure for a plan of positive action.

A. Let me repeat that future developments and the future itself depend on us. The presence of alien troops on our territory is condoned neither

by international law nor by any principle of international dealings. Our success in liberating our territory from the usurper will be in proportion to our strength and unity and to our having an effective plan of action. As I said before, the success of a political solution does not depend on the adoption of a resolution, but on the possibility of enforcing it in accordance with our principles. President Gamal Abd an-Nasir expressed this very eloquently in his latest speech, when he said that what is taken by force can only be recovered by force. To recover your rights you must be strong and able to control your strength. Moreover, strength is not only military strength—it also includes political strength. Political success supports the development of your military strength, while the development of your military arm leads to success in the political sphere; these are two intertwining paths which we must pursue in our struggle for our cause and our principles.

449

Joint Communiqué on Talks Between U.A.R. President Nasir and Iraqi Premier Yahya.¹
[Excerpts]

Cairo, December 4, 1967

The Unified Political Command of the Republic of Iraq and the United Arab Republic held a meeting in Cairo from November 30 until December 3, 1967.

In the course of their meetings the two sides discussed the situation in which the Arab nation finds itself in the present stage, so crucial to its destiny, in which it is exposed to Zionist aggression. They reviewed the efforts made at the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council to discuss means of eliminating the consequences of the aggression, and the attitudes of all countries to the Arab nation.

The Command discussed the question of convening an Arab Summit Conference and the necessity of unifying Arab efforts on a basis of joint responsibility and a common destiny.

The Iraqi side expressed its appreciation for the steps taken by the United Arab Republic to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and affirmed that Iraq supported these efforts and fully shared in them.

450

Statement by the Heads of Christian Communities in Jordan on the Cancellation of Christmas Festivities and Visits to the Holy Places.²

Amman, December 6, 1967

In view of the cruel circumstances in which we now find ourselves and of the painful situation of the refugees, we have decided to cancel all exchanges of visits and parties at Christmas, the New Year and the Feast of the Epiphany, and to restrict ourselves to religious services and prayers in the churches, and we call on our flocks to give greater relief to the needy. We also advise our congregations not to visit the holy places which are still under occupation at the time of the Feast and we pray that God will help His Majesty King Husayn and his government to establish peace and justice in the land of peace.

Signed: Ni'mat as-Sim'an, Latin Bishop; Mikhail Assaf, Greek Catholic Bishop; Theodoros, Greek Orthodox Bishop; Anusha Van, Head of the Armenian Orthodox Community; Rev. Shafiq Farah, Head of the Arab Episcopal Evangelical Community; Father Sarkis Uzunian, Head of the Armenian Catholic Community.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 5/12/1967.

² *Ad-Dustur*, 7/12/1967.

451

Statement of Policy Issued by the "Fateh" Movement Declaring Its Rejection of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November.¹

December 12, 1967

To the heroic Arab people of Palestine;

To the glorious Arab Nation;

After the setback of 5 June, how necessary it is for us to come to grips with events in a spirit of scientific objectivity, with far-reaching and lucid frankness. Today, the cause of Palestine is at one of the most decisive moments of its history since the Balfour Declaration and the Partition Plan. It is obvious to any observer that the enemy is implementing an iniquitous scheme against us. He is taking organised measures against us at political, military and propaganda levels, in which he is manipulating the psychological aftermath of the recent setback in every possible way.

The present state of affairs is shameful. We have to admit that we have not come to grips with the designs of the enemy from a unified viewpoint or with a unified plan. This has paralysed the Arab stand. We are still improvising and thrashing about. We are once more falling into the snare constituted by the United Nations and the Security Council. Under the slogan of "eliminating the consequences of the aggression" and attracted by the glitter of "a political solution," the Security Council proposal or the British proposal for the solution of the Middle East crisis has been unanimously approved.

This proposal has placed the Arab people at a crossroads: either we agree to surrender and accept humiliation and shame, or we resist with courage and carry on the armed struggle until the new occupation is no more and the old one is liquidated.

We, in our capacity as a revolutionary movement that represents the conscience on the struggling Arab people of Palestine, hereby declare our categorical rejection of this Zionist-imperialist project which implies:

— The final liquidation of the Palestine problem.

— The consolidation and legitimisation of the occupation of our land by the Zionists.

— The recognition of the right of international trusteeship over the cause of our people.

— The thwarting of the Palestine liberation revolution.

Moreover, such a project disregards the rights of two million Palestinian refugees who are living in exile in concentration camps, who are deprived of their homeland, of a decent future, of life. The people of Palestine, in rejecting this proposal, refuses to be bound by any decision issuing from that international body that has been disregarding the rights of this people for twenty years. Furthermore, the people of Palestine hereby issues a warning to any Arab body that may set itself up as the guardian of this people and accepts any decision that disregards its will and its determination to carry on the struggle until the Zionist-imperialist presence is erased from its occupied territory.

Masses of our Arab people; The situation is most critical and demands that we be on the alert. Imperialism, which resents our aspirations and our stability, has opened fire upon us on all fronts and is attempting to bargain with us from a position of strength. We must come to realise the dimensions of the battle that lies ahead of us and its intricately woven fabric, so that the conspiracy may not take us by surprise, forcing us to submit to the *fait accompli*, so that we may not have to suffer another setback that would cause us to lose our trust in ourselves and in our abilities. The issue now is not so much the cause of the Palestinian people as of the struggle behind the scenes between the Arab nation with all its history and its culture, and imperialism with all its viciousness and its treachery. The issue is an issue of destiny and of survival. The battle that is now being waged by the people of Palestine against the Zionist presence is no more than a reflection of the true battle which is being waged behind the scenes between imperialism and the Arab people. This is where the responsibility of the organised forces of the Arab world becomes manifest, as does the responsibility of the Palestinian Arab people, a people that has made, and continues to make, great sacrifices for the cause of our common destiny, which is a cause of life or death.

¹ *Al-Jumhuriyah*, Baghdad, 17/12/1967.

The Palestinian Arab people are faced with grim circumstances that require that the Arab people stand by their side to aid them in their resistance, to aid their revolution and to help them to place all their resources at the disposal of the long and bloody struggle that they are engaged in. It may come to pass that the political settlement will be accepted or be imposed under international pressure; it may come to pass that the military forces of the Zionist state withdraw, either partially or completely, from the territories they occupied during the June War—what then will be our position? Is our people to go back to being terrorised by secret services and to being harassed by bickering and wrangling? Is the armed revolution of our people to be liquidated? For these reasons, we find it necessary to express our position clearly and conclusively on the following issues:

— The withdrawal from the occupied territories.

— The continuation of the armed struggle and the rejection of either Arab or international tutelage.

— The unity of the Palestinian national forces.

Firstly: withdrawal from the occupied territories will do no more, in our eyes, than eliminate the latest manifestation of aggression; the question of the source of the aggression, which is embodied in the alien Zionist presence on our land, will remain unaffected. We, who form a vanguard that has placed its trust in armed struggle as the means to liberation, cannot allow a spirit of defeatism to dominate the situation in the Arab world, or to allow this to become an excuse to kill our men and to scatter our revolutionaries. We shall not allow intelligence services or security branches to rule our people once again or to hold sway over our free men. We do not aspire to rule nor do we seek power, but our people must be allowed to live in freedom, to carry arms, to dig trenches, to fortify their villages and to protect their towns. We cannot accept governments that will suffocate freedom, crucify the law and kill the revolutionary spirit of the people and implant lassitude and submission in its stead. We cannot accept a form of government in which foreign lackeys bear the sceptre of power and have dominion while free men are led to the scaffold,

arrested and terrorised. We want governments that will protect the revolution and support it with money, with arms and with men.

Secondly: the continuation of the armed struggle and the growth of the Palestinian revolution is a principle on which there can be no compromise, for these embody the will of the Palestinian people and this is the path which any people that is persecuted may legitimately follow in the pursuit of its right to self-determination, a right guaranteed by international organisations. Any attempt to deprive our armed struggle of its self-determined character and of its indigenously Palestinian points of departure will be futile; it will be a desperate and a devastating move which will supply the enemy with a trump card to use in the sphere of international affairs. We therefore refuse any international or Arab tutelage over our legitimate rights and we regard any intervention that is designed to protect the Zionist enemy from the revolution of the people of Palestine as an act of aggression perpetrated against the will of our people and a crime that serves the interests of imperialism and Zionism.

Thirdly: our position regarding the unity of the Palestinian revolution is based on principle. We believe in the absolute necessity for Palestinian forces to meet, for our movement, by its very nature, has sprung from a faith in national unity. Nevertheless, circumstances do not allow us the luxury of flattery or self-deception. Our understanding of this unity does not spring from an emotional or transitory rallying to the cause of unity; it seeks to draw on the most lofty content of the concept of unity. We formulated the slogan of "meeting on the field of battle" in order to distinguish in the Palestinian arena between those organisations that were created in a suspect manner with the intention of engulfing our people in a vortex of dissolution and dispersal, and those that have the effective potential to serve. When the Palestine Liberation Organisation was established, we welcomed this act in the hope that it might bring into full play the most lofty content of the concept that it embodies through day-by-day struggle. Unfortunately, the Organisation has become the prisoner of all the limitations that we had warned its leadership against. We consider the most important of these to be:

— The lack of an independent character,

for the Organisation is the offspring of the Arab reality, from which it has inherited all its contradictions as well as its methods.

— The domineering nature of the leadership of the Organisation, or of the leader himself, which has made competition inside the Organisation too strong to allow it to achieve any practical results in the service of the Palestinian cause.

— The total absence from the Organisation of either a political, military or information policy, which has rendered it unable to act in the service of Palestine or to achieve national unity... and which has transformed it into a paralysed bureaucratic organ.

It is unfortunate that this situation has robbed the Organisation of the positive role that it has to play in the arena of Palestinian struggle and has led it to have recourse to dishonourable methods to claim credit for the achievements and the heroic deeds of our people in the occupied territories. Nevertheless, we want our people to know that we are prepared to join the front of honourable Palestinian forces—including the Organisation—once a radical change has taken place in its political leadership and in its methods. This can come about within the context of a carefully formulated plan, negotiations for which can take place in the presence of other Arab observers, so that *in camera* discussions may not provide an opportunity for political overbidding at these difficult times.

Masses of our great people; Since 5 June, the Palestinian Arab people in the West Bank, in the Gaza Strip and throughout Palestine have embarked upon a brave movement of resistance and are facing up to the terrorist Zionist rule with uncommon heroism under the cruellest circumstances. This courageous resistance has shaken the pillars on which the military occupation rests, and thereby led the Zionists to perpetrate the ugliest acts of reprisal against our people. They have levelled villages in their entirety, they have demolished peaceful homes over the heads of their inhabitants, not to mention the thousands of detainees, both men and women, who have gone to meet a dark fate in the prison camps of a vicious fascist terrorism that has not hesitated to kill wounded members of “Al-Asifah.”

In view of the painful condition of our people under the shadow of the occupation, we wonder, with bitterness and in anguish, “Where are the

popular organisations? Where are the Arab parties? Where is the Syndicate of Arab Lawyers? Where is the Red Cross? Where are they all? Where are they, that they may point the finger of accusation at the new criminals of war? Where are their voices that they may be raised in full force to awaken the conscience of the world, which has been taken in by the ruse of ‘Zionist democracy’ and by the lie of the ‘progressiveness of Zionism’?

In the face of these base acts of terrorism we cannot but salute our heroic people, its men and women and its youths and girls, as we renew our pledge not to give up the struggle regardless of the cost and no matter how great the sacrifice. We shall offer them one leader after another and one martyr after another. In conclusion, the Palestine National Liberation Movement “Fateh” calls on all Palestinians, in these critical times, to advance at once to the field of battle in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to join their people in their heroic stand and their fierce resistance.

452

First Political Statement Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.¹

Mases of our Arab nation;

Mases of our Palestinian people;

For fifty years our people have been confronted with an uninterrupted series of Zionist-imperialist conspiracies against our nation and against the right of its people to liberty and life. For fifty years, the forces of Zionism and of world imperialism have hatched plots, perpetrated acts of aggression and waged war, seeking to consolidate the existence of the state of Israel and to force acceptance of the idea which it embodies. Yet not for a single day, in the whole of this cruel period of history, have our people rested from the struggle to prevent the realisation of these designs.

Throughout the years the people of Palestine have been engaged in a continuous struggle which

¹ *Al-Hurriyah*, 11/12/1967.

has manifested itself in repeated revolts and upheavals.

Recently, the struggle has crystallised into commando activity which has been carried on by the vanguards of the Palestinian people in the usurped territory. Commando activity is an expression of our people's refusal to submit or to surrender, and of their rejection of any "settlement" or any form of futile political action. It is an expression, too, of the determination of the Palestinian people to take the initiative in blazing the trail towards total liberation, which is also the responsibility of the whole Arab people.

Masses of our struggling people;

We hereby declare that the military defeat which the Arab armies suffered was only the beginning of a new era—of revolutionary action in which the people will assume the responsibility and take the lead in combating the forces of imperialism and Zionism, for such is their proper role. They will do this by force of arms, which history has shown to be the most effective means of overcoming all forms of imperialist aggression and of giving the initiative to the people. This is the way in which they can mould the future to their will and in accordance with their interests, in the face of imperialist, Zionist and reactionary acts of aggression. The only weapon left in the hands of the people with which to rechannel history into its proper course, with which to bleed the resources of the enemy and eventually to overcome him, is revolutionary violence. In the face of a vicious enemy who demands unconditional surrender, this is the only course open to the people of the Arab nation. The Palestinian Arab people, both in the occupied territory and throughout the whole Arab world, who are fully aware of the objective circumstances attendant on the Arab and Palestinian effort, both before and after 5 June, and of the nature of the phase through which they are passing, know that the time is ripe to raise the banner of armed popular struggle. It is time to undertake armed popular resistance, and to exploit it to the full, in the course of a war that will be long and cruel, but which can only end with victory of the will and the aspirations of the people.

For the first time since the disaster of 1948, the masses of the people of Palestine are to be found, throughout the whole of occupied Palestine,

face to face with the enemy usurper. We intend to face the challenge to the bitter end. It is up to us either to accept the challenge or to give in and allow the enemy to realise his ambitions, to continue his daily humiliation of our people, and to bleed us of our means of livelihood. Throughout the whole period of the dispersal of our people, over the past twenty years, the situation has never before arisen in which the fate of our cause, of our people, of every Palestinian, has been conditional on the determination of our people to do battle with the invaders and to rally to the defence of the dignity of the ties that bind us to our land and of the dignity of man.

This is our message to the people of Palestine, to those in the isolation of the refugee camps, to the farmers of a land in flames, the persecuted and the poverty-stricken of our towns, of our villages and of the camps of misery: there is but one course before you and one choice—resistance; there is but one rallying cry from this day on: armed resistance. There is no life left for us in our land except in the pursuit of popular armed struggle. We live to serve its objectives and to fight its battles day after day.

Armed resistance is the effective course, it is the only course, it is the course our people can follow if they are to stand up to the Zionist enemy and to combat his interests and his very presence. The people are the stuff of which the resistance is made, they are its guiding hand, and it is through them that final victory will be achieved. The enlisting of the potential of the popular masses and the mobilisation of their active resources can only be achieved through popular revolutionary organisation, which embarks on the armed struggle strengthened by the armed potential of the masses, by their awareness of the scope of the battle and its stages, and by the constant marshaling of all the human resources that are connected with the armed struggle, and its military and political objectives.

Through revolutionary organisation and under its guidance, the armed popular masses will become better fitted to pursue the course of resistance and to endure in it despite all difficulties and all obstacles. For that reason, and in order to unite the forces of the people of Palestine in the occupied territory and to combine their resources, complete agreement has been reached

among the following Palestinian organisations:

The Heroes of the Return, the Palestine Liberation Front (the Abd al-Latif Sharuru division, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam division and the Abd al-Qader al-Husayni division) the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Youth of the Revenge) and several other Palestinian groups in the homeland.

The above-mentioned groups have decided to join ranks under the name of "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," which organisation has undertaken to unite in the certainty that the nature and the dimensions of the battle of destiny and of enemy forces make imperative the unification of the efforts of our people and of their revolutionary ranks in their long and bitter struggle against their enemies.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which has already approached an essential section of the revolutionary forces of our people, now issues an open appeal to all Palestinian forces and all Palestinian groups to bring about a wider national union of the forces of revolution, so that this may lead to the unity of all Palestinian groups engaged in armed resistance. What the masses really demand is that all engaged in the struggle should be united. The battle will be long and cruel and will brook no disunity among the ranks of the national movement. For this reason, in its zeal to meet this demand, in response to which it came into existence, the Popular Front now appeals to all those engaged in armed resistance. It is an article of faith for the Front that the sole guarantee for the endurance of the armed struggle and its escalation into a full-scale Palestinian revolt in the fullest sense of the expression is that the popular masses should display total solidarity with the armed resistance and with its united forces.

Masses of our struggling people;

The only language that the enemy understands is that of revolutionary violence. Armed resistance is the one way in which our land can become the major field of battle for the long-drawn-out struggle against the occupation and its efforts to liquidate our cause, whether through attempts to establish a regime which will owe its allegiance to the enemy occupying our land, or the recent attempts to resettle the refugees in various Arab areas, or even the desperate

efforts to impose a dishonourable settlement upon us by occupying certain regions of the Arab homeland. The historic course which we shall follow will be to engage the enemy in fierce fighting on every inch of soil trod by his soldiers until the day comes when we shall launch such an attack against the enemy that the land of Palestine becomes an inferno whose flames will consume the invaders; for armed resistance knows no limits. Nor should the resistance be the exclusive province of those who actually fight; every Palestinian has his role to play in combating the enemy. Let there be a total boycott of all the establishments which the enemy is attempting to set up, whether economic, civil or political. Let the rallying cry of the people be "steadfastness till victory" Let us become firmly rooted in our land, for we shall stay in it and never leave it. The Front, and with it the masses of the people, stand up today and say: "We shall die rather than leave our land." This is the slogan we must repeat every day when every shot is fired, when every martyr meets his death. The land of Palestine today belongs to the masses. Every square inch of it that must be bought with blood and freed from the sway of the usurper will be the heritage of those who fight for it. Every Palestinian will dig his nails into the soil, into the very rocks of his land. He will not forsake one inch of it for it belongs to the multitudes of the poor, the hungry, the refugees. Our fighters die that these may once again enjoy their right to liberate the land; they die with their heads held high.

The people are the lungs through which the resistance fighter must breathe. The participation of the people in the battle is our guarantee of eventual victory. Popular support for the resistance fighters, to be given everywhere and at all times, constitutes the firm and sound basis for the endurance of our struggle and for its escalation to the point where the enemy, his bases and his illegitimate aspirations, will be crushed. Armed resistance rests upon the foundations of the people and their support. All collaborators and all traitors are enemies of the people. Their fate will be as the fate of the enemy who occupies our land: they will be crushed.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in doing what it must to dispel the

clouds of waiting and stagnation which have enveloped our land under the occupation, and in declaring its determination to reject all forms of humiliation and abasement and any "settlement," makes this pledge to our people: to present them with nothing but the truth in whatever relates to any engagements with the enemy, our achievements, and whatever real obstacles stand in the way of the movement of armed resistance. The people must have the truth, for we do not believe that we can be any more zealous for the cause and for the welfare of the people than the people themselves. The people must be fully aware of the achievements of the armed resistance and of the problems involved, with no embellishments but with no calls to alarm, for it is the people that is entrusted with the aims and aspirations of the struggle, and it is they who will give all they have, even the blood of their hearts, for the sake of the struggle. The resistance movement in the land of Palestine has embarked on a new course in its political activities and its dealings with the people characterised by complete frankness. Let the people know all the truth.

People of the Arab nation; Our battle is long and cruel. Armed resistance is the vanguard in the unrelenting struggle all along the Arab front. It is required of every Arab that he give his full support to the armed battle and its striking arm at every possible level. The battle that is being fought by the people of Palestine in the occupied territory is an effective part of the Arab revolt against world imperialism and the forces subservient to it. Our confrontation with the alliance of Zionism and imperialism demands that the struggle of the people of Palestine be organically linked with the struggle of the people of the Arab nation who stand face to face with the same danger, the same enemy and the same designs against them. Therefore, the armed Palestinian action defines its position as Arab, alongside whoever sides with it in the struggle, against whoever makes himself its enemy. The struggle of the people of Palestine is organically linked with the struggle of the revolutionary forces in the Arab world and requires the closest possible alliance between it and all the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world. The nature of the alliance against us demands that there be a counter-alliance grouping all anti-imperialist

forces throughout the world.

To all fighters throughout the land of Palestine, to the workers, the farmers, the poor, the refugees, the students, the employees and the merchants:

This is the beginning. The Popular Front, which belongs to you all, has adopted challenge, sacrifice and endurance as its battle cry. We, who address you from the battlefield of the war of armed resistance, offer you not rosy dreams but more battles, further endurance, greater political mobilisation, and we promise that we shall use everything that lies in our power to better defend the isolated masses from acts of retaliation. The war on which we are now embarking will be long, bitter and cruel. You are its leaders, you are its material, and it is you who have effective power to determine its course. This, our battle, will not be an easy battle, nor will it be short or its conduct easily improvised. It is a battle for destiny, for survival. It requires a capacity to persevere, to withstand and to endure.

453

Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at a Dinner Offered by French President De Gaulle in His Honor.¹ [Excerpt]

Paris, December 15, 1967

You will remember, Mr. President, how before the aggression we made a point of exchanging views, and how we assured you at the time that we were the victims of a spate of vicious propaganda while at the same time an aggression against our country was being prepared with the greatest care and attention to detail. This has since been confirmed, and today part of our territory is groaning under the yoke of occupation.

We are no different from other peoples who have, throughout history, resisted invasions—they have remained in their countries and expelled the aggressors. You, Mr. President, as

¹ *Ath-Thaurah*, 16/12/1967.

the leader of resistance to Nazi occupation, are in a better position than any one else to realise this fact. Our country, the cradle of the revealed religions, has always been a refuge for the oppressed. Muslim, Christian and Jewish Arabs long lived together in brotherly concord, up to the day when international Zionism and imperialism came to occupy our homeland and evict our people, robbing them of their land and their past and submitting them to the cruellest sufferings known to mankind. If we want just and permanent peace, the Palestinian Arab people must return to their homeland.

454

Interview Statements by a Leader of the "Al-Asifah" Organisation.¹

Q. After the aggression against the Arab nation on 5 June, there were off-the-cuff predictions in certain circles that it was all over with "Al-Asifah." But "Al-Asifah" has grown and expanded, and subsequent events have gone directly against these predictions. What lies behind this evolution in the resistance movement?

A. "Al-Asifah" did not consider that the battle ended with the setback which we suffered on 5 June. For us, the battle was still on. "Al-Asifah" therefore began at once to train a large number of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—the total eventually exceeded several thousands. At the same time, we saturated the occupied territories with arms as far as we could. "Al-Asifah," moreover, has worked at organising the population and established contact with the people at all levels within the framework of their social structure, regardless of class or religion, in order first to organise passive resistance and then to move on to armed resistance.

Passive resistance has succeeded to a certain extent. Its effects have been seen in the strikes of shopkeepers and government and communications employees. The effects have also been seen in the closing of schools and the rejection of Israeli

education curricula which the occupation authorities tried to impose on Arab schools.

Armed resistance has been manifested in the military operations we have carried out since 27 August 1967. These operations are proceeding according to the plans made for the present stage. Their sphere of operations has included both the original occupied territories and those recently occupied. Our forces have penetrated to various points in the original occupied territories reaching al-Khudayrah, Natania, Nazareth, Beersheba, Tel-Aviv and various other points. Our operations have been directed against automobile assembly plants, electricity works, canning factories, trains and railways. We have succeeded in blowing up enemy trains at three points, one north of Natania, another west of Jerusalem and the third north of Beersheba. We have also launched military operations at certain vital points in occupied Jerusalem in retaliation for enemy acts of repression against our people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Recently, our military operations have developed and escalated. We have started to use mortars. In addition, we have come into direct contact with the armed forces of the enemy at Tubas, where the engagement lasted 48 hours, at al-Mughir, where it lasted 10 hours, at Bani Na'im, in Hebron, where it lasted three days and at Wadi al-Kuff, where it lasted a whole day. In these engagements the enemy suffered considerable losses, whereas we only lost a few men who died as heroes on the field of battle. The facts are quite different from what the enemy has broadcast over his radio network and from the statements made by enemy officials. At al-Mughir, for instance, the enemy lost 83 paratroopers dead, two helicopters and three military vehicles, while we only lost two dead and ten prisoners, including eight wounded—yet the enemy announced at the time that its armed forces had only lost three men. As a further indication of the inconsistency of the statements of enemy army officials, Moshe Dayan declared, at the beginning of the exchanges between us, that their forces had already eradicated 95% of the forces of "Fatch" and that the remainder of the resistance would be eradicated within a few weeks. Then, about ten days ago, he made another statement to the effect that the battle with "Fatch" would be long, bitter and cruel, and told the Israeli people that their help would be needed and that

¹ *Al-Mujahid*, 17/12/1967.

sacrifices are demanded of them.

Q. "Fateh" has chosen the course of armed resistance as the means by which to regain the usurped rights of the people of Palestine. Is there any other way in which the usurped territory can be restored to its rightful owners?

A. "Fateh" is firmly convinced that armed resistance is the only way to regain the usurped homeland and that popular resistance is the only effective means to that end. The experience of all peoples who are fighting for their independence and for their right to exist provides ample proof of this truth. I cite such examples as the Algerian war for independence, and the Korean and Vietnam wars. Our own revolution is itself further proof of it. The Israeli army has been incapacitated and paralysed by the resistance of our people in the occupied territories, although it was drunk with its victory over the Arab armies only last June. The movement embodied in "Fateh" is determined to pursue the path it has chosen despite the cruelty, the viciousness, the barbarity, even the Nazi-like character of the acts perpetrated by the Israeli armed forces in their attempt to thwart the revolt of our people. "Fateh" is resolved to pursue its objective, which is to liberate the usurped homeland and to ensure that its people shall once more enjoy the rights of which they have been deprived. "Fateh" will achieve this through military action, through action at popular level and through popular organisation. We are determined to pursue the path of armed resistance. However, let it be clear that we are not the enemies of Judaism as a religion nor are we enemies of the Jewish race. Our battle is with the colonialist, imperialist, Zionist entity which has occupied our homeland. We affirm that the presence of Israel as a state constitutes a bridgehead for imperialistic American colonialism in the Arab world, a gendarmerie which imperialism can spur into action at any time it so desires. The interests of imperialism and of Zionism in our homeland are one and the same. Our movement is an affirmation of the fact that the revolt in which we are engaged cannot survive in isolation from the masses of our people, either inside or outside the occupied territories.

Q. You have referred to the close ties between "Fateh" and the masses. How do the masses participate in the armed resistance?

A. The truth of the matter is that this revolt has sprung from the people and it belongs to the people. The members of our resistance come from the ranks of our struggling people. This is manifest from the number of students, farmers, workers, and employees who have joined the cadres of the revolt, whether to carry arms themselves or to stand behind those who do carry arms and to prepare the way for them. The same is true at all levels in the structure of the revolution, in military, political, ideological, financial, and information fields. For instance, those who placed the bomb in the *Sahyun* cinema in Jerusalem were young men and women, some of whom were arrested by the enemy. Another instance is that of a woman who, when a search was being carried out in Nablus, allowed her own son to be arrested instead of a member of the resistance who had taken refuge with the family.

Q. Certain papers have mentioned the existence of treasonous Palestinian elements which are cooperating with the forces of occupation to bring into existence a petty Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. What measure of truth is there in this allegation?

A. The occupation authorities are trying to establish such a Palestinian state which would have no power of self-determination, and over which they would have full control. The enemy has been seeking support for this idea from among our people, but in vain. In fact, this idea was only adopted because a few traitors had consented to it. Moreover, our own movement has not stood idly by while these traitors and their like did their work. We have warned them from the very start and we are ready to deal with anyone who does not heed the warning. The resistance has already executed a number of these traitors.

Q. Every revolt has difficulties and problems to cope with. What difficulties have you encountered?

A. The difficulties we meet in the field of battle, no matter how harsh they may be, are only to be expected. We are determined to bear these difficulties and eventually to overcome them. However, there are unfortunately other difficulties which we have encountered outside the occupied territories.

It is most unfortunate that the Jordanian government continues to arrest the members of

our resistance movement, confiscate their arms and imprison them the minute they set foot on the East Bank of the Jordan. In doing this, the Jordanian government is trying to engage us in a side issue. But we refuse to be engaged in side issues designed to distract us from our principal objective, which is in the occupied territory.

Another problem we have encountered is in the sphere of information media. We have found that a secret war is being waged against our revolutionary movement at the level of world public opinion and even of Arab public opinion. This problem is directly linked with that posed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation with its passive, non-revolutionary attitude towards the revolt in the occupied territories. In view of the immense resources at the disposal of the Organisation we cannot help feeling bitter. These resources were placed at its disposal by the Palestinian people and by the governments of Arab countries. Unfortunately, these resources have been frozen, and if they are ever exploited it is not where they should be exploited by a so-called "Liberation Organisation." The Organisation is quite content at present to restrict itself to announcing the creation of revolutionary organs in the occupied territory, which, in fact, exist in name only; they are purely imaginary. Their only purpose is to cause confusion in the ranks of our people and to divide them into factions. These organisations are formed outside the occupied territories and have absolutely nothing to do with either the popular or the military organisations in the occupied territories. Thus, in the course of a single month the Organisation first announced the creation of a command for the forces of popular liberation, then it shelved the issue, only to announce later the formation of a revolutionary council. It claimed, moreover, that this council had been formed in the occupied territories. The Organisation even went so far as to broadcast a communiqué from this newly formed council in which it took credit for actions carried out by members of our own resistance movement in the occupied territories, actions for which we had paid with the lives of our men.

Q. The United Nations concluded its deliberations by endorsing the British proposal. What is your opinion of the resolution that was adopted?

A. As I have already said, we believe that

armed resistance is the only way of recovering our homeland. We have waited twenty years for the United Nations and the Security Council to arrive at a solution to our problem. With what result? Further displacement of our people and further complexities added to our problem. Under these circumstances, I think we may be permitted to regard whatever issues from the Security Council, none of whose resolutions have been implemented over the last twenty years, as being no more than empty words. Furthermore, the sum total of these resolutions has done nothing but sanction the crime committed when the state of Israel was founded over the scattered remnants of our people; nor are these resolutions achieving anything different today. It is as though it were the lot of our people to pay for the atrocities committed by the Nazis against the Jews. We are categorically opposed to any settlement that stands in the way of the struggle our people has undertaken to regain its usurped homeland and to remove the Israeli entity from its territory.

Q. It has been decided that the Arab Summit Conference shall meet next month. Will you be taking part in it, and do you expect any positive results from it?

A. We have neither been invited to attend the Summit Conference, nor do we intend to do so. We have already made our views clear as regards solutions of the Palestine problem in the memoranda we have sent to the previous conferences. Unfortunately, no attention has been paid to these memoranda. Had they received the attention they deserve, the whole face of the issue of Palestine would have been altered. However, what concerns us in these Summit Conferences or in any other conferences that may be held, is that they should support the armed struggle which we have undertaken. Indeed, in the words of President Bumadayan, we have lost a battle, but we have not lost the war. What is essential in our view is that our will to do battle should never waver. The immense resources of our people provide sufficient guarantee of final victory for us and for our nation.

455

Statement by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir on Ambassador Jarring's Mission.¹ [Excerpt]

Kuwait, December 17, 1967

If Mr. Jarring's visit to the Middle East is for the purpose of discussing the British-sponsored resolution recently adopted by the Security Council, I wish to assert that we reject this project and demand first and foremost the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Arabs territories they have occupied.

456

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of the Jordanian Ministerial Commission for Relief, Information and Public Relations on the Number of Displaced Palestinians.²

Amman, December 21, 1967

The number of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during November was 4,720—2,946 from the West Bank and 1,774 from the Gaza Strip. The number of persons displaced from 1 to 15 December was 2,144—1,476 from the West Bank and 668 from the Gaza Strip.

From the testimony of these displaced persons it is clear that the direct causes for most of them leaving were organised intimidation and the acts of demolition and destruction carried out by the Israeli armed forces. Other important reasons were the exertion of economic pressure and the diminished opportunities of finding employment.

According to available information, the total number of new refugees is about 350,000. It will not be possible to arrive at a final figure until the operation of registration now being carried out is complete; this will probably be at the end of January.

¹ *Ar-Ra'yul-'Aam*, Kuwait, 18/12/1967.

² *Ad-Dustur*, 22/12/1967.

Among these new refugees are 35,000 from Gaza, 6,000 of whom are living in the present emergency camps. It is estimated that some 45,000 displaced persons are at present living in emergency camps. The rest of the displaced persons are living in towns and villages in the East Bank, sometimes under worse conditions than those prevailing in the emergency camps. A sufficient indication of this is the fact that the 25,000 refugees living in Amman New Camp have, since June, provided accommodation for 12,000 new refugees, who are their relations from the West Bank.

The Israeli authorities have so far allowed about 100 persons to return to the West Bank under the reuniting of families programme since it was launched at the beginning of October.

457

Statement Issued by the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Addressed to the Palestinian People.³

Cairo, December 25, 1967

Among the results of the defeat of last June was the occupation of the whole of Palestine, Sinai and the Golan Heights by the forces of racist Zionism, which are the spearhead of the forces of colonialism and imperialism in the Arab homeland. The Arab people, and especially the Palestinian people, have faced this cruel and bewildering defeat with a resolution and unswerving courage never expected by the enemy. An illustration of this is the fact that the people have not surrendered to the will of imperialism and Zionism, but have resolved to stand firm before the tempest, and to search for their own weak points and the reasons for their defeat, so as to eliminate them and mobilise all resources that will enable them to turn this defeat into victory and to liberate Arab territories.

The immediate reaction of the Palestinian Arab people was to resist the Zionist-imperialist

³ *Al-Ahram*, 26/12/1967. Mr. Ahmad Ash-Shuqayri resigned from the chairmanship of the Palestine Liberation Organisation on December 24, 1967.

occupation. This resistance has taken place in two main fields in occupied Palestine. The first is non-violent resistance: popular leaderships were openly established which immediately reacted, with the greatest courage, addressing the enemy in the name of the people, and declaring their rejection of and resistance to the Zionist-imperialist occupation and all the arbitrary measures taken by it. This has been accompanied by a popular movement working on a basis of non-cooperation with the Zionist-imperialist authorities in all possible fields and employing all possible methods.

The second field of resistance to the occupation has been that of armed resistance which has been the forceful and courageous expression of our refusal to accept the consequences of the defeat, and of our determination to eliminate these consequences and to liberate Palestine.

It was both logical and essential that these immediate reactions should be accompanied by the drafting of a plan of action based on an analysis of the reasons for the defeat and comprising a scientific scheme for the liberation of the homeland and for the mobilisation and unification of all available forces and resources.

It is to the Palestine Liberation Organisation that the Palestinian people look to take the initiative in realising this ambition of theirs. And it is to realise this aim that the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation will work at the present stage, with all the forces and resources available to it. It will call on all effective forces for the achievement of the following aims:

1. The establishment of an Assembly representing the will of the people, which will be the source of responsible collective leadership.
2. The unification and escalation of armed struggle.
3. The achievement of national unity.
4. The mobilisation of national efforts.
5. The development of the Organisation's subsidiary organs.

In this connection the Executive Committee addresses itself to all the effective elements and organised forces of the Palestinian people, calling on them to help and support it in the achievement of the above objectives, so that we may perfect

all the elements of power necessary to resist all Zionist-imperialist schemes aimed at liquidating the Palestine problem, and advance with all our strength along the course that leads to the liberation of Palestine, depending on the unity of the Arab struggle in all fields.

458

Interview Granted by Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen to the French daily "France-Soir."¹

Paris, December, 1967

Q. At his press conference, when he was sketching the main lines of a solution for the Middle East crisis, General de Gaulle expressed his support for "the evacuation of the territories taken by force, the termination of the state of belligerency, and mutual recognition of each other by the countries concerned. After that it will be possible, under United Nations supervision, to demarcate frontiers accurately, to define conditions for the security of both parties, to decide the fate of the refugees, and also to settle the problem of freedom of navigation for all in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal."² This is the so-called French peace plan. Do you support this solution, and is Syria prepared to accept this plan for a settlement?

A. Your question deals with only one part of what General de Gaulle said on this subject. For he generously and courageously disclosed the roots of the Palestine problem when he mentioned the establishment of Zionist colonies in Palestinian territory between the two World Wars, the seizure by force of land belonging to others, and the expansion of these colonies through the use of threats and inducements, under the supervision of Britain which issued the iniquitous Balfour Declaration and paved the way for the establishment of the State of Israel rather than providing the Palestinian people, whether they were Muslims, Christians or indigenous Jews, with the right of self-determination.

We believe, and it is perfectly clear from the speeches of Eshkol, Dayan, Allon, Nahum Gold-

¹ *Ath-Thaurah*, 27/12/1967. During his visit to France from 10 to 15 December.

² See *ante*, doc. 212.

mann and other Zionist leaders, that Israel will regard any solution accepted by the Arabs, whatever concessions it may involve, as no more than a stage in the preparation of their aggressive resources for further expansion aimed at achieving the Greater Israel stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. General de Gaulle also referred to these expansionist intentions and to the calls for increased immigration. He also, as a great resistance fighter, stressed that the rise of Arab opposition to the occupation is something perfectly natural which must not be called terrorism, as Israel alleges it to be, any more than it is permissible to call the struggle of the French against the occupying Nazis terrorism. Consequently any solution will be merely temporary and liable to explode if it is not based on full justice comprehending all aspects of the problem, the first of which is the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Q. Syria, which boycotted the last Summit Conference in Khartum, has decided to be represented by her Ambassador in Cairo at the Conference of Foreign Ministers now being held there. How do you interpret this development in Syria's attitude, Mr. Prime Minister?

A. We are members of the Arab League and we attend all its meetings below Summit level. This has been our practice on all occasions.

459

Speech of Syrian Prime Minister Zu'ayyen at the Inauguration of an Electric Grid Project.¹ [Excerpt]

Al-Qabun, December 28, 1967

What we must remember about the aggression of 5 June is that it was not a reaction to any specific action; it was carried out in implementation of a comprehensive plan drafted in the Pentagon and in the offices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Israel was merely the instrument of its execution.

The aggression was both directly preceded and accompanied by a world-wide propaganda campaign into which the intelligence services of the United States and world Zionism poured vast sums of money. The object was to sap the will of the Arab nation, the will of the Arab citizen to resist or to do battle. We all know the object of this campaign and the themes it played on. It was designed to support the aggression in attaining its objective, which was precisely to vanquish the will of the Arab people. However, the Arab people resisted, they fought, they withstood—every man according to his ability.

Moreover, far from ending with the stop of the fighting, the war of nerves against our people has grown more intense, exploiting the consequences of the aggression to undermine our trust in our armed forces and to promote conflict among the ranks of the Arab people.

It was alleged in the context of this campaign that the Arabs are not capable of resisting because of their technological backwardness—there was even such nonsense as that the Israelis could man a tank with two soldiers whereas the Arabs needed three, or that the Israelis were better at fighting. The conclusion that all this was meant to lead up to is that the Arabs had better give up in the face of modern technology.

A great deal of fuss has been made by certain people who claim that we manned our front lines with reserve soldiers and officers, keeping the regular army in the rear. The truth is that, ever since the exchange of fire on 7 April, our entire army, both reserves and regulars, had been mobilised for the defence of our frontiers. One has only to think that the majority of the Israeli army is composed of reserves to realise the danger of presenting the issue in this way. Other voices have been raised in accusation—and attention has been drawn to these by the Israeli broadcasting service and by American news agencies—to claim that a certain group among the people stabbed the army in the back or gave help to the Zionists. If we look at the list of those who were killed we find that they were all Arab members of this people who have shed their blood freely to liberate our homeland from imperialism. None of us helps the enemy or shirks his duty to defend his

¹ *Al-Ba'th*, 29/12/1967.

country. The Arab people have fought, and their armed forces have fought, on all fronts. Many have laid down their lives for their country. But the battle is not over. The battle is long, and in fighting it our people will yet prove their capacity and steadfastness. The world will come to see that this people, a people to whose credit history has recorded the most splendid deeds of heroism, a people that has been true, throughout history, to the defence of its homeland, is equal, at this or at any other time, to this task and will grudge no sacrifice, however great, for the sake of the defence of its homeland. Those who cast doubt on the ability of our people and of its armed forces are a fifth column desiring no good for their nation. Their like are found everywhere, and wherever they are found the people know how to deal with them.

Brothers and fellow-citizens; There are certain issues which imperialism and its Zionist agents are doing their best to exploit in order to misrepresent our position and to undermine and disperse the forces of revolution in the Arab world. To thwart these enemy attempts, we shall have to clarify the points at issue. It has been said that we in Syria reject political action, and that although we lack military potential, we nevertheless advocate immediate military action. The answer to this is that political measures are one thing, surrender is quite another. In fact, we are the only country whose head of state attended the special session of the General Assembly, where he spent a whole month, working jointly with friendly statesmen from countries all over the world, in order to expose the American-Zionist aggression. We have never relinquished the political struggle, as we understand it. We have contacted all the countries of the world, except those who are known to have played a part in the planning of the aggression and to have given it support. Furthermore, both as a government and as a party, and acting through popular organisations, we have made many contacts with parties and movements that stand for liberation in all five continents; we have explained our just cause and have won a great deal of support for it, even in Western Europe. We are carrying on the political struggle because we believe that it can lead to isolating Israel from the other nations of the world, it can win us new friends and it can gain us time in which to reorganise ourselves and to mobilise

all our potential and press it into service at all levels. However, we see nothing in the British project except a consolidation of the aggression and vague, ambiguous phrases, so that when it was voted on in the Security Council, the Soviet delegate said that he interpreted it to mean such and such, and that he was voting accordingly; the French delegate gave his own interpretation and then voted on that basis, and so did the delegate from India. The British proposal was formulated in the British tradition and our people know what that means; every line carries several meanings. As for us, we understood the British proposal as not being in the interests of our people; to accept it would be to relinquish all the previous United Nations resolutions in favour of the Arab people of Palestine and a complete disregard for the Palestinian cause and for the people of Palestine.

When we rejected the proposal on its adoption by the Security Council people said that we were not cooperating with the United Nations, that we refused to meet the delegate of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But, having rejected the very basis of the British proposal, what possible justification can we have to meet the Secretary-General's delegate, Mr. Jarring, who has come on a specific mission, namely to put into effect the very project that we reject? There are no grounds for our entering into fruitless negotiations with him as our opinion has been expressed again and again over a period of five months at the United Nations.

As far as the Arab Summit Conferences are concerned, our refusal to attend them is not a form of political overbidding nor is it a condemnation of others, as the enemy's propaganda machine suggests. We have never said that we were against unified Arab action. We believe that the struggle against imperialism requires the efforts of the entire Arab people. But this is one thing and the method represented by the Summit Conferences is something else.

The experience of our generation with Summit Conferences, since 1948, has shown that such conferences are incapable of arriving at adequate solutions for the challenges we face. The last Conference at Khartum was a further illustration of this. Despite the good will of the progressive Arab forces and their desire to arrive at a unified

Arab attitude which, by ignoring all internal differences, would enable them to come to grips with the threat, and confront the challenge to the efforts of the Arab nation and to its destiny, and despite the adherence of the progressive forces to this attitude, we could not help but notice that certain reactionary Arab countries continued to conspire against the progressive regimes in the Arab world, exploiting the calamity that had befallen us and the difficult situation of the Arab nation after the aggression, as a way of venting their hatred for these progressive regimes and of settling accounts with them. This is something which any Arab who has regard for the honour of his nation and his country must refuse to do. What is at present going on in Yemen is the best proof of all this.

We in this country have suffered heavy material losses. We have endured these losses and we have stood fast, and we shall continue to stand fast. Moreover, when the Summit Conference was held at Khartoum it was said that the oil-rich countries would aid the countries which had been affected by the aggression and which were preparing themselves for a battle of endurance. Of course this country has not received the benefit of any aid. When certain of our Arab brothers asked why Syria was receiving no aid, as Syria was on the front line, and as she was standing fast, the answer was that this was because its President had not attended the Summit Conference, and that perhaps Syria had not been affected after all. Of course none of this makes sense. Our position is that we have the capacity to endure; we have taken all eventualities into account, and we are mobilising all the resources and all the potential of this country to use them in the battle of endurance. I say this to point out the mentality of those who insist that we sit down together to draw up plans for the future battle. If there are reactionary rulers who ignore the will of the Arab people they will surely regret it. The resources of the Arab homeland are large; they need only determination and work done in good faith. Today we can even manufacture arms; we can manufacture guns and tanks if we want to.

All this is quite different from what some Arab leaders think. This must all become quite clear to the forces of progress in the Arab world. These forces must make a scientific analysis of

the situation—which takes into account all the circumstances of the Arab world and all international circumstances with thorough objectivity—the basis for their comprehensive plans and strategy. In this way they can acquire a clear and revolutionary perspective of the future, and they must not lose sight of this perspective as a result of such reverses as they may suffer in their long and arduous course.

On this principle we maintain that our struggle to bring about a unity of the forces of progress in the Arab world constitutes, as our Party sees it, the least that the forces of progress can achieve at this stage.

We cannot allow the line we have taken to be affected by other, transitory circumstances which may be imposed by the difficult stage we shall have to pass through. On the contrary, it is our opinion that such difficult stages in our history demand further endeavour to ensure that the forces of progress in the Arab world come together and join ranks, that they may be able to draw the masses of the people throughout the Arab world to them. We cannot allow either a Summit Conference or any other means that our brothers may choose for the attainment of their ends to be a cause of differences between us and those with whom we share our destiny; nor can a Summit Conference be a substitute for our meeting on a clearly progressive and revolutionary basis.

For that reason, we still advocate the idea of a popular Arab conference to formulate a unified stand for the people of the entire Arab nation and to define the stages of the objectives for which the people must strive if they are to defend their existence and protect their future and their right to a decent life against the escalating Zionist-imperialist attack.

Brothers; The Arab nation is at one of the most crucial stages of its struggle in the whole of modern history. An evil aggression has been perpetrated against us; the enemy has carried out a treacherous invasion, and he has won this round. But he has not attained the objectives of his aggression. He is still making every effort to attain these objectives, the most prominent of which is to stop the advance of the Arab revolution and to undermine the will of the Arab citizen. The stage we are now passing through is therefore that of the

struggle for destiny in the full sense of the term. Our slogan at this stage must be: determination, resolution, an inflexible will. These qualities will enable us to surmount all difficulties and overcome all obstacles. We must also tighten our belts and practice austerity, for this is only natural for any country whose destiny is in the balance and which is striving to realise its will to live a free and honourable life.

We are faced with a hard choice: either to surrender—and our people refuse that categorically—or to undertake a fierce, cruel struggle so that we may lead a free and honourable life on

the soil of our country.

Let our watchword be “struggle,” no matter how great the sacrifice. Let us take the course of determination and of resoluteness, of austerity and of sacrifice. Let our motto be “production and more production.” Let us inaugurate a new project every month to consolidate our economic base; let us perform a new action every day to be added to the list of numerous actions we have performed for the struggling masses of our people. Let us protect our attainments and let us preserve our gains through our own might which we shall build with our own hands.

INDEX

NOTE

The names of *countries* and *organisations* have two different groups of numbers indexed under them; those in the first group refer to the pages on which the name of a country or organisation is mentioned in the text, those in the second, headed *Documents*, to the pages on which documents issued by or on behalf of a particular country or organisation are to be found.

Entries for *persons* are similarly divided into a first group, which consists of the numbers of pages on which the names of such persons are mentioned in documents of which they are not the authors, and a second, which consists of the numbers of pages on which documents issued by or on behalf of such persons are printed. This group is further broken down under the following subheadings: 1) Communiqué (s), abbreviated to *comm.* 2) Interview (s), abbreviated to *int.* 3) Letter (s), abbreviated to *lett.* (4) News conference(s), abbreviated to *news conf.* 5) Speech(es), abbreviated to *sp.* and 6) Statement(s), abbreviated to *stat.*

A

Abraham's Tomb, 345.
 Abramov, Lachezar, *com.* 155.
 Abu Ageila, 224, 585, 586, 591.
 Abu Dhabi, 94.
 Abul-Izz, Madkour, 713.
 Adebo, Chief Simeon Olaosebikan, 278.
 Aden, 37, 40, 65, 94, 190, 528, 531, 576, 635, 680.
 Afghanistan, 145, 254n, 556, 565.
 Ahmad, Qa'ed, *sp.* 589-590.
 al-Ahram, 8n, 488.
 Akruf, Daud, 585.
 Alawi, Mahmud, 585.
 Albania, 133.
 Documents 196, 253.
 Aleppo, 361.
 Algeria, 11, 22, 56, 57, 77, 84, 85, 119, 126, 129, 141, 143, 148, 501, 512, 517, 520, 531, 548, 577, 580, 581, 598, 604, 608, 632, 666, 673, 682.
 Documents 4, 575-577, 589-590, 600-601, 608-610, 654-655.
 al-Ali, Shaikh Jabir, *int.* 657.
 Allon, Yigal, 201, 272.
 American Friends Committee, 401.
 Amir, Ali Ali, 488.
 Lett. 587, 593, *stat.* 533.
 Amman, 231, 232, 301, 302, 303, 345, 358, 359, 363, 371, 390, 401, 403.
 Amman New Camp, 730.

Amman Radio, 493.
 Amwas, 339, 340, 363, 645.
 Aqaba, 302, 345, 537.
 Aqaba, Gulf of, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 80, 81, 82, 83, 91, 104, 119, 113, 114, 118, 123, 145, 146, 147, 185, 195, 196, 207, 216, 223, 224, 226, 286, 474, 476, 502, 503, 504, 538, 540, 544, 545, 548, 549, 552, 554, 555, 557, 558, 560, 561, 562, 564, 568, 570, 574, 577, 578, 584, 593, 613, 621, 622, 623, 715, 716, 731.
 al-Aqsa Mosque, 167, 305, 312, 314, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 324, 325, 329, 370.
 Arab Defence Council, 489, 659.
 Arab League, 5, 22, 162, 163, 164, 488, 504, 505, 506, 507, 510, 525, 547, 569, 584, 687, 696, 699, 732.
 Documents 511-512, 536, 568, 664-665.
 Arab Nationalist Movement, *Document* 636-642.
 Arab Oil Ministers' Conference, 615, 657.
 Document 584-585.
 Arab Summit Conference (Khartum, 1967), 691, 695, 700, 707, 708, 712, 715, 732, 734.
 Documents 655-656, 656-657.
 Argentina, 255n., 278, 289.
 Arif, General Abd ar-Rahman 65, 130, 131, 143, 577, 578, 598, 632. *Com.* 4, 493, 582, 655-665, *int.* 613-614, *news conf.* 489-492, *sp.* 696, *stat.* 617, 644.

- al-Arish, 212, 229, 233, 347, 348, 349, 351, 352, 374, 375, 376, 591.
 Armistice Agreements, General (1949), 10, 11.
 al-Asad, Major General Hafiz, *com.* 601, *int.* 534-536, *sp.* 493-494.
 Assaf, Archbishop Mikhail, 677, 720.
sp. 675-767.
 al-Asifah, 682, 695, 723.
Document 727-729.
 Aswan High Dam, 599, 632.
 al-Atasi, Nur ad-Din, 53, 72, 130, 131, 623.
Sp. 501-502, 512-516, *stat.* 617.
 Athlit Prisoner of War Camp, 348.
 al-Aujah, 224, 249, 551, 561.
 Australia, 46, 70.
Documents 18, 61, 113.
 Austria, 255n.
 Avon, Lord, see Eden, Anthony.
 Axen, Hermann, 98.
 Ayub Khan, Muhammed. *com.* 168, *sp.* 126, *stat.* 171.
 al-Azhari, Ismail, 632.
Com. 6, 646, 655-656, *stat.* 579-580.

B

- al-Badri, Abd al-Qadir, *stat.* 615.
 al-Badri, Abd ar-Rahman, 588.
Int. 646-647.
 Baghdad, 93, 130.
 Baghdad Pact, 517, 521, 523.
 al-Adgham, al-Bahi, *com.* 655-656.
 Bahrain, 498.
 Bait Auwa, 338, 339, 340, 363, 645.
 Bait Nuba, 339, 340, 363, 645.
 Baker, Howard H. 158n.
 al-Bakkush, Abd al-Hamid, *sp.* 698-699.
 Balfour Declaration, 580, 581, 613, 731.
 Banias, 237, 239, 240, 333, 334, 336, 373.
 Baptist Mission (United States), 439.
 al-Buraq Wall, see Wailing Wall.
 Barbados, 255n.
 Bardawil, Fawzi, 585.
 Bashev, Ivan H., 200.
 Ba'th Party of Syria, 471, 516.
Documents 526-529, 541-542, 602-605, 665-675.
 Baxter, William, 95.
 Beeley, Harold, 192.
 Begin, Menahem, 155, 156, 294.
 Beirut, 232, 303, 355, 359, 384, 385, 406.

- Belgium, 255n, 392.
 Ben Gurion, David, 207, 538, 551, 561, 563.
 Ben Natan, Asher, *int.* 201-206.
 Bérard, Armand, 284.
 Bernadotte Agreement (1948), 454.
 Bernadotte, Count Folke, 271, 379, 551, 716.
 Bethlehem, 70, 234, 301, 315, 324, 337, 341, 344, 345, 358, 368, 369, 370, 478, 573, 652, 658.
 Biffen, William J., 189, 190.
 Birch, Nigel, 96.
 al-Birah, 315.
 Bolivia, 255n.
 Borch, Otto R., 291.
 Borten, Per, *sp.* 176.
 Boumedienne, Hawari, see Bumadyan, Hawari.
 Boyd-Carpenter, John A., 69, 70.
 Brandt, Willy, *int.* 162.
 Brazil, 18, 148, 230, 234, 255n, 278, 282, 285, 290, 560.
 Brezhnev, Leonid I., 98, 119, 139, 143, 193, 708.
Com. 188, *sp.* 129.
 Brosio, Manlio, *stat.* 104.
 Brown, George, 3, 22, 27, 37, 43, 68, 85, 88, 89, 92, 94, 95, 96, 146, 189, 190, 191, 192, 276, 284, 290, 709.
sp. 30, 55, 84, 135.
 Bulgaria, 98, 138, 278, 287.
Documents, 61, 155.
 Bull, General Odd, 107, 108, 133, 229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 262, 263, 480, 481.
 Bumadyan, Hawari, 131, 143, 588, 598, 632, 682, 729.
Com. 655-656, *sp.* 575-577, 608-610, 654-655.
 Bundy, McGeorge, 76.
 Burden, Frederick F., 68.
 Burghiba, Habib, 486, 490, 491, 496, 497, 499, 522, 525, 532.
Com. 655-656, *lett.* 547, *sp.* 580-582.
 Burma, 145.
 Burundi, 254n.
 Butafliga, Abd al-Aziz, *com.* 655-656.

C

- Cairo, 8n, 11, 13, 19, 20, 29, 33, 35, 61, 64, 71, 80, 130, 192, 228, 229, 359, 386, 579, 585.
 Cambodia, 145, 254n.
 Cameroon, 145.
 Campbell, Gordon T., 90.

Canada, 18, 35, 39, 41, 47, 66, 108, 148, 255n, 278, 286, 291, 408, 539, 555, 559, 560.
Documents 13-17, 92, 161, 180, 248.

Canada, Unitarian Service Committee of, 401.

Canada, United Church of, 401.

Canadian Red Cross Society, 401.

Caradon, Lord (Hugh M. Foot), 35, 36, 38, 56, 69, 84, 94, 182, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 290, 292, 719.

Caritas (Belgium), 392.

Caritas Internationalis, 393.

Carvalho Silos, Seraldo de 282, 285.

Catholic Relief Services, 392, 393, 401.

Cave of Makfila, 321, 322.

Cave of Zedekiah, 329.

Ceausescu, Nicolae. *sp.* 30.

Ceylon, 145, 254n,
Documents 167, 194.

Chagla, Mahomedali C., *com.* 4, *sp.* 18, 144.

Chelouche, A., 330.

Chile, 255n.
Documents 48.

Central Intelligence Agency, 523, 524.

China, People's Republic of, 75, 118, 128, 197, 278, 292, 565, 634.
Documents 22, 62, 71, 72, 73.

Chou En-Lai 179.
Lett. 71, 72, 73, *sp.* 176.

Church of Bethany (Jerusalem), 314.

Church of Gethesmane (Jerusalem), 314.

Church of The Holy Sepulchre (Jerusalem), 325, 329, 341.

Church of the Prison of Christ (Jerusalem), 314.

Church World Services, 401.

Colombia, 255n.

Comay, Michael, 460, 480.

Commonwealth Save the Children Fund, 392.

Congo, Democratic Republic of, 145, 254n.

Conference of non-aligned countries (Cairo), 4, 6.

Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946), 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 460.

Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), 347, 349, 351, 373, 374, 375, 393.

Costa Rica, 255n.

Council of Arab Information Ministers (Bizerte, 1967).
Document 679-681.

Couve de Murville, Maurice, 161.
Sp. 79, 109, 114, 186.

Cuba, 145.

Cunningham, Knox, 66, 182.

Cyprus, 166, 39, 47, 84, 108, 145, 254n, 359, 556, 634.

Cyrankiewicz, Josef, 98, 139.

Czechoslovakia, 21, 98, 138, 191, 499.
Document 20.

D

Daily Mail, 540.

Daily News Bulletin, 270.

Damascus, 19, 29, 100, 130, 229, 230, 232, 237, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 294, 354, 359, 361, 386, 391, 512, 531, 535, 538, 544, 545, 550, 555, 560, 565, 566, 572.

Dayan, Moshe, 155, 156, 201, 241, 272, 294, 524, 727.

Dead Sea Scrolls, 325.

de Gaulle, Charles, 51, 68, 128, 141, 144, 161, 163, 199, 203, 548, 614, 622, 708, 719, 726, 731, 732.
Com. 166, *lett.* 207, *news conf.* 194, *sp.* 171, 198, *stat.* 118.

Dehan, Lieutenant Joubrael, 205.

Demirel, Suleiman, *com.* 167, 179, *sp.* 177.

Denmark, 14, 15, 18, 41, 46, 148, 160n. 255n, 278, 291, 410, 711.
Documents 160, 248.

Development Bank of Jordan, 411, 414, 420.s

Dirksen, Everett M., *sp.* 1.

Dodds-Parker, Arthur D., 88, 191.

Dome of the Rock 314, 318, 320, 321, 370.

Dominican Republic, 255n.

Douglas-Home, Alec, 42, 44, 69, 85, 92, 132, 135, 136, 190, 192.

Dulles, John Foster, 91, 146.

E

Eban, Abba, 11, 24, 84, 144, 195, 243, 269, 280, 293, 294, 310, 380, 480, 481, 529, 719.
Int. 2-3, 115-116, *news conf.* 28-29, 59, 157, *sp.* 179, 185-186.

Ecuador, 255n.

Edelman, Maurice, 137.

Eden, Anthony, 521.

Eden, Sir John, 89.

Egal, Mohamed I., *com.* 183.

Egged Transport Company, 303, 370.

Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement, 248, 249.
 Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, 249.
 Egypt-Jordan Defence Agreement, 69.
 Egypt-Syria Joint Defence Agreement, 515, 517, 518, 521, 523, 524, 527, 528, 531, 536, 545, 566, 568.
 Eilat, 490, 540, 573, 613.
 Eilat (Israeli destroyer), 181n, 263, 264, 713.
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 11, 12, 394, 491, 521, 560.
 Entr'aide Socialiste, 392.
 Erhard, Ludwig, 162.
 Eshkol, Levi, 7, 29, 110, 155, 156, 173, 201, 203, 231, 269, 307, 330, 481, 493, 514, 515, 516, 529, 534, 538, 545, 549, 565, 571, 572, 625, 709.
Int. 4-5, *lett.* 49-50, 54-55, *sp.* 9, 24, 103, 183, 188, *stat.* 23, 156.
 Ethiopia, 154, 255n, 273, 278, 290, 708.
L'Express, 647.

F

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), 462, 466.
 Fateh, 340, 378, 714.
Documents 681-682, 695, 698, 727-729.
 Fawzi, General Muhammad, 211, 212, 222, 223, 500, 539.
 Fayiq, Muhammad, *sp.* 662-664.
 Faysal, King of Saudi Arabia, 490, 491, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 521, 522, 523, 525, 633.
Com. 167, 655-656, *int.* 570, 699-700, *news conf.* 541, *sp.* 493, 676-677.
 Faulds, Andrew, 86.
 Ferdan, 150.
 Finland, 255n, 410.
Document, 160.
 Fock, Jenoe, 98, 138.
 Foot, Michael, 90.
 France, 1, 3, 4, 22, 23, 24, 26, 43, 46, 55, 67, 69, 71, 72, 115, 124, 125, 126, 128, 163, 176, 187, 189, 195, 196, 221, 222, 223, 263, 244, 246, 278, 284, 290, 410, 498, 501, 519, 538, 548, 552, 554, 560, 562, 564, 572, 573, 576, 578, 579, 580, 582, 598, 615, 622, 708, 711, 731.
Documents 50, 79-83, 109-112, 114, 118-119, 138, 144, 161, 171, 194, 198, 207.
 Fraser, Hugh, 70.
 Fulbright, William, 160, 171.

G

Galilee, 70, 682.
 Galili, Israel, 201.
Sp. 100.
 Gaza, 220, 224, 228, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 277, 346, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 356, 370, 737, 374, 376, 385, 386, 388, 391, 393, 395, 396, 397, 401, 403, 409, 423, 530, 537, 660, 730.
 Gaza Strip, 10, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 37, 41, 54, 59, 63, 71, 78, 80, 147, 160, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 213, 224, 228, 347, 348, 349, 354, 369, 371, 373, 374, 375, 376, 381, 387, 388, 391, 393, 394, 397, 399, 403, 404, 407, 408, 409, 410, 415, 421, 460, 461, 462, 463, 539, 682, 686, 689, 727, 738, 730.
 Gehlhof, W., *int.* 5-6.
 Geneva Convention (1922), 695, 698.
 Geneva Convention (1949), 251, 331, 359, 360, 366, 651.
 German Democratic Republic, 98, 132, 138, 491, 525, 555.
Documents 53-54, 92, 98.
 German Evangelical Relief Organisation, 392.
 German Federal Republic, 5n, 54, 92, 130, 131, 151, 155, 197, 198, 410, 411, 491, 492, 498, 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 520, 525, 527, 534, 556, 580, 618, 670, 675, 678, 688, 700.
Documents 5-6, 30, 162-164, 194.
 Ghandi, Indira, 708.
Com. 167, 177, *int.* 169, *sp.* 77-79, 170.
 Giles, Morgan C., 70.
 Ginsburg, David, 70.
 Giovanetti, Msgr. Alberto, *lett.* 120.
 Gligorov, Kiro, 139.
 Golan, 272.
 Golan Heights, 185, 202, 381, 463, 639, 640, 641, 730.
 Goldberg, Arthur, 11, 97, 105, 117, 137, 142, 199, 275, 277, 282, 292, 709.
 Gomulka, Wadyslaw, 98, 139.
 Gorse, Georges, *stat.* 51, 161.
 Government House (Jerusalem), 229, 230, 231, 238, 246.
 Greece, 145, 615, 634.
 Griffiths, Eldon, 94, 191.
 Gromyko, Andrei, 3, 27, 51, 122, 193, 200, 689.
Lett. 252.
 Guatemala, 255n.
 Guinea, 254n., 556, 634.
Documents 21, 71.

Gussing, Nils-Göran, 191, 331, 333, 363, 365, 366, 367, 387.
Guyana, 255n.

H

Haaretz, 320, 321.
Hagourim, 485.
Hague Rules (1967), 366.
Haifa, 538.
Haile Selassie I, His Imperial Majesty, Emperor of Ethiopia, 154.
Hakim, Dr. George, 516.
Hale, Charles L., 67, 88.
Hamling, William, 190, 191.
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 16, 19, 39, 40, 44, 70, 217, 218, 221, 223.
al-Haram Mosque, 321.
Hasan, Crown Prince of Jordan, 691.
Hasan II, King of Morocco, *com.* 565-656, *let.* 601-602, 653-654, *sp.*, 583-584.
Hasluck, Paul, 61.
Statements 18, 113.
Hassunah, Abdul Khalek, 5, 163, 164, 525, 547.
al-Hayat, 646.
Heath, Edward, 65, 94, 96, 182, 183.
Sp. 37-42.
Hebrew University (Jerusalem)i, 204.
Hebron, 234, 317, 324, 337, 340, 341, 345, 369, 370, 388, 727.
Heffer, Eric S., 69, 95.
Henig, Stanley, 190.
Herod's Gate (Jerusalem), 324.
Higher Muslim Council, 306.
Hilu, Charles, 494.
Com. 655-656, 695-696, *sp.* 700-701.
Histadrut, 303, 304.
Holy Places (Jerusalem), 307, 308, 309, 312, 314, 319, 320, 324, 325, 328, 370, 373, 613, 614, 615, 645, 720.
Holy See, 120, 121, 308.
Homs, 397, 464.
Honduras, 255n.
Hoveyda, Amir-Abbas, *com.* 152.
L'Humanité, 571.
Humphrey, Hubert H., 8, 145, 553, 575, 624.
Hungary, *Documents* 98, 138.
Husayn, Abd as-Sattar Ali, 585.
Husayn ibn Talal, King of Jordan, 38, 95, 149, 162, 201, 203, 230, 231, 367, 490, 491, 493, 496,

498, 499, 500, 506, 507, 508, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 569, 578, 586, 588, 591, 593, 594, 597, 611, 614, 616, 624, 632, 635, 647, 661, 662, 691, 697.
Com. 168, 494-495, 496, 655-656, *int.* 487-489, 647-650, 650-651, 658-659, *lett.* 486-487, 586-587, 587, 592, 593-594, 606, 612, *sp.* 472-479, 502-505, 594-595, 693-694.

I

Ibn Abd al-Aziz, Crown Prince Emir Khalid, *stat.* 533.
Ibn Hima, Dr. Muhammed, *com.* 655-656.
Ibrahimi Mosque, 317, 321, 322.
Iceland, 255n.
Document, 160.
Idris I as-Sanusi, King of Libya, 646.
India, 35, 126, 183, 230, 231, 234, 246, 254n, 255n, 266, 275, 277, 278, 280, 282, 285, 290, 293, 556, 565, 634, 711.
Documents 4, 6, 18-20, 77-79, 144-148, 167, 169, 170.
Institute For Palestine Studies (Beirut), 570n, 682n.
International Monetary Fund, 347, 365.
International Committee of the Red Cross, 332, 335, 350, 354, 356, 357, 359, 360, 364, 365, 389, 393, 461, 651, 652, 659, 660, 698.
Indonesia, 145, 254n.
International Court of Justice, 14, 66, 146.
Iran, 108, 132, 160, 173, 255n, 491, 541.
Documents 4, 118, 152-153, 196.
Iran, Shah of, 491, 497, 498, 522, 525.
Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society, *Com.* 160, 392.
Iraq, 11, 22, 38, 56, 57, 65, 84, 85, 100, 108, 143, 145, 159, 177, 181, 185, 235, 411, 477, 489, 497, 537, 548, 578, 586, 587, 595, 598, 602, 624, 666, 673.
Documents, 3, 4, 5, 155, 158, 179, 489-492, 493, 577, 582, 613-614, 635-636, 644, 688-589, 720, 696.
Iraq Petroleum Company, 527.
Ireland, 234, 255n.
Islamic-Christian Conference (Amman 1967), 675.
Document 677.
Islamic Pact, 496, 497, 522.
Ismailia, 135, 150, 713.
Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234.

Israel, 1-735, *passim*.

Documents 1, 2-3, 4-5, 7, 9-10, 23, 24-25, 28-29, 49-50, 54-55, 59, 100, 103-104, 112, 115-116, 153, 154, 156, 157, 171, 175, 179-180, 183-185, 185-186, 188, 201-206, 261, 264, 330.

Israel Radio, 480, 481, 493.

Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line, 229, 231, 232.

Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, 32, 330, 232, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 247, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486.

Italy, 46, 55, 255n, 615.

Document 199.

J

Jackson, Colin, 189, 190.

Jadid, Salah, *sp.* 472.

Jaffa Gate (Jerusalem), 329.

Janner, Barnett, 89, 90.

Japan, 145, 225n, 278, 290, 291, 292.

Documents 99, 152.

Jamaica, 255n.

Jarring, Gunnar, 199, 203, 730.

Jarvis, Frank E., 380.

Jenin, 65, 232, 234, 369, 514.

Jenkins, Hugh, 95.

Jericho, 315, 324, 345, 358, 359, 369, 388, 652.

Jerusalem, 55, 59, 65, 70, 83, 84, 90, 96, 102, 104, 108, 110, 113, 117, 120, 121, 125, 126, 133, 134, 136, 137, 141, 142, 143, 147, 150, 151, 166, 168, 169, 175, 179, 184, 187, 195, 196, 202, 203, 207, 230, 232, 234, 235, 255, 256, 260, 271, 277, 295-330, *passim*. 332, 337, 339, 344, 345, 346, 358, 364, 366, 367, 368, 370, 373, 388, 390, 478, 514, 572, 586, 597, 608, 609, 613, 616, 618, 620, 645, 649, 652, 662, 663, 664, 681, 683, 691, 728.

Jerusalem Municipal Council (East Jerusalem), 297, 306, 310, 313, 620.

Jerusalem Municipal Council (West Jerusalem), 297, 306, 310, 313, 620.

Jerusalem Post, 314, 318, 319, 320, 322.

Johnson, Lyndon B., 2, 8n, 12, 22, 34, 26, 27, 58, 65, 66, 72, 123, 124, 137, 145, 148, 149, 165, 172, 173, 174, 182, 193, 278, 282, 284, 546, 548, 573, 597, 622, 624, 633, 637, 644.

Com. 160, *int.* 199, *lett.* 7-8, 97. *news conf.* 105-107, 143, *sp.* 1, 113, 116-118, 121-122, *stat.* 10-11, 74, 76.

Jidda, 172, 173.

Joint Arab Defence Council, 486, 505, 506, 687.

Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of, 1-208, 229-317, 338-372, 386-423, 454-466, 491-531, *passim*. 540, 545, 571-635 *passim*. 645, 625-689, 712-728 *pazsim*.

Documents 166, 168, 472-479, 486-487, 487-489, 492, 494-495, 502-505, 505-506, 507-510, 526, 532, 540-541, 544, 549, 586-587, 587, 592, 593-594, 594-595, 613, 614-615, 616-617, 646, 650-651, 651-652, 658-659, 659-662, 665, 693-694, 696-697, 730.

Jordan Red Crescent, 357, 363, 365.

Judd, Frank A., 93, 191.

Jum'ah, Sa'd, *news conf.* 659-662, *sp.* 616-617, *stat.* 526, 532, 540-541, 544, 549, 614-615, 635 651-652.

al-Jumhuriyah, 688.

K

Kadar, Janos, 98, 138.

Kalandia, 305, 316.

Kalandia Airport, 298, 315.

Kalkilia, see Qalqiliya.

Kamil, Dr. Hasan, 585.

Kamishli, 361.

Kantara, 150, 261, 262, 347, 348, 353.

Karami, Rachid, *sp.* 610-611, *stat.* 543.

Katzenbach, Nicholas Deb., *sp.* 189.

Kaunda, Kenneth, *sp.* 115.

Kelley, Richard, 70.

Kennedy, John F., 11, 12, 516, 546, 623, 625.

Kenya, 254n.

Khan Yunis, 229, 231, 374, 375, 376, 585, 586.

Kharas, 340, 363.

Khartum Conference, 161, 165, 168, 169, 184, 187.

al-Khatib, Rauhi, 313.

Khuri, Yusef, 312.

Kiesinger, Kurt-Georg, *com.* 194.

Kollek, Teddy, 330.

al-Kony, Muhammad Awad, 235, 261, 264, 266.

Kosygin, Alexei N., 27, 49, 51, 54, 70, 98, 107, 121, 130, 139, 143, 144, 148, 193, 199, 565, 632, 711.

Lett. 161, *news conf.* 122-124, *sp.* 128, *stat.* 122,

Kuneitra, see *al-Qunaytra*

Kuntilla, 212, 213, 585, 586.

Kuwait, 11, 39, 40, 65, 84, 86, 93, 772, 173, 235, 350, 548, 552, 553, 598, 602, 657.

Documents 4, 183, 196, 492, 494, 536-537, 583,
612-613, 644, 657, 717, 689-690, 730.
Kuznetsov, Vassili V., 143, 278, 285.

L

Langford-Holt, John, 90.
Latrun, 65, 232, 234, 338, 339, 340, 388, 514.
Lawson, George M., 87.
League of Arab States, 406.
League of Nations, 59, 319, 321.
League of Red Cross Societies, 364, 392, 393.
Lebanon, 11, 16, 85, 147, 180, 333n, 335, 359,
360, 385, 387, 396, 400, 401, 403, 407, 408, 411,
423, 454, 457, 458, 459, 464 505 554 571 572
578, 598, 578.
Documents 7, 494, 516, 543, 543-544, 610-611,
695-696, 700-701.
Le Monde, 371.
Lenart, Josef, 98, 139.
Liberia, 255n.
Liberty, U.S.S., 624, 625.
Libya, 93, 180, 181, 511, 657.
Documents 582-583, 615, 646-647, 698-699.
Life, 625.
Lin Piao, 72, 73.
Liu, Yang-hai, 292.
Lod Airport, 315.
Lubbock, Eric R., 183.
Lutheran World Federation, 339, 355, 392, 393,
401.
Lutheran World Relief (Canada), 401.
Luxemburg, 109.
Lydda, 232.

M

MacNamara, Robert, 2, 513, 534.
Macomber, William, *lett.* 160, 171-173.
Maghribi (Quarter of Jerusalem), 305, 311, 312,
314, 317, 318, 322, 364.
Mahjub, Mohammad, *int.* 642-644.
Mahendra, Bir Bikranu Shah Deva, King of
Nepal, *com.* 185.
Maheu, René, 384.
Makarios, Archbishop, 39.
Makhus, Dr. Ibrahim, 236, 237, 238, 239, 565.
Int. 577-573.
Makonnen, Endalchew, 273.

Malaysia, 145, 254n, 556, 565.
Mali, 254n, 266, 271, 278, 290, 292, 634, 708, 711.
Malnashan, A., *stat.* 169.
Malta, 84.
Mansfield, Michael J., 105.
Lett. 97.
Mao Tse-Tung, 22, 23, 27, 62, 72, 73 75, 120.
Marten, Neil, 66, 181, 189, 190, 191.
Martin, Paul, *sp.* 92, 161-162, 180.
Maudling, Reginald, 94.
Mauritania, 145, 178.
Documents 4, 178-179.
Mayhew, Christopher, 88, 190.
McCloskey, Robert J., 58.
Int. 180-181.
McEwen, John, *stat.* 61.
McMillan, Harold, 67.
Meir, Golda, 524.
Melinki, Shamel, 205.
Mendelson, John J., 69.
Mennonite Central Committee, 439.
Mexico, 255n.
Michelmores, Dr. Lawrence, 381, 459, 460.
Mihai, M., 200.
Miki, Takeo, *com.* 152.
Mills, William Stratton, 189, 190.
Millet, Guy, 186.
Mordechai, Captain Lavo, 585.
Morocco, 81, 142, 180, 181, 473, 477, 511, 528,
580, 581, 598.
Documents 583-584, 601-602, 653-654.
Morris, Alfred, 67.
Morsink, Hubert, 333.
Mount Mora, 320.
Mount Scopus, 298, 324, 388.
Muhyiddin, Zakariya, 145, 523, 575, 599, 622,
623, 624, 625, 703.
Muller, Hilgard, *sp.* 59-60.
Mulley, Frederick W., 137.
Musa, Khalifa, 585.
Muslim Brotherhood, 495, 523, 629.

N

Nablus, 337, 338, 341, 342, 343, 344, 347, 369,
370.
Nahal Yam, 272.
an-Nahar, 162.
an-Nasir, Gamal Abd, 7, 8n, 12, 16, 19, 20, 24,
25, 32, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49, 57, 54, 55, 65, 66,

68, 71, 80, 86, 130, 130, 131, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 169, 170, 177, 179, 191, 201, 203, 206, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 476, 477, 504, 507, 508, 509, 569, 586, 592, 612, 637, 720.
Com. 655-656, 720, *int.* 492, 687-688, *lett.* 573-575, 588-589, 591-592, 592-593, 593, 594, 611-612, *news conf.* 489-492, 549-564, *sp.* 495-501, 521-525, 538-541, 547-549, 564-565, 577-579, 596-599, 620-634, *stat.* 617.
 Nazareth, 79, 727.
 Near East Christian Council for Refugee Work, 393.
 Near East Emergency Donations (NEED), 394, 465.
 Negeb, 54, 682.
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 147.
 Nepal, *Document* 185.
 Netherlands, 46.
New York Times, 272.
 New Zealand, 46, 70.
 New Zealand Council of Organization for Relief Services Overseas, 401.
 Nicaragua, 255n.
 Niger, 255n.
 Nigeria, 145, 255n, 266, 277, 278, 280, 290, 708, 711.
 Nikezic, Marko, 200, 206.
 Nilson, Torsten, *sp.* 101-102, 178.
 Nissim, Isaac, 205.
 Noel-Baker, Philip, 89.
 Nolte, Richard, 8n, 15.
 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 517.
 North Korea, 634.
 North Vietnam, 634.
 Norway, 18, 46, 148, 255n, 392.
Documents 160, 176-177.
 Norwegian Church, 401.
 Norwegian Refugee Council, 393.
 Novotny, Antonin, 98, 139.
 Nuba, 363.

O

Ogden, Eric, 192.
 Omar, Mosque of 305, 313, 325.
 Ould-Daddah, Mukhtar 4, 176, 178.
 Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), 401.

P

Pachachi, Adnan M., *com.* 3, 4, 5.
 Pachachi, Dr. Nadim, 585.
 Paget, Reginald T., 94.
 Pakistan, 145, 246, 254n, 255n, 556, 565, 634, 708.
Documents 3, 17, 25-26, 62-63, 73, 101, 126, 168, 171, 176.
 Palestine Liberation Army, 14, 37, 73, 348, 391, 491, 495, 505, 511, 537, 570, 687.
 Palestine Liberation Organisation, 305, 472, 478, 487, 488, 490, 492, 493, 495, 500, 511, 586, 714, 728, 729.
Documents 537, 570-571, 605, 650, 686-687, 715-716, 690-691, 730-731.
 Panama, 255n.
 Paraguay, 255n.
 Paris, 384.
 Parthasarathi, Gopalaswami, 275.
 Paul VI, Pope, 614, 648, 658, 677n.
Lett. 90.
 Pearson, Lester, 555, 559.
Sp. 13-17, 90-92.
 Persian Gulf, 147.
 Peter, Janos, 200.
 Petra, 303.
 Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, *sp.* 25-26, 62-63, *stat.* 17, 101.
 Podgorny, Nikolay V., 98, 130, 634.
Com. 63, *lett.* 161.
 Poland, 98, 138.
Documents 152, 166.
 Pompidou, Georges, 128.
Com. 138.
 Ponomarev, Boris N., 139, 143, 153.
 Pontifical Mission For Palestine, 356, 392, 393, 470.
 Popovic, Vladimir, 98, 139, 161.
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, *Document* 723-726.
 Porter, Dwight, 516.
 Port Fouad, 261, 262.
 Port Ibrahim, 264.
 Port Said, 135, 181n, 187, 261, 262, 495.
 Port Tewfiq, 264.
Pravda, 6, 102, 143, 153, 165, 193.
 Prevot, Robert, 333.
 Pudlak, J., 200.
 Pullai, Arpad, 138.

Q

- Qalqiliya, 202, 272, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 363, 388, 645.
 al-Qasim, 212, 213, 224, 229, 591.
 Qatar, 94.
 al-Qunaytra, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 271, 272, 333, 334, 336, 381, 463, 603.

R

- Rabat, 200.
 Rabin, General Itzhak, 246, 272, 493, 430, 540, 549, 571.
Int. 1.
 Rafah, 229, 230, 232, 349, 350, 374, 376.
 Rafael, Gideon, 235, 237, 238, 262, 264.
 Ramallah, 232, 315, 324, 339, 366, 369, 370, 406, 464.
 Ramsey, Archbishop, 677n.
 Rankin, John, 87.
 Rapacki, Adam, 200.
 Red Crescent, 355, 391.
 Red Cross International, 296, 347, 357, 365, 366, 371, 374, 389, 390.
 See also Canadian Red Cross Society, International Committee of the Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies.
Renmin Ribao, 26, 74, 192.
 Renton, David, 70.
 Rhodesia, 471.
 ar-Rida, Hasan, *com.* 655-656.
 ar-Rifa'i, Abdul Munem, 269, 288.
 Rikhye, General Inderjit, 19, 211, 212, 228, 229, 231.
 Riley, Lieutenant-General William E., 485.
 Riyadh, General Abd al-Mun'im, 587, 592, 593.
Lett. 586.
 Riyadh, Mahmud, 15, 206, 214, 269, 288, 579, 709, 717.
 Rockefeller Museum (Jerusalem), 325, 326.
 Rosenne, Shabtai, *lett.* 264.
 Rostow, Eugene, *sp.* 140-141.
 Rostow, Walt, 76, 106.
 Rothschild, Edmund de, 136.
 Roux, Jacques, 579.
 Ruda, José Maria, 282, 289.
 Rumania, *Documents* 30, 169.
 Rusk, Dean, 2, 56, 107, 122, 191, 709.

News conf. 58-59, 64, 148-150, 164-165, *sp.* 137, *stat.* 142.

Rwanda, 255n.

S

- as-Sabah, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir, 644.
Com. 196, *int.* 612-613, *sp.* 536-537, 689-690, *stat.* 730.
 Sabri, Ali, 498, 708.
Com. 188.
 as-Sadat, Anwar, 621.
 Sahyun Cinema (Jerusalem), 728.
 as-Salim as-Sabah, Sabah, *com.* 655-656, *sp.* 717.
 as-Sallal, Abdullah, *com.* 655-656.
 as-Samu', 1, 31, 272, 474, 478, 487, 494, 500, 513.
 El Salvador, 255n.
 Sandys, Duncan, 87, 95.
 Saragat, Giuseppe, *com.* 166.
 Sasson, Eliahu, 240, 241, 244, 245, 247, 481.
 Sato, Eisaku, *int.* 99.
 Sa'ud ibn Abd al-Aziz, Former King of Saudi Arabia, 497, 498.
 Saudi Arabia, 20, 38, 46, 51, 81, 88, 146, 172, 173, 180, 350, 475n, 477, 479, 489, 490, 491, 495, 496, 505, 511, 520, 521, 522, 525, 528, 531, 563, 612, 633, 634, 657.
Documents 167, 533, 541, 570, 583, 602, 695-696, 699-700.
 Scotland, Church of, 401.
 Senegal, 254n.
 Sha'afat, 298, 301, 305, 316, 330.
 Sharm ash-Shaykh, 13, 14, 32, 41, 44, 49, 80, 110, 211, 212, 213, 217, 219, 220, 222, 224, 227, 540, 547, 574, 585, 597.
 Shazar, Zalman, 1.
 Sheldon, Robert E., 183.
 Shinwell, Emmanuel, 86, 87, 182, 190.
 ash-Shuqairi, Ahmed, 2, 73, 305, 487, 493, 506.
Int. 570-571, *lett.* 537, *sp.* 605, *stat.* 686-687, 690-691.
 Siblin, 464.
 Silwan, 330.
 Sinai, 10, 12, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 39, 47, 54, 63, 8, 83, 93, 150, 181n, 201, 202, 206, 277, 347, 349, 352, 353, 354, 359, 374, 391, 393, 394, 537, 539, 551, 552, 578, 585, 600, 602, 609, 639, 640, 641, 687, 689, 730,
 Singapore, 255n.

Sixth Fleet (United States), 5, 22, 26, 74, 75, 515, 518, 525, 535, 536, 545, 563, 572, 577, 598, 608, 610, 624, 625.
 Somalia, 254n,
 Documents 167, 183.
 South Africa, 471.
 Document 59-60.
 Spain, 145, 615, 634.
 Document 75-76.
Der Spiegel, 201-206.
 Stavropoulos, C.A., 386, 455.
 St. John Stevas, Norman A., 88.
 Stoph, Willi, 98, 138.
 Sudan, 11, 85, 140, 141, 598, 632.
 Documents 6-7, 579-580, 589, 642-644, 646.
 Suez, 135, 150, 187, 263, 264, 713.
 Suez Canal, 9, 21, 60, 61, 64, 66, 67, 71, 74, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 104, 107, 108, 110, 113, 123, 132, 135, 141, 144, 147, 150, 152, 180, 181, 182, 183, 195, 191, 193, 194, 196, 200, 206, 207, 222, 223, 228, 254, 261, 262, 264, 265, 267, 286, 347, 348, 352, 350, 354, 378, 388, 527, 557, 579, 581, 585, 586, 596, 599, 600, 622, 627, 663, 679, 687, 705, 707, 712, 715, 699, 700, 703, 705, 707, 731.
 Suez Crisis (1956), 20, 518, 531, 551, 552, 554, 564.
 Sunay, Cevdet, *com.* 125-6, *sp.* 124-5, 162.
 Supreme Religious Court (Jerusalem), 317.
 Suslov, Mikhail A., 153.
 Suwaydani, Major General Ahmad, *int.* 518-521.
 Sweden, 18, 102, 148, 230, 233, 255n, 410, 564, 580.
 Documents 160, 178.
 Swedish Organization for Individual Relief, 393.
 Switzerland, 86, 295, 309, 410, 576.
 Syrian Arab Republic, 6-25, 31-85, 98-110, 119-130, 141-168 *passim.* 181, 185, 203, 206, 229-255, 269-294 *passim.* 308, 333-336, 354-361, 381-423, 454-477, 495-560, 574-586, 596-609, 621-643, 666-712 *passim.*
 Documents 2, 157, 196-197, 197-198, 198-199, 199, 471, 472, 479, 480-486, 493-494, 501-502, 512-516, 516-517, 518-521, 526-529, 529-531, 534-536, 541-542, 544-547, 565-568, 568-569, 571-573, 591, 601, 602-605, 716-717, 726-727, 731-732, 732-735.
 Syrian Communist Party, *Document* 618-620.

T

at-Talhuni, Bahjat, *sp.* 696-697.
 Tankizi School (Jerusalem), 320, 322.
 Tanzania, United Republic of, 254n. 634.
 Document 128-129.
 Tapsell, Peter H., 68.
 Tarabanov, Milko, 287.
Tass, 150.
 Tel Aviv, 184, 195, 232, 338, 339, 359, 538, 727,
 Thalmann, Ernest A., 295, 309.
 Thant, U, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 26, 32, 33, 35, 39, 49, 64, 78, 79, 80, 87, 112, 133, 136, 145, 146, 182, 191, 211-468, *passim.* 480, 539, 550, 561, 573, 677n, 695.
 Thomson, George, *sp.* 197-108, 132-135.
 Thorpe, Jeremy, 67, 86, 96.
 Tiberias, 232, 235, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246, 527, 534, 535.
Time, 144.
Times, *The*, 499.
 Tiran, Straits of, 9, 13, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 36, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 52, 54, 63, 67, 80, 81, 99, 116, 123, 141, 146, 193, 215, 216, 217, 219, 224, 254, 378, 476, 550, 551, 552, 554, 557, 563, 664, 574, 597.
 Tito, Josif B., 98, 126, 127, 139, 144, 161, 169, 170, 661, 689, 708.
 Com. 157, 158, *sp.* 154, *stat.* 57.
 Tomeh, George J., 237, 238, 269, 293.
 Toukan, Ahmed, 233.
 Toure, Sekou, *sp.* 21, 71.
 Trinidad and Tobago, 255n.
 Tripartite Declaration, 1, 33, 37, 38.
 Truman, Harry S., 11, 12.
 Tsuruoka, Senjin, 282, 290.
 Tuck, Raphael, 88.
 Tunisia, 81, 142, 180, 486, 496, 528, 598.
 Documents 547, 580-582.
 Turkey, 3, 108, 255n, 411, 572, 615, 634.
 Documents 24, 118, 124-125, 125-126, 162, 166, 167, 179.

U

Udall, Stewart L., *sp.* 173-175.
 Ulbricht, Walter, 98, 139, 508, 509.
 Com. 198, *lett.* 53-54.
 Unified Arab Command, 489, 490, 491, 499, 503, 505, 519, 521, 537, 658, 659, 687.

- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 3, 6, 12, 14, 15, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 38, 41, 42, 43, 49, 50-55, *passim*. 58, 68, 69, 74, 75, 79, 81, 83, 85, 89, 93, 95, 98, 102, 103, 106, 107, 111, 112, 126, 130-136, *passim*. 140, 143, 144, 149, 155, 156, 162, 178, 189, 190-192, *passim*. 238, 240, 267, 268, 275, 278, 280-285, *passim*. 472, 548, 555, 556, 559, 560, 563, 565, 572, 586, 593, 596, 598, 604, 606, 607, 614, 618, 619, 622, 634, 644, 661, 689, 708, 711, 712, 733. Documents 2, 5, 21, 56-57, 100, 119-120, 122, 122-124, 128, 138, 150, 151-152, 153-154, 161, 167, 168, 188, 196-197, 198, 249, 252.
- United Arab Republic, 1-700 *passim*.
Documents 158-159, 177, 188, 206, 248, 261, 263, 266, 489-492, 493, 495-501, 521-525, 531-532, 544, 538, 547-549, 549-564, 564-565, 568-569, 573-575, 577-579, 579, 585-586, 586, 588-589, 591, 591-592, 592, 592-593, 594, 596, 611-612, 620-634, 652-653, 662-664, 687-688, 701-715, 717-720, 720.
- United Kingdom, 1-4, *passim*. 13n, 22, 23, 26, 27, 33, 72-75, *passim*. 80, 83, 110, 124, 126, 130, 151, 155, 179, 186, 197, 221-223, *passim*. 253, 268, 270, 273, 276, 277, 280-286, *passim*. 289, 291, 329, 408, 465, 491, 496-498, *passim*. 520, 522, 527, 532, 539-549, 553-556, 560-565, 571-582, 586-591, *passim*. 597, 601-608, *passim*. 614, 615, 618, 630, 634, 643, 647, 670, 675, 678, 687, 688, 709-721, 729-733, *passim*. Documents 37-42, 42-48, 51-53, 64-71, 84-90, 92-96, 99-100, 101-108, 132-135, 181-183, 189-192.
- United Nations, 10-19, 29-60, 70-91, 102-138, 150-187, 203-468, 474-485, *passim*. 502, 514, 529-581, 595-614, 625-627, 646-677, 693-733, *passim*.
- United Nations Charter, 3, 80, 104, 137, 147, 151, 221, 228, 248, 252, 254, 267, 268, 270, 275, 276, 286, 289, 290, 316, 378, 454, 458, 545, 558, 569, 573, 620, 672.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 256, 300, 322, 347, 349, 354, 355, 391, 392, 393, 393, 394, 462, 466.
- United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, 120, 380, 394, 467.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 332.
- United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut (UNESOB), 332, 379.
- United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (1949), 381.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 336, 384, 397, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 411, 434, 436, 437, 438, 462, 463, 464.
- United Nations Emergency Force, 8, 10, 13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 31, 32, 35, 41, 44, 49, 52, 63, 78, 102, 148, 211-235, *passim*. 248n, 350, 376, 379, 388, 394, 396, 476, 478, 504, 536, 537, 547, 550, 554, 555, 561, 563, 563, 574, 578, 597, 621, 689.
- United Nations Emergency Force Advisory Committee, 214, 217, 218, 221, 225, 226.
- United Nations General Assembly Roll-Call Votes (July 4, 1967), 257-259.
- United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 620, 659, 665, 681, 713, 715, 716, 721, 730.
Documents 466-467, 467-468, 468.
- United Nations Partition Plan (1947), 63, 178.
- United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 6, 34, 134, 136, 191, 256, 300, 331-333, *passim*. 339, 342, 347-350, 354-356, 359-365, 371-376, 379-395, 398-443, 451-468, *passim*. 652, 660.
- United Nations Security Council, 14-16, *passim*. 31, 32, 35, 36, 41, 45-49, 52-56, *passim*. 61, 62, 65-71, 76-78, 83-85, *passim*. 93, 96-103, *passim*. 110, 111, 133, 135, 146, 151, 152, 176, 180, 188, 191, 193, 200, 211-468, 480-485, *passim*. 529, 530, 544, 551, 566, 573, 579, 586, 591-602, *passim*. 662, 712, 733.
- United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), 16, 16, 31, 35, 38, 41, 49, 55, 78, 96, 107, 108, 133, 180, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 254, 264, 332, 335, 336, 376, 379, 480, 483, 484, 485, 486.
- United States of America, 2-5, 14-111 *passim*. 119, 126-139, 150-155, 172-200, *passim*. 253, 266, 275-292, 393-408 *passim*. 465, 488-501, 511-655, 670-719 *passim*.
Documents 1, 7-8, 10-11, 12, 58-59, 64, 74, 76, 97, 105-107, 113, 116-118, 121-122, 125, 157, 140-141, 142, 148-150, 158, 164-165, 173-175, 180-181, 189, 249, 253.
- United States Congress, 12, 56, 106, 165.
- U Thant, See Thant, U.

V

- Valdes, Gabriel, *sp.* 48.
 Vastkustens Efterkrigshjalp, 402.
 Vatican, see Holy See.
 Venezuela, 255n.
 Vester, Bertha Spafford, 204.
 Vietnam, 37, 43, 52, 75, 118, 119, 187, 196, 501,
 517, 520, 524, 531, 600, 610.

W

- Walters, Dennis, 68.
 Waqf, 298, 311, 312, 314, 317, 318, 320, 321,
 322, 645, 677.
 Western Wall (Jerusalem), See Wailing Wall.
 Wickham, Commandant, 234.
 Wilson, Harold, 3, 24, 66, 67, 68, 70, 548, 554,
 578.
 News conf. 51-53, *sp.* 42-48, 64-65, 99-100, *stat.*
 181, 182, 183.
 Winnick, David Julius, 68.
 Winzer, Otto, 200.
 Lett. 92.
 Wailing Wall, 305, 312, 318, 319, 321, 322, 324,
 325, 326, 570.
 Womens Royal Voluntary Service (United
 Kingdom), 402.
 World Alliance of YMCA's and YWCA's, 390,
 408.

- World Council of Churches, 393.
 World Food Programme, 355, 356, 391, 392,
 393, 401, 462, 466.
 World Health Organization (WHO), 402, 403,
 404, 405, 462.

Y

- Yahia, General Taher, *com.* 720, *sp.* 635-636.
 Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 585.
 Yemen, 11, 22, 94, 95, 190, 201, 474, 476, 497,
 503, 504, 531, 532, 533, 538, 539, 542, 598, 612,
 Yugoslavia, 18, 35, 98, 126n, 138, 145, 148, 161,
 169, 181, 212, 213, 233, 254n, 255n, 3411,
 565, 634, 661, 689, 708.
 Documents 57, 101, 105, 126-128, 154, 157, 158
 158-159, 206.

Z

- Zambia, 254n, 634.
 Document 115.
 Zhivkov, Todor, 98, 138, 287.
 Zhivkov, Zhivko, 98, 138.
 Zu'ayyen, *com.* 196, 198, *int.* 731-732, *sp.* 471,
 471, 516-517, 726-727, 732-735.
 Zu'bi, *sp.* 479.